


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FUTURE U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY: THE NEED FOR
A STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE

BY

JAMES R. HELMLY
Department of the Army Civilian

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
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As the United States goes about restructuring its military forces to provide military security in a volatile, unsettled strategic environment, it must do so with significantly reduced resources and within an environment of great uncertainty. In reviewing the emerging National Military Strategy, the reliance on "contingency forces" capable of rapid power projection to meet unexpected threats is emphasized. But these forces and their capabilities are not viewed holistically, rather they are viewed and defined parochially, along service lines. Forming them into a composite whole is lacking. In reviewing the lessons of famous American first battles the military historian John Shy notes the persistent problem of command and control. In post-Vietnam contingency operations this same glaring problem arises out of the creation of an ad hoc Joint Task Force (JTF).					
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In structuring contingency forces envisioned in the future military strategy we should recognize first battle and historical experiences and organize these forces into a standing JTF. This JTF would provide the dedicated focus and direction so important to preparing these contingency forces to fight and win on the lethal, dynamic battlefields of tomorrow anywhere in the world. The JTF could be employed under a regional commander (CINC) or directly under the National Command Authority if warranted. Further, it would be capable of being tailored to meet the unique characteristics of a developing contingency and could serve as an independent force or as the lead element of a larger force, if required, to deal with a major regional contingency.

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FUTURE U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY: THE NEED FOR A STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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As the United States goes about restructuring its military forces to provide military security in a volatile, unsettled strategic environment, it must do so with significantly reduced resources and within an environment of great uncertainty. In reviewing the emerging National Military Strategy, the reliance on "contingency forces" capable of rapid power projection to meet unexpected threats is emphasized. But these forces and their capabilities are not viewed holistically, rather they are viewed and defined parochially, along service lines. Forming them into a composite whole is lacking.

In reviewing the lessons of famous American first battles the military historian John Shy notes the persistent problem of command and control. In post-Vietnam contingency operations this same glaring problem arises out of the creation of an ad hoc Joint Task Force (JTF).

In structuring contingency forces envisioned in the future military strategy we should recognize first battle and historical experiences and organize these forces into a standing JTF. This JTF would provide the dedicated focus and direction so important to preparing these contingency forces to fight and win on the lethal, dynamic battlefields of tomorrow anywhere in the world. The JTF could be employed under a regional commander (CJRC) or directly under the National Command Authority if warranted. Further, it would be capable of being tailored to meet the unique characteristics of a developing contingency and could serve as an independent force or as the lead element of a larger force, if required, to deal with a major regional contingency.

INTRODUCTION

The Romans said, 'If you would have peace, you must be prepared for war.' And while we pray for peace, we can never forget that organization, no less than a bayonet or an aircraft carrier, is a weapon of war. We owe it to our soliders, our sailors, our airmen, and our marines to ensure that this weapon is lean enough, flexible enough, and tough enough to help them win if, God forbid, that ever becomes necessary.¹

The above statement by the late Representative Bill Nichols, one of the primary authors of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, summarizes this paper, specifically the United State's joint organization for war at levels below the combatant (unified/specified) command.

From the founding of our Nation until early 1941 the United States relied on two command structures for its armed forces--one for land forces and one for naval forces. The country's experience in World War II with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system and the concept of unified command had a profound effect on the Nation's view of how to control its armed forces and led to passage of the National Security Act of 1947. This act accomplished several tasks, key among them was the establishment of the unified command structure and the doctrine of unity of command. While the intent of the Act included "...to provide... for (the armed forces') authoritative coordination and unified direction...but not to merge them...and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces,"² it is open to question whether the intent of the Act has been fully

realized. Clearly the intent of the Act was not only to cause unified effort by the armed services but also to forge jointness in operations. Over 40 years later, despite frequent executive department orders and statements and major legislative changes in 1949, 1958 and 1986, the record of compliance with the spirit of the Act is unsettled. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the most far-reaching change since the 1947 Act, made major changes toward realizing the full intent of the 1947 Act. While changes of this magnitude require time, it is important to identify where further attention is needed.

Beginning the decade of the nineties and preparing for the twenty-first century, geopolitical changes of impressive magnitude and budget woes of enormous proportion are driving revision of U.S. national security and national military strategies. It is clear that defense resources, including force structure, will be significantly reduced.³ In building this smaller structure it is important to remember Congressman Nichol's remarks at the beginning of this paper.

Building the forces (organizations) necessary to prosecute war is primarily a Service responsibility.⁴ In the main these organizations are built to accomplish Service missions using Service doctrine, concepts and systems as a baseline. Understandably, the Services are usually reluctant to build organizations, thus devoting resources, to accomplish joint

missions. Commanding these forces, to include organizing them for combat and subsequently directing their employment in combat, is a function under the authority of combatant (unified/ specified) commanders (CINCs).⁵ CINCs are provided doctrinal guidance⁶ for organizing their forces, but the final decision is correctly the CINCs. In general, CINCs use a combination of the following methods to organize their forces (see Appendix A for a complete description):

- Subordinate Unified Command
- Service Component Command
- Joint Task Force (JTF)
- Functional Component Command

Organizations for national defense at the national and strategic level are prescribed by law and Presidential directive, i.e., President, Department of Defense, Service Departments, combatant commands. As noted above, the organization of forces below the combatant commander is the responsibility of the CINC. While no one can predict with certainty what the future holds and thus what organizations may be necessary, it is necessary to address future national security issues in seeking to structure organizations which will accommodate the Nation's most likely and demanding requirements.

