



AD-A236 894



The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: WHAT SHOULD
THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES BE?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DANIEL RUIZ, JR.
United States Army


DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1991



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

91-02213



91 6 14 068

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Distribution A		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) AWCAB	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Same as 6a			
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER			
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS			
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) National Drug Control Strategy: What Should the Military Objectives Be?					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Ruiz, Jr., U.S. Army					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Individual Study Project	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 91-04-11		15. PAGE COUNT 53	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The "war on drugs" is an issue of great national importance. Our national leaders have declared illegal narcotics as a threat to our national security, and have included it as a part of the National Security Strategy of the United States. In compliance with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, President Bush submitted this 1990 National Drug Control Strategy that specified a greater role for the Department of Defense, and Congress has mandated that the military take a larger role in the war against drugs. This project is an analysis of the military involvement in drug warfare. It is a step-by-step review of the military thought process that ultimately evolves into military strategy; that is the military ways to employ military means to achieve military ends. The analysis of the war against drugs begins with an examination of the threat--the purpose of which is to					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☐ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL James M. Kelly, Colonel, U.S. Army			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (717) 245-3022		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCAB

identify its center of gravity. This is followed by a discussion of the current national counternarcotic strategy using time-tested military concepts, principles, and standards to test suitability. Given the National Security Strategy of the United States, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the nature of drug warfare, it then answers the question: What should the military objectives be?



1	
INSPECTED	
SECURITY	
A-1	
Special	

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY:
WHAT SHOULD THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES BE?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Ruiz, Jr.
United States Army

Colonel James M. Kelly
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Daniel Ruiz, Jr., Lt Col, USA

TITLE: National Drug Control Strategy:
What Should the Military Objectives Be?

FORMAT: INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

DATE: 11 April 1991 PAGES: 53 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The "war on drugs" is an issue of great national importance. Our national leaders have declared illegal narcotics as a threat to our national security, and have included it as a part of the National Security Strategy of the United States. In compliance with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, President Bush submitted his 1990 National Drug Control Strategy that specified a greater role for the Department of Defense, and Congress has mandated that the military take a larger role in the war against drugs. This project is an analysis of the military involvement in drug warfare. It is a step-by-step review of the military thought process that ultimately evolves into military strategy; that is the *military ways* to employ *military means* to achieve *military ends*. The analysis of the war against drugs begins with an examination of the threat--the purpose of which is to identify its center of gravity. This is followed by a discussion of the current national counternarcotic strategy using time-tested military concepts, principles, and standards to test suitability. Given the National Security Strategy of the United States, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the nature of drug warfare, it then answers the question: What should the military objectives be?

INTRODUCTION

There is no question that the use of illicit drugs is one of the most dangerous threats the United States will face in the next decade. The cost in both human and monetary resources to control this scourge has become disproportionate and cost-prohibitive in comparison to other meaningful and productive social programs. Because of the alarming and catastrophic trends from illegal drug use, our national leaders have declared the trafficking of illicit drugs as a threat to our national security.¹

The solutions to the illegal use of drugs and their destructive effects are controversial, and cause our national leadership increasing concern. In response to this threat, and in reply to the Congressional request for a national drug control strategy, President Bush annually submits a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) to Congress.² Within this strategy, an expanded role by the military has become a primary issue.

This issue is controversial for many varied reasons, but the primary one is the view that the role of the military is to defend the U.S. against foreign aggression, and that it should not be used as a constabulary force against American citizens.³

The basic principle in the controversy is that Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) are responsible for the enforcement of domestic laws. LEAs are trained in law enforcement and in the procedures that protect individual rights--the military is not.

But, with the Congressional approval and funding of the

plan. the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for the development of a viable military counternarcotic strategy to support the drug war. The purpose of this paper is to answer the question--National Drug Control Strategy: What should the military objectives be?

METHODOLOGY

My interest in the counternarcotic effort was generated as a result of personal frustration. Like many Americans as well as a majority of the military community, there seems to be a national frustration to the growing trends of increased crime, homicides, corruption, and disregard for the values for which this country was founded. These trends can be attributed in great part to the trafficking of illegal drugs and the collateral effects they have on our society. With the diminishing Soviet threat, many expect that the military could and should contribute more expertise and resources to the war against drugs.

There are not many in this country who can admit that they have not had a friend or family member affected by the illegal use of narcotics. Although the government has stated that the negative trends are being reversed, nearly every day there are drug-related incidents reported in the local and national media.

Knowing that the military was taking a more active role, and personally being a strong supporter of the use of the military in a more direct role in the war against drugs, the obvious question was what actual role should the military have and what should the military objectives be? Unfamiliar with the current military

objective and strategy, my methodology would be to follow the normal sequence for the development of military strategy.

My first step was to analyze the threat by conducting a threat analysis in order to find its center of gravity. This is normally the first step in the military thought process. By identifying the threat and its center of gravity, it would not be difficult to develop military objectives. However, since the stated national threat was a nontraditional military threat, a greater amount of time and research was required to fully develop what might be a military center of gravity.

Having identified the centers of gravity, I quickly found great difficulty in developing military objectives for what is clearly not a military threat. Therefore, I resorted to the basic standards and principles for which I would hope to better articulate the rationale for the use of the military in what I believe is a real threat to our national security.

This lead to my next step which was to review the current national strategy in order to identify the stated missions and tasks given to the military by law, and by the National Command Authority. After the review of the current national strategy, an analysis of the strategy was done using the concept of war, the principles of war and the standard of suitability, feasibility, acceptability.

I attempted through the use of these time-tested concepts, principles, and standards to define the role of the military in the counternarcotic effort, and to establish what its military

objectives should be. Based on this process, I developed my conclusions and recommendations.

ASSUMPTIONS

The problem of illicit drugs will not be solved in the near future. As a result, I have made the following assumptions: (1) that the illegal use of drugs is both a national and international problem, and efforts will continue to progress in the development of an appropriate international counternarcotic strategy; (2) that Congress will continue to demand and support military participation in the war against drugs; and (3) that the counternarcotic mission will continue to be a high priority mission for DOD in an environment of constrained resources.

LIMITATIONS

The war on drugs is a multi-national, multi-agency effort and a very complicated issue. The NDCS attacks the drug problem in many areas with no simple solution to the problem. The criminal justice system, drug treatment, education, community action, efforts at the workplace, international efforts, interdiction efforts, a research agenda, and an intelligence agenda are all activities that the multi-faceted strategy in President Bush's battle plan uses to eliminate illicit drugs.⁴ Therefore, the scope of this study is subject to the following limitations.

The drug problem is described in terms borrowed from economics "as a largely market function influenced by the variable 'supply' of drug sellers and the variable 'demand' of

drug buyers."⁵ The U.S. Armed Forces and the NDCS both have strategies and policies directed at demand reduction. The first limitation is that this paper focuses only on the U.S. Armed Forces and its potential for involvement against the supply side (growers, traffickers, dealers and suppliers).

The second limitation of this paper will be that the focus is limited to the U.S. Armed Forces and its role as specified by the National Command Authority. A point that is important: the role of the military in the total NDCS is only a small part of the overall total solution.⁶

The third and final limitation is that the scope will be restricted only to the development of appropriate military objectives. Because strategy equals ways plus means plus ends--the ways and means will only be discussed as they support the thesis in articulating appropriate military objectives (ends).⁷

THE THREAT

Recognition of the problem (the threat analysis) is the critical component of the military thought process. It is the foundation to determining appropriate military strategy. In this case the national threat has been identified by our national leadership as trafficking in illicit drugs.⁸ The next step is to identify its center of gravity, which FM 100-5, referring to Carl von Clausewitz, defines as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."⁹

The time-tested standard of focusing our strategy on the threat's center of gravity has historically proven that it is

tantamount to achieving our objectives. Once identified, appropriate military objectives can be developed by focusing all our efforts towards attacking the center of gravity. So, when one speaks of directing the military to get involved in the war on drugs, the most important question to be asked is: What is the threat and what is its center of gravity?

