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SHOULD THE UNITED STATES REMAIN IN NATO and if so, HOW
SHOULD WE BE COMMITTED?

by
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College
in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department
of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own person views and
are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the
Department of the Navy.

Signature Billy D. Browsers

11 February 1981

Paper directed by COL Theodore L. Gatchel
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ABSTRACT

The United States has been a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the last four decades. With the recent collapse of the Soviet led Warsaw Pact alliance and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement the very basis for U.S. membership in NATO is being questioned. The long term future of Germany's participation in NATO is under serious scrutiny both within and outside Germany. The 1994 pullout of Soviet forces from previously East Germany will have severe implications on future basing of NATO soldiers in the now united Germany. This paper explores the role of NATO in the future and what the level of U.S. commitment should be. The paper concludes with the recommendation that NATO shift from a military focus to a political one and that U.S. forces be pulled out of Germany and locate to Belgium and the Netherlands. A recommended structure of U.S. forces to comply with the proposed reduction of unified commands is presented.

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HOW WE GOT TO WHERE WE ARE TODAY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On 4 APRIL 1949 the United States became a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Along with the Marshall Plan the American policies had shifted from a pre World War II isolationism to one of broad global responsibilities with a Europe first scenario. We clearly had chosen to unshackle ourselves from our posture of unpreparedness to one of readiness and forward defense. The commitment to Europe had profound global implications. Indeed, in his speech during the signing ceremony, President Truman pointedly broadened the significance of the Atlantic Treaty. He announced, "The pact will be a positive, not a negative, influence for peace, and its influence will be felt not only in the area it specifically covers but throughout the world."¹

NATO did much more than create an armed camp in Western Europe; at the end of World War II the economy was in a state of disrepair. England, once a world power, was in economic ruins. NATO provided, through a program of dialogue, a direction and focus for the European countries. The driving force for the development of NATO was the United States. It was in our best interests to see that Europe recovered and could match the military threat that was facing them from the East. The end

result was a stronger Europe and a remarkable program for rebuilding the infrastructure, economy, and military.

The initial question of whether Germany (the new government of West Germany) should be in NATO was a political dilemma. There was intense resistance from the French, who had been the recipient of two German aggressive actions in the previous three decades, to re-arm and become a key player in NATO. President Truman's rationale was that the German's inhabited "the very core of Europe... Without Germany, the defense of Europe was a rearguard action on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. With Germany, there could be a defense in depth, powerful enough to offer effective resistance to aggression from the East."² The rearmament of Western Germany in 1955, allowed for the U.S. strategy on forward defense. The stationing of U.S., British, and French troops on the soil of West Germany was legitimized under the NATO umbrella. The future of Europe (and of America) was to be played out in West Germany.

For the past forty years NATO's role in the defense of Europe and the economic recovery can be viewed as an outstanding success. There has never been a direct confrontation between East and West in Europe since World War II. The military strength of NATO is unparalleled in modern times. Its only true counterpart is the Soviet Union. For nearly forty decades Europe's postwar security system seemed to be a permanent feature of the international scene. Yet, as Kennan wrote in 1948, "A divided Europe is not permanently viable, and the political will of the U.S. people is not sufficient to enable U.S. to support Western

Europe indefinitely as a military appendage." Put another way, the post war settlement would last only as long as the United States--and the Soviet Union-- were willing to accept it.³ The fall of a divided Europe came to fruition in the fall of 1989. The dramatic opening of the Berlin Wall was testimony to the end of the Cold War.

The formal end of the Cold War came about on 1 October 1990, with the signing of the Two Plus Four treaty allowing for the unification of Germany at midnight 3 October 1990.⁴ Major provisions of the treaty called for:

1. The elimination of all Soviet troops from the former East Germany by 1994.
2. The right of a unified Germany to belong to alliances with all rights and responsibilities.
3. Provided for the continued presence of British, French, and American troops in Berlin during the interim period at the request of the German government.
4. Made clear the current borders of the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic should be the final and defensive borders of a united Germany (settled the dispute with Poland over its border).⁵

Today, NATO is still a viable entity. Many questions are being asked as to whether its demise is a certainty or should NATO change its focus. A unified Germany is an equal partner in NATO. How Germany changes in the next decade will play a significant role in the future of NATO. How long it remains in NATO is questionable. The United States, suffering from a huge budget

deficit, is under heavy pressure to bring the soldiers stationed in Germany home and provide the "peace dividend".

