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AIRLAND BATTLE

AND

LOW INTENSITY WARFARE

BY

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-INTRODUCTION-

The past five years have been a period of unprecedented self-examination, critical review and positive evolution for the United States Army. We have fielded a new warfighting doctrine--the AirLand Battle--that maximizes the potential of the Army to fight and win. The Army 86 studies, recent force design initiatives for an Army of Excellence, and related actions addressing deployability, cohesion and readiness are continually improving the structure of the force. We have undertaken the greatest equipment modernization program in the history of the Army, and concurrently have experienced a near revolution in techniques and modern realistic facilities for training. The establishment of Total Army Goals and promulgation of The Army Plan have provided a direction for policy. For the first time we have structured a system to deal with change, to focus the development of equipment, organizations, training and doctrine. Through all these efforts is woven a constant thread--to improve the capability of the Army to accomplish its mission:

"TO DETER ANY ATTACK UPON US NATIONAL INTERESTS AND, IF DETERRENCE FAILS, TO ENGAGE AND DEFEAT ANY ENEMY IN ANY ENVIRONMENT".

This is a strategic statement of the broadest order. Implied within it is a wide and complex range of tasks at many levels, and across the spectrum of conflict. (Fig 1).

| PEACE | LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT | MID INTENSITY CONFLICT | HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT |
|--|---|--|---|
| ABSOLUTE PEACE CULTURAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION | POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONFLICT, FORMATION OF CARTELS & ALLIANCES, BOYCOTT PROPAGANDA, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SANCTIONS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL CONFLICT HOSTILE PROPAGANDA BOYCOTTS, SEIZURES, BORDER INCIDENTS AND REPRISALS TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM, ASSASSINATIONS, SABOTAGE, HOSTAGES TAKING AND RESCUES, TRAINING AND ADVISORY ASSISTANCE MILITARY SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE OVERT LIMITED CONFLICT REBELLION, REVOLUTION, GUERRILLA AND COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS, EXTERNAL ADVISORS IN COMBAT, OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY, SEIZURE OF RESOURCES INCREASED MILITARY SUPPORT AND DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT OPERATIONS, EXTERNAL FORCES INVOLVED IN COMBAT | REGULAR FORCES ENGAGED, ATTACKS ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE, DECLARATION OF WAR, INVASION, EXPANDED CHERICAL WAR, ATTACKS ON CIVIL TARGETS, INCREASING NATIONAL FOCUS OR MILITARY VICTORY STRATEGIC WAR, EXPANSION OF MILITARY FORCE ACROSS SPECTRUM OF MILITARY CAPABILITY, MOBILIZATION | FULL MOBILIZATION WAR IN ALL DIMENSIONS, SEA, AIR & LAND, DECLARATION OF INTENT TO CONQUER TACTICAL NUCLEAR COMBAT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR |
| RELATIVE PEACE | INCREASING TENSIONS | LIMITED WAR | GENERAL WAR |

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. The limited use of power by nations or organisations; to gain or protect territory and interests; coerce, control, or defend a population; to establish or defend rights; to influence the political and economic systems. It includes military operations by or against irregular forces, peacekeeping operations, terrorism, counterterrorism, rescue and military assistance, often under conditions of armed opposition. The commitment of regular armed forces, other than those indigenous to the conflict, is limited to advisory and supporting roles or to specific short term missions of a decisive nature. Low intensity conflict is characterized by the employment of military capabilities--rather than military force--in concert with other aspects of national power to achieve political, economic and social goals.

MID INTENSITY CONFLICT. The limited use of power by nations or organisations in order to gain or protect territory and interests. This intensity of conflict does not include the use of nuclear weapons. However, it is characterized by the protracted employment of regular armed forces in combat as a major manifestation of power by the threat and responding nations, and the designation of purely military objectives to achieve political and economic goals.

HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT. The unlimited use of power by one or more nations to gain or protect territory and interests which directly affect the survival of the nation. This form of conflict is characterized by extreme levels of violence. The employment of the full range of military force, sustained by the preponderance of other national resources, to achieve military and political victory is the primary manifestation of power by the threat and the responding nations. It may include the use of nuclear weapons and may include some or all of the techniques and characteristics of low and mid intensity conflict.

These categories are an adaptation of proposed definitions developed at USAJFKSC in November 1983.

Fig 1 - Spectrum of Conflict

Conflict takes many forms but in every case it is characterized by a threat or potential threat (which may, or may not, be immediately violent in nature), an interest (which may be tangible, clearly apparent and direct or intangible, somewhat obscure and indirect), and a response which involves the application of power by those whose interest is threatened.

The degree to which military force is employed in the application of power varies with the importance of the interest and the level of violence which characterizes the conflict. But in all conflicts--violent or nonviolent--military capability is a factor and military forces play a role along with the political, economic, and other aspects of national power. (Fig 2).




