


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
USSTRANSCOM REORGANIZATION

BY

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Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller review of the Vander Schaaf (Deputy DOD IG) recommendations in July 1990 and a Defense Management Review (DMR) on consolidation of USTRANSCOM and its components caused CINCUSTRANSCOM to recommend sweeping changes. In November 1990 the chairman and JCS approved most of the recommended changes. This paper traces the history of USTRANSCOM, outlines the recommended and approved changes, and analyzes their impact. The conclusion is that USTRANSCOM is headed in the right direction. However, additional consolidations are possible and needed.



## ABSTRACT

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The form and functions of USTRANSCOM have been debated since even before its inception. NIFTY NUGGET, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) command post exercise (CPX) in the fall of 1978 clearly identified the need to consolidate wartime mobilization and deployment planning. This led to the creation of the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA). Its job was to integrate the automated data processing (ADP) systems and deployment planning of the transportation operating agencies (TOAs). JDA had only the authority to coordinate. It could not compel the TOAs to comply. There were numerous studies and recommendations to form a unified transportation command. The last of these, the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management finally led to the formation of USTRANSCOM in October 1988. USTRANSCOM's mission was wartime planning and execution. In peace time the TOAs under the service departments operated the Defense Transportation System (DTS). Exercise PROUD EAGLE 90, another mobilization and deployment exercise revealed continuing problems in traffic management and integration of ADP systems. Additionally the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller review of the Vander Schaaf (Deputy DOD IG) recommendations in July 1990 and a Defense Management Review (DMR) on consolidation of USTRANSCOM and its components caused CINCUSTRANSCOM to recommend sweeping changes. In November 1990 the Chairman and JCS approved most of the recommended changes. This paper traces the history of USTRANSCOM, outlines the recommended and approved changes, and analyzes their impact. The conclusion is that USTRANSCOM is headed in the right direction however additional consolidations are possible and needed.

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## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to examine the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to determine how it is organized to perform its assigned mission and functions. First I will outline some of the history that led to the formation of USTRANSCOM. Also, I will analyze the evolving relationship between USTRANSCOM and the transportation operating agencies (TOAs) - Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Military Airlift Command (MAC) and Military Sealift Command (MSC). In July 1990 CINCUSTRANSCOM proposed a sweeping reorganization of USTRANSCOM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a partial reorganization of USTRANSCOM in December 1990. No DOD Directive implementing this reorganization has been issued.

Does the Commander-in-Chief USTRANSCOM have adequate control over the TOAs in peacetime and wartime? If not, what changes need to be made? There is a constant discussion within the joint logistics community of the Department of Defense (DOD) regarding these questions. Even as I write this paper decisions are being made in the Pentagon to alter the structure and functions of USTRANSCOM. I will review these decisions and address other areas where there can be even more consolidations and realignments.

Any reorganizing plan must first consider the fundamental reason for the existence of the organization. USTRANSCOM only exists in peacetime in order to be able to perform its wartime mission. The organization and functions in peacetime must support the wartime mission. "Train like you're going to fight" is an old but still valid cliché. How well does the peacetime organization and functions of USTRANSCOM support its wartime mission? Can other changes be implemented to increase effectiveness and efficiency? How much does service parochialism and organizational resistance to change within the TOAs impact upon the compromise decisions? These are considerations as logistics planners try to map out the road for USTRANSCOM.

## CHRONOLOGY LEADING TO USTRANSCOM

The National Security Act of 1947 officially recognized the need to reorganize U.S. armed forces to be better able to execute joint warfare. Many of the plans that led up to this legislation proposed consolidation of all logistics for all services. Almost a fifth service. This was too drastic. A compromise position allowed the services to retain responsibility for logistical support of their forces. This led to splitting up the responsibility for transportation functions among the services.