NATO faces many challenges ahead. Its strategy for opposing a threat from the East is in question. The Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement lessens the ability of the East to attack and thus, negates the need for a strong NATO. The other argument is whether the threat is actually dead. Can the Soviets still attack? The following chapters will explore some possibilities and answers that face NATO and the United States.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES EUROPE (CFE) AGREEMENT

CHAPTER II

The CFE agreement, signed on 19 November 1990, is the most comprehensive arms control treaty that has been signed between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries to date. Its effect will be to not only diminish the possibility of an aggressive attack by either side, but also to allow for defense in the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) region of Europe. The treaty will limit the size of Soviet forces to about one third of the total armaments permitted to all of the countries in Europe. CFE includes an unprecedented monitoring regime, including detailed information exchange, onsite inspection, challenge inspection, and monitoring of arms destruction.⁶ At Table #1 the basic numerical reductions to be absorbed by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries appears.

The CFE agreement, while limiting conventional forces in the ATTU region, does not do away with nuclear capabilities of either side. Both (NATO and WTO) can deliver nuclear warheads from the furthestmost frontiers and still cause mass destruction. Also, CFE does not take into account the new high technology of modern weapons. The agreement does away with numbers of types of equipment. To meet the treaty quotas both sides are destroying old pieces of equipment vice the new pieces placed into service in the last decade. The Soviet Union alone will be obliged to destroy thousands of weapons; much more equipment than will be reduced by all of the NATO countries combined. In a process called "cascading", NATO members with newer equipment, including

the United States, have agreed to transfer some of this equipment to allies with older equipment. "Cascading" will not reduce NATO's destruction obligation. Under the cascading system, no U.S. equipment must be destroyed to meet CFE ceilings, but some 2,000 pieces of U.S. equipment will be transferred to NATO allies.⁸

<u>WEAPON CATEGORY</u>	<u>NATO</u>	<u>WARSAW PACT</u>
Tanks		
each alliance	20,000	20,000
any one country	12,000	14,000
outside of national territory	3,200	4,500
Artillery		
each alliance	16,500	24,000
any one country	10,000	17,000
outside of national territory	1,700	4,000
Armored Personnel Carriers		
each alliance	28,000	28,000
any one country	16,800	18,000
outside of national territory	6,000	7,500
Aircraft		
each alliance	4,600	1,500
any one country	...	1,200
outside of national territory	...	350
Helicopters		
each alliance	2,200	1,700
any one country	...	1,350
outside of national territory	...	600

TABLE #1 7

With the signing of the CFE agreement NATO must be prepared to defend its borders with reduced equipment densities and new defensive strategies. NATO can restructure its own force in such

a way that results in higher confidence defense if deterrence fails and in greater stability in crisis. A defense distributed in greater depth with greater reliance on forward obstacle systems would advance both ends even if the Soviets did not restructure defensively themselves. If both sides restructured along such lines, the likelihood of crises escalating to war would be further reduced.²

The implications of the treaty are far reaching. With the pullout of Soviet forces from the WTO (Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization) region the basic premise for NATO's existence is threatened. Will there be a need for NATO if a viable offensive Army is not poised at its border ready to launch a preemptive strike all the way to the Atlantic? The budgetary crises that face the United States and other NATO countries will place enormous pressure on the political/military leaders to justify the expense of a NATO alliance with no perceived threat on their eastern borders.

In the United States the issue of belonging to and supporting NATO will become a key question. In the next two chapters the alternatives to NATO and the U.S. involvement in NATO will be examined.

WHERE IS NATO HEADED in the 1990's?

CHAPTER III

On 6 July 1990 NATO predicted its own demise. In Article 21 of the London Declaration NATO members declared:

"The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should become more prominent in Europe's future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America."¹⁰

With this statement NATO announced that the thirty five member nations of the central and eastern European area would slowly replace the political functions of the sixteen member NATO organization. This is historically significant in that NATO had been previously the only free European wide voice; both politically and militarily.

