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NATO OUT-OF-AREA OPERATION; NECESSARY OF NOT?

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by

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LTCOL USMC

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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but can be acted upon by nations, either unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally.

Abstract of

NATO Out-of-Area Operations; Necessary or Not?

Some believe NATO should establish a multinational reaction force which could be used to respond to security threats outside Europe. NATO currently has its plate full with the uncertainties and instability that exist within its designated area. Although the Soviet threat is diminishing, instability in Eastern Europe is increasing.

A review of three out-of-area disputes is conducted to determine if the lessons learned can provide guidance for future responses. The disputes during the Cold War era portrays the divergent interest of nations who have legitimate out-of-area interests, but who are not supported by the other nations, for fear of being guilty by association or for fear of being drawn into a conflict where they do not believe their survival interest are threatened.

As Europe enters a new era NATO must continue to provide common defense. The uncertainties and instabilities that exist in its area provides a vehicle for the nations to retain a common thread. Without common interest, it will be difficult to get a consensus on conducting out-of-area operations. Therefore, if NATO is to remain a viable organization, out-of-area operations should only be discussed in the NATO arena, but can be acted upon by nations either bilaterally or multilaterally.

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NATO OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS; NECESSARY OR NOT?

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

"There is no place in the future for an inward looking NATO, anymore than there is for an inward looking European Community. We have all this rhetoric about a common security policy as part of the political union, yet when it comes to something practical which affects us fundamentally, some countries are hesitant. We cannot expect the United States to go on bearing major military and defense burdens world wide, acting in effect as the world's policeman."

Margaret Thatcher
Former British Prime Minister¹

Enormous changes have occurred on the European continent since 1989. The world has witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall; terms like glasnost and perestroika have become household words; Germany has unified; the Warsaw Treaty Organization has ceased to exist; Eastern European countries are attempting to establish internal stability and prosperity; and the Cold War has ended.

The changes in Europe have ushered in different uncertainties and instabilities. Within Russia, the Baltic Republics, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union satellite states there is domestic turmoil, such as ethnic problems, border disputes, power struggles, civil strife, and the resurgence of nationalism. The North Atlantic Treaty

Organization's (NATO) designated area is therefore extremely volatile.

NATO has provided common defense for the past 45 years, and although a myriad of challenges exist, NATO is attempting to keep pace with the changes in Europe and also develop future strategy that will ensure NATO remains a viable organization for the 1990's and beyond. (See Appendix I for NATO membership)

In December 1990, General Galvin, the current Supreme Allied Commander Europe indicated that he was proposing that, "the Atlantic Alliance adopt a new 'Fire Brigade' strategy in the wake of the Cold War, preparing a force for rapid deployment in trouble-spots outside Europe, like the current crisis in the Persian Gulf."²

Accomplishing SACEUR's proposal, or Mrs. Thatcher's desire to have NATO to do more than look inward, will require more than simply having the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or Defense Planning Committee (DPC) meet and agree that NATO forces could participate in out-of-area operations. A revision of Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO charter would be required if NATO forces, operating under NATO command, are to be used outside the designated NATO area.

The purpose of the Alliance has been to defend Europe against aggression by the Soviet Union. Since the threat from the Soviet Union is dissipating, should the NATO forces participate out-of-area? I submit that NATO's European security plate is full. Furthermore, in a post-Cold War era

NATO does not need to project power beyond its designated area in order to provide European security.

This paper will briefly describe the purpose NATO's founders envisioned and the strategy that supported that purpose. The subsequent chapters will focus on the response and criticism made in past out-of-area situations, the problems caused if NATO adopts a strategy where they would project force out-of-area, and the future European security agenda on NATO's plate. The operational aspects of future NATO strategy that will benefit those who practice the operational art will also be addressed.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

NATO'S PURPOSE

After 1945, the United States (US) and key Western European governments recognized a mutual interest in the creation of a security arrangement to deter Soviet aggression. Therefore, through endless efforts it seemed that, "the Alliance sprang naturally and almost inevitably from a common concern with a common heritage that had a chance to survive only through common support."¹

On April 4, 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, and since that time, the Alliance has played a vital role in ensuring that the democracy and heritage of each of its member countries were protected through sound defensive policies. An excellent description of the scope of the treaty is provided in NATO's Facts and Figures, "The North Atlantic Treaty is the political framework for an international Alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel it, should it occur. It provides for continuous cooperation and consultation in political, economic, and military fields. It is of indefinite duration."²

Manfred Woerner, the current Secretary General of NATO indicates that the Alliance changed as the politics of Europe evolved. He states, "in the past 12 months the Alliance has affirmed that it is a political Alliance whose primary task is to be an agent of change."³ Although the Alliance was created

with a political nature, during the Cold War years NATO's main focus was on the defense of Europe against aggression by the Soviet Union.

