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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
MATCHING THE NEW WORLD ORDER

by
JOHN CHARLES GAVIN

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**Abstract of
EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
MATCHING THE NEW WORLD ORDER**

The aging face of U.S. National Security Strategy is examined by highlighting the proposed alterations in the U.S. Defense Posture as articulated by President BUSH in his 'Aspen Institute Address' of 2 August 1990.

An overview of the key factors of Strategy and their application to the evolving National Security Strategy is conducted. In the future the U.S. will structure our forces and conduct our strategy with a more pronounced emphasis on National Interest rather than threat orientation, while maintaining a wary eye on our Soviet adversary. General Powell's 'Base Force' proposal is explored, found suitable and endorsed. Ultimately, the changing face of the World Order brought about by Soviet disengagement and Warsaw Pact disintegration mandate reduction and restructuring of U.S. Armed Forces.

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Change has been the chronic condition of the twentieth century. Sadly, as the dawn of the 1990's gives evidence peaceful change has made precious few appearances. The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia and Central and South America, demonstrate the world is altering in revolutionary ways which are mind numbing in their speed and impact.

Since the close of the second world war the United States pursued a national security strategy essentially Eurasian focused, anti-hegemonically structured and designed to preserve balance of power relative to our principle adversary, the Soviet Union. During our 'Eurasian Phase'¹ our security was indexed to the military capability and ideological expansionism of the Soviet Union. Deterrence, alliances, positioning our forces forward for flexible defense, and the ability to project massive power at great distance were the cornerstones of security. Continuing events in Eastern Europe have eliminated the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact security arrangement. The results are obvious, America will craft a new National Security Strategy which reflects this fundamental alteration in the world order.

Thesis: The National Security Strategy of the United States will be the focus of a total reexamination of both America's role in the world and her overall military capability to support this role. The major factor underlying this reexamination is the recognition by ~~of~~ the Congress and the Administration that the

amount of resources devoted to Defense in the last decade need not be sustained in the face of Soviet economic and military decline.

The strategy challenge for the U.S. defense community in the 1990's is to adjust strategically to budgetary hard times.

U.S. planners face the dilemma- that on one hand- because political peace visibly is breaking out between East and West, military means are certain to shrink to a substantial degree. On the other hand, the very events that undermine the political rationale for western defense preparation also generate an instability which is unprecedented in the postwar period.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the form and substance of the Evolving National Security Strategy proposed by the Department of Defense. Further, to analyze its ability to support U.S. Interests world wide.

CHAPTER II THE KEY FACTORS OF STRATEGY

In order to discuss the concept and form of our evolving National Security Strategy it is useful to define our term:

STRATEGY

'The art of distributing military means to fulfil the ends of policy'

Liddell Hart

'The practical adaptation of the means at hand to the ends in view'

Helmuth von Moltke

'There are no prizes for coming in second. Failure in deterrence means war; failure in war means defeat. Strategy is about winning and losing.'

Colin Gray

Definitions are arbitrary and can be either true or false, depending on ones perspective. But they are necessary for clear communication. 'Policy is the purpose of governments and policy making is the process by which high government officials determine what those purposes should be.'³ Liddell Hart's 'Grand Strategy', which in peacetime American lexicon is called National Security Strategy, is the art of employing all the relevant assets of a country for the political purpose set by high policy.

'The U.S. has throughout our history pursued a stable set of policy goals. We have always sought to protect the safety of the Nation, its citizens and our way of life. We have also worked to advance the welfare of our people by contributing to an international environment of peace, freedom and progress within which our democracy, and other free nations can flourish.'⁴

Given these policy goals this the modern pillars of America's strategy have been; Deterrence, Alliances, Forward presence and Force projection. In light of the fundamental changes in the world order, are these enduring pillars or artifices which will need to be altered in some radical manner?