NATO also stated in the London Declaration that its position on the first use of nuclear weapons had changed. Article 15 states:

"As a defensive alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self defense and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war."¹¹

With the unification of Germany and it's remaining in NATO, two major questions were answered for NATO. The resolution of the German question had been answered for the short term. If Germany were not to be a part of NATO the biggest fear of both the East and West was that no one could keep the Germans in check. Germany being a great economic power with a vast

industrial/military complex is able to convert to an aggressive posture. NATO will be able to keep the lid on Germany and prevent future aggressive actions.

But without Germany in NATO could NATO survive? Germany is key when factoring the total number of soldiers and equipment of NATO. Also, the concept of forward defense is readily played out on the soil of what was formerly West Germany.

NATO has begun to take into account that the enemy, Russia and the WTO, is disappearing. One should bear in mind that the recent reduction in Soviet military capabilities began from the record high levels of a massive buildup. IN the strategic area Soviet production continues virtually unabated. In fact, the Soviets continue to produce SS-18, SS-24, and SS-25 ICBMs, Blackjack, Backfire and Bear-H bombers and Delta IV nuclear submarines.¹²

NATO, while taking CFE into account, has not done away with its total conventional capability nor its nuclear arsenal. Its nuclear capability is very much intact and poses a significant deterrence threat to the Soviets. The remaining conventional armies and air forces would be able to withstand a conventional attack from the East. Should NATO disband into a loose alliance of armed states headed by the CSCE or should NATO remain a viable element that militarily strengthens the goals and aims of the CSCE?

The challenge for NATO is to meet the requirements of a changed security environment in ways that will be supported by NATO's publics and parliaments while bearing in mind enduring

realities and continuing security challenges for NATO.¹³ The keys will be to keep the enemy threat real in the public's minds, keeping the United States as a viable member, strengthening its position with the CSCE and developing new strategies to fight a war. The German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, feels that, "The CSCE process offers the framework of stability within which to establish the peaceful order in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals which we want... the alliances will increasingly become elements of cooperative security structures in which they can ultimately be absorbed."¹⁴

NATO must not let its demise occur simultaneously with the strengthening of the CSCE and the establishment of the European Community (EC) in 1992. Political instability in the Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact countries do lend themselves to peaceful coexistence in the next decade. The struggles for self rule is a powder keg. President Gorbachev can easily be deposed and replaced by a hard liner that renounces all of his policies and treaties. It appears to be much easier for the Soviets to rearm themselves than it would be for the NATO alliance to do so.

The watchword here is for NATO to proceed slowly and carefully. NATO should not be lulled into a false sense of security and become lackadaisical. NATO has been good for Europe and the free world for the last four decades. In order to survive the end of the Cold War it must change and become more political and less military in outward appearance. NATO's premise of containment has worked and should in work in the future.

NATO in the 1990's must:

- Remain a separate entity and strengthen the CSCE
- Develop new defensive strategies
- Employ a flexible response with a nuclear deterrent
- Remain technologically superior to the East
- Down size in order to meet budgetary and CFE constraints

NATO should work hard to keep Germany in the fold. If, in a few years, the Germans decided to quit the alliance serious problems would arise; Germany would not be held in check, the forward defense system would collapse, and NATO would no longer unite the military strengths of the West European world.

THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO NATO
WHERE SHOULD U.S. FORCES BE LOCATED?
WHAT SHOULD THE COMMAND STRUCTURE BE?

CHAPTER IV

THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO NATO

In 1989, Secretary of State James Baker stated that, "a new European architecture should reflect that America's security - politically, militarily, and economically - remains linked to Europe's security.¹⁵ The U.S. commitment to Europe was specifically stated, but the question as to its architecture remained open. Should the U.S. hang on to its leadership of NATO and thus European policy or should it become less prominent in Europe and forsake NATO for a strong CSCE?

The answer for America's direction was given by President Bush in his address to the Aspen Institute on 2 August 1990.

The U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies want and need us there. As we and our allies adapt NATO to a changing world, the size and shape of our forces will also change to suit new and less threatening circumstances. But we will remain in Europe to deter any new dangers, to be a force for stability - and to reassure all of Europe - East and West - that the European balance will remain secure."¹⁶

Americans, and thus NATO, must understand that the Soviets have four basic tenets for their military strategy: withdrawal, reductions, restructuring, and modernization.¹⁷ General Powell views the Soviets as a viable threat; albeit a reduced one. Taking the threat and the political turmoil ongoing in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries it is imperative that we recognize

this and remain totally committed to NATO and the defense of our European partners. Another concept that must be discussed is forward defense. It seems to be rather well known secret that the U.S. believes that its own forward defense is to fight the war in Europe rather than on the shores of the United States.