In addressing the organization of forces below the CINC this paper will review the developing national security environment including an emerging national military strategy,

doctrinal guidance and current capabilities. A short review of major problems encountered in some post-Vietnam military operations (Mayaguez, Desert One, Urgent Fury, Just Cause) will be provided to determine historical trends and relevancy to expected future requirements. Finally, conclusions regarding expected future organizational requirements will be provided with subsequent recommendations.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

It is clear that we are in the midst of the most far-reaching changes in our strategic environment since World War II. So profound are these changes that they've been described by the President as "breath-taking in...character, dimension, and pace."⁷ Indeed the rate and scope of change on the international scene is almost incomprehensible. Fundamental changes in the political, military, and economic institutions of the Soviet Union have allowed rapprochement between that country and ours leading to a lessening of East-West tensions throughout the world. The military threat to Western Europe posed by a coerced Warsaw Pact has all but disappeared and many of the former member states of that body are moving rapidly toward democracy and free market economies. Certainly, the unification of Germany heralds both the end of one era and the beginning of a new one, so radically altered that President Bush has begun describing it as a "new world order." Similarly, with the notable exception of the Persian Gulf, a lessening of tensions, adoption of democratic forms of government and increasing respect

for human rights have heightened the prospects for a new order of peaceful competition, amiable relations and betterment of the worldwide standard of living.

The emergence of this new world order in the decade of the nineties will critically affect the United State's future security. Ongoing events will markedly impact the defense needs and strategy of the Nation. To a great extent these geopolitical prospects are ones the U.S. has long sought, including changes favoring democratic tenets and reduced Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe, significant arms control agreements, increased democratization in Latin America, Africa, and the Pacific, a greater recognition of human rights, and a more multipolar world. Other changes, including the rapid proliferation of high technology weapons, terrorism, arms and force buildups in Third World states, narcotics trafficking, religious extremism and heightened nationalism are less welcome. We face new and changing threats, technologies, weapons systems, and revised concepts of operation. All of these make for an increasingly complex, volatile and unpredictable world in which the necessity to use U.S. military force to protect vital national interests may become more, instead of less likely.

Such momentous geopolitical and military changes around the world, combined with increasing domestic concerns and Federal budget pressures have combined to cause great demand to reduce the size, shape and deployment of our armed forces. There is

pressure to produce a new military strategy. While this new military strategy is still evolving, the broad outline and basic elements of it are relatively clear:⁸

- Deterrence, both nuclear and conventional remains a cornerstone. Flexible response remains a linchpin.
- Strong alliances and collective security.
- Forward defense remains an essential element. It is accepted that reductions in the size and location of U.S. forward-deployed forces will be incurred. Though the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty ratification now appears to be stalemated, its de facto implementation has already occurred. The breakup of the Warsaw Pact and substantial reductions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe have now been accompanied by the deployment out of Europe of a full U.S. Corps of two plus divisions and other associated support and tactical air forces. U.S. Force levels in the Pacific, including Korea, may also be substantially reduced⁹ and U.S. forces must be withdrawn from Panama by the year 2000 to comply with the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977.

Note: The emphasis on permanently stationed forward-deployed forces to provide forward defense has sufficiently shifted that the accepted term is now "forward presence."¹⁰

- Projection of powerful, conventional forces from the United States to overseas locations where vital national

interests are threatened will likely increase in importance as the level and location of forward-deployed forces is reduced.

These broad objectives of our military strategy are relatively constant and unchanged, but the global environment within which this strategy is executed is undergoing profound change. Reviewing the strategic environment and emerging U.S. National Military Strategy it appears that we are left in a quandary: relatively unchanged security objectives in an ever-changing world with significantly reduced defense resources. The need for a fresh approach is apparent; the President described the situation as follows: we know our forces can be smaller, but "we would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken down version of the ones we possess at present...what we need are not merely reductions--but restructuring."¹¹

While the details of the future force structure are undecided and/or classified a general outline of the Nations' future military force is beginning to emerge. It is built around a "base force" concept articulated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell.¹² The key elements of this base force envisioned by General Powell are:

- An Atlantic force organized, trained and equipped for U.S. military requirements in Europe, Southwest Asia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea.

- A Pacific Force structured to recognize the predominantly maritime aspect of that theater.
- A strategic force which would provide strategic nuclear deterrence and be comprised of the Nation's strategic nuclear forces and, perhaps, in the future, strategic defense forces.
- A contingency force comprised of forces from each Service organized, trained and equipped to respond to spontaneous, often unpredictable crises calling for highly trained, ready forces that are air deliverable and largely self-sufficient.

In essence, though much changed, the emerging national security environment can be expected to include a number of prominent features:¹³

- Continued U.S.-Soviet rivalry, but increased importance of other regional states having significantly increased capabilities.
- An increasing number of flashpoints for armed conflict across the operational continuum.
- An increasing number of state and non-state parties in a conflict setting providing for potential wars.
- Continued proliferation of technologies for the conduct of warfare across the operational continuum.

The potential for military operations is clearly increasing at the same time that our resources to conduct these operations

are decreasing. This divergence of trends demands that planning for the future organizations necessary to conduct such operations be prudent, flexible and pragmatic.

Unified and Joint Operations

In his famous 1958 statement proposing strengthening of the 1947 National Security Act, President Eisenhower said:

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements in all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one regardless of Service.

This statement, perhaps more than any other, embodies the essence of jointness:

- Fight as one single concentrated effort.
- Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified.
- Peacetime preparatory and organizational efforts must conform to the above.
- Combat forces must be organized into unified commands, singly led and prepared to fight as one.

Though the term "unified" was used by President Eisenhower and appears more often than "joint" in legislation and directives it is clear after reviewing the definitions of these two terms and the phrase "integration into an efficient team" used in the

1947 Act that the Nation intends to create a unified team to pursue joint operations.

The current DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not provide an approved definition of joint operations, though "joint force" and "joint" are defined.¹⁴ Unified operations is defined as the wide scope of operations taking place within unified commands under the unified commander's direction.¹⁵ The draft definition of joint operations in Joint Publication 3-0 (Test), Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations:

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic operational, tactical, training, or administrative military mission by forces from two or more services; also the conduct of combat...needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign....¹⁶

Comparing this definition to that of unified operations, one can see that not all unified operations are joint and not all joint operations are unified.