Fig 2 - Relative Impact of Elements of Power
Across Conflict Spectrum

The Army's focus in recent years has been on the mid and high intensity end of the spectrum, and as an Army and a nation we are relatively well prepared for high and mid intensity conflicts--the European, Korean or Southwest Asian wars. We are also capable of dealing with the very limited short-fuse contingency situation as demonstrated so well recently in Grenada. Nevertheless, the AirLand Battle doctrine, our training, equipment and organizations must allow us to contribute effectively in the less visible, but equally important long term struggles which characterize most of the world. The reinvigoration of Special Operations Forces and the creation of the new Light Infantry Division with its orientation toward true light infantry-not line infantry made lighter-are significant steps in the correct direction. However, these initiatives need to be viewed from and woven into a perspective that focuses on the broader problems and challenges of Low Intensity Conflict. For in low intensity conflict it is in the relationship between AirLand Battle fundamentals and the operational level of war as applied prior to the use of US Conventional Forces that the seeds of success lay.

-THE PROBLEM-

Fundamentally it is the threat that is most influential in deciding how military power is employed. Traditionally our national policy has been one of deterrence--through forces in

being--and committing US forces to combat in reaction to an attack or a direct and overt threat to US national interests.

Low intensity operations have involved the United States or its allies in Africa, Latin America, Asia and to a lesser degree, in Europe for the past two decades. Furthermore, the United States is now involved in a smoldering low intensity conflict across the globe with which neither the nation nor the Army is presently able to cope. Its hot spots are located in the developing nations where our national interests have been and are being steadily and indirectly eroded. These insidious and, in isolation, often minor episodes of low intensity activity are not perceived as direct threats by the public and in many cases by senior leaders. Nevertheless, their cumulative effect can be devastating to US interests. Our response has been such that we may be placed in a position of having no alternative but to commit substantial forces at the mid or high intensity range in an effort to restore a situation or to limit damage. When that happens we have failed in our mission--regardless of the outcome of the combat--for the first task of the US Army is to deter mid and high intensity war.

At the low end of the conflict scale, deterrence has a different character than it does at the higher levels of intensity. It is not so much an issue of preventing hostilities through a balance of forces in-being as it is one of preventing or ameliorating the conditions which lead to hostilities by effective use of available military resources in concert with

other elements of national power. Our efforts in the lower end of the conflict spectrum have been inadequate, open us to criticism and risk failure.

While the visible threat to Western Europe may remain the greatest single potential risk to the survival of the United States, the subtle threat to United States interests extant today in the developing regions of the world places us at equal risk--now. Simply put, the threat is change.

THE FIRST RULE OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS IS THAT CHANGE WILL OCCUR.

Change may be evolutionary or revolutionary--but it will come. That process must be influenced where and when it serves our national interests. This is a long term process in which the political, economic and psychological options provide the best route to lasting success. However, because of the major role played by the indigenous military in most developing nations, the US Army can make a significant contribution to US efforts.

THE SECOND RULE OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS IS THAT SOME DEGREE OF VIOLENCE AND COUNTER-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY IS LIKELY.

It is at this point that the Army historically has become involved--usually after significant damage has occurred.

The worldwide commitments of the United States clearly require a doctrine and structure which is appropriate to any conditions under which the US Army might have to fight. FM 100-5, operations provides such a doctrine, It states in Chapter 2 that:

"The US Army must meet a variety of situations and challenges...It may fight on a sophisticated battlefield with an existing infrastructure--or on a relatively unsophisticated battlefield, it may have to create an infrastructure or choose to fight without one. It must be ready to fight light, well equipped forces such as Soviet-supported insurgents or sophisticated terrorist groups...Soldiers and units must prepare for such battles, and the Army's operational concept must enable it to win. AirLand Battle is the doctrine that deals with these worldwide challenges."

However, simple military intervention--if successful--restores a situation to the status-quo ante. The challenges of low intensity conflict defy purely military solutions, they require a multi-discipline approach which recognizes the interplay of political, social, cultural, economic, psychological and military factors.

The role of the Army in this milieu is to assist US agencies and our allies in influencing and moderating the effects of change, and preventing the exploitation of violence or resistance by those hostile to our interests. Thus the Army's capability to deal with low intensity conflict at the tactical level is constrained at the outset--and it should be. Tactical operations in a low intensity conflict should, in fact must, be prosecuted by the forces indigenous to the conflict whenever possible.

This does not imply that we are incapable of conducting tactical operations in the low intensity arena. We can, and are improving our ability to do so. However, it is not the capability for a US tactical response that influences change, prevents conflict escalation or deters external involvement. It is credibility and intent that matter. The United States has always been reluctant to apply military force in low intensity operations and when force is applied it is likely to be for a short period in reaction to a direct threat or for immediate and decisive results. In other words, we have traditionally focused our military capability against the symptoms of low intensity conflict -- not against the causes. If we must commit US regular forces to a combat role in a low intensity situation we have lost the initiative, may exacerbate the effects of change and risk escalation of the conflict without necessarily affecting its causes.