Our economic ties to Europe are strong. To keep the U.S. economy buoyant we are dependent on a strong European economy. Our presence in the European theater insures that our voice is heard within the EC 92 (European Community) that is shaping a European economic plan. NATO is a viable forum and provides us the leadership that we desire.

The continued presence of a military giant such as the Soviet Union, poses what some Europeans describe as an existential threat to Europe: because Soviet intentions could change, the mere existence of such impressive and proximate military capabilities cannot be ignored. Declining empires have been known to lash out in earlier periods. While European integration will eventually allow Europe to do more for its own defense, a credible American guarantee helps to balance Soviet or Russian power. Obviously, the number and roles of American forces can be greatly reduced, but some presence remains useful.¹⁸

WHERE SHOULD UNITED STATES FORCES BE LOCATED?

With the eventual pullout of Soviet forces from the former East Germany by 1994 and the pullout of forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia by the year's end, the American presence in Germany

will become tenuous at best. Two different political factions within Germany oppose our continued presence; the Green party and the Republikan party.

The Green party is composed of mostly left wing, young, and somewhat radical Germans. Prior to the last election their political clout was being felt within the German system. The last election may be looked upon as a political abnormality because it was primarily an election to voice approval for unification and Chancellor Kohl.

The Green party was instrumental in organizing and staging protests against the Pershing II missile system's deployment in West Germany. They are still quite active in the legislation and protests to restrict low flying military aircraft of the NATO countries. Their bottom line is that they want the U.S. to leave Germany as they perceive no threat from the East and our soldiers and equipment are harmful to the environment and German way of life.

The Republikan party, a far right wing party that was created in Berlin, can best be compared to the Nazi party of the 1930's. They are extremely right wing and wish that all Americans and NATO would leave. They fully believe that Germany should be militarily self sufficient and could take care of its self if hostilities were to commence.

Taking the Green and Republikan parties into consideration the bulk of the German population desires that Germany remain a part of NATO, but not necessarily with United States soldiers in Germany.

The Germans are caught between a rock and a hard place. They have won concessions from the Soviets to pull out while having virtually given up nothing. In order to stave off the Russian bear they will eventually be called upon to show good faith and demilitarize their country of all foreign soldiers. This does not mean that they will be forced to withdraw from the NATO alliance. No one wants Germany unchecked.

With the coming changes necessary for NATO to remain an effective alliance, we expect that our allies will assume a greater responsibility for day-to-day deterrence and unilateral defense. There will be fewer U.S. forces forward based permanently and more periodic deployments of ground, air, and Naval forces for varying duration.¹⁹

We should begin to take the initiative to withdraw our forces from Germany to coincide with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from German soil. As a world leader we have the responsibility to show that we truly stand for peace. It is better for us to leave on our own terms to a location of our (and NATO's) choosing than it is to be forced out by the German populace. In the short run, the retention of troops in Germany will be needed as a concrete statement of Washington's readiness to act as a guarantor of that nation's responsible behavior. However, this can only be an interim arrangement at best. It is delusory to think that a proud Germany, exultant in its newfound nationhood, would tolerate perpetual occupation.²⁰

I am not saying that our forces should leave Europe. We should remain a partner in NATO, but on a smaller scale and in a

more politically palatable form to Germany. The U.S. cannot leave Europe entirely at this moment in history because it would permit the Soviet domination of Europe.²¹

If the United States were to leave only prepositioned equipment, liaison staffs, and intelligence equipment in Germany and move the remaining soldiers and equipment to the western NATO countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and United Kingdom) the Germans would be pacified, the Soviets assured of a purely defensive NATO, and the United States could be assured that it would be able to mount a quick response to Soviet aggression. The nuclear arsenal would still be the main deterrent to the Soviet threat.

It has already been stipulated that the U.S. will reduce its forces in Europe. The remaining force (1 Corps and 1 numbered air force element) can easily be relocated to the western NATO theater. The ground troops should be moved to Belgium or the Netherlands. The English Channel would be too much of an obstacle to overcome in order to meet the objective of a quick response to Soviet aggressions. The Air Force element can be moved to British airfields. France, a non active partner in NATO since 1966, is unacceptable for stationing U.S. forces in their country.