Since trafficking in illicit drugs has already been identified as the national threat, for the purpose of simplicity and understanding, the threat analysis is discussed from three perspectives: (1) the threat to American society, (2) the threat to allies, and (3) the threat of drug trafficking organizations.

There are two very important reasons for taking this three-pronged approach: (1) the entire spectrum of the drug threat and culture must be reviewed to insure that any and all possible centers of gravity are identified; and (2) since trafficking in illicit drugs is not a traditional military threat, understanding of the basic principles and terminology is essential in order to take a close look at what the threat is, and to identify a military-oriented center of gravity.

The Threat to American Society

Corruption, crime, murder, prostitution, AIDS, criminal terrorism, and many other forms of lawlessness are the direct effects of trafficking in illicit drugs. The following is but a small representation of the magnitude of the problem.

Demand for drugs. According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse's National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, which the

1990 NDCS referenced, there are an estimated 12.9 million drug users in the U.S..¹⁰ But, even these "facts" are suspect. Prominent Congressmen who have access to the same information by virtue of sitting on committees such as the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the House Select Committee on Drug Abuse and Control, strongly refute the figures. Their opinion is that the figures are low and erroneous because they do not account for a population of society that is high-risk, but not surveyed: high school dropouts, homeless, prisoners, those in shelters, those receiving drug treatment, and the fact that 18 percent of those contacted by the survey refused to participate.¹¹

As for the potential for future demand which in large part can be measured by the current trends and demand among youth, the future looks bleak. Drug traffickers easily exploit and victimize the young because they lack maturity, believe they are invincible, and are continually seeking the thrills and high of illicit drugs. Exploitation of demand among the youth has even led to the experimentation with alternatives such as the use of inhalants, and in the opinion of some, the rise is in epidemic proportions.¹² And then there are the results of a survey where 48 percent of the high school seniors surveyed declared using illegal drugs at least once.¹³

Drug Profits. Drug trafficking is not only profitable, but is tax-free income for drug entrepreneurs, criminals, or any other organization willing to take the risk. Americans are spending \$100+ billion each year on illegal narcotics.¹⁴ Compare

this to the fact this would more than fund the entire 1991 Navy budget which is expected to be \$100.3 billion--the Navy has the largest budget of all the services.¹⁵

In Merrill Collett's book The Cocaine Connection, he states that *The Tampa Tribune* reported that Florida drug dealers are estimated to be earning "\$6 billion annually, more than agriculture and second only to tourism."¹⁶ Compare this to the fact that Florida's drug business is 150 percent more than Panama's total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which was \$3.9 billion in 1989.¹⁷

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates the marijuana per plant value to be approximately \$200 for wild "ditch weed," \$1000 to \$1500 for cultivated plants, and up to \$3000 for high grade sinsemilla--it is now the number one U.S. cash crop.¹⁸ In 1991, the DEA expects the U.S. to be one of the world's largest producers and an exporter of marijuana.¹⁹

Homicides. While not all murders are a result of drugs, few would dispute the fact that drugs have had a major role in the rise in homicides. "Drug-related murders more than doubled as a percentage of all murders from 1985 to 1988, according to the FBI's [sic] reports."²⁰

In the first six months of 1990 the national murder rate was up 10 percent.²¹ Territorial battles among drug traffickers and growing disrespect for life in general among the drug population are major contributors to the increased murder rate.

"The USA had an estimated record 23,220 murders in 1990--at

least 20 major cities set new marks."²² In our nation's capital, with the death of a 17-year old student and two others on 23 November 1990, the District of Columbia had registered 436 murders for 1990 which was its third consecutive annual homicide record.²³

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 authorized the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy to designate certain areas as high intensity drug trafficking areas (HIDTAs).²⁴ As of January 1990 there were five areas listed as HIDTAs: Los Angeles, Houston, Miami, New York, and the Southwest Border.²⁵

In Los Angeles, police are making 60,000 drug arrests a year (1988-90).²⁶ In New York City, the Department of Correction has the largest average daily detention system population in the world. The average daily detention population for New York City is 17,439 (FY 89) inmates, at the daily cost per inmate of \$150 (FY 90).²⁷ Approximately 60 percent of the detainees admitted are addicted to drugs.²⁸ To further state the case, and to magnify the extent of the problem, 8 percent of the officer candidates in the New York City Department of Correction Academy test positive for drugs.²⁹

Along the Southwest border, Starr and its two adjacent counties in Texas are known as Little Colombia because the "area is basking in a cocaine-driven economic boom."³⁰ In Brownsville, Texas local Customs Agents are reported by the DEA as having lax inspection procedures that allegedly allow three-fourths of a ton

of cocaine a day into the U.S.. "in return for large monetary payoffs."³¹

Youth-related crime. In 1989, 78,954 teenagers were arrested in the U.S. for violent crimes.³² Dr. Thomas B. Smith, a retired microbiologist from Howard University, stated to *USA TODAY* that he doesn't consider racism the number one issue for blacks, but how to save "one to two generations of young black people who are at risk losing out to drugs and lack of interest in obtaining an education."³³

Dr. Padriac Sweeny, vice chief of emergency services for Detroit Receiving Hospital, stated to *TIME* magazine that "we have kids 13 and 14 years old who are as hardened as anyone in a penitentiary. Look into their eyes, and you see these cold blank stares, void of most moral values. The drug trade has shown them that they can make a lot of money, and they've accepted the violence that goes with it."³⁴

Health. In the area of medical care, there is an over-burdening of facilities. Dr. Sweeny, again to *TIME* magazine, stated that he has noticed fewer emergencies due to overdose, but an increase in drug-related violent-crime.³⁵

In hospital emergency rooms across the country, doctors, nurses and other medical personnel are sounding the alarm about overcrowding. An influx of victims from drug-related violence and drug-related illnesses is putting the squeeze on traditional emergency room care.³⁶

Crack babies and the social costs associated with the postnatal care are an additional burden to society, a direct result of illegal narcotics.

The AIDS epidemic is rising and drug-related contraction of AIDS is now a primary cause for its spread, even higher than homosexuality. The federal centers for Disease Control estimate that a million to 1.5 million people in the U.S. are infected with HIV, and 5,000 to 10,000 are children.³⁷ The health costs are expected to be in tens of billions of dollars by mid-1990, and 70 billion by the year 2000.³⁸

Narcoterrorism. Narcoterrorism, that is the use of terror by drug traffickers to maintain markets, to intimidate witnesses, and to secure territorial "turf" has become their modis operandi. Deliberate acts of violent crime as a result of drug-related incidents have many law abiding citizens living in terror and fear of becoming innocent victims of the drug war.

A trial in Chicago involves two defendants who are "accused of murdering a federal witness to protect their \$50,000-a-day drug ring."³⁹ In New Jersey, a defendant is being tried for dismembering a police informant and killing a fifteen year old girl.⁴⁰ In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; a playground where children are supposed to play, became a hang-out for drug dealers, users, and vagrants; was vandalized beyond use, and became known as a place where "more bullets than basketballs have flown through the air there since 1987."⁴¹

Trafficking in illicit drugs is an obvious threat to American society. It is also apparent that from both a human and fiscal perspective that we cannot allow the problem to grow. Because of the strong emotions many Americans have against

illicit drugs. coupled with the frustration we have because of our inability to eliminate them, our national leadership is and should be committing appropriate resources to defeat this national threat.

The major threat to American society is from within. It is our demand for illicit drugs that is fueling this national and international crisis of crime and illicit drug trafficking. As the facts presented earlier have shown, it is demand that is the root cause for all the collateral effects of the drug culture such as homicides, HDTAs, crime, health issues, narcoterrorism, and corruption.

