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**The Contingency Army:
Structured For Operational Success?**

**A Monograph
by
Major Arthur W. Finehout
Aviation**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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
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
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
Approved by:


COL James L. Moody

Monograph Director


COL James R. McDonough

Director, School of
Advanced Military
Studies


Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate
Degree Program

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ABSTRACT

THE CONTINGENCY ARMY: STRUCTURED FOR OPERATIONAL SUCCESS?

By Major Arthur W. Finehout, US Army, 51 pages.

The last several years have brought stunning changes in the world's economic, political, and social fabric. The demise of the Warsaw Pact, reduced Soviet threat, and easing of Cold War tensions have changed the strategic environment. The post-Cold War army will be smaller, CONUS based, and used in a power projection role. As the Army "builds down" and restructures itself, the organization of the "contingency army" is being debated. This monograph examines one aspect of the debate; Should heavy forces be included in the contingency army?

This monograph begins by defining contingencies and the role they play in supporting national strategy and policies. A brief history of U.S. contingency operations and the reasons they are conducted is presented. The background is completed by developing the primary characteristics of contingency operations, and a discussion of what constitutes a credible contingency force. The proposed contingency army is examined through the lens of versatility, lethality, and deployability to determine the need for heavy forces. The British Army experience in the Boer War, and the American Army's experience in the Korean War are used as historical examples.

The monograph concludes that the contingency army must include heavy forces to be credible. In order to conduct a wide range of missions, against all threats, and across the spectrum of conflict, the contingency army needs access to all the capabilities in the Army. To be lethal the contingency army needs heavy forces with their inherent characteristics of mobility, firepower, and survivability. To be truly deployable, these required heavy forces must be an integral part of the contingency army.

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What a beautiful fix we are in now! Peace has been declared.

Napoleon I¹

The United States has won the Cold War, preserved democracy in Western Europe, and kept a global peace which allowed economic prosperity in western nations. For forty-five years America's military focused on Europe and the threat posed by communism. It worked; the Warsaw Pact is disintegrating, the Russian threat is fading, and the spread of communism has been checked. This victory signals the end of a forty-five year campaign, and has prompted the United States to review its projected role in the post cold war world.

This review will have a direct impact on the Department of Defense and the United States Army. The national strategy and policies are reflected in the national military strategy, service roles and missions, and finally force structure and organization.

Ideally, military force capabilities should be developed in response to operational needs, and force structure based on an assessment of the perceived threat. A failure to understand the true operational needs or an incorrect threat assessment leads to the wrong force structure and capabilities. The future of the United States Army is being shaped by this review.

This restructuring is not a theoretical exercise, the force we end up with is what we will go to war with. To paraphrase Michael Howard; we won't get the force right, but we don't want to get it too far wrong.²

The United States has "built down" before. In fact, after every major conflict military forces and capabilities are reduced in response to the changed threat, budgetary constraints, and societal pressures. Unfortunately, with a "war is won" attitude, the actual threat and projected roles and missions of the services have not carried as much weight as the desire for a "peace dividend".

The result is a military whose capabilities and force structure are determined by accountants, and not by the threats it will face, or the missions it will be asked to perform. When this military is committed to combat you have the near debacle of the Korean War.

Following World War Two there was a rapid demobilization and severe limits on military spending. Deterrence, not warfighting, became the mission of the armed forces under the broader policy of containment of Soviet expansionism. America was pre-occupied with general war, not limited war or regional conflict.

The United States relied on its nuclear weapons superiority to dissuade potential enemies. The "bomb" was counted on to deter wars, or to win them, if

deterrence failed. The Air Force, charged with delivering the nuclear bombs, became the dominant service. Conventional capabilities were seen as less important and conventional forces, especially the Army, were allowed to wither.

In June, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea and the myth of what was later termed massive retaliation was exposed. A limited war did not warrant an answer of atomic annihilation. Conventional ground forces were required and ultimately committed. However, "to retaliate against a communist military initiative on any but an atomic scale, the American armed forces in 1950 were ill equipped".³ There were only ten under-strength, poorly equipped divisions in the United States Army. The first units sent to Korea were routed by the North Korean Peoples Army.

Because of a flawed national military strategy and accompanying force structure, United States national interests were at risk and soldier's lives spent. The strongest nation in the world put its prestige on the line and was nearly beaten by a third-rate power.

This lesson from the Korean War was soon forgotten. After the war many people felt that ground combat and the army were probably obsolete.⁴ The "hollow" army of the 1970's looked much like the army of 1949. As we enter a new period of "building down",

we must ensure the United States Army emerges ready to perform its mission of decisive combat.

A recent report by The Center for Strategic and International Studies sums up the current situation well. "1990 marks the beginning of a policy debate that will largely set our course for strategy and policy through the year 2002. The restructuring of the United States military must take place within an overarching strategy that takes into account the changing security environment, the domestic economic situation, and the leadership role of the United States in the global community."⁵

This monograph examines one part of the Department of Defense (DOD) restructuring, the organization of the proposed Contingency Force, specifically the "Contingency Army".⁶ The debate over the structure and organization of the contingency army contains many important issues. Among them are the active/reserve mix, command and control, strategic lift, and tracks versus wheels. This paper will focus on one issue, the "light" versus "heavy" argument. The central question to be examined is: should heavy forces be included in the Contingency Army?