The Army had responsibility for surface transportation and common user ocean terminals. The Air Force managed all airlift requirements. The Navy arranged all ocean transportation. The services each managed their portion of the transportation system independently. There was no connectivity between the modes of transportation. Data processing and information management systems were developed autonomously. Through the next thirty years many realized there could be improvements in both effectiveness and efficiency of the Defense Transportation System (DTS).

All of the concerns came to a head in the fall of 1978 with Exercise NIFTY NUGGET. This was a command post exercise (CPX) designed to test mobilization and deployment of U.S. forces. The primary conclusion of this exercise was that the DTS was broken.

The DTS could not adequately coordinate and execute a major deployment of U.S. forces.

During the exercise accurate cargo requirements could not be identified. The services were unable to coordinate the various modes of transportation. There was cargo at transportation nodes (aerial/ocean ports, railheads etc.) with no transport available. The converse of this situation also occurred, there was transport at locations where no cargo existed. The service transportation managers had no shared ADP software or databases. There was no one commander/manager within DOD responsible for the total DTS or specifically for deployment planning<sup>1</sup>.

To solve all of these problems the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) created the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) in May 1979. JDA was to be the entity that would pull together the deployment planning of all of the services and the TOAs. The first and most obvious pre-requisite to achieve this was an automated system which would interface with the services and TOAs to manage requirements and capabilities. The Joint Deployment System (JDS) was developed to fulfil this need.

Due to service parochialism the necessary interfaces and data exchanges never occurred<sup>2</sup>. As a JCS agency JDA had only the authority to coordinate with the TOAs and could not force their compliance<sup>3</sup>. The JDA was a significant step in the right

direction and provided a foundation to build upon. However, it lacked the clout to be fully successful. The basic problem was a lack of authority commensurate with the responsibility.

In the years between 1980 and 1986 there were several studies, proposals and recommendations on how to reorganize the DTS to better accomplish its mission. The Navy was particularly recalcitrant in opposing any plan which would impact on service prerogatives. Both Congress and the Executive branch perceived a lack of interoperability and overall mismanagement within DOD. One area that many felt interoperability could be significantly increased was transportation management. This culminated in the formation of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission On Defense Management (Packard Commission). One of its recommendations was that DOD should "establish a single unified command to integrate global air, land, and sea transportation".

It is interesting to note that even in the face of this recommendation the Navy remained obdurate. The Navy's dissent caused the Chairman of the JCS to exercise his new authority under the recent Goldwater-Nichols Act to present his personal view to the Secretary of Defense rather than those of each of the five JCS. Admiral Crowe supported the formation of a unified transportation command. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 was issued on 1 April 1986 directing the establishment of a unified transportation command.

## FORMATION OF U.S. TRANSCOM

U. S. USTRANSCOM came into being on 15 April 1987 at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. There was initially only a small nucleus of personnel to develop the organization and structure of the command. MAC, MTMC, and MSC were assigned to USTRANSCOM for planning purposes. JDA remained a separate operational command until USTRANSCOM was able to assume its functions and responsibilities. The planning and developing phase lasted until 1 October 1988 when U.S. USTRANSCOM became an operational unified combatant command. MAC ceased to be a specified command at this time.

The evolution of this command resulted in a unique mission and a complex set of command relationships. The mission was and is to "provide global air, land , and sea transportation to meet national security objectives"<sup>5</sup>. This general mission was further delineated into three specific missions; strategic mobility planning, ADP systems integration, and centralized wartime traffic management.

USTRANSCOM is organized on a functional basis rather than a geographical area as most of the other unified commands are organized. During the peacetime planning process CINCUSTRANSCOM is the supported CINC. The other unified commands and the services must input their movement requirements to USTRANSCOM via

Joint Operations, Planning System (JOPS) in order for CINCUSTRANSCOM to plan for wartime requirements. In wartime CINCUSTRANSCOM becomes a supporting CINC as USTRANSCOM coordinates and manages the flow of personnel and supplies to the theater of the unified combatant commander.

