

AD-A240 253



2

PIERCING THE FOG?
Irregular Forces as a Source
of Operational Intelligence

A Monograph
by
Major Richard D. Newton
United States Air Force

DTIC
SELECTE
S D
SEP 12 1991



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term 90-91

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

91-10373



91 9 11 059

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 5 May 1991		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Monograph	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Piercing the Fog: Irregular Forces as a Source of Operational Intelligence				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Maj. Richard D. Newton					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command & General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies Attn: ATZL Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) See attached.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS Irregular Forces, Operational Intelligence, George Crook, Douglas MacArthur, Operational Design				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 48	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLAS	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLAS	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLAS	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL		

ABSTRACT

**PIERCING THE FOG: IRREGULAR FORCES AS A SOURCE OF
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.** by Major Richard D. Newton,
USAF, 48 pages.

This monograph examines the employment of irregular forces as a source of operational intelligence. Often, technical methods are the primary (and sometimes the only) source of operational intelligence. Irregular forces, locally recruited paramilitary groups indigenous to the targeted region, can provide valuable augmentation to the usual sources of intelligence.

The goal of intelligence at the operational level of war is to discern the enemy commander's intentions. In other words, getting inside the opposing commander's mind in order to reduce the uncertainty and thus the element of chance inherent in all campaign planning. Reducing uncertainty is one way for the commander to better assess the risk in his campaign and thereby plan alternative operational methods to address any shortfalls in capability or mission. The Ends-Ways-Means model provides the criteria for evaluating a commander's risk in this monograph.

The monograph uses General George Crook's 1880s campaign to pacify the Chiricahua Apaches and the prelude to General Douglas MacArthur's liberation of the Philippines in 1943 as case studies to evaluate theory in light of the Ends-Ways-Means criteria. The analysis shows that irregular forces can be a valuable tool in the operational commander's "kitbag," providing the qualitative assessments necessary to discover enemy intentions and reduce the uncertainty in the commander's decision-making process.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Richard D. Newton

Title of Monograph: Piercing the Fog: Irregular Forces as
a Source of Operational Intelligence.

Approved by:

Dennis K. Hill, Monograph Director
Colonel Dennis K. Hill, K.Ed, MS, MMAS

James R. McDonough, Director, School of
Colonel James R. McDonough, MS Advanced Military
Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Programs

Accepted this 8th day of May 1991



Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	J
DTIC TAB	
Unannounced	
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

ABSTRACT

**PIERCING THE FOG: IRREGULAR FORCES AS A SOURCE OF
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.** by Major Richard D. Newton,
USAF, 48 pages.

This monograph examines the employment of irregular forces as a source of operational intelligence. Often, technical methods are the primary (and sometimes the only) source of operational intelligence. Irregular forces, locally recruited paramilitary groups indigenous to the targeted region, can provide valuable augmentation to the usual sources of intelligence.

The goal of intelligence at the operational level of war is to discern the enemy commander's intentions. In other words, getting inside the opposing commander's mind in order to reduce the uncertainty and thus the element of chance inherent in all campaign planning. Reducing uncertainty is one way for the commander to better assess the risk in his campaign and thereby plan alternative operational methods to address any shortfalls in capability or mission. The Ends-Ways-Means model provides the criteria for evaluating a commander's risk in this monograph.

The monograph uses General George Crook's 1880s campaign to pacify the Chiricahua Apaches and the prelude to General Douglas MacArthur's liberation of the Philippines in 1943 as case studies to evaluate theory in light of the Ends-Ways-Means criteria. The analysis shows that irregular forces can be a valuable tool in the operational commander's "kitbag," providing the qualitative assessments necessary to discover enemy intentions and reduce the uncertainty in the commander's decision-making process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	111
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
Page	
I. Introduction	1
II. Irregular Warfare and Operational Art	8
III. Historical Case Studies	16
IV. Analysis	28
V. Conclusion and Implications	37
ENDNOTES	40
BIBLIOGRAPHY	45

INTRODUCTION

Native spies are those from the enemy's country people whom we employ.

Sun Tzu¹

Kuwait's underground resistance fighters told astonishing stories of their high-tech, low-profile war against Iraqi occupation. Among their exploits: sending maps of Iraqi position to the allies by facsimile machines. US military commanders in Saudi Arabia recently praised the resistance for the valuable information it obtained both before and during the war.²

At the operational level of war, the goal of intelligence is to discover and preempt enemy intentions.³ The reason for the effort is to reduce the operational commander's uncertainty.⁴ This chore is difficult but necessary as each commander seeks an advantage over his opponent. Assessing the moral dimensions of battle-- morale, discipline, training and readiness--helps create a truer rendition of the opposing force's capabilities. Knowing the personality of the enemy commander and the internal dynamics, strengths, and weaknesses of his staff also contribute to determining enemy intentions. How many of the Allies' military actions during Operation Desert Storm would have been different if we had truly known what Saddam Hussein intended?

Who would have guessed that once the ground campaign began during Operation Desert Storm, the enemy would capitulate after only four days? This was not the conventional wisdom prior to the start of the ground war. The Iraqi army was touted as one of the better Soviet surrogates--battle hardened after eight years of war against Iran, and a fanatically loyal Republican Guard reputedly able to conduct mobile armored warfare on the Soviet model. Although final reports have not been compiled and published, was the Allies' overestimation of Iraqi capability an intelligence failure or a clever deception to lure Saddam Hussein into a false sense of security? Either way, operational commanders must have a variety of intelligence tools to pierce the fog of war and discern the enemy commander's intentions. Irregular forces operating in the enemy rear can be one of those tools.

This monograph contends that irregular forces, locally recruited indigenous groups who are not members of an organized military or police unit, can be a valuable source of operational intelligence. Using such forces to gather intelligence is not a new concept for the US military. During the American Indian Wars, both before and after the Civil War, the Army made extensive use of other Indians to gather and interpret intelligence on the tribes it was trying to control. During the Second World War, the Army also used local inhabitants to provide quantitative data and qualitative assessments of enemy strength in all the

theaters of operation. There are many other examples throughout US history of irregular forces such as these providing the types of information unavailable to sensors which "see" vehicles and "listen" to electronic transmissions. First, though, one must define intelligence and how it is applied at the operational level of war.

The noted Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, defined intelligence as every sort of information about the enemy and his country and the basis of friendly plans and operations.⁵ JCS Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, on the other hand, defines intelligence as the "product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas."⁶ Like Clausewitz's definition, this one is equally broad and somewhat vague. The operational intelligence addressed by this paper is much more focused than suggested by Clausewitz or the JCS Pub.