In enacting the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 Congress stated the following policy objectives of that legislation:¹⁷

- (1) To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in DoD.
- (2) Improve military advice provided the President National Security Council and Secretary of Defense.

- (3) Place responsibility on combatant commanders for accomplishment of missions assigned to the combatant commands.
- (4) Provide authority to the CINCs commensurate with their responsibility.
- (5) Increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning.
- (6) Provide more efficiency in using defense resources.
- (7) Improve joint officer management policies.
- (8) Enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of DoD.

A further review of the legislative history of this act shows more clearly that which is implied in this policy statement¹⁸ - that forging jointness in military operations was a clear intention of the Act. It should be remembered that much of the impetus for this legislation was the perceived joint operations problems encountered in the Iran hostage rescue operation (Desert One) in April 1980 and Operation Urgent Fury in October 1983. Additionally, the Packard Commission Report ¹⁹ and several articles and speeches by retired senior officers, notably General David A. Jones, USAF, Ret. former JCS Chairman and General Edward C. Meyer, USA, Ret. Chief of Staff Army, all critiqued the U.S. military's ability to operate jointly.

In seeking to establish the necessity to forge a better joint operations capability one must be careful not to fall into

a trap of arguing jointness for its own sake. Though not substantiated in formal after-action reviews, both the Desert One and Urgent Fury operations were critiqued for ensuring that all Services participated just to give each of the armed forces a "piece of the pie." Whether these allegations are true is immaterial - forces selected for military operations should be selected for their capabilities to contribute to accomplishing the mission at hand: in the language of Congress, the effectiveness and efficiency of military operations.²⁰ Equally true is the fact that as the complexity of modern warfare increases so too does the need to employ the unique capabilities of Service forces jointly.

Prior to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the major thrust of unified and joint operations was on deployment and achieving jointness thru unified effort at the strategic (national, CINC) level.²¹ Because of this we fell into a trap of viewing unified and joint operations as synonymous when, as shown previously, they are not. When reviewing some of the most often mentioned examples of problem-plagued joint operations such as the Mayaguez Operation, Grenada, and Desert One, it stands out that many of the notable difficulties encountered were in the employment of joint forces at the operational and tactical levels of war as well as the unified employment of these forces at the strategic level of war.

The Goldwater-Nichols provision charging the CJCS with developing joint doctrine and the resultant joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures development program²² is a step in the right direction of providing a doctrinal basis for the conduct of joint operations. But this effort is not without its difficulty. JCS Test Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations is considered the keystone document in the series of joint "how to" publications currently under development. The forwarding memorandum of this publication states that it "contains proposed joint doctrine to guide the activities and employment of the Armed Forces...during unified and joint operations." A careful review of this publication provides the reader with many definitions and descriptive phrases but little substantive guidance on how to conduct joint operations. The Air Force has recognized this fault in the document by noting in their review comments²³ that "...it lacks sufficient guidance for employing joint forces in combat..." Clearly, the current Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS)²⁴ emphasizes unified deployment operations and not joint employment. Joint Publication 5-0 (Final Draft), Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations is similar in its approach to Pub 3-0 - little substance on employing joint forces.

In fairness, these efforts to develop doctrinal concepts for employment of joint forces are not without substantive difficulty. Great strides are being made. The Armed Forces Staff College now focuses on the employment of joint forces at

the operational level of war including campaign planning and synchronization of joint forces to achieve optimal results.²⁵ These changes mark significant progress in forging greater unity and jointness. The success to date should not deter us from an equally impressive fact, that the task has only just begun.

Historical Perspective

As previously noted, our record of success in joint operations is problematic. While Desert One and Urgent Fury stand out, less well known are joint operations problems encountered in the Mayaguez operation in 1975 and going farther back, in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic operation, 1958 Lebanon operation and the Korean War. Indeed, American military history is replete with examples of serious problems encountered in employing joint military forces.²⁶ Problems of all sorts, not just joint, have occurred in all of our wars, expeditions and operations and they've been thoroughly studied. While each of these has had its share of lessons learned, we seem loathe to address lessons which cause questioning the sacred cow of service parochialism without legislative direction.

In seeking to determine lessons that may be drawn from America's military history America's First Battles 1776-1965 examined the first battle or campaign in each of nine wars in which the U.S. Army has fought. Attempting to put these first battles in retrospect, the military historian John Shy wrote:

More glaring than poorly trained troops as a first-battle problem is the weakness of command-and-control. Virtually every case study emphasizes the lack of realistic large-scale operational exercises before the first battle, exercises that might have taught commanders and staffs the hard, practical side of their wartime business as even the most basic training introduces it to the soldier at the small-unit level. Virtually every case study indicates that the results of continuing demoralization, and exhaustion at the command-and-staff level are at first bloody, at worst irremediable - a more crippling defect even than combat units falling apart, because units can often be relieved or replaced in time, headquarters almost never.²⁷

What then of those "first battles" subsequent to 1965 (Vietnam War)? Was command-and-control also a problem in those first battles?