Demand reduction is a center of gravity; however, it is a social issue and as was stated earlier, offers no form in which the military element of power can be applied--the exception being the military's own demand reduction program.

In examining the threat to American society from the supply side, the suppliers are American citizens involved in criminal activity which means that drug traffickers are committing drug-related crimes and are under the jurisdiction of LEAs. Although the supply side is the focus for the military, within the U.S. it is clearly and legally an issue to be resolved by LEAs. A military-oriented threat does not exist within the U.S., so the next question to answer is does one exist outside the U.S.--what is the threat to our allies?

The Threat To Allies

Our incessant demand for illegal narcotics has had negative

effects internationally, with grave ramifications on the economies and governments of our allies and friends. The American demand for drugs has resulted in coca, from which cocaine is ultimately made, becoming the crop of choice for Andean countries.

Trafficking in illegal drugs equates to money, and money equates to power; power so great that the "Colombian scenario" is that drug cartels will not only attempt to influence economies and government officials, but will also eliminate those who stand in their way. Small wonder that the incentives for suppliers and drug entrepreneurship in Andean countries is so great.

The Andean countries who are the largest source of supply of cocaine to the U.S., merit special attention as having potential for the use of the military in its effort to attack the supply. The following are but a few of the telling facts of the impact that illicit drugs have on countries with fragile governments and economies.

Peru. Peru is a country of 21.9 million, per capita income of \$880 and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$18.9 billion.⁴² The economy is wrought with problems, debt, labor problems and yet it is the world's largest producer of coca, from which cocaine is produced.⁴³

A communist organization called The Shining Path has an estimated 5,000 militants and 20,000 supporters, and has become a major player in drugs in Peru.⁴⁴ They finance their movement with drug profits, while offering protection to coca farmers from

government law enforcement officers."⁴⁵

Colombia. Colombia is a country in which drugs have had a major role. It is a country of 33 million people with a per capita income of \$1,110 and a GDP of \$35.4 billion."⁴⁶ "A troublesome rural insurgency, and drug-related violence dampen prospects for future growth."⁴⁷ It is a major international producer of marijuana and cocaine, and is a key supplier for the U.S.--drugs accounting for 4 percent of the country's total GDP and 28 percent of its foreign exchange earnings."⁴⁸ Its defense expenditures are 1.9 percent of GDP, or \$700 million (1990 est.), which is dwarfed by drug profits."

In Colombia, drug profits are also used "to organize private militias, to purchase sophisticated weapons, and to bribe, intimidate, and terrorize the Colombian justice and political systems."⁵⁰ "Massacres are common in Medellin, home to one of the country's cocaine rings."⁵¹ Medellin and Cali cartels control the Andean region's cocaine business, and their estimated annual income is \$2-4 billion."⁵²

Colombians are the infamous captains of the cocaine industry."⁵³ According to U.S. government sources and Bruce Bagley, an academic expert whose information was used by Merrill Collett, 1987 figures reflected that 90 percent of the world's coca came from Bolivia and Peru, while 70 to 80 percent of the processed cocaine came from Colombia."⁵⁴ Colombia is the key processing center and source of supply to the U.S..⁵⁵

Bolivia. Bolivia is a country of 6.7 million with a per

capita income of \$660 and a GDP of \$4.6 billion.⁵⁶ Its economic problems are debt, inflation, and very little economic growth. It is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, and its main cash crop is coca--it is the world's second largest coca producer.⁵⁷

From the U.S. perspective, the Andean region is the undisputed main source of supply. The threat to them is the fact that the U.S. demand for illicit drugs has a destabilizing effect on their economies and on their fragile democratic governments. The drug trafficking organizations have obtained political and economic power through illicit drug trafficking, and have become a force to be reckoned with.

The Threat of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)

We have discussed the effects of the drugs themselves, but not the traffickers who profit from them. The drug market has created unique forms of criminal activities and the organizations who manage them. Hereafter these criminal organizations will be referred to as DTOs.

Both foreign and domestic DTOs generate huge drug profits. As a result, they have capabilities and resources at their disposal that far exceed those of LEAs. They organize, produce, transport, protect, market, and finance the illicit drug trade. They sponsor drug engineers who design and develop the lethal drugs such as "crack" cocaine, and "Tango and Cash" heroine. The reputation of "crack" is well known, but the most recent trend in designer drugs had such lethal effects that law enforcement

officials had to issue warnings against their use."⁵⁵

In the Andean countries, they are responsible for taking "advantage of the economic, social, and cultural problems of the developing countries, they bribe and threaten officials, and deceive the peasants by offering them 'better' economic conditions."⁵⁶ They can quickly change supply routes, production and delivery methods, using their own informal intelligence sources.⁶⁰ They are paramilitary, buy state of the art equipment and arms; and, as in the case of Panama with General Noriega, can achieve positions of great influence in government.

Analyzing DTOs leads to the basic conclusion that whether it is a gang in the U.S., a cartel in Colombia, or an insurgent organization in Peru or Colombia; DTOs are the organizational infrastructure of the supply side of illicit drug trafficking. They are the key to the effectiveness of drug supply.

THE CENTER OF GRAVITY

As was stated earlier, the purpose for the review of the threat was to determine its centers of gravity. The stated national threat, trafficking in illicit drugs, has two centers of gravity. They are (1) demand, obviously if the demand can be reduced, there would be no need for illicit drugs; and (2) DTOs, the organizations which are comprised of the individuals who mastermind and finance the sophisticated illegal drug trafficking operations.

Because trafficking in illicit drugs is the stated national

threat and objective, the issue of the military involvement in support of the drug war poses a difficult dilemma for the development of strategic military objectives. As the 1989 NDCS stated, it is an issue categorized into the areas of supply and demand. But, whether the military focuses on the suppliers in the U.S., in international waters, or in a foreign country; trafficking in illicit drugs is a crime punishable by civil laws.

Logic dictates that these centers of gravity are suitable to social and law enforcement solutions and they do not provide situations which are suitable for the direct use of military forces in its traditional role. This point is sometimes lost when determining what the military objectives should be, but was not lost by Mr. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. when he wrote some very prophetic words:

National leaders may choose to use the military element of power in pursuit of national policy objectives that are primarily political or economic in nature. This can cause problems. Sometimes military force is not the appropriate tool. Military commanders may then have difficulty in deriving feasible military objectives from the objectives of national policy."

Now that the threat has been analyzed and its centers of gravity identified, the next step is to review our current military strategy in order to examine its suitability, or to determine what the military objectives should be.

STRATEGY

The importance of understanding the national strategy is that it is the genesis for the development of military strategy. The definition of national strategy is as follows:

National Strategy.--The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.⁶²

By definition, the role of the armed forces is to act in concert with the other elements of power to secure the national objectives. Therefore, we must first understand what the national strategy is prior to developing military objectives.

To the credit of Congress and our national leadership, the effects of illicit drugs had been explicitly identified as a threat to the security of the U.S. for some time. In fact, a provision of The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 was to "create a Drug-Free America by 1995."⁶³ Although an admirable goal, what was needed most was a formal national strategy to achieve the goal.

National Security Strategy and Objective. In reference to illegal narcotics, the 1990 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSSUS) identified the national threat, the national objective, and the national strategy.