To assist in answering the research question, the information and analysis presented will be viewed through the lens of the following criteria:

versatility, lethality, and deployability. These are the characteristics that General Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, envisions as key for the United States Army.⁷

Given the projected operating environment, will the contingency army need heavy forces in order to be versatile and lethal enough to win? Is a contingency army which includes heavy forces still deployable?

This study will start with a background section which will examine recent changes in the world's economic, political, and military environment. The impact of these changes on United States national military strategy, service roles, and Army missions will then be determined. Contingency operations and forces will subsequently be defined, their characteristics examined, and the requisite capabilities of contingency forces determined.

The analysis section will explore "heavy" and "light" forces using the WASS de CZEGE Combat Power Model. The contingency army will be examined using the criteria of versatility, lethality, and deployability to determine if there is a need for heavy forces. Conclusions will be drawn from the information presented to answer the research question. Finally, implications for United States Army doctrine and force structure will be discussed.

BACKGROUND: The Changing Environment.

For the last 40 years the United States has operated in a bi-polar world with a policy of containment and a strategy of flexible response. The Soviet Union was the main threat. Defending against a surprise Soviet attack into western europe represented the primary mission of our conventional forces. For the Army, this scenario translated to a focus on Europe, a mission to defend against the Warsaw Pact and a posture of heavy, forward deployed forces, reinforced by CONUS-based units in time of war.

The rapid changes of the last several years have literally turned the world upside down. In the view of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, "not since the Middle Ages have the five major factors operating on the balance of power - economic, social, religious, technological, and military - all changed at the same time."³

The fading of the Soviet threat, breakup of the Warsaw Pact, democracy movements, and a downward spiral in defense spending are all working to change the strategic and operational environment. You do not need two armored cavalry regiments on the border when Germany is reunited and there is no Warsaw Pact.

At the same time, potential threats to United States interests in the third world are increasing.

Third world problems of overpopulation, weak economies, and fragile political systems are still present. The de-stabilizing forces of nationalism, tribalism, religious hostilities, and ethnic hatred are at work.

The proliferation of sophisticated arms in the third world has made them a dangerous force to be reckoned with. The armies of at least 16 third world countries are equipped with more than 1,000 tanks, 22 with more than 500.⁹ In 1989, the CIA reported that at least 15 developing nations could be producing missiles with ranges of 3,000 miles by the turn of the century. Some 20 countries are believed to have chemical weapons available, or under development.¹⁰

As third world nations emerge as regional powers, they will have the capability to use force to settle regional disputes, and/or influence events that could threaten United States interests. This changing strategic environment has necessitated a revision of the national military strategy which takes into account the changing threat, America's role in the world, and the realities of budget constraints. This revision was characterized by the Army DCSOPS as the "evolving national military strategy" and is summarized in figure 1.¹¹

THE EVOLVING NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

<u>1988</u>	<u>1997</u>
Soviet Orientation	Global Orientation
Forward Deployed	Forward Presence
Rapid Reinforcement	Power Projection
Mobilization	Force Generation
Forward Defense	Counter-Concentration

FIG 1

The evolving national military strategy points to a new method of supporting national policy with military force. Contingency operations will grow in importance in order to support this globally oriented, power projection strategy. CONUS- based contingency forces will take on added significance as forward deployed units shrink and third world conflict becomes more likely.

This change is clear to the decision makers. In his 1990 annual report to the President and the Congress, the Secretary of Defense stated, "the changing requirements and new roles and missions assumed by United States forces will require strategies that rely more heavily on mobile, highly ready, well equipped forces and solid power projection capabilities."¹²

The national leadership is making decisions that will reshape the military. A picture of what the post-cold war army will look like is emerging from the process. The United States Army will be smaller, less forward deployed, globally-oriented, and utilized in a power projection role. General Vuono states, "We must have powerful forces based within the United States that are designed to respond to contingencies worldwide."¹³

This restructuring is already taking place. The 1992 DOD budget contained a plan to replace the ten unified and specified commands with four "forces". These are the Atlantic Force, the Pacific Force, Strategic Nuclear Force, and the Contingency Force. According to the Secretary of Defense, the result will be a military "designed to handle regional contingencies such as the war with Iraq, but not a military ready to take on a global war with the Soviet Union."¹⁴

These changes elevate contingency operations, and the Contingency Force to unprecedented levels of importance and scrutiny. As the Contingency Force is formed, the contingency army within the total army will grow in both size and importance.

The current debate concerns the structure and organization of the Contingency Force and contingency

army. The "knee jerk" reaction within DOD and the Army is to assign light forces to the contingency role. Recent articles have stated that the planned Contingency Force would be a mixture of light army forces, marines, special operations forces, and selected air force and Navy assets.¹⁵ This author is concerned that a light contingency army may not be versatile and lethal enough to gain victory in all cases.

An interesting parallel can be drawn between today's debate on the structure of the post-cold war Army, and the earlier development of the Army's Light Infantry Divisions. In the early 1980's, there was a recognition that the United States had to reassess its forces to meet growing threats outside the traditional European theater. It was acknowledged that a force was needed to react to contingencies worldwide. Other than stating the force must be capable of responding across the spectrum of conflict, the operational need was not defined or developed in any but the most general terms.¹⁶

The force planners did not develop a concept based on what missions would be given this light force, or what threat it would face. In fact, the availability of strategic airlift dictated the design of the force.¹⁷ Rapid deployment became the driving factor

when it was decided the light infantry division had to deploy on less than 500 C-141 sorties.