The Mayaguez operation manifests several distinguishing attributes which can be visualized as characteristic of a short-notice contingency operation:

- Unexpected. Though formal relations with the Cambodian government at the time were nonexistent, thus straining communications between the U.S. and Cambodian governments, there was no prior warning and the seizure of the U.S. registered ship S.S. Mayaguez came about unexpectedly.
- Confused. Solid information at the strategic, operational and tactical levels was very difficult to come by and even more difficult to confirm. Reportedly, intelligence support was so poor that a tactical map of Koh Tang Island could not be provided.²⁸

- Time Sensitive. From the time the vessel was seized until the military operation to rescue the vessel and its crew was completed encompassed approximately three and one-half days.
- Remote. The incident occurred in a far distant corner of the world in the Gulf of Thailand approximately sixty miles southwest of the Cambodian port of Kompong Som.
- Forces available. The nearest naval forces available were at least twenty-four hours steaming time away from the Mayaguez. The nearest air forces were 195 miles away in Thailand and the nearest ground forces were on Okinawa at least ten hours flying time away.²⁹ None of the forces to be involved in the military operation had trained, rehearsed or operated together prior to the operation.
- No plan. There was no existing operations or contingency plan to deal with a situation such as existed.
- Ad hoc command and control arrangements. While the Commander In Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) was responsible for military operations in the area, there is evidence that much of the strategic planning and control was exercised directly by the President.³⁰ The CINCPAC (Admiral Noel Gaylor) personally was in Washington when the crisis began but the plan for using force was developed by JCS planners and not by Gaylor's staff. Below the CINCPAC level the command arrangements were makeshift. CINCPAC

designated the Commander, United States Support Activities Group/7th Air Force, Lt. Gen. J.J. Burns, USAF, as the "on-scene commander." Gen. Burns exercised operational control of Marine forces and tactical air forces thru an airborne mission commander located in an airborne command and control aircraft (ABCCC).³¹ Naval forces took their direction from CINCPAC though they were to support Gen. Burns' operation. As if to compound the command and control structure, the Marine forces were task organized under a command group from the III Marine Amphibious Force Staff and an Air Force provisional task force was organized under the Deputy Commander for Operations, 56th Special Operations Wing.³² Just as command arrangements were developed ad hoc, so too were supporting command, control and communication systems, facilities and procedures. There is clear evidence that these ad hoc arrangements inhibited the operation.³³

- As a last and important point regarding this incident, strategic, operational and tactical planning were confused and conducted simultaneously. As noted previously, the President took personal charge of the operation and the plans were developed by the JCS. Because accurate information regarding operations and tactical capabilities is inevitably sparse in Washington, commanders and staffs of tactical units were frequently bothered to provide up to date information, detracting

from their ability to plan the multitude of operational and tactical details inherent in any military operation.³⁴

The purpose here is not to deal at length with the Mayaguez operation but to point out those distinguishing attributes which appear to characterize many of our emergency military operations in the post-World War II era.

In seeking to establish that the Mayaguez operation was not isolated in the characteristics noted above, it is not necessary to conduct exhaustive reviews of operations since then but only to note similar problems.

After the ill-fated American effort to rescue U.S. hostages held by Iran in April 1980, the JCS commissioned a Special Operations Review Group (Holloway Commission) to conduct an examination of the planning, organization, coordination, direction and control of the operation. In publishing their findings the Holloway Commission stated that two fundamental concerns emerged as related to most of the major issues identified in their report - ad hoc nature of organization, and planning and operations security. In addressing organization, the Commission stated:

"Command and control was excellent at the upper echelons, but became more tenuous and fragile at the intermediate levels."³⁵ The Commission added:

The ad hoc nature of the organization and planning is related to most of the major issues and underlies the group's conclusions.

By not utilizing an existing JTF organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to start, literally from the beginning, to establish a JTF, find a commander, create an organization, provide a staff, develop a plan, select the units, and train the forces before attaining even the most rudimentary mission readiness.

An existing JTF organization, even with a small staff and only cadre units assigned, would have provided an organizational framework of professional expertise around which a larger tailored force organization could quickly coalesce.

The Holloway Commission's recommendations went on to recommend establishment of a counter-terrorist Joint Task Force. We should not deceive ourselves that this finding would be applicable only to such specialized operations. Indeed, the necessity for an adequate command and control capability is just as applicable in conventional operations.

Operation Urgent Fury, the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983, was the largest U.S. military operation since the Vietnam War. It contained many of the same characteristics of the Mayaguez Operation. Specifically, time sensitivity, no plan, inadequate intelligence, unexpected, simultaneous planning, ad hoc command and control arrangements and a requirement to use forces from all four armed services. The JTF formed to command this operation was designated JTF 120. Though organized and provided for on paper it was not, in fact, an operational headquarters. Its organization was hurried with most of the staff not having worked together previously and it did not

provide the kinds of expertise to be required in the operation.³⁶ As a commentary to the speed with which the JTF was organized, the deputy commander, Army MG Norman Schwarzkopf was temporarily relieved of his command of the 24th Infantry Division and assigned as the JTF Deputy Commander only 36 hours prior to D-Day.³⁷

In Operation Just Cause, the U.S. invasion of Panama on 20 December 1989, it seems that many of our past ills regarding joint operations were conquered. In reviewing the command and control arrangements, though significantly improved, we find that the JTF organization (JTF South) that reported to the theater CINC (CINC South) was provisionally organized. Not to denigrate the effectiveness of the operation, the command and control requirements of JTF South were not as stressful as would have been required had the force been more joint and had the enemy been more capable.³⁸ Additionally, the JTF had, in effect, been designated as such some six months prior to D-Day³⁹ and had been conducting planning and rehearsals during this period.

Similar ad hoc command and control headquarters were formed for the Dominican Republic intervention in April 1965 and the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in July 1958. As in the Mayaguez, Desert One and Urgent Fury operations these earlier contingency operations were troubled by difficulties in command and control and demonstrated an apparent "inability to mount a joint contingency operation in a timely and effective way."⁴⁰

COMMAND OPTIONS

As noted earlier, combatant commanders may prescribe the internal organization of their commands. In organizing their commands the CINCs are guided by doctrine, missions assigned the command, nature and scope of operating forces available, geography, enemy forces, and time available.⁴¹

In reviewing the methods of organization below the combatant command level (Appendix A) it is apparent that each has distinguishing characteristics and depending upon the factors cited above may have certain advantages and disadvantages. Factually, combatant commands use a combination of these methods on a daily basis around the world.⁴² Of these, the method most often used to organize to meet unexpected contingencies, the kind of operations more likely to be encountered in the future, is the Joint Task Force (JTF). Other methods provide for more permanence (sub-unified command) or functional specialization (functional commands). Establishing a JTF is a prerogative of the Secretary of Defense or the commander of a combatant command or sub-unified command.⁴³ Just as a JTF has often been used for unexpected contingencies the doctrine which calls for its creation under such circumstances calls for its demise after the mission has been accomplished, specifically:

