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INACTIVATION: A BLUEPRINT FOR A DIVISION

BY

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
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**INACTIVATION: A BLUEPRINT FOR A DIVISION
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT**

.. by

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ABSTRACT

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In January 1990, the Department of Defense announced the first of a series of mandatory budget and force reductions for FY 90-94. More recently the Secretary of Defense revealed even more drastic reductions to a Army force of 12 active and 6 reserve component divisions by 1996. This paper examines the processes behind a division level inactivation and provides a blueprint for future selected units to follow. In particular, the focus is on the organization of the division team, procedures, and the "how-to" aspects of personnel, operational, and logistical functional areas. In addition, the study offers a few considerations for leaders at all levels as the Army reshapes the force for the 1990s



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INTRODUCTION

In January 1990 the Department of Defense announced a number of mandatory budget and program reductions for FY 90-94. These reductions included a time-phased series of unit inactivations, reorganizations, and restationing actions. The initial Army transition plan visualized a force of 15 active and 8 reserve component divisions as an end state.¹ However, recent announcements by the Secretary of Defense outline even more drastic reductions of several hundred thousand volunteer soldiers to a force of 12 active and 6 reserve component divisions by 1996, the lowest active force structure in half a century.² This paper identifies the processes behind a division inactivation and provides a blueprint to guide future selected units. While the current demands of Operation Desert Storm may delay the prospects of additional, immediate inactivations, it is clear that more force structure reductions will follow in order to meet congressionally mandated budget cuts.

This paper is constructed from a CONUS division level staff perspective with a focus on the management team, procedures, and division staff functional area concerns. Much of the data is drawn from the author's personal role as the division staff officer responsible for the inactivation of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) (9th ID). Previous research on this critical subject revealed an absolute void in Department of the Army guidance and in other references on the "how-to" aspects of an inactivation of this magnitude. Only

one regulation even discussed inactivation and that was purely in the sense of designating provisional units. Further, there was no immediate procedural guidance from the major command (MACOM) level regarding personnel, training, and logistical concerns. Fortunately, the 9th ID recorded some lessons-learned from a previous experience of inactivating one brigade and used that data to formulate a successful strategy to comply with the directed inactivation of the division. The term inactivation, rather than deactivation, is used as it more accurately conveys the finality of causing a military unit to go out of existence vice placing a unit on a nonactive status.

Clearly a project of this scale is a team effort. Each level of command will, by virtue of their functional expertise, have a slightly different view of required actions and scope of responsibilities. Likewise, units not stationed in CONUS may experience other requirements due to unique geographical, mission, or other related factors. As expected, brigade, battalion, and company commanders carry the bulk of the responsibility and must execute the inactivation mission just as they complete any other given task. Collectively, the Army must perform inactivation to the highest possible standards in order to enter into the 1990s with the best possible soldiers, equipment, and leaders. The downsizing guideposts in this paper will assist in completing this mission and reshaping our Army to be a versatile, deployable, and lethal force.

ORGANIZING THE TEAM

Initial concerns must be resolved when organizing an inactivation mission. These include: establishment of the division team for overall control of the project; production of guidance and milestone schedules; and development of required reports and in-process reviews to provide adequate information for the decision makers as to the progress of the mission and for any mid-course corrections. The following paragraphs will deal with each of these concerns to set up a functional managerial framework.

As a recent brigade commander noted, "inactivation is a command mission".³ In order to assist the division commander in this mission, the division staff must adjust to coordinate the process. The existing staff functions and responsibilities of each U.S. Army division are generally well understood by all leaders. However, a closer inspection of a typical division structure reveals some shortcomings when preparing for a project with the magnitude of an inactivation. In particular, the actions required for an inactivation cross all traditional staff lines. Personnel, training, force structure, logistics, resource management, and facilities are a few of the areas that must be addressed. By current staff and organizational manuals, the responsibility for these functional areas is divided among the division staff. Therefore, some form of staff realignment will be needed for integrating these traditional

roles and responsibilities. The staff must adjust to support the commander and to coordinate, in their obligatory roles, with all headquarters and involved organizations. Also, the staff sections will still have to maintain typical day-to-day responsibilities in their respective functional areas. A variety of possible solutions are available to assist in this force integration effort.

As noted in FM 100-11, Force Integration, two primary approaches seem feasible: the centralized staff structure or an ad-hoc, temporary task force.⁴ The centralized staff section offers a consistent, permanent team to manage the entire scope of the inactivation but will require additional staffing and support. The task force, on the other hand, may be a less resource intensive organization but may not capture the full support of primary staff officers and may be easily overcome by the scale of inactivation requirements.

A review of division organization charts reveals that some divisions already have an existing primary staff section known as the G6, responsible for force integration, modernization, force structure, and stationing concerns.⁵ For the remainder of this paper, the term G6 will be used in reference to the division staff section responsible for performing inactivation functions. This is the ideal section to build a team to assume overall coordination and ensure focus for the inactivation remains on track. Figure

1 outlines a strawman approach to the G6 staff section as currently used by the 9thID.6

This staff section becomes the focal point for all internal and external actions concerned with the inactivation. It performs all the requisite planning, coordination, and integration of other staff functional areas. Each of the other division staff and organization points of contact (POCs) depicted in Figure 1 perform functional tasks but remain under the operational control of their respective section. In effect the POC's serve to answer functional questions and to cue their respective parent staff directorates as to required actions and information flow. This central staff section becomes even more viable when one considers the other possible actions that may be related to the inactivation, such as transfer of a particular unit to another headquarters, conversion of a division unit to a corps structure, and assorted restationing challenges. In addition, it performs on the same level as the other division staff elements, operating under the direction of the chief of staff and the authority of the division commander. Finally, it facilitates staff coordination with corps, installation, and external level organizations.

In addition to the G6 staff section, other division level members play key roles in the team effort. The division commander imparts his intent, guiding principles,

support, and authority throughout the mission. The chief of staff continues to perform his normal functions, ensuring overall staff coordination. The Assistant Division Commander for Support (ADC-S) is the ideal senior level leader to be in overall control of the inactivation mission since his normal responsibility is to integrate the efforts of the support community and the installation team. Ideally, the key staff members discussed to this point would be stabilized in their positions with sufficient time to conduct the mission. More importantly, the plans and guidance supporting the inactivation must adequately express and reflect the details in the mission approach to the inactivation, regardless of any personnel turbulence.

PRINCIPLES, PLANS, PROCESS

The format of the inactivation plan is not as important as the content. A mission type order is the most familiar and conveys the message that this task must be carried out with the full support of the chain of command. While requirements will certainly vary among divisions, the following points offer some key principles to guide the inactivation:⁷

- o Meet reduction targets.
- o Maintain unit/combat team integrity.
- o Where appropriate, first inactivate units with high operation and maintenance costs.
- o Fighters out first, supporters last.
- o Train and prepare soldiers for next assignment.
- o Don't spend resources on equipment scheduled for disposal.

