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ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC VISION

BY

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This paper approaches the subject of strategic vision indirectly by examining the lives of three men, Marshal Napoleon Buonaparte, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, and General George Catlett Marshall, considered to have displayed strategic vision during the course of their military careers. They have been chosen from different periods of history, different countries, and different military services for the purpose of finding common factors in the development of their visions that transcend time, nationality, and service orientation. The paper begins its development of the concept by discriminating between those elements that are and those that are not an essential part of strategic vision. Specifically, it discusses the visions of these men, the environment(s) they grew up in, their thought processes, their experiences, and other factors that played a part in shaping their visions. It identifies components that have implications for Army policies and programs that could nurture the recognition, expansion, or creation of opportunities for expression of strategic vision.

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

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC VISION

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper approaches the subject of strategic vision indirectly by examining the lives of three men, Marshal Napoleon Buonaparte, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, and General George Catlett Marshall, considered to have displayed strategic vision during the course of their military careers. They have been chosen from different periods of history, different countries, and different military services for the purpose of finding common factors in the development of their visions that transcend time, nationality, and service orientation. The paper begins its development of the concept by discriminating between those elements that are and those that are not an essential part of strategic vision. Specifically, it discusses the visions of these men, the environment(s) they grew up in, their thought processes, their experiences, and other factors that played a part in shaping their visions. It identifies components that have implications for Army policies and programs that could nurture the recognition, expansion, or creation of opportunities for expression of strategic vision.

This paper will approach the subject of strategic vision indirectly by examining the lives of three figures considered to have displayed strategic vision during the course of their military careers. Common elements in their backgrounds, education, and experiences will emerge and serve as bases for future research on the subject. The subjects, Marshal Napoleon Buonaparte, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, and General George Catlett Marshall, have been chosen from different periods of history, different countries, and different military services for the purpose of finding common factors in the development of their visions that transcend time, nationality, and service orientation. As it happens, Napoleon and Marshall went on to hold high political office, but for the purposes of this paper, consideration will be restricted to their impact during their military service.

This paper is an attempt to develop a concept. It tries to discriminate between those elements that are and those that are not an essential part of strategic vision. Specifically, it will look at the visions of three men, the environment(s) they grew up in, their thought processes, their experiences, and other factors that have contributed to shaping their contributions to military strategy. It will identify components that have implications for Army policies and programs. The results of this effort could nurture the recognition, expansion, or creation of opportunities for expression of strategic vision.

METHODOLOGY

To ensure that the subjects chosen did not represent any preconceived notion of a strategic visionary on the part of the author, the names of those to be compared and contrasted were selected on the basis of an informal survey conducted among instructors from all departments of the Army War College. Military and civilian professionals with backgrounds in history, strategy, leadership and national security were contacted and only those military figures named by members from at least three departments were considered as potential subjects.

The definition of the term was left to the instructors' understanding. The only guidance provided was that they should name one Army figure, one figure from a sister service and one foreign military figure. The object was to provide a framework against which the importance of various elements of strategic vision could be examined. By identifying the relevance of those elements in the lives of men having strategic vision, it could then be postulated whether such a skill could be identified or developed in others.

STRATEGIC VISION

How can strategic visions be characterized? Some of the elements worthy of consideration are whether or not the visions constituted "new" ideas, changed the way people thought about warfighting, influenced events and/or impacted on what happened

thereafter. It is hard to conceive of an idea that is so totally new that roots cannot be found in previous situations or previously espoused ideas in either the same area or in normally unassociated areas. All of the visions to be discussed are remarkable more in their combination of previously known information or in their method of application than in the absoluteness of their novelty. A brief discussion of those visions is in order.

* * *

Although Napoleon kept all of his thinking to himself, never discussing his ideas with others or putting pen to paper before the whole of the idea was formed, he developed the ideas of those who had gone before, improved on them, and combined them into a method of warfighting that was to revolutionize the way wars would be conducted for years to come. His strategy inspired two other military strategists, Clausewitz and Jomini, who would impact military thinking ever after. He built on the work of Maurice, Count of Saxony, whose night surprise and capture of Prague in 1741 won him the title of Marshal of France. Marshal Saxe was the first to form mixed units of infantry and artillery. Napoleon also borrowed from Marshal Broglie who had learned to disperse units in supporting distance on the march and then concentrate his army on the battlefield by rapidly assembling his divisions; and Gribeauval, a lieutenant general in the French Army, who had increased the mobility of artillery so it could maneuver with the infantry.

The essence of Napoleon's strategy was a meticulously

planned campaign which would result in a single, decisive battle to resolve the war at a stroke, conducted at a speed which might genuinely be termed the Napoleonic blitzkrieg; followed by a relentless pursuit to destroy the enemy army.[1] Increasingly, France and, later other European countries, moved from head on collisions and siege warfare to wars of combined arms and maneuver.