The threat is stated as follows:

Traffic in illicit drugs imposes exceptional costs on the economy of the United States, undermines our national values and institutions, and is directly responsible for the destruction and loss of many American lives. The international traffic in illicit drugs constitutes a major threat to our national security and to the security of other nations."⁶⁴

The national objective is to "reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States."⁶⁵

The national strategy is to establish our first line of

defense "at the source--in those countries where illicit drugs are produced before being sent to the United States and other countries."⁶⁶ The second line of defense involves the use of appropriate military elements "with the primary role of detecting and monitoring the transportation of drugs to the U.S. border."⁶⁷

The national strategy is clear and concise in articulating the military tasks. Simply, the specified DOD tasks are (1) to execute the security assistance program in support of host-countries counternarcotic operations; (2) to detect and monitor the trafficking of illegal narcotics into the U.S.; and (3) to cooperate and coordinate with U.S. and host-country LEAs to establish an intelligence network which will provide information for "timely and effective interdiction."⁶⁸

National Drug Control Strategy and Objectives. President Bush's 1990 NDCS is obviously more focused on the illicit drug issue. The national drug control objective is "to disrupt, to dismantle, and ultimately to destroy the illegal market for drugs by attacking both the supply and demand sides of the drug problem."⁶⁹

The national drug control strategy is designed to attack all phases of the problem. There are eight major priorities to the plan: (1) the Criminal Justice System--will enhance State and Federal Criminal Justice Systems in order to increase federal aid to state and local law enforcement agencies for "street level" attacks on the drug trade; (2) drug treatment--will expand drug

treatment programs to take addicts off the streets; (3) education, community action, and the workplace--will improve and expand education and drug prevention programs, and cut off federal aid to schools, colleges and universities that do not implement a drug education program; (4) international initiatives--will expand international cooperation and efforts while tripling drug-fighting aid to Colombia, Peru and Bolivia; (5) research agenda--will expand and enhance our research agenda in order to evaluate the effectiveness of our policies and the magnitude of the drug problem; (6) intelligence agenda--will create and support a National Drug Intelligence Center to provide a central source for Drug-related strategic and international intelligence; and finally, (7) interdiction initiatives--will enhance and expand interdiction efforts to include a larger role for DOD in detection and monitoring of drug trafficking.⁷⁰

Of the seven priorities within the NDCS, only three have military implications for consideration in the development of military objectives. The three are the international initiatives which called for an expanded assistance program for Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia; the interdiction efforts which enhanced and expanded the role for DOD in the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking; and the intelligence agenda which called for the cooperation and coordination with LEAs for intelligence on illegal trafficking.

Congress approved and funded the plan, and by statute, DOD was directed to be the lead agency of the Federal Government "for

the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States."⁷¹ Additionally, the 1989 plan tasked DOD to "be the executive agent for implementing communications systems to support drug enforcement activities."⁷²

The question is not whether the military should be involved; but, how involved should it be? The observation here is that the national leadership was perceptive in its initial analysis and did view the threat of illicit drugs as a social and political issue. Therefore, while it did expand some of DOD's current support and assist roles, it did not direct the military to develop or execute major non-traditional roles.

Military Strategy and Objective. The threat, the centers of gravity, and the national strategy have all been reviewed. This leaves the final element to be examined--the current military objective and strategy which was derived from national strategy. The definition of military strategy is as follows:

Military Strategy.-The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by application of force, or the threat of force.

The important point here is that conceptually, the employment of armed forces to secure the objectives of national policy implies the use of, or the threat of the use of force.

On 18 September 1989, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney signed a letter to DOD that articulated his guidance for the implementation of President Bush's NDCS. The letter acknowledged (1) that DOD was the lead agency "for the detection and

monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States." (2) that in cooperation with the Department of State and U.S. LEAs, it would "help lead the attack on the supply of illegal drugs from abroad," and (3) directed that all DOD agencies were to make the counternarcotic missions a high priority.⁷⁴

Mr. Cheney also stated his DOD objective was "to advance substantially the national objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States through the effective application of available resources consistent with our national values and legal framework."⁷⁵

He also provided the DOD strategy to accomplish his objective.

An effective attack on the flow of illegal drugs depends upon action at every phase of the flow: (1) in the countries that are the sources of drugs, (2) in transit from the source countries to the United States, and (3) in distribution in the United States. The United States Armed Forces can assist in the attack on the supply in each of these phases.⁷⁶

An important point here is that this is the first time in any of the national strategies that the direct use of U.S. Armed Forces within the U.S. is mentioned.

The guidance went on to explain the three phased strategy. Attacking the flow of illicit drugs in countries that are the source involves three elements; (1) assistance for nation-building, (2) operational support to host-country forces, and (3) cooperation with host-country forces to prevent drug exports.⁷⁷ This mission represents no change from the traditional security

assistance role, but did provide additional dedicated funding for the counternarcotic role.

Attacking the flow of illicit drugs in transit requires appropriate military forces to deploy with the primary mission to interdict and deter the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. The intent is to have the application of the military to be in addition to, rather than in place of current Federal LEAs.⁷⁶ Laws exist to allow the U.S. Armed Forces such as the Navy and Air Force to provide criminal information to LEAs, if it is obtained in the course of normal operations.⁷⁷

Finally, attacking drugs within the U.S. requires the military to support Federal, State and local LEAs and the National Guard (NG) in state status. This involves the appropriate use of military forces or material in training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning and logistics in support of counternarcotic operations. In case by case situations, personnel and equipment may be detailed to LEAs.⁷⁸

As a result of the national strategy and the DOD guidance, the 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) stated that the counternarcotic military objective is "to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States."⁷⁹ The JMNA did not have a military counternarcotic strategy to support the stated counternarcotic objective.

All the components of the current U.S. counternarcotic strategy have now been reviewed. The threat analysis with its two centers of gravity, as well as the national objectives and

strategy have all been identified. In order to validate or develop what the military objectives should be, we will now examine the application of the military and its ability to execute the national strategy in its drug warfare role.

DRUG WARFARE

For the purpose of simplicity, I have encompassed all the components of the "war against drugs"--the threat, the objectives, and the strategies under the umbrella of drug warfare. Within this umbrella, I will use concepts and principles which directly impact on the development of military counternarcotic objectives to validate the use of the military in the counternarcotic role.

The purpose for using the military concepts, principles and standards is to systematically find appropriate military solutions to the drug trafficking problems that threaten U.S national security interests.⁸² The time-tested concepts and standards such as the concept of war, the principles of war, the key concepts of operational design (center of gravity), and the standard of suitability, feasibility and acceptability are all used to insure that the current military objective is in fact viable.

I have already shown that the stated threat has two centers of gravity, and that neither apply to the development of a military objective in the traditional sense. However, if in fact the military has an objective to stem the flow of drugs into the U.S., how do these basic concepts and principles apply to the

military's capability to conduct drug warfare?

War against drugs? Everyone assumes that when a country is at war, that it is the military element of power that is used to achieve the national objectives. But, militarily, can we be at war against drugs? It is the military concept of war which is a method for validating the suitability of using the military element of power in the war against drugs.

Carl von Clausewitz, one of history's great military philosophers, wrote that war is "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."³³ Since the national leadership has stated to the American people that we are at war against drugs, and with the military taking on an expanded role; how do we militarily make drugs do our will? If drugs are our enemy, conceptually we have a problem with this fitting the definition of war because we cannot be at war with a social issue--an enemy we cannot militarily fight and defeat.

Another philosopher of war, Sun Tzu, stated the way to win wars was to frustrate your enemy's plans and to break up his alliances; isolate, demoralize and break his will to resist.³⁴ Again, the obvious is that within the military concept of war, in a war against illicit drugs, we can never accomplish this. Drugs have no plans to frustrate, no alliances to break, no country or capital to capture, no government to topple, and no army with a will to destroy.

The paradox is that the military is told to get involved in the war against drugs, but philosophically, realistically, and

conceptually, it cannot be at war against drugs. Still, if Americans are told the threat is drugs and that we are at war against drugs, then the will of the American people is being galvanized to defeat a faceless, mindless entity--illicit drugs and drug trafficking. To the American people, illicit drugs and drug traffickers are the enemy. The concept of war and the use of the military as an element of power in the war against drugs are incompatible; therefore, the concept does not validate the use of the U.S. Armed Forces in the counternarcotic role.

