Operation Musketeer - The End of Empire a Study of Organizational Failure in Combined Operations,
Abstract
This monograph studies the failure of Operation MUSKETEER to achieve both its military and political objectives. The study examines an important facet of combined warfare, the conduct of a combined contingency operation. In examining the events that triggered the launching of Operation MUSKETEER in November, 1956, several salient features became evident. The principal architect for the disaster was Britain's Prime Minister Eden. He failed to recognize that Britain's military was not structured to conduct rapid contingency operations. Once he decided on using the military option, he did not insure that the political objective was supported by the military operation. The French shared in the disaster because they assumed the British were prepared to act quickly with military force and the goal was the removal of Nasser. However, as the crisis became prolonged and the Suez Canal became the military objective, the French failed to achieve their goals. The monograph concludes that military operations must be closely tied to the desired political effect. In combined operations, the potential for misreading the political goals of an ally greatly complicates the military planning progress.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 05, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA240214
Entities
People
- Patrick L. Neky
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College