The nature of change to the strategy equation^{is} worthy of study. Dr. Roger W. Barret identifies six key factors which contribute to the formulation of strategy: Geography, National Objectives, Adversaries, Alliances, Strategic Culture, and Forces to carry out the strategy.

a. The Impact of Geography

Universally geography captures first place on the list. Why? As evidenced by the most rudimentary elementary school globe, it is permanent. The application of geography to U.S. strategy has fostered an almost sophomoric debate regarding our status as a Maritime Power, a Continental Power or an Aerospace Power. The old saw; a sailor sees the world as a grouping of islands surrounded by oceans, a soldier views continents interrupted by lakes, and an airman the world as a series of air navigation routes linking officer's clubs, has a loud ring of truth to it. In point of fact America is historically a rather curious hybrid. We are obliged by geography to be first class in our maritime security provisions, else we could not fight on the ground beyond North American shores. Further, possessing power of continental

proportions in regards to the abundance of material and human assets we have not the need nor tradition for the measured application of force as in the case of true maritime nations such as or to a lesser degree Japan. As concerns geography our National Military Strategy has an enduring requirement to project massive power at long distance. 'Geography plays an important role in shaping strategy, for Strategy is the Art of the possible, and geography often delimits what is and is not possible.' 5

One may conclude Geography's impact on any evolving National Military Strategy will provide continued emphasis on a balanced Maritime and Continental approach. Our Aerospace Strategy will continue to serve to facilitate our hybrid approach. Fundamentally the impact of geography has not altered.

b. National Objectives

The second factor to be addressed are National Objectives. 'Objectives may be thought of as the What while Strategy is the How.' 6 The March 1990 National Security Strategy outlines interests and objectives and is condensed as follows:

1. The Survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad.

3. A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights and democratic institutions.

4. Healthy vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

An enduring theme of US strategy is the imperative of maintaining robust deterrence at the Strategic Nuclear level. Only in the realm of Nuclear Strategic Weapons could the United States have the potential to suffer an irretrievable defeat of arms. Therefore our first priority must be deterrence of nuclear war, particularly of the type capable of spilling onto our shores.

Secondly the territorial integrity of the U.S. must be preserved. The U.S. has been blessed by a geostrategic position which sharply limits the likelihood of an invasion of Bayonne New Jersey. Never the less a continuing U.S. objective seeks to ensure if wars are fought they not be fought on American soil.

A powerful and growing U.S. economy, access to world markets, a stable, secure world fostering political freedoms and a healthy vigorous relationship with our allies will require a significant capability for crisis response. A prime facilitator for that capability will be a viable and flexible forward presence. Most significantly U.S. National Objectives have not radically altered.

c. Adversaries

'Since 1989, NATO's warning time is to be measured neither in 14 days nor 37 days, but rather in years. The years it would take to re-Stalinize Eastern Europe.

Fred Ikle
Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy, 1990

We in the Defense business will doubtless yearn for the good old days, when we wore white hats and our opponents and their proxies were clearly marked by the red star on theirs. For this author, who by self description is neither particularly imaginative nor creative, the luxury of having the ability to focus on a singular, ideologically based, expansionist oriented, threatening entity, the Soviet Union, was a godsend. The world for its purported complexity was, from a military standpoint, rather simple. For forty five years we functioned effectively, while not always efficiently, under a threat driven defense policy. We indexed our national security to our perception of what the Soviets were, or at least we thought they were, capable of.

Despite the blind ravings of the extreme right , our Defense Department had quite rationally abandoned our military posturing strictly on the basis of the Soviet threat. ⁷

The question arises, against whom do you measure your security index? As fate would have it, just when you thought it was safe to grant the peace dividend, Saddam Hussein gives the world stark reminder of the predatory nature of man. Our evolving

strategy will have to account for a diffuse, ill defined and amorphous threat which will challenge our crisis response capability. Concurrently U.S. Defense Planners must maintain unrelenting vigilance. Guarding against trends in the Soviet Union which would foreshadow a resurgence of their former offensive posture. The U.S. will face the historic dilemma of democratic nations which is an unwillingness to pay the hunter unless the wolf is at the door.

It is in the realm of adversaries wherein the impact on strategy will be most acutely felt.

d. Allies

'Better the enemy you know'

Grandma Gavin

Instability brought about by post WWII decolonialization, amplified by East West tensions was the principle conflict generator of the Cold War. In a forty five year period the U.S.; became chief adversary of two of our three principle allies in WWII, assumed key alliances with all three of the principle axis powers, managed to preserve our "Special Relationship" with Great Britain, while continuing our love hate relationship with France. This is the literal tip of the iceberg. The essential point is wars make strange bedfellows. Further the preservation of allies in the absence of shared interest is, both militarily and diplomatically, a most delicate balancing act. Our geostrategic position makes ours a nation dependent on allies. During the Post

Cold War era our alliance efforts will favor a regional approach for stability and close military and economic cooperation with allies to preserve our power projection capability. Moreover we will have to preserve much of the very structure of our current alliances ensure our ability to reconstitute global warmaking capability.

e. Strategic Culture

'Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.'