A JTF is established when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics....A JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been dissolved.⁴⁴

While flexibility is important, going into battle with a "transient" organization for joint command and control is a clear violation of our first battle experiences cited earlier. This tendency to go into battle with a "pick-up" team has been cited as a major shortcoming in several of our country's contingency operations including the Dominican Crisis, Grenada, the Persian Gulf and Honduras.⁴⁵

JTFs are used today around the world to accomplish missions under the command of combatant commanders, specifically, Joint Task Forces Four, Five and Six which are assigned counter-narcotics missions by CINCLANT, CINCPAC and CINCFOR, respectively, and JTF-Bravo in Honduras, under USCINCSO, which provides command and control over U.S. forces routinely operating in Honduras. These JTFs appear to be assigned missions which do not conform with the doctrinal guidance for establishing a JTF,⁴⁶ specifically that the JTF is established when the mission has a specific limited objective. These JTFs certainly do not conform to the concept of "short-notice contingency operations" contained in JCS Pub 5-00.2, JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) under the unified U.S. Special Operations Command fulfills the Holloway Commission's recommendation to establish a dedicated counter-terrorist JTF but is a standing JTF which remains in existence to conduct special operations missions as assigned. Additionally, most, if not all of the combatant commanders have plans to organize a JTF when required. These plans have been frequently exercised but the

JTFs are normally organized "out of hide" meaning the commander and staff are pulled from other duty assignments, many times having never met or worked with each other. Further, the commander may be required to command subordinate forces that he is unfamiliar with. The time sensitivity associated with crisis conditions likely will not allow for great care in selecting the commander and staff for such a JTF. While flexibility is important in any military undertaking, arguing that such plans are good because they demonstrate flexibility borders on the absurd. If such was the case, all forces should be organized as disparate pieces and fit together once the battle is joined. Such is clearly not the case; our operating forces are organized into composite teams fitting together the various pieces deemed necessary to accomplish the missions for which they were originally designed. But these composite teams are designed, organized, trained and equipped along Service lines. It is at the joint level that these composite forces begin to fragment. Thus, at precisely the level where unity is most needed and at the level where it's most difficult to achieve, the joint level, we are faced with forming a team on the spur of the moment. To compound this problem in this age of technology, command and control is often viewed as primarily a technical problem. Joint operations are perceived as a mere communications and management requirement, lacking challenges in the vision, understanding and human elements that service concepts of command are oriented around.⁴⁷

In his article titled "Joint Command and Control" in the July 1990 edition of Military Review, LTG John H. Cushman (USA, Ret) addresses this issue of Service orientation at the warfighting level. In his article LTG (Ret) Cushman states:

Command-oriented thought uses reason, informed judgment and, in the end, command direction rather than negotiation. It sees forces in all their variety as tools for mission accomplishment; it is holistic in its view rather than partitioned; and it looks at function and logic rather than at directed organization and doctrine. To mission-oriented commanders, forces are there to be used where and how they will best serve the Command's mission. Indeed this is the way single-service formation commanders in the field uniformly deal with matters of organization and operations.⁴⁸

The CINC may choose to provide the joint command focus from his position - this appears to have been Gen. Schwarzkopf's decision during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and his success cannot be argued. But it was not the CINC'S decision in those contingencies cited earlier. Further, depending upon the circumstances it may be difficult for a theater CINC to concentrate his and his staff's attention on the strategic, operational, and tactical level details inherent in a crisis requiring military forces. A combatant commander has many diverse responsibilities spanning the realm of routine functions associated with command. To say that a CINC is a busy man is an understatement. His responsibilities for developing proposed courses of action and working with the National Command Authority in a crisis through the CJCS are well established in joint doctrine. The importance of providing the CINC a "joint warfighter" under such circumstances is apparent. This was the case in Just Cause.⁴⁹ Such a decision should come as no

surprise. Though there may be a focal point of military operations in one specific part of a CINC's theater (a theater of war, a theater of operations) the CINC remains responsible for the entire theater and all U.S. military forces in the theater. A JTF provides the CINC a joint command which can focus on the operational tasks at hand, freeing the CINC to concentrate on broader theater-wide strategic issues. Though a CINC is not limited to the strategic levels of war and in fact must concern himself and his staff with all levels, the development of theater strategy is clearly a function of the theater CINC.⁵⁰ By using a JTF, a CINC can provide focused effort. By avoiding a temptation to become his own "warfighter" a CINC is able to retain a broader, strategic view of a crisis, not only assisting the NCA in arriving at realistic courses of action but also marshalling the necessary resources from within and outside of his theater necessary to undertake the military missions required. When posed with the question: "Would you desire to use a JTF to conduct a specific crisis response contingency operation under your overall command or would you prefer to command the forces involved directly?" two of the current unified CINCs responded they would desire to use a JTF. These officers and their positions are not named here in respect for the Army War College nonattribution policy.

Not seeking to impose a particular method of command on any CINC, arguments for and against using a JTF are not germane to the issue at hand - when a CINC desires to use a JTF he must

organize it ad hoc; at precisely the time the CINC and the Nation need their first team, we pull together a pick-up team.

The Joint Task Force

On 1 October 1979 the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) Headquarters was established. It marked a first in the Nation's military history - the first time a permanent, fully-staffed JTF Headquarters had been organized, trained, and equipped in peacetime with forces from each of the armed forces. Its mission was to "plan, train, exercise, and prepare to deploy and employ forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps."⁵¹ Though focused on the Persian Gulf, the RDJTF was a force with a global orientation, designed to respond to contingencies outside NATO and Korea.⁵² But the RDJTF is no more. It was matured into a unified command, US Central Command, in 1983 and not replaced.

