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Marine Corps Long - Range Plan (MLRP) 2000 - 2020

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
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Subj: MARINE CORPS LONG-RANGE PLAN (MLRP)

1. The Marine Corps Long-Range Plan sets forth guidance, concepts, and goals to accomplish statutory missions in support of strategic objectives in the long-range period (2000-2020). The plan is designed to be read by all Marines, as well as to be used by planners. It provides a vision for our Corps and what has to be done to ensure the Marine Corps is the world's premier expeditionary force-in-readiness in the 21st century.

2. As we study this plan, we should remember that the performance of Marines today did not just happen. It is the result of the vision of our predecessors and the persistence and initiative of countless Marines. I am confident our vision for the future is on the mark. Make it happen.

3. This plan is effective upon receipt. I encourage all readers to comment on its content. Comments should be addressed to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (WF 10).

A. M. GRAY
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps



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A MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) beyond the year 2000 will remain self-contained, combined arms warfighting organizations. The entire force will be more expeditionary -- lighter, more mobile, more capable for conducting a wide range of military operations across the spectrum of conflict. We will be a true general purpose force.

In the approaching years of defense budget austerity, the Navy and Marine Corps will not be able to do everything that previous plans had proposed. MAGTFs will remain the nation's "force of choice" for expeditionary operations. Accordingly, we must maintain our operational focus and institutional ethos as soldiers of the sea.

Future MAGTFs will train as they intend to fight. Individual Marines will be more capable than ever before, by virtue of enhanced Marine boot camp or Basic School training with additional combat skills training and professional military education (PME) that continues throughout their active service. Prowess in executing individual and small unit actions will remain the hallmark of Marines.

The Nation's most versatile means of forcible entry will be improved by the attainment of a complete over-the-horizon (OTH) amphibious assault capability, the capability to land a MAGTF on a hostile shore from 25 nautical miles or more, at night and in adverse weather. In the conduct of an amphibious raid, the reach of a MAGTF will be extended to 400 nautical miles -- in and out in the same night. The Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team will remain the most effective means for maintaining presence, projecting power, and sustaining forces ashore wherever our nation requires.


A. M. GRAY
General, U.S. Marine Corps

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MARINE CORPS LONG-RANGE PLAN (MLRP)

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SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE

The Marine Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP) defines the future goals of the Marine Corps. This document guides changes to future force structure and directs the research and development effort during the long-range period (2000-2020). It is a key document in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, and an integral part of the Concept Based Requirements System. The Marine Corps' warfighting concepts describe the future operations of the Marine Corps for the National Command Authorities, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commanders, and the Fleet Marine Forces.

The MLRP is designed as a readable, working document for planners. It is derived from the broad planning guidance of the Marine Corps Campaign Plan (MCCP). The MLRP provides the Marine Corps' long-range goals to the mid-range planners. The mid-range planners translate these goals into achievable objectives in the MAGTF Master Plan (MMP). The objectives are translated into capabilities in the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM).

2. **METHODOLOGY.** Research of numerous possible future

environments was conducted to determine the world order in the 2000-2020 time frame. Research postulated a multipolar world as the most probable world environment. The goal of this methodology is to project a possible future, not to predict one nor to forecast any possible environment.

3. **ORGANIZATION.** The MLRP contains eight sections. Section 1, Introduction, specifies the purpose, methodology, organization, and basic assumptions that were used to develop the plan. Section 2, World Environment, portrays the world envisioned for the year 2020. Section 3 provides a Threat Assessment which describes global and regional threats that affect the future national security environment. Section 4 describes the future National Security Environment, along with the Marine Corps' role and missions. The Warfighting Concepts of 2020 in Section 5 describe expeditionary maneuver warfare. Section 6, Organization, describes the core values which will guide future Marine Corps force structure development. Section 7, Technology, contains technological trends that will influence force development. The final section, Section 8, lists a number of Marine Corps' Goals required to meet future challenges.

4. **BASIC ASSUMPTIONS.** The following assumptions form the basis for the MLRP:

The fundamental national security objective will be to preserve the U.S. as a free nation with its institutions and values intact.

The U.S. will remain a leading power in world affairs, and will continue to pursue a foreign policy which promotes its security, territorial integrity, and economic well-being.

The Marine Corps' mission, as prescribed in the National Security Act of 1947 (amended), will remain unchanged.

SECTION 2

WORLD ENVIRONMENT

1. MULTI-POLAR WORLD OF 2020

Description

The world of 2020 will be characterized by the need for stability between nations. World stability will be the responsibility of the major powers of the time and a function of all elements of national power - economic, political, and military. The decline in the influence of the bipolar superpowers and the economic and military rise of other countries will create a world of multiple major powers, each with a strong but differing influence on world order. U.S. concern with budget and domestic priorities, world trade frictions, unequal distribution of global wealth, technological acceleration, disparate demographic trends, ethnic divisions, and separatist tendencies, will result in a world characterized by rising nationalism.

The major powers are forecasted to be the European Community, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Other countries, like China and a united Korea, also may have the potential to become a major power. Each of these countries will possess some combination of political, economic, and/or military strength to qualify as a major power.

The nonmajor powers in 2020 will consist of regional powers, developing nations, and the lesser or Fourth World countries. The regional powers and the developing nations are exactly what their names imply. However, the Fourth World countries are characterized as those nations which are poverty stricken, lack an industrial base, do not possess significant raw materials, and rely heavily on foreign aid. This reliance on others for their basic needs will create a feeling of disenfranchisement and be a source of unrest for the world community.

By the year 2020, the world population will be about 150 percent of current levels. Eighty percent of the population will live in the developing areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The patterns of migration will shift populations away from the heartlands toward the coasts with an attendant increase in urbanization. As much as fifty percent of the world's population may live in urban areas, and most of these areas will be on or near the seas. In many of these developing countries, population shifts will place an increased strain on already overburdened economies and social welfare systems.

Demographics will profoundly affect the consumption of both food and energy, and will be a causal factor in regional disputes. The industrial nations will have an increased need for both energy and raw materials. Regional conflicts could disrupt access to these essential resources and to world markets producing a regional situation with global implications. Accordingly, maintaining regional stability represents the greatest global challenge.

A summary description of the Multi-Polar World Environment is contained in Chart 2-1.

MULTI-POLAR WORLD SUMMARY

	U.S.	SOVIET UNION	EUROPEAN COMMUNITY	JAPAN
POLITICAL	No permanent alliances; seeks to balance or negate blocs among other great powers	Political instability, but at subdued level; Soviet Union moving toward democratic reforms; WTO abolished, Soviets ally with Europe, US and others on different issues	United under European Community; Germany unified and reduced military strength; Europe acts as single political entity; U.S. exercises little political influence in internal issues.	Nationalistic government that leads a coalition of Pacific rim nations in foreign affairs; Operates as independent international power, aligning with other powers on different issues
ECONOMIC	Economic interests dominant; trade disputes with Europe a major concern	Economic reforms hold; Soviet economy dependent on world trade; consumer goods prevalent; moderate economic growth	High economic integration; Generally high rates of economic growth independent European defense industry competes with that of U.S.	Economically integrated with other Pacific Rim nations; supports major defense industry that competes with Europe, USSR and the United States
MILITARY	Limited forward deployment forces; reduced military; emphasis on rapid deployment of flexible forces	Smaller, modernized conventional forces; no forward deployments other than allied; potent nuclear capabilities.	Integrated European command structure without U.S.; European nuclear forces built around French and British nuclear forces; no U.S. forces in Europe	Assumes defense responsibilities, including nuclear capability; military forces have some projection power within 1000 miles of home islands

CHART 2-1

Economic Implications

Economic interdependency, competition, and cooperation will characterize the multipolar world. Free enterprise will form the foundation of the world's economy. Economic partnerships, similar to 20th century military alliances, will develop. These economic relationships will not only require the major powers to compete with each other for resources, but will also require mutual cooperation to ensure global peace and access to resources and world markets.