Sun Tsu

American strategy must be appropriate to our history and institutions, both political and military. It must be responsive to national needs and reflect our strengths and weaknesses. 'The U.S. is a big, lumbering, pluralistic, affluent, liberal, democratic, individualistic, materialistic, technologically supremely sophisticated society' ⁸ To know oneself is the first step in creating a capable and workable strategy. One the critical component of of the Clausewitzian trinity, the people, can support.

Since the outbreak of the Korean War we generally pursued a strategy for the use of conventional forces which deviated sharply from earlier American strategic traditions. Interestingly enough, prior to the current imbroglio in South West Asia, post Korea conventional response emphasized the use of force, not to win, but to avoid or limit overt conflict in an effort to prevent

catastrophic escalation.

The crucial question is what does the nature of American society and past successful strategic traditions tell us about how Americans can incorporate force into national Strategy successfully?

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington would have us include at least these five elements: ⁹

1. Plan to win and win quickly. The war powers act gives the president 60 days, if you cannot meet that deadline you are well advised to get the backing of congress, and by inference the American people.

2. Emphasize the offensive. While Clausewitz tells us the defense is the stronger form of combat it is only offensive action which can be decisive. If the U.S. is to achieve crisis response objectives in a timely fashion, the luxury of defensive oriented strategies are not acceptable.

3. The U.S. is the most technologically advanced nation in the world and our strategies must reflect this in all aspects of defense from procurement to recruitment and training.

4. The U.S. is a big country and we should fight our wars in a big way. One of our great advantages is mass. We should not hesitate, once the political decision is made, to use it. It is not necessarily bad for us to undertake any military action, however trivial, without employing all four services. "Redundancy is duplication, but it is also insurance, reinforcement and strength. We can afford four services, we can afford four air forces. Lets use them." ¹⁰

5. Finally if American forces are to be used they should be used to achieve military objectives. Military forces are not instruments of communication. They are instruments of coercion, to compel an opponent to alter behavior, or to punish his transgressions.

In summary the American Strategic culture would accept strategy wherein military intervention is not promiscuous, but when it occurs the U.S. would intervene rapidly, in an offensive manner, and so far as possible with overwhelming force with a

view to defeating enemy military forces in the shortest time possible. 11

The impact of American Strategic Culture cannot be overlooked. It must be applied to both our strategy and the forces designed to carry out that strategy.

f. Forces

'The United States would be ill served by forces that represented nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess. Forces that we possess right now. If we simply prorate our reductions-- cut equally across the board-- we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely, and less than we must to meet emerging challenges. What we need are not merely reductions, but restructuring.'

George Bush
2 August 90
Aspen Colorado

The military viewpoint naturally gravitates to a desire for superiority. Strategy, operational art, and tactics are then much more simplified. The civilian decision maker believes superiority is wasteful, unnecessary, and perhaps dangerous for both economic and strategic reasons. No decision maker, whether civilian or military, wants to lose. But while the civilian may be satisfied winning 7-6 or 14-7 (Football is the Military's favorite metaphor), the Military man is more likely to desire 45-0. The difference between the military and civilian is quite simple, the civilian seeks to minimize the cost, while the military the risk.

Therefore the amount of resources allocated to our National

Security Strategy will determine what may be accomplished and how objectives are to be met. Ideally we would decide what must be done and simply allocate resources to it. In our fiscally constrained 90's the question will be, How much do we have to spend and how far can we stretch it?

What is to be accomplished and what are our vital and major national interests. Post WWII strategy of the 2 1/2 wars became 1 1/2 wars. With our principle adversary in a state of decline it may be active forces for 1/2 war, while reconstituting the Global capability commensurate with Soviet reversal.

In conclusion The essential change in the world situation regarding the Key Factors of Strategy center on the precipitous decline in conventional capabilities of our principle adversary, the Soviet Union. The absence of a common threat or shared interest limits the U.S.'s ability to preserve our Alliance Structure crafted over forty years, and clearly indicates a potential shift in emphasis. Finally while geography and National Objectives remain relatively unchanged, the significantly reduced conventional threat in Europe will generate heavy reductions in Defense Budget authority thereby reducing our forces to the bare essentials for mission accomplishment.