The light infantry division was not developed to fulfill an operational requirement, nor was it designed based on an assessment of the threat. As a result, seven years after the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Light Infantry Divisions be organized, the United States Army is still wrestling with their doctrinal employment. More to the point, a significant portion of our current contingency army is "not light enough to get there and not heavy enough to win."¹⁸

As the United States military "builds down" in response to the remarkable changes of the last several years, it should proceed carefully. The contingency army's structure and capabilities must be developed to meet operational needs and defeat projected threats.

BACKGROUND: Contingency Operations.

Contingency operations are "military actions requiring rapid deployment to perform military tasks in support of national policy."¹⁹ United States national policies form the requirement for the military to maintain contingency forces. As an example, in 1947 President Truman announced before a joint session of Congress "the determination of the United States to help free people resist attempted subjugation by armed

minorities or outside pressures." The Truman Doctrine essentially required military forces of the United States to be capable of deploying anywhere in the world to assist other free nations.

The link between national policy and contingency operations was demonstrated recently. The Desert Storm operation traces its lineage directly to The Carter Doctrine of 1980. In his State of the Union Address, President Carter stated "any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force."²⁰

There is a solid political reason for contingency operations. The 1973 War Powers Resolution limits the President to 90 days of unrestricted use of military forces without congressional consent. The President can avoid a confrontation with Congress by conducting limited duration contingency operations.

Contingency operations are conducted when national interests are involved and other means of national power have failed or appear in question. Such operations may be mounted to protect United States property and citizens abroad, rescue hostages, or react to the invasion of a friendly government. The Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff captured the importance of the military's role when he stated:

One of the fondest expressions around is that we can't be the world's policeman. But guess who gets called when suddenly someone needs a cop?

General Colin Powell²¹

The United States has a long history of conducting contingency operations to protect its national interests. From the raids on the Barbary Pirates in 1803, to the Marine Corps "Banana Wars" in the 1920's, to Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, the United States military has conducted contingency operations. In one well known study, the researchers found 215 occasions between 1946 and 1975 where the United States employed its armed forces as political instruments.²² There is a reason the term "gunboat diplomacy" has entered our lexicon.

Contingency operations in support of national policy and to protect national interests will continue. There is an operational need for the contingency army. However, in determining the structure and organization of the contingency army, it is important to understand the fundamental nature of such operations.

Contingency is a "term used in military planning to designate the possible employment of armed forces in hostilities that might break out at unexpected times or

places."²³ Given this definition and the role contingency operations play in supporting national policy, the primary characteristics of contingency operations emerge.

1. United States interests are at stake.
2. Generated by a crisis.
3. Pressure for a quick, clear victory.
4. Constrained sealift and airlift resources.
5. An uncertain mission, situation, and enemy.

The fact that United States interests and prestige are at stake emphasize the importance of the mission. Contingency operations are often tied to crisis situations and there will be pressure for a quick, clear victory. The contingency force must be able to deploy to theater and assemble decisive combat power rapidly. Strategic lift is constrained not only by the finite numbers available, but also by the short time between decision and execution.

The uncertainty of the mission, situation, and enemy is the salient characteristic of contingency operations. The operational planner does not know where, when, or against whom the force will be used. Possible missions cover the full spectrum of conflict from non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), to raids, to extended combat operations in a mid-intensity conflict. Although the force may key on certain more

likely threats or missions, it must be ready for them all.

"A great nation cannot fight in a small war."

The Duke of Wellington²⁴

The United States must view all conflicts as vitally important, and their outcome as decisive. National prestige and credibility are on the line whenever military forces are committed. In a general war, operations tend to ebb and flow. Setbacks are allowed if the final outcome is victory. In a contingency operation, under time pressure and media scrutiny, you may only get one chance to win quickly and convincingly.

Henry Asquith, leader of the British liberal party during the Boer War, fully grasped the significance of contingency operations to a nation. He stated, "The struggle now went much deeper than a mere question of asserting and maintaining our position in South Africa. It is our title to be known as a world power which is now upon trial."²⁵

The Army is charged with achieving the quick victory. The Army is the nation's primary landpower force and the service which conducts decisive ground combat operations to defeat the enemy. In a contingency operation involving ground combat, the other services basically transport the Army to, and

support the Army in, the decisive combat phase. Given this service responsibility, the Army must structure, equip, and train a credible contingency force.

The contingency army must appear credible to the world in order to deter potential enemies, regional aggression, and threats to United States interests. The force must seem credible to the domestic political leadership, if it is to be considered for employment. Finally, the contingency army must display credibility in actual combat operations against the enemy.

The United States cannot afford to be in the position of 19th century England. When asked if England presented a threat, the Prussian Chancellor is reported to have said:

If the British Army lands on the Prussian coast, I will send a policeman to arrest it.

Otto Von Bismarck²⁶

In summary, contingency operations are characterized by their unexpected, crisis nature, the rapid commitment of forces into an uncertain situation, and pressure for a quick, clear victory. In a contingency involving ground combat, the Army is charged with conducting the decisive combat. To accomplish this, the contingency army must be credible in the eyes of domestic political leaders, potential enemies, and battlefield opponents.