Economic interests will be the dominant concern for the major powers. The economic conditions within Eastern Europe will have improved steadily, and their economies will be dependent on world trade, with consumer goods being the prevalent items. They will move toward integration with the rest of the European Community, and will become eventually part of the integrated European defense industry that will compete with the United States. The Pacific Rim nations will also have an integrated economic community and will also compete within the defense industry. The United States' economic difficulties resulting from its debt structure will decrease its ability to influence the world market, and to a degree, will degrade its ability to compete in the high technology market place.

Many nations will carry debt burdens of such magnitude that they will be virtually

insolvent, and considered poor risks within the world market place. Poverty will remain endemic in the Fourth World countries. Widespread unemployment, especially in the growing urban areas, will result in an ever widening gap between the "haves and have nots." Countries unable to meet the expectations of the poor will risk internal disorder.

Political Implications

The economic interdependence between nations will normally inhibit unilateral action in the multipolar world. Although most low intensity conflicts have potential for global escalation, economic interests could have global implications. Major powers, once involved, will attempt to terminate hostilities quickly to prevent escalation, and return to a condition of economic stability.

International alignments will shift as the major powers strive to ensure global security. The Warsaw Pact and NATO military alliances may not exist as they do today. Alliances will be less permanent and will shift between the major powers or other nations in response to evolving mutual interests and concern over changes in the overall balance of world power. This shifting will tend to be more along political and economic lines than military lines as major powers and other nations compete for resources, trade, access, and influence.

Nations will work to avoid extreme shifts in the balance of power that would have global implications, and could lead to global warfare.

Rivalries and conflict within the developing nations and Fourth World countries may evolve into major competition, and sometimes, into conflict. Ideological, religious, and ethnic differences could lead to regional conflicts, have global implications, but probably would not escalate into global war.

Military Implications

High technology weapons could be employed at all levels of future conflict. The major powers, as well as some regional powers, will possess nuclear weapon and delivery means enabling them to destroy the social-political structure of any rival. All regional powers will have weapons capable of destroying the social-political structures of any nation in their respective regions. Other high technology weapons, such as ballistic and cruise missiles and chemical weapons, will have proliferated among the nonmajor powers. Strategic deterrence will continue to be vitally important to maintaining global stability.

Economic interdependence and competing interests of the major powers will restrict our ability to use overseas bases. Access to facilities in other nations will be transient and restricted to specific purposes through prior arrangements.

Defense planning must consider these issues carefully. Access to facilities, like alliances, will be temporary and focused.

Military manpower resources will increase in the Fourth World countries. Although the United States will face an initial decline in its manpower base early in the next century, a small increase will begin in 2010.

Despite this upturn, fewer male and female youths will likely be available for military service. Male recruits will be older; female recruits will be younger. Females will perform in an increasingly wide variety of occupations and assignments traditionally performed by males. The largest minority/ethnic increase in the United States will be among Hispanics, who will constitute 14 percent of the Nation's population.

2. TECHNOLOGY

Technological advances in agriculture, medicine, and manufacturing will improve the quality of life for almost all nations. Longer life expectancy will impact on a growing world population. Multi-national corporations and individual countries will establish centers of advanced technology research, development, and production. These technology hubs will offset the high cost of technology development, reduce the technology race, and help proliferate technology world-

wide. Even with this scientific cooperation, global tension and regional conflict will continue as not all countries will have access to the benefits of advanced technologies.

Technological advancements will not be limited to the major powers. Both regional and developing nations will endeavor to obtain the latest technology regardless of the sacrifice in order to bolster their international status. The proliferation of technology will lead to battlefield parity among many nations. Additionally, terrorist organizations will have access to a wider variety of modern weapons with a far greater lethality than today's systems.

The military application of advanced technology will produce improved weapon performance and increased lethality for military forces. Applied technology will enable a smaller force of the future to achieve greater combat power than current forces. Weapons of mass destruction will expand to include biotechnology, directed energy, and other energy forms. Robotics will augment or replace humans at many tasks.

Space systems will play an increasingly important role in military operations for all major and some regional powers. Nations will exploit space systems for real-time tactical information collection, improved tactical communications, and high value target acquisition. These systems will make the world

relatively transparent. This transparency will make strategic or operational surprise nearly impossible, putting a premium on such things as tactical surprise, speed, stealth, deception, and firepower. It will impact on both the deployments of ground and air forces, and on individual naval platforms. Therefore, stealth/signature reduction technology is needed not only for air and ground systems, but also in shipbuilding.

Economic and political conditions will determine the extent to which any nation can afford and apply technology to modernize their armed forces. Technology will be expensive but represent a national investment. Technology development should be guided towards those functional areas which provide significant advantage or high return for the investment. Technologies which will challenge our adversaries weaknesses must be vigorously explored. Technologies which simply match our adversaries strengths must be carefully reviewed.

SECTION 3

THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. OVERVIEW

The threat facing the United States during the period 2000-2020 will be a global threat. As a maritime nation, with global interests, U.S. forces must be prepared to meet any threat worldwide. Although regional instabilities and conflict will most probably not escalate into global war, they could have global implications and challenge U.S. interests. Most conflicts will be at the low to mid-intensity level.

Terrorist activity will continue through the period as nations and organizations maintain that terrorism is an effective way to "wage war." The United States, as well as the other powers, will devote considerable resources -- political, economic, and ultimately, military to maintaining a stable world order.

2. REGIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT

The economic, political, and military conditions which contribute to instability, as well as general military capabilities, are identified by geographic area.

Middle East

Factors affecting the threat will include the continued oil dependency of industrial nations, internal and regional conflicts, Arab-Israeli relations, weapons proliferation, and terrorism.

Inter-regional conflicts will result from oil production capacity limits, pricing policies, and the quest for regional hegemony. Splinter nations could band together against other nations to gain power and resources. Intra-regional conflict precipitated by religious and political rivalries will continue but will unlikely require U.S. intervention. Arab-Israeli relations, and U.S. support to Israel, will continue to be a source of confrontation in this area. Israeli military power in terms of sophisticated weapons technology and nuclear weapons will support its position as a regional power.

Low to high intensity conflict could occur in the Middle East. Intervention by the major powers may be necessary to protect national or world interests should an individual nation or group of states band together to gain power or control energy resources. It is unlikely that the major powers will choose to get involved militarily in internal conflicts unless these

conflicts impact on access to energy resources. The proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons will pose a major threat to military forces employed in the area. Several nations will possess a regional nuclear delivery capability by 2020. Conventional conflict will include large scale state-of-the-art armor formations heavily supported by artillery, sophisticated offensive air, and integrated air defense.

The Middle East will continue to be a launch point for terrorist activity directed against the U.S. and the rest of the Western World. Terrorist activity can be expected to change from its current targeting of individuals and independent activities such as single aircraft, to sabotage of the infrastructures of the West, such as powerplants and water supplies.

Africa

The current economic and social problems plaguing most of northern Africa are expected to continue. Poverty, famine, and disease (primarily AIDS) will continue to ravage the population and be a growing problem to existing governments. The economic, political, and military status of these nations is not expected to improve or change significantly. Any conflict will be internal; low to mid-intensity with no direct threat to the U.S. anticipated.

Libya, Egypt, and Algeria will continue to be the most modern of the northern African nations primarily due to oil revenues. These countries will pose the main military threat in the area and be possible sites of low to mid-intensity conflict. These nations will have conventional military capabilities ranging from large numbers of sophisticated armor, artillery, and fixed-wing aircraft to limited air defense. In addition, there will be a threat of chemical warfare and possibly, a nuclear weapons delivery capability within the region.