THE THIRD RULE OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS IS THAT IF WE CANNOT DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE CHALLENGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY RULES 1 AND 2, WE LOSE.

We believe the United States and the Army are equal to the task. The strategic imperatives are clear, our basic doctrine is sound, and we have a history of demonstrated competence at the tactical level.

However, if we are to meet these challenges we must define the Army's total role and determine how we can best apply our military capability in synchronization with the other elements

of national power. We must develop an operational perspective which allows us to apply our military capabilities using the fundamentals of our doctrine in the low intensity environment, then refine our doctrine and develop organizations, equipment and training in the tactics, techniques and procedures appropriate to low intensity conflict.

This article proposes an operational approach to low intensity conflict.

-AN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT-

1. Purpose.

This concept outlines an approach to military operations in Low Intensity Conflict. It rests on the conviction that such conflicts cannot be won through force of arms alone if the national interests and fundamental values of the United States are to be preserved.

It describes a framework and a method for realizing the Army's potential--in concert with other elements of national power--to assist those indigenous to the conflict in achieving a resolution favorable to the interests of the United States.

This concept does not advocate new ways to fight--it does advocate a new perspective on low intensity conflict at the operational level which will ultimately manifest itself in the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by tactical and operational echelons. This perspective and its realization stem from, and are compatible with the basic worldwide doctrine for

the United States Army--the AirLand Battle--as promulgated in FM 100-5, Operations.

2. General.

a. The primary role of the Army in low intensity conflicts is to:

- o Assist in the prevention and resolution of indigenous or regional conditions which contribute to conflict.

- o Prevent the exploitation of the conflict by external powers hostile to the interests of the United States.

- o Eliminate or minimize likelihood of US combat involvement.

b. Fundamental to this approach is the notion that success does not rest upon the commitment of US ground forces in a combat role; in fact the opposite is more often the case. However direct US assistance may be required, and planning for that eventuality must be continuous and thorough.

c. If US combat involvement is directed US forces orient on stabilizing the situation and returning responsibility for tactical activity to indigenous forces at the earliest opportunity.

d. The concept focuses on the developing regions of the world--the most likely arena for low intensity conflict to occur. But, its fundamentals are appropriate to more developed regions as well--either in isolation or in conjunction with mid and high intensity operations.

e. The application of military power, regardless of the intensity of the conflict, is a national undertaking which must be coordinated from the highest policy-making levels to the basic levels of execution. Thus our approach emphasizes the requirement for synchronization of political, economic, and military activity. This involves the:

- o Identification of US interests.
- o Articulation of a National Strategy to preserve those interests.
- o Recognition of threats to US interests.
- o Development of coordinated policy to support the strategy.
- o Allocation of resources.
- o Identification and execution of tasks or projects.

f. The identification of national interests is beyond the scope of this concept. But the concept recognizes that our national interests are normally expressed in a regional context while execution of policy takes place on a country-by-country basis. Thus, while each nation in a region is unique in its relationship to US interests, each is affected by events taking place elsewhere in the region with a resultant effect on its relationship to our interests. Thus low intensity conflict must be viewed from a regional as well as a country specific perspective. It is for this reason that the focal point for military activity in Low Intensity Conflict is the CINC.

g. National strategy sets the fundamental conditions for operations. This concept proposes that rather than reacting each time a new crisis erupts in the developing world, the United States must identify its long term interests and develop a pragmatic and integrated political, economic, and military strategy based on those interests. That strategy should prevent indigenous or regional conditions which might prove inimical to our interests or prompt Soviet or Soviet sponsored involvement; deter external involvement if prevention fails, and compel the Soviets or their surrogates to desist if deterrence fails. Conversely, when in our interest to do so the strategy should create conditions which will result in situations favorable to our interests and disadvantageous to our competitors.

h. The US Army contributes to national strategy as an element of military power which compliments and supports the other elements of national power. The broad divisions of activity in preparing for and applying military power are the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

(1) Military strategy is the employment of military forces to secure the objectives of national strategy by application of military power or the threat of force. At this level military objectives that support national strategy are clearly identified in consultation with other national level actors and the military command charged with responsibility for the region is allocated resources for planning, coordinating and executing its campaign to achieve them.

(2) The operational level is the bridge between strategy and tactics. The operational level makes use of military resources to attain strategic goals within a theater or region. This involves the direction and employment of military assets, in coordination with US, indigenous, and regional, political, economic, and military actors, to ensure that tactical operations compliment strategic objectives. The duration of US participation will vary by nation and results desired. However, lasting results are not often obtained with short term efforts and a realistic assessment must consider long term as well as short term assistance activities.

i. The tactical level is the employment of combat, combat support and combat service support to accomplish specific high impact tasks which affect the sources of threat or to win specific, short term battles or engagements.

j. AirLand Battle fundamentals are as appropriate to operations in El Salvador and Chad as they are to Europe and Korea. The AirLand Battle doctrine outlined in FM 100-5 provides the basic principles which guide the Army's efforts. Although the tactics, techniques and procedures employed in a given situation may vary, the concept on which the doctrine is based is appropriate to each of the levels of war and to any intensity conflict. It can be explained in four words--initiative, synchronization, agility, and depth. Their relevance to low intensity conflict is described below.