The Centers of Gravity. The threat analysis had shown earlier that the centers of gravity were demand and DTOs. Demand reduction is not within the scope of this study and is addressed by the national drug control strategy through other means. It clearly has no potential in contributing to the development of a viable military counternarcotic objective--an exception is the military's own successful internal program to reduce demand.

DTOs are comprised of individuals who are involved in the commerce of illicit drugs. However, drug trafficking is governed by civil laws. Since the U.S. is not legally at war, and all DTOs are citizens of either the U.S. or a country not at war with the U.S.; then the individuals who comprise the DTOs are afforded their individual rights under civil law. DTOs is a proper center of gravity for the stated threat, but is a center of gravity which is more appropriately addressed by civil law and LEAs.

The basic principle here is that the two centers of gravity which were assessed through the threat analysis are appropriate

centers of gravity for the stated threat, but are not applicable as military-oriented centers of gravity which the U.S. Armed Forces could attack and defeat. This makes the development of viable military counternarcotic objectives difficult if not impossible. There is a strong argument to be made that the JMNA was correct in not articulating a military counternarcotic strategy, and was correct in only restating the national objective. If the role of the military is to support and assist LEAs in what is obviously a non-military threat, a military strategy would not be required.

The Principles of War. The principles of war recognized by the U.S. Armed forces are the principles of objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity, timing and tempo, logistics and cohesion."⁵

The principles of war are "fundamental truths that have stood the test of time," and are the second criteria I use to attempt to validate the current military objective and strategy."⁶ They normally represent "a good starting point for evaluating military strategy."⁷

However, I have already demonstrated that the concept of war in this case does not apply, so I have chosen two principles which merit use as an analytical tool for validating the current military strategy and objectives. They are the principles of objective, and unity of command.

The principle of objective is defined as directing every

military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."⁸⁸ In developing military objectives, these imperatives are referred to as defining success.

FM 100-5 further states that "the strategic military objective of a nation at war must be to apply whatever degree of force is necessary to attain the political purpose for which the war is being fought."⁸⁹ Again, the critical point here is that the use of the military implies the use of force. This same point was made earlier with the definition of military strategy. Although not at war, the use of force or the threat of its use is clearly understood by definition to be an imperative in achieving the military objective for which it is being employed, in this case to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S..

Given these facts and the definition, the current military objective does not meet the standard for the principle of objective. That is to say, "to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States" is not clearly defined, decisive or attainable. It clearly does not define military success.

The current military objective is merely a duplication of the national strategic objective (the political objective) as stated in the NSSUS, with the operative term to *stem* leaving doubt as to the ends desired."⁹⁰ Also questionable is whether the use of military force or the threat of its use will achieve the desired end--to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S..

Could a lone navy vessel off the coast of Florida constitute "stemming" the flow? If so, did we attain our military

objective? Obviously not, but the point is that it is not clearly defined.

How does the military measure success in stemming the flow? The answer is simply that it cannot. Therefore, this objective is unattainable because it is indecisive and cannot clearly define success.

The NDCS does list Quantified Two and Ten-Year Objectives; however, they are listed as percentages of reduction and production and have no military application in terms of measuring success.⁹¹

The Principle of unity of command is defined as for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.⁹² Given this definition and the present military role in the current counternarcotic effort, the principle of unity of command is violated because there is no one commander designated to ensure unity of effort.

All DOD agencies were tasked to make the counternarcotic mission a high priority.⁹³ Each CINC was required to develop his own plan. There is no one responsible commander to insure unity of effort for the one military counternarcotic objective.

DTOs have no boundaries and their area for drug operations begins at the source (outside the U.S.) and ends at the user level. Each CINC has his own agenda, his own funding, and is developing his own counternarcotic operational objectives.

"The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 requires the President to designate lead agencies with areas of responsibility for carrying

out the National Drug Control Strategy." "There are 23 program agencies of which DOD is one; none are accountable to any one individual in command to insure unity of effort." Any involvement of the military could require extensive coordination with any number of agencies, and within the borders of the U.S., the military by law cannot have a unilateral direct role. This further complicates the military involvement because not only is there no one military commander to insure a military unity of effort, but there is also no national commander or agent to insure national unity of effort.

The stated military objective of "stemming the flow of drugs into the U.S." fails miserably the principle of objective and unity of command.

Suitability, feasibility, acceptability. The third and final set of criteria used in this study to validate or develop viable military objectives and strategy are the standards of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.

The first standard, *suitability*, relates primarily to determining whether the military objective, if achieved, will lead to the desired effect. But the objective sought must also be *feasible*. This requires that the resources available for the attainment of the objective be compared to the enemy's capability to prevent its attainment. Finally, if the strategic concept has met the demands of suitability and feasibility, it must yet be determined whether the operation can achieve its military objective at a reasonable cost -- *acceptability*...."

This third set of criteria was meant to be the centerpiece of my argument for validating or developing military objectives for the counternarcotic role. It was at this point I had hoped

to validate the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of the current military objective.

But, the current military objective as was stated earlier, is indecisive and leaves both the level of effort and duration of effort unclear. If it were achieved, it would not lead to the desired results of "ultimately destroying the illegal market for drugs." Therefore, the current military objective does not meet the standard of suitability.

My opinion is also based on the unsuitability of the military to be involved in a non-traditional role which violates all concepts and principles of warfighting. These standards are still the most important of all the criteria and will be used next for developing what the military objectives should be.

WHAT SHOULD THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES BE?

Military strategy equals military objectives (ends) plus military strategic concepts (ways) plus military resources (means). But, before attempting to develop new military objectives, there are several major factors in each component of the ends, ways, means that must be discussed in terms of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.

Suitability. Will the achievement of the objective lead to the desired effect? The first factor that must be taken into account is that no military objective for the drug war can be written at the strategic level that will pass the test of suitability. The reasoning, as was discussed earlier, is that the national threat is not a military threat; therefore, the

application of the military element of power against illicit drug trafficking and its centers of gravity is inappropriate and alone cannot achieve the national desired ends. Therefore, no strategic military objective (ends) will be suitable.

A second factor to be considered is that the ways (strategic concepts) in which the military routinely accomplishes its traditional missions, attacking centers of gravity, are not applicable in drug warfare. The bottom line is that direct military involvement would require changes in mission, functions, civil laws, thinking, and training.

Feasibility. Are resources available to attain the military objective compared to the enemy's capability to prevent it? The issue of feasibility at the strategic level has caused a great deal of concern. When applying military resources to the war on drugs, our national leadership has recognized "that military involvement in this mission has costs, and that in a world of finite resources increased effort here is at the expense of other important defense activities. We accept these trade-offs, and will do the job."⁹⁹ But exactly what does that mean?

Funding has always been a major factor. How much military counternarcotic effort can we afford? Americans already spend ten times more purchasing illicit drugs than the government allocates to the total war against drugs.¹⁰⁰

Directly tied to funding is training and readiness, and readiness has always been a primary concern of all the services and for those who would advocate the use of the military as well.

No one desires the counternarcotic mission to degrade readiness. With the build-down of the military imminent, counternarcotic operations have both tangible and intangible costs.

An example is the use of the Active Component (AC) Army units in drug operations such as Green Sweep and Ghost Dancer. Both involved active duty units in which a large amount of training and preparation had to be conducted prior to the actual conduct of the operation. This resulted in "opportunity costs"--the training time lost that would have used to train for wartime missions. This becomes of greater importance as the Army draws down, has fewer forces, a smaller budget, and must be prepared and trained for deployment on contingency missions.

Because this is a mission for which the AC Army is not primarily trained, and one for which its direct use is inappropriate; much time and resources are used to insure that units are mission capable in non-traditional counternarcotic tasks. The wartime mission training days lost due to a counternarcotic mission makes the counternarcotic mission a training distractor, a detriment to unit readiness and therefore not feasible.