Napoleon's impact on others cannot be underestimated. Collections of his maxims were translated into German, English, Spanish and Italian. Stonewall Jackson reportedly carried a copy with him through his campaigns. Baron Jomini expounded his methods and Clausewitz' book On War was an outgrowth of his study of Napoleon. The genius of Napoleon was that he had the ability to devise principles without ever becoming so tied to them that he wouldn't ignore them if the situation dictated. Similarly, he could not only devise great plans but could ensure success through his personal presence on the battlefield.

* * *

Mahan at various times credited Francis Bacon, Sir Walter Raleigh, Theodor Mommsen, Sir Walter Napier, Sir John Seeley and Stephen B. Luce with having helped him discover, hone and apply the idea of the influence of sea power on history, claiming for himself only its rediscovery. His Sea Power books, he confessed, merely represented "old things in a new form such as may make them more cordially received, because clearer."[2]

Mahan took the ideas of Jomini on land warfare and applied them to a situation where they had not previously been applied -

to the sea. Although on the operational level, Mahan's vision looked backward to Trafalgar rather than forward to Jutland, his strategic vision is what set him apart. His vision was of an offensive Navy that could greatly expand the wealth and power of the nation which it served. He had drawn that conclusion from what he had seen occur in England with the British Navy.

Whereas the Navy had been composed primarily of cruisers, he saw the need for many battleships organized into a fleet. Mahan felt the U.S. must build a strong Navy to protect the necessary emergence of a strong merchant marine. Besides, the imminent construction of a canal across Central America would draw foreign trading and warships into U.S. waters in threatening numbers that would end American isolationism and make the U.S. vulnerable to involvement in European power politics. His ideas found support in Washington and the "new fleet" allowed the U.S. to fight and defeat Spain in the Carribbean and Philippines in 1898-99. From this grew the "Great White Fleet" that cruised the world in 1908-09.

His works were translated into the principal languages of Europe and Japanese. They were read and appreciated by senior officers in the British Admiralty and the Emperor and Crown Prince of Japan. John Keegan asserts that when Kaiser Wilhelm II read The Influence of Sea Power upon History in 1894, he was instantly converted to "navalism". In the U.S., Mahan "made the Naval War College what it is today, and his book had much to do with resurrecting the U.S. Navy from its post-Civil War grave

and giving it the professional ballast and theoretical direction that helped guide it to victory in 1898, in 1918, and in 1945.[3]

* * *

Marshall's vision grew out of his experience with the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in World War I. Having been through a deployment for war for which no one was prepared, he dedicated himself to ensuring that such a situation would never reoccur. He believed that because the U.S. was unwilling and unable to maintain a large army between wars, the army must be composed of a small number of highly specialized cadre that could quickly swell their numbers several times over. The Army must be able to train and teach citizen-soldiers that would be called up for the next war quickly and simply. Leaders must be able to think on their feet and then act.

His influence was the greatest in the United States where he was able to influence the Army through the positions he held and through his teaching and training of others. Because he was a modest man, his impact with senior U. S. and foreign leaders came primarily through the force of his personality and his strictly held value system that inspired others to trust him and be persuaded by him.

ENVIRONMENT

People are influenced by their families. by the values and thinking they are exposed to early on and by the environment they grow up in. If they are subjected to markedly different

environments early in life, might they not be more likely to see situations from more than one angle and therefore be more likely to produce new ways of seeing things? The following would seem to support such a hypothesis.

* * *

Napoleon was born a Corsican and from the time he entered school in France on a scholarship at the age of 9, his "differentness" was brought to his attention on a daily basis. His family was of the old nobility who had fallen on hard times, while his classmates all came from the true nobility, wealthy and carefree. He spoke barely passable French and did not share the values of his classmates. He was short, rumpled in appearance and spoke roughly and crudely in his adopted language. He preferred his books to the company of other boys and was reflective where the others were much more concerned with socializing. During his youth he moved back and forth between these two cultures, trying to stir Corsicans to rebellion with ideas he'd learned in France and trying to adapt to French ways with a Corsican upbringing. He moved from life in a peasant village to dealing with scheming politicians and mighty military figures.

At the age of 29, he was again immersed in a different culture when he began his Egyptian Campaign in 1798. He sailed to Alexandria where he observed Ramadan, carried out the duties of a Pasha, crossed 70 leagues of desert eating dogs, donkeys and camels and tasted his first terrible defeat.

* * *

Alfred Thayer Mahan was born and raised on the grounds of

the U.S. Military Academy at West Point where his father, Dennis Hart Mahan, was Dean of Faculty and Professor of Civil and Military Engineering. Because Mahan saw himself as so superior to others, he had difficulty making friends. His happiest memories of childhood were those he spent in reading. At 12 he was sent off to a Southern-oriented Episcopal boarding school where his devout, Bible-reading mother prayed God that he would become a clergyman.