(1) An underlying purpose of every military effort is the seizure and retention of the initiative. Key to this effort is an offensive or proactive orientation which normally is the most effective means of attaining a positive goal. To prevent low intensity conflict we must be as aggressive in prosecuting the peace as we are in prosecuting a war. To do this we must act within the context of an overall plan to create the conditions for success then follow up boldly in a synchronized effort with other actors to resolve the conditions which foment conflict. If hostilities are ongoing, that action should be taken in such a fashion that it facilitates seizing the initiative at the tactical level by friendly forces indigenous to the conflict. The role of the CINC in developing this plan is crucial.

(2) Synchronization is more than coordinated action. It is an all pervading unity of effort across the political, military, economic, and psychological spectrum. There is no wasted effort. Every action of every element flows from an understanding of the national interests and objectives at stake. Synchronization must also characterize our operations with sister services and allies in order to achieve maximum effect on the sources and manifestations of threats. Synchronization between the resources provided to pursue the operational level (most likely US) with those provided to pursue

the tactical level (most likely indigenous) is essential.

(3) Agility means that we must find out what is going on, decide what to do about it, and act faster than those who would exploit the situation. Our operations must do this repeatedly so that as the opponent starts to exploit a condition his plan has already been upset by action which undermines his capability or resolves the condition. As the condition underlying conflict becomes resolved efforts to exploit it become increasingly ineffective, uncoordinated, and counter-productive. The credibility and effectiveness of overt threats wane and they become more vulnerable to collapse and eventual destruction by friendly indigenous forces.

(4) Depth is especially important to low intensity operations. The dimensions of depth are time, distance, and resources. Obviously time and distance are factors in assessing the conditions and potential threats and in allocating resources, while the depth of resources -- men and materiel -- influences the nature of the action taken. But most important to low intensity operations is depth in thought and will. This is the bond that permits initiative and agility and facilitates synchronization. The factors of Mission, Enemy, Terrain (and weather), Troops available and Time are not enough in low intensity operations. The threat is the result of conditions brought about by change and the terrain is the population as well as the geography. To defeat or prevent the emergence of the manifestations of threat we must understand the total

environment as well or better than those who would oppose us. Our dedication to the resolution of the conditions which encourage conflict must be equal to or greater than those who would exploit them.

3. Limitations. Competent civil authority must direct the Army or Army element to commence low intensity operations in support of a government or group in pursuit of clearly defined objectives.

4. Concept.

"There is no simple formula for winning wars. Defeating enemy forces in battle will not always insure victory. Other national instruments of power and persuasion will influence or even determine the results of wars. Wars cannot be won, however, without a national will and military forces equal to the task. Although successful military operations do not guarantee victory they are an indispensable part of winning." (FM 100-5, pg 1-1)

a. The basic difference between military operations in low intensity conflict and the mid to high intensity levels is the nature of military success. In the latter, military success is measured in terms of winning campaigns and battles. In the case of low intensity conflict it is achieving political, social, economic, and military objectives without recourse to protracted combat. Thus the dynamics of the conflict--the interaction of factors that decide the outcome--are broader. Dealing effectively with low intensity conflict requires an understanding of the other instruments of national power and persuasion and their relationship to the military aspects of the conflict.

b. It is imperative that we recognize that low intensity conflict is neither simple nor short term. The environment is not stable, and conflict prevention is not a function of military force ratios. It is a complex multi-level and multi-dimensional problem and the threats it generates are much more diverse than just military.

(1) Developing regions are progressing beyond traditional societies and are experiencing the turbulent processes of economic, social, military, political and psychological change. The process of modernization brings with it rising expectations, a shift toward increased urbanization, and a disruption of traditional customs and values. These changes are all the more difficult to assimilate in the unstable political systems which characterize the developing world with its generally inadequate industrial, educational, and technological base. Change creates exploitable conditions for those who seek political power or the redress of social grievances. Equally threatening is resistance to change which may be due to ideology or undesirable consequences to those who currently wield power and influence. This situation is sometimes reversed and those who are in power seek changes which are resisted by a segment of the society. Thus it is change which gives rise to social, economic, and political conditions which may ultimately manifest themselves in conflict which can

threaten US interests.