Chapter III OUR EVOLVING NATIONAL STRATEGY

Longstanding pillars of U.S. Defense posture comprised; deterrence, alliances, positioning our forces forward for flexible defense, and the ability to project massive power at great distance.

Under our proposed new posture the most significant change will see the United States, rather than forward deploy forces at the level which have been seen since the end of WWII, maintain a much smaller conventional active and reserve force mix, capable of dealing with a major contingency operation somewhere in the world--- not a major conventional war with the Soviet Union.

In support of our National Objectives the Defense Department has focused on four essential missions:

1. Deterring nuclear war
2. Preserving the capacity to reconstitute our global warmaking ability, vis a vis the Soviet Union
3. Crisis Response
4. Forward presence

The critical assumption underpinning this reexamination is the assumption of two years warning time of a major war in Europe. This assumption is inextricably linked to U.S. ability to generate wholly new forces, to rebuild or reconstitute them if necessary in that two year timeframe.¹²

"The two year warning estimate is based upon the assumptions that all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw to the homeland, that Conventional Force Europe like parity will exist from the Atlantic to the Ural's, that the Soviet Union remains inwardly focused and that NATO and its associated intelligence apparatus still functions."¹³

The correlation of events; a declining or sharply limited Soviet Conventional threat, and an Administration Goal (Congress may not find this sufficient) of reducing military spending, after inflation, by 10% over five years, mandates a significant restructuring in military force. The details of the remaining active and reserve conventional forces under the President's New National Security Strategy are being debated but are likely to result in a significant decrease in active and reserve forces.

The breakout of conventional forces reflects: ¹⁴

ARMY: 12 Active, 2 Reconstitutable Reserve, 6 Other Reserve.
(Currently 18 Active and 10 Reserve)

AIR FORCE: 25 Active and Reserve Tactical Air Wings.
(Currently 36)

NAVY: 11-12 Aircraft Carriers (Currently 14)

MARINE CORPS: 150,000 end strength (Currently 196,000)

The new plan "The Base Force" concept organizes the Military into four basic components. 'It would establish an Atlantic Force that would include armored units and sizable Army and Air Force reserves to guard against a renewed Soviet threat, and to meet threats in the Persian Gulf. There would be a Pacific Force that would emphasize Naval and Tactical Air Units to defend South Korea and other allies in Asia. A Contingency Force for rapid response to smaller conflicts in the third world and to be the leading edge if a major military action became necessary. There would also be the Strategic Force of long range nuclear weapons.' ¹⁵

The changes proposed by the Department of Defense deal

predominantly with conventional forces. The Soviet Union, as the worlds largest nuclear power, continues to pose the only credible threat to the U.S. Thus the U.S. will continue to size our Strategic Forces relative to strict Soviet capabilities.

An overview of the 'Base Force' proposal follows:¹⁶

STRATEGIC FORCES

75 B-2'S, 18 TRIDENT SSBN'S
START II ICBM'S
3000-4500 WARHEADS (POST START II)
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
- 'GLOBAL PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED
STRIKES' (100 WARHEADS)
- 4.6 BILLION REQUESTED FY 92

PACIFIC FORCES

ARMY:

1 DIV KOREA
1 REINFORCING DIVISION
IN ALASKA OR HAWAII

AIR FORCE:

3-4 TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS IN PAC

NAVY:

6 CVBG'S, 1 OF WHICH HOMEPORTED
IN JAPAN

MARINES:

4 MEB'S - 1 JAPAN
1 HAWAII
2 CONUS
1 RESERVE

ATLANTIC FORCES

ARMY:

5 ACTIVE DIVISIONS
6 RESERVE DIVISIONS
2 RECONSTITUTABLE DIV
(2 BASED IN EUROPE)

AIR FORCE:

3-4 TAC FIGHTER WINGS
IN EUROPE
2 ACTIVE WINGS CONUS
9 RESERVE WINGS

NAVY:

6 CVBG'S, 1 DEPLOYED
TO MEDITERRANEAN

MARINES:

2 MEB'S CONUS
1 RESERVE MEB
MEU DEPLOYED TO MED

CONTINGENCY FORCE

ARMY:

5 DIVISIONS (82d, 101st, 24th, 7th AND 10th)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES:

HOSTAGE RESCUE AND COUNTER TERRORIST ASSETS

AIR FORCE:

7 ACTIVE FIGHTER WINGS

BUTTRESSED BY CVBG'S AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

It must be emphasized, this 'Base Force' proposed by General Powell, concurred with by Secretary Cheney and endorsed by the President is a floor structure. It is a limit below which the world wide response capability of the National Command Authority will be sacrificed, 'it is the crossover point between enduring tasks and shrinking resources' 17

CHAPTER IV MISSION ANALYSIS

a. Strategic Deterrence Crucial to restructuring our Strategic Deterrence will be the impact of Arms Control. Strategic Arms Reductions Talks II (START II) figures prominently into the equation. President Bush's 2 August Aspen speech outlines his basis for a confident strategic deterrence; 75 B-2 bombers, 18 Trident Submarines, development of the small ICBM and rail based 'Peacekeeper' ICBM.¹⁸ The emphasis on SDI was pronounced and buttressed this year by an appropriation request of 4.6 billion for FY 92. (up from 2.9 billion FY 91)¹⁹

Our ability to articulate rationales for strategic forces still focus on Soviet Strategic Capabilities. In the realm of SDI, the 'Global Protection Against Limited Strikes' centers quite logically, not on an accidental Soviet discharge, but rather on the all too horrifying apparition of a disintegrating Soviet Union whose splintering republics may gain control of delivery systems, or against the proliferation of intercontinental delivery systems, estimated to be 15 developing nations by the year 2000.²⁰ The U.S. will can not reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. They deterr the only physical threat to our homeland.

b. Reconstitution of Forces. The underlying assumption of Soviet inability to threaten a massive conventional strike into Europe inside of two years allows defense planners to conduct mobilization from scratch rather than from well trained reserves. Literally units will be produced wholesale from pre-stocked

material. The benefits to the manufacturing sector for continued production of material, as well as continued research and development for new systems to maintain technological dominance are pronounced. The question is will it work? The complex weapons systems we employ do not allow for untrained draftees to operate them effectively. Two years warning may be sufficient but only with timely warning and prompt and effective action. Failure to reinstate a draft quickly could be fatal. Senator Nunn (D-Ga) has endorsed favorably the concept of national service, either military or humanitarian. While it may be wise to adopt a more european style system of universal service for our reserve and reconstitution units it is likely politically unfeasable.

c. Crisis Response

In many of the conflicts we could face, we may not have the luxury of matching manpower with prepositioned materials. We will have to have the air and sea lift capacities to get our forces where they are needed.

President Bush
2 August, Aspen

Speaking on 2 August 1990 the president could not be aware of how successful the deployment to Saudi Arabia would be. The lessons learned will help us shape our requirements to support crisis response for the foreseeable future.

In a later speech Lieutenant General Butler, J-5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided a detailed breakout concept of employment for the "Contingency Force". The first stage to be used in a "Graduated Deterrence Response" would consist of (1) Army light and airborne Divisions, (2) Marine Corps Expeditionary Brigades (MPS Equipped), (3) Special Operations Forces, and (4)

Selected Air Force units. It would appear any force to be rapidly employed in this manner would fly into a crisis area, ala Desert Shield .

The initial component of the 'Contingency Force' would be buttressed by CVBG's and Amphibious Forces. The application of CVBG's to the second tier does reflect the parochialism of the plan, but in reality General Powell places highest emphasis in his 'Base Force Concept' on the strongest possible Navy. This reflects the reality of 45 years of 'crisis response' wherein Naval Forces, both Navy and Marine have been the preeminent tool for the National Command Authority.

The application of amphibious assets to the second tier while disturbing at first glance reflects clearly on past use, but more importantly on the correct application of amphibious forces in maneuver warfare. The need for Amphibious forces simply to overcome the sovereignty issue during peace would validate their expense, let alone their inherent power and force multiplication potential during war.

d. Presence

A cross cutting theme of our evolving National Security Strategy is the need to preserve alliance relationships. President Bush cited the need for an 'engaged America' as a force for stability throughout the world. He implies, while we will be reducing our overall forces we will not be reducing our commitment to friends and allies. How then to demonstrate our commitment? Historically the nation has relied on our Naval

Forces for presence outside of formal defense arrangements. This will not alter. Nations are increasingly sensitive to sovereignty issues. Nationalism, mistrust and non-alignment will hamper overseas basing, while fear of U.S. interventionism by 'Contingency Forces' may prevent the generation of bilateral training exercises in sensitive regions.

