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U. S. AND CUBAN RELATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR
THE FUTURE

BY

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U.S. AND CUBAN RELATIONS:

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961 following the Castro led Cuban Revolution. Since that time U.S.-Cuban relations have not been a model for foreign policy. A brief history of United States and Cuban foreign policies is described and an analysis of the failure of both policies is offered. A continuing United States policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba is recommended until Castro's death. Possible post-Castro scenarios include a transition from a charismatic dictatorship to a populist socialist regime, a violent overthrow of the present communist regime, or a peaceful takeover of the government by a sector of the current regime. The most likely scenario is peaceful takeover and the Cuban military can accomplish the task. The United States could influence the military transition government by increasing the military-to-military contacts with Cuban military. Additionally, the United States could assist in developing an economic assistance program that will create a stronger Cuban economy that is closely tied but not dependent on the United States. These policy initiatives could assist the elimination of the last vestige of communism in the Western Hemisphere.

INTRODUCTION

January 1991 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the breaking of U. S. relations with Cuba. With the Castro revolt and subsequent takeover of the Cuban government in 1959, a new era evolved in U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. A cornerstone to U.S. foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine, had crumbled and the Soviet Union no longer recognized U.S. hegemony in the West. The Soviet-supported Castro regime has been a continuous problem for U.S. policymakers and the indirect threat 90 miles from the shores of the U.S. presented a new challenge.

The policies of the various United States administrations since 1959 have been unsuccessful in eliminating the Cuban communist regime in the Caribbean Basin. The problem remains as to how best to deal with the communist government in Havana. Possible solutions to the problem could be: an increased hard-line approach in an attempt to isolate Cuba and force her to change; a softening position where the U.S. government would be satisfied with a de-Sovietization but not de-communization; and a final position of maintaining the status quo until the Castro regime falls and then openly court Cuba back to the U.S. sphere. The most appropriate solution is the last alternative.

However, to understand this policy direction, an examination of the primary actors is required. A description of how the U.S. views the problem and a brief history of United States foreign

policy regarding Cuba will be portrayed. This will be followed by a description of Cuban foreign policy. After the United States and Cuban policy positions are discussed, a prescription for possible "inroads" for the improvement of future U.S.-Cuban relations will be offered.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The United States approach to the development of a foreign policy for Cuba is more complicated than the Cuban basis for relations with the United States. This problem stems from changing administrations and the fact that the U.S. foreign policy is divided into two general camps; conservatives and liberals. The oscillations of U.S. policy are a direct result of the influence of those groups in the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government.

The conservative element has the perspective that basically divides the world according to the major power centers. They believe that each power center operates within its sphere of influence and maintains that influence. Deviation from this pattern is extremely limited. Using the conservative approach to foreign policy their deduction for Cuba would be the following. Latin America is in the U.S. sphere of influence. Cuba is not under our influence. Therefore, it must be isolated because it is threatening our supremacy.¹ Conservatives offer two basic arguments for maintaining a "hard-line" policy against Cuba:

1. Cuba is exporting revolution and threatening Latin America.
2. Cuba's military ties to the Soviet Union are a threat to the U.S. and the world balance of power.

The conservatives' view of foreign policy toward Cuba can be seen as uncompromising and often hostile to any change.

The liberals' approach is much like the conservatives' approach in their general view of the world. However, they believe that there is room for "accommodation" with durable regimes that achieve a certain autonomy.² While liberals may favor a softening of U.S. policy toward Cuba, they are still hostile to communism and the expansion of communism in the U.S. sphere of influence.

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES POLICY

The liberal and conservative approaches of the United States towards Cuba have caused tension in establishing a policy and have created a history of U.S. relations with Cuba that has been less than consistent. There has been one consistent objective in U.S. policy; the ultimate purpose has been to destabilize the government of Cuba³ within the greater United States policy of containment of communism.

During the late years of the Eisenhower Administration, the precedents for U.S. policy toward Cuba were established. The U.S. and Cuban conflict will not be dealt with in detail, but it "was the result of the historical interaction of the parties, how each viewed the 1959 revolt, and an understanding of the

East-West Cold War with regard to Latin America."⁴ As Cuba established closer ties with the Soviet Union, the United States-Cuban relationship rapidly deteriorated. In response to a Cuban limitation of 11 personnel for an embassy staff, President Eisenhower, in his last 16 days of office, finally broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 3, 1961.