Though never called upon to actually deploy and conduct military operations, the RDJTF was successful in forging jointness and in attacking many issues associated with rapid deployment and contingency operations that had been hidden behind a veil of Europe and Korea only for far too long.⁵³ Its efforts helped to forge much of our current joint doctrine and lessons learned.

In his book U.S. Military Power and Rapid Deployment Requirements in the 1980s,⁵⁴ Dr. Sherwood S. Cordier noted the

"essentiality of maintaining a joint headquarters to command and control U.S. forces in a rapid deployment, contingency scenario." The need is, if anything, more acute today than it was in 1983 when Dr. Cordier published his book. As he noted, "improvisation, in joint operations, is an invitation to disaster." Though still early, the stunning military success demonstrated by the United States in Operation Desert Storm provides an excellent opportunity to finally overcome the legacies of Mayaguez, Desert One, Grenada, and Beirut as we go about restructuring the organizations needed to execute the National Military Strategy.

A strong first step in preparing the military instrument for effective use in a "new world order" would be the creation of a true Joint Task Force, assigned forces from each of the armed services, assigned for their capabilities to execute rapid deployment, forced entry if necessary, and subsequently fight and win. A general design of this JTF has already been provided by the CJCS in his description of proposed contingency forces:⁵⁵

- Light, mobile forces, ready to deploy on very short notice.
- Able to respond to diverse, unexpected and unpredictable crises. Examples include Just Cause, Desert Storm, Operation Illwind (rescue of U.S. citizens from Liberia), and the rescue of Americans from Somalia.

- Forces drawn from each of the U.S. Armed Forces, including Special Operations Forces, and maintained at "the highest level of readiness" and capable of being tailored.
- Less dependence on reserve components.
- Rapidly deployable, highly lethal and ready to serve as the principal force for lesser regional contingencies or the lead element of larger forces necessary for a major regional contingency such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

The concept provided above describes contingency "forces" not a contingency "force," the difference here being more than a matter of mere semantics. The singular provides a single entity, under one commander, both a focus and unity of effort, while the plural provides several, diverse organizations adhering to common criteria. This difference is important, for the concept of diverse forces from each of the armed forces responding to the "contingency that suddenly pops up at 2:00 in the morning"⁵⁶ carries with it the notion of organizing an ad hoc JTF Headquarters to command and control these forces. The precise method of command cannot be dictated with certainty in advance of such unexpected contingencies but the U.S. proclivity to use a JTF in such situations has been clearly demonstrated.⁵⁷ Indeed this kind of situation is precisely the kind envisioned in the doctrinal guidance for a JTF, JCS Pub 5-00.2, JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures.

A concept for a restructured unified command system which correlates to the "base force" concept, including contingency forces, articulated by the CJCS has not been outlined although it is clear that the number of combatant commands will likely be substantially reduced.⁵⁸ Assuming that the U.S. retains its global interests and responsibilities, such a reduction in combatant commands may place more responsibilities on the surviving unified commands.

Related to the issue of a reduced number of combatant commands is the issue of the functions of remaining commands. At the same time that Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the authority and responsibilities of CINCs it indirectly increased their workload. Getting such commands (headquarters) to concentrate on training and preparing for war is difficult at best. Though directed at the Army, John Shy's observation that "Headquarters ...habitually spend their time and energies on routine administration, seldom pushing, training, and testing themselves as they push, train, and test their troops"⁵⁹ aptly describes a phenomena of combatant command headquarters. Collectively, these reasons may explain the tendency to use a JTF Headquarters to command and control joint forces for short-notice contingency operations.

Because the Services organize, train and equip organizations along individual Service lines, little attention is spent on joint organizations. As discussed earlier, doctrine for

joint organizations has only recently begun development.⁶⁰ John Shy has related doctrine to the problem of command-and-control, noting how it "shapes the first battle and is in turn affected by the experience of the first battle."⁶¹ Certainly, a lack of approved joint doctrine has not prevented us from forming ad hoc military organizations to conduct unexpected operations in the past, specifically JTFs.

Notwithstanding the increased authority of the CJCS and the CINCs, the Services remain an integral part of the Nation's military establishment. Thus, in order to ensure soundness and utility, joint doctrine must, of necessity, receive Service input and be thoroughly coordinated with them. This will necessarily slow the pace of development. Substituting training and exercises for the first battles discussed by Shy, establishment of a JTF Headquarters could contribute to the experience and knowledge base necessary for joint doctrine, hopefully avoiding the critical first battle lesson regarding organizations cited by Shy.⁶²

As noted earlier, CINCs have the authority to establish a JTF and have used this authority frequently. But this requires resources that are in short supply. Furthermore, the concept of contingency forces carries with it a notion that many of the forces are not forward deployed but are CONUS based.⁶³ In an ideal world, each unified commander would command all of the resources (forces) including appropriate command and control

headquarters required to accomplish all missions assigned him. One of the major reasons why a revised national military strategy is needed is limited resources. Further, while a forward deployed JTF Headquarters in each CINC's theater would provide theater focus and familiarity, it would continue the practice of viewing joint command and control as a technical practice, as Gen. (Ret) Cushman describes it "a bloodless process utterly lacking in vitality - a management problem"⁶⁴ because it would not have all of its forces. As Cushman further points out, this view of joint command and control comes from our military legacy of viewing military operations along service lines, even within unified commands.⁶⁵ To remedy this situation requires that we start to view military forces as a means to an end of mission accomplishment. As Cushman describes it, such a process uses "command-oriented thought...holistic in its view rather than partitioned...looks at function and logic rather than at directed organization and doctrine."⁶⁶ To achieve such thought requires that "contingency forces" be organized as a force - one organization which is led by a commander who knows the capabilities and limitations of his forces and is ready to fight those forces using "command-oriented thought."

