Cuba: The Successful Insurgency
Abstract
The Cuban Revolution of the mid-1950's represents a classic case study of insurgent warfare in which neither the government in power nor the rebel element in opposition were controlled or supported by external entities. The conflict between a dictator and a rebel focused on the legitimate right to govern the people of Cuba. This author saw legitimacy as the strategic center of gravity for both warring parties and argues that Castro recognized that center of gravity while Batista clearly did not. The campaign study presented covers historical background to 1953 and the entirety of the Cuban Revolution up to Batista's departure from Cuba. While the focus is on insurgent military operations, a fair amount of information is provided on urban warfare, economic sabotage, and psychological operations. It is hoped that a study of this insurgency and other insurgent wars will lead us to understand that future counterinsurgencies in which we may become involved will not be won by massive firepower and maneuver. As in any war we must look for the strategic center of gravity and either protect it or destroy it.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA236488
Entities
People
- S. Hildebrandt
Organizations
- United States Army War College