DEFENSIVE NATO STRATEGY

For the past 20 years NATO's defensive strategy included a flexible and balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. These responses subject to appropriate political control, were designed to deter aggression and thus preserve peace, but should aggression unhappily occur, to maintain the security and integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty area, with the concept of forward defense.⁴

One aspect of forward defense that received key attention during the past 20 years was the NATO national corps arrayed side by side from north to south (layer-caked) on the inter-German border. As a consequence of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, reduction of US forces, and of course German unification, the "layer-caked" forward defense no longer exists. Another key aspect of forward defense was rapid reinforcement. All NATO commands benefitted from this aspect. Each Commander was aware of the reinforcement plan, therefore, they could plan their defenses accordingly. It is surmised that rapid reinforcement will continue to be one of the highlights of the Alliance.

Indeed, the NATO strategy of flexible response and forward deployed forces has served its purpose. The strategy

has aided NATO in being the "shield against aggression" that President Harry Truman envisioned when he signed the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949.⁵ President Truman also envisioned American entry into the Atlantic Alliance as a means of buying time for the European nations to establish themselves politically and economically.⁶ The current democratic and economic viability of western Europe is proof that the NATO strategy established to support the defensive alliance was a good strategy. Lord Carrington, the sixth Secretary General of NATO apparently also believes the strategy chosen was a good strategy. He states, "No one can prove that NATO has prevented a Third World War, but he would be a brave man who maintained that the unparalleled prosperity of western Europe, due to more than forty years of uninterrupted peace, had nothing to do with the maintenance of our security."⁷

NATO MILITARY STRATEGY RE-EXAMINED

The face of Europe has changed drastically during the past two years. "The most important recent changes in Eastern Europe include: the demise of Soviet-imposed regimes; steps toward democratization, including free elections; increased recognition of basic human rights; movement toward free market economies; and Soviet agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary for complete troop withdrawals by the end of June 1991."⁸

The nations of NATO have realized that to continue to provide security and support to the aforementioned changes they must reshape NATO in such a way that it will be a viable organization in the 1990's and beyond. Therefore, during July 1990 the leaders of the NATO nations issued the London Declaration which provides NATO new strategic guidance. The following is a list of items deduced from the Declaration which will provide some insight into the ongoing process of updating NATO strategy. The North Atlantic Alliance will:

- remain a defensive Alliance;
- defend the territory of the members;
- field highly mobile and versatile forces made up of multinational corps with national units;
- retain the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
- move away from "forward defense", where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence, and;
- modify "flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, which will become "truly weapons of last resort."

In light of the fact that the Soviets continue to produce SS-18, SS-24, and SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles, Blackjack and Backfire and Bear-H bombers, and Delta IV nuclear submarines, NATO must continue to maintain a viable defense in this period of uncertainty and instability. NATO must also be able to respond to those changes which have already occurred and determine, based on the strategic

guidance provided by the London Declaration, where NATO should be in the future.

General Galvin indicates that NATO is changing. It is putting more emphasis on crisis management. He also indicates that NATO envisions smaller flexible forces with less on nuclear weapons.⁹ At a recent NATO symposium General Eide, Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO also maintained that NATO is changing. He indicated that NATO is working towards greater versatility and multi-national forces with a leaner command organization.¹⁰ Although Europe is changing, NATO still faces a myriad of challenges. An imperative challenge facing NATO today is to make certain that the four decades of relative stability and freedom from war in Europe, won at great economic and individual cost, are safeguarded in the unpredictable period ahead.¹¹

Thus far a brief description has been provided about the purpose and strategy of NATO. Also, it has been pointed out that NATO is re-examining its strategy, based on the strategic guidance provided in the London Declaration. Now let us turn to a review of past out-of-area disputes and assess the lessons learned, to determine the risk NATO would take should it accept the additional burden of out-of-area operations.