From 1857 - 1869, Mahan visited many foreign climes - Japan, China, the Philippines, India, France, Italy, England, Austria, Panama, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil. But although exposed to a number of these exotic places, he chose, when he went ashore, to visit with British and American families in their compounds. He would take long walks and write wonderfully descriptive letters home about what he had observed, but he never got truly involved.

The crew aboard his ship, the Iroquois, was composed primarily of American sailors but nearly 3/4 of the crew was made up of Irish, German, and French soldiers with a scattering of negroes, orientals and others of mixed heritage. Desertion and drunkenness were common problems but Mahan got involved only enough to administer courts-martial proceedings against the miscreants. On board, as on shore, he was a keen observer of proceedings but always from a distance.

* * *

George Marshall grew up in a small town in America where everyone knew everyone so his introduction to Virginia Military

Institute (VMI) was a change. Though attending school in the United States, his yankee twang made him stand out among his Southern classmates and commanded special attention from the upperclassmen for his "differentness" until he won them over with other attributes that they respected. This added to the richness of the hazing that he received initially and, probably, to his determination to accomplish the mission he had set for himself.

Marshall's first assignment as a new lieutenant, was to travel half way around the world to the Philippines. He walked the battlefields there with Japanese officers to try to understand their point of view on the Russo-Japanese War.

After a second assignment in the Philippines in 1913, he spent a month in England and some time in France, Italy and Austria before returning home via Algiers.

Four years later, he pulled duty with the American Expeditionary Force in France and at age 44, commanded a regiment in Tientsin, China.

* * *

All three, then, were exposed to a variety of cultures and/or social classes, certainly different ways of thinking, acting and seeing the world at a fairly young age. To varying degrees they were seen as "different" from their contemporaries and found their own ways to cope with, assimilate and/or use the experiences they had. It may well have been their exposure to multiple life-styles that liberated them from becoming enmeshed in a single, rigid paradigm. It also reflects favorably on

their ability to function effectively in a strange environment. Each had early and repeated exposure to foreign cultures. Napoleon spoke French and Italian. Marshall had occasion to use both the French he had learned at VMI and the Chinese he learned in Tientsin. Not all were as receptive to or profited to the same degree from such cross-cultural experiences. We have seen that Mahan was very selective in what he would allow to influence him. But all were at a minimum exposed to different customs, thinking and viewpoints.

THOUGHT PROCESSES

Are there any common patterns in the thought processes used by our subjects? Do they focus only on the "big picture"? Do they get involved with details? What did they read? How did they learn?

It is fortunate that these men left at least a few comments as to how they approached problems. In some cases, those who worked closely with them provided further clues. It is clear, however, that they all paid attention to the problem-solving process as well as to the desired results of their visions.

* * *

In April 1779, at the age of 9, Napoleon describes his first experience with formal schooling in France.

> "I entered Brienne and I was happy. My mind was beginning to work; I was anxious to learn, to

know, to get on; I devoured books....I was conscious of my powers; I enjoyed my superiority." [4]

He was very bright and in five years of study at Brienne learned study habits that would remain with him for the rest of his life. He went on to finish a two year course at the Ecole Militaire in one year. He excelled in history, geography and mathematics. He read widely and at great depth - to include Rousseau's Confessions and Plato's Republic. He was characterized by his instructors as ambitious, hard-working and reflective, preferring books to the company of others.

Anecdotes are legion about Napoleon's close personal attention to minute details of his campaign plans and he devoted hours to them. At a time when he commanded thousands of soldiers, he gave orders as to where each artillery piece should be emplaced. Although he seemed to have a facility for this kind of detail work, he left the conduct of the tactical situation to his subordinates. He not only believed that his commanders must have some leeway to respond to the situation that existed on the ground at the time but, frankly, he was not much interested in tactics.

With all his attention to detail, however, he never lost site of the overall goal. As he once observed, 'There are in Europe many good generals, but they see too many things at once. I see only one thing, namely the enemy's main body.' [5]

Napoleon had the "big picture" in mind when he was ordered to seize Milan by his superiors in 1796. He had already determined that any objective less than total conquest of Italy

was merely an intermediate objective, a means to an end. A colonel who worked closely with Napoleon spoke of how one idea produced by his vivid imagination immediately gave rise to a thousand others. [6] And yet, no one cautioned more frequently than Napoleon how each campaign must be carefully planned, step by step. Every move of the enemy must be anticipated and one must know surely what to do should the enemy exercise an alternate option.

> If I appear to be always ready to reply to everything, it is because, before undertaking anything, I have meditated for a long time - I have foreseen what might happen." [7]

So if Napoleon was intuitive, he was also disciplined and focused in his thinking. If he was able to extract important points from reports full of excruciating details, he was also able to determine what was likely to happen from information that was often vague and contradictory.