On the other hand, the use of properly resourced NG units in these operations make it feasible because it enhances their training posture; it is in addition to their monthly weekend drill, provides additional funding to their limited training funds and has proven to be extremely successful.¹⁰¹ The support of the local populace is likely to be more behind the "home

boys", and the laws support their use in state status.

For the past seven years the Florida National Guard has been working in support of U.S. Customs Service and the DEA.¹⁰² In terms of success, in 1989, "Florida Guardsmen uncovered almost 5 tons of cocaine with a street value of \$295 million, as well as \$26 million in other contraband."¹⁰³ One officer of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement stated to *Soldiers* magazine that "the Guard is a tremendous asset because it has the manpower, the equipment and the know-how....we wouldn't be nearly as effective without them."¹⁰⁴

Acceptability. If the strategic concept meets the standard of suitability and feasibility, can we achieve the military objective at a reasonable cost? I consider Mr. Cheney's words of applying "available resources consistent with our national values and legal framework" key to focusing on the important factors.¹⁰⁵

The question of national values brings to mind the factor of national will. The American people must decide that illicit drugs and all the collateral effects of the drug culture are a threat to our national security, and that it will require a special national effort on their part as well.

Another factor is one of American individual rights which are strongly entrenched in our constitutional laws. The strong feelings we have for the freedom of individual rights means that we expect to be protected from the abusive acts of the government, LEAs, and especially the military.

Americans want to be assured that the military will not become abusive; but their fears are founded by the fact that the AC Army has gotten directly involved with combat units, and the fact that it is not properly trained for the counternarcotic mission. This sentiment is echoed by a Justice Department official who was reported by *TIME* magazine to have stated: "Law-enforcement officers are trained to extract criminals from society, to think about the rights of innocent people and to be mindful of the sovereignty of other nations. Military forces are trained to take on whatever gets in the way, to destroy the enemy."¹⁰⁶

Yet another factor is the question of legality. The legal issue is one of propriety in the use of U.S. Armed Forces against American citizens. Posse Comitatus prevents the use of the Army or Air Force in the execution of civil law, with violators subject to the penalty of a \$10,000 fine or not more than 10 years imprisonment, or both.¹⁰⁷ The law does authorize providing criminal information obtained during the normal course of military operations; loaning of military equipment and facilities for law enforcement purposes; providing military personnel to train civilian law enforcement personnel in the operation and maintenance of equipment authorized under the new act; and providing of expert advice.¹⁰⁸ It also authorized military personnel to operate military equipment to support LEAs provided that the use of personnel and equipment did not affect military preparedness.¹⁰⁹ The point here is that there is a legal factor

to be considered.

Desert Storm Lessons. There is no doubt many significant lessons are to be learned from the recent Desert Storm Operation. More importantly, there are some observations that have application to drug warfare. They are the following:

--that the military does in fact have a great capability and experience in intelligence gathering, and in command and control. Use of national assets to gather intelligence on known illicit drug traffickers and drug trafficking operations would greatly enhance the LEAs in the capture or interdiction of illicit drugs into the U.S..

--that a great amount of public "grass root" support was generated because of the NG and Reserve call-up. The average citizen became directly involved in support of national policies, more aware of the political and national issues, and they supported the military if not necessarily the war.

In support of LEAs, the use of the NG in state status demonstrates a visible national resolve to eliminate illegal drugs, and also provides an opportunity for the local populace to be actively involved in the war against drugs. The local citizens are less fearful and more supportive of the use of NG soldiers who happen to be members of the community as opposed to AC military units.

--that the media role in any crisis is important. In the Gulf Crisis it was the media that was the forum to keeping the American people informed as to the progress of the war.

It is my strong belief that the prevalent attitude of the military to maintain a "low-profile" in drug warfare, especially when used within American communities, is an indicator that the use of the military in the counternarcotic role is suspect. Why would the military not be willing to educate the public on its involvement in a Congressionally mandated mission? What could the military be doing in support of LEAs that would cause American citizens to resent their presence in what is obviously a just and legal cause?

I would submit that if the public is properly informed, it would be the methods and the legality issues as well as the use of armed military in the constabulary role which Americans and the press would take issue with, and rightfully so. The media offers the opportunity and the forum to explain to the citizenry of any community in which the military is involved, the purpose and role of the military in the support and assist role. The American people as a whole, have proven to be understanding and supportive of any justifiable, common-sense approach to national issues.

These lessons merit consideration because of their potential for great impact on the development of appropriate and viable counternarcotic objectives and strategy.

What should the military objectives be? Because the threat, the concepts, the principles of war, and the standards of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability are all incompatible with the non-traditional military counternarcotic mission; I

believe there should be no formal "military objective and strategy." What should exist are formal "counternarcotic support and assist objectives and strategy." The intent is to formalize how the military will support and assist LEAs and the Department of State, and how it will institutionalize the support and assist role as opposed to developing objectives and strategy on how the military will stem the flow of drugs into the U.S..

Specifically, logistic annexes in support of LEAs are appropriate as opposed to operational plans, counternarcotic plans, and the seeking of sponsorship for counternarcotic missions with drug funds under the pretense of conducting "high priority" training missions. Guidance to the CINCs should clearly state that the military counternarcotic role is not an operational mission, but a support and assist role in support of LEAs and allies. This involves the military mainly in the logistic and security assistance role. Exceptions would be the Navy and the Air Force in the interdiction role while performing normal operational missions.

Semantics in this issue are critical because they clearly define the role, and in this case would by definition clearly define the mission of the military as a pure assist and support role as it was originally intended.

Based on the national counternarcotic strategy and the DOD Guidance, the counternarcotic support and assist objectives should be as follows:

--To act as the lead agency for the detection of aerial and

maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States.¹¹⁰

--To execute security assistance programs, in coordination with the State Department, and in accordance with Presidential instructions and applicable laws; to assist other governments in combating DTOs.¹¹¹

--To support and assist Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, and the National Guard in State status--when requested; with training, equipment, and personnel for counternarcotic efforts.¹¹²

--To develop for use by the U.S. Armed Forces in its support and assist role of counternarcotic operations, consistent with our national values and legal framework, appropriate Rules of Engagement, and Rules on the Use of Force.¹¹³

--To act as the executive agent for implementing communications systems to support drug enforcement activities.¹¹⁴

Given the national strategy, the DOD guidance, and the above factors, the counternarcotic support and assist strategy should be stated as follows: The Department of Defense will support and assist the Department of State and Law Enforcement Agencies in the attack against Drug Trafficking Organizations consistent with our national values and legal framework; at the source, in transit, and within the United States.¹¹⁵

CONCLUSIONS

As a result of this project, my conclusions are as

simplified as the issue itself. The military has a dilemma. The obedient servant it must be. Directed by Congress to get involved, but against a threat which is clearly the responsibility of LEAs and social programs to defeat. The direct use of the military is incompatible with all concepts and principles inherent in the military institution as well as the laws and values of the U.S.; especially the historical national feelings towards the use of standing armies against American citizens. As a result of my research I offer the following conclusions:

--that given the national threat and its centers of gravity, no suitable strategic military objectives or strategies can be developed which will pass the test of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.

--that the current military counternarcotic objective as it is now stated, does not meet the test of suitability, feasibility and acceptability.

--that the military has no formal military strategy to support the current JMNA military counternarcotic objective.

--that the current military counternarcotic objective does not pass the time-tested concepts and principles which the military uses as standards in its problem solving method to develop objectives and strategy.

--that Congress and the NDCS intent is for the military to use military resources, not military power to support and assist LEAs and the Department of State in the counternarcotic role, and

that it is the military itself that has expanded the role within the U.S., with the genesis being Mr. Cheney's letter which issued guidance to DOD agencies.