CHAPTER III

NATO OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS

Since 1949, NATO has deterred Soviet aggression, and because of NATO's effectiveness within the European theater, most of the crises bearing on the interest of the Atlantic allies have taken place beyond Europe.¹ The Alliance has been able to consult and discuss out-of-area issues, and has weathered the storms of out-of-area disputes because they have maintained a "sense of priority in their security calculations. The survival and efficient functioning of NATO has always mattered more to the NATO members than the specific out-of-area situation."²

Because of the recent Persian Gulf War, the diminishing Soviet threat, and changes in Europe, it has been speculated by some writers, that NATO leaders have been searching for a new purpose. As part of that new purpose the writers suggest that NATO forces should participate in out-of-area operations. Additionally, as indicated in the Introduction, SACEUR has proposed that an out-of-area capability be developed in NATO.

Prior to review of past out-of-area disputes, it should be pointed out that in order for NATO to conduct out-of-area operations at least two Articles of its charter would need revising. Article 6 establishes the boundaries of the Alliance. Article 6 states:

"...an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the

Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of and of the parties in North Atlantic area North of the Tropic of Cancer...or the Mediterranean Sea or..."³

Whereas Article 6 establishes the boundaries for NATO, Article 5 obliges nations to take action. Article 5 states:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them...will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area...."⁴

As a collective body, NATO nations would not be obligated to act out-of-area without Article 5 being revised to include wider security interest other than their immediate territorial defense. Therefore, NATO nations who have no outside interests or feel that out-of-area threats might not be vital to their survival will probably not agree to a change in the NATO Charter.

THE SUEZ CRISIS 1956

The Suez crisis is the first case for review. It involved Britain, France, and the US in an out-of-area dispute with Egypt. Each of the Allies had informed the other on numerous occasions of their concerns about Egypt's leader, Abdul Nasser. Britain viewed Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal as an unraveling of British influence in the Middle East. The French linked him to the ongoing crisis in Algeria which ultimately lead to the demise of French influence in

North Africa. "From the British and French perspective, Egypt's nationalization of the Canal was a straightforward act of aggression with serious implications for European access to oil...."⁵

The US was concerned that the dispute over the Suez Canal would undermine its influence with key nations of the Third World who were members of the global containment network, such as India and Pakistan. The Eisenhower Administration was pushing for a negotiated settlement, and particularly thought armed conflict should be the last resort. In a reply to a letter from Britain's Foreign Secretary, President Eisenhower repeated his unequivocal opposition to the British and French mobilization and his unwillingness to provide support for it. He stated:

"I must tell you frankly that American opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force, particularly when it does not seem that every possible means of protecting our vital interest has been exhausted without result...I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible means. The use of forces would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy."⁶

Appendix II provides a list of five types of out-of-area disputes as identified by Stuart and Tow in Limits of Alliance. The Suez crisis fits the "guilty by association," the "domaine reserve," and the "out-of-area preoccupation" types.

What is clear from the dispute is that the US had particular interests which were different from those of

Britain and France, and these interest constrained the British and French from acting in their domaine réservé. The US interest included the fear that the American public would react adversely if it appeared that allies were pursuing independent military initiatives in the Third World at the expense of NATO or US interest.' In other words the US did not want to be guilty by association. Britain, on the other hand, expected support from her US ally. She felt that the US would not publicly humiliate her closeth ally; after all, the Middle East was of vital interest to Britain and France, why would it also not be vital to the other NATO allies. Although the British, French, and Americans had been discussing their concerns about Abdul Nasser, the nations did not consult at NATO before Britain and France took military action.