- o 10/20 operational level maintenance standards will be the goal; capture and track costs. Funding for 10/20 may vary.
- o Use combat vehicle evaluation/rebuild programs, lateral transfers to on-post units, and transfer to affiliated Reserve Component (RC) to reduce costs.
- o Maintain collective readiness as long as practical.
- o Command information key to soldier concerns and quality of life issues.
- o Coordinate realignment of contingency missions, RC support, and taskings commensurate with inactivation milestones.
- o Centralized planning and review; decentralized execution by brigade combat team.

Department of the Army (DA) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) guidance, as well as other intermediate headquarter's policies, may supplant some of these principles. However, these points serve to adequately reinforce the division commander's intent to his Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs). Some of these principles will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper as they apply to specific functional areas.

The next area of required centralized guidance concerns setting valid milestones and timelines for the inactivation process. In this instance DA will establish the inactivation period and the force reduction targets over the course of the fiscal years. As an example, DA provided specific force structure reduction floors for the 9th ID as follows: 2903 for FY 90; 3100 for FY 91; 1889 for FY 92(In conjunction with these inactivations, additional force structure actions may be required, e.g., retaining 3906 spaces for configuring a separate motorized brigade).8

Given this type of mission guidance, the division commander can then begin the analysis process and the final determination of the sequence of inactivation based on the previously discussed principles. A critical concern for all participants is the amount of time required to complete all actions. There is no single answer for every type unit since there are so many variables of personnel, equipment types, disposition instructions, and the flow capacity of supporting units for inspection, repair, turn-in, and transfer. An analysis of the experiences of the 9th ID and 4th ID, another division to recently complete an inactivation, reveals that a time-line of 210 to 240 days is required to conduct all functional area actions and to process the 30-40,000 items of equipment authorized in a typical brigade combat team.⁹ During this period, subunits are time sequenced and staggered to efficiently flow the process rather than having an entire brigade all start on the exact same time schedule. As part of the mission analysis process, the division staff and the MSCs would have identified the critical events and planning assumptions for the inactivation and the general sequence in which these activities would occur. Further, the interaction of these events would be reviewed to ensure the plan provides the requisite scheme of action to give order to the numerous complex tasks. In effect the staff must develop a mini-program evaluation and review technique (PERT) or at

least a matrix outline of tasks, time requirements, and associated proponency for those tasks.¹⁰ As a reference, a sample master milestone schedule is shown at Figures 2 to 6.¹¹ This document is the centerpiece of the plan and is supplemented by annexes delineating specific responsibility for each milestone and specifying the types of managerial reports and forums to keep the inactivation on track.

In order to assist the senior leadership in controlling and tracking the progress of the inactivation at the division level, a series of working meetings and reviews are scheduled. Figure 7 lays out an approach to the flow of activity, authority, and responsibility of the hierarchy of the inactivation team.¹² Not visible in this flow are the similar reviews and agencies that meet at the MSC and subunit level.

Each week the G6 heads a working session to focus on the division staff and MSC major issues and to resolve problems appropriate to that level of authority. The session is guided by formatted status reports and all directives and actions are captured through concise minutes. The POCs from each element report out to parent organizations and continue to work on all unresolved issues until the next session. Each primary staff section also conducts action meetings as required to answer specific functional problems. The G6, as the primary staff proponent, continues coordination throughout the intervening timeframe

to ensure all the team players are on track. Every two to four weeks (dependent on intensity of actions and ADC-S preference) an in-process review is provided to the ADC-S and the council of colonels (Chief of Staff and O-6 commanders). The ADC-S, Chief of Staff, MSC commanders, primary division staff, and other key players attend these sessions to receive status reports, approve major actions, and to provide additional guidance to the team. The division commander attends these sessions on a periodic basis. In turn, these results can be used to brief higher headquarters as to overall status and resource requirements. Ideally, each of these reviews is a concise, structured event so as to emphasize the important issues in as short as time as possible. Each briefer's data and issues are staffed previously to eliminate discrepancies and to ensure a logical, orderly flow. In short, the division commander and all participants will then have productive sessions due to the continuous coordination of the staff on a day to day basis.

Standardized reports, formats, and automation must be used to clarify the process and to provide timely, accurate information for subsequent decisions. These standardized documents are particularly important when dealing with the logistical status of the numerous types of organization, installation, and facility equipment. These categories constantly change due to the progress of inventories,

inspections, and final disposition of the items. Figures 9 to 26 represent a sample of standardized reports for the personnel, security, training and operations, logistics, and financial aspects of the inactivation. Overall assessments of each functional area can be displayed through green, amber, and red color codes, indicating respectively no, minor, or major problems. In addition, the status of key functional information is readily apparent. Likewise, each staff member can highlight major issues and corrective actions. The displayed data corresponds to the key tasks on the master milestone schedule from Figures 2 to 6. The existing information systems, automated property book, and supplemental computer systems in most divisions can easily be adapted to extract the desired status of each functional area. As noted previously, reports and in-process reviews for the command group and the council of colonels capture trends and are tailored to present broad categories of information. On the other hand, primary staff sections, for example the G4 and the division material management center (DMMC), will track functional data in much more detail in order to correctly perform their missions.

Time spent by the staff in planning and developing the division inactivation team, procedural guidance and policy, and the early establishment of various management tools, standard reports, and reviews will be invaluable as the mission unfolds. The framework shaped by these major

components will truly allow the division staff and the MSCs to concentrate on the task at hand and will clearly minimize confusion and time loss at a later date. In turn, the focus of this blueprint can now shift to a consideration of key issues for the inactivation team.

PERSONNEL ISSUES

In the personnel arena, the Army certainly has an experience base and historical perspective on force reductions from the demobilization efforts following WWII and other periods in our history.¹³ However, as one analyst has noted, today's military force is composed of volunteers, most of whom wish to remain in the service.¹⁴ The paradox lies in figuring out how to eliminate people in a fair manner yet retain enough faith in the all-volunteer system so as not to shatter our soldier's belief that the Army will do the "right thing" to retain an effective force. While DA, through Personnel Command (PERSCOM), will establish centralized programs covering early-out, reassignment, and reenlistment procedures, the division inactivation team has a key role in the single most important concern, caring for the soldiers and families.

The first step in this process almost seems simplistic: keep the soldiers and their families informed throughout the mission. As expected in an operation of this nature, rumors and misinformation spread very rapidly; this in turn can readily lead to frustration, loss of trust, and a drop in

morale. From the beginning, the senior leaders must explain the reasons, issues, and known policies surrounding the inactivation and must continue to provide the answers to the soldiers. Initial briefings by the division commander to the brigade and battalion chain of command and to the chain of concern (spouses and key family members of the chain of command) can effectively counter the questions of "why and what is going to happen to me?" Subordinate commanders can build on these briefings to support the needs of their units and to defuse any immediate misperceptions among the soldiers.

Another effective tool is the production of an information pamphlet and publication of articles in the post newspaper explaining the reasons behind the inactivation. These documents should also address a series of typical questions and answers that soldiers are most likely to pose, focusing on such things as "how will I be reassigned, is there an early release from active duty, and is my reenlistment for present duty assignment (PDA) going to be honored?" The personnel community must aggressively address these concerns and once resolution is achieved ensure the resulting policies and answers flow to the units. In addition, the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) can use these measures plus approved articles in local newspapers to keep the civilian community appropriately informed as to the progress of the inactivation.