* * *

As previously noted, Mahan was raised in a military environment with a house full of books on war. Later in life, Mahan often said that he had read himself into the U.S. Navy. He devoured the sea tales of James Fenimore Cooper, enjoyed the reminiscences of British naval officers who fought gloriously against the tyrant Napoleon, and, along with works on military history, read popular stories for boys. He was <u>not</u> allowed to

read Uncle Tom's Cabin though, in his anti-abolitionist home.

Mahan, like Napoleon, was very bright as a child and, when the boarding school failed to live up to his father's standards, he was pulled out and enrolled at Columbia College in New York City at age 14. At Columbia he continued his love of history, increased his appreciation of salvationist theology but failed to shake the influence of the popular novels of the time. He entered the U.S. Naval Academy in 1856. Because he had completed two years of college at Columbia, he was permitted to skip his fourth class year.

He had a remarkable memory, a broad capacity to comprehend and a clarity of perception that was obvious to all and never downplayed by Mahan. Unlike Marshall who learned from others, Mahan could neither understand nor tolerate those who disagreed with him. Such people were obviously either perverse or malevolent.

Mahan, like Napoleon, realized that patterns must be found in the mass of detail that confronted one in an ambiguous and uncertain situation. Napoleon, however, saw these patterns within the often vague and contradictory situations that confronted him while Mahan used only those historical details from the mass available that proved his point.

"Mahan evolved a research methodology that he called 'subordination'. This technique involved a careful gathering and selecting of historical facts. He then applied these facts to the illustration of events that were related to the larger notion of the influence of sea power on history. Put another

way his task was to 'subordinate' a group of selected facts in such a way as to prove the 'truth' of an already determined conclusion. He thus rejected the inductive, or scientific alternative of proceeding from the facts to the conclusion. His approach was entirely deductive."[8]

* * *

"'Smart' was the one word Marshall would never have used about himself. In his first years at Miss Thompson's prep school in Uniontown, he discovered that learning did not come easily. For one reason or another, he lacked a sense of application, and when, time and again, he emerged from tests toward the bottom of his class, he was mortified and ashamed. He confessed later that he decided early on that he was destined to be 'one of the dull ones,'".[9] But Marshall always added when he confessed to being a poor student in those early years that one subject he liked in school - even better out of school - was history. "If it was history, that was all right; I could star in history" [10]

He got through VMI on his sheer determination to prove to his older brother that he could do it. When he attended the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth as a lieutenant and found that the course required committing facts and formulas to memory and regurgitating them during oral presentations, he got down to accomplishing the mission, but in his words, "it was the hardest work I ever did in my life.[11]

It wasn't until he attended the Army Staff College the year following that he began to experience some joy in education.

"My reading of course was pretty helpful, as was my study of past operations. I learned how to digest them...My habits of thought were being trained. While I learned little I could use...I learned how to learn." [12]

When Marshall was assigned to the Philippines the second time, in 1913, he was embarrassed by his lack of information on the Philippine Insurrection so he read voluminous reports from the War Department on the subject. This may have been the first time he got interested in the conflicts between the civilian government and the soldiers.

But he seemed to learn better from real life experience than from books. He walked the battlefields of the Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War, talked to people and listened to what they had to say.

"...I found that a few hours on the actual field apparently did more to instruct me in the details of troop leading and the larger phases of tactics than years of theoretical study. I came away with a new idea of those fights and entirely different ideas as to the proper methods to follow in peace training. In this connection I had dozens of opportunities to watch the Japanese troops at work, and the officers I went about with told me of changes they had made in their system of training

since the war - and why they had made them."[13]

Like Napoleon, Marshall was a very self-contained man, but he was a keen observer and a careful listener. Marshall had the discipline to deal with details when it was required of him - as it was during his attendance at the Infantry and Cavalry School in 1906-1908. A practical soldier, he knew how to instruct others in handling weapons, doing drills and so forth, but he learned by the time he commanded a regiment in China in 1924 that he did not have the time nor the inclination to stay involved with details. He maintained his efforts at delegating throughout and removed himself from dealing with details ever after.

* * *

In summary, then, all three of these strategic visionaries were intelligent. All three read broadly, beyond their interests in military matters. All were introduced to history early on and maintained this interest throughout their lives. It can be inferred that the ability to see patterns and trends is enhanced in those who have knowledge of what went before as well as knowledge of the current situation. All looked at detailed information as well as broad brush concepts. Napoleon, because he saw value in them and knew how to use them; Mahan because he used them selectively to prove his points; and Marshall, because he had to on occasion to reach his goals. Marshall continued to divest himself of details at every opportunity, making up for his lack of personal attention to detail by his unerring ability to put the right men in the right

jobs to ensure that details were well handled. This strategy seemed to work very well for him. Napoleon continued to try to deal with masses of detail beyond the time it became practical or even possible to do so. His army was simply too large and the breadth of his responsibilities too great to allow it. Mahan was contemptuous of details and used them to serve his own purpose but nothing more. It may be fairly stated, however, that all were able to get involved in details when it was required and then disengage themselves from the detailed work when it was appropriate. This ability to keep the big picture in mind while being able to get down into a specific area that needs attention and then disengaging to return to the broader concept may be the most telling skill of all.