The concept of organizing a standing JTF to respond to contingencies as part of restructured U.S. military forces has received recent attention. In his study of the Army's past, present, and future strategic formulation, COL Harry Rothman recommended that two JTFs be established in CONUS, assigned

contingency missions and apportioned to unified commands for planning.⁶⁷ Rothman's description of these JTFs as containing an Army corps, a Marine expeditionary force, an Air Force tactical air wing and the capabilities he espouses for these forces - rapidly deployable, lethal, survivable across the operational continuum, closely parallels the description of contingency forces provided by General Powell. Rothman's proposal for two JTFs provides flexibility, theater focus, and obviously provides a capability to respond to more than one contingency simultaneously. But while two JTFs may be preferable to one, the importance of the number pales in comparison to the concept, i.e., organizing our contingency forces as a single organization, capable of being tailored jointly to meet the unique requirements of rapidly developing contingencies as diverse as the Mayaguez operation, Urgent Fury or Just Cause. The JTF could serve as an independent force for a limited regional contingency, e.g., Urgent Fury, Just Cause or as the lead element of a larger force if required to deal with a major regional contingency, e.g., Desert Shield.

The number of JTFs and their precise organizational structure are beyond the scope of this paper. The concept that I propose is straightforward and simple - at least one standing JTF with the following characteristics:

- Organized in peacetime. Peacetime missions would be to plan, train and conduct exercises concentrating on the

operational and tactical levels of war. The JTF's mission would be preparedness to deploy any place at any time and fight and win under any conditions along the operational continuum.

- Capable of operations under the strategic direction of a unified CINC or if directed, under the strategic direction of the NCA.
- Staffed with "joint warriors," trained and skilled in the operational art, first in their parent service and subsequently in jointness.
- Forces assigned from each service or, if impractical, as in the case of naval assets, habitual relationships formed based on routine planning and training. The forces should be those with the contingency force characteristics described by General Powell in his statements before Congress (HASC and SASC).
- The commander and staff should be hand-picked based on their ability as proven warriors and ability to forego service parochialism and view forces from a holistic, functional perspective. The commander and staff must first be fluent in their parent service with a demonstrated record of competence.
- The JTF Headquarters should possess similar physical characteristics to the contingency forces it commands: light, rapidly deployable, maintained at a high state of readiness.

- To provide the readiness and focus needed, great care must be exercised to avoid assigning daily, routine missions and tasks to the JTF Commander and staff which are, as John Shy observed, dictated by "peacetime needs." Shy argues that in each of the first battles studied "realistic preparation and testing of senior commanders and their staffs for the complex, unnatural task of controlling large-scale combat can hardly be overemphasized."⁶⁸

CONCLUSION

The above is a tall order. As pointed out earlier, joint doctrine is only now beginning to emerge. Thus, to define exactly what the JTF Commander and staff should be able to do and how they should be organized will require a great deal of care and study. In his article on the Joint Specialist, General (Ret) William E. DePuy cited five opportunities for improvement and innovation in the joint arena which, when combined with lessons learned from past contingency operations would provide a good start point for defining what a JTF's capabilities should be:⁶⁹

- Raising the quality of joint military advice.
- Improving the U.S. record in operational art.
- Determining joint force requirements.
- Providing joint command and control over joint collateral support operations.
- Synchronizing cross-service support at the tactical level.

General DePuy concludes his article noting that there are limits to the scope of tactical jointness. This is most assuredly so. There are those who have argued for abolishing the Services as we know them and reorganizing them along the Canadian model.⁷⁰ Such radical measures are probably unworkable in our country, if for no other reason than our very culture and history creates a system of checks and balances within our Government (including the military establishment), owing to our suspicion and distrust of a powerful central government with a large, standing military and an armed forces general staff.

Thus, while recognizing that such radical ideas as combining the military services do not appear warranted, it is incumbent on the Nation's professional military establishment to heed the words of President Eisenhower (p. 9) and the advice of Congressman Nichols and prepare for war by organizing in peacetime for wartime. This can be accomplished by organizing our contingency forces in peacetime the way we'll most likely fight them in wartime - as a single entity, a standing Joint Task Force.

Until we're capable of achieving Clausewitz's advice and placing a genius in charge⁷¹ it is important to remember that true command is much more than technical communications, coordination, and management. Rather, it must be viewed as a continuous process which uses information to direct the organization in a decisive, focused way toward victory. This

process requires, as LTG (Ret) Cushman argues, "The Commander's sure hand on his forces."⁷² Such a "sure hand" cannot be provided by using a pick-up team. To avoid another first battle failure caused by weak command and control we must heed the lessons cited in this paper and prepare the Nation's contingency forces as a contingency force, under one commander who can, in the absence of genius, begin developing the "sure hand" now.

ENDNOTES

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11. Speech by President George Bush at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990.

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APPENDIX A

Summary of Joint Organizations. (Extracted from Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991, pp. 2-25, 2-26).