(2) In addition to indigenous or regional dissatisfaction and conflict the increasing Soviet involvement in the Third World poses direct challenges to US interests. Their involvement is achieved through alliances, military assistance and surrogates--and, as in Afghanistan, direct intervention where necessary. Their strategy is based on exploiting instability and conflict of local origin often in support of ideologically compatible groups or governments. However, on balance their decision to become involved is usually based on pragmatic rather than ideological grounds. They have clearly chosen a policy of global reach and view the developing nations as ripe for an expansion of their influence, where possible at the expense of the West. The ability of the Soviet Union to project influence far beyond its borders is essentially contained in its military capabilities. This is an inherent weakness in their capacity to achieve long term effects. It is clear that the Soviets are concerned with avoiding serious confrontation with the West and regional powers because they recognize that their ability to achieve long term success is limited vis-a-vis the economic, managerial and technological strengths of the West. And in any case, they perceive themselves as strategically successful without recourse to direct confrontation. Their involvement often provokes an inappropriate response that can be advantageous to Soviet interests and which dilutes the credibility of the United States and diffuses our power.

(3) The initiative rests with those who can influence or exploit the process of change. We have allowed others to exercise the initiative thus enhancing the possibility that conflict will occur.

THE BEST WAY TO WIN A LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS TO PREVENT IT.

c. To do so the Army's contribution must include the ability to advise on the nature of the peace, the character of potential threats and their underlying causes, the political, economic, psychological and military objectives of our military activities, their regional ramifications and the likelihood of success. Key to achieving this capability are the Diplomat, Military Foreign Area Officers, the CINC, and their interaction at the country team and operational levels.

(1) If synergism is to be obtained and the Army's advice is to be useful, diplomats and other USG Representatives must have an understanding and awareness of the military aspects of the situation. More importantly they must have an appreciation for military capabilities--beyond the application of force. Finally they must be sensitive to the relevance of military capabilities in support of nation building, the economic and political elements of power, and the capacity of the US Military to influence indigenous actors.

(2) Foreign area officers perform as attaches, in key positions in the military assistance effort and on the CINCS staff. The breadth of knowledge and depth of understanding needed in low intensity environments cannot be gained on an ad

hoc or as required basis. Additional emphasis on identification and training of high quality officers to fill these needs must be applied now. In-country training of these key personnel must be repetitive and relevant as they progress to positions of higher responsibility if their talents and effectiveness are to be preserved. A major spin-off of such an approach is the expansion; nurturing and strengthening of military-to-military relationships which facilitate our ability to influence change.

(3) The role of the CINC is a critical one. It is at his level that the operational objectives to achieve strategic goals are developed and that the synchronization of effort on a regional basis is achieved. The CINC directs and coordinates the employment of military assets in coordination with the country teams, and other US and indigenous actors to ensure that local efforts support regional and operational level objectives. It is for these reasons that:

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR, AS DESCRIBED IN FM 100-5, MUST BE APPLIED FROM THE LEVEL OF THE CINC IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, WHEREAS IN HIGH AND MID INTENSITY IT IS APPLIED AT THE CORPS LEVEL.

d. As the process of change or external influences begin to create conditions which may affect US national interests, initial efforts are directed toward assessing the impact and the potential threat to US interests which may accrue. The capability of the host nation to respond to the condition and the potential threat is also evaluated. This is a continuous

process under the direction of the Senior US diplomatic representative to the country concerned in conjunction with the CINC'S regional perspective. The entire country team participates in the process and the US Defense Attache and the Senior US Military Representative charged with responsibility for military assistance are key players. It is important to recognize that at the country level the military perspective and ability to influence is more than geographical and broader than the local military. Actions taken in the military arena cannot be separated from--and will have an affect in--the political, economic, psychological and social environments as well. Conversely, not every condition will require a military effort but the situation must be evaluated in a multi-discipline fashion to ensure that military initiatives in one area do not interfere with or inhibit other efforts and vice versa. The focus here is on ensuring a synchronized approach to ameliorating the conditions which result in conflict. The most effective tools in this endeavor are those military capabilities which contribute to nation building. Concurrent sustaining or supporting of indigenous operations against direct threats which may have emerged may also be required. This country or "local level" effort is in effect the identification of tactical level requirements and the execution of operational level plans and direction.

e. The operational level is that of the CINC who supervises the military efforts at the country level within his area of

responsibility. His is often the only regional perspective and consequently he has a much greater range of interests and alternatives he must consider. Just as activity at the local level is synchronized it is even more important that synchronization at this level occur--the military effort at the regional level must be closely coordinated not only with regional actors but also with all the ambassadors and country teams in the region as well as the regional authorities within the State Department and other USG agencies involved. The CINC's staff must be structured to accomplish this synchronization as well as the purely military aspects of the command's mission.

(1) It is from the regional perspective--the operational level--that the resolution of competing priorities and interests takes place. The United States does not have the luxury of countering all threats at all times in all places. We must have the depth of knowledge, the wisdom and the foresight to distinguish the critical threats to our interests and correctly assess their relationship to the rest.