--that many Americans have reservations with the use of the U.S Armed Forces in what we are now calling the war against drugs. The reality is that if the military is to be used in the war against drugs to help in the eradication of drugs; drug warfare means that they may be confronting U.S. citizens in a law enforcement role with the probability that use of deadly force may be required. This thought has a very sobering affect on many Americans, and has potential for future public demand that U.S Armed Forces not be used within the U.S. as a constabulary force. As the military becomes more involved in the war against drugs, the risk becomes greater that the use of deadly force by the military may be required.

--that the time-tested concepts and principles that are part of the Army thought process are excellent tests for developing viable military strategy and objectives. They can become invaluable in articulating to the national leadership the rationale for the use of the military element of power in the support and assist role.

--that the U.S. Armed Forces can have an impact in the drug warfare. First and foremost it is a visible sign of the nation's resolve to do something about illicit drugs. Second, they can support and assist LEAs with capabilities LEAs do not have. Third, they have potential to muster "grass root" support for the

-- of the military through the use of the NG in State Status.

--that Army NG units should be given priority in funding and equipment and training for this mission within the U.S.. They are the key to military "grass root" support. Guardsmen are not under the same limitations as AC soldiers when conducting counternarcotic support and assist missions in state status. NG participation in this effort enhances readiness for their units as opposed to being a training distractor for the AC units.

--that as a minimum, the U.S. military should continue its support and assist role in the attack on the supply of illegal narcotics. This does require appropriate military participation at the source, in transit, and in the U.S.. Appropriate is defined as trained military personnel with equipment in support of LEAs and the Department of State, used in tasks compatible with traditional wartime missions. This means the use of personnel in the support and assist role in tasks for which they are trained. Use of AC Army combat formations in the support role is not appropriate or consistent with national values and legal framework.

RECOMMENDATIONS

--That DOD strongly support the national leadership in the pursuit of the political objective of stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S..

--That it does so by clearly defining its role as a support and assist role in support of LEAs and the Department of State.

--That all formal references to the military counternarcotic

objective and strategy be referred to as "support and assist objectives" and "support and assist strategy," in lieu of military objectives and strategy.

--That the military Public Affairs office develop a public information plan which informs the U.S. public of the support and assist role, and the support and assist objectives the military has in the war against drugs.

--That the military Public Affairs office conduct information news briefings in conjunction with the supported LEAs, to inform local populace of the role of the military in any counternarcotic eradication operation conducted within the U.S..

ENDNOTES

1. The White House. National Security Strategy of The United States: 1992. p. 7.
2. The White House. National Drug Control Strategy: 1990. p. 11.
3. Dennis F. Coupe. Col. Are Constabulary Forces Suited to Fight the Drug War? p. 14.
4. The White House. National Drug Control Strategy: 1991. pp. 13-122.
5. The White House. National Drug Control Strategy: 1989. p. 12.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
7. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward An Understanding of Military Strategy." in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, ed. by Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., p. 3.
8. The White House. National Security Strategy of The United States: 1990. p. 7.
9. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-5. p. 179 (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-5").
10. The White House. National Drug Control Strategy: 1991. p. 5.
11. Mike Snider, "More seniors saying 'no' to drugs in school." USA TODAY, 25 January 1991, p. 1D; Sam Vincent Meddis and Mike Snider, "Drug war 'focused' on blacks." USA TODAY, 20 December 1990, p. 1A; and Jack Kelly, "Senator: Survey 'wildly off the mark'." USA TODAY, 20 December 1990, p. 6A.
12. Phil Galewitz, "Inhalant abuse lethal, and rising," Sunday Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA), 17 February 1991, pp. A1 & A19.
13. Kenneth J. Cooper, "Survey Says Student Drug Use Continues to Drop." The Washington Post (D.C.), 25 January 1991, p. A1.
14. Merrill Collett, THE COCAINE CONNECTION: Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations. p.7.
15. Army Budget Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, The Army Budget: FY 1991 Budget Estimates, p. 5.
16. Collett, p. 49.
17. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1990. p. 245.

18. Donna Miles, "Stamping Out Domestic Drugs", SOLDIERS, November 1990, p. 37.
19. Collett, p.43.
20. Charles B. Ragnel, "Don't wave the victory flag yet in the fight against drug abuse," USA TODAY, 5 March 1991, p. 10A.
21. Elaine Shannon, "A Losing Battle," TIME, 3 December 1990, p. 46.
22. Tom Squitieri, "War's violence often imitated at home," USA TODAY, 6 March 1991, p. 5A.
23. Anita Womack, "D.C. murders set third mark in a row", Sunday Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA), 25 November 1990, p. A18.
24. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy: 1991, p. 127.
25. Ibid.
26. Shannon, p. 46.
27. David N. Dinkins, Mayor; and Allyn R. Sielaff, Commissioner, New York City Department of Correction, Correctional Department City of New York, p. 1.
28. Mark Bauman, "Gregory on board vs. drugs," Daily News (New York City), 25 September 1989, p. 15.
29. Interview with Ann Mayfield, DOT, New York City Department of Correction Academy, New York City, 9 October 1990.
30. Shannon, p. 45.
31. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "Cozy Arrangement Allows Drug Smugglers Safe Entry," The Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA), 1 February 1991, p. A7.
32. CBS Evening News, "Mean Streets," 7 Nov 1990.
33. Barbara Reynolds and Wendy Benedetto, "Blacks need to tone down their rhetoric," USA TODAY, 21 January 1991, p. 9A.
34. Shannon, p. 45.
35. Ibid.
36. Ragnel, p. 10A.

37. "AIDS: Offer pregnant women testing, report says." The Patriot News, Harrisburg, PA, 15 January 1991, p. A9.
38. Commission on Long-term Strategy. Sources of Change in Future Security, p.11.
39. Todd Richissin. "1988 death penalty drug law to be tested in three states," Sunday Patriot-News (Harrisburg, PA), 3 February 1991, p. A4.
40. Ibid.
41. Jim Lewis. "Allison Hill residents hope to reclaim playground from drug dealers, vagrants," The Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA), 8 March 1991, pp. A1-A2.
42. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 1990, pp. 249-250.
43. Ibid., p. 250.
44. Collett, p. 35.
45. "Attacking the Source: Bennett's Plan to Send Military Advisors to Aid Anti-Narcotics Campaigns in Peru and Bolivia Arouses Serious Worries in Washington," TIME, Vol. 1343, 28 August 1989, p. 10.
46. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 1990, pp. 67-68.
47. Ibid., p. 68.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Bruce M. Bagley, "Dateline Drug Wars: Colombia: The Wrong Strategy," FOREIGN POLICY, No. 77, Winter 1989-1990, p. 154.
51. "13 Dead in Separate Colombian Massacres," The Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA), 3 February 1991, p. A6.
52. Bagley, p. 154.
53. Collett, p. 15.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.

56. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 1990. pp 35-36.
57. Ibid., p. 36.
58. Paul Gietner, "'Designer' heroin kills 7; many ill." Sunday Patriot News, (Harrisburg, PA), 3 February 1991, p. A4; and "'Designer' drug death number climbs to 11." The Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA), 4 February 1991, p. A3.
59. Carlos Garcia Priani, COL, Drugs in the Americas: Their Influence on International Relations, p. 21.
60. Virgil E. Raines, LTC, Criteria For Success in the War On Drugs, p. 8.
61. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward An Understanding of Military Strategy." p. 5.
62. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, p. xvii.
63. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy: 1989, p. 9.
64. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990, p.7.
65. Ibid., p. 2.
66. Ibid., p. 28.
67. Ibid., p. 29.
68. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
69. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy: 1990, p.1.
70. Ibid., pp. 13-85.
71. Ibid., p. 112.
72. Ibid., p. 114.
73. Weigley, p. xvii.
74. Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, 18 September 1989, p. 1 (hereafter referred to as "Cheney, Guidance").
75. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Paul J. Rice, COL. New Laws and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act, p. 2; and AFSC PUB 1, pp. 1-10 & 1-14.

80. Ibid.

81. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1990 Joint Net Assessment, p. ES-2.