A final point offered for consideration is the establishment of a "division hotline". This is a 24 hour phone service available to any soldier and any family member to provide information or to answer any questions. It can be established in the division inspector general's (IG) office so that the caller would not feel any repercussions, regardless of the nature of the question or the validity of the individual's concerns. The division IG would maintain the client's privacy and forward the questions to the division G6 for resolution and reply within the next 24 hours. As expected, the 9th ID experience shows that most of the inquiries revolve around reassignment concerns. There can easily be some misapprehension by the chain of command as to the purpose behind this measure and to the perceived duplicity of the chain of command's function. However, in addition to its stated purpose, the Hotline can really serve as a relief valve to voice frustration and questions directly to the division command team. The Hotline for the 9th ID served its purpose and as time went on, its use tapered off due to the effectiveness of information provided by the chain of command.

Personnel issues revolve around coordination among DA, the Division G1, and commanders. Once DA policies regarding time on station and worldwide personnel requirements are known, the G1 can publish directives to manage the personnel aspects of the inactivation, direct transfers, and

coordinate release dates with the parent battalion commanders. Key to the success of this effort is the early face to face coordination with DA representatives, preferably at the post location, to define the overall directives concerning enlisted and officer distribution. Second is the formation of the Personnel Action Group (G1 work group, Figure 7), composed of representatives from the MSCs, G1, and post Adjutant General (AG) proponents. Their purpose is to refine, monitor, and coordinate the continuing personnel programs. Finally, the unit commanders can conduct personal interviews with each soldier to determine preferences for available assignments. This process is clearly time intensive but firmly captures the soldiers' trust in the chain of command's intent to take care of them. The directives resulting from the above actions should establish the following principles:15

- o Cross level within installation to meet authorized vacancies.
- o Unit commander determines release date of soldiers eligible for transfer based on inactivation progress and workload.
- o Current unit responsible for soldiers with ETS/PCS dates prior to unit inactivation date.
- o Sponsor program essential for reassigned and normal incoming personnel.
- o G1/AG coordinate diversion requirements NLT 210 days prior to effective date of inactivation (E-210).
- o Use of DA early release programs.
- o Soldiers subject to DA and local bars to reenlistment may request voluntary separation.
- o Direct coordination with PERSCOM to revise upcoming brigade/battalion commander slates(12 month minimum).
- o Review company command slate to obtain minimum of 12 month tour. Consider order of merit list at MSC level to accommodate deserving officers.

- o Review CSM/1SG slates to determine necessary diversion and assignments.
- o Early attendance at officer advance course after 24 months on station (PERSCOM approval).
- o Honor PDA reenlistments and stabilization tours.

An immediate challenge facing the G1/AG community is to forestall the tendency of PERSCOM to stop all incoming personnel to the inactivating division. Over the time frame of inactivation the division will still need a certain number of key military skills, a fair distribution of Military Educational Level 1 (MEL-1) officers, MEL-4 officers, and other personnel. Due to the updated authorization document entries (these reflect periodic changes in personnel authorizations due to force structure changes) into the personnel management authorization document (PMAD), there seems to be an inclination by PERSCOM to assume all force structure reductions occur immediately. Consequently, officer and enlisted distribution plans are immediately changed to reflect the new reduced authorizations.¹⁶ Again, effective staff coordination can resolve this problem, resulting in incremental reductions phased in over the entire period of the inactivation. Ideally, this coordination should be conducted as soon as the staff analysis is completed. In turn other issues such as expanding early out programs and obtaining accelerated assignment instructions can be explored with the PERSCOM staff.

One goal that becomes increasingly difficult to attain is the transfer of crews and squads, etc., intact to other units. While this is desirable on the surface, it is entirely dependent on the receiving organization's capability to absorb these packages. It should be done in the instances where receiving units have zeroed out the same type sub-units and can readily employ these packages. Again, at some point in the process the division may have to adopt a more flexible view of maintaining unit integrity.

The GI can normally use existing Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) reports and the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) to manage most personnel aspects of the inactivation. However, one area that will require special attention is the completion of all officer and enlisted efficiency reports. The key consideration is to ensure rating chains, timeframes, and raters are synchronized completely. Due to the frequent transfers and departures of all concerned personnel, every effort must be made to submit required reports ahead of due dates

Once the sequence of inactivating units is determined, that information will be sent to the Major Army Command (MACOM) for eventual entry into the DA master command plan. This will set the stage for those higher staffs to review various policy issues. In the personnel arena, PERSCOM should specify the policy as to the acceptable length of

time for a brigade or battalion command tenure. In the case of the 9th ID, PERSCOM set a minimum battalion command tour of 12 months on station.¹⁷ Those personnel meeting that criteria were considered to have completed the tour, while all others became eligible for another slating. The G1, in follow-up actions, needs to identify those brigade and battalion command positions that will need to be adjusted due to the inactivation of the division. Other factors included in this dialogue are prepositioned selectees, branch considerations, and the ability of the division to absorb the selectees in the inactivation period. In some cases, the current commander could be extended to complete the close out of his unit. Conversely, the incoming commander may face the responsibility of concentrating on the task of inactivation rather than the traditional aspirations of a normal command tour.

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE

The division G2 section, security and intelligence, is primarily concerned with all aspects of physical, weapons, document, communications, and personnel security issues during the inactivation. As noted in Figure 7, the G2 will organize a working group composed of internal plans, operations, and Special Security Office (SSO) representatives and representatives from the provost marshal and subordinate units to monitor and guide their portion of the inactivation.

Specific events for the G2 are keyed to the milestone charts at Figures 2 to 6. Some of the more critical functions concern the closure of all Communications Security (COMSEC) accounts and of unit arms rooms. During these phases of the operation the G2 concentrates on inventory, accountability, and turn-in of sensitive items in compliance with the details of all applicable regulations. In particular, units must conduct a 100% inventory of all arms prior to joint verification and turn-in to the Installation Supply and Services Division (ISSD). Following the transfer of all weapons, the G2 section will coordinate with the installation Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH) for deactivating and clearing all intrusion and surveillance devices.

A final area worthy of mention for the G2 section is the termination of Emergency Action (EA) documents, systems, and the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). This includes the turn-in or destruction of COMSEC materials, EA references, and the administrative removal of members of units from the PRP. The units will receive automated account listings and conduct complete inventories. Once all unit actions are completed, the G2 will coordinate through channels with the MACOM and DA to obtain certification/termination approval memorandums releasing the unit from further accountability and responsibility.

TRAINING AND OPERATIONS ISSUES

The G3, division training and operations section, continues to face major challenges during the inactivation in terms of training requirements, readiness reporting, warplans, and various forms of internal and external support taskings. In spite of the inactivation, the division will still be expected to perform its mission, maintain RC support, and respond to MACOM taskings until the appropriate authority provides dates of relief or the scope of the inactivation effort mandates release from all other requirements. Again, a complete mission analysis of all requirements over the timeline of the inactivation will set the stage for a successful dialogue with the higher headquarters to sort out these issues and to publish any necessary revisions to command training guidance.