Southern Africa will emerge as a regional power bloc by 2020. Internal political stability may be achieved by the end of the period. South Africa may have a multi-racial society capable of undertaking major economic development. Other nations in the region such as Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zaire will develop as major agricultural and mineral resource centers. The combination of the industrial capabilities of South Africa and the resource base of the other Southern African nations is likely to make the area a regional power.

Militarily, Southern Africa will be strong due to the armaments capabilities of South Africa and the combat seasoned troops within the region. South Africa will possess an out-of-region nuclear weapons capability by 2020. Conventional force capabilities will consist of armor, artillery, fighter aircraft and attack helicopters, and limited air

defense. The region is likely to suffer pockets of instability as traditional leaders lose influence on an emerging economically progressive society. Soviet influence in this region is expected to remain strong as past military ties are likely to provide an entree into economic development opportunities.

Central America and Cuba

The economic and political preconditions of insurgency and regional instability will be present in the smaller Central American nations. By 2020, Mexico will achieve political and economic stability. Mexico, the U.S., and Canada may form a regional trade bloc.

Post-Castro Cuba is not anticipated to be a future conflict area. It may become more isolated as aid is not forthcoming from the economically depressed Soviets. Conversely, Cuba may seek to merge economically with a regional power. Cuba will remain an independent country due to its strong sense of nationalism. Exiled Cubans will probably return. These repatriated citizens could encourage Cuba to establish economic ties with other nations.

Political instability, insurgent actions, and border conflicts are likely to fuel low intensity conflict in the Central American region. These activities are likely to take place in Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Nations will attempt to solve

these conflicts internally, rejecting major power intervention. U.S. and Soviet arming of the Central American countries with sophisticated weapons is unlikely. If military action is required, U.S. forces can expect to face conventional weaponry based on late 20th century technology.

South America

South America will suffer from the continuing debt crisis, insurgency actions, political instability, and the effects of narcotics trafficking. Due to the nature of the conditions and types of problems in this area, conflict is expected to be low intensity. Political instability fostered by economic conditions and insurgent activity will continue in all countries but primarily in Peru, Argentina, and Colombia. Resolution of the region's debt will not take place until at least 2005.

Regional power will reside with Brazil and Argentina. It is anticipated that both nations will possess nuclear weapons technology and a delivery capability by 2020. Other countries in the region including Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela can be expected to possess sophisticated conventional weapons. Although there will be almost no regional capability to engage in full-scale war, the region will be able to deploy modern weapons technology to include armor, artillery, fixed-wing air, and air defense.

The current and near-term counternarcotics efforts will force traffickers to realign operations. The lack of public support for the long-term commitment of funds and manpower to the war on drugs will result in either an increased mid-term effort to eradicate drugs or major pharmaceutical advances toward preventive treatment of addiction. In either case, the U.S. narcotics problem will be ameliorated by 2020.

Asia

Asian nations are likely to pose a serious threat to U.S. interests. Several nations can be expected to band together and become a major power based primarily on economic strength, technological prowess, and political stability. Japan may garner the support of nations such as China, the Koreas, Singapore and the other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries in forming a regional trade bloc. A reunited Korea may emerge based on popular support and economic need. A united China could result as Taiwan seeks to join in the economic benefits of the Asian region.

Japan will have a major influence on international activities. Japanese self interests will require a larger military force, overseas deployment, and advanced weaponry. Partnership with China will provide resources and manpower in exchange for shared technology. Political instability in China will be resolved with the passing of

the current regime. The repossession of Hong Kong in 1997 will not only provide needed capital for development, but also inroads into world markets. With Japanese assistance, China will have made significant progress in correcting their technological deficiencies by 2020.

Conflict in the region can be expected to consist of border disputes, continuing political instability, and limited insurgency operations. Reunification of the Koreas is a possibility, but the potential for conflict in this area remains high. Border disputes between China and India, and China and Vietnam, can be expected. Political instability and insurgency operations are likely in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma. U.S. assistance in these areas will be limited to providing military equipment and political support. However, U.S. forces could be used to evacuate U.S. citizens.

The region has a sophisticated military capability which is expected to grow. In addition to advanced conventional weaponry, chemical and biological warfare, and out-of-region nuclear strike capabilities, Asian nations will explore the use of space for military and commercial purposes. Asia has an unmatched potential for economic, technical, and military power.

Southwest Asia

Southwest Asia will remain a major site of regional conflict through 2020. Conflict will result from control of access to the area's energy resources required by industrialized nations, fundamentalist differences, and border disputes. India and Pakistan will have border skirmishes and suffer internal strife. Hostilities between Iran and Iraq are likely. The area will be the site of major power struggles for influence and control of resources. Despite instability, countries in the region will advance technologically. Conflicts in the region will range from low to high intensity. The military threat faced by U.S. forces will range from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons to sophisticated conventional weaponry including armor, artillery, fixed-wing air, and air defense.

Western Europe

The European community is expected to become an economic power bloc following formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1992. By 2005, problem areas such as trade practices and partnerships will be resolved. Political disputes between Germany and France or Great Britain are expected to continue. Although these countries will remain politically independent, problems will be resolved with a view toward strengthening the EEC. U.S. intervention in

Europe is not expected. Military capabilities will include sophisticated conventional weaponry and nuclear weapons.

Eastern Europe

Eastern European nations will achieve limited advancement. The area will experience widespread instability and increasing debt as it adjusts to political independence. Struggles between political factions and nationalistic blocks are expected, as are the resumption of regional disputes over borders. Economic depression will fuel these disputes in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Eventually, Eastern European countries are likely to become members of the EEC. Economic development is expected to progress slowly as Western technology and techniques are assimilated.

Without Soviet assistance, the region will have a limited military capability consisting of older Soviet weapons technology. Despite its age, conventional weapons will range from artillery and armor to fixed-wing air and air defense. By 2015, Eastern European nations may have the manufacturing capability and economic power to upgrade military forces.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union will suffer the consequences of restructuring into the 21st century. Although current disputes are likely to result in a loose federation of independent states, instability, and regional disagreements are expected to continue. As in Eastern Europe, historical border differences are likely as are confrontations over religious differences. Political instability will continue. Economic or political gains are unlikely until late in the period. Despite these problems, the Soviets will pose the primary military threat to the U.S. in terms of nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities.

3. TERRORISM

Acts of terrorism will likely increase in both frequency and lethality. Many nations and organizations will use terrorism as an effective way to "wage war" against governments, other nations, and various political and religious groups. U.S. citizens, particularly those serving or traveling abroad, will be at risk.

State-sponsored terrorism will present a serious threat to national security. It will not only disrupt diplomacy, trade and travel, but also challenge the ability of democratic governments to protect their citizens. State-sponsorship provides support

for a terrorist operation to succeed. Sponsors provide safe havens, travel documents, operational intelligence, weapons, training and money. In return, the terrorist groups offer sponsors the capability to attack selected targets with impunity. The possibility of terrorist groups employing weapons of mass destruction will pose an ominous threat.

Soviet support to terrorist groups should decrease. Control of these groups will shift to any sponsor willing to provide required support.

SECTION 4

NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

1. **OVERVIEW.** The national security environment in the period 2000-2020 will be shaped by emerging regional powers, economic interdependence, and fierce competition for resources. These factors combine to create a dynamic and uncertain world. U.S. interests will be global and U.S. military strategy will have a global focus. The U.S. must have the means to ensure conflicting ideologies are resolved peacefully or with a minimum of force. The U.S. may have to act to ensure all nations have unimpeded access to critical resources and world markets. Often the U.S. action will be in the form of military presence or commitment of military forces.