Current and emerging doctrine notes that operational intelligence, while embracing many elements of tactical and strategic intelligence, is much broader in scope (See Fig 1). Operational intelligence ranges from what many consider to be tactical intelligence, enemy order of battle for example, through the types of data normally associated with strategic intelligence, such as political, economic, and social information.⁷ Finally, intelligence at the

operational level of war is intended to be more predictive and anticipatory than either tactical or strategic intelligence.*




Figure 1.*

The commander of the US Army Intelligence Center suggests that operational intelligence is that which is required to realize strategic goals within a theater of war. He also says that the focus of the operational intelligence effort is to identify strategic and operational centers of gravity.¹⁰ TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield, shifts the emphasis slightly and says that operational intelligence identifies those decisive points which affect strategic aims. Blueprint of the Battlefield goes on to say, though, that intelligence at the operational level of war must probe the mind of the enemy commander.¹¹ Richard Simpkin, in his book Race to

the Swift, defined operational level intelligence as that which discovers the "mind of the commander," his war aims and intentions.¹²

None of these definitions, from Clausewitz to present, are mutually exclusive--yet none completely describe operational intelligence. Perhaps Clayton Newell best sums up the essence and role of operational intelligence when he calls it "personal intelligence," or that information which discerns enemy intentions.¹³ Much of the subjective and qualitative information concerning enemy moral factors needed to probe the mind of the enemy commander is only available to someone living and working among the enemy. The "fuzzy" nature and inherent ambiguity of the moral elements makes it difficult to collect, identify, and analyze such information with technical means. Irregular forces, being indigenous and living with and among the opponent's forces in a Theater of War or Operations, are able to collect the intangible data which makes up so much of operational intelligence.

This monograph will examine how the operational commander might utilize irregular forces to augment and/or enhance his technical means of collection and analysis. It will examine the unique ability of irregular forces to provide qualitative data concerning the enemy's moral domain, specifically those training, discipline, readiness, morale, and staff dynamics issues which play so heavily in the operational commander's decision-making process.

Friendly irregulars living in and among the enemy know when social and military conditions are changing--their information can play an important role in the friendly commander's decision processes as he sequences military operations. As the Commander of the US Army Intelligence Center said, "The value of good human intelligence (HUMINT) . . . cannot be overstated."¹⁴ Properly employed irregular forces are a possible source for this valuable human intelligence.

I will use the following methodology to examine the value of irregular forces as a source of intelligence for the operational commander. The monograph begins by discussing the theory of irregular warfare. Mao Zedong, Clausewitz, T. E. Lawrence, Roger Trinquier, and Sun Tzu all wrote about the employment of irregular forces. Section Two summarizes their thoughts on the proper employment of irregulars and establishes a theoretical and doctrinal basis for employing irregular forces in support of conventional campaigns. Next, the paper presents two case studies where irregular forces were used with great success to provide operational intelligence to the operational commander. Both examples, General George Crook's 1880s campaign against the Chiricahua Apaches and General Douglas MacArthur's use of Filipino guerrillas to aid his 1943 liberation of the Philippine Islands, offer today's officers an opportunity to glean some enduring lessons that might be applied to modern day operations.

Section Four looks at how irregular forces might serve as an adjunct to technical means of collection and provide a human element to the collection and analysis process. Lastly, the paper concludes by suggesting how one might employ irregular forces to obtain the operational intelligence necessary to facilitate present and future operations.




Figure 2.

The criteria to measure the success of this proposal will be the Ends-Ways-Means model (Fig 2). Every well thought out plan has to balance the ends, ways, and means to determine the amount of risk involved. This risk assessment helps the operational commander assess his chances for success.¹⁵ The operational commander can accept, change, or reject the campaign plan based upon his determination of the risk involved. One way he can change the level of risk is by adjusting the operational means employed. If one accepts the earlier premise that the purpose of operational intelligence is to reduce uncertainty for the operational commander, then operational intelligence is one means available to shift the

Ends-Ways-Means model to the friendly operational commander's favor.

This study will only examine the use of irregular forces as a source of operational intelligence. Historically, irregulars have also been employed as internal security forces, raiders, and to conduct deep operations in support of conventional campaigns. These other missions, however, are beyond the scope of this monograph. First, let's begin by examining the theoretical use of irregular forces and their relationship to operational intelligence and conventional campaigns.

IRREGULAR WARFARE and OPERATIONAL ART

. . . regular warfare is primary and (irregular) warfare is supplementary.¹⁶

Mao Zedong

This section begins by defining and discussing the theoretical value of irregular forces. It concludes by showing the linkage between regular and irregular forces at the operational level of war.

JCS Publication 1-02, defines irregular forces as armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces or police--in other words, locally recruited, armed, and trained paramilitary groups, such as guerrillas or partisans.¹⁷ Insurgents might include

irregular forces, however insurgents can also include conventional forces and terrorists insurgents and irregular forces are not synonymous terms.

The theoretical works and historical experiences of Clausewitz, Mao Zedong, T.E. Lawrence, and Roger Trinquier support our current doctrinal notion that irregulars can be powerful auxiliaries to conventional forces. More importantly, though, they support the notion that irregular forces are rarely decisive in their own right.

Thomas Dempsey, in an article published in Defense Analysis on the use of irregular forces, says there are four ways irregulars are typically used to augment conventional campaigns.^{1*} Irregular forces are most famous for conducting deep attacks in support of conventional operations, as T.E. Lawrence and the Bedouins aided General Allenby's First World War Palestine campaign or as Orde Wingate and the Chindits supported General Slim in Burma during World War Two. Also, irregulars can provide internal or rear area security as they did during the Malayan Insurgency and the American experience in Vietnam. Raiding, as during the American Civil War for example, is another form of irregular warfare. Lastly, irregular forces have been used to provide intelligence in support of conventional campaigns.

Mao Zedong is usually considered the premier theorist of irregular warfare. From his perspective, all wars are a combination of regular and irregular forces. Regular

forces, he said were required to achieve quick, decisive results. Irregulars or guerrillas, on the other hand, while not decisive did involve the support of the masses and therefore strengthened the foundation of one opponent's power.¹⁹ In regards to operational intelligence, Mao noted that because irregulars worked and lived among the people; they enjoyed certain advantages over their conventional opponents. For example, their dependence upon the support of the local population for survival forced the irregulars to cultivate and maintain a local information network to fulfill their intelligence needs.²⁰ Lastly, the extensive knowledge of local climate, terrain, and social customs and infrastructure gave them a decided advantage over regular forces operating in the same area. Mao, with the typical Chinese penchant for explaining themselves with analogies from nature, compared the peoples' support of irregular forces as the sea is to a fish--they are the medium which protects and sustains irregular forces.