The Kennedy plan of action for combating Cuba was based on his perception that "the Soviet Union fights the Cold War outside its own sphere of influence; therefore, defeats are failed conquests, not real losses."⁵ The description of Kennedy's view of the USSR was the impetus for the three eras of Cuban policy during his short administration. They included the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961, the consideration for direct intervention in Cuba from April 1961 to October 1962 and the missile crisis with the resulting blockade, up to the time of Kennedy's death. During these periods there were also rumors of CIA assassination plans and attempts on Castro. To say the least, this was a most aggressive position.

The early Johnson program was a continuation of the Kennedy view, but with a major focus of "preventing another Cuba." The policy of containment of communism resulted in direct intervention in the Dominican Republic. Due to the growing involvement of the United States in Vietnam, the major position towards Cuba rapidly became one of benign neglect. The U.S. commitment in Vietnam would place Cuba as a secondary issue in the containment arena.

The Nixon-Ford-Kissinger era of foreign policy was marked by

detente. Although some scholars⁶ and some Congressmen⁷ believed that the great failure of the Administration not to recognize Cuba was a great contradiction to detente, it is difficult to agree. The major powers were more directly concerned with problems with each other and not as much with peripheral issues. In reality, Cuba did benefit from the lifting of export restrictions on various products shipped to communist countries but not directly to Cuba. There was a gradual easing of tensions with Cuba in an effort to appease the Soviet Union.

The Ford years were a continuation of the Nixon-Kissinger era. "There were signs the traditional hostility had eroded to the extent that prospect of detente were not unrealistic" with Cuba.⁸

The Carter Administration's relations with Cuba were those of greater liberalization. One major initiative was the establishment of a U.S. Interests Section in the Czechoslovakian Embassy in June 1977. This presented a greater opportunity for expanded relations with the Castro regime. This action created an atmosphere for 11 other Latin American nations to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1977. Additionally, Carter ceased reconnaissance flights over Cuba in the spring of that year. This liberalized attitude was shocked into change by the Cuban involvement in Ethiopia. The Administration increased its political and psychological efforts against Cuba by divulging the presence of the Soviet Cuban Brigade. The administrations political fiasco of "discovering" a brigade that had been present for many years was a considerable blow to U.S. prestige and power

projection throughout the world. It also created additional animosity toward Cuba from the Carter administration.

The Reagan Administration returned to a "hard-line" approach to the Cuban regime. The tough policies against Cuba were intensified. The administration increased the number of radio broadcasts not only on the Voice of America but also on Radio Marti, whose target is specifically Cuba. Additionally, they placed burdensome restriction on U.S. travel to Cuba. These measures seem mild compared to President Reagan's remark that a total blockade might be "a way to rid the island of Soviet presence."⁹ The Administration's stance was "uncompromisingly tough if not openly hostile toward Cuba."¹⁰

The Bush administration has continued the hard line approach. This position is being enhanced by the Soviet Union's retrenchment in its foreign policy toward Cuba. The communist regime in Cuba may be less directly linked to the Soviet Union resulting in further isolation of Cuba. The Bush administration has not taken any major steps to improve relations with Cuba and appears to be continuing a policy of "malign neglect".¹¹ Use of television broadcasts from Miami has enhanced the awareness of human rights issues and has fostered increased dissatisfaction with Castro's regime.

As has been portrayed, the U.S. policy has evolved from one of direct involvement in Cuban internal affairs, to benign neglect, then a measure of liberalization, to an almost closed door. Although it has not been discussed in detail, the economic embargo has been a primary issue in all policies as each

administration supported it. It is not the effectiveness of the embargo as much as the fact that it has become a symbol. Lifting the embargo would be a way of "consecrating" the irreversible nature of the Cuban communist regime. The embargo is a logical consequence of the conservative approach to the policy, isolating the regime within the U.S. sphere of influence. It is evident that a conservative basis for United States foreign policy has been prevalent for thirty years.

