The Fulcrum of Necessity: Strategic Planning Before Pearl Harbor

Abstract

This thesis is a historical analysis of the evolution of strategic planning in the United States during the years 1919-1941. It examines the interwar genesis of U.S. strategic culture, and focuses on three aspects: structure, process, and products. Army, Navy, and joint planning agencies, as well as their interrelationships, are analyzed. Within the military, the planning process was limited throughout the interwar years by a lack of national policy guidance. Moreover, the joint planning process was hindered by a lack of executive authority and inattention to the production and incorporation of strategic intelligence information. The products of interwar planning efforts were increasingly sophisticated strategic plans and, more importantly, a corps of strategists who were subsequently able to craft the winning strategy for World War II. The study concludes that despite its ad hoc origins, the American planning structure produced successful strategic thinkers and concepts, and the interwar years provided the seminal impetus for the development of joint planning.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 1990
Accession Number
ADA239386

Entities

People

  • Keith V. Adolphson

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Doctrine
  • Foreign Policy
  • Foreign Relations
  • Geography
  • Military Intelligence
  • Military Science
  • National Security
  • Naval Operations
  • Naval Warfare
  • Navy
  • Recreation
  • Second World War
  • Students
  • Treaties
  • United States
  • War Colleges

Readers

  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Strategic Security Studies
  • Systems Analysis and Design