ANALYSIS: GENERAL

Numerous broad issues develop from a discussion of how a credible contingency army should be structured and organized. The issues have been narrowed to one for this monograph; should heavy forces be a part of the contingency army? To answer this question, it is necessary to first define the terms "heavy" and "light". For purposes of this paper, heavy and light are defined as opposite ends of a scale of potential combat power.

Combat power is determined by the effects of firepower, maneuver, and protection generated by the commander from assets organic to or supporting his organization.²⁷ Forces will be categorized as light or heavy based on their capability to generate combat power. Each unit occupies a discrete place on the combat power scale. A tank division, for example, has more combat power than a light infantry division. An armored formation can simply produce more firepower and maneuver effect while protecting itself better. The Tank Division is "heavier".

There are certain requisite qualities the contingency army must possess to be considered a credible force. This paper will summarize these qualities using the characteristics of the future army as set forth by General Vuono²⁸(i.e. the contingency

army must be versatile, lethal, and deployable). These three characteristics are the lens through which the contingency army will be examined in order to determine if heavy forces are needed.

ANALYSIS: VERSATILE

The contingency army must be versatile. It must be able to successfully conduct a wide range of missions, across the spectrum of conflict, and against all possible threat forces. Recent contingency operations in Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait certainly bears this out.

The range of possible contingency missions runs the gamut from a NEO, to a raid, to sustained combat operations. As the missions move along the scale from peacekeeping to warfighting, the contingency army must move along a parallel scale of increasing capability and combat power. The contingency army must have the ability to tailor its "weight" by adding capabilities and heavy forces as needed to achieve superior relative combat power for the specific mission.

The spectrum of conflict does not have a nicely defined zone for contingency operations. Low intensity conflict will be the case many times, however many third world regional powers are fully capable of mid

intensity conflict. In order to operate anywhere along the spectrum of conflict, the contingency army must have access to all the forces and capabilities in the Army as a whole.

The contingency army must be prepared to fight all possible threat forces. United States contingency forces cannot count on facing a poorly armed, unsophisticated enemy. There will be no great technological gap they can use as a moat to hide behind. The time when a British expeditionary force in the Sudan could use howitzers, machine guns, and rifles to kill 10,000 Dervishes who charged them waving spears is long gone.²⁹

Man portable anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, and long range artillery are now readily available on the world's arms market. Radios, small arms, and mines are easy to obtain. Tactical mobility gained from commercial pickup trucks and jeeps was demonstrated in Chad against Libyan forces.

The proliferation of modern arms and equipment has touched every region of the world. There are 38 developing nations with over 100 tanks, 38 with over 100 armored personnel carriers, and 31 third world nations have at least 100 field artillery pieces.³⁰

In addition to being well equipped, many third world armies have effective combined arms organizations

with diverse capabilities. Their organization contributes to their ability to generate increased combat power. As an example, the Nigerian Army is organized with:

One Armored Div, (4 AR, 1 Mech Bde).

One Composite Div, (1 ea Abn, AASLT, Amphib Bde).

Two MECH Div, (3 Mech Bde's each).

Each Nigerian Army Division has a field artillery brigade, engineer brigade, and Reconnaissance battalion.

It is clear that many third world countries have the capability to create substantial combat power. The United States contingency army would have to be further up the scale of combat power in order to defeat them. Although most of the third world threats pale in comparison with the total combat power of the United States military, combat power is relative to the enemy at the decisive point.

For example, a light airborne contingency force could have its hands full in Zaire. The 22,000 man Zairian Army is equipped with 60 tanks, 84 armored personnel carriers, 95 French AML-60 recon vehicles, and 128 field artillery pieces (including 130 mm and Multiple Rocket Launchers). The Zairian Army has the requisite mobility, firepower, and protection to create

considerable combat power. Relative to the airborne contingency force, the Zairian Army is a "heavy" force.

The Zairian army does not have to beat the entire United States Army, only the contingency force we put on the ground to oppose them. They do not even have to decisively defeat our force. Inflicting heavy casualties and subjecting the United States to intense, and perhaps adverse, media scrutiny may be a win in the contingency arena. The contingency force sent to Zaire must be able to generate superior combat power relative to the Zairian Army. To do this against an enemy armed with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery requires the mobility, firepower, and protection associated with heavy forces.

In summary, versatility is defined as the ability to adapt to many uses or functions; to be competent in many things.³¹ The contingency army must be seen as a credible force across the spectrum of missions, situation, and threats. Versatility demands the ability to generate combat power across the scale of combat power from light to heavy. The contingency army must be able to tailor the "weight" (combat power) of the force to the situation. To do this, heavy capabilities/forces must be available in the contingency army.

ANALYSIS: LETHAL

Lethality is the assured capability to defeat an opponent, winning as quickly as possible while preserving our most valued asset, the lives of our soldiers.³² Lethality is a product of combat power, derived from the maneuver effect, firepower effect, and protection effect generated by a force. The three components of combat power must be present and working together in order to create lethality.

Mobility enables you to maneuver. If one side has a mobility advantage (motorized over feet), they will have a superior maneuver effect relative to the other. Mobility allows you to mass firepower, set the tempo of operations, seize and exploit the initiative, and protect your force by moving/withdrawing. If the contingency army will conduct decisive combat operations, it must have mobility.