There are those who would argue that the U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba has been a total disaster and incredibly incompetent. In describing his beliefs on U.S. initiatives Donald Schultz states,

...the quintessence of incompetence lies not in inability to effectuate one's intentions but rather having an effect that is precisely the opposite of what is intended by one's interests and values. Counterproductivity rather than impotence is the cardinal sin of foreign policy.¹²

"The Cuba policy of the United States has failed to achieve any of its objectives."¹³ In reviewing the U.S. policy toward Cuba, it can be fairly stated that the effect has been the opposite of our intent. The policy has failed to destabilize the Cuban government and in fact may have contributed to strengthening it. The greatest success of U.S. foreign policy may not be our affairs with Cuba but our policies toward the Soviet Union which will have a major impact on the peripheral issue of Cuba. Possible future U.S. policies will be addressed after a discussion of how Cuba perceives the problem.

CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY

To understand how to develop a U.S. foreign policy for Cuba, one must have an understanding of how the Cubans view the problem. "Cuba's fundamental foreign policy has not changed since 1898. It has tried to be an independent autonomous state that can exert international influence."¹⁴ Historically, Cubans believe that they have been dominated by the U.S. "In the minds of many Cuban intellectuals in 1893, the U.S. replaced Spain as the major external impediment of full nationhood."¹⁵ Considering this factor Castro spelled out the basis for foreign policy as "the ideological world of Marxism-Leninism is one of bipolarity, divided between the world Socialists system and the western Capitalist-imperialist powers led by the U.S."¹⁶ With these primary elements of Cuba's view of the world, it is not surprising that since 1959, the relationship has been strongly anti-U.S.

Cuban foreign policy is based on five major elements¹⁷ which will be evaluated within the Hemisphere:

1. Survival of the revolutionary government
2. Economic development
3. Cuban influence over other governments
4. Support of revolution
5. Influence over the Left

The survival of the revolutionary government remains the foremost objective of Cuban foreign policy. If one measures everything else against that objective, it can be said that for 30 years

Cuba has had a successful foreign policy considering its geopolitical position with respect to the U.S.

Regardless of the success of its main objective, it is necessary to examine the other elements of the foreign policy to determine the viability of their present position to determine areas that can be utilized for future U.S. policy initiatives.

The first element is economic development. A great deal had been written on Cuban development, but in the final analysis the hoped-for economic development has not been successful. The economy has become increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union. Although figures are presented that display a Gross National Product (GNP) growth rate of 6.4% for Cuba during the mid-1970's¹⁸ the figures are quite inflated as a result of the sharp increase in the price of sugar during that period. From 1980 to 1984 Cuba had a healthy growth rate; however, in 1986 the Cuban economy suffered a significant decline.¹⁹ This was the result of Castro's returning to a more centrally directed economy in keeping with a more ideological approach rather than a pragmatic one.

A better way to examine economic growth may be to examine GNP per capita. In 1957 Cuba ranked fourth in Latin America. After many years of revolutionary development Cuba had dropped to the seventeenth position by 1989.²⁰ Cuba today continues to have a single-crop economy and is dependent, underdeveloped and poor. These were the same conditions against which Castro revolted in 1959. In reality, the "revolution" has not improved the situation and in many cases has hindered development. There are

no longer exploitative capitalists to blame. Only Castro's revolutionary rhetoric and Soviet rubles hold the economy together. The lack of success in the economic arena has limited the projection of Cuban policies and permits future U.S. policy considerations in this area.

The Cuban influence over other governments has been greatly reduced in recent years. During the late 1970's Cuba was at its zenith in this area of foreign policy. Many Latin American nations reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba. Latin American countries, including Colombia, were placing increased pressure on the U.S. to have Cuba readmitted to the OAS.²¹ When Castro portrayed himself as the leader of the nonaligned nations, it appeared as if he had accomplished his goals. However, the constant revolutionary rhetoric, anti-U.S. outcries, and open promulgation of obvious Soviet initiatives in Africa soon caused a decline in credibility of his proposed nonalignment and forced many nations to take a more moderate stance and divorce themselves from the Castro image. Even though Castro tried a subtle change of policy from total ideological foundation to the increased use of the language of high diplomacy, the U.S. viewed the situation as a continued intransigence on behalf of Cuba.