All three were aware early on of the importance of "learning how to learn". This awareness of process provided them a framework in which to evaluate their thinking as well as allowing them increased flexibility in dealing with ambiguous situations.

It would appear that Mahan learned primarily from books, having admitted that his seaman skills were below average. Marshall preferred to learn by walking the battlefields and Napoleon stressed the importance of getting out to see things with one's own eyes. Marshall learned a great deal from listening to others while Napoleon would not share his thoughts with even his trusted chief of staff. The conclusion is that it is not so important how one receives information as it is that one actually learns. All read, had contact with others and all

had impactful experiences - some profited more from some types of experiences than from others, but all used what they learned.

EXPERIENCE

The greatest learning comes from experience, first, one's own, then, that of others. People vary in their ability to learn either from their own or from the experience of others. Mere exposure is not enough though; the experiences must be assimilated.

And though different lessons are drawn by different individuals in the same situation, it is safe to say that one sees a situation differently depending on how much of the situation he is responsible for. The view is a lot different from the foxhole than it is from Corps Headquarters.

It is also important to note that those events involving significant emotion will have impact beyond the specific task or mission - some that will shape the individual's actions throughout his career. This is the most unpredictable aspect of our study for while it can be assumed that experience in battle will necessarily be more impactful than conducting inventories of desks, the timing of events is not controllable.

All of this can be considered under the major headings of learning from one's own experience, especially the level of experience, learning from others, and learning from significant emotional experiences that may or may not be job-related.

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

Napoleon and Marshall were put in jobs at high levels very early in their careers, thus allowing them a much broader view of how things worked. These experiences had considerable impact on how they viewed the situations in which they found themselves thereafter.

* * *

Looking first at Napoleon, it is apparent that he rose to the responsibilities placed on him. Napoleon was commissioned a 2LT of Artillery in a French regiment at age 16. At 19 he began writing an essay "On Royal Authority" in which he concluded that few monarchs of the day were worthy of their thrones. By the time he was 23, he was serving at battalion level as an adjutant major of a volunteer battalion.

At age 24, he saw that power went to those who took the initiative and had his opportunity to seize the moment as he was enroute to assignment with the Army of Italy. He stopped to observe the siege of Toulon and, when the French artillery commander was wounded, began directing the guns. Impatient with the lack of progress of the siege, Napoleon presented his plan for the capture of the Spanish fortress, organized an offensive against the key terrain, participated in the final assault and was recognized for his efforts with promotion three days later to General of the Brigade.

He assumed the position of artillery commander of the Army of Italy at age 24. He was pulled back to Paris to work in

the War Ministry and soon gained a reputation as a planner. But he was not only planning, he was executing. The French government asked him to quash the insurrection in Paris in 1795 and he did so, killing 200 insurgents in the process. He was appointed General in Chief of the Army of the Interior months later. Follow-on successes sharpened his eye for what must be done next and an indication of his level of thinking is seen in the words he wrote on 1 July 1795 when he was 25.

> "In the present situation of Europe the King of Sardinia obviously must want peace. We must carry the war into his country, and maneuver the Austrians into such a position that we can eventually operate against them. The Army of Italy must drive the enemy from the Loano, threaten Piedmont, conquer Lombardy, penetrate into the Tyrol, and effect its junction with the Army of the Rhine." [14]

In 1796 he returned to his role of field soldier in command of a dispirited Army of Italy. Before leaving Paris to take command he persuaded the Directory, then the government of France, to phrase his mission to give him the widest possible latitude. This would enable him to execute the strategic vision that he had put in writing the year before. The Directory wanted him to put his main effort against the Austrians, to drive the enemy beyond the Po and seize Milan. They added that this could only be done after defeating the Sardinian Army and

concluding peace with the King of Sardinia. As shown, his plan went even beyond the thinking of the government.

The unit Napoleon was to command consisted of approximately 45,000 men lead by experienced veterans averaging 16 years older than he was. They had not been paid in months, lacked food, clothing and weapons, and were now given the mission to drive the Austrian Army beyond the Po - a leadership challenge for even the most experienced! The fact that he was successful beyond even the government's wildest dreams attests to his ability.

Even at so young an age, Napoleon had an intuitive grasp of how the government and the military worked together. With characteristic audacity, he wrote to the Directory:

> "Would it not be as well to start a little quarrel at once with the Minister of Venice in Paris, so that as soon as I have taken Mantua I can make an opportunity for asking them, as you desire I should, for several millions?" [15]

And, in spite of Napoleon's warning that a nation should be governed by a civilian, he was crowned Emperor of France in 1804, not yet 35 years of age.