Dependent upon the approved timelines for inactivation, training will remain a major issue for all units. Collective readiness should be maintained as long as possible to provide a warfighting focus, particularly for those units not yet in the latter stages of inactivation. A vivid example of the utility of this consideration is the recent deployment of a brigade from the 2nd Armored Division to Operation Desert Storm. Although previously scheduled for inactivation, the brigade readily deployed as a part of another division and fulfilled a critical role on the battlefield. While the date for cessation of collective

training and responsibility for contingency plans may vary, a review of the master milestone schedule at Figure 2 indicates that 120 days prior to the effective date (E-120) may be appropriate due to the required inactivation actions. Even as the process approaches the end point for each organization, the division must retain an obligation to the soldier for his individual training in terms of weapons, physical, common skills, and MOS specific proficiency. As equipment is turned in, some consolidation of training may be necessary. In addition, affiliated and sister units can assist through short term loans of equipment and transportation support. In the end, training will serve to prepare soldiers for their next unit through maintenance of basic skills and by providing a sense of common direction and purpose.¹⁸

The G3's mission analysis will also reveal challenges in conducting the variety of RC evaluations and directed training associations, ROTC missions, firefighting, post guard, and other MACOM and installation taskings. The result of this analysis should not result in a blanket request for total relief in all categories since there is a rapidly declining population of other units to assume the mission. Instead, the intent should be to restructure commitments, reprogram resources, downscale taskings commensurate with the inactivation, and eliminate those events which clearly exceed the division's capability. For

example, the level of assistance provided during a RC annual training period or an external evaluation can be adjusted downward in sufficient time to allow the supported unit to proportionately modify the scope of its planned programs. Likewise, some readiness groups may be able to assist by supplementing the training assistance effort. At a lower level, taskings can be realigned or clear decisions made to eliminate certain functions commensurate with the inactivation timeline. In summary, experience indicates that the unit will continue to be tasked throughout the inactivation period. The key lies in clearly laying out the division's viewpoint on the subject and in offering some reasonable alternatives to the higher headquarters.

While the G3 should not require any special reports to monitor his functional areas of concern, the unit status report (USR) must continue to be a primary report and source of information. In addition to the army regulation covering status reports (AR 220-1), the MACOM should publish explicit guidance concerning reporting requirements for inactivating units. This interim guidance should authorize units to report actual C-levels until C-4 in a specific resource area is reached, at which time they will then report C-5. Units would then continue to report C-5 until 90 days before the effective date of the inactivation; at that point the unit would submit a final USR.¹⁹ Remarks in the Ready card would highlight that the unit is inactivating.

Contingency plans must be modified to reflect the decreasing capabilities of the division. This revision is based on the actual timelines of the inactivation. In major plans supporting a particular Commander in Chief (CINC) area of concern, coordination with the supporting MACOM should provide a reasonable, early release date due to the long lead time required to realign all the issues. In other areas the division will still retain sufficient capability over time to conduct some missions. Supporting the drug war, ROTC support, and civic assistance are examples of the latter case. In any event, the G3 must clearly delineate the variations to be accomplished and publish the resulting mission tasks. This will be a continuous task as supporting units move through the pipeline toward inactivation.

LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT ISSUES

To set the stage for the division G4's logistical and support role in the inactivation team, our attention must first turn to three key parameters which must be set by the Department of the Army staff through the respective MACOM headquarters. These areas concern equipment disposition instructions, turn-in maintenance standards, and availability of budget dollars to accomplish the inactivation. As part of an earlier supposition, the forthcoming scale of possible force reductions make it impossible to firmly clarify the answers to these three concerns, however certain principles should still apply.

At some point after the inactivation announcement the MACOM J4 should forward instructions on the initial redistribution and disposition of equipment. These instructions will include the identification of critical items to be intensely managed at the DA and MACOM level, for example, 5Ton trucks and radios. Those critical items which would be excess to installation requirements must then be reported to the MACOM J4 for additional instructions. In addition, a general priority of redistribution should be included. For the FY 90 inactivating units the priority supported a smart way to do business as follows:20

- o Redistribute to fill 100% MTOE shortages on the installation.
- o Pure fleet vehicles remaining in installation MTOE units.
- o Fill affiliated reserve component units with non-critical equipment; submit critical equipment requirements as recommendations.
- o Retain/redistribute any remaining excess ASL/PLL; at end of one year report any residual excess.

While the above instructions helped to clarify one major concern, the issue of maintenance standards remained a contentious problem. Although 10/20 maintenance standards as denoted in the appropriate technical manuals have always been a stated goal, that standard is difficult to reach given the reduced budgets in recent years and the somewhat imprecise nature of the varying viewpoints of the technical inspectors (TIs). A thorough analysis of the existing budget and spending projection by the division comptroller

and the G4 will assist in defining and explaining the division's position on the ability to execute the 10/20 requirement. Simply put, there may not be enough money to resource complete 10/20 standards. In this event, coordination with the MACOM can lead to some common sense solutions to the standards and funding problem.

First, there must be a command decision to not spend any resources on equipment that is destined to be retired or sold as surplus. Those items should simply be turned in through the proper supply channels in an "as is" condition with applicable shortage annexes. This will clearly save valuable dollars, parts, and precious manpower which in turn can be dedicated to higher priority projects. Secondly, the division should take rightful advantage of any rebuild and evaluation programs which could accommodate selected items of equipment and which would further reduce the budget and logistical impact on the unit. Also, the division, with MACOM approval, should resort to another cost-saving measure by transferring equipment to other installation units at a operational ready status as outlined in the appropriate -10 technical manual. In any event, the division Comptroller and the G4 must establish an account processing code (APC) and a project code to track and record all requisitions and turn-in transactions. The APC will then allow the division to capture all expenditures to accommodate submission of unfinanced requirements and for programming any available

money in the current and following budget years. In the worst case, if no money is forthcoming, the division could also record all maintenance and parts data, shortages, and uncorrected faults, and defer actual expenditures until resources became available. In this way, inactivating units could repair vehicles to meet at least operational ready standards and turn them in to the installation facility. At a later date, if required, parts could then be ordered and vehicles repaired with a composite team of residual unit and installation personnel.