Another major problem for Castro is the attempt to portray Cuba as the model to be emulated by other nations. Although there has been an increase in literacy and most of the Cuban people have access to some medical care, the relative quality of life has decreased since 1959.²² The great lack of political and social freedom is demonstrated by the exodus of over 800,000

exiles by 1980. Although originally most were white, 15% of the exiles were black.²³ As Lenin stated, "Exiles vote with their feet." The exodus of almost 10% of the population can hardly lend credibility to the Cuban governmental system.

Additionally, Castro's attempt to institutionalize the "revolution" has failed. As issues became more complex and socio-economic problems increased, there was further centralization of power. In the early 1980s, Castro directly supervised the ministries of Defense, Interior, Health and Culture. Only through his tremendous charismatic leadership has he been able to continue to maintain control. The establishment of the Organs of Popular Power as a means of institutionalizing participation in the governmental process has not been very successful. Although Communist Party membership figures differ for 1980, Party membership estimates range from 250,000²⁴ to 523,000²⁵ or between 3% and 5% of the total population. Overall party membership grew approximately 21% from 1980 to 1986, but membership in the professional and education sectors declined during the same period.²⁶ With this minimal degree of interest in the left within Cuba, the movement could hardly be considered to be a shining example of successful socialism.

Cuba has failed to break the dependent nation role and continued the history of economic and political dependence.²⁷ The dependence relationship started with Spain then the United States and now the Soviet Union. This fact coupled with the lack of credibility as a nonaligned nation, the failure of Cuba to act as

a model for other governments to emulate, and the absence of an institutionalized system with increased caudillo-style leadership have lead to many failures in Cuban foreign policy. These are additional areas that could be examined for U.S. initiatives, particularly since Castro's support of various "revolutions" in the Caribbean Basin have recently had major setbacks in Grenada and Nicaragua.

The Cuban support of revolts in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador has resulted in greater incursions into the U.S. sphere of influence. The initial success in Nicaragua, whose "revolution" was originally portrayed as an anti-Somoza movement, was quickly exploited by the Cuban-backed Sandanistas. The moderate junta that seized power was soon dismantled and replaced by a Marxist-Leninist regime. The U.S.-backed El Salvador government has served notice that the line has been drawn and the U.S. will not tolerate a spillover effect. These Cuban-supported revolts have caused other nations to reevaluate their relations with Cuba as the threat comes closer to their own borders and not on a distant continent such as Africa. Support of the revolutions has caused some increased isolation for Cuba in the hemisphere. However, successes in this area of foreign policy have increased the stature of Cuba with some nonaligned nations even though they have resulted in a more belligerent stance by the U.S. There is very little possibility of exploiting this area of Cuban foreign policy for U.S. policy initiatives unless a U.S. military solution is desired.

In conjunction with supporting revolts, Castro has been able

to influence leftist movements in the hemisphere. The supplying of arms and medical and military advisors has greatly influenced the segmented "Left" in Latin America. This support was widely known and sometimes permitted by Latin American governments as the threat of communists served only to add legitimization to their governments as they combated the "foreign-sponsored terrorists."

The evaluation of Cuban foreign policy on its five basic elements portrays a situation of mixed success for Castro. Cuban support of revolts and leftist movements can be declared marginally successful in the short run, but long term failures because of the major setbacks in Nicaragua and El Salvador coupled with the new Soviet foreign policy of not actively supporting wars of "national liberation." The primary element of Cuban foreign policy, that of the survival of its "revolution," has been successful. Under the ideological and charismatic leadership of Castro the communist government of Cuba continues to exist.

CURRENT POLICY OPTIONS

As can be seen by the discussion of U.S. and Cuban foreign policies, neither the U.S. or Cuba can claim to be successful overall in achieving their respective goals. A major problem of the past has been the presence of a third party, the Soviet Union. This presence has stifled U.S. policy initiatives. Because of the dominance of the Soviet influence in the economic and

military sphere of Cuban policy, analysts believed that important policy decisions were made in the USSR. This created a greater problem for the United States in dealing with Castro's Cuba.