The role of CINCUSTRANSCOM is further complicated by the fact that the TOAs are assigned during peacetime for planning purposes only. This relationship was a compromise between the extreme of having no unified transportation command and the opposite extreme of severing all service connections of the functional component commands. It is also quite normal that unified commands do not have forces assigned until required to accomplish a specific mission in an emergency or war.

The TOAs continue to function as separate major commands of the service departments. The TOA commanders are responsible to their service department secretaries and chiefs for their service unique missions<sup>1</sup>. They perform their common user transportation functions by single service manager charters from DOD through service departments. USTRANSCOM assumes operational command only in time of war or declared national emergency.




Figure 1

Figure 1 depicts the command relationship between USTRANSCOM and the TOAs prior to reorganization.

Each of the TOAs continue to operate their independent ADP and management information systems. These TOA ADP systems are operating the DTS in peacetime. In wartime the Joint Deployment System (JDS) plans, directs, and monitors movements in support of OPLAN execution. There was no connection between the peacetime and wartime systems. Early on USTRANSCOM planners recognized that " the personnel, policies, procedures, and ADP support of these two systems are different and independent. The move to an integrated system for continuous use in peace or war is essential...". "From the transportation perspective, war should represent only an increase in intensity of the same basic

procedures used in peace<sup>4</sup>". However USTRANSCOM lacked the authority to provide the directions to the TOAs to integrate their peacetime systems.

Exercise Proud Eagle 90, a JCS directed mobilization and deployment command post exercise (CPX), reiterated this point. This exercise was very similar to Nifty Nugget in 1978. The establishment of USTRANSCOM had not yet satisfactorily resolved the problems surfaced in 1978. The after action reports recommended, " CINCUSTRANSCOM should consolidate certain peacetime and crisis management tasks at USTRANSCOM headquarters, beginning with traffic management and contracting, to improve the coordination between transportation modes and to provide the basis for improved reporting and tracking of actual movements. Such steps would be valuable also in better aligning the transition from peacetime to wartime operations<sup>5</sup>".

The OSD Comptroller gave additional impetus for change when he initiated a review of the Vander Schaaf recommendations in July of 1990<sup>6</sup>. Mr Vander Schaaf, the Deputy DOD Inspector General, recommended in February 1988, that among other things, the component command headquarters of USTRANSCOM be eliminated. This was to result in significant manpower savings. This recommendation was being revisited. At this same time OSD tasked CJCS to reply by 15 August 1990 to a Defense Management Review (DMR) that proposed consolidation of USTRANSCOM and its

components . The time was ripe for change.

## PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF USTRANSCOM

CINCUSTRANSCOM presented a decision briefing on the reorganization of USTRANSCOM to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 July 1990. CINCUSTRANSCOM stated "this reorganization proposal is to make USTRANSCOM a fully operational unified command in peace and war ... to enhance the transportation system in peace and war rather than effect economies and manpower savings<sup>11</sup>."

The briefing outlined the same problems of USTRANSCOM that were previously discussed. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) and JCS USTRANSCOM Implementation Plan clearly specifies that it is a wartime oriented command. Peacetime operations are conducted through single service manager charters. In order for USTRANSCOM to optimize wartime transportation capabilities it must be able to influence peacetime operations. The transition from peace to war is complicated by different organizations with different policies, and procedures operating the transportation system upon mobilization.

The proposal was based upon six major elements to be changed during a three phased reorganization. The elements to be changed were mission, charter, policy direction, traffic management, contracting, and financial management. The phases are to maintain continuity of operations while transitioning

responsibility.

The first recommended change was to revise the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to provide an operational mission in peacetime as well as in wartime. This would entail assigning the TOAs directly to USTRANSCOM for all common user transportation functions. They would then become transportation component commands (TCCs) of USTRANSCOM. In this fashion USTRANSCOM will have the same command relationship with the TCCs as other unified commands have with their components. CINCUSTRANSCOM then can accomplish the responsibilities of a JCS unified commander in peace and war. These are to maintain the preparedness of the command, carry out assigned missions and tasks, and assign tasks to and direct coordination among the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort<sup>12</sup>.