As noted earlier, the inactivation process is largely driven by the "supporters" in the division. Accordingly, the division G4, the installation staff, and the Division Support Command (DISCOM) elements play crucial roles; typically the support units should be among the last units to be inactivated as they will process all equipment and property and will be able to assist the installation Director of Logistics (DOL) and Director of Engineering and Housing (DEH) in this effort. As expected, the disposition of equipment will include lateral transfers to other installation units, off-post units, and in some cases transfers to reserve component organizations. In other cases, the equipment will be turned in through normal supply channels until final disposition can be determined. As shown in Figure 7, the G4 should establish a work group or a logistics action group (LAG) to resolve these procedural and

scheduling issues and to act as the central logistics information collection and reporting agency.²¹ The LAG, chaired by the G4 on a weekly basis, should include the following representatives:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| o DOL | o G6 |
| o Army Material Command | o Division Material |
| Logistics Assistance Office | Mgmt. Center (DMMC) |
| (LAO) | o G3 (Automation) |
| o Unit | o Division Surgeon |
| o DISCOM | o Comptroller |
| o DEH | |

One of the principles fostered throughout the inactivation is centralized planning and decentralized execution. In the G4 arena considerable effort must be given to detailing the standards, turn-in and transfer procedures, and the required timing to keep the inactivation on schedule. In turn, numerous outside agencies are involved, such as DOL and DEH; most of these agencies will have explicit procedures and requirements that must be followed. As a consequence, the G4 should exercise a more centralized control, with correspondingly less flexibility for the inactivating units to develop separate schedules. The extremely detailed instructions prepared by the G4 are beyond the scope of this study, but there are several areas which must be considered at the outset of the inactivation period.

In order to handle the thousands of items of equipment and property, the milestone charts at Figures 2 to 6 are set up to accommodate the inventory, inspection, repair, and

final disposition of said items for each concerned unit when they enter that point of the schedule. For example, at the E-180 day point, the unit is involved in full inventory and initiation of technical inspections. The G4 portion of the division inactivation plan must contain sufficient detail to resolve those concerns in conjunction with the LAG meetings and the other forums doing periodic reviews. However, to be truly successful, the G4, in coordination with respective units, must also publish a separate turn-in plan by the E-120 date for each unit in that portion of the inactivation window. This document details the specific instructions, standards, calendar schedule, and turn-in locations for each type of equipment and other unit property. In general, inspections and lateral transfers of equipment should be conducted at the unit's or the supporting unit's area to reduce transit and processing times. Actual turn-in of various commodities will normally be done at the installation's logistics center. A sample turn-in flow chart for one commodity is shown at Figure 8.

Additional challenges that must be resolved include the staffing and training of the technical inspectors (TI's). The staffing issue concerns the availability of adequate inspectors for the many commodities of equipment that must be transferred or turned in to the installation logistics center. A second problem, as noted earlier, is the interpretation of the 10/20 technical manual maintenance

standards by the various personalities among the TI's. In regards to the staffing problem, a possible solution lies in supplementing the DOL's TI's with additional "green-suiters" from the division and other units on the installation. As much as possible, these personnel would be selected for their expertise and long term availability. The benefit is that these personnel over time would provide a consistent viewpoint on the acceptance and processing of equipment. In addition, they would frankly allow the DOL to be adequately staffed to accommodate the thousands of line items; the alternative seems to be an unacceptable delay in the turn-in sequence. The second problem is to "train the trainer" to minimize the human frailties of interpreting the technical manuals and to ensure each inactivating unit is subject to a relatively consistent inspection. In the preparatory and execution phases the AMC LAO can provide additional expertise in defining or clarifying standards for the wide variety of items. Enhancements to this training could also include development of specific checklists for at least major end items to further provide consistency. As a side note, this same process should be applied to the initial and final inspections of the various buildings, motor pools, and other facilities under the control of each unit. With a good up-front inspection, the commander can readily comply with the DEH expectations or at least resolve potential differences. In addition, decisions can be made as to unit

tasks of a self-help nature or programing of the facilities for future DEH/contract renovations. By having a quality, trained team doing early inspections in accordance with the same criteria used by the final DOL and DEH inspectors, the division will clearly save valuable time and alleviate confusion and frustration.²²

A final tool to assist the G4 and the division is the request for a DA project code. AR 725-50 contains the criteria involved in such a request. In addition, the AMC LAO can readily process the request through his direct technical channel. The benefit of a project code is that it will help distinguish requisitions and shipments and will allow the staff to accumulate cost data associated with the inactivation; conversely, it does not impact on any existing priorities or precedence for handling transactions.²³ Ultimately it will assist in the management of the logistical and resource costs of the inactivation as well as providing a historical track and data base for other interested agencies.

SPECIAL STAFF

The division special staff members generally perform supporting roles in the inactivation mission. The division IG continues his normal activities, but remains particularly sensitive to the various personnel and command climate concerns which emerge during the course of the inactivation. Likewise, as discussed in the Personnel Issues section of

this paper, the IG should establish the division hotline to ensure a client's confidentiality and to obtain direct readings of the soldiers' concerns.

The division chaplain and the surgeon tend to primarily support the G1 in the personnel arena and to ensure the units' spiritual and medical needs are met as the downsizing goes on. In addition, the surgeon will also be responsible, in conjunction with the G4, for the disposition of all class VIII (medical) equipment and supplies. Likewise, the surgeon will coordinate with the installation medical staff and facilities to synchronize the close-out of division medical clinics and unit aid stations.

The division Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) will focus his efforts on the continuity of legal and disciplinary actions. He will also advise the division commander on the adjustment of Uniform Code of Military Justice authority as the division incrementally stands down. Finally, the SJA will fulfill a major responsibility in the preparation of the Environmental Assessment (EA) as discussed in the following section.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 (NEPA) requires all federal installations to address any proposed actions potentially affecting the quality of the environment. The format of the mandated environmental assessment (EA) includes a statement of purpose, description of the proposed action, alternatives considered, discussion

of the installation environment, and an analysis of various environmental and socioeconomic impacts.²⁴ In general terms, the installation DEH is the primary proponent for the EA and prepares and coordinates the document for final submission through the MACOM to Headquarters DA for public comment and final approval.²⁵ As the inactivation of a division or the closure of a base creates great sensitivity at the local and even national level, most actions involved in an inactivation must be considered as proposals and cannot be irreversible until all environmental documentation is completed and approved.²⁶ Furthermore, the impacts of a base closure along with an inactivation cannot be adequately addressed in this paper. The base closure creates even greater consternation among civilian employees and in the community for its potential economic impact. In addition, the retired military constituents will rightfully register great concern for the loss of exchange, commissary, and medical facilities.

The G6, SJA, and the G3 are the primary division staff sections who work, in conjunction with the installation DEH, on the preparation and submission of the EA. The DEH uses a variety of highly technical sources and programs to measure the impact on pure environmental issues, such as air, water, noise, wildlife, and cultural concerns. In addition, the DEH will prepare data as input into the Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL) economic impact

forecast system to calculate the projected results for goods and services in the surrounding area.²⁷ The key task for the responsible division staff sections is to ensure all portions of the EA relating to the purpose, description, and alternatives are accurate and that the division command section complies with all ensuing regulatory guidance. The SJA must also be actively involved in a review of all other inactivation actions to eliminate the possibility of inadvertently prejudicing the final outcome of the EA. Finally, the life cycle of the EA is a lengthy process. It is in the best interest of all concerned agencies to quickly initiate and submit a superbly documented EA so that the division can execute the mission of inactivation.

FINAL COMMENTS

This Blueprint for Inactivation has primarily focused on division level concerns and actions. However, the implications for the DA and MACOM staffs are equally enormous. Accordingly, a few comments and recommendations are in order.