Therefore, the first lesson learned from the Suez crisis is that within NATO nations, there will be divergent views about out-of-area vital interest, and these views can hamper a rapid response. For example, the recent Southwest Asia crisis required an immediate response. NATO expressed strong and unanimous opposition to Saddam Hussein's action, and supported United Nations resolutions condemning the invasion and annexation of Kuwait.* However, NATO's reluctance to provide a direct military response immediately reflected the widely differing notions about the importance of out-of-area vital interest. The lack of an immediate response prompted the words of Mrs. Thatcher, that was used in the Introduction. Many of the NATO nations simply did not associate the US vital

interest to their own survival interest. Additionally, just as in the Suez crisis, key European Allies expressed differences with the US over the question of how much diplomacy was required before the western community opted for war in the Gulf.⁹

Another situation during the recent Gulf crisis that reflects divergent views is the issue of perception of effort. It was perceived by some nations that other nations would not support the crisis as they should. For example, intense debate went on in European countries over whether NATO should support Turkey if she were attacked. It was perceived that Germany was hesitant in supporting her World War I ally, and the Turkish reaction was one of disbelief. Turkey's President Turgut Ozal claimed on German television, that the Germans had completely lost its fighting spirit.¹⁰

During the same period as the Suez crisis, the Soviet military invaded Hungary, and the other NATO allies claimed that the Suez crisis made it impossible for NATO to focus its attention on the Soviet threat in Eastern Europe and develop a common position against Moscow's behavior. It was also contended that Britain and France had weakened the Alliance's ability to respond militarily in the event that chaos had spilled across the Central Front.¹¹

Therefore, the second lesson learned from the Suez crisis is that NATO nations will respond when they feel their vital interest are being threatened by events out-of-area. They normally negotiate responses bilaterally or multilaterally,

and they might even consult with other NATO members, but they will respond. In the recent Gulf War, for example, the US, Britain, and France took immediate action. Through the consultation process, the US requested aid from other NATO nations. Some NATO forces were deployed within NATO's current boundaries to defend Turkey from possible aggression, and other countries whose constitutions prohibit military action outside Europe, provided forces to the Mediterranean to replace the US naval forces that were sent to the Persian Gulf. Therefore, NATO forces were heavily preoccupied with the Gulf crisis, and unless reinforcements were available, the defensive posture of NATO was at risk. The Gulf War situation shows how NATO forces could quickly become over extended, and if NATO were to assume an additional responsibility for out-of-area operations, because of the reduction of forces, they would be forced to adopt a "Fire Brigade" strategy.

THE GULF CRISIS OF 1987

The second out-of-area dispute reviewed also shows the extent to which events outside the Treaty area can affect the vital common interest of the NATO members. It provides an indication of the importance of NATO training and procedures and suggests a possible alternative to NATO taking on the added burden of out-of-area operations.

It was not until the seventh year of the Iraq-Iran War, that increased attacks on shipping traffic created a crisis atmosphere among the NATO nations. "Various actions were

taken individually, both by the US and by several European countries, to protect shipping, and steps were taken by some of the countries concerned to coordinate their operations bilaterally and multilaterally."¹² However, NATO did not collectively respond. In fact, when Mr. Weinberger asked for Allied support, NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington emphasized that the call for assistance should be considered outside the formal NATO framework: "What happens in the Persian Gulf has a very considerable effect on the members of the Alliance. But, when you get to doing anything about it in military terms, or in planning terms, then that has to be done either in a different forum or bilaterally."¹³

Unilateral and bilateral action was taken. The US and UK reflagged and protected the Kuwaiti ships, and once other European nations shipping was affected, they also decided to provide assistance. Initially, the British and French desired to conduct operations separately, however, as the threat to shipping increased, so did the spirit of cooperation. The European nations had deployed mine clearing capability and they also protected their civilian shipping. "In keeping with past patterns, the three principal powers of NATO therefore worked in parallel to protect western interest rather than under a formal regime of cooperation."¹⁴ The European governments that contributed to the Gulf Armada did so on a unilateral basis, but coordination was carried out under the auspices of the WEU.

The Gulf Crisis of 1987 fits several of the out-of-area types discussed by Stuart and Tow. The US sought direct or indirect support from the Alliance members, however, at first the US requests for support were rebuffed. The rebuff highlighted the fundamental differences of opinion among the NATO allies regarding the nature of the threat beyond Europe. Also, any assets sent to the Gulf were not available for immediate NATO use.

Although NATO did not respond as a collective body, some NATO nations did respond. Therefore, one of the lessons that can be learned from the Gulf crisis is that bilateral dialogue on out-of-area issues produces results. It produced results for the Gulf crisis of 1987, it certainly produced results in the recent Gulf War, and it could possibly continue to produce results as long as NATO consults on out-of-area issues.