The second element to be changed would be the charters. As stated earlier the services currently manage their portion of the DTS under single service charters from OSD. These charters contain service unique as well as common user transportation functions. The recommendation was that common user transportation functions be assigned to USTRANSCOM for centralized management. Only in this way can the transportation system start to operate/train in peacetime as it will fight in wartime. USTRANSCOM can provide a unified command perspective on the total defense transportation system. Efficiency and

effectiveness can be maximized through centralized management of a multi-modal transportation system.

The third element to change would be policy guidance. Currently common user lift policy is established by OSD. The policies are passed to the Service Secretaries who supplement and execute the policies under their single service charters. To align with the first two changes the service secretaries must be removed from this policy arena. OSD would pass policy guidance for traffic management, contracting and financial management to USTRANSCOM who would implement and execute through the TCCs.

These three policy areas are also the last three elements which must be changed. They are completely inter-related. Because most of the DTS is actually commercial transportation assets, traffic management, contracting and financial management are the keys to controlling and influencing the system.

As proposed by CINCUSTRANSCOM, OSD should assign responsibility for all common user transportation traffic management to USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM could collect all movement requirements above a specified threshold and task the TCCs to execute them as required. Hand in hand with the traffic management function comes the contracting for common user transportation. Once more the proposal recommended OSD transfer this authority from the TCCs to USTRANSCOM. These transfers of

authority would enable USTRANSCOM to direct utilization of various modes of transport to best satisfy the services needs and to maintain a mobilization base. Lastly, CINCUSTRANSCOM proposed creation of a Defense Transportation Industrial Fund (DTIF). All common user transportation financial transactions would be processed through this fund in lieu of the separate service industrial funds as is now the case. This would require each of the services to transfer that portion of their industrial fund related to transportation functions into the DTIF<sup>13</sup>.

The Services would retain responsibility to train, equip and organize the personnel assigned to the functional commands. The services would retain responsibility for certain service unique functions to be performed by the TCCs. The Army/MTMC would retain responsibility for worldwide operation of water terminals and the personal property program for all of DOD. In CONUS the Army would also retain responsibility for the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet and the Transportation Engineering Agency. The Navy/MSC would retain operational control of organic and chartered sealift, naval fleet auxiliary force and special mission vessels. The Air Force/MAC would continue to be responsible for organic and chartered airlift, operational support airlift, aerospace rescue and recovery, air weather service, aerospace audiovisual service and aeromedical evacuation<sup>14</sup>.

During Phase I of the reorganization USTRANSCOM would start with oversight and policy guidance for traffic management and contracting. They would analyze forecasted movement requirements to gain visibility over all modes of transport. Certain large scale movement requirements i.e. unit moves of battalion or squadron or larger would be centralized at USTRANSCOM. A financial management office would be established at USTRANSCOM and financial system requirements developed. There is not much execution in Phase I, primarily just gaining experience and visibility over the transportation system.

The next step, Phase II, would consolidate execution of all passenger movements at USTRANSCOM. MTMC now manages, contracts and executes all domestic passenger movements both air and surface. MAC does the same for international air passengers. Consolidation would result in better customer service and greater leverage over the commercial carriers. The second phase of the financial transition would involve testing of the DTIF system and conversion of the TCCs industrial fund managers to field offices of USTRANSCOM.

Phase III would entail USTRANSCOM assuming full traffic management, contract execution and consolidation of all industrial fund transactions under the DTIF. CINCUSTRANSCOM recognized that although Phase III would be the optimum solution it would meet such strong service opposition that it would not be

attainable. He recommended a compromise position.