"Because the Cuban government's autonomy in foreign policy is perceived as close to zero, it becomes impossible to treat a mere province as a sovereign government."²⁸ This widely accepted view compounded any initiatives that were presented to enhance U.S.-Cuban relations. There are some who believe that most foreign policy actions including those incursions in Africa were initiated by Cuba and then exploited by the Soviet Union.²⁹ Regardless of the previous situation, the role of the Soviet Union is changing and it appears that the Cuban "surrogate" role will disappear and Soviet support will diminish.

The current position of U.S. foreign policy is extremely conservative. Cuba should not continue as a communist satellite in the Caribbean. The hard-line position has been drawn and a warming of relations is not apparent in the near future. This approach is almost equivalent to the first alternative of an increasing hard line. However, Cuban foreign policy is based on a stated communist ideology which is augmented by a charismatic centralized government. The U.S. hard-line position and the Cuban ideological approach to foreign policy make it difficult at best to initiate any policy changes toward a compromising direction. The Bush Administration faces reelection and the continued hard line with Cuba will serve to appease the extreme right forces that support the incumbent. In response to the U.S. position, Castro has become further entrenched in the ideological

framework: "Cuba is once again persecuted by the imperialist U.S." The Cuban position is not likely to change as long as Castro continues to dominate Cuban foreign policy. The U.S. position of isolating Cuba does appear to have some viability because of the declining role of the Soviet Union. However, if the Soviet Union continues to support Cuba, then this option becomes much weaker.

A policy of de-Sovietization would face different problems. The obvious issue would be: how to appease the hardliners and the Cuban exiles if a communist regime remained in Cuba. Although the Soviets appear as if they will let Castro drift from the Soviet camp, Castro may look to China for the nationalistic ideological ties he needs to continue validating his Marxist-Leninist regime. China has always been a model because of its strong ideological stance and its independence from the Soviet Union. Castro is the master of turning adversity to advantage.³⁰ He is currently looking to break the "dependence" image with the Soviet Union and look to China for support. He is attempting to build new diplomatic relations in Latin America and even with the church by the proposed visit of the Pope in 1991.

U.S. initiatives could include a softening of some economic restrictions and a greater economic role for Cuba in the Caribbean Basin. This position would pose problems for the U.S. Being satisfied with the de-Sovietization of Cuba would serve only to prolong the problem of de-communization of Cuba and the region. The recognition of Cuba as a communist regime would offer legitimization to other communist movements in the

hemisphere. This could be detrimental to our allies in Latin America who are consistently fighting these forces. Because of the uncertainty of the Castro's response and the problem created for our allies, a de-Sovietization policy does not appear to be sufficient to fill our foreign policy requirements.

For the present, the U.S. policy needs to continue to be one of hemispheric containment. Communist regimes have to be limited in their expansion until the most important event occurs: the demise of Castro. This will have to be of natural causes. Any assassination would only create a hero larger than life. Castro's death could mark the point for a shift in U.S. policy. The centralized Cuban government would be without leadership and the hard ideological stance of Castro would be gone.

POST-CASTRO CUBA

The problem that needs to be addressed is what to do after the death of Castro. There are three possible scenarios in post-Castro Cuba which are appropriate; evolution from a charismatic dictatorship to a socialist government, violent overthrow of the communist regime, or a "peaceful" overthrow of the regime. The prospect of the Castro regime evolving into a socialistic system after his death is highly unlikely. The government has failed to be institutionalized and the previous party elite groups³¹ continuously vie for power. These groups, ranging from the original rosters of the 26th of July Movement to the young technocrats, are loosely held together by the charisma

and power of Castro. In an effort to maintain the regime and provide for an orderly transition of leadership after his death, Castro has named his brother, Raul, as his successor. Raul does not have the influence nor the charisma to hold the regime together. The participation in the 1959 revolution is the identification and cohesion factors with Raul and the elites within the government. While this forms a coalition of "oldtimers", it alienates the younger members of the power groups as they cannot identify with this basis for ideology.