A classical theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, on the other hand, did not like irregular forces. He felt that "people's war" was legalized anarchy--as much a threat to the social order at home as it was to the enemy.²¹ This attitude is understandable given his upbringing and education in an established 18th Century family and his observations of Napoleon's disastrous campaign of 1814 in Spain. There, The Duke of Wellington's British and Spanish

armies exhausted the French forces under Marshall Massena by avoiding decisive battle and encouraging Spanish guerrillas to disrupt French logistics and command and control. Clausewitz realized, though, there were some times when a nation might choose to employ irregulars. Because he also held a dim view of intelligence, Clausewitz never seemed to appreciate the irregulars' ability to assist the operational commander as a source of information.²² To him, their sole purpose was to harass conventional forces and deny whole sections of a country to an invader. This way the enemy would expend energy "striking at air" and the irregulars did not have to engage the main forces in decisive battle.²³

A hundred years later, T.E. Lawrence was formulating his theories of irregular warfare in the deserts of Arabia and Palestine. Like Clausewitz, Lawrence recognized the inherent weakness of irregular forces--they were rarely successful when attacking defended positions and they were unlikely to stay and defend a static position against a determined opponent. But Lawrence also saw that in certain situations, irregulars had a decided advantage. In the open expanse of the Arabian Peninsula, an alien invader was probably too small to occupy the entire country, thus leaving vast tracts free for the irregular forces to live in and control. Also, the irregular's extensive knowledge of local terrain, climate, and culture give him a mobility, sustainment, and endurance advantage. Lawrence suggested

that given mobility, security, time, and the proper doctrine, the overall advantage lay with the irregulars.²⁴ While this may have been true in Lawrence's unique case, Mao and others would counter by reiterating that irregulars can effectively augment a campaign but are rarely decisive.

Lawrence's doctrine in Palestine and the Arabian Peninsula was to never afford a target, seeking neither the enemy's strength nor his weakness. The key to executing this doctrine successfully was what Lawrence called "perfect intelligence." The focus of the irregulars' intelligence effort was the opposing "general's head".²⁵ Specifically, the irregular forces' primary intelligence requirement was to discover the opposing commander's intentions. This way, the irregulars could strike where the enemy was weak, avoid enemy main efforts, and exploit enemy vulnerabilities.

This "avoidance" doctrine applied to all operations by irregular forces. By utilizing superior intelligence to avoid engagements, Lawrence's irregular forces retained the initiative and were never on the tactical defensive except through accident or miscalculation. Lawrence, like Mao, found that by drawing his irregular forces from the local population he had an established information network and thus an exploitable intelligence advantage over his opponents. Lawrence was able to convert that advantage

into tactical success by avoiding battle with strong Turkish units and keeping Turkish forces effectively pinned down in their desert strongholds.

A post-World War II theorist, Roger Trinquier, in his book Modern Warfare, observed that the advantages of terrain and a supportive population accrued to irregular forces. Like Lawrence, Trinquier stressed the importance of intelligence at both the tactical and operational levels. He noted that by remaining detached from the enemy, irregulars were able to maintain constant observation of their adversaries and thus discover opponents' vulnerabilities.²⁶ During his experiences in both Indochina and Algeria, Trinquier effectively used indigenous irregular forces to collect and interpret the types of information he needed to anticipate and preempt the actions of opposing enemy commanders.

But how does one link irregular and regular forces to conduct major operations and campaigns? Mao Zedong, as he considered the operational level of war, also wrestled with this problem.²⁷ He said that during the conduct of campaigns, the actions of irregular forces must be coordinated with those of the main body. Among the many functions served by irregular forces, the key ones were to gather information on enemy strengths and weaknesses, and to expose enemy vulnerabilities. Mao acknowledged the important role of irregular forces as they disrupted the enemy rear and diverted enemy forces from the main battle,

but he needed irregulars to tap into their local information network.

Finally, Mao said that to achieve coordinated actions throughout a theater of operations (distributed free maneuver?), it was absolutely necessary for the irregulars to have radios so that they could communicate with the regular force commanders.²⁸ He recognized that irregular forces have to be tied into the operational commander's command and control network if they are to be effective. The necessity to orchestrate the various conventional and irregular means at an operational commander's disposal, to achieve a strategic or an operational end, is very much in keeping with Mao's writings.²⁹ Though it is doubtful if Mao would have recognized the term "operational art," he likely would have understood the concept. Although the discussion so far has concentrated on operational intelligence as an element of the operational level of war, before continuing, it is proper to establish a definition of operational art.

Mr James Schneider, theoretician at the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies, says that the dominant characteristic of operational art is distributed free maneuver of forces in a theater of operations. Further, distributed free maneuver includes a series of coordinated, distributed battles leading up to dispersed expenditure of combat power in space and time.³⁰ JCS Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, on the other

hand, defines operational art as "the employment of military forces to attain strategic or operational objectives . . ." through the conduct of campaigns and major operations.³¹ The operational level of war provides the linkage between strategic goals and tactical actions. One way to accomplish this linkage is to collecting the political, geographic, moral, social, and economic information needed by an operational commander to sequence the various elements of his campaign. If one agrees with Mao, Lawrence, Schneider, and the doctrine, the operational commander must also seek to integrate irregular forces into the orchestration of his campaign plan.

Today, campaign plans are developed to phase the simultaneous and sequential operations of all forces available to the operational commander. During the campaign design process, the commander addresses all his military and other resources in order to accomplish the strategic and operational objectives--this includes any irregular forces operating in his area. Even though irregular forces are rarely decisive in their own right, they can and often have played a valuable role augmenting regular forces--especially as a source of operational intelligence. The following two case studies will show how other commanders used irregular forces to gain and exploit operational intelligence.

HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

In his introduction to On War, Bernard Brodie says students of war have a duty to seek the enduring lessons from historical examples and the way other leaders addressed their problems.³² Similarly, others such as Clausewitz and Mao Zedong have said that in order to wage war successfully soldiers must prepare themselves during peacetime. Unlike most professionals, though, soldiers cannot regularly practice their craft or art. Studying and using the enduring lessons of history, said Clausewitz, provide the means for modern soldiers to learn about war.³³ This monograph uses General George Crook's 1880s campaign against the Chiricahua Apaches and the prelude to General Douglas MacArthur's 1943 liberation of the Philippines as historical case studies of irregular forces used to gain intelligence with an operational level impact. These two operational campaigns, as Clausewitz suggested, offer the opportunity to evaluate theory and learn from the experiences of past soldiers.

In the last few years, the United States military has renewed its interest and study of operational art. General Charles Donnelly noted that operational art has been a vital part of warfare "since the beginning of military history," but, in his opinion it wasn't well understood.³⁴ FM 100-5, Operations, says that operational art is the "employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in

a theater of war or operations"25 In the course of designing a campaign, an operational commander first determines the military condition which will produce the desired strategic goal in the theater, then decides the sequence of actions necessary to achieve the military condition, and finally resources the sequence of actions. As the operational commander focuses on long range objectives for the campaign, he "views tactical outcomes and task accomplishments from the perspective of how they contribute to the next series of operations."26

I believe the effect or the aim of an operation rather than the size of forces or the area of operations involved determines if an action is "operational" in nature. The operational commander directs or influences those actions necessary to execute his operational plan. In the following examples, the actions of relatively small forces had operational impacts upon the strategic goals set for the two campaigns. Both commanders used irregular forces in the course of designing their operations. If we agree that irregular forces helped Crook and MacArthur attain the strategic goals established for their respective theaters, then the actions of these groups can be considered operational.

