Blinding the Enemy: Soviet Tactical Reconnaissance in the Rear Area

Abstract

This monograph examines Soviet tactical reconnaissance doctrine, organizations, and capability. The Soviet capability is analyzed using their own criteria for the conduct of tactical reconnaissance operations: purposefulness, aggressiveness, continuity, timeliness, and reliability. Soviet and Warsaw Pact Army documents (in translation) are used extensively. A recent Combined Arms Center study concluded that the U.S. Army's counterreconnaissance doctrine, force structure, and training are deficient. Beginning with this assertion, the monograph briefly explores the historical and current relationship between effective tactical reconnaissance and success on the battlefield. Then a detailed analysis of the Soviet reconnaissance capability determines that, despite difficulties in executing their doctrine, the Soviets possess a significant capability for seeing through the depth of the modern battlefield.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Nov 17, 1989
Accession Number
ADA234396

Entities

People

  • Jerry R. Bolzak

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Counter WMD
  • Engineered Resilient Systems
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes
  • Sensors
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Artillery
  • Combat Operations
  • Combat Support
  • Command And Control
  • Doctrine
  • Employment
  • Fire Support
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Plastic Explosives
  • Reconnaissance
  • Reliability
  • Security
  • Surveillance
  • Tactical Reconnaissance
  • Training
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • History

Readers

  • Geospatial Intelligence and Artificial Intelligence Analytics
  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Strategic Security Studies