CINCUSTRANSCOM, GEN. Johnson's recommendation was, "A full USTRANSCOM mission peace and war, clear assignment of our components to USTRANSCOM, a single charter for USTRANSCOM for common-user lift, consolidating common-user lift traffic management policy, contract policy, and financial management policy at USTRANSCOM, establishing a DTIF structure at USTRANSCOM with component field offices, and finally consolidating requirements management at USTRANSCOM for critical unit moves and full traffic management execution for all passenger movements, with contract authority remaining at components<sup>15</sup>." Basically this would be stopping at Phase II.

As Gen. Johnson stated, the purpose of the proposed reorganization was greater effectiveness in managing the defense transportation system. The reorganization was not intended to save manpower spaces by eliminating subordinate headquarters. However, if the entire proposal were to be implemented there would be a 16% reduction in spaces. USTRANSCOM would gain 603 spaces. The components would have 120 spaces to be redistributed to other functions<sup>16</sup>. If only the partial reorganization were implemented USTRANSCOM would gain about half the number of spaces and there virtually no manpower savings to be redistributed within the components<sup>17</sup>.

## COMPROMISE SOLUTION

On 30 November 1990 the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the reorganization of USTRANSCOM<sup>10</sup>. They gave CINCUSTRANSCOM much of what he had recommended with some important exceptions. The exceptions were the DTIF and centralized passenger movement management and execution. USTRANSCOM can establish a financial management office to maintain visibility over component industrial fund operations. The components will continue to operate their individual industrial funds. Management and execution of passenger movements remained split between MTMC and MAC. USTRANSCOM will gain some visibility over passenger movements while managing critical unit moves, exercises, and deployments.

Although CJCS has approved these changes much work remains to make it all a reality. Probably one of the most challenging will be getting all the services to agree on a new DOD directive on the management of common-user transportation and a USTRANSCOM charter for common-user lift. A draft directive is currently being staffed with the Joint Staff and the service departments. A response is due back to the Asst. Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics in February 1991. Even when these changes are fully implemented the debate over the structure and functions of USTRANSCOM will continue.




Figure 2

Figure 2 depicts the command relationship between USTRANSCOM and the TCC's after reorganization. It is interesting to note that the draft DOD Directive requires the Service Secretaries to communicate through CINCUSTRANSCOM to the service components.

CINCUSTRANSCOM's complete reorganization proposal is definitely the direction that DOD should be going. One important thing to remember about the DTS is that it is not military trucks, trains, ships or planes. In 1990 MTMC moved 17.5 million measurement tons of military cargo, 746,000 personal property shipments, and 48,000 ammunition shipments<sup>18</sup> predominately through commercial terminals on civilian equipment. During DESERT SHIELD/STORM civilian stevedores under contract to MTMC loaded over 3 million tons of cargo onto 150 ships at thirty commercial ports. The U.S. commercial rail fleet consists of

over 1.4 million railcars. The DOD fleet of military railcars is only 2600.<sup>10</sup> The DTS is primarily civilian transportation assets being used in support of DOD. These assets belong to a wide variety of private and corporate entities. These civilians interact with DOD and the services daily in hundreds of locations. When we go to war these are the same people we will be relying upon to transport us to the theater of war/operations. It is not wise to plan in advance to change the way we do business with these folks just as a crisis erupts.

Even within the military this does not make sense. The transition from peace to war is a confused and hectic period. All other logistics functions i.e. supply and maintenance merely increase the tempo to sustain the wartime level of activity. Yet for several years transportation management has been planned to operate one way in peacetime and significantly differently in wartime. Transportation management provides the linkage between the combat units and the civilian sector. The mode of operation should be consistent from daily interactions through crisis management. This will make the transition from peace to war less confusing and hectic.

The omission of the DTIF from the approved reorganization of USTRANSCOM will adversely impact the close coordinated functioning that DOD is striving for. A commander must have control over his resources, i.e. manpower, material, time, money.