* * *

Alfred T. Mahan presents both similarities and stark contrasts to Napoleon. Although he graduated second in his class at the Naval Academy because he could not be bothered to

put forth the little extra effort required to rank first, he "proposed to win renown in his profession through intellectual performance."[16] He believed that the days of winning distinction through acts of daring were past.

And, indeed, we see the growth of Mahan's daring in his writings from his first book, The Gulf and Inland Waters, which was a straight forward account of selected Civil War naval operations that established him as a competent naval historian; through The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, which indicated that the U.S. possessed all of the historical elements to become a world class sea power; to his increasingly controversial writing such as his article on "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power", advocating quick annexation of the Hawaiian group because of its strategic position for sea control in the Pacific. This article came out in print within a week of the anti-expansionist Grover Cleveland's inauguration and a couple of months before the new President withdrew the Hawaiian annexation treaty from the Senate.

Mahan's wartime duty stations invariably kept him out of harms way. With the exception of a few days when his ship came under Confederate fire in 1861, direct contact with armed hostilities eluded him during his 40 year career. Napoleon, in 23 years, had participated in no less than 60 battles.

Mahan's one opportunity to serve in a position above his paygrade came when he was 29. A shake-up in the naval ranks at the time caused him to be elevated to acting commander of the Iroquois for three months until he was hospitalized for malaria.

Again we see that Mahan's achievements must be measured against a scholarly standard rather than one of active involvement.

* * *

After an unremarkable first assignment as an infantry lieutenant, Marshall attended the Infantry and Cavalry School early and came out first in his class. Unlike Mahan, he had worked very hard for that honor and for the opportunity to attend the follow-on year at the Army Staff College for which placing in the class was a requirement. During his time at the Staff College he found himself not just learning tactics and identifying principles of war but applying them to war at the operational level. He was studying the duties of the General Staff, the organization of foreign armies, reading military history, reconstructing the Peninsula Campaign of the Civil War, preparing operational orders as Chief of Staff to General Lee during the withdrawal from Antietam, planning action to take place following the evening of 30 June 1863 for General Meade, hearing first hand the experiences of a recent veteran of the Russo-Japanese War and tracing the courses of real battles on the battlefields where they had been fought - heady stuff for a lieutenant 27 years old.

Adding depth to his academic experiences, George Marshall dealt with large numbers of soldiers during the summers. He was put in charge of planning and organizing maneuvers with the Pennsylvania National Guard - which taught him a great deal about working with untrained troops and constrained resources.

"I learned a tremendous amount about how to do a great deal in a short time. Troops were arriving one day and going into maneuvers the next. We were running eight to ten maneuvers on the road. I shall never forget the lesson I learned from the human reactions and from what goes to make attacks apart from maps." [17]

The lessons he learned about the lack of readiness of the militia would serve him well in later years as well.

At age 32, though still only a lieutenant, he organized an amphibious landing at Batangas Bay in the Philippines and wrote the order for the invasion of Luzon as part of a major training exercise.

The senior officer in charge of the "White Force" was found to be ineffective and was about to be relieved prior to the exercise. Marshall, anxious to implement his plan and fearful that the new commander would be difficult to deal with, seized the opportunity. He pleaded with the Commanding General, J. Franklin Bell, to leave the senior officer in place until after the exercise was over. Marshall's pleas were heard, and the ineffective commander was told that he was to issue no orders regarding the exercise. Then, just prior to the beginning of the exercise, the Chief of Staff of White Force was hospitalized. Marshall was made Acting Chief of Staff and given control of the 5,000 man exercise force. He accomplished the mission to rave reviews from the evaluator. Like Napoleon, he recognized an opportunity and took advantage of it.

Five years later, holding the temporary wartime rank of colonel, CPT Marshall was planning the first American offensive at Cantigny. He developed the plans for the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient with 17 divisions plus artillery while simultaneously planning a second offensive on the Meuse-Argonne 60 miles away. That effort required the transfer of 600,000 men and 2700 guns over three roads between two fronts. He had only a few hours to prepare the latter but was prouder of that contribution to the war effort than any other he had made. Two years later he was returned to the rank of captain before being promoted to major a few days later. But there was no lessening of the level of his responsibility.

Serving as aide to General Pershing who became Chief of Staff of the Army on 1 July 1921, Marshall was left in charge of preparing reports for his signature, carrying out special assignments and keeping him informed of the situation in Washington while he was gone - once for six consecutive months. There was no noticeable drop in efficiency.

LEARNING FROM OTHERS

Even people of great genius do not get to where they end up without some help along the way. Though the importance of that help fades into the background as the central figure grows in stature over the years, the fact remains that strategic visionaries were helped and influenced along the way too. As a minimum, there had to be recognition of their abilities or their

potential. Usually introductions to important people or access to jobs where one's talents could be fully challenged played a major part in success. Some learning was positive, some negative. How much learning took place was a function of how receptive the subject was.