There does not appear to be any movement towards a populist socialist government. During the Third Party Congress in 1986 there was evidence of declining interest in party membership and a major concern over the "ossification" of the leadership. The Communist Party of Cuba has become more elitist. Additionally, Communist Party economic policies appear to be moving away from a socialist market economy towards a command economy.³² The party elite even decided to close the free markets run by the peasants. With an ever more elitist party and a move towards a more centrally commanded economy, it does not appear as if there is any evolution in the revolution. Consequently, when Castro leaves power, there will be no one to fill his place as the demagogue to hold the government together. Neither Raul nor the party have the legitimacy to accomplish the transition. Although the United States would like to see an evolution to a populist socialist regime, the ability to influence this transition is extremely limited. The U.S. hardliners would not settle for anything less than a castigation of the communist leadership.

The next possibility in the post-Castro era is violent overthrow of the government. The precursors are present for another "revolution." There are the socio-economic conditions of relative deprivation, elite/mass relationship, awareness of repression of human rights, and a middle class migration.³³ Through Radio Marti and television broadcasts the United States has increased the awareness of the Cuban people to human rights violations. Visits from relatives in the U.S. have shown the Cubans that there is a better life elsewhere and the revolution has failed to produce the desired effect. There is increased dissatisfaction with the regime, but the people continue to believe in Castro and believe in the revolution through him. However, when Castro dies, there will be a major disenfranchisement of the masses who feel no connection to the government except through Castro. The element missing for a violent overthrow is a political group that can rally the people to action. Any effort by the United States in this direction would be doomed to failure as intervention by the "yankees" and could in fact prolong the communist regime as the backlash of Cuban nationalism against the United States would rally the people behind the government. This would have great repercussions for U.S. relations with the rest of Latin America as these countries see communism and Cuba being a diminished threat to their nations and region.

The last possibility after Castro is a peaceful overthrow of the communist government. The question is who or what can do it. It is my belief that there is an organization that has all the

capability to conduct this option, the Cuban military.

Historically, the military has played a major role in Cuba. It is possibly the only institution that can hold together a quorum that could be capable of having a functional government.

Additionally, the military has become increasingly less satisfied with Castro and the communist regime.³⁴ Primary indicators of this dissatisfaction include the defection of General Del Pino in 1987 and the execution of General Ochoa and eight high ranking officers on drug charges in 1989. Another area that may be a root cause of military dissatisfaction with the regime is the military involvement in Africa. Although it is not known at this time exactly how many Cuban lives were lost, these excursions for an ideology that has failed on a worldwide basis may lead the military to question why they were used. A plausible response could be that the military was used because it was becoming too active in the internal politics of Cuba. Involvement in Africa was a means to manipulate the military out of Cuba in order to reduce its visibility and limit its role in the government resulting in diminished power in the regime. The military is an organization to which the United States could provide some influence in order to ensure that a transitional government were possible.

POLICY INITIATIVES

An area for U.S. policy initiatives could be the military-to-military contact. There is a common bond among

military personnel throughout Latin America. This possibility has already been explored. A U.S. Army Foreign Area officer, Major Dennis Quinn, made an official trip to Cuba in January 1981. While there he had the opportunity to visit several military facilities, including the military academy. Cuban officers inquired if a reciprocal trip could be arranged. A reciprocal trip was not approved by the United States. The great interest shown during Major Quinn's trip led to consideration of establishing a military position in the U.S. Interests Section. This also has not come to fruition. The use of the military channel has been successful in assisting relations with other republics in Latin America, and it is believed that this approach could also be pursued within the de-communization policy.

Within Latin America the military has been a political rather than a defense institution. It is a branch of domestic politics.³⁵ The institution of the military has been based on a nationalistic populist approach.³⁶ This nationalistic fervor is the foundation of the current Cuban government. An interim military rule would continue this nationalism to which the masses are accustomed. The military has been a major contributor to the Cuban people by helping with the sugarcane harvest. The populace would have a known institution with which they can immediately identify.