82. Armed Forces Staff College. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991, p. 3-3 (hereafter referred to as "AFSC PUB 1").

83. Carl von Clausewitz. On War, eds. and trans. Micheal Howard and Peter Paret, p. 75.

84. Sun Tzu. The Art Of War, trans. by Samuel B Griffith, p. 39.

85. AFSC PUB 1, p. 1-3.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. FM 100-5, p. 173.

89. Ibid.

90. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990, p. 2.

91. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy: 1990, pp. 117-121.

92. FM 100-5, p. 175.

93. Cheney, Guidance, p. 1.

94. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy: 1990, p.112.

95. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy: 1991, p. 143-148.

96. William O. Staudenmaier, "Strategic Concepts for the 1980's," p. 14.

97. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy: 1990, p.1.

98. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward An Understanding of Military Strategy," in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, ed. by Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., p. 11.
99. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990, p. 7.
100. Collett, p.7; and The White House. National Drug Control Strategy: 1991, p. 135.
101. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress: 1991, p. 86.
102. Donna Miles, "Stamping Out Domestic Drugs", SOLDIERS, November 1990, p. 37.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Cheney, Guidance, p. 1.
106. "Attacking the Source", p.11.
107. Paul J. Rice, COL, New Laws and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act, p. 2.
108. Ibid., p. 45.
109. Ibid., p. 45-46.
110. Cheney, Guidance, p. 3.
111. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
112. Ibid., p. 4.
113. Ibid., p. 1; and, M. P. W. Stone, Secretary of the Army and Carl E. Vuono, General, United States Army Chief of Staff, Army Conternarcotics Plan, 17 April 1990, p. 21.
114. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy: 1990, p. 127.
115. Cheney, Guidance, p. 1.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "13 Dead in Separate Colombian Massacres." The Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA). 3 February 1991. p. A6.
- "AIDS: Offer pregnant women testing, report says." The Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA). 16 January 1991. p. A9.
- Akre, Brian S. "Marijuana ban starts in Alaska, faces suit." The Sunday-Patriot News, (Harrisburg, PA). 3 March 1991. p. A6.
- Anderson, Jack, and Van Atta, Dale. "Cozy Arrangement Allows Drug Smugglers Safe Entry." The Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA). 1 February 1991. p. A7.
- Armed Forces Staff College. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991. Washington: 1991.
- Army Budget Office. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management. The Army Budget: FY 1991 Budget Estimates. March 1990.
- Bagley, Bruce M. "Dateline Drug Wars: Colombia: The Wrong Strategy." FOREIGN POLICY, No. 77, Winter 1989-1990. pp. 154-171.
- Bauman, Mark. "Gregory on board vs. drugs." Daily News (New York City). 25 September 1989. p. 15.
- CBS Evening News. Mean Streets. 7 November 1990.
- Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 1990. Washington, D.C., 1990.
- Cheney, Richard B. Secretary of Defense. Letter to Department of Defense Agencies. Subject: Department of Defense Guidance For Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy. 18 September 1989.
- Church, George J. "Fighting Back." Time. 11 September 1989. pp. 12-18.
- Collett, Merrill. THE COCAINE CONNECTION: Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations. FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION: Headline Series, No. 290, Fall 1989.
- Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy. Sources of Change In the Future Security Environment. Washington: 1988.
- Cooper, Kenneth J. "Survey Says Student Drug Use Continues to Drop." The Washington Post (D.C.). 25 January 1991. pp. A1

& A9.

Coupe, Dennis F., Col. Are Constabulary Forces Suited to Fight the Drug War? U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, PA. Prepared for the Conference on Ethical Dimensions of the Changing Use of Force at the Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame, October 25, 1990.

"'Designer' drug death number climbs to 11." The Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA), 4 February 1991, p. A3.

Dinkins, David N., Mayor; and Sielaff, Allyn R., Commissioner. Correctional Department City of New York. New York City, 1990.

Galewitz, Phil. "Inhalant abuse lethal, and rising." Sunday Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA), 17 February 1991, pp. A1 & A19.

Geitner, Paul. "'Designer' heroin kills 7; many ill." Sunday Patriot News, (Harrisburg, PA), 3 February 1991, p. A4.

Hanle, Donald J. Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare. New York: Macmillan, 1989.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1990 Joint Net Assessment. Washington: 1990.

Kelly, Jack. "Senator: Survey 'wildly off the mark'." USA TODAY, 20 December 1990, p. 6A.

Kolton, Randy J. "Combating the Colombian Drug Cartels." Military Review, Vol. 70, March 1990, pp. 49-63.

Lewis, Jim. "Allison Hill residents hope to reclaim playground from drug dealers, vagrants." The Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA), 8 March 1991, pp. A1-A2.

Lykke, Arthur F. Jr. ed. Military Strategy: Theory and Application. USAWC Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1989. pp. 9-11: "A Methodology For Developing Military Strategy," by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.

Lykke, Arthur F. Jr. ed. Military Strategy: Theory and Application. USAWC Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1989. pp. 3-8: "Toward An Understanding of Military Strategy," by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.

Mayfield, Ann. DOT, New York City Department of Correction Academy. Personal Interview. New York City, 9 October 1990.

Meddis, Sam Vincent, and Snider, Mike. "Drug war 'focused' on Blacks." USA TODAY, 20 December 1990, p. 1A.

Miles, Donna. "Stamping Out Domestic Drugs." Soldiers, November 1990, pp. 37-40.

Priani, Carlos G., COL., ARMY, Mexico. Drugs in the Americas: Their Influence on International Relations. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 31 March 1989.

Ragnel, Charles B. "Don't wave the victory flag yet in the fight against drug abuse." USA TODAY, 5 March 1991, p. 10A.

Raines, Virgil E., LTC. Criteria for Success in the War On Drugs. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 31 March 1989.

Reynolds, Barbara, and Benedetto, Wendy. "Blacks need to tone down their rhetoric." USA TODAY, 21 January 1991, p. 9A.

Rice, Paul J., COL. New Laws and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 26 May 1983.

Richissin, Todd. "1988 death penalty drug law to be tested in three states." Sunday Patriot News, (Harrisburg, PA), 3 February 1991, p. A4.

Shannon, Elaine. "A Losing Battle." TIME, 3 December 1990, Vol. 136, No. 24, pp. 44-48.

Shannon, Elaine. "Attacking the Source: Bennett's Plan to Send Military Advisors to Aid Anti-Narcotics Campaigns In Peru and Bolivia Arouses Serious Worries in Washington." Time, Vol. 134, 28 August 1989, pp. 10-12.

Shannon, Elaine. Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and the War America Can't Win. New York: Viking, 1988.

Snider, Mike. "More seniors saying 'no' to drugs in school." USA TODAY, 25 January 1991, p. 1D.

Staudenmaier, William O. "Strategic Concepts for the 1980's." Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 5 February 1981.

Stone, M.P.W., Secretary of the Army; and Vuono, Carl E., General, Army Chief of Staff. Letter to Army Staff. Subject: Army Counternarcotics Plan, 17 April 1990.

Squitieri, Tom. "War's violence often imitated at home." USA TODAY, 6 March 1991, p. 5A.

- The White House. National Drug Control Strategy: 1989.
Washington: 1989.
- The White House. National Drug Control Strategy: 1990.
Washington: 1990.
- The White House. National Drug Control Strategy: 1991.
Washington: 1991.
- The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990. Washington: 1990.
- Tzu, Sun. The Art Of War. trans. by Samuel B Griffith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-5: Operations. Washington: 1986.
- von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. eds. and trans. Micheal Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington, Indiana: Macmillan, 1977.
- Womack, Anita. "D.C. murders set third mark in a row." Sunday Patriot-News (Harrisburg, PA), 25 November 1990, p. A18.
- Yarbro, Stan. "Colombian drug lords claim bloody bombing." The Patriot News (Harrisburg, PA), 18 February 1991, p. A3.