The utility of Navy-Marine forces as a traditional and routine visage on the sea scape coupled with their transitory nature continue to preserve their preeminent status as force of choice for the presence mission. Meanwhile to employ our 'Contingency Force' effectively they must have experience in likely regions of conflict. 'Bright Star' exercises are a classic example. Yet if bilateral arrangements are unavailable, what then?

The work around will be Humanitarian Assistance, Civil Affairs, and Security Assistance. 'If you want peace work for justice' is bumper sticker strategy. But sometimes complex issues can be distilled into their essence. The 'Presence Mission' needs to emphasize good will and betterment of condition not simply 'Door kicking and double tap'.²¹ As part of our restructuring efforts the Army and the Air Force must emphasize Medical Units, Engineer Units and Civil Affairs Units as active duty forces not reserves.

V THREATS TO THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

'OUTLOOK IS CLOUDY FOR AN ARMS DEAL BY U.S. AND SOVIETS'

Military influence in Moscow concerns American aides as do technical areas.

New York Times, 6 Feb 90

'CHENEY FORESEES NEW SOVIET UNREST'

Defense Chief says turmoil may prompt rethinking of U.S. Military cuts.

'The possibility for major unrest may be such that we would not feel safe recommending to the Congress of the United States the kinds of long term six year reductions in military spending requested by President Bush in his latest budget.'

New York Times, 8 Feb 90

Considering the President submitted his budget recommendation a little more than a week prior to the 8 Feb pronouncement, I have to accept as possible two explanations. First, the administration is disavowing responsibility for cuts by placing National Security squarely in the hands of the Democrat controlled Congress. Or alternately the Department of Defense is disavowing the cuts implying they were made under duress and now the situation under which their planning was predicated has unraveled. What changed a scant six months after DoD proposed a self generated 25% reduction in personnel and a 10% reduction in spending over five years.

In the wake of Soviet instability, the emergence of a hard line Soviet faction, and now apparent Soviet duplicity in the Iraq War, the crumbling 'Evil Empire' is still threatening. Our Allies in NATO have seen unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces

from NATO to support Desert Shield/Storm. They can see the writing on the wall which says those forces are probably gone from the NATO equation permanently. All in the absence of the CFE treaty. This coupled with the realization of just how much force we needed to implement 'Desert Storm' has DoD suitably nervous. Will this affect implementation of reductions.

In my own mind the equation is altered irrevocably. America will ultimately leave defense of Europe to the Europeans. The concept of an Integrated European Community, E.C. 92, may never come to complete fruition, but a grouping of nations cumulatively possessing a larger population and GDP than the United States is well enough endowed to take care of their own defense.

The argument of the Soviets resurrecting their old posture is specious. With their economy a wreck, even if in ten years the Soviets were able to restore their old swagger, her economic potential would be stillborn relative to Europe and Japan. Russia could not hope to win an arms race with them let alone the United States. Should the Military preserve ascendancy and continue to bankrupt their economy further the resultant domestic strife will surely fracture them at a grander scale.

VI RECOMMENDATIONS

My recommendations regarding our evolving National Security Strategy:

a. The need for an enemy as an alien defining the U.S. posture will persist, if only for psychological reasons (Budget). That enemy will have to be an image which most menaces American values. The Soviets and Peoples of Eastern Europe, struggling for freedom and a better life may well become our next allies. Historically the U.S. has concentrated our efforts and friendship on a vanquished foe. The emotive power of the Soviet Union is waning, our threat receptors have begun to fasten on Japan and even Germany. In the wake of Desert Shield/Storm this may accelerate. The essential purpose of our evolving National Security Strategy must be to serve U.S. interests first, last and foremost.

b. Despite recent Defense Department lamentations of the resurgence of the Soviet Military's influence, reductions and restructuring must proceed. Why? Because it makes sense. Reductions and restructuring are going to hurt. It implies an element of risk. Most critically it will require military officers who are willing to put their allegiance to country ahead of combat arm or service parochialism.

