Saddam Hussein's First War: An Assessment of Iraqi Operational Art in the Iran-Iraq War,
Abstract
This monograph examines the Iran-Iraq War from an operational perspective. This eight year war represents the Iraqi's only experience with successful operational maneuver. As such, it is likely that lessons learned, particularly in the final campaign where they synchronized successive battles, will shape their operational thinking for the foreseeable future. This examination of Iraqi performance reveals little evidence of operational art early in the war. However, by their final campaign it is apparent that the Iraqis were practicing operational art. They were able to conduct joint operations, effectively integrating major army operations with navy, air force and guerrilla actions. Throughout the final campaign, operational synchronization was apparent. Multiple corps were employed to attain a combination of terrain and force oriented objectives. Finally, the operations were executed and supported across a broad, 700 kilometer front.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 22, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA240184
Entities
People
- David B. Lacquement
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College