SUMMARY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS

	SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND	JOINT TASK FORCE	FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND
ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY		• SECRETARY OF DEFENSE • CINC OF US COMMAND • SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND • EXISTING JTF	UNIFIED COMMANDER, WHEN AUTHORIZED BY CJCS
MISSION CRITERIA		• SPECIFIC LIMITED OBJECTIVE • DOES NOT REQUIRE CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF LOGISTICS • REQUIRES CLOSE INTEGRATION OF EFFORT • REQUIRES COORDINATION OF LOCAL DEFENSE OF SUBORDINATE AREA	
COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES	• RECOMMEND PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF SERVICE FORCES • ACCOMPLISH OPERATIONAL MISSIONS • SELECT UNITS FOR ASSIGNMENT TO SUBORDINATE FORCES • CONDUCT JOINT TRAINING • INFORM CINC OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN LOGISTIC SUPPORT • UNDER CRISIS ACTION OR WARTIME, IMPLEMENT CINC'S LOGISTIC DIRECTIVES • DEVELOP PROGRAM AND BUDGET REQUESTS THAT COMPLY WITH CINC'S GUIDANCE • INFORM CINC OF PROGRAM AND BUDGET DECISIONS THAT AFFECT PLANNING • SERVICE FUNCTIONS: INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION AND DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS, SERVICE INTELLIGENCE • FURNISH FORCE DATA TO SUPPORT CINC-ASSIGNED MISSIONS	• RECOMMEND PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF ASSIGNED FORCES • ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED OPERATIONAL MISSIONS • JOINTLY TRAIN ASSIGNED FORCES	• PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES • ACCOMPLISHING ASSIGNED OPERATIONAL MISSIONS • JOINT TRAINING
FORCES	• ALL SERVICE INDIVIDUALS, UNITS, DETACHMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND INSTALLATIONS UNDER THE COMMAND ASSIGNED TO THE UNIFIED COMMAND	• ASSIGNED FORCES OF TWO OR MORE SERVICES ON A SIGNIFICANT SCALE • ASSIGNED BY ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY	• NORMALLY, BUT NOT NECESSARILY, FORCES OF TWO OR MORE SERVICES
AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDER		• EXERCISES OPCON THROUGH ASSIGNED & ATTACHED FORCES	• EXERCISES OPCON THROUGH ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED FORCES IN PEACETIME OR WARTIME
NOTES	• COMMANDER IS SENIOR OFFICER OF SERVICE SELECTED WITH CONCURRENCE OF CINC	• JTF IS DISSOLVED WHEN PURPOSE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED • COMMANDER MAY BE A SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDER SELECTED WITH CONCURRENCE OF CINC	• PERFORMS OPERATIONAL MISSIONS OF LONG OR SHORT DURATION • COMMANDER DESIGNATED BY ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY MAY BE SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDER SELECTED WITH CONCURRENCE OF CINC

SUMMARY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS

	UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND	SPECIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND	SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND
ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY	PRESIDENT THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WITH ADVICE & ASSISTANCE OF CJCS	PRESIDENT THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WITH THE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE OF CJCS	UNIFIED COMMANDER, WHEN AUTHORIZED BY CJCS
MISSION CRITERIA	EITHER OR BOTH • BROAD CONTINUING MISSION TWO OR MORE SERVICES SINGLE STRATEGIC DIRECTION • TWO OR MORE SERVICES WITH COMBINATION OF (1) LARGE-SCALE OPERATION LARGE & COMPLEX FORCE REQUIRES CONTROL OF TACTICAL EXECUTION (2) LARGE AREA SINGLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATION (3) COMMON USE OF LIMITED LOGISTICS	• BROAD CONTINUING MISSION	• CONDUCT OPERATIONS ON A CONTINUING BASIS PER CRITERIA OF A UNIFIED COMMAND
COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES	• MAINTAIN SECURITY OF THE COMMAND AND PROTECT THE U.S. • MAINTAIN PREPAREDNESS TO CARRY OUT ASSIGNED MISSIONS • CARRY OUT ASSIGNED MISSIONS • ASSIGN TASKS AND DIRECT COORDINATION TO ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT • COMMUNICATE WITH SERVICES, SECDEF, & SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS • ADVISE CJCS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS THAT OCCUR IN AOR	• SAME RESPONSIBILITIES AS UNIFIED COMMANDER	• RESPONSIBILITIES SIMILAR TO THE UNIFIED COMMANDER'S
FORCES	• SIGNIFICANT ASSIGNED FORCES OF TWO OR MORE SERVICES	• NORMALLY COMPOSED OF FORCES OF ONE SERVICE • MAY INCLUDE UNITS FROM OTHER SERVICES IF A LONG-TERM ASSIGNMENT, UNIFIED COMMAND WOULD NORMALLY BE ESTABLISHED	• SIGNIFICANT ASSIGNED FORCES OF TWO OR MORE SERVICES
AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDER	OPERATIONAL COMMAND, I.E., • GIVE AUTHORITATIVE DIRECTION FOR LOGISTICS/JOINT TRAINING • PRESCRIBE CHAIN OF COMMAND • ORGANIZE COMMANDS/FORCES • EMPLOY FORCES • ASSIGN COMMAND FUNCTIONS • COORDINATE/APPROVE ADMIN & SUPPORT • SELECT COMMANDERS & STAFF • IN AN EMERGENCY, ASSUME OPCON OF ALL FORCES IN AREA • IN AN UNUSUAL SITUATION, MAY EXERCISE DIRECT OPCON OF SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS	• SAME AS UNIFIED COMMANDER'S EXCEPT NO AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH A SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND	• SIMILAR TO UNIFIED COMMAND WITHIN THE ASSIGNED AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
NOTES	• EXERCISES OPCOM THROUGH SERVICE COMPONENTS FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS SINGLE-SERVICE FORCES JOINT TASK FORCES ATTACHING ELEMENTS OF ONE FORCE TO ANOTHER AND DIRECTLY TO SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL FORCES • COMMANDER'S STAFF KEY STAFF POSITIONS REPRESENTED BY SERVICES ASSIGNED • BALANCED BY COMPOSITION OF FORCES & CHARACTER OF OPERATIONS	• EXERCISES OPCOM THROUGH SERVICE COMPONENTS FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS SINGLE-SERVICE FORCES JOINT TASK FORCES AND ATTACHING ELEMENTS OF ONE FORCE TO ANOTHER • COMMANDER'S STAFF MAY INCLUDE REPRESENTATION FROM OTHER SERVICES	• EXERCISES OPCOM THROUGH SERVICE COMPONENTS SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS SINGLE-SERVICE FORCES JOINT TASK FORCES ATTACHING ELEMENTS OF ONE FORCE TO ANOTHER AND DIRECTLY TO SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL FORCES