The second lesson learned from this crisis is that European nations found that they had the capability to coordinate and implement a plan to support their interests beyond Europe. The Western European Union (WEU) coordinated the naval efforts in both the 1987 and 1990 Gulf crises. The WEU, since its revival in early 1980's has become competent in matters relating to out-of-area problems. Mr. Stuart indicates that it is easier to achieve military cooperation within the WEU than within NATO for three reasons:

- Because of the smaller size of the WEU and WEU excludes the traditional out-of-area critics;

- Because the WEU Treaty has no geographic delimitations; and

-Because intra-European consensus is sometimes easier to achieve than trans-Atlantic consensus because the US continues to approach extra-European security issues from a great, global power point of view while its European allies, for all of their dependence on overseas trade and overseas sources of energy and resources, are more inclined to view such crises from the point of view of middle, regional powers.¹⁵

As the European Community (EC) comes into prominence as Europe charts its new course, the WEU could fit into the EC security picture. "The European Community's charter forbids it from dealing with defense matters and some members...will resist altering that structure."¹⁶ (See Appendix I for EC's Membership) Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd of Britain has suggested that the WEU could be a bridge between the EC and the US.¹⁷

The last out-of-area dispute that will be discussed will reiterate the difficulties inherent to out-of-area issues. Although the Gulf war was successful, many of the same types of disputes seen in the Suez and Persian Gulf crises also appeared in the Gulf War of 1990-1991.

RECENT GULF WAR

NATO, although not directly involved in the Gulf War, participated in ways that certainly helped the US lead coalition to be successful. The closest direct involvement for NATO was the deployment of the air component of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force to Turkey. However, NATO provided a key political forum for the US request for support from the NATO and European nations. All but two of the NATO nations

provided some form of support. General Galvin indicates that the NATO Alliance assisted substantially:

- approximately 90 percent of airlift and deployment aircraft were supported as they transited through bases in Germany, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK).

- Canada, France, Italy and the UK sent combat air units that participated daily.

- France and Britain deployed large ground forces.

- The Dutch provided Air Defense batteries to help defend Israel.

- Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany provided outstanding transportation assistance to US deployment of VII Corps.¹⁸

Douglas T. Stuart in his study for the Strategic Studies Institute indicates that the bases for the common Western position was political condemnation backed by an embargo, but as the January 15 deadline approached, the common Alliance policy tended to fall between a US-UK bloc which was preparing for war and a European-Canadian bloc which was scrambling to find a diplomatic formula which could preempt a conflict in the Gulf.¹⁹

The lessons learned from the recent Gulf War show that even in 1991 there are divergent interest among NATO members. Although NATO's current structure provides for consultation about out-of-area threats to security, the recent Gulf crisis clearly shows that it took action between sovereign nations to produce results. Another lesson is that when events occur outside of NATO's designated area that affects the security of

its member nation, there are organizations and coalitions outside of NATO that can coordinate and conduct operations.

Therefore, during the period of change in Europe no reason exist for NATO forces to be overtaxed with the security burden of out-of-area operations. NATO's plate is currently full with efforts to reduce its force structure, and at the same time maintain high quality military forces that are able to counterbalance residual Soviet military capability, or any other military crisis in the NATO area.

NATO MUST FOCUS ON EUROPE

There are several reasons why NATO's focus should remain on Europe. First, no one could deny that the diminishing Soviet threat has made the prospect of war in Europe lower today than at anytime during the Cold War era. But, despite the promise of arms reductions, the Soviets still have 630,000 troops in Eastern Europe.²⁰ When all Soviet forces are removed from the former Soviet satellite countries the numbers will be significantly reduced. Yet, the Soviet union will remain the largest military power in Europe. The Soviet conventional and nuclear arsenal exceeds those of any other individual nation of the region. General Galvin, in his article, 'A Strategy for the Future,' stated, "In the west we have some modernization. The Soviets have upgraded their nuclear capable artillery, and so have we. The Soviets have modernized their aircraft, so have we. But, we have not modernized the one single, ground-to-ground missile that we

have--the lance. On the other hand the FROG, the SCUD, the SS-21, and if it comes back the SS-23 have all been improved.²¹