First, DA and the MACOM staffs must correlate the lessons and experiences of the FY 90 inactivating divisions in order to produce some primary guidance and policy for all functional area concerns. The Center for Army Lessons Learned at the Combined Arms Command is a possible starting point for the collection and dissemination of inactivation data as they currently capture many other lessons and

clearly the inactivation experience is as critical as other tactical operations. In turn, the higher level staffs can be proactive in analyzing and adjusting policies, requirements, and plans to meet the future sequence of inactivating units well prior to initiation of the milestone schedule. In particular, this should result in timely equipment distribution/disposal guidance to preserve dwindling dollars and to prevent thousands of pieces of equipment sitting and deteriorating in various installation logistics centers for a period of years.

Secondly, it is time to offer some instruction and guidance to the brigade and battalion pre-command courses and the general officer courses relative to inactivation issues. In this instance, the focus should be on DA policies for personnel, operational, and resource concerns. It would also be an appropriate time to introduce the legal, political, and public concerns for downsizing units, preparing environmental assessments, and performing base closures.

Finally, the sequence and timing of inactivations must be carefully constructed to program the degradation of the Army's warfighting capability. Specifically, DA should dictate the sequence of inactivation to maintain combat readiness as long as possible to meet our contingency requirements and yet comply with the mandated force reductions. In addition, this is a logical opportunity to

program the equipment sets from inactivating units into any form of planned pre-positioning to match the emerging strategy of force projection.

CONCLUSIONS


This paper has offered some key guideposts for assisting units faced with the unenviable task of inactivation. Clearly there is a myriad of day to day details which must be synchronized in order to complete the mission. Early planning, highly involved commanders and staffs, and the consistent communication of the division inactivation team will ensure success. Above all, inactivation is not just about equipment and facilities. Instead, it embodies the core values and ideals of our soldiers and units and will ultimately prescribe the sentiment of all future soldiers towards the institution of the Army. Our performance in completing this change of mission will truly dictate the reshaping of the Army in the 1990s.

APPENDIX 1

FIGURES 1-26

This appendix includes suggested formats for standardized reports and in-process reviews.

GENERAL STAFF-FORCE INTEGRATION INACTIVATION PROPONENT



Appendix 1, Figure 1

MILESTONES: PROJECT RELIABLE PRIDE

DATE	TASK
E-210	Begin diversion of sponsored personnel gains not essential to inactivation.
E-180	KEY Use APC (AAGAL), Fund Code (GA), PC (FES) and EIC for all inactivation related requisitions. Begin initial Technical Inspection (TI) of facilities, commo equip, vehicles etc. DPBO cancels inbound equipment requisitions. Verify vehicle and equipment serial numbers. Forward sponsorship files to gaining unit to ensure sponsorship process continues. Review DEH work orders: cancel as appropriate. Begin repair of property and facilities to prescribed standards; identify shortages. Unit begin 100% Inventory (Organizational, Installation, FMB, and Facilities).
E-150	KEY Unit complete 100% Inventory and TI of Equipment and facilities. Initiate Adjustment documents for equipment shortages. Within funding restraints, replace shortages. Commo and CIA items turned-in/lateral transfer. Identify UFR. Identify to G1, soldiers in critical positions or with special skills who will be retained until the end of unit inactivations. Complete evaluation and training plan to ensure individual readiness and POR qualification of each reassigned soldier. Prepare unit surplus report (excess equipment). Non-standard items verified. Begin reassignment of soldiers not critical to inactivation. Provide Bn draft equipment distribution/turn-in schedule.
E-130	
E-120	KEY Publish Division E-120 Day Turn-in Plan. KEY Cross-walk professional schools plan with personnel assignment plan to ensure all opportunities are provided for continued schooling. KEY Determine impact on command tours/analyze command opportunities. Determine impact on BN XO/S3 positions. KEY Cease collective training/support missions. Prepare equipment disposition spread sheet. Receive inactivation directive. Conduct transition briefing for inactivating unit personnel. DOL acceptance TI begins. Identify reassignments and coordinate with OMB for ANEDD officers/Warrant Officers. Task units to identify soldiers for early ETS, as well as soldiers with P3 physical status, bars, pending investigation or elimination. Coordinate with DEH, DOL, and G4 for turn-in of all property. Coordinate with units to identify medical NCO's for on post reassignment. Submit unit material surplus report. Adjust EMB fill plans. Publish property turn-in SOP. Pick up COMSEC account inventory report.

MILESTONES: PROJECT RELIABLE PRIDE

E-120 cont

- Joint validation of Unit Security Roster with DSEC.
- Task units to identify soldiers for reassignment.
- Begin turn-in of maps and NATO documents.
- Turn-in equipment already at prescribed state of repair (less long lead time parts).
- Commanders interview soldiers to obtain assignment preferences.
- Ensure AMEDO Officers/Warrant Officers and NCO's to be reassigned are briefed.
- Coordinate with PSMB, reference personnel requisitions, diversions, cross leveling requirements and personnel management plan.
- Adjust EMB fill plans.
- Coordinate G6/DEH building/FMS/Installation Property pre-turn-in inspections.
- Notify 1 CORPS and FORSCOM Surgeon of changes in requirements for PROFS fills.
- Identify SD positions for transfer to gaining units.

E-115 KEY Turn-in COMSEC equipment.

E-110 Relief for accountability Statement for COMSEC account available.

E-105 KEY Acceptance Tls Completed. All required repair parts ordered.

- KEY Complete Identification of soldiers with bars, pending investigation or elimination, or on short tour in the HAAP program (all special cut).
- KEY Complete Identification of soldiers for early ETS.
- Complete Map turn-in.
- Submit acceptance TI 2404s with RONA annotated to support operations for DS verification.
- Begin turn-in of organizational property to ISSD, reconcile hand receipts with DFBO.
- Begin turn-in NSA/unit fund property to NSA, reconcile hand receipts with MSA.

E-90 KEY Coordinate CSM/1SG reassignments with the GI/AG SGM and DCSM.

- KEY Identify soldiers on FDA, Educational Benefits Re-up options and other stabilized tour.
- KEY Stop PRL replenishment. After this date, parts requests submitted on exception basis only (exceptions approved by DMAC-MATO).
- Ensure soldiers attend COPREN briefings if PCSing overseas (ongoing).
- Complete NATO document turn-in.
- Divert non-critical sponsored gains from inactivating units.
- Adjust USR spreadsheets to delete C5 units.
- Identify release dates for personnel assigned.
- Produce NCO-ER/OER shells 30 days prior to respective rating end date (ongoing).
- Coordinate with 1 CORPS for reassignment of soldiers in MOSs which cannot be utilized elsewhere on the installation.
- Pick up EAP account inventory.
- Begin separation of soldiers electing early ETS (for soldiers whose ETS dates are within 90 days prior to E-Date).
- Ensure incoming AMEDO personnel are appropriately diverted.
- Units validates 2404s originally submitted to Support Operations (annotate parts received on original acceptance 2404).
- DISCOM begins LF inquiries.