Firepower kills the enemy, destroys his means and will to fight and forces a decision. Firepower is derived from organic weapons, supporting weapons (e.g. CAS, attack helicopters), and supporting functions (e.g. intelligence, C3I). At the most basic level, our firepower must be able to find enemy targets, range them, and then defeat the enemy's protection efforts. If the contingency army is to be lethal enough to gain

a decisive victory, it must have the firepower to do so.

A force containing mobility and firepower will be ineffective if it does not survive long enough to put them to use. Survivability is protecting the force from the effects of enemy actions. A contingency force must operate independently; there will be no quick replacement of either men or equipment. A tailored force must have available all the capabilities that deployed with it. If the contingency force is to gain a quick victory, it must ensure it does not fall victim to a quick defeat.

Lethality, as a function of mobility, firepower, and survivability is always relative to your enemy. Commercial four wheel drive vehicles mounting machine guns and grenade launchers may not have much firepower or protection, but who are they facing? If you are a "leg infantry unit" and the enemy has these vehicles, he has gained superior relative combat power through tactical mobility. His maneuver effect is enhanced. He can quickly mass firepower at the decisive point and can protect his force by running from danger.

In Operation Just Cause in Panama, Task Force 4-6 Infantry, 5th Infantry Division, was the heavy task force. The unit consisted of two mechanized companies (equipped with M113 personnel carriers), one platoon of

M551 Sheridans, and one platoon of Marine Corps LAV-25's.

The M113 is a lightly armored vehicle mounting a 50 caliber machine gun. It is not normally viewed as a system which will create overwhelming combat power. However, given an enemy armed with small arms and protected by cotton shirts, the M113 gave the United States forces superior lethality. The personnel carrier proved invaluable in moving through and eliminating enemy roadblocks that light infantry and wheeled vehicles could not pass.³³ The personnel carriers were also instrumental in moving troops through enemy fire, bringing them up to the objectives, and repositioning forces rapidly. The M113 was effective in its own right, but was immeasurably more potent when teamed with the Sheridan airborne assault vehicle.

The M551 Sheridan used its armored protection to close with the enemy, and its firepower (152mm HEAT) to blow holes in the reinforced concrete walls of such critical enemy positions as the Commandancia.³⁴ In addition to destroying and intimidating the enemy, using the Sheridan meant reduced exposure for the infantry clearing the buildings.

The M113's and Sheridan's created superior lethality in Operation Just Cause, but they would not

work in other situations. Lethality is tailored to the threat. If the enemy has a tank battalion and a mechanized infantry battalion, two M113 companies and a Sheridan platoon are probably not the answer. However, if our two mechanized companies and the Sheridan platoon are operating with AH-64 helicopters, CAS, and field artillery support, they may be lethal enough to defend against the enemy while awaiting follow on forces.

Although a force can be made more lethal using many different means, a planner will inevitably consider using armor and mechanized infantry forces. Other systems may have one or two of the combat power elements (e.g. attack helicopters have mobility and firepower), but only armor and mechanized infantry embody all three. The architect of the German "Panzer" force, Field Marshal Heinz Guderian highlighted their inherent capabilities: "mechanized forces fight while in motion, their attack being a combination of fire, movement, and armor protection."³⁵

Lethality can be increased by a number of methods. For example, using electronic jammers to disrupt the enemy's fire control system degrades his firepower effects, and enhances your protection effort. This allows you to gain a relative combat power advantage over the enemy.

In short, lethality is the quality which will enable the contingency army to defeat the enemy. Lethality is the result of achieving superior relative combat power and is derived from mobility, firepower, and survivability. Superior lethality may be assured with a mechanized company in one case, a tank battalion or mechanized brigade may be needed in another. A force is made "heavier", moved up the scale of combat power, in order to become more lethal. Traditional "heavy" forces contain the qualities of mobility, firepower, and survivability needed to build lethality in the contingency army.

The British experience in the Boer War is instructive from the standpoint of contingency force lethality. From 1837 to 1898, in Asia, Africa, and Arabia, the British Army was involved in almost continuous combat. The people of Britain had had war on the cheap for half a century, small wars against savages, the rifle against the spear.³⁶ The British enjoyed superior lethality by virtue of being an industrialized, modern nation.

In 1899, the British sent out the largest overseas expeditionary force in their history to fight one of the world's smallest countries. The British Army, the press, and the general public expected a "walkover".

This expectation was dashed in a hail of long range fire from the Boer's modern Mauser rifles.

The British Army did not have superior lethality over the Boer Army. The British could not claim an advantage in any of the three components of lethality; firepower, mobility, or protection. The Boer Army was equipped with the latest magazine fed Mauser rifles, firing smokeless powder. The British Army had used magazine rifles and smokeless powder for several years, but had never faced an enemy who had them. British tactics developed for an enemy firing muskets proved disastrous against the "incessant drumming" of Boer Mauser fire.

The Boer's gained a decisive firepower advantage from their artillery. The Boer Army had the latest breech loading Krupp artillery which outranged the British artillery. The Boer artillery fired smokeless powder which made detection and counter-fires almost impossible. Parts of the British force still used muzzle loading cannon. The Boers had purchased the experimental Vickers-Maxims "Pom-Pom", which was a rapid firing one pound gun. The British Army had no comparable weapon.

In addition to superior firepower, virtually the entire Boer force was mounted. This advantage in tactical mobility led to a superior maneuver effect.