Lack of control over these resources certainly limits the amount of control CINCUSTRANSCOM has over the functioning of his organization. The TCC's will continue to operate under the provisions of their service industrial funds. Through this leverage the services will continue to have significant influence over the operation of the TCCs. USTRANSCOM will have only visibility, and no control over the service industrial funds. There will be ample opportunity for conflict if USTRANSCOM differs with the services over operation/management of their industrial funds. Once more CINCUSTRANSCOM appears to have a mission without the authority to make it happen.

The consolidation of all passenger travel bookings makes sense. Such an office could provide one stop shopping for a customer whether the destination is domestic or international. MTMC will continue to manage and contract with commercial carriers for domestic travel. MAC will continue to handle overseas traffic. There will continue to be some redundancy of function. The opportunity to maximize DOD's influence on the transportation industry is diluted.

The approved reorganization will only provide USTRANSCOM visibility of selected unit moves. Transportation requirements for unit deployments to exercises and to the National Training Center (NTC) will be submitted to USTRANSCOM for review. USTRANSCOM will look for opportunities to consolidate and direct

the TCC's to execute the movements. The TCC's will review all other transportation requirements for opportunities to consolidate and execute without USTRANSCOM involvement. This appears to be redundancy in function. If the TCC's can manage all other movements why not unit moves? If USTRANSCOM is going to manage unit moves, why not manage all transportation requirements? One of the trends in the commercial sector is consolidation of transportation functions into huge multi-modal corporations. USTRANSCOM will need full traffic management and contracting authority to optimize the potential efficiencies and savings that these multi-modal corporations may present.

The limited traffic management function that USTRANSCOM will have in peacetime will provide an opportunity for some positive gains. One example is containerization. I recognize not everyone in the military agrees that containerization is good. However, the vast majority of the U.S. maritime fleet are container vessels. In this era of constrained resources the military needs to optimize the use of the commercial logistics assets which are available. Very little of the cargo in unit deployments is containerized. Much more of the cargo could be containerized if properly managed. By maintaining visibility over these movements USTRANSCOM will be able to influence the amount of cargo that gets containerized. Containerization will result in much faster loading and discharge at the ports of embarkation and debarkation. Of course the deploying units will

require specific equipment and elements to handle the containers. USTRANSCOM will have to be the containerization advocate with the services.

Perhaps of more fundamental importance is the data required for USTRANSCOM to have peacetime visibility over even some of the transportation movements. This implies that the service elements, TCC's, and USTRANSCOM must have some kind of interconnected, compatible data systems to pass requirements and instructions. USTRANSCOM will have the authority to designate the data protocols and procedures to be used. This authority will enable USTRANSCOM to force the services to a single unified transportation data system for peace or war. This will be a major step in correcting the problems exposed by NIFTY NUGGET 78.

Another positive aspect of the approved reorganization is the new procedures to activate the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Previously COMSC requested through the Chief of Naval Operations, the Sec. Navy and the Sec. Def. that the Secretary of Transportation (SEC DOT) activate the SRP. CINCMAC could activate Stage I of CRAF. He recommended through CJCS to Sec. Def. for activation of Stage II and to the President for Stage III. Under these procedures subordinate service component commanders of CINCUSTRANSCOM could make recommendations to CJCS, SECDEF, and the President without CINCUSTRANSCOM being in the decision loop. In a national

emergency probably both programs will need to be activated simultaneously. The decision/recommendation authority should be at the unified command level.

The new procedures for activation of civil transportation augmentation programs all flow through CINCUSTRANSCOM. He requests SECDOT activate SRP with approval of SECDEF incoordination with SECNAV. CINCUSTRANSCOM has the authority to call Stage I of CRAF. He recommends activation of Stage II through CJCS to SECDEF and Stage III to the President. These procedures place the decision to initiate civil augmentation programs at the proper level in the joint command structure and follow the proper chain of command. One commander having the authority for both programs ensures simultaneous mobilization of all the transportation resources needed for an overseas deployment.