MILESTONES: PROJECT RELIABLE PRIDE

- E-90 cont** Coordinate with G1 for reassignment of AMEDD NCO's who cannot be reassigned at Ft. Lewis. Develop unit history report.
- E-80** Turn-in EAP material. Request EAP, PRP and Nuclear Qualification termination.
- E-75** **KEY** Reports of survey and adjustment documents Completed. Submit request for termination of barracks cable TV service effective E-Date. Appropriate award recommendations completed prior to soldiers departure (ongoing). Termination of responsibility of EAP, PRP and Nuclear Qualification. Coordinate with PM for weapons transfer dates.
- E-60** **KEY** Receive Inactivation orders/clearance. Monitor NCO-ER/OER requirements. Review rehab distribution needs. Coordinate with Inactivating units, reassign core MOSs not needed for turn-in duties. Prepare/submit appropriate NCO-ER/OER. Begin personnel zero balance monitoring. Submit unit surplus report (equipment) to 9D. 100% inventory of all unit historical property. Begin cross leveling/transfer of personnel (ongoing). Identify consolidated classified materials holding area. Submit Inactivation news release to media. Submit publication cancellation. Gaining units implement sponsorship, reception, and orientation plans. Begin food service equipment TI. Identify soldiers who will be TDY during inactivation, monitor reassignment. Long lead time parts verified by DMMC. Turn-in identified long lead time equipment with funds. Coordinate with PM for Arms room certification inspections. Staff with losing and gaining MSC's any AMEDD officer reassignments.
- E-45** **KEY** All weapons turned-in. **KEY** Accountable classified documents cleared. **KEY** Complete arms room clearance. Notify PM & DAMO of Turn-in or deactivation of JSIDS. **KEY** Complete turn-in of training support equipment clear TASC accounts. **KEY** Notify Division of SCI billets to be turned in and provide a list of names of soldiers requiring SCI billets in follow-on assignment to SSO. Monitor cross leveling on Division and CORPS levels to ensure remaining Division units retain strength. Request termination of copier contract effective E-Date. Notify DSEC of personnel transferred to other units. Coordinate with museum curator, identify and report to PAO any significant historical items and memorabilia (Trophies, WWII flags etc.). Request termination of SSSC account effective E-Date.

MILESTONES: PROJECT RELIABLE PRIDE

E-45 cont Notify FORSCOM of SCI Billets to be turned in.
 Cancel R&U account with DEH.

E-30 **KEY** Turn-in intelligence reference material to G2 ASPS.
 KEY All remaining organizational equipment turn in complete.
 KEY Turn-in OPLANs to G3.
 KEY Remaining Classified documents destroyed or transferred to holding area. Supporting MFR sent to G2.
 Complete and forward performance counseling forms on soldiers with bars to MSC Retention NCO.
 Begin separation of soldiers electing early ETS (whose ETS is within 90 days after E-Date).
 Submit post office change of address cards.
 Submit RFO's for on-post ANMEDD officers/warrant officer reassignments.
 Package and ship unit historical items and memorabilia (traphies, etc.).
 Inspect classified documents holding areas (S2).
 Begin turn-in of unserviceable CONNEX containers.
 Conduct close-out coordination with AOAP Lab and 95th Cal.
 Begin intensive monitoring of SIDPERS for departures, error resolution, and OSTR.
 Notify DA Branch OMB of ANMEDD officer/warrant officer changes in reassignments.

E-20 ADP accreditation packets turned in to DAMO.

E-15 **KEY** Complete final Billets Pre-Clearance Inspection.
 KEY Complete UCMJ/Chapter actions. Reassign soldiers pending elimination, chapter etc., whose actions are not completed.
 KEY Finalize/complete change of roster NCO-ER/OER.
 KEY Bring unit to zero strength.
 Coordinate with PM for vacant building security patrols.
 Begin clearing remaining facilities.
 Complete turn-in of unserviceable CONNEX containers.
 Inventory and turn-in all blank forms.
 Close out LCR account.
 Coordinate adjustment of news paper and DB distribution.
 Turn-in unit historical report to PAO.

E-14 **KEY** Monitor unit zero balance reports between now and E-Date.
 ADP equipment notification to DSEC.


E-10 Final personnel security clearance processing review by DSEC.
 Final Security Clearance Roster validation with DSEC.

E-7 Visit gaining units to talk with transferred soldiers (ongoing CSM).

MILESTONES: PROJECT RELIABLE PRIDE


- E-6 KEY** Submit SDPERS CLOS transaction to remove affected unit from organization files.
- E-5 KEY** Hazardous waste turned in.
- E-1** Submit OADL transition.
- E-0 KEY** Inactivation Ceremony.
Remove affected units from monthly AMEDO USR.
Remove affected units from TACCS organization tables.
Terminate meal card account.
- E+5** Submit final dining facilities personnel status report.
Package and ship unit canteen and guidons.
Submit dining facilities account card.
- E+7** Destruction of SDPERS Interface Branch reports on affected unit.
- E+10 KEY** Close out unit organizational hand receipts/reconcile property book.
Turn-in to PAO one copy of Inactivation After Action Report.
Close out MSA hand receipts.
- E+15 KEY** Submit remaining NCO-ER/OERs.
KEY Completion of turn-in/lateral transfer of FMB, Installation property and facilities.
KEY Vacate Buildings/Facilities.
Submit subsistence report.
- E+20 KEY** Reconcile FMB, Installation and facilities hand receipts.

DIVISION INACTIVATION TEAM RESPONSIBILITIES



Appendix 1, Figure 7

EQUIPMENT TURN-IN FLOWCHART (SAMPLE)



Appendix 1, Figure 8

PERSONNEL STATUS


GI/AG SECTION

OVERALL STATUS	(O)
- PERSONNEL ISSUES	(O)
- PERSONNEL SERVICE	(O)
- REENLISTMENT	(O)
- ADMIN SERVICES	(O)
- LEGAL	(O)
- MEDICAL	(O)

note: color code status
green=no problems
amber=minor problems
red= major problems

PERSONNEL INACTIVATION PLAN

1st Battalion, 9th Aviation Regiment



Appendix 1, Figure 10

OFFICER/WO/ENLISTED DISPOSITION

UNIT -----

START DATE STRENGTH	-----	DATE	-----	
TODAY'S STRENGTH	-----	DATE	-----	
% FILL	-----			
	ORDERS CUT	ORDERS EXECUTED	ORDERS NOT EXECUTED	AWAITING ORDERS
REASSIGNED WITHIN DIV	----	----	----	----
REASSIGNED WITHIN POST	----	----	----	----
PCS	----	----	----	----
ETS	----	----	----	----
RETIREMENT	----	----	----	----
OTHER	----	----	----	----
				TOTAL

Appendix 1, Figure 11 NOTE: SEPARATE CHARTS ARE MADE FOR OFF/WO/ENL.