Napoleon, Mahan and Marshall all had mentors along the way.

* * *

It so happened that when Napoleon took charge of the siege at Toulon, the senior French political representative at the scene was an old friend of the family - one Antonio Saliceti. It was Saliceti who publicized what Napoleon had done that day and Saliceti who got Napoleon his early assignment as Plans Officer at the War Ministry. Once given the opportunity to show his talents at high levels, Napoleon was his own publicist.

* * *

Mahan was mentored by Admiral Stephen B. Luce, who brought him to the U.S. Naval Academy to teach and write. At one point, Mahan even gave him credit for suggesting that there might be similarities between land warfare and seapower.

* * *

Marshall fell under the watchful eye of MG J. Franklin Bell who approved his early attendance at the Army Staff College, influenced his early assignments, and later allowed him to command the 5,000 man White Force as a lieutenant. Later in his career, he learned a great deal from General John Pershing. He was impressed with the fact that anyone could say anything he wanted to Pershing as long as it was constructive. He never

held criticism against anyone even for an instant. He observed him in both off duty and on duty situations as his aide and noted that he dominated any group he was a part of - a kindly, likeable man off duty but quite stern on duty. A man, not unlike tne man George Marshall would become.

SIGNIFICANT EMOTIONAL EVENTS

In 1792, Napoleon witnessed the on-going French Revolution and had opportunity to consider the relationship of rebellion, patriotism, discipline and authority. While most lieutenants of his age would not necessarily have seen the events of the day in those terms - it is instructive that he did. It was a significant emotional event for him, however and he later wrote:

> "Never since that day, no, not on all my battlefields, have I had such an impression of masses of dead men as the Swiss [the palace guards loyal to the King] then produced on me." [18]

Not yet 24 years old and he had faced a political uprising, understood the end of the King's authority and been hardened to the effects of mass casualties - an experience that cannot help but spur the maturation process.

* * *

Mahan's significant emotional experience, described late in his life when he was involved in a renewed search for religious

certainty, occurred in 1884 while he was reading Theodor Mommsen's The History of Rome. He was doing some preliminary reading in preparation for a series of lectures that Admiral Luce had asked him to give at the Naval War College on naval history and tactics. The historical insight that would radically change his professional life, revolutionize the study of naval history at the time and make his name a household word during America's imperialist period came to him in the small library of the English Club in Lima, Peru.

> "...the light dawned first on my inner consciousness; I owed it to no other man...I cannot now reconstitute the sequence of my mental process; but while my problem was still wrestling with my brain there dawned upon me one of those concrete perceptions which turn inward darkness into light - and give substance to shadow."[19]

Thereafter he shifted the focus of his lecture series from the relationship between ordnance and tactics and explored the concept of the influence of sea power on history instead, converting himself to a position of anti-isolationism in the process.

* * *

It was not too long after he joined the Army that Marshall had the emotionally charged experience that was to influence his

actions for the rest of his military career.

In World War I Marshall sailed to Europe with the first convoy of American troops. The 1st Division Staff assembled for the first time on shipboard. The staff discovered that it was responsible for units they had never heard of, armed with weapons the troops knew nothing about, deploying without such essential equipment as field kitchens. Viewing this from the elbow of the commander of the AEF, watching General Pershing attempt to train the AEF in mobile warfare tactics over the strong opposition of the British and the French, Marshall saw what was required for an army to be ready for a first battle and worked the rest of his career to ensure that the sights he saw in those early days would not be replicated.

Through memos, letters, speeches and a tour as Commandant of the Infantry School, Marshall worked relentlessly to "expunge the bunk, complications and ponderosities" so that citizen-soldiers of the next war could quickly grasp the essentials of what was required from the Regular Army officers trained to communicate them simply and clearly. His friendships never got in the way of his strong conviction that citizen-soldiers would not be sent into action under commanders whose minds were no longer capable of making split-second decisions in a fast moving war and whose bodies were no longer capable of standing up under the rigorous demands of field service.[21] At the Infantry School he rewarded unorthodox solutions to tactical problems - making sure that they were published to the student body and threw unexpected situations at students to see how well they

could think on their feet. He cut down the amount of information they had on which to make decisions and introduced both ambiguity and vague and contradictory information wherever he could.

CONCLUSIONS

Patterns seen in this brief look at three military figures who had significant impact on military thinking of their times are worthy of note because of the implications for today's Army. The sample is too small and the overview too general to draw firm conclusions but the basis for forming some general attitudes and developing some avenues for future research has been established.