The Boers used their mobility to keep the initiative; they decided when and where to give battle. Boer forces could disperse, move long distances, and then mass quickly for a new engagement. The Boer's, however, did far more than moving and shooting. They were diligent in their actions to protect their force.

Survivability was perhaps the Boer's most significant advantage. The individual Boer was adept at using cover and concealment, they were virtually invisible to the British. When the Boers stood to fight, they fought from slit trenches and rifle pits. The Boers also used barbed wire as an obstacle in front of their entrenched defenses. Individual field guns were placed in concealed, protected positions. This was in marked contrast to the British batteries laid out in perfect order on flat, open ground. All these measures gave the Boers a decided edge in protecting their force from the British, who advanced against the positions in formation and at a steady pace.

The British lost 700 killed in action, 3,000 wounded, and several thousand captured soldiers in the first three months of the war.³⁷ The period 10-17 December was the most disastrous for the British Army in the 19th century and was dubbed "Black Week".

The battlefield lessons were harsh, and fully documented by the media. The British press was present

in strength and quickly reported every battlefield reverse to their public. One of the leading war correspondents of the day, George Steevens of the Daily Mail, witnessed the British Army retreat after being beaten at Ladysmith. He wrote, "What shame! All ashamed for England. Once more she was a source of laughter to her enemies."³⁸

The British expeditionary force was not lethal enough to be assured of defeating the Boers, winning quickly, and preserving the lives of British soldiers. The Boers had the edge in firepower, mobility, and protection, and generated greater lethality at the decisive point.

ANALYSIS: DEPLOYABLE

Too often deployment is designed solely to rapidly place forces on the battlefield with no regard for what they will have to do when they arrive.³⁹

FM 100-6, Large Unit Operations

The contingency army must be deployable. It must be able to project combat power from its CONUS base to literally any point in the world. Simply moving conventional forces with advance notice and a timetable is hard enough. But contingencies are crisis situations which require a rapid response. The

contingency army must not only be able to move to any point in the world, but do it quickly.

Contingency forces are also expected to win quickly. This sets up the tension inherent in contingency force structure decisions and contingency deployment planning. If the force is "light" enough to deploy quickly and easily, it may not be "heavy" enough to create the combat power to win.

As you move a force up the scale towards "heavy", it does require more resources to deploy. But simply going down the combat power scale until the force is light enough to lift is not the answer. The resulting force may not be heavy enough to fight and win. The contingency army must be tailored using the factors of METT-T, not arbitrary transportation constraints.

Deployability is seen as the achilles heel of heavy force participation in contingency operations. The critics acknowledge the need for heavy force capabilities in the contingency army, but argue that deploying them is just too hard to do. They recite the standard litany of problems; the declining U.S. merchant marine, insufficient strategic lift, declining budgets, and the sheer size of modern armies. This argument shows a lack of understanding of the deployability issue. There are three broad areas of misunderstanding.

The first is summarized with the phrase, deployability does not equal transportability. Deployability does not just equal lift requirements (e.g. square footage on a ship, number of sorties). Lift is only one of the variables which determine a unit's deployability. The organization's structure, location, training, experience, readiness, and mental attitude also determine its ability to deploy.

The most important factor in a unit's deployability is the mental attitude and cohesion of the soldiers. Deployability requires a force in readiness, both physically and mentally. Soldiers must be prepared to quickly make the psychological transition from peace to war. Training and experience build an "expeditionary" mindset and fosters cohesion which produces true readiness. Heavy forces must participate in the contingency training and experiences in order to develop as expeditionary warriors.

The importance of unit cohesion is emphasized in all writings on the moral domain of battle. Unit cohesion cannot be mandated, it grows out of shared hardships. Napoleon is reported to have said, "Soldiers have to eat soup together for a long time before they are ready to fight."⁴⁰ The heavy forces have to be an integral part of the contingency army in

order to share the hardships, and develop the necessary cohesion.

The second misunderstanding about deployability is that "heavy" always means an armored division. Relative combat power, not shipping weight, dictates how heavy a force is for a particular contingency. Each contingency force will be tailored for the situation. The heavy portion of the force could be a motorized company, an AH-64 helicopter company, or a tank platoon. In Panama, the heavy Task Force was two mechanized infantry companies, one platoon of Sheridans, and one platoon of LAV-25's. This force created superior combat power relative to the enemy, and was well within the capability of the United States to deploy with airlift.

Even contingencies that would require traditional heavy forces can be supported with existing strategic airlift. In a Military Review article entitled, "Deployable Armor Today", the author proposes using the armored cavalry regiment as a contingency force.⁴¹

He advocates leading the deployment flow with a single squadron of 38 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicles and six mortar tracks. This echelon would include the support vehicles and logistics to make the force self sufficient and requires only ten C-5B, and twelve C-141B sorties to deploy. The second echelon brings in

the howitzer battery, ammunition, and additional support capability. Three C-5B and six C-141B sorties are required to deploy the second echelon.

The armored cavalry squadron with its howitzer battery has the firepower, mobility, and protection to develop considerable combat power. It is a heavy force, relative to many threats, and is capable of deploying rapidly.

The final misunderstanding is that the entire contingency army should be a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Only with unlimited strategic mobility assets could all contingency forces be called rapid deployment forces. As an example, the mechanized division in the contingency army is not part of the RDF, although some of its companies could be earmarked to deploy with the RDF. The RDF is only one component of power projection.