c. Success of our new strategy depends on the good behavior of the Soviets. It is clearly not optimum to base your strategy on the intentions of your principle adversary, but the public's perception that the Soviets are an economic basket case,

incapable of carrying out world shaping maneuvers is essentially correct. None the less, our strategy requires the Soviets to withdraw to their homeland and focus internally. Therefore our Strategy must seek to modify Soviet behavior to induce their disengagement.

d. A critical function is held by the intelligence community. They must be capable of meeting the challenge of detecting shifts in Soviet posture. If their funding follows the downward spiral of general defense spending our strategy will be bankrupt as reconstitution will fail. Appropriate emphasis must be placed on improving our ability to peer into "that enigma wrapped in a puzzle".

e. If we want to retain friends and allies, their concerns must be met. Yet we must be cognizant of the shifting nature of alliances. As Lord Palmerston said "We have few enduring interests and no permanent allies"

f. Our National Security Strategy must be fully integrated. Traditionally it focused on; economics, political and diplomatic conditions, and military power. In the future we will have to consider and include; ecological factors, technology, social and health impacts, and forms of government of participating states.

VII CONCLUSION

"It must be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, more dangerous to manage, than the creation of a new system. For the initiator has the enmity of all who would profit by the preservation of the old institutions and merely lukewarm defenders in those who would gain in the new one"

Niccolo Machiavelli 1513

The concept of our proposed National Security Strategy is sound. It will support our world wide interests. However, the political and military debate rages: How much can we reduce, where and when? I recall a TV interview with Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) in fall of 1989, "Senator, Fort Benning, Warner Robbins, Fort Stewart, Kings Bay, et al, can you close any of those?" The Senator who was visibly discomfited by the question rapidly regained control of the interview and replied, (I paraphrase) "We have just completed our base closure deliberations, and took some very painful measures. Before we close another U.S. Base we are going to look very hard at our overseas basing."

The Base force concept endorses this attitude fully while maintaining an engaged presence with world wide response capability. It is a plan which will be worked out in the smoke filled rooms of Congressional Committees. It will not be cheap, it will allow us to favorably affect U.S. interests world wide when threatened, most essentially it will require some careful soul searching and reexamination by all of the services. In short it must be done.

NOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, 'National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy', Proceedings, May 1954, pp. 488.
2. Colin S. Gray, War Peace and Victory (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp.106
3. Ibid. pp 29.
4. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: 1990) pp.1.
5. Dr. Roger W. Barnett, 'Maritime Strategy: A new Oceanic Phase.' Lecture to the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport R.I.: 3 June 1991, pp. 12
6. Ibid. pp. 18
7. Captain J. Seaquist USN. 'National Security Strategy.' Lecture at the Naval War College, Newport R.I.: 3 January 1991.
8. Samuel P. Huntington, American Military Strategy. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1986) pp 13.
9. Ibid. pp 13-15
10. IBID pp 15
11. If I searched the personal libraries of Mr. Cheney and Generals Powell and Schwartzkopf I believe, given the character of Desert Shield/Storm, I would find a copy of 'American Strategy'.
12. Seaquist lecture
13. James J. Tritten, 'America Promises to Come Back, A New National Strategy.' Unpublished Paper, Washington D.C.: 1 Dec. 1990, pp. 3.
14. Michael Gordon. 'Post Cold War Strategy.' New York Times, 2 Aug. 1990, pp. A:1, A:4-5.
15. Ibid. pp.A:5.
16. Ibid. pp. A:5

17. Lt. Gen. G. L. Butler USA.' Speech to the Center for Defense Journalism.' National Press Club, Washington D.C.: 27 Sept. 1990.

18. President George Bush, 'Address to the Aspen Institute.' Aspen, Colorado: 2 Aug. 1990.

19. William J. Broad. 'A New Course for Star Wars.' New York Times, 31 Jan 1991, pp. A:5.

20. President Bush cited the number of Developing Nations capable of acquiring or developing Intercontinental Delivery systems as 15. Events in SW Asia are likely reduce that number to 14. Aspen Speech, 2 Aug. 90.

21. Double Tap is a technique of close combat pistol shooting emphasizing two rounds into the core of the chest to assure a quick kill.

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