The critical aspect of a military assumption of power after Castro dies would be the response by the United States government. In the past the U.S. has shown great tolerance for military governments.³⁷ If this precedent holds, then the

military could take power. Although this prospect would make "liberals" cringe at the idea of a return to military rule in Latin America, almost all military regimes have handed over power to more democratic governments.³⁸ The modern military governments by their bureaucratic nature have been able to consolidate power. They have had success in the social and political arena but have been very weak in running the economy. With Cuba's current economic problems it is unlikely the military will be capable of effecting significant change in the economy.

Addressing the economic issues with Cuba could be a second initiative in improving U.S. relations with Cuba. It can be argued that there is little to be gained by better economic relations with Cuba.³⁹ However, a major impasse for improved foreign relations with Cuba has been in the economic area. Lifting the economic embargo could be a starting point for de-communization. Prior to the embargo Cuba had \$1.1 billion of trade with the U.S.⁴⁰ Even though Cuba has established sugar markets in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, these markets may rapidly decline as a free market economy begins to develop in Eastern Europe. In this changed environment Cuba would gladly accept an opportunity for increased trade with the U.S.

The United States could assist Cuba by investing in the development of its large nickel and magnesium deposits.⁴¹ Additional areas for investment and markets include tobacco, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and seafood. In conjunction with the seafood industry the U.S. could offer great assistance with marine pollution control, an important

environmental issue. Tourism which is presently fourth in economic importance in Cuba⁴² is one industry where the U.S. could immediately assist by lifting the visiting restrictions. Thousands would flock to Cuba as the "gem" of the Caribbean.

Although there may be some concern over the \$1.8 billion of expropriated U.S. property during the revolution, this can be disregarded as the U.S. government has already given tax credits for the property and could declare any claims null and void.

The increased economic influence by the U.S. may force elements of the former Cuban government to reevaluate its ideological ties to communism. Without Castro to profess the "word," the ideological ties could be greatly reduced for the benefit of improved standards of living and more employment through U.S.-sponsored, labor-intensive industries. Bringing Cuba to a capitalist economy would be further assisted by the fact that it already conducts trade with Japan and Canada. In addition to elimination of the economic trade sanctions, and in exchange for a denouncement of communist ideology, the U.S. could offer Cuba an interim economic subsidy in order to insure and foster "economic survival." This might take the form of direct aid or loans from the World Bank/International Monetary Fund. U.S. Government sponsored investment and tax advantages for businesses willing to invest in Cuba is another area where proactive economic development programs could pay great dividends. The economic approach is a primary route for change to achieve U.S. policy objectives. This policy must be promulgated slowly. The ultimate goal is not to reestablish a

dependency relationship into which Cuba has historically fallen but to develop an independent economy enhanced by an alliance with a great power.

Neither the United States nor Cuba has been totally successful in their foreign relations with each other. However, past failures should not discount possibilities for the future. Even though the current policy should continue to be oriented to isolating Cuba within this hemisphere, in the post-Castro era there will be opportunities for developing relations with Cuba. These could include the fostering of military relations with the Cuban military to serve as a transition government moving towards democracy and breaking the economic barriers to open trade and economic development. The future must continue to be focused on eliminating communism from Cuba to show that established communist regimes in this hemisphere are as ill-suited to the nature of man as those fallen regimes in Eastern Europe.

ENDNOTES

1. James F. Petras, "The U.S. Cuban Policy Debate", The New Cuba, p. 176.

2. Ibid., p. 178.

3. Phillip Brenner, From Confrontation to Negotiation: U.S. Relations with Cuba, p. 81.

4. Peter Ditoro, The Breaking of Relations: Cuba and the United States, p. 2.

5. Carlos A. Montaner, Secret Report on the Cuban Revolution, p. 236.

6. Petras, p. 180. Petras and Howard Wiardra believe that the mutual recognition of the great powers' spheres of influence is the first major feature of detente. Cuba's geographic position vice its political position was a significant problem in the detente equation.

7. Lester A. Sobel, Castro's Cuba in the 1970's, p. 47. Twelve Congressmen urged President Nixon to normalize relations with Cuba in January 1973. In their statement "A Detente with Cuba," they stated such action would eliminate an apparent policy contradiction which strives for friendship with the USSR while concurrently condemning Cuba for harboring a Soviet presence.