In order for the U.S. forces to be relocated outside of Germany and the number of soldiers to be significantly reduced by 1994, then a restructuring of the U.S. command and NATO relationships must occur.

WHAT SHOULD THE COMMAND STRUCTURE BE?

The President of the United States announced at the Aspen Institute on 2 August 1990, a new military strategy that would require vast amounts of restructuring. The new force would be composed of:

1. Atlantic Forces
2. Pacific Forces
3. Contingency Forces
4. Strategic Forces²²

The current plan for the Atlantic Force is to have five active Army divisions with two in Europe, six reserve divisions, two reconstitutable divisions, six active Air Force flight wings with three or four in Europe and nine reserve wings. The Navy will have six carrier groups with one in the Mediterranean.²³

With the reduction of unified commands, US USCINCEUR is abolished. Taking the loss of the unified command and the almost 50% reduction of ground troops it is almost certain that a new command structure must be established.

SACEUR, with the loss of HQS USEUCOM, will no longer have U.S. staff that work directly for him. I propose that the U.S. turn over more of the European planning and execution functions to the Europeans and that SACEUR be only in charge of NATO forces. His responsibility for all U.S. forces in Europe (during peace time) would transfer to a sub-unified commander , CDR US FORCES EUROPE, who would work for US CINCLANT. If hostilities were to break out the CDR USFOREUR would be chopped to the control of the NATO commander.

SACEUR would have total control of all forces and all nuclear assets that member countries released for use. Each country would have final approval for nuclear release by SACEUR.

US CINCLANT would assume the mission for Europe. The SOC forces under his command would be theater forces to be used at his discretion. SOCEUR and SOCLANT forces would be combined. As a major NATO commander for the Atlantic region his NATO orders would come from the NATO Military Committee as do the SACEUR's.

CDR USFOREUR would remain as a four star billet with his component commanders being down graded to three stars and being dual hatted as component commanders and unit commanders. With the current down sizing of deployed troops the rationale for higher grades would not be feasible.

The proposed organization chart for CDR USFOREUR and US CINCLANT is at Table #2.

To better facilitate coordination the CDR USFOREUR should be co-located with SACEUR in Belgium. The ability to utilize the NATO staff and facilities will allow for better use of scarce resources and improved facilities that exist in Mons, Belgium.

The military must be prepared to implement the President's call for a new military strategy and restructuring. We can resist as we might, but the total force is being reduced by 25% and in Europe by almost 50%. If we pull out of Germany now and restructure our command in the right way, we can keep a hand in NATO and utilize NATO's key facilities.

U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND: 1994




TABLE 2

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER V

NATO is in the midst of a crisis. In order for it to survive it must redefine its mission and goals. The threat from the East, for the near term, is becoming less menacing and lacks the capability to launch a no notice attack.

Careful analysis must be conducted on the Soviet threat and NATO's counter balancing measures must be correlated to the true Soviet capabilities. The verification of the CFE agreement will be critical to the actual drawdown of forces that has been anticipated.

After reviewing the actual verification process of drawdown, the U.S. must take very positive and proactive steps to drawdown its forces in Europe. With the pullout of U.S. forces from Germany in 1991 and the relocation to the Western NATO boundaries the alliance will still have its deterrent capabilities while the U.S. will have won its battle to claim the reduction of hostilities in Central Europe. The Germans will still have their protection from the alliance, but will become free of foreign soldiers on their land.

With the pullout of U.S. forces and the dramatic drawdown that will be required the command structure will be required to change and deal with less. In order to prevent the danger with less members we must turn over some of the NATO missions back to the NATO alliance and let the Europeans worry about themselves.

We cannot forsake Europe or our commitment to the NATO alliance. Our economic livelihood is dependent upon a free and strong Europe. The best way for us to protect our livelihood is to reduce our commitment to NATO, bolster the CSCE, protect our interests in a free and NATO allied Germany, and provide the deterrence necessary to keep the Soviet war machine in a defensive posture.

We, as the world leaders, must make the positive efforts now to promote a lasting peace in this time of Soviet turmoil and budgetary demands. The choice is up to us to act in our best interests now as to how Europe, especially Germany, forces us to leave the continent with a firm commitment.

NOTES

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