All of the subjects were exposed to at least two radically different cultural environments during the early part of their personal and professional lives. Seeing things through two different sets of eyes can't help but cause one to compare and contrast - the first steps in concept development. One surely cannot be confined to a single paradigm when one is so heavily immersed in different cultures, whether those cultures are defined by race, nationality, social class or anything else.

Napoleon and Marshall were much more involved in different cultures than was Mahan. They learned foreign languages, lived for extended periods in different countries, experienced conflict between the two cultures. Mahan's experience with

other cultures came much more as an observer. His approach was intellectual and therefore somewhat detached from the social, psychological, and political aspects of different lifestyles.

All three were men of significant intelligence although each intelligence was unique. While Napoleon seemed to possessa great deal of natural genius, Marshall made up for natural ability with determination and perseverance. From the information available, Napoleon and Mahan seemed to be the most aware of the thought processes they used to determine desired results. Marshall left behind the most limited record of such thoughts.

All seemed to have a facility to deal both with details and with the big picture when it was appropriate. Marshall got away from dealing with details whenever and wherever he could, Mahan used them when it suited his purpose and Napoleon clung to personal involvement with details beyond the time it was an effective tool for him to use. But all were able to get involved with details and then disengage to keep sight of the larger situation.

All read widely and cultivated interests beyond their profession. The common theme of a sense of history runs deeply through the experiences of all. This extension of points of reference from the past through the present very likely enabled them to look ahead to the future. Current research has, in fact, shown that "adults who show a greater concern for past events in their relation to the present are also likely to trace

the consequences of present behavior into the more distant future"[22]

They developed at different rates. Napoleon and Mahan demonstrated keen intelligence very early in life. Marshall had to work harder and came into his own a bit later on.

Much of what Mahan learned was from books. His approach was intellectual, he was comfortable with ideas, and not very comfortable with the people or the situations in which he found himself. Both Napoleon and Marshall walked the terrain. They dealt with people differently. Napoleon's communication with his subordinates was pretty much one way - from him to them. Marshall listened carefully to those who talked to him and profited from what he heard. The common element appears to be that they were all successful in extracting value from their experiences.

The implications of these conclusions are clear. Strategic visions are not always generally accepted nor politically popular and therefore require considerable courage on the part of those who have them and those who support them. Such visions are developed out of a breadth and depth of experience that is encouraged by current assignment policies but discouraged by the lack of time allowed for breadth of reading and for reflection once one assumes the duties of his assignment.

Those who have shown ability and initiative early on must have greater and greater challenges regardless of rank held or rank required by the mission. Those who have not demonstrated this ability early on must be put into situations where they

gain a broader view of their circumstances or are mentored by those who can provide such experience vicariously. Many more would rise to the occasion than will be given the opportunity. And so the young soldiers must be challenged and the old soldiers must be given incentives to challenge the young.

Earlier exposure to solving broad, complex problems with incomplete, vague and contradictory information is needed. It does not make sense to train servicemembers to think one way for 20 years and then switch to an alternate method thereafter. Young soldiers will have more opportunity to use detailed information to achieve objective goals at first and more opportunity to use complex problem-solving skills later but a large part of wisdom is having the tools available when you need them and recognizing which tools or techniques are required for the situation at hand.

We must never forget the emotional aspect of the total person. We have seen how Marshall's and Mahan's emotional experience influenced their professional careers and their visions of the future. "If the words a person says to himself in imagining his future are to motivate behavior, they must somehow generate in themselves appropriate emotional experiences." [23] There are many opportunities to collide with stressful situations in the military and life generates its own significant emotional events that can impact on duty performance. These experiences, properly channeled, can provide a rich source of imaginative thinking when combined with the other factors discussed.

ENDNOTES

1. Philip J. Haythornthwaite, Napoleon's Military Machine, p. 80.

2. Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan, p.430

3. Ibid., p. xi.

4. R.M. Johnston, The Corsican, p. 3.

5 Philip J. Haythornthwaite, Napoleon's Military Machine, p. 80.

6. Colonel Vachee, Napoleon at Work, p. 11.

7. Ibid., p. 7.

8. Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan, p. 431.

9. Leonard Mosely, Marshall Hero for Our Times, p. 6.

10. Forrest C. Pogue, Education of a General, p. 22.

11. Ibid., p. 96.

12. Ibid., p. 101.

13. Larry I. Bland and Sharon R. Ritenour, The Soldierly Spirit December 1880 - June 1939, Pp. 88-89.

14. R.M. Johnston, The Corsican, p. 14.

15. Ibid., p. 35.

16. Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan, p. 14.

17. Forrest C. Pogue, Education of a General, p. 103.

18. R.M. Johnston, The Corsican, p. 10.

19. Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan, p. 145.

20. R.M. Johnston, The Corsican, p. 10.

21. Eric Larrabee, Commander-in-Chief, p. 101.

22. Thomas J. Cottle and Stephen L. Klineberg, The Present of Things Future, p. 11.

23. Ibid. p. 13.

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