NATO Mobilization and Reinforcement: Can We Get There from Here?
Abstract
Since 1978, the U.S. 10 has been committed to reinforcement of NATO, within 10 days of a decision to do so, with 6 additional Army divisions, 60 additional tactical squadrons, and one Marine expeditionary brigade, plus supporting units for all of these forces. To meet this schedule, we must preposition the majority of the equipment for these units in Europe. Once the initial deployment is complete, U.S. sea and airlift, augmented by allied ships and aircraft, would deploy follow-on forces, as well as the majority of the materiel needed to sustain and win the conflict. This monograph examines our current commitment to NATO and the associated requirements and capabilities necessary to meet this commitment. This study also takes into account the possible impacts of ongoing force reduction negotiations as they relate to U.S. strategic mobility. The author concludes that we can get there from here. The U. S's '10 in 10' commitment to NATO is achievable considering the number of military and civilian ships and aircraft that are available from the United States and the NATO member countries. The question of sustainment beyond the initial mobilization surge is clearly an issue that warrants concern within the NATO alliance. The most critical element of the NATO reinforcement dilemma is not the number of ships and aircraft that make up our collective strategic lift inventory; the real concern is an ability and willingness to make a political decision to mobilize and reinforce the alliance. Without this decision, a sea full of fast ships and a sky full of the most modern aircraft will not get us there.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 30, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA234367
Entities
People
- Dennis G. Heapy
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College