Additional consolidations of functions can attain greater efficiency and effectiveness. To accomplish these the Services must get past parochial arguments over who will perform the functions. One possibility for consolidation is the booking of cargo on ocean carriers. Currently MTMC gets the requirement for ocean transport from a customer. MTMC then tasks MSC to obtain cargo space on a vessel. MSC contracts with a commercial carrier and notifies MTMC. MTMC books the cargo with the carrier under the MSC contract. MSC pays the carrier once MTMC verifies

services were performed. This system requires many communication links. There are many opportunities for confusion and failure. Intensive management minimizes malfunctioning of the system. This convoluted system could be greatly simplified if one office were assigned the entire function. Since MTMC already receives the requirement from the customer, books the cargo with the carrier, and verifies the billing it would not be too difficult for MTMC to also accomplish the contracting and payment functions.

Since the DESERT STORM deployments the news media has often reported the quantity of U.S. equipment and supplies that were shipped in foreign flag vessels. MSC chartered 38 foreign ships from 14 allied nations. The critics point out that this emphasizes the need for U.S. fast sealift ships. This is nothing new. DOD and Congress have known of this requirement for several years. In past years Congress even put money in the DOD budget to purchase such vessels. In fiscal year 1990 (FY90) Congress appropriated \$600 million for sealift<sup>11</sup>. These funds were either not spent or diverted to other programs. DOD decided to use \$275 million to buy out M-1 tank production and for personnel accounts. In FY91 Congress put another \$900 million in the DOD budget for sealift. DOD now has \$1.225 billion for sealift for which there is no plan to obligate<sup>11</sup>. The Services continue to debate the best use of these monies, fast sealift, prepositioning ships, or subsidizing commercial vessels. There are arguments

for each of these alternatives. I do not intend discuss them here. The key point is that a decision needs to be made and a course of action taken to ensure adequate sealift for the U.S. military.

One way to solve these problems would be for Congress to put the funds in USTRANSCOM's budget. USTRANSCOM could ensure proper obligation of the funds in accordance with Congress's wishes. USTRANSCOM could work with the Navy to procure the vessels in one manner or another. Once the funds are committed and the vessels delivered MSC could take operational control of them for USTRANSCOM.

## CONCLUSIONS

In NIFTY NUGGET 78 the problems of mobilization/deployment planning and execution were recognized. The JDA was created in 1979, but it lacked the authority to resolve the problems. In 1987/88 USTRANSCOM was created. Exercise PROUD EAGLE 90 showed that there were still disconnects and no one had complete control. The deployment to DESERT STORM in late 1990 was a great success. The lessons learned from that deployment have not yet been published.

Now in 1991 DOD is reorganizing USTRANSCOM. Once again there is a compromise between what may be the optimum solution and what is politically attainable. Many critics argue that DOD should have a totally centralized, joint transportation command. Only when CINCUSTRANSCOM has full command of the TCC's will he have adequate control to perform his peacetime and wartime mission. Yet the services tenaciously hang onto their portions of the DTS. DOD has chosen a compromise path. USTRANSCOM is moving toward centralized direction with decentralized execution of transportation.

Much of the training for logistics elements should be accomplished in the performance of the daily mission. The DTS is still not functioning in peacetime as it will fight in wartime. Therefore the performance of peacetime mission is not training

the DTS managers nor the civil sector in the procedures which will be used in time of crisis. This was not a problem in the Gulf Crisis with the long build-up time. A crisis requiring faster responses under more arduous conditions could exacerbate this inherent systemic weakness.

The key is to overcome confining service perspectives and develop a joint orientation on the problems. The reorganization of USTRANSCOM confronts many of the fundamental DOD traffic management problems. It also sidesteps many of them. The hope is that as the decision makers see the joint transportation system function they will be more receptive to changes that will enhance the total system and not to sub-optimize the individual service portions.

## ENDNOTES

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