(2) Contingency planning for direct assistance and contingency planning for possible commitment of US forces also begins at this level. Planning should be predicated on achieving decisive results in a short period of time or, as has always been the case, to preserve US interests in imminent danger. Planning for withdrawal of US forces and return of tactical operations to indigenous forces must be integrated with

contingency planning. Throughout the effort at the operational level a key concern is to ensure that actions planned or taken do not create new threats or exacerbate existing conditions.

(3) The CINC is in the best position to ensure that unity of the military effort is obtained, resources are applied against high pay-off targets, and operational synchronization with the other elements of power is obtained. Thus the regional--or operational--level is the focal point for low intensity operations.

5. Success in low intensity conflict is tied to three key requirements.

- INTELLIGENCE
- TOTAL PREPARATION OF THE CONFLICT AREA
- EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF RESOURCES

It must be stressed that these essential elements are not mutually exclusive. None can be effective without the other and if accomplished independently will not necessarily ensure success.

a. INTELLIGENCE is key to obtaining the synergism which attacks the source of the low intensity conflict as well as its symptoms. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) must be comprehensive, thorough, and most important it must begin early. IPB is described in FM 100-5, however, in low intensity conflict its scope is broader particularly in its target development aspects. In low intensity conflict high payoff targets are not necessarily enemy forces, systems or

command and control. Often of greater value are the sources of economic, political and sociological conditions which result in overt manifestations of threat. Attacking these targets through nation building efforts at the operational level can create the conditions for tactical success. We must view low intensity operations from the perspective of the total environment. Consequently, the fusion of economic, political and military intelligence becomes much more important.

(1) IPB is an extension of the process begun by the country team in its analysis of the conditions which might affect US interests. Much of the military input to the process will originate from the DATT, ARMA and military assistance personnel on the scene and will contain information from other USG agencies operating at the local level as well. At the operational level it is vital that commanders and staffs avoid the temptation to focus exclusively on the military manifestations of the threat in directing the intelligence effort. Essential Elements of Information (EEI) and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) must reflect a sensitivity to the interrelationship of military, political and economic and social factors if an integrated view of the total environment is to be obtained. Because of the complex and dynamic nature of low intensity environments the intelligence process must be continuous, proactive and responsive. The intelligence effort is the foundation for virtually all other actions in low intensity operations. Consequently there is a need for intelligence teams at the operational level, with a regional orientation, trained and capable of conducting the required

interface with other USG and indigenous actors in the conflict area. Equally important is the early employment of similar teams in support of indigenous forces to assist in satisfying intelligence needs at the country team and tactical level.

b TOTAL PREPARATION OF THE CONFLICT AREA is the basis for the low intensity campaign. The shape and nature of the effort is determined in coordination with the other elements of national power at the operational level. Its building blocks are Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Civil Affairs (CA), and Security Assistance (SA) which rest on the foundation of intelligence. The whole is bonded together by effective communications and logistics. This effort takes place on two levels:

(1) At the country team level it involves the employment of military assets--normally small teams orienting on intelligence, communications, logistics, engineer, and medical as well as PSYOP and CA--to support indigenous efforts. While their immediate purpose is to assist indigenous tactical operations, their employment has obvious operational overtones.

(2) From the CINC's operational perspective the preparation of the conflict area involves the employment of teams on a regional as well as county specific basis. The focus at this level is ^{on} ensuring that whether or not indigenous forces are successful proper preparation of the conflict area will lessen the requirement for prolonged employment of US Combat Forces. Thus the CINC's emphasis is on providing for indigenous tactical

success, ensuring regional stability and developing an intelligence, logistical and psychological infrastructure that supports contingency plans for the employment of US Forces if required. Illustrative of this approach might be the employment of selected elements of a Light Infantry Division DISCOM in support of nation building efforts during the pre-hostilities phase of a conflict. Should tactical operations begin, Division elements, in team or small unit configuration, support indigenous forces much as they would the combat elements of the Division and in a fashion that compliments the CINCS contingency planning. Such efforts could include establishment of ASP's, water points, medical facilities, LOC's etc. Should indigenous efforts fail then the infrastructure to support execution of contingency plans by US Forces is in place and operating. Close coordination and synchronization with other USG actors is essential in the preparation effort and the CINC and his staff must resist the temptation to effect a quick tactical resolution with US forces which might have adverse impact on the operational objectives. The application of resources must be effective in the operational as well as the tactical sense.

(3) EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF RESOURCES rests on the correct identification of the sources of conflict. Of paramount concern is the effect desired. To attack the symptoms of the condition is to delay the eventual outcome at best and at worst could accelerate the growth of other, equally dangerous sources

of conflict. Clearly there is a requirement to deal with the immediate threats which manifest themselves but it is essential that those actions contribute to the resolution of the fundamental problem. The focus must be on payoff--the goal is to apply the right resource at the right time to the sources of threat in a synergistic effort with the other elements of national power. At the operational level the employment of these resources is analagous to a deep attack--they provide time and opportunity for indigenous forces or agencies to deal with immediate threats and at the same time reduce the influence of the underlying conditions which foment overt threats. Maximum impact is obtained through the effective use of intelligence, PSYOPS, engineer, medical, civil affairs, communication, combat service support, advisory and special operations elements.