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE

G2 SECTION

OVERALL STATUS

- PERSONNEL CLEARANCE (O)
- ARMS ROOM CLEARANCE (O)
- SENSITIVE ITEMS TURN-IN (O)
- CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT STATUS (O)
- COMSEC EQUIPMENT TURN-IN (O)
- EMERGENCY ACTION PROGRAM (O)

note: color code status
green=no problems
amber=minor problems
red=major problems

PERSONNEL CLEARANCE STATUS

G2 SECTION

UNIT	ROSTER VALIDATED (E-120)	TERMINATE ACCESS (CONTINUOUS)	FINAL REVIEW (E-10)	FINAL RECONCILIATION (E+10)
HHC, 1 BDE	O	O	O	O
2-23	O	O	O	O
4-23	O	O	O	O
1-33	O	O	O	O
1-9	O	O	O	O

note: color code status
 green-no problems
 amber-minor problems
 red-major problems

Appendix 1, Figure 13

ARMS ROOM STATUS G2 SECTION

UNIT	PRIVATE WEAPONS (E-40)	WEAPONS TURN-IN (E-30)	DEH COORD (E-25)	JSIDS DISCONNECT (E-20)	ARMS ROOM CLEARED (E-16)
HHC, 1 BDE	O	O	O	O	O
2-23	O	O	O	O	O
4-23	O	O	O	O	O
1-33	O	O	O	O	O
1-9	O	O	O	O	O

note: color code status
green=no problems
amber=minor problems
red=major problems

SENSITIVE ITEMS TURN-IN **G2 SECTION (E-30)**

UNITS	WEAPONS	AMMO	NIGHT VISION DEVICES
HHC, 1 BDE	O	O	O
2-23	O	O	O
4-23	O	O	O
1-33	O	O	O
1-9	O	O	O

note: color code status
green=no problems
amber=minor problems
red=major problems

DOCUMENT/COMSEC STATUS

G2 SECTION

UNITS	HHC, 1 BDE	2-23	4-23	1-33	1-9
DOCUMENTS					
• INVENTORY (E-120)	O	O	O	O	O
• DESTRUCTION	O	O	O	O	O
• TRANSFER (E-90)	O	O	O	O	O
• CLNC MFR (E-45)	O	O	O	O	O
COMSEC					
• INVENTORY (E-120)	O	O	O	O	O
• TURN-IN (E-116)	O	O	O	O	O
• RELIEF LETTER (E-110)	O	O	O	O	O

note: color code status
green=no problems
amber=minor problems
red=major problems

OPERATIONS STATUS

G3 SECTION

OVERALL STATUS	(O)
- WAR PLANS	(O)
- MASTER TRAINING PLAN	(O)
- SOLDIER SUSTAINMENT TRAINING	(O)
- INACTIVATION CEREMONIES	(O)
- TRAINING RESOURCES	(O)

note: color code status
green=no problems
amber=minor problems
red= major problems

TURN-IN OPLANS/WARBOOK

G3 SECTION(E-30)

UNIT	STATUS
HHC, 1 BDE	O
2-23	O
4-23	O
1-33	O
1-9	O

note: color code status
green=no problems
amber=minor problems
red=major problems

TASC ACCOUNTS **G3 SECTION**

UNIT	CLEAR/DATE(E-45)
HHC, 1 BDE	O
2-23	O
4-23	O
1-33	O
1-9	O

note: color code status
green=no problems
amber=minor problems
red=major problems


LOGISTICS STATUS

G4 SECTION

OVERALL STATUS	(O)
ON SCHEDULE	(O)
• INVENTORY	(O)
• TECH INSPECTION	(O)
• TURN-IN	(O)
ACCOUNTABILITY	(O)
MAINTENANCE	(O)
FUND ACCOUNTING	(O)
FACILITIES	(O)

note: color code status
green=no problems
amber-minor problems
red- major problems

-----UNIT EQUIPMENT TURN-IN STATUS G4 SECTION (TREND ANALYSIS)



Appendix 1, Figure 21

LOGISTICS STATUS (TRANSFER/TURN-IN)

G4 SECTION

1. UNIT: 1-33

2. STATUS AS OF-----

TYPE	QUANTITY	% INVENTORY	TRANSFER TURN-IN	TOTAL %
ORGANIZATION	6610	100%	6277	95%
INSTALLATION	1166	100%	36	3%
FMB	4872	100%	187	3%
FACILITIES	27	100%	0	0%

3. EQUIPMENT STATUS REPORT (ORGANIZATION)

TYPE	QUANTITY	TRANSFER	TURN-IN	TOTAL %
WHEEL VEH	116	23	67	70%
TRACK VEH	99	0	94	96%
GEN/EN EQUIP	19	6	8	68%
WEAPONS	1661	342	1308	99%
CTA	1126	16	1008	91%
COMMO	788	149	686	93%
COMSEC	406	268	146	99%
NON-STND	301	13	272	96%
AIRCRAFT	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
OTHER	2096	446	1649	96%
TOTAL	6610			

Note: This chart provides more detailed analysis of a unit.
Appendix 1, Figure 22 Use with trend analysis to review compliance with milestone.

FACILITIES STATUS **G4 SECTION**

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>BUILDING</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
2-23	PO3412 PO3415	BN HQ BARRACKS	TURN-IN 15 SEP DEH FINAL INSPECT
4-23	PT3467 PT3489	SUPPLY BARRACKS	DEH REPAIR OVERFLOW

BUILDINGS REMAINING AS OF-----

COMPTROLLER STATUS
DIVISION COMPTROLLER SECTION

OVERALL STATUS (O)

USE OF ACCOUNT CODE (O)

USE OF PROJECT CODE (O)

WITHIN BUDGET (O)

NOTE: COLOR CODE STATUS
GREEN - NO PROBLEMS
AMBER - MINOR PROBLEMS
RED - MAJOR PROBLEMS

INACTIVATION COSTS COMPTROLLER SECTION

	E-180	E-120	E-30	E-DATE	TOTAL
FACILITIES					
WHEEL VEH					
TRACK VEH					
GEN/EN EQUIP					
WEAPONS					
CTA					
COMMO					
COMSEC					
NON-STND					
AIRCRAFT					
OTHER					
TOTAL					

Appendix 1, Figure 25

INACTIVATION ISSUES

- **LATERAL TRANSFER OF UTILITY VEHICLES TO RC**
- **REQUIRED SUPPORT FOR SUMMER ROTC ADVANCED CAMP**
- **BATTALION COMMAND SLATING REVISION**

Note: Division G6 can highlight specific issues to indicate progress and to appraise command group of status.

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5. Ibid., p. 52.
6. Ibid.
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9. 9th ID MOI, pp. B-1-1 to B-1-3.
10. Martin Blumenson, Reorganization of the Army, 1962, pp. 93-94.
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12. Ibid., pp. A-1 to A-2.
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15. 9th ID MOI, pp. 6-7.

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20. U.S. Department of the Army, Message, FORSCOM, Equipment Redistribution Instructions, pp. 1-5.
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22. U.S. Department of the Army, Memorandum: Reliable Pride Lessons Learned, pp. 1-2.
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27. EA 9th ID, p. 25.

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