**GENERAL GEORGE CROOK AND THE APACHE CAMPAIGN
1882-1886**

The officer who used Indian auxiliaries to the greatest effect was George Crook. . . . Chiricahua warriors in Crook's service matched the skills of their quarry and knew how they thought, where they were likely to be, and what they could be expected to do.³⁷

In September 1882, General George Crook took command of the Department of Arizona, a theater of operations in the Division of the Pacific.³⁸ His mission (end) was to establish order and to control the Indians in the Arizona and New Mexico Territories.³⁹ The way Crook proposed to accomplish his objective was through a series of campaigns to return the Apaches to their reservation and then control them once they were there. The means he had been given were meager, about two regiments of cavalry, but through extensive use of Apache Indian Scouts, he was able to reduce the risk and restore order in the theater.

During the early 1870s, the Army forced most Apache tribes, including the Chiricahuas, to accept government reservations. Almost as soon as they were settled on the reservations, disaffection, suspicion, and unrest served to undermine the Interior Department's program to make the Apaches self-sufficient. Dishonest Indian agents and contractors encouraged the natural Apache proclivity to raid ranches, settlements, and other tribes. The peace and prosperity hoped for by well-intentioned social reformers in Washington didn't happen in the desert Southwest.

General William T. Sherman, General-in-Chief of the US Army, warned that blatant mismanagement and Congressional insensitivity encouraged open opposition by the Indians.⁴⁰ Starving Indians could not understand bureaucratic bumbling.

After a succession of Apache raids in Mexico and the United States stirred international tensions, the Army was ordered to consolidate all the Apache tribes at the San Carlos Reservation, on the dry wastelands of the Upper Gila River. The US government believed controlling one large reservation would be easier than administering several smaller ones. By June 1876, most Apaches in Arizona and New Mexico had been moved to the San Carlos Reservation.⁴¹ Four hundred Chiricahua Apaches, though, under their leader Geronimo, faded into the Sierra Madre mountains in Mexico and did not report to the reservation. Although the mountains were rugged, at least the Apaches could eat and live in traditional tribal ways.⁴² Chiricahua raids and border incidents forced the US Army to act and in 1877 elements of the Sixth and Ninth Cavalry and some Apache Scouts moved Geronimo and the Chiricahuas onto the San Carlos Reservation. The settlement was temporary, though, and in 1881 Geronimo and hundreds of sympathetic followers left the Reservation for the Sierra Madre sanctuary.

In September 1882, after a string of Apache incidents on both sides of the border, General Crook began his campaign to bring the reservation Apaches under control,

protect the lives and property of white settlers in the Territories, and subjugate the hostile Indians living in the Sierra Madres.⁴³ When Crook and his staff arrived, one of his officers observed that ten years of "incompetence and rascality had done their worst" to foster Apache acceptance of US Indian policies and had destroyed the Apaches as a people.⁴⁴

As part of the process of bringing peace to the New Mexico and Arizona Territories, General Crook replaced the corrupt civilian Indian agent at San Carlos with two young Army officers. These officers recruited scout companies from among the reservation Indians to serve as irregular augmentees to the US Army. More importantly, they also set up a network of "Confidential Indians," informants to feed them intelligence, warn of impending trouble, and preempt hostile actions.⁴⁵ Crook and his officers knew that the reservation Indians were somehow able to keep contact with those who had escaped. These informants kept Crook's staff advised of Apache attitudes and intentions--they enabled him to probe the Apache leaders' heads.

General Crook was very adamant that his subordinates understand and exploit the cultural and social habits of the tribes and subdivisions within the tribes. He made it a point to study the Indians intensely so that as his aide recalled, "he knew the Indian better than the Indian did."⁴⁶ Crook felt that if the Army cooperated with friendly Apaches to develop an intelligence structure, it

would give him an edge and cultivate a relationship which would separate the belligerents from their support.⁴⁷ Crook's policies were radically different because they never intended to defeat Geronimo in battle. To the contrary, he demonstrated that by turning Apache against Apache and using intelligence from the informants and Apache Scouts he could penetrate Geronimo's strongholds and preempt Chiricahua raids. During Crook's six years in the Arizona and New Mexico Territories he fought few major battles, but pursued his opponents relentlessly and made extensive use of irregular Apache forces to gain Indian guerrilla warfare skills and exploit the psychological impact of Indians against Indians. Geronimo surrendered his band for the last time in September 1886 to Crook's successor, after recognizing that the Sierra Madre mountains no longer afforded him a sanctuary.⁴⁸ Crook's alternative approach to Indian fighting was the key to solving the Apache problems in the Southwest. As historian Robert Utley noted, "These techniques broke down the unity of the bands, fostered factions sympathetic to Crook's aims, and gave military authorities warning of impending trouble."⁴⁹

In the course of conducting an Ends-Ways-Means analysis (or the equivalent planning tool used in the 1880s) for his theater, General Crook surely must have realized he faced a daunting problem. Establishing peace was an attainable goal, but it did not appear that he had

been given sufficient means. Two regiments of cavalry were simply not enough soldiers to establish and maintain the peace. The disparity between the desired end and available means constituted Crook's risk. If Crook wished to accomplish his objective, then he had to make use of other means to reduce the amount of risk he was taking (See Fig 3). He reduced his risk to an acceptable level by using Chiricahua Scouts to provide the intelligence he needed to seize and retain the initiative during his operations.




Figure 3.

General Crook's meager forces were outgunned and vastly outnumbered by the Chiricahuas. Crook had to outthink his opponents or risk destruction of his force. As Schneider notes in Theoretical Paper #3, Crook had to use operational methods to offset his shortfall in combat power.⁹⁰ Apache Scouts provided Crook the operational intelligence he needed to find the renegade's sanctuaries and to preempt their offensive and defensive actions. They enabled Crook to seize and maintain the initiative during his campaign to subdue the renegade tribes. The

information they collected helped General Crook sequence his actions to achieve a strategic end--irregular forces had an operational impact on this campaign.

The next operation we will examine is the prelude to General Douglas MacArthur's campaign to liberate the Philippines in 1943. The events prior to the landings at Leyte Gulf illustrate how a modern operational commander orchestrated indigenous forces to gain the operational level intelligence he needed for a successful campaign.

**GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR
and
THE LIBERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES**

As part of his Southwest Pacific campaign, General Douglas MacArthur had an intermediary objective of liberating the Philippines. In the course of his campaign design, MacArthur determined that the primary military condition was defeat of the Japanese forces on the main islands, Leyte and Luzon (end). The sequence of events (way) necessary to establish the military condition called for the recapture of a series of islands in order to bring Allied air power to bear. MacArthur only had a finite number of Allied land, air, naval, and logistics forces available to accomplish his objective (means). He had to eliminate the risk or face culmination of his campaign prior to achieving his goal. Like Crook, MacArthur used

irregular forces to collect, analyze, and transmit the intelligence he needed in order to reduce uncertainty about the enemy and shift the operational balance in his favor.

After the fall of Corregidor former US and Filipino soldiers took to the hills around Manila and formed guerrilla organizations. On Luzon, the main Philippine Island, Colonel Charles Thorpe, a US Army officer who had evaded capture, created the Luzon Guerrilla Force. MacArthur instructed Thorpe to organize a united guerrilla operation to harass the Japanese invaders and to collect the strategic/operational intelligence necessary prior to invading the Philippines. With their cadre of American and Filipino soldiers, the Luzon Guerrilla Force competed with the most famous of the Philippine guerrilla groups, the Hukbalahaps (People's Anti-Japanese Army in native Tagalog, simply called Huks). The Huks were a coalition of prewar socialists and communists with postwar ambitions of a Maoist, peasant based revolution. Their independent stance and MacArthur's distrust of Huk postwar ambitions caused MacArthur to largely disregard the Huks and any contributions they might make.⁵¹ Though there were instances of cooperation between the Huks and other guerrilla groups feeding information to MacArthur, those times were rare. This monograph acknowledges the existence of the Huks, but notes that their support of the campaign to liberate the Philippines was only a small fraction of that provided by the Luzon Guerrilla Force.

One significant advantage held by the Luzon Guerrilla Force was their connections to the prewar infrastructure of the Philippines. Because the Japanese needed the prewar leadership to run the government and services after the Philippines were conquered, the irregular forces were able to gain extraordinary access to the information MacArthur needed to determine Japanese vulnerabilities. FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, says that such sources have the potential to discover the most guarded of enemy secrets, to include intentions, plans, decisions, leadership, and morale.⁵² This is exactly what happened.

Former military, business, and political leaders agreed to serve the puppet government and in the course of their duties gathered intelligence for the Allies.⁵³ Through the Luzon Guerrilla Force, they sent "reams of intelligence" concerning Japanese plans, moral, social policies, troop discipline, fortifications, and leadership changes to the Allies.⁵⁴ The postwar history of the liberation of the Philippines credits the guerrillas and their sources with making "far-reaching contributions to the war effort."⁵⁵ Throughout the years between the fall of Corregidor and MacArthur's return, the guerrilla's information proved to be more objective and reliable than that provided by other sources.⁵⁶ This is a prime example of the role irregular forces can play in providing operational intelligence to the theater commander.

One key piece of information the guerrillas successfully passed to MacArthur was the Japanese General Staff's order to General Yamashita, the commanding general in the Philippines, to establish his main defenses for the islands on Leyte, rather than Luzon (where Manila is located). US signals intelligence had also intercepted this message. The irregular's confirmation of the signal intercept validated MacArthur's original campaign plan to first take Talaud, 200 miles southeast of the Philippines and then Mindanao, the southernmost major island of the Philippines, to establish air bases before invading Leyte.⁵⁷ The guerrillas' sources confirmed Yamashita's receipt of the instructions, but as the guerrilla forces observed the field commands, they noted that the General Staff's orders were being ignored. General Yamashita wanted to fight on Luzon.

After receiving this startling news, MacArthur changed the sequence of his operations, dropping the Talaud landing scheduled for 15 October and the Mindano invasion scheduled for 15 November.⁵⁸ MacArthur moved up the Leyte landing, originally scheduled for late December 1944 to October and the Allies landed almost unopposed. Afterwards, MacArthur noted that the information supplied by the Luzon Guerrilla Force was the key to the success of the Leyte landings and the final liberation of the Philippines.⁵⁹

By the time the US Sixth Army came ashore at Leyte on 20 October 1944, the Luzon Guerrilla Force and their

associated units on other islands had sent MacArthur's staff enough information to build a fairly accurate picture of the Japanese situation, their plans, training status, leadership, readiness, discipline, and morale. General Crosbie Saint once said that operational intelligence should allow commanders to picture the battlefield.⁶⁰ This is exactly what the guerrillas were able to do for MacArthur.

General MacArthur, as the theater of war commander for the Southwest Pacific, designed his campaign to defeat the Japanese by liberating the key islands leading to Japan. With limited means available, he had to minimize risk by choosing his fights carefully (Fig 4). The operational intelligence provided by the Philippine irregulars allowed MacArthur to capitalize upon Japanese vulnerabilities and compressed his campaign schedule for the Southwest Pacific.




Figure 4.

In sum, both campaigns are good examples of irregular forces providing operational intelligence to the theater commander. Although the study of many more operations

would permit a more in-depth study, these two campaigns enable us to begin our analysis. The next section will evaluate the two case studies in the context of the Ends-Ways-Means methodology.

ANALYSIS

The reason a brilliant sovereign and a wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge of the enemy situation. This foreknowledge . . . must be obtained from men who know the enemy's situation.*¹

Sun Tzu

The purpose of this section is to answer the original research question in terms of the historical case studies--specifically, how can the operational commander use irregular forces to assist efforts to develop his intelligence picture? With the Ends-Ways-Means model as a framework, this section will compare the theoretical use of irregular forces and their potential as a source of operational intelligence.

In the course of designing a campaign, commanders conduct an End-Ways-Means analysis.*² Over the last year, we have seen President Bush articulate the specific objectives and military conditions to theater commanders conducting operations in Panama and Iraq. Once the strategic and operational ends were set, the operational

commander determined the sequence of events (ways) necessary to achieve the desired objectives. Next, the commanders evaluated their mission in terms of resources at hand or available from other theaters (means) and balanced those against their requirements. The difference between ways and means constituted the basis for their risk assessments. This methodology is analogous to the "Operational Design" conducted by Generals Crook and MacArthur prior to their campaigns in Arizona and the Philippines.

As operational commanders orchestrate sequential and simultaneous actions to achieve strategic ends; operational intelligence supports those operations.⁶³ General Crook realized that Geronimo and the Chiricahuas retained the initiative so long as they were could maintain their relative freedom in the Sierra Madre mountains. General MacArthur, on the other hand, had to plan his invasion of Leyte based upon a worst case scenario--not knowing the true strength, disposition, or vulnerabilities of the Japanese defenders. In both examples, the operational commanders synchronized a series of actions to achieve their operational ends. One of those actions was the intentional use of irregular forces as an operational method to offset their shortfall in combat power and in the process, help reduce the potential risks.