(1) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are an essential component of political, economic and military actions that support both long term and immediate objectives. They can reinforce the effectiveness of one element of power and at the same time inhibit efforts in another area. Therefore, PSYOPS planning and execution must be carefully integrated at the operational level as well as at the country level. An integrated PSYOP effort at both levels must begin early if its full potential is to be realized Army PSYOPS units must be sensitive to and supportive of the PSYOPS requirements of other

USG agencies involved in the region.

(2) Civil Affairs (CA) at the operational and country team levels are directed at political, economic and sociological conditions which may produce or lend credibility to overt threats. Continuous and effective intelligence and PSYOPS operations must be integrated with the CA effort to maximize its effect. In long term actions planning must ensure that indigenous personnel are trained concurrently so that the CA effort is lasting and pervasive after US efforts are terminated. CA activity should be planned and executed in a logical pattern to obtain a synergistic effect and increase impact where possible. For example Army engineer construction of a reservoir, Peace Corps efforts at irrigation farming and an agriculture plan for fish breeding should be coordinated closely and executed concurrently rather than as separate projects over a protracted period. All military organizations are capable of conducting CA activities. In most cases however, the greatest impact is obtained from those organizations which can contribute to Nation Building--Engineer, Transportation, Quartermaster and, Signal organizations can have a profound impact on economic and political conditions while Medical, Military Police and Administrative elements can help in ameliorating sociological problems. However, their effectiveness is a function of their training and preparation for employment in low intensity operations and the Army's force structure. It is questionable

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12 either is adequate today. The fundamental questions for the operational level in selecting the target for CA activity are: Does it compliment the total effort?; If I apply the resource to the sources of the threat will the effect be greater than if I dedicate it against the manifestation of the threat?; and, Will it lessen the potential for eventual commitment of US forces?

(3) Security Assistance (SA) is based on the view that the indigenous actor assumes the primary responsibility for tactical operations from the outset. US efforts focus on ensuring their military posture is credible and adequate to meet potential threats and to minimize the possibility that US combat forces may be called on. At the operational level care must be taken to ensure that SA efforts compliment US interests and are not counterproductive to PSYOPS and CA activities. If hostilities have not begun equal emphasis should be placed on the military's ability to contribute to national development and on its role in society as an agent of the population in dealing with the effects of change and the conditions which contribute to conflict. If hostilities are ongoing SA should focus on providing the indigenous forces the training, equipment, and wherewithal to achieve tactical objectives while continuing to contribute to national development. At the country level Military Assistance Groups, (MAAGS) Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Mobile Training Teams (MTT) are the cutting edge of the SA effort. In most of the developing world SA personnel are in a position to influence the

most influential indigenous actor--the military. Consequently, the scope of their effort must be broader than the purely military task or support they provide. MTT and SOP elements should be augmented with medical engineer, intelligence, PSYOPS and CA assets based on the local situation. In addition to close and continuous liaison with the country team, they form a key link between the operational level and the indigenous military providing feedback on the progress of the campaign. They must be attuned to the total environment, aware of their role in the intelligence cycle and sensitive to their ability to influence the PSYOPS, CA and political processes. This requires increased emphasis on language, regional orientation, and skill of personnel selected for these duties.

(4) Finally, since low intensity conflicts are dynamic and rarely short term we must be able to sustain the effort and ensure effective control. Sound logistics planning and rapid, robust communications are essential to success. Flexibility and responsiveness are the key words in logistics and communications in low intensity environments. It is imperative that the Army communications network be compatible with other USG agencies at the regional and local levels. Planning and structuring of the logistics organizations should also consider the requirement to support other agencies. Ideally the capacity for both logistics and communications should exceed immediate demand to the degree that rapid expansion of both systems is possible.

d. At the operational level the processes of intelligence, total preparation of the conflict area and effective application

of resources develops the framework in which the Army operates, defines the Army's role and analyzes and identifies overt, emerging and potential threats and the conditions which foster them. This enables the CINC to identify the operational objectives and develop plans, assign missions and dedicate assets which:

- o Assist in the prevention or resolution of the conditions which contribute to conflict.
- o Prevent the exploitation of the conflict.
- o Minimize the likelihood of US combat involvement.