Second, growing instability in Central and Eastern Europe represents a possibility of local conflicts escalating into a minor European confrontation. Violent conflicts on economic, ethnic, religious or political issues appear to be the norm during 1991. Violence is certainly possible in the Balkan area, especially in Yugoslavia. The country is locked in a constitutional battle over whether a Croat or a Serb will be president.²² Serbia and Croatia are the largest nations of Yugoslavia's six republics. The constitution battle has the federal government virtually paralyzed and has pushed the economy to the brink of collapse. The political rivalry between Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia is characterized by growing nationalism and separatism. A Central Intelligence Agency report which appeared in the New York Times in November 1990, predicted that the federated Yugoslavia will break apart most probably in the next 18 months and that civil war is likely.²³

Certainly, Yugoslavia is not the only country experiencing difficulties, however, the example was used to show that there is ethnic unrest, civil strife, and violence in areas that provide potential threats to the security of NATO nations. NATO must remain aware and be able to access any volatile situations. NATO has invited the former Warsaw Pact member nations to establish diplomatic liaison. Therefore, the consultation procedures reflected in Article 4

of the NATO charter can be used to discuss issues that could affect the whole of Europe.

Third, NATO should retain its focus in Europe because "there are conventional treaties, chemical treaties, nuclear treaties, signed on the dotted line, not reversible, verifiable, actionable in case of a violation, and all tied together in a matrix that will provide a protected peace for Europe."²⁴ NATO will be the overwatch organization for the verification of the treaties. Arms control is another area that will focus NATO's attention in Europe. Collectively the Alliance members and the Soviets have worked out a plan for verification. The verification effort will not be an easy task, and will not be accomplished within a few days. NATO nations must demonstrate resolve to hold firm on CFE provisions. To retain the most capable post-CFE force, NATO has a plan called "cascading," where nations with excess equipment will transfer modern equipment. The recipient will then destroy the older equipment in order to meet the Alliances' reduction objective.

Finally, as NATO re-examines its strategy with a focus on Europe, force structure issues, both manpower and weapon systems must be addressed. It has been virtually determined, that reduced force structure will lead NATO to adopt multinational forces. The higher ground forces headquarters in Europe are already multinational, such as the Northern and Central Army Groups. The tactical air force headquarters, such as the Second and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Forces

(2ATAF and 4ATAF) are also multinational. The ground and air forces of the Northern and Southern regions are capable of becoming multinational headquarters, in the sense that when US reinforcements arrive Liaison Officers are assigned to the respective NATO Headquarters. Some examples of existing multinational forces are; the Allied Command Europe Mobile forces, both land and air; the NATO Composite Force; and the UK/Netherlands Amphibious forces. There are also standing Naval Forces. These special units are deployed early during a period of tension and play an important part in the Alliance deterrent posture.

Although the major headquarters are multinational the Corps headquarters are not. With less Corps in Europe, the remaining Corps takes on added importance. It is at this level that the various components, air, land, and sea are combined to control joint operations. To maintain deterrent credibility, effective warfighting maneuver forces based forward in Europe is the concept being proposed at NATO. The idea of cadre units to be expanded in time of conflicts places NATO at a higher risk. If NATO has to fight, then at least it should have an initial fighting capability, and the execution of the reinforcement plan will bring the rest of the fighting capability.

Additionally, the London Declaration's strategic guidance indicates that NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units and rely on the ability to build up larger forces. Therefore, in order to build up larger forces, or

reinforce, NATO will need to concentrate on maintaining the capability to exercise strategic and operational mobility. "Strategic mobility is more than aircraft and ships. It is airfields, seaports, trains, fuel lines, and prepositioned stocks." NATO must retain the logistical infrastructure that enables redirection of reinforcements and resources between regions.

NATO's plate is full with the European political and military issues. Each of the previously mentioned issues not only affects the political part of NATO, but also affects the military part. SACEUR, must use the strategic guidance provided and formulate military strategy that support the NATO interest. An area that can benefit him in the execution of future strategy is the formulation of a campaign plan. The discussion of NATO's focus provides an excellent starting point for the Commander to provide to his subordinates the broad concepts for operations and sustainment that would translate the London Declaration's strategic guidance into operational direction. Some uncertainties exist about the assigned forces, however, even a skeleton plan would be better than no plan. The plan could encompass all the areas that are currently affecting NATO, such as Arms Control, border disputes, reinforcement and sustainment. If NATO is to remain involved and influence European affairs with a competent, credible, operationally significant military force, a campaign plan is a tool that could be very beneficial.