Quantitative analysis, counting the number of soldiers, vehicles, and widgets, is a tactical intelligence

perspective. At the operational level of war, the commander must have much more qualitative or subjective information. Some of the qualitative data the operational commander needs include the status of enemy training, length of time opposing units have been in combat, traditions and past performance of opposing units and commanders, morale, health, discipline of opposing units, and the personality traits of the opposing operational commander.** Because this type of information requires subjective value judgements, most US intelligence sources, except those derived through human sources, cannot fulfill the requirement.**

Because combat is largely a clash of hostile intentions, operational intelligence must be able to see "inside the enemy commander's head." Unable to do that, a qualitative assessment of discipline, training, morale, and leadership helps the operational commander determine his opponent's intentions. In the process, he also hopes to discover enemy decisive points, disrupt enemy plans, and cloud his opponents decision-making process. Irregular forces, as employed by Generals Crook and MacArthur reported the crucial operational intelligence these operational commanders needed to conduct their successful campaigns.

A modern commander, General Crosbie Saint, while serving as commander of III Corps observed that operational intelligence allowed the commander to manipulate enemy

actions and reactions.** This was certainly true during General Crook's Arizona campaign. Because the Apache irregulars told Crook where Geronimo was likely to be and what he intended for his next move, the Army was continuously able to wrest the initiative from the Chiricahuas and deny the renegades their Sierra Madre sanctuary.*7 General Saint went on to say that the deficiencies of current technical intelligence systems made it difficult for a modern commander to manipulate enemy actions. General MacArthur faced a similar frustration with technical systems in Philippines. Although his signals intelligence was able to intercept and decode Japanese messages, MacArthur had no way of knowing if the local commander had followed orders or the status of local commander's compliance. If the key to successful modern warfare is seizing and retaining the initiative, then the commander must be able to receive and utilize the information necessary to make good decisions, despite expected gaps in intelligence.

Clausewitz said that in war everything is uncertain and chance.** This is especially true when it comes to predicting the course another commander will take. Later in the same chapter of Book Two, Clausewitz introduces the concept of "fog;" his notion that because all information is unreliable and is hidden from full view, one must trust in talent or luck to discern the truth. While this may be true in some cases, the good operational commander

skillfully orchestrates his various assets to minimize the amount of luck required. Operational commanders have to base their decisions upon what they know, realizing that gaps in their information will always exist. Successful commanders use their "genius" to overcome the shortcomings of their intelligence systems and reduce the risk/chance inherent in operational decisions. Alternatively, they can select different operational methods to reduce their information shortfall and also reduce risk.

General Saint also offered that the first and most important task for operational intelligence was to focus on enemy vulnerabilities.⁴⁹ Recognizing that in a high intensity scenario US forces would likely have to fight outnumbered, operational intelligence had to give him alternative methods or identify decisive vulnerabilities. The operational commander must then exploit those fleeting opportunities and strike where the enemy is weak, disrupting enemy plans and tempo and denying him the initiative. Identifying significant vulnerabilities is the special expertise of irregular forces. As Clausewitz, Mao, and Lawrence said, irregulars must avoid the opponent's main body and strike the enemy on the periphery. The successful irregular force's highly developed intelligence network helps them find and target enemy vulnerabilities.

Through their contacts with the population, irregulars can learn and then report the information the operational commander needs to build his picture of the enemy force and

its commander. Superior intelligence equates to survival for irregular forces. Mao and Sun Tzu say that the successful commander uses all his resources to discover the enemy commander's intent.⁷⁰ Directing the efforts of irregular forces away from purely tactical missions in order to discern enemy plans, intentions, dispositions, training, discipline and morale, takes advantage of the irregulars' strengths and channels them away from missions for which they are not suited.⁷¹

Experience shows that seeing the campaign through the eyes of the enemy commander is the key to intelligence at the operational level of war.⁷² Certainly, General Crook understood this when he exhorted his subordinates to develop an indigenous intelligence structure. As historian Dr Robert Utley noted, General Crook's irregulars gave him the ability to think like Geronimo and thus he was able to preempt many of the Chiricahuas' actions.⁷³ It is impossible to expect that US military organizations will be living and working among the enemy populace as the Luzon Guerrilla force was for MacArthur in the Philippines. Friendly, sympathetic indigenous forces from targeted regions, therefore, offer a tremendous alternative source for operational intelligence derived from human sources.

A recent group of news articles highlighted the inadequacies of strategic systems trying to provide timely and accurate operational intelligence to the commander of Operation Desert Storm. Technical limitations of the

collection systems, bureaucratic safeguards protecting access to the information, and vigorous deception efforts by the Iraqis contributed to the intelligence deficiencies encountered. General Schwartzkopf, as the operational commander, effectively utilized human sources to fill the voids in his intelligence picture--confirming, denying, and augmenting the information he received via technical means. Irregular forces also gathered the subjective information which is invisible to satellites and airplanes.⁷⁴

We can draw a useful analogy between General Crook's experiences during his campaign against the Chiricahua Apaches or the events leading up to General MacArthur's liberation of the Philippines and the planning and execution of Operation Desert Storm. Similar to Crook and MacArthur, the Allies needed to know where Iraqi forces were, their strength, their morale, discipline, readiness, and leadership. Although strategic and tactical technical systems collected part of the data, some of the necessary information was subjective or otherwise "invisible" to satellites or airplanes. The intelligence gaps had to be filled by human sources. Initial media reports indicate that General Schwartzkopf used irregular forces to augment, clarify, and confirm the information he received from strategic and tactical systems.⁷⁵ As the doctrine states, though, this was just as it should be. Irregular forces augment or enhance conventional forces and systems. They rarely replace them. Yet one must be cautious.

Irregular forces are not a cure-all for deficiencies in the intelligence system. There are some significant limitations in their abilities that must be addressed.

One problem with irregular forces is that by their very nature they are incompatible with the modern intelligence "system." Timeliness, range, threat, and communications are a few of the limiting factors which determine how intelligence managers task their intelligence assets. There are often times when irregular forces are simply the wrong tool for the job. Usually, their mobility is constrained, their communications are tenuous and rarely secure, and irregulars are liable to endanger themselves and their support network by their actions.

In addition, unless irregular forces are able to receive information requirements and then return the requested information to the operational commander, they have no utility. General MacArthur recognized this command and control problem in 1943 and established a submarine courier system and a radio network for the Luzon Guerrilla Force. General Crook used couriers on mules to help solve his C² problems during his Apache Campaign. Mao emphasized that it was absolutely critical for the operational commander to maintain control of his irregulars, otherwise they served no purpose in the attainment of operational or strategic ends.

