U.S. Army Deception Planning at the Operational Level of War
Abstract
This monograph discusses operational deception planning in the U.S. Army. A common misconception is that modern technology precludes effective deception above the tactical level. Technology such as satellite surveillance may increase the difficulty of operational deception planning, but it does not obviate the need for such planning. Too frequently, however, deception plans are constructed as afterthoughts to the overall operations plan. As a result, they are frequently unrealistic and ineffective. In that light, this monograph examines deception at the operational level of war and proposes recommendations to effectively plan deception at that level. The monograph first examines the deception theories of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and Basil Henry Liddell Hart. Next, the monograph uses history to determine which of these theories, if any, are evident in previous campaigns. This paper studies Napoleon's use of the reserve cavalry corps during the Ulm campaign in 1805, Operation Mincemeat (Sicily 1943), Operation Fortitude (Normandy 1944), and the Egyptian Army crossing the Suez canal in 1973. The monograph then scrutinizes current U.S. Army deception doctrine in order to establish the baseline of our deception planning. The conclusions show that current U.S. Army deception doctrine contains valuable lessons from both theory and history.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 25, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA240251
Entities
People
- Philip S. Thompson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College