A foreign policy to maintain global stability reflects the maritime nature of national interests--unimpeded access to critical resources. The absence of overseas bases places a greater responsibility on forward afloat forces which often will be the only military forces available for timely commitment.

2. **NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES.** National security objectives are to ensure the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation; promote a healthy and growing economy to ensure opportunity at home and abroad;

encourage a stable and secure world with political and religious freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions; and to pursue cooperative relations with allies and friendly nations.

3. **NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.** In the past, the policy of containment of the spread of Soviet communism led to a European centered continental strategy. In the future, the national policy will focus on maintaining global stability resulting in a stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests. U.S. strategy emanating from a policy of world stability must be flexible and reflect the necessity to project globally a wide range of national military power. In an uncertain world, missions ranging from peacetime presence to the commitment of large-scale conventional and strategic forces require the integrated use of all elements of national military power. Accordingly, the national military strategy will be maritime in character, integrate all aspects of national military power, and emphasize global power projection.

4. INTEGRATED MARITIME STRATEGY

The integrated maritime strategy enables the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy in a dynamic and uncertain environment. The integrated maritime strategy differs from the current use of the term "maritime strategy", which in reality is used to describe the naval campaign as part of a continental strategy. The integrated maritime strategy depends on traditional control of the sea and the ability to provide strategic deterrence, but emphasizes the projection of power.

Military power is configured for regional application in a precise manner using the appropriate mix of forces. The Nation is able to draw from a pool of integrated capabilities and forge the type of force appropriate for a specific situation or objective. Although configured for regional application, the strategy is inextricably tied to the ability to project globally all elements of national military power. Elements of the integrated maritime strategy include -

- **Strategic Deterrence.** Strategic deterrence will continue to rest on the Nuclear Triad. The threat of nuclear retaliation has preserved the security of the United States and its allies and will continue as a deterrent. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will shift deterrence to a greater reliance on strategic defenses. As nuclear

proliferation increases, SDI will become more of an imperative for the security of the U.S.

- Power Projection

The U.S. must maintain a credible maritime power projection capability to protect its vital interests. Given the decreasing global support for U.S. basing and overflight rights, maritime forces often will be the only forces available for timely commitment. Forward naval forces deter both nuclear and conventional conflict and, if committed, provide a variety of power projection options. The combined-arms capability, mobility, and the self-sustaining nature of integrated Navy and Marine forces are essential elements of U.S. power projection and will be increasingly important to maintain the ability to deter and wage war.

Maritime forces represent a flexible force-in-readiness whose aggregate usefulness to the Nation includes -

- o Flexible employment options across the spectrum of conflict from peacetime presence to global war.

- o Timely response to a large variety of crisis situations.

- o The ability to deploy to a wide range of geographically dispersed areas.

- o The ability to loiter in an area without commitment.

o A forcible entry capability.

- Sea Control

Sea control is the third aspect of an integrated maritime strategy. The sea will remain the principal means to move large forces and cargo. Control of the sea denies an enemy and also permits U.S. forces access to certain sea areas vital to national interests. Any conflict, which requires U.S. military intervention will likely compel the movement of military forces and equipment across vast bodies of open ocean and through restricted Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). The capability to establish and maintain sea control is critical to U.S. national security in military and economic terms.

Protecting our ties with allies and the sources of our economic lifelines require -

o Keeping the sea lanes clear of threats.

o Neutralizing sources of attack.

o Denying effective maritime operations to hostile powers.

o Moving goods, ground, and air forces when necessary.

5. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL MILITARY POWER. The most frequent test of our strategy will be to deter regional conflicts by all means ranging

from diplomacy to the timely application of military power. The United States deters attacks by making it clear to potential aggressors that threats to the U.S. or its interests cannot be successful. The use of force would result in consequences unacceptable to a potential enemy. Should deterrence fail, the United States will employ a wide range of options, and attempt to control the escalation and duration of conflict.

6. ROLE OF THE MARINE CORPS.

The Marine Corps will remain the NATIONAL FORCE-IN-READINESS. The increased emphasis on the maritime component of an integrated strategy and the necessity of combat power projection from the sea brings into sharp focus the importance of "soldiers of the sea." Future requirements for versatile, expeditionary, and combat ready forces will increase.

- Mission. The military Services are organized, trained, and equipped to perform specific combatant functions (roles and missions) which Congress has elected to define in law. The statutory basis for these combatant functions is the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and codified in Title 10, U.S. Code. The law prescribes that the Marine Corps will include "...not less than three combat divisions, and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine

Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps...shall perform such other duties as the President may direct."

- Tasks. To carry out its' functions in an unstable and uncertain world, the Marine Corps will be prepared to:

- o Conduct landing force operations, including forcible entry, at all levels of conflict up to and including general war.

- o Conduct land operations as part of a naval campaign, including the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases, destroying the enemy's bases and means of support, controlling chokepoints on sea lines of communication, and conducting air operations in support of the fleet.

- o Conduct presence and political reinforcement operations, including intervention, as an adjunct of naval power projection.

- o Conduct operations using maritime and/or geographic prepositioning in concert with airlift or fast sealift.

- o Provide maritime force projection capabilities in support of a continental

campaign.

- o Provide security forces in support of the Department of State at designated embassies, consulates, and legations.

- o Provide forces in support of counterterrorist operations.

- o Provide forces in support of counternarcotic operations.

- o Provide forces capable of operating in river environments and in training and supporting nation-building endeavors.

Additional tasks will be identified as national security needs change. The trend toward lower levels of conflict suggests increased emphasis on maritime special operations, military assistance operations, and unconventional warfare.

SECTION 5

WARFIGHTING CONCEPTS

1. **EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE.** The Marine Corps will be structured to fight in an austere environment using a warfighting doctrine emphasizing rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. As an expeditionary, combined arms force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps must be able to rapidly deploy and operate in support of national security objectives. The fundamental principal in which Marine forces are organized for combat is flexibility to respond with combat power tailored to any contingency. It is required more in the future than ever before. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force concept will be the basis for how the Marine Corps will fight on the future battlefield.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Concept. The Marine Corps organization for combat is the MAGTF, a combined arms organization structured to exploit the synergy inherent in closely integrated air and ground operations. MAGTFs will range in size from small special purpose forces (SPFs) to Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs), and will be task-organized to accomplish specific missions. Fundamental to success on the future battlefield will be the MAGTF's -

- Strategic, operational, and tactical mobility.

- Enhanced combined arms capability.

- Viable command, control, and communications and intelligence (C³I) capability in the fast moving, uncertain conditions of the future battlefield.

Expeditionary Environment

The requirement for a global focus will place a number of significant demands on Marine Corps operations such as the -

- Ability for leaders at every level to plan for, operate in, and seize opportunities in an uncertain environment.

- Need for rapid deployment means.

- Requirement for lighter, more lethal forces which emphasize advanced stealth technology.

- Ability to operate under austere conditions.

- Need for improved tactical mobility.

- Requirement for forces which are easily sustained.

- Need for better regional awareness, to include a knowledge of "cultural terrain" (i.e., language, religion, political factors, etc.,).

Maneuver Warfare

Maneuver warfare orients on the enemy and is equally adaptable to amphibious assaults and subsequent operations ashore. Maneuver warfare is particularly appropriate in environments of uncertainty. The Corps' ability to conduct maneuver warfare will continue to improve as training is enhanced, force structure is modified, and advanced equipment is acquisitioned. These efforts will be vital given the lethality and proliferation of high tech weaponry.

Enemy strength is avoided. A defender cannot demonstrate strength at all assailable points simultaneously; a fact which takes on greater importance on the expanded battlefield. Emphasis is on exploiting enemy weak points (gaps) by aggressive intelligence collection. It requires full exploitation of every available intelligence collection asset (including space-based assets external to the MAGTF).