Lastly, the modern intelligence system is intended to be a pull system, based upon commander's information

requirements. The nature of irregular forces--living and working in enemy rear--means that they cannot be immediately responsive to conventional forces' information requests. In many cases, the irregulars' primary consideration is protecting themselves and their support network. Intelligence managers have to restrict the use of irregular forces to those missions for which they are best suited, for example those not time critical or which expose the irregular forces to excess danger. This limitation covers more than the types of information (subjective assessments of morale, discipline, etc) requested, but also the time and methods required for a response. It is incumbent on the intelligence manager to ensure irregular forces are utilized properly and they are not compromised nor unnecessarily endangered because of an unsuitable mission or dangerous C² linkage.

Modern officers understand how the operational commander uses an Ends-Ways-Means methodology to construct his campaign. Once a combat power shortfall is identified, though, the commander must use additional operational methods to offset the deficiency or else accept additional risk. Operational intelligence is one of the tools the commander can use to reduce his risk. Both General Crook and General MacArthur conducted successful campaigns despite significant combat power shortfalls after irregular forces identified opponent's vulnerabilities.

CONCLUSION and IMPLICATIONS

At the operational level of war, the commander is responsible for integrating irregular forces into his campaign plan. Only with forethought and vision can he hope to gain the type of information which will help him discern his opponent's intentions. He must develop the ability to exploit their unique capabilities properly. Like any other tool in his "operational kitbag," though, irregulars can be misused and wasted. The problem facing most US officers today is that few of us have any experience with this type of warfare or channeling the irregulars' efforts to the benefit of the conventional campaign.

Sun Tzu, Mao, Lawrence, and Trinquier all suggested ways of integrating irregular forces into a campaign. Current doctrine also offers a methodology--Operational Design. We have to assume that Crook, MacArthur, and General Schwartzkopf all used some sort of Ends-Ways-Means analysis, analogous to Operational Design, during their campaign planning process. After determining the military conditions, the sequence of events, and the resources necessary to achieve their end states, these operational commanders had to compensate for their shortfalls in relative combat power. Without additional forces available to shift the balance in their favor, these theater commanders either had to accept high risk or utilize

alternative operational methods to compensate for the deficiencies.^{7*} In all three instances, irregular forces offered them an additional operational means to reduce the uncertainty and thus the risk inherent in their campaign plans.

The implication for future commanders, as they heed Clausewitz's guidance about utilizing theory and past campaigns as a forum for practicing their art, is to consider how they might use irregular forces as an operational tool to reduce the risk in their Operational Design. As we have said, irregular forces can augment conventional campaigns in four ways--deep attack, raiding, rear area security, and operational intelligence. This monograph has shown how General Crook and MacArthur used irregulars to wrest the initiative from their opponents by using irregular forces to help them determine the opposing commander's intentions. Their operational experiences seem to validate theory as proposed by Sun Tzu, Mao, Lawrence, and Trinquier.

It was noted earlier in this paper how chance and "fog" make the conduct of war a risky proposition. The operational commander can degrade the effects of chance by getting inside the opposing commander's head and discerning his intentions--the goal of operational intelligence.

The United States has an amazing array of technical systems able to gather intelligence ("spy" as Sun Tzu would say) about an enemy, but none can provide qualitative

assessments as human sources can. The operational commander must use all available technical systems to gather the information he needs about his enemy in order to make operational decisions. Irregular forces, though, have the special ability of assessing such moral factors as training status, discipline, readiness, morale, and staff dynamics--factors largely invisible to prying electronics and photography. Within definite limits, properly employed irregular forces can give the operational commander the intelligence he needs to discover his enemy's intentions, reduce the uncertainty in his decision-making process, and wrest the operational initiative from his opponent. Modern officers need to do a better job of planning and preparation in order to exploit this valuable source of human intelligence.

¹Sun Tzu, Art of War, ed. Tao Hanzhang, trans. Yuan Shibing (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1987), p 127.

²Greg Myre, "Resistance Was the Ally Within," The Associated Press, The Kansas City Star, 3 March 1991.

³Clayton Newell, "What is Operational Art?" Military Review, September 1990, p 10. Also, Sun Tzu said, "Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered." p 118.

⁴Frketic, Operational Intelligence and the US Army: Much Ado About Nothing or Misunderstood Excellence? A Prescription for the 1990s and Beyond (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1989), p 35.

⁵Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p 117.

⁶JCS Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989), p 188.

⁷FM 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations (Preliminary Draft) (Ft Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 1990), p 2-26.

⁸Frketic, p 34.

⁹FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Hq Dept of the Army, 1987), p 2-9.

¹⁰Julius Parker, Jr, "From the Commander," Military Intelligence, March 1987, p 2.

¹¹TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield (Ft Monroe, VA: Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1990), p 15.

¹²Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift (McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985), pp 201-204.

¹³Newell, p 10.

¹⁴FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Headquarters Depts of the Army and the Air Force, 1990), p E-13.

¹⁵James J. Schneider, Theoretical Paper #3, The Theory of Operational Art (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1988), p 19.

¹⁶Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), p 153.

¹⁷JCS Pub 1-02, p 192.

¹⁸Thomas Dempsey, "Desert Guerrillas: Combat Multipliers for US Central Command," Defense Analysis (April 1989), p 342.

¹⁹Mao pp 246-247.

²⁰Mao, pp 160-161.

²¹Clausewitz, p 479.

²²Clausewitz, p 117. "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain . . . In short, most intelligence is false . . ."

²³Clausewitz, pp 480-81.

²⁴T.E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt", reprinted from Army Quarterly and Defense Journal (October 1920) (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1990), p 22.

²⁵T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London, England: Penguin Books, 1926), p 200.

²⁶Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (London, England: Pall Mall Press, Ltd, 1964), p 91.

²⁷Mao, pp 165-167.

²⁸Mao, p 166.

²⁹Mao, pp 156-185.

³⁰James J. Schneider, "Theoretical Implications of Operational Art," Military Review (September 1990), p 21.

³¹JCS Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations (Test Pub) (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990), p xii.

³²Bernard Brodie, "The Continuing Relevance of On War" in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p 56.

³³Clausewitz, p 170.

³⁴Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., "An Air Commander's View of Operational Art," Military Review (September 1990), p 79.

³⁵FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Hq Dept of the Army, 1986), p 10.

³⁶FM 100-7, p 2-25.

³⁷Robert M. Utley, S.L.A. Marshall Military History Lecture, given at Ft Leavenworth, KS, Dec 1985. General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946). It is interesting to note that when General Nelson A. Miles replaced Crook in Arizona, he decried Crook's methodology. He eventually recognized his mistake and completed the operation using Crook's means.

³⁸The Apache problem also extended into the New Mexico Territory, part of the Department of Missouri. Crook was able to sort out the political details to achieve unity of command and effort.

³⁹Capt John G. Bourke, An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1886), p 92.

⁴⁰Lt Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1929), p 180. Lt Davis was assigned to the San Carlos Reservation by General Crook to organize the Apache Scouts and Reservation police.

⁴¹Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866 - 1890 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p 358.

⁴²Bourke, p 4.