8. Donald E. Schulz, "Strategy of Conflict and the Politics of Counterproductivity," Orbis, Fall 1981, p. 679.

9. Ibid., p. 681.

10. Sergio Roca, "Cuba Confronts the 1980's," Current History, February 1983, p. 79. Hereafter cited as Roca, Cuba.

11. William M. LeoGrande, "Cuba Policy Recycled," Foreign Policy, Spring 1982 p. 116.

12. Schulz, p. 679.

13. Brenner, p. 81.

14. Pamela S. Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy, p. 151.

15. W. Raymond Duncan, "Problems of Cuban Foreign Policy," in Cuban Communism, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz, p. 432.

16. Ibid., p. 433.

17. Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1978, p. 85.

18. Maisie McAdoo, "Twenty Years of El Bloque," Nation, December 4, 1982, p. 587.

19. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Cuban Economy in the 1980's: The Return of Ideology," in Socialist Cuba: Past Interpretations and Future Challenges, ed. Sergio Roca, p. 59. There was a loss of 1.4 percent or 0.3 percent per capita.

20. The World Fact Book 1990, p. 75.

21. Roca, p. 78. Technically the Cuban people are still members of the OAS. The communist government in Cuba is not recognized by the OAS.

22. Montaner, p. 179.

23. Casey McWilliams, "Second Thoughts," Nation, June 14, 1980, p. 711.

24. Max Acrizi, "Institutionalization of the Cuban State: A Political Perspective," Journal of Inter-American Studies, August 1980, p. 325.

25. Brenner, p. 63.

26. Jorge I. Dominguez, "Blaming Itself, Not Himself: Cuban Political Regime After the Third Party Congress," in Socialist Cuba: Past Interpretations and Future Challenges, ed. Sergio Roca, p. 7.

27. Falk, p. 170.

28. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," p. 83.

29. Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuba in the 1980's," Foreign Affairs, Fall, 1986, p. 130. Dominguez believes that the Cuban policies in Africa were not directed by the Soviet Union but were convergent with the Soviet policy of expansion. He also posits that U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba would be much simpler if Cuba was just a puppet of the Soviet Union.

30. Gillian Gunn, "Will Castro Fall," Foreign Policy, Summer 1990, p. 133.

31. Rhoda Rabkin, "The Aging of a Revolution," in Socialist Cuba: Past Interpretations and Future Challenges, ed. Sergio Roca, p. 59. There are several elite groups as described by Rabkin. They consist of the 26th of July Movement with Guellermo Garcia, Juan Almeda, Pedro Miret, and Jesus Montana as the principals. The next group is the Raulistas, led by Raul Castro and his veterans who fought with him. There are also the old communists; ex-members of the Partido Socialista Popular. Finally the young technocrats are a loosely fit group who do not exert major influence.

32. Dominguez, "Politics After the Third Party Congress," p. 9.

33. Michael J. Mazarr, "Prospects for Revolution in Post-Castro Cuba," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Winter 1989, p. 69.

34. Ibid., p. 79.

35. Edwin Lieuwen, "The Problem of Military Government," in New Military Politics in Latin America, ed. Robert Wesson, p. 3.

36. Martin C. Needler, "Problems Facing Military Governments in Latin America," in New Military Politics in Latin America, ed. Robert Wesson, p. 202.

37. The exception to U.S. toleration may be the decision by President Carter not to recognize the military coup in the Dominican Republic in 1978. The Dominican military had to backdown.

38. Lieuwen, p. 13.

39. Kenneth P. Jameson, "U.S.-Cuban Economic Relations in the 1990," in U.S. Cuban Relations in the 1990's, ed. Rafael Hernandez and Jorge I. Dominguez. Jameson believes that politics dominates economic relations within Cuba. He does not see this in other foreign relations. I disagree with the position that there is little to be gained by improving economic relations. Jameson's premise is based on a communist regime where I propose a military transition government to manage the economy.

40. McAdoo, p. 586.

41. William Watts, The United States and Cuba: Old Issues and New Directions, p. 47.

42. Alfonso Montero and Pedro Gonzales, "Cuba and the United States: The Potential of Their Economic Relations," in U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990's, ed. Rafael Hernandez and Jorge I. Dominguez, p. 238.

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