6. Thus far this concept has focused on an operational perspective based on the fundamental principles of AirLand Battle doctrine which attempts to resolve the low intensity conflict without resorting to direct involvement in combat. However, we do not live in a perfect world. Although this approach lessens the likelihood of US involvement in combat operations, it is possible that a US threat to US interests will not be identified until it has reached serious proportions or has grown beyond the capability of indigenous forces to contain. Thus, the commitment of US forces in direct support of indigenous forces engaged in combat and, at the extreme, directly to combat on behalf of US interests is possible. Such an eventuality does not negate the requirement for the activities described earlier. If anything, it demands a more concerted effort at the operational level to nullify the conditions which produce the threat while concurrently directing

operations at the tactical level. The US effort is oriented at providing the assistance necessary for the indigenous forces to win the tactical battle, while concurrently attacking the sources of the threat in concert with economic, political, and psychological efforts.

a. The fundamental requirements of intelligence, civil affairs and PSYOPS remain primary concerns and the factors of security assistance, logistics, and communications take on greater significance in order to provide adequate support to the military effort. Thus, total preparation of the conflict area has served a contingency function as well by providing the basic intelligence, logistic and C² infrastructure to support the introduction of US combat forces in advisory, supporting, peacekeeping, counterguerilla, or higher intensity operations if directed by the National Command Authority. The objective in commitment of US forces to a combat or combat support role, is to effect a decisive change in the conflict, to preserve US interests in serious jeopardy or to provide the time and space for indigenous forces to regain the tactical initiative and resume control of tactical operations.

b. The degree to which US military force is applied and the rules of engagement are based on recommendations developed at the operational level in close consultation with other USG and indigenous actors. The goal is to restrict the use of force and the level of commitment to the minimum level feasible. This

implies short and decisive actions which reinforce the notion of allocation of assets towards the highest payoff and which contribute to efforts to deal with the sources of the conflict.

c. The manner in which we apply our tactical assets will vary with the situation. It is preferable that they be used at decisive points for specific payoff rather than as surrogate general purpose forces. We cannot afford to let our involvement in tactical operations become counterproductive. The requirement for synchronization of military operations with the other elements of the country team is in no way diminished and the operational level must be particularly attuned to the information and coordination requirements of the tactical forces.

d. We have good basic doctrine and we are developing organizations for low intensity tactical operations. If there is a serious problem at this level it is training and force structure in the areas of PSYOPS, civic action and counter guerilla operations for general purpose forces that might be committed to low intensity operations. Conventional forces earmarked for possible commitment to low intensity operations should be augmented with intelligence, PSYOPS, and CA personnel; language and area training are essential ingredients to success. Conventional forces must be prepared to operate unconventionally this is not so much a problem of doctrine--all of the operative tactics of AirLand Battle are relevant--it is a problem of application and training in tactics, techniques and procedures relevant to the region and potential threats.

7. Low intensity conflicts cannot be won, or even contained, by military power alone. The challenge is a national one which requires the synchronized application of all elements of national power across the entire range of conditions which are the sources of the conflict, and concurrently against the immediate threats which challenge US interests. The Army's role in low intensity conflict is a major one--likely to be played out on the global stage with increasing frequency in the future--and we are not adequately prepared for the part.

a. We must accelerate our efforts, to identify the requirements and develop the capabilities in training, equipment, and organizations to meet the broader demands of low intensity conflict.

b. We must, continue to refine our doctrine and emphasize the development of the tactics, techniques and procedures appropriate to the low intensity environment.

c. We must ensure that an adequate reservoir of personnel with the language skills, multi discipline orientation, and regional background necessary to meet the complexities of low intensity operations is maintained.

d. Most importantly, we must begin to identify, establish and standardize the interdepartmental linkages with other US Government agencies that will facilitate planning, enhance synchronization, and permit the efficient and synergistic application of resources to the causes of low intensity conflict.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

We believe this concept, with its operational perspective is a step in the right direction. But like most things of great worth, this capability will not be easily gained. We do not presume to have identified the answer--we have not identified all the challenges--but it is clear we must start, and we propose the Army serve as a catalyst to make it happen. As a beginning we recommend that the Army

- o Stress the requirement for CINCS and staffs to view their missions from the perspective of the operational level and train them accordingly--just as we ~~have done~~ ^{ARE DOING} for corps commanders and staffs for mid and high intensity environments.

- o Re-emphasize and advance the concept of the Foreign Area Officer (SC 48) with a focus on the operational level that compliments the tactical orientation of Special Operations Forces.

- o Continue to enhance Special Operations Forces as the cutting edge of Security Assistance, Foreign Internal Development, Strike Operations and Strategic Intelligence Collection in the developing world.

- o Revitalize, develop and enhance the nation building capability of the Army with emphasis on augmenting or enhancing the activities of Security Assistance Teams and SOP.

- o Structure, man, train and dedicate a portion of conventional forces for Combat and Combat Support Operations in the developing regions of the world.

- o Initiate and offer its support, to the JCS in developing and conducting an interdepartmental Mission Area

Analysis on low intensity conflict. At a minimum the effort should involve the Services, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, USAID, USAIS and Commerce with other agency participation as required. The objective of the analysis should be to identify deficiencies and develop solutions toward a synchronized and truly national approach to Low Intensity Conflict.