⁴³Utley, p 377, from George Crook, Resumé of Operations against Apache Indians, 1882 to 1886 (1886), p 10.

⁴⁴Bourke, p 8

⁴⁵Davis, p 39.

⁴⁶Utley, p 179.

⁴⁷Robert A. Wooster, The Military and the United States Indian Policy (New York: Yale University, 1988), p 148.

⁴⁸Utley, p 392.

⁴⁹Utley, Frontier Regulars, p 378.

*°Schneider, Theoretical Paper #3, p 18.

*¹Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House, 1989), p 340. It should be noted, though, that once the Allied divisions were ashore and the campaign to liberate the islands began, the Huks did assist the Allies with reconnaissance and intelligence.

*²FM 34-1, p 2-13.

*³Edwin Price Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele, Lieutenant Ramsey's War (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing, 1990), p 175.

*⁴Ramsey and Rivele, p 116.

*⁵M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines. The US Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1954), p 20.

*⁶Cannon, p 250.

*⁷C. Vann Woodward, The Battle for Leyte Gulf (New York: Macmillan Press, 1947), p 9.

*⁸Woodward, p 11.

*⁹Ramsey and Rivele, p 320.

*°Crosbie E. Saint, "A CINC's View of Operational Art," Military Review, (September 1990), p 78.

*¹Sun Tzu, p 126.

*²FM 100-5, Operations, Operational Design, p 10.

*³FM 100-7, p 2-25.

*⁴FM 34-1, p 3-39.

*⁵FM 34-1, p 2-13.

*⁶Crosbie E. Saint, "Intelligence Requirements at the Operational Level of War," Military Intelligence (March 1987), p 6. Hereafter cited as "Intelligence Requirements".

*⁷Utley, S.L.A. Marshall Military History Lecture.

*⁸Clausewitz, p 136

*Saint, "Intelligence Requirements," p 6.

⁷⁰Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), p 86. Mao explains Sun Tzu's dictum "know the enemy, know yourself. . ."

⁷¹FM 34-1, p 2-13.

⁷²FM 100-7, p 2-26.

⁷³Utley, S.L.A. Marshall Military History Lecture.

⁷⁴Robert Unger, "US Spy Agencies Fell Flat in Gulf War," and "Special Operations Filled the Vacuum," Kansas City Star, 7 April 1991. These were the most explicit, however Newsweek, Time, and US News and World Report, to name a few, all had articles covering this subject.

⁷⁵Unger, Kansas City Star.

⁷⁶Schneider, Theoretical Paper #3, p 18.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Air University Press Style Guide. (1990) Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL.
- Asprey, Robert B. (1975) War in the Shadows, Volume One. Doubleday & Co, Garden City, NY.
- Banks, Floyd T. and William W. Mendel. (1988) Campaign Planning. Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
- Brodie, Bernard. (1976) "The Continuing Relevance of On War." introductory essay to Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Bourke, John G. (1886) An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre. Scribner & Sons, New York, NY.
- Cannon, M. Hamill. (1954) Leyte: The Return to the Philippines. The US Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific. Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (1976) ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Crook, George. (1946) General George Crook: His Autobiography. Ed. Martin F. Schmitt. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK.
- Davis, Britton. (1929) The Truth About Geronimo. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE.
- Greenberg, Lawrence M. (1986) The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946 - 1955. Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
- Lawrence, Thomas E. (1926) Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Penguin Books, London, England.
- Mac, Zedong. (1972) Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, People's Republic of China.
- Simpkin, Richard E. (1985) Race to the Swift. Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, McClean, VA.

- Tao Hanzhang. (1987) Sun Tzu's Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation. translated by Yuan Shibang. Sterling Publishing, New York, NY.
- Trinquier, Roger. (1964) Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Pall Mall Press, Ltd, London, England.
- Utley, Robert M. (1973) Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891. Macmillan Publishing, New York, NY.
- Weigley, Russel F. (1973) The American Way of War. MacMillan, New York, NY.
- Woodward, C. Vann. (1947) The Battle for Leyte Gulf. The Macmillan Co, New York, NY.
- Wooster, Robert A. (1988) The Military and United States Indian Policy. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

- JCS Publication 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (1989). The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.
- JCS Publication 3-0. Doctrine for Joint and Unified Operations (Test Pub). (1990) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.
- JCS Publication 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Final Draft). (1990) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.
- JCS Publication 3-07. Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Test Pub). (1990) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.
- FM 34-1. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. (1987) Hq Dept of the Army, Washington, DC.
- FM 100-5. Operations. (1986) Hq Dept of the Army, Washington, DC.
- FM 100-7. The Army in Theater Operations (Preliminary Draft). (1990) Hq Training and Doctrine Command, Ft Monroe, VA.
- FM 100-20/AFP 3-20. Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict (1990) Hq Dept of the Army and Hq Dept of the Air Force, Washington, DC.

TRADOC Pam 11-9. Blueprint of the Battlefield. (1990). Hq
Training and Doctrine Command, Ft Monroe, VA.

PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES

Dempsey, Thomas A. (1989) "Desert Guerrillas: Combat
Multipliers for US Central Command" Defense Analysis, Vol
5, No 4.

Lawrence, T.E. (October 1920) "The Evolution of a Revolt",
reprinted from Army Quarterly and Defense Journal by the
Combat Studies Institute, Ft Leavenworth, KS.

Myre, Greg "Resistance Was the Ally Within," The Associated
Press, printed in The Kansas City Star, 3 March 1991.

Newell, Clayton (September 1990) "What is Operational Art?"
Military Review, Vol 70, No 9.

Parker, Julius, Jr (March 1987) "From the Commander," Military
Intelligence.

Saint, Crosbie E. (March 1987) "Intelligence Requirements at
the Operational Level of War," Military Intelligence.

. (September 1990) "A CINC's View of
Operational Art," Military Review, Vol 70, No 9.

Schneider, James J. (March 1989) "The Loose Marble--and the
Origins of Operational Art," Parameters, Vol 19, No 1.

. (September 1990) "Theoretical Implications
of Operational Art," Military Review, Vol 70, No 9.

Schwartzkopf, H. Norman (11 March 1991) Newsweek, Vol 117, No
10.

Unger, Robert. "US Spy Agencies Fell Flat in Gulf War,"
Kansas City Star, 7 April 1991.

. "Special Operations Filled the Vacuum,
Kansas City Star, 7 April 1991.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Dempsey, Thomas A. (1989) Employment of Irregular Forces in
Support of Conventional Campaigns. School of Advanced
Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS.

Erketic, John D. (1989) Operational Intelligence and the US Army: Much Ado About Nothing or Misunderstood Excellence? A Prescription for the 1990s and Beyond. School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS.

Rosello, Victor M. Jr. (1989) The Origins of Operational Intelligence. School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS.

Schneider, James J. (1988) Theoretical Paper #3, The Theory of Operational Art. School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS.