Opening Pandora's Box: The U.S. Army in Combined Contingency Operations.
Abstract
Field Manual 100-5, Operations, the U.S. Army's keystone warfighting manual, states: 'in addition to operating as part of a joint force, the Army must be prepared for combined operations with land, air, and naval forces of allied governments.' The manual goes on to observe that where formal alliances and established combined commands do not exist, 'US and allied forces will have to work out procedures for combined operations under the pressure of imminent conflict or even while operations under way.' Thus, FM 100-5 sanctions what is in effect an ad hoc approach to the business of conducting combined contingency operations; such an approach is inherently dangerous from the outset. The purpose of this monograph is to identify ways the Army can improve its capability to operate in a combined contingency environment, before the exigencies of combat exacerbate an already complex undertaking. The monograph begins by presenting an overview and analysis of the existing doctrine that governs the Army's preparation for, and practice of, combined operations, in order, to identify doctrinal shortfalls that constrain the Army's ability to plan and execute those operations. The monograph then turns to analyses of theory and historical practice to discern some possible solutions to the doctrinal deficiencies noted. In so doing the monograph offers some recommendations that, if accepted and implemented, may move the U.S. Army toward an improved capability to plan for, and execute, combined operations in contingency environments.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 08, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA240212
Entities
People
- William A. Gregory
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College