Chapter IV

CONCLUSIONS

As Europe enters a new era, NATO must continue to provide for common defense. The Allies will continue to share a broad spectrum of common interest, both within and beyond Europe. Looking back over the Cold War era when allies sought agreement on actions dealing with out-of-area operations, they ran the risk of overtaxing their collective agenda, and provided disagreements that, at the time, damaged Allied solidarity. NATO members will continue to have divergent views, therefore, areas must be sought to retain the common interest. It appears that a focus on the situation on the continent of Europe would provide that common interest.

The practice of bilateral and multilateral negotiations evolved among the member nations who had an interest in the area beyond Europe. The most recent example of bilateral and multilateral negotiations producing results, is the coalition that was formed to defeat Iraq. While NATO has consulted on out-of-area situations, anytime two or more NATO nations employed forces together outside NATO, the decision was normally a bi or multilateral agreement, not a NATO decision. As the EC evolves, and if the WEU participates as part of the security structure, Europe then has an ability to respond to out-of-area threats without the NATO focus being diverted.

Previous out-of-area disputes did not tax NATO's political consensus and military resources were not stretched too thin. However, in the Gulf War the forces deploying away from NATO's official domaine of responsibility put the immediate territorial security of the NATO nations at risk. Sharp criticism also sprang up from the nations that disagreed with the use of force over diplomacy. These types of disagreements in the current environment where NATO does not have all of its focus on the Soviet Union, could tear NATO asunder and create ill will that could immobilize NATO at the very time when events in Europe demand vigilance and cohesion.

NATO has been able to maintain its defensive status and regional focus in spite of the out-of-area developments that threatened the Allies interest. NATO is not responsible for global security. They are not the world policeman. The Alliance was created for a specific purpose and has held together based on a common interest and a common threat. Because the threat is diminishing the Alliance will have serious difficulties handling re-incriminating public disputes over out-of-area issues. Therefore, in the post-Cold war era NATO's focus should not be placed on developing and projecting power beyond its designated area in order to provide European security.

APPENDIX I

Memberships in Selected European Organizations

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Belgium	Greece
France	Spain
Germany	Portugal
Italy	Turkey
Luxembourg	Norway
Netherlands	Iceland
United Kingdom	Canada
Denmark	United States

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU)

Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Portugal
Spain

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Denmark
Greece
Spain
Portugal
Ireland

Source: Collier's Encyclopedia, 38th ed, compiled from information contained in v. 9, pp. 421-422; and v. 17, p 607.

APPENDIX II

FIVE TYPES OF OUT-OF-AREA DISPUTES

1. Situations in which NATO members have been concerned about the possibility of "guilt by association" with the out-of-area policies of another ally.
2. Situations in which one NATO member has seen another member's out-of-area actions as an infringement upon its domaine reserve in the Third World.
3. Situations in which a NATO member involved in an out-of-area campaign has solicited the direct or indirect support of other Alliance members and has been rebuffed.
4. Situations in which the out-of-area pre-occupations of a NATO member are criticized by other allies on the grounds that they are diverting attention, energies, or resources away from the Alliance.
5. Situations that highlight fundamental differences of opinion among NATO allies regarding the nature or implications of threats to the alliance or beyond the Alliance Treaty area.

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NOTES

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⁵ Peter Corterier, "Quo Vadis NATO?" Survival, March/April 1990, p. 141.

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⁸ "Galvin Says NATO to Study Mobile Force," European Stars and Stripes, 8 April, 1991, p. 8.

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¹⁸ General John R. Galvin, USA, "Change is for Good in NATO Europe," The Officer, May 1991, p.22.

¹⁹ Stuart, p. 12.

²⁰ Woerner, p. 12.

²¹ General John R. Galvin, "A Strategy for the Future," RUSI Journal, Autumn 1989.

²² Celestine Bohlen, "Rotation of Yugoslav Leaders Blocked by Dominant Region," The New York Times, 16 May 1991, p. A 1.

²³ David Binder, "Yugoslavia Seen Breaking up Soon," The New York Times, 28 November 1990, p. A. 4.

²⁴ Excerpts from a Speech by General John R. Galvin, 5 March 1990, p. 1.

²⁵ Galvin, The Officer, p. 21.

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