The power projection process consists of four different sets of forces: rapid deployment, light reinforcement, heavy reinforcement, and sustainment forces. The rapid deployment forces are the first to arrive in the area of operation, their emphasis is on the speed of deployment, not mass. The RDF make the initial assault and seizes the lodgement area.

The light reinforcement forces (LRF) are next. They expand the lodgement, secure it for follow on

forces, and conduct initial combat operations. The RDF and LRF will be augmented with heavy forces to achieve the required lethality.

Next come the deliberate reinforcement forces. These are the heaviest units, both in terms of combat power and transportation requirements. These units could be any size, up to and including armor and mechanized divisions. These are considered the "forces of decision" in an extended campaign or expedition.

The power projection process phases in forces, with the heaviest forces arriving last. This supports contingency operations doctrine where traditional heavy organizations such as armor and mechanized divisions are given more time to get to the fight. These heavy units do not play a decisive role until the fourth phase of a five phase contingency operation (i.e. deployment, initial combat actions, force buildup, decisive combat operations, and redeployment).⁴²

In summary, deployability is the ability to move quickly to any point in the world, and create the combat power necessary to defeat the enemy. Deployability is determined by many variables, chief among them the mental attitude and cohesion of the soldiers. Heavy forces are no less mentally ready or cohesive than light forces.

There will be heavy forces present in almost every contingency operation. Most heavy contingency forces are well within realistic strategic lift constraints. Even large heavy organizations can be transported to the theater in time to perform their decisive role in the fourth phase of a contingency operation.

ANALYSIS: HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

The American response to the invasion of South Korea in June, 1950, contains many of the characteristics of contingency operations. This example further highlights the capabilities needed in a credible contingency army. This brief historical vignette will focus on the initial United States combat troops committed, Task Force Smith. TF Smith was formed from the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, based in Japan. The task force consisted of two rifle companies, one half of headquarters company, a recoilless rifle platoon, and a 4.2 inch mortar section. The 406 members of TF Smith were joined in Korea by six 105mm howitzers and 108 men from the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion.

The characteristics of contingency operations were all evident in June of 1950. United States interests were at stake as the world watched our response to this communist aggression against a free

country. The unexpected invasion and the possible fall of the Republic of South Korea created the crisis situation which forced decisions under pressure.

In the crisis atmosphere there was a push for the quick deployment of United States troops to signal our resolve and possibly deter further aggression. The commander of TF Smith was notified of the mission at 2230 hours on 30 June. At 0805 the next morning, the TF was assembled at Itazuke Air Base for movement to Korea.

Strategic airlift and sealift was virtually nonexistent. Only six Air Force C-54 transport planes were available to airlift the Task Force. Follow on units of the 24th Infantry Division had to commandeered Japanese freighters and LST's to make their way to Korea.⁴³

Upon arrival in Korea, the situation faced by TF Smith typifies the uncertainty of situation and enemy which is the salient characteristic of contingency operations. The guidance given the commander of TF Smith by MG Dean, Commander, 24th Infantry Division, illustrates the situation.

When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon. We want to stop the North Koreans as far north as possible. Contact General Church. If you can't locate him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can. Sorry I can't give you more information. That's all I've got.⁴⁴

TF Smith dug in north of Osan on 5 July and waited for the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA). The first NKPA unit was a column of 33 T-34 tanks which went through TF Smith with a loss of only three tanks immobilized. An hour later two regiments of the NKPA 4th Division hit TF Smith, and the American defenders were forced from their position. The withdrawal became a rout. The men of TF Smith threw away their helmets, rifles, even boots, in order to run faster from the advancing enemy. They abandoned their crew served weapons and left their wounded.⁴⁵ The next morning TF Smith could account for only 185 of its 406 original members.

In an attempt to determine what happened to TF Smith, the lens of versatility, lethality, and deployability will be used to examine this contingency operation. TF Smith was not versatile enough to adapt to the unexpected situation and threat they were faced with. The 24th Infantry Division was performing occupation duty in Japan and did not envision doing anything else. As late as the spring of 1949, the primary mission of the 24th Infantry Division was to occupy the island of Kyushu. Its secondary mission was to train.⁴⁶ The men of Task Force Smith did an adequate job as occupation soldiers, but they were not trained, equipped, or ready for combat.

When TF Smith was committed to battle, it could not generate the lethality needed to defeat the enemy. Not only was it impossible for TF Smith to gain a decisive victory, it did not have the combat power to save itself from decisive defeat. TF Smith did not have an advantage in any of the three components of lethality: mobility, firepower, or protection.

TF Smith had no tactical mobility advantage over an NKPA force equipped with tanks and truck transport. In fact, TF Smith had to use scrounged Korean vehicles just to get to their defensive positions. The NKPA created a superior maneuver effect relative to TF Smith. Their mobility enabled the NKPA to set the tempo by seizing and exploiting the initiative. The commander of TF Smith did not even have sufficient tactical mobility to break contact and protect his force.

