Command in Joint and Combined Operations: The Campaign for the Netherlands East Indies
Abstract
This monograph is a study of command at the theater level, using the campaign for the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) in early 1942 as a case study. This campaign is examined as a means to validate current United States doctrine for command in joint and combined operations. The analysis of the NEI campaign is divided into three time periods. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the Allies in the Pacific failed to form a combined command. The Directive that specified the formation of the American, British, Dutch, and Australian Command (ABDACOM) did not give the Supreme Commander adequate authority, but did provide him with the ability to obtain unity of effort. During ABDACOM's defense of the Malay Barrier from 15 January to 25 February 1942, GEN Sir Archibald Wavell as Supreme Commander failed to direct the actions necessary to accomplish the mission and did not obtain unity of effort. Among the conclusions drawn from this investigation are: combined commands must be supported by a cohesive alliance whose countries possess similar interests and a desire to prevail; combined commands should be organized prior to war; the multinational commander's personality must enable him to understand and operate in the politico-strategic realities of the coalition; and United States doctrine must more fully address the possibility of future combined commands in which the commander is not an American.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 30, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA235079
Entities
People
- John R. Kennedy
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College