On the uncertain battlefield, the principles of maneuver warfare include tactical mobility, operational speed, and operational flexibility. Tactical mobility provides the freedom to maneuver rapidly. When combined with firepower, it achieves a positional advantage over the enemy. Operational speed (op tempo) allows the commander to seize the initiative, shape the battle, and keep the enemy off

balance. By decentralizing decision making, gathering and processing intelligence rapidly, and observing, orienting, deciding, and acting faster than the enemy, the enemy's cohesion is effected. It creates confusion, panic, paralysis, and loss of the will to resist.

The foundation of operational flexibility is the application of combined arms. A MAGTF task-organized with appropriate combined arms will present the enemy with a dilemma. Actions taken by the enemy to counter one element of combined arms results in becoming vulnerable to another element.

2. DEPLOYMENT

Sequential Application of Power

Strategic mobility defines the sequential application of military power into the theater of operations. It defines not only the timeliness and scope of the initial response, but also the time required for reinforcing capabilities to arrive in theater.

The sequential application of power is not a step-by-step process. Rather, it represents a logical flow of specific capabilities into a crisis area. Commanders in Chief (CinCs) must be able to rapidly flow appropriate military power to the crisis region and build up that power to control crisis escalation and establish situational stability. The key to crisis deterrence is rapid

closure.

Marines will continue to deploy as amphibious forces, using amphibious sealift, as air contingency forces and maritime prepositioned forces using strategic airlift, or a combination of strategic airlift and prepositioned equipment and supplies. Each has distinct advantages.

Amphibious Forces. Amphibious forces embarked on more capable and versatile amphibious ships may be deployed in the vicinity of a crisis area for immediate response. These forces represent the force of choice in a nonpermissive environment. Amphibious forces are capable of forcible entry and seizure of port and/or airfield facilities to support follow-on forces.

Strategic Airlift. The primary advantage of strategic airlift is speed. It provides a rapid deployment means for use in a permissive or semi-permissive environment. Airlift will carry air contingency forces for limited operations and/or a fly-in-echelon for subsequent marry-up with other forces for larger scale operations.

Prepositioned Forces. By prepositioning unit equipment and supplies in a prospective operating area, MAGTF forces can deploy more rapidly with less airlift. There are two variants:

- **Land Prepositioning.** Land prepositioning significantly reduces lift and closure time during the initial reinforce-

ment to the affected theater. The disadvantages are restricted operational flexibility, high cost, and lack of access to overseas bases.

- **Maritime Prepositioning.** Maritime prepositioning combines the advantages of airlift speed with sealift capacity to rapidly deploy a MAGTF. Maritime prepositioning will support forces ranging in size from a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) to a heavy Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB). Alert and movement of the force to the vicinity of a potential crisis point will serve as a deterrent, improve initial force closure, and provide limited sustainment for the MAGTF.

Maritime prepositioned forces (MPF) will be modified. Although the MPF is not a substitute for amphibious lift, it can be employed to increase future operational flexibility of the MAGTF. Innovative employment concepts to include seabasing will enhance MPF utility across the spectrum of conflict. Small scale operations, including logistics operations, can be conducted from sea bases. Replacements for the current MPF ships will emphasize improvements in aviation capability, C³, and troop habitability through modular design to enhance the MPF's utility.

A seaborne expeditionary airfield (SEAF) will also be employed with MPFs. SEAF's purpose is to transport expeditionary airfield equipment, STOVL (short take off, vertical landing) Strike

Fighter/VTOL (vertical take off and landing) aircraft to the area of operations, and to provide a platform to conduct limited operations upon arrival in the crisis area. SEAF in conjunction with the aviation logistics support ships (TAVB) will also provide an emergency landing platform and repair facilities for Marine aviation ashore.

Reconstitution of the MPF after initial off-load will permit the National Command Authorities (NCA) to respond to an additional crisis or increase the regional CinC's combat power in the objective area. Additional equipment sets prepared and strategically positioned will facilitate the reconstitution.

The United States' vital interests will be located in four major geographical areas: the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf, the Eastern Atlantic Ocean/Mediterranean Sea, and the Caribbean Sea. Consideration will be given to deploying the MPFs in these critical areas.

The MAGTF will continue to organize to take advantage of the most readily available and practical method of attaining force closure, whether it is amphibious shipping, strategic airlift, or marry-up with pre-positioned land or seabased equipment.

3. EMPLOYMENT

Amphibious Operations

The MAGTF will have the capability to conduct amphibious operations from over-the-horizon (OTH) under all weather conditions, day or night. These operations will present unique requirements in the areas of C³, fire support, mobility, intelligence collection capability, and logistics support.

Future amphibious operations will continue to emphasize the maneuver warfare principles of tactical mobility, operational speed, and operational flexibility in order to achieve tactical surprise and counter the enemy's anti-landing defense doctrine and high technology weaponry.

Amphibious operations will generally include coordinated vertical and surface assaults launched from well beyond the horizon using advanced landing craft and VTOL aircraft. These assaults can occur simultaneously or sequentially. Either may represent the focus of effort. It can be shifted by redirecting the weight of combat power to the element which offers the greatest potential for success.

Pre-assault operations will concentrate on information gathering and shaping the battle. Beaches or landing zones will serve only as points of entry or coordination/control measures for introduction of forces ashore.

Seabasing

Opportunities afforded by advanced technologies will make it increasingly possible to conduct and support operations from sea bases. Seabasing and its reduced reliance on shore based facilities will provide a number of advantages to the MAGTF such as -

- Enhanced security.
- Reduced visibility/cultural impact.
- Conservation of combat power.
- Increased operational flexibility.
- Support of both operational missions and the logistics effort.

The scope of seabasing will vary depending on the intensity and duration of operations ashore. In any case, future seabasing efforts will require enhancements in C³, aviation operations and support, habitability, selected off-load capability, and ship-to-shore movement.

A variety of platforms will support seabased operations. Modular configurations and rapid modifications will enable commercial shipping and sea-barges, as well as amphibious shipping, to be used in the seabasing role. Improved technology will enable the transfer of equipment and supplies from the sea base. The sea base will expand as follow-on forces and materiel arrive.

Seabased forces will deploy to an area and loiter for extended times without being committed. Future prepositioning of sea bases, using the MPF, will combine the advantages of both concepts to enhance strategic and operational mobility.

Riverine Operations

The riverine environment is a principal means of transportation in many areas of the world. It is an environment of significant interest to the Marine Corps. The MAGTF will be prepared to conduct and support a wide variety of riverine operations. These range from disaster relief to combat operations. Riverine operations may originate from land or sea bases.

To support riverine denial or control operations, future technologies will improve shallow draft, high speed water craft. Expeditionary seabased aircraft will be capable of integrating with and supporting the ground operation with reconnaissance, fire power, and troop transport.

Counternarcotics (CN). During the early stages of the 21st century, traffic in illicit drugs may still pose a threat to the security of the U.S. by undermining our national values and institutions. As a participant in CN operations, the Marine Corps will continue to provide support (personnel and equipment) to the Department of Defense and designated law enforcement agencies. Sensor technology

will improve our ability to detect and monitor drug trafficking.

Counterterrorism (CT)

Participation in CT operations will include support of national CT forces (security, diversion, raid, reaction force, etc.), unilateral limited-objective operations, and in-extremis hostage rescue missions.

SECTION 6

ORGANIZATION

1. **OVERVIEW.** Future force structure implications resulting from a dynamic national security environment, technological advances, and changing demographic patterns will be significant. When bounded by a struggling economy and continuing efforts to reduce the national debt, force development will represent a difficult challenge. The Nation will require an expeditionary force-in-readiness; balanced, combined arms forces which can respond quickly and effectively across the spectrum of conflict. Force planners will have to balance operational requirements and technological changes with fiscal and demographic reality. Force development will serve the needs of the nation but remain affordable. Planners must take a long term approach to force development, and not over react to transient world affairs or technological fads. Basic enduring organizational strengths will be continually identified, maintained, improved upon, and used as the basis for long-range force development.