TF Smith did not have the firepower to be a lethal force. The two recoilless rifles, two 4.2 inch mortars, six 105mm howitzers, and scattered bazooka teams were no match in quantity or quality to the enemy. Although the NKPA was known to be leading their attack with tanks, no American armor was sent with TF Smith. There were few tanks in the whole of Eighth Army to begin with. Due to a lack of training areas and the "occupation" mission, the tank company

authorized to each regiment had been eliminated from the tables of organization.⁴⁷

The weapons organic to TF Smith were "lighter" than the enemy they faced. The 24th Infantry Division had not been issued any of its authorized 90mm antitank guns.⁴⁸ The 75mm recoilless rifles and bazookas of TF Smith scored numerous direct hits on the NPKA tanks, but did not damage them. The howitzers were effective in a direct fire mode using high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds, but they had deployed with only six HEAT rounds. The normal high explosive rounds bounced off the tanks.⁴⁹

Antitank mines could have wreaked havoc on the NKPA force as it rolled down the narrow road through TF Smith's position. But TF Smith had no antitank mines; there were none in the occupation army of Japan. Old, poorly maintained communications equipment meant the supporting artillery could not communicate with the infantry to bring effective fires on the enemy. Friendly aviation could have been used to add to the firepower effect and "heavy up" TF Smith, but bad weather and communication problems prevented them from flying support.⁵⁰

TF Smith was not deployable, and it had nothing to do with weight or outsized cargo. It resulted from the lack of a warrior ethos and weak unit cohesion. In the

words of one historian, "American forces stationed in Japan after the second world war resembled a colonial army; they were concerned with administrative duties, not poised and ready for commitment to battle."⁵¹

The soldiers of TF Smith did not believe that war was possible, they had joined the army for every reason except fighting. When they faced the NKPA, they could not make the mental adjustment from peace to war. What unit cohesion there was had been lost when the 24th Infantry Division was filled out for deployment with 4,723 men stripped from other units. TF Smith did not possess the expeditionary attitude and unit cohesion vital to successful contingency operations.

TF Smith was barely transportable. The decision was made to airlift the first unit to Korea for the sake of speed. But with only six transports available, men and equipment had to be left behind from this already small, light force. Some light tanks were assigned to the infantry divisions in Japan, but the tanks could not be airlifted, and the division was still scrounging Japanese LST's when TF Smith was deployed.

American contingency forces in Japan were not credible, therefore, they did not deter the NKPA from attacking South Korea. American leaders themselves were unsure of the adequacy of the forces available.

General MacArthur later referred to his commitment of TF Smith as "that arrogant display of strength" which he hoped would fool the enemy into thinking that a much larger force was at hand.⁵² TF Smith was not a credible contingency force, it was not versatile, lethal, or deployable, it was simply all the United States had.

CONCLUSION

The end of the Cold War has brought sweeping changes in the world's political, economic, and social environment. As a result, the United States is reviewing its role as a superpower and the national strategy used to protect national interests. The military will reduce its strength, re-orient its strategy, and restructure its forces in response to the new situation.

The United States Army will become CONUS based, globally oriented, and regionally focused. Contingency operations will play a larger role and contingency forces will become more important. Already, the structure and organization of the contingency army is being revamped. The role of heavy forces in the contingency army remains a critical question in the ongoing debate. The correct answers must be found and implemented to avoid repeating the anguish of Task

Force Smith, or the internal feud over the Light Infantry Division. The focus must remain on building a contingency army that can win, not simply avoid a loss.

To win quickly and decisively, the contingency army must create superior relative combat power at the decisive point. Remaining versatile across the spectrum of conflict requires the contingency army to "tailor its weight", its combat power, to any point on the combat power scale. To be lethal against well armed third world countries, the contingency army must be able to increase its combat power to be heavier than the enemy. To be deployable, all parts of the contingency army must be part of the "force in being", trained, mentally ready, and cohesive.

A mistake in the original concentration of the army can hardly be made good in the entire course of the campaign.

Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff.⁵³

Just as von Moltke was concerned with concentrating his combat power at the decisive point for the campaign, today's contingency planner must be concerned with creating superior relative combat power at his decisive point. Contingency forces must win quickly and decisively; they will only get one chance. An error in the original force tailored for the

operation cannot be corrected in the middle of the fight to gain the lodgement.

The contingency planner must have heavy forces available to him for use in tailoring the weight of his force. Putting an upper limit on the level of combat power the commander can build into his force, by denying him heavy forces, ensures his failure at some point. The contingency army must have heavy forces to be truly versatile and lethal.

Pulling heavy forces from outside the contingency army as needed for operations ignores the realities of the moral domain of war. Expeditionary mindset, cohesion, and the ability to thrive in uncertainty cannot be handed to soldiers as they board the aircraft. The contingency army must already contain heavy forces to be truly deployable.

IMPLICATIONS:

Incorporating heavy forces into the contingency army has implications primarily in the areas of organization and institutional attitudes. The heavy units must be organized and trained on the lines of the current light contingency force. This may mean a mechanized infantry division with one "ready" brigade on a six hour alert to deploy by air. Another brigade may have its equipment (or a second set) always

uploaded on fast sealift, ready to steam in eight hours. At the national level, POMCUS sites and equipment sets pre-positioned on shipping near possible areas of employment are a possibility. These ideas are not new. We should simply apply the methods now used by other contingency forces to the heavy component of the contingency army.

Changing the Army's institutional mindset towards contingency forces will be more difficult. The traditional light contingency force has claimed this turf as their own. The Army's heavy forces have focused on Europe and shunned the contingency role. Both camps will have to reassess their role in contingency operations. A good first step would be to use the "lessons learned" from the heavy/light mix in recent contingency operations, to educate the Army's officer corps.

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