2. **CORE VALUES.** The Marine Corps' primary mission will be to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, including integrated aviation and logistical components, for service with the U.S. Navy as part of a Naval Expeditionary

Force. This mission is consistent with the United States' position as a maritime nation with global interests. It supports a national military strategy that has a global focus, and places a premium on rapid, flexible response across the spectrum of conflict. It is the expeditionary focus and combined arms nature of the Corps which make it unique. It is these two aspects which must form the basis for future changes to force structure and equipment development. Although the expeditionary focus and combined arms nature of the Corps make it unique, **OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE** is the hallmark of the Corps. Operational excellence is primarily a function of the individual Marine and Sailor, and training and leadership. Accordingly, it is not only the expeditionary focus, combined arms nature, but also manpower, and training of the Corps which represent the core values that must be preserved, improved upon, and used to form the basis of future force development.

3. EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITIES.

The expeditionary force will be strategically mobile, capable of forcible entry, organized, trained, and equipped for all regions, self-sustaining, and interoperable with joint and combined forces.

Strategic Mobility. The global focus of national military strategy places emphasis on the rapid deployment of forces worldwide. Southwest Asia provided an excellent example of the importance of rapid deployment, and the need for increased strategic mobility assets, i.e., air and sea. The planned obsolescence of certain classes of amphibious ships through the year 2015 will significantly alter the number and composition of amphibious lift. Shipbuilding programs will likely be delayed due to competing priorities and budget constraints. Replacement ships will be larger and more capable, but fewer in numbers. A move towards modular construction and multipurpose platforms will reduce the high cost of ship construction. Regardless of the composition of the amphibious fleet or the cost, the requirement to simultaneously lift the assault echelons of two MEFs will be essential. MPS squadrons will enhance existing sealift. The current ships, as well as the prepositioned equipment, will need replacement during the next 20 years. Replacement of this critical asset will be carefully integrated with the development of other strategic lift capabilities.

Forcible Entry. The interdependency between nations will further erode an already fragile system of alliances. Overseas basing and overflight rights will become unreliable as alliances change due to economic pressures. Forward basing of large forces will become fiscally prohibitive. The

Marine Corps will retain its capability to conduct amphibious assaults across the spectrum of conflict. It includes the capability to conduct a MEF level assault, at night or during periods of reduced visibility, from over-the-horizon. The proliferation of modern weapon systems will require a significant technological investment to maintain such a capability.

Organized, Trained, and Equipped for all Regions. The Marine Corps global orientation represents the greatest single challenge to force developers. A global mission prohibits force planners from focusing on any single geographic area or specific level or type of conflict. Marine organizations will be flexible, capable of satisfying the mission requirements of a special purpose force and adapting to the rigors of general war and multiple MEF operations. Equipment development will be equally adaptable, carefully balancing the need for rapid transportability and tactical mobility with the need for combat effectiveness on a technologically advanced battlefield.

Self-Sustaining. Expeditionary forces will be self-contained and self-sustaining. The degree of sustainment embedded within maritime forces is unmatched. Expeditionary forces will be able to sustain operations until the introduction of follow-on-forces. Maritime forces also will be able to operate from a sea base for

indefinite periods. Self-sustainment goes beyond the staging of equipment and supplies. It will be built into force development. Equipment with self-diagnostics and modular construction will be pursued to support a "fix forward" concept. Echelons of maintenance will be based on combat criticality and time of repair. All aspects of logistics will be developed with a mindset as opportunistic as the maneuver warfare undertaken by the MAGTF.

Interoperable With Joint and Combined Forces. Fiscal constraints will force individual services to develop complementary capabilities. The world environment will make large scale, single nation, unilateral operations unlikely. Joint and combined operations will be the norm, requiring improved interoperability of C²I systems.

4. **COMBINED ARMS.** The balanced combat capability of the MAGTF vastly exceeds that of the sum of the capabilities of the subordinate elements. The size and composition of the Marine Corps will change over time, primarily influenced by the needs of the Nation, operational necessity, technology, and affordability. Future force structure changes will acknowledge the combined arms aspect of the MAGTF and also the importance of balance. Balanced combined arms capabilities must be preserved. No specific combat capability can be deleted or reduced to ineffectiveness without

damaging the overall combat effectiveness of the MAGTF.

5. **TOTAL FORCE.** The Marine Corps will continue to retain a Total Force orientation consisting of active and reserve forces. Three active MEFs will be organized, trained, and equipped for immediate employment across the spectrum of conflict, up to and including general war. Organizations not immediately required for regional conflict will be located in the Marine Corps Reserve. The Marine Corps Reserve will maintain the ability to rapidly expand the capabilities of the active force during a national emergency when mobilized. Units within the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) must be trained, equipped, and manned to meet the demands of the active FMF in a sustained combat environment. The primary roles of the SMCR are to:

- Augment the active MEFs to full wartime structure.
- Selectively reinforce the active MEFs with SMCR units.

The Reserves also will provide the:

- Capability to field a Marine expeditionary brigade.
- Capability to field a division, wing, and force service support group with reduced capability if augmentation/reinforcement is not ordered.

- Nucleus to reconstitute a division, wing, and force service support group if augmentation/ reinforcement is ordered.

6. **MANPOWER.** The Marine Corps' greatest resource is its manpower. Tomorrow's technological advances will create a greater need for a highly skilled work force. Competition for skilled manpower resources will be keen. The Marine Corps' success in recruiting adequate numbers of qualified men and women into its ranks during the 21st century will depend on several factors. The propensity of young men and women to enlist in the Armed Forces, unemployment rates, demographic changes, and technological change will impact on the manpower market place.

As the technological growth continues, it is likely that entry-level skill requirements will be higher. Marine Corps' recruiters will compete with the other Services, civilian employers, and institutions of higher learning for a highly qualified, technically oriented individual. The recruit will be mentally and physically capable of manning more technical weaponry and fulfilling the demands of small unit leadership on a complex battlefield. Foreign language aptitude will be extraordinarily important.

Advances in technology may reduce the demand for unskilled labor and non-technically

educated personnel. The impact will be the requirement for sophisticated pre-entry testing and longer more costly training programs.

7. **TRAINING.** Training is the keystone of readiness. Emphasis will be on realistic mission oriented training. There is no substitute for innovative, imaginative leadership. However, advanced technology offers challenges as well as opportunities. The challenges are how to prepare the Corps to integrate technology into its operations, and to determine how to best use technology in training the force. Individual and unit training will be realistic and structured around mission requirements. Individual training will be enhanced through the use of a wide variety of simulators which provide realism to training, and reduces the high cost of field exercises. Wargaming will be expanded to provide the same realism and cost savings to unit and staff training. Geographically dispersed staffs will be linked electronically and trained as a unit, sharing common information and experiences. These technological changes, coupled with the enhanced leadership training, will ensure the Marine Corps is prepared for the future battlefield.

SECTION 7

TECHNOLOGY

1. OVERVIEW

Future technologies of primary concern to the Marine Corps will be those with the potential to effect MAGTF operational capabilities to conduct amphibious operations and maneuver warfare. Directed energy weaponry, vertical take off and landing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), precision guided munitions, improved sensors, robotics, stealth, and superior space systems are currently under development. Others, such as genetic engineering and other biotechnologies, will lead to capabilities in chemical and biological weaponry impossible to envision.

The Marine Corps will exploit affordable new technology to maintain a credible military force in the next century. Fiscal constraints will require the development and exploitation of technology with both civilian and military applicability. Joint military and civilian development of technology is not limited to a single area. The design of aircraft, ships, avionics, communications, data processing, and robotics already serve both communities.

Although the total impact of advancing technology on the battlefield is dynamic, several trends can be identified. There will be an increased

emphasis on night fighting capability to exploit enemy weaknesses. The battlefield of the next century will be increasingly lethal and fluid; dispersed over wider areas. Rear areas will be less defined and subject to combat operations. Command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, and interoperability systems will be fully integrated and capable of rapidly processing, fusing, analyzing, and disseminating tremendous quantities of information.

Success on the battlefield will require highly mobile and self-supporting forces. Forces will rapidly mass and deliver firepower from dispersed locations. Sustained operations under all weather conditions, day or night will be a necessity. Forces will be capable of independent, small unit action, with success depending on equipment and individual and unit initiative, leadership and discipline.

Research and development efforts will focus on improving expeditionary capabilities. The Marine Corps will pursue development of lighter, but more lethal, equipment and ammunition. Related efforts will focus on improving night fighting ability, command and control, intelligence collection and processing, system operability/survivability in all environments,

energy and propulsion, and more efficient ways to sustain forces.

The following technological advancements will influence expeditionary maneuver warfare in several functional areas.

2. MANEUVER

Achievement of the over-the-horizon capability will be greatly influenced by new technologies. Greater range, increased speed, and improved payload of ship-to-shore vehicles will permit elements of the MAGTF to avoid enemy strengths and rapidly move ashore. On the future nonlinear battlefield, technology will enhance mobility across land, through the atmosphere, and over/under the sea. Range, speed, and payload will increase as transport vehicles/platforms evolve. Power sources will be more efficient and less of a logistics burden.

Ground mobility requires lighter, faster, and more protected direct fire and transport systems. Vehicles will be able to negotiate adverse terrain and operate in all climatic conditions using self-contained navigation and communications systems. Maneuver forces will experience greater freedom of movement with improved minefield/obstacles breaching capabilities made possible through enhanced explosives.

Aircraft will be of multi-mission VTOL and STOVL families, deployable from Navy or commercial ships/platforms, austere sites, as well as traditional airfields. The speed and range of troop transport aircraft will increase thereby adding to MAGTF maneuverability and force employment options. Ship-to-shore movement via surface means will be accomplished by more capable air cushion vehicles, high speed/heavy payload assault craft, and a high water speed advanced assault amphibian.

3. ATTACK OF GROUND TARGETS

The destruction of ground targets will be accomplished by a large array of weapons systems located on surface, vehicle, and air platforms. Systems will be characterized by increased mobility, lighter weight, and all weather, day or night capabilities. Surveillance, detection, and target acquisition systems with improvements in sensor, signal processing, and computing technologies will speed target identification and fire control solutions.

Directed energy weapons using lasers and high powered microwaves will include man-packed and vehicle-mounted systems with the capability to engage most targets on the battlefield. Hypervelocity, electrothermal, and electromagnetic weapons, as well as smart/brilliant

weapons, will have greater accuracy and lethality against armored vehicles and aircraft.

"Fire and Forget" weapons in the form of precision guided missiles and rockets will become smaller, more portable, and employable in lower levels of combat organizations. Indirect fire weapons will demonstrate greater versatility through enhanced munitions, range, and deployability. Long-range indirect fire weapons will permit the engagement of targets in a sophisticated, high air threat environment previously attacked only by manned aircraft. Aircraft will continue to be potent offensive threats as multiple weapons platforms.

More powerful, high energy explosives will be used in all types of warheads and weapons. These explosives, coupled with improved chemical and kinetic energy projectile designs, will permit penetration of active/advanced passive armors and combinations of active/passive armors.

Mines will continue to be a serious threat with improved capabilities resulting from advancements in target sensing, microprocessing, artificial intelligence, and robotics. Mine delivery systems will become more advanced and capable of quickly responding to dynamic operational situations.

4. COMBAT INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Future command and control systems will provide real-time battlefield information and a responsive, secure communications system to receive information and direct the activities of units. C² will be critical to the success of over-the-horizon operations and the conduct of maneuver warfare.

Imagery systems with wide-band data links will provide real-time digital data for use within an all-source data fusion/processing system assisted by artificial intelligence, photonics, and microelectronics. Dissemination of information will be expanded by graphic systems.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will continue to provide battlefield information from extended ranges and for longer periods due to greater speeds and increased loiter time. Lethal UAVs will also be able to identify and attack targets.

There will be an increased demand for and reliance on information gathered from space stations and satellites (weather, ground activity, etc). It will result in decreased opportunities for battlefield surprise. Space technology will greatly contribute to operational success in the areas of communication, detection, surveillance, and position determination. Inexpensive, short-term, limited capability satellites will be positioned

anywhere above the earth for surveillance and communications purposes.

5. AIR DEFENSE

Protection from hostile aircraft will increase with developments in detection, early warning, and target destruction systems. Improved surveillance (active and passive) technologies will improve target detection, tracking, and acquisition. Satellite and UAV capabilities will be integrated into air defense systems.

Surface-to-air missiles will be managed by automatic targeting systems, equipped with more accurate sensor and guidance systems, and carry more potent warheads over greater distances. Directed energy weapons will be used to engage both aircraft and missile threats. Hyper-velocity guns, electro-thermal and electromagnetic guns will become viable air defense weapons.

Battlefield obscurants, flares, and chaff will be able to better screen the battlefield and present a variety of false targets to deceive the incoming missile threats.

6. CONTROL OF FORCES

In the 21st century battlefield success in maneuvering forces will depend on an ability to rapidly assimilate information, quickly analyze the situation, make

decisions, and act accordingly. Advanced, portable, problem solving computer systems (Expert Systems), will aid commanders in deploying, and maneuvering forces on the battlefield.

Technology advances in artificial intelligence, semiconductor/microelectronics, computer software, and the use of space will provide the necessary responsive, robust, and secure communications system. Future C³I systems will be flexible, adaptable, and survivable featuring the characteristics of a multimedia system with dynamic connectivity. Command elements will become lighter in personnel and equipment, gain increased survivability through enhanced mobility, and become more attuned to the battlefield situation.

7. SURVIVABILITY

The proliferation of advanced technology and employment of increasingly lethal conventional and special weapons makes survivability a premier concern. To achieve survivability and maintain operability, a combination of mobility, agility, hardness, cover, deception, and training will be required.

The individual Marine will be prepared to fight in a suit designed to protect from chemical, biological, ballistic, flame, laser, microwave, and thermal conditions. Additionally, the suit will have microclimate

conditioning, respiratory protection, and an individual communications system.

Static positions and vehicles will have enhanced countermeasure systems against enemy targeting via the employment of stealth technology. Self-decontaminating coatings for vehicles and equipment will improve protection and decrease the manpower and logistic effort necessary for decontamination. Aircraft will have greater survivability through stealth (signature reduction), smart skins, and electronic warfare applications across the entire electromagnetic spectrum.

Transportable, pre-fab decoy weapon systems and buildings that generate false electromagnetic signals will be developed. Additionally, the use of enhanced smoke and obscurants will degrade the use of electronic target acquisition systems and directed energy weapons.

Countermine operations will incorporate the use of directed energy systems and distributed explosives.

8. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Expeditionary battlefield sustainment provided by combat service support (CSS) organizations will be a combat multiplier as equipment and systems become more technologically advanced. CSS will provide the means to maintain momentum through advanced delivery vehicles, repair

capabilities, and logistical support.

Similarity of design and interchangeability of components will improve and speed the repair of damaged equipment and decrease the support signature. Inter-service compatibility will be required for heavy equipment items.

Equipment will have self-test, modular components that are easy to repair or replace. Automation and robotic material handling equipment will improve the efficiency of the supply system both in field and garrison environments. The identification of containerized contents through radio frequency/sensors and the modular packaging of supplies will expedite resupply efforts. The use of alternate fuels will reduce POL requirements.

Engineer efforts to enhance operational speed and mobility will benefit from stronger, light weight bridging and construction materials, advanced sensor technology, and high energy explosives. Medical treatments and combat casualty care will feature improved diagnostic, resuscitation, and stabilization techniques. Lightweight and field-portable medical treatment systems will reduce the urgency for immediate medevacs in combat situations. Wound specific bandages, synthetic blood, therapeutic compounds, and artificial skin will enhance the survivability rate of wounded Marines and allow the application of "buddy aid" when

medical personnel are unavailable. Multi-purpose vaccines will be available against many of the diseases found in underdeveloped nations as well as multi-purpose antidotes for protection/treatment of chemical agents.

9. TRAINING

Computer software coupled with improved audio-visual simulation trainers will provide realistic training wargames for command element staffs. Cross-training of Marines on various weapons systems, vehicles, communications equipment, and the battlefield essential subjects tasks will be augmented by educational technologies.

The benefits of interoperability between real mission performance and training will be enhanced by the use of embedded training systems. The artificial intelligence of the instructing mechanism will in many cases be superior to that of the student. Future developments in automation, robotic systems, and artificial intelligence will lead to significant enhancement in the quality of training devices and subsequent mission performance.

SECTION 8

GOALS

1. OVERVIEW

The preceding chapters have focused on describing the various factors that will impact on the Marine Corps in the future. This chapter projects the goals needed to meet the requirements of the 21st century Marine Corps. These stated goals will:

- Guide changes to force structure.
- Direct research and development efforts.
- Provide the conceptual framework for development of innovative concepts, evolving doctrine, and training and education programs.
- Provide long-range direction for the development of the MAGTF Master Plan.

The proposed goals do not represent a comprehensive listing of goals. It is merely an attempt to provide direction which will enhance the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps for the next century. It underscores the necessity to maintain a close relationship with research agencies. The MAGTF Master Plan converts long-range goals into mid-term objectives and a continuous planning and programming effort translates objectives into capabilities.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS.

Marine Corps goals must serve to maintain and expand expeditionary capabilities and utility of the Marine Corps to meet the requirements of the nation. Evolutionary changes to force structure, equipment, and materiel will be required. Force structure will decrease as warfighting concepts, influenced by high technology, provide an extraordinarily lethal and effective combined arms team. Doctrine and training requirements will emerge as structure and equipment change. Marine Corps' organizational goals include:

- Remaining the nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness capable of combined arms operations across the spectrum of conflict with primary emphasis in the low to mid-intensity range.
- Maintaining a Total Force consisting of three active MEFs capable of immediate employment across the spectrum of conflict to include general war, and a "shaped" Reserve Force which augments or reinforces the Active Forces.
- Pursuing technology to maintain and expand the MAGTF's amphibious and forcible entry capabilities.

- Retaining the MAGTF war-fighting structure and its special operations capabilities.

- Developing a hierarchy of required capabilities most critical to naval expeditionary operations that provide the basis for force development.

- Continuing to emphasize the importance of the Marine, both as an individual and as a member of the Total Force.

- Training for combined arms combat across the spectrum of conflict with emphasis on small unit operations at the low to mid-intensity levels of conflict.

- Supporting strategic air and sealift initiatives.

- Supporting initiatives for the development of modular ship construction and the enhancement of air cushion technology.

3. MAGTF WARFIGHTING GOALS.

The goals are presented by battlefield functional areas and are broad in scope.

Maneuver/Mobility

- Guide the development of a family of light weight advanced armored systems that possess the requisite speed, protection, and tactical mobility to be employed in amphibious (OTH) operations and subsequent operations ashore.

- Pursue technology that leads to the development of smaller, lighter, more powerful fuel efficient propulsion systems.

- Develop and field systems which provide the means for precise navigation, in all weather, day or night operations.

- Develop the successor to the medium lift replacement (MLR) and the present heavy lift helicopter.

- Maintain and improve our rapid response capability of the MEF.

- Enhance the MPF capability through program expansion and equipment modernization.

- Reduce the combat load of the individual combat Marine while retaining effective combat capabilities.

- Pursue technology to provide the capability to detect, clear, or avoid obstacles, barriers, and minefields.

Attack of Ground Targets

- Develop directed energy, hypervelocity, electrothermal, electromagnetic, and autonomous "hunter-killer" technology.

- Develop improved anti-armor systems that are lighter, less vulnerable, and feature greater range, accuracy, and lethality.

- Expand the target engagement capabilities of indirect fire weapons and munitions through increased range, accuracy, and mobility.

- Develop "fire and forget" capabilities for both ground and airborne platforms.

- Improve the versatility (all weather, day or night) of target acquisition systems.

Combat Information and Intelligence

- Provide each MAGTF with the ability to access national, theater, joint, and combined intelligence systems to facilitate total intelligence development.

- Develop reliable and responsive, ground, air, and space systems which provide real-time surveillance of the battlefield.

- Develop durable, mobile and secure systems for the collecting, processing, and analyzing information, and subsequent dissemination of all source intelligence.

- Develop enhanced Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

Aviation and Air Defense

- Develop advanced STOVL technology.

- Pursue improved VTOL initiatives and follow-on propulsion technology.

- Develop an improved air defense capability from air and ground platforms.

- Pursue a passive air detection and noncooperative aircraft identification capability.

- Develop a detection and engagement capability against aircraft and UAVs which use stealth technology.

- Develop an improved active air defense capability to engage Tactical Ballistic Missiles.

- Pursue air defense weapon systems which are not restricted to missile technology.

Control of Forces

- Improve interoperability between the Marine Corps, national agencies, unified commands, allies, and other services.

- Develop smaller, more capable command and control systems.

- Pursue the use of space systems to enhance secure communication capabilities.

Survivability

- Develop enhanced individual protection against the employment of nuclear, chemical, biological, and directed energy weapons.

- Develop self-decontaminating coatings for vehicles and equipment.

- Enhance the survivability of air and ground assault systems through improvements to signature reduction, and mobility.

- Develop realistic decoy systems and structures which generate false electromagnetic and other signatures.

- Improve the survivability of electro-optical systems through enhanced overall protective hardening.

Combat Service Support

- Provide flexible and dynamic combat service support capabilities focused on the needs of the maneuver forces.

- Develop maintenance and supply concepts which feature improvements in modular replacements, self-testing, "throw-away" components, forward repair of equipment, and modular supply packages.

- Improve inventory management techniques, containerized systems, and delivery methods.

- Develop responsive maneuver force sustainment procedures suitable for use from a variety of seabased platforms.

- Continue to improve combat medical support to include forward area triage, casualty care and processing, and evacuation.

4. MANPOWER GOALS

- Develop processes for selection, assignment, and promotion of personnel that will attract and reward a warfighting perspective and orientation.

- Develop pre-testing and pre-training systems, and refine MOS requirements to obtain the best match of enlistee to military occupation.

- Maintain and improve the quality of life of individual Marines and their families.

- Pursue those initiatives that ensure balanced and effective manpower programs.

- Support initiatives to ensure adequate medical care for the families of Marines.

- Explore the expanding role of women in combat and combat support roles.

5. TRAINING GOALS

- Match operational training to probable missions and war plans.

- Develop state-of-the-art simulators, including embedded systems to train all Marines.

- Develop wargames that challenge warfighting skills through realistic warfighting scenarios.

- Develop wargaming systems that enable geographically separated units the capability to conduct concurrent staff training.

- Train to ensure multiservice interoperability.

- Train to ensure foreign area expertise.

- Enhance individual physical performance through training programs which promote good health, physical strength, endurance, and individual combat skills.

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