


2

AD-A240 519



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

NATION ASSISTANCE - A MISUNDERSTOOD MISSION

by

Robin R. Cababa
LTC, US ARMY

DTIC
PLACED
SEP 13 1991
S D

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.


The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

This document has been approved for release and sale; its distribution is unlimited.


Robin R. Cababa

20 May 1991

91-10467



DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited	
2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT	6b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) C	7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, RI 02841		7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) NATION ASSISTANCE A MISUNDERSTOOD MISSION (2)			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) LTC Robin R. Cababa U.S. Army			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL	13b TIME COVERED FROM TO	14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1991, May 20	15 PAGE COUNT 32
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.			
17 COSATI CODES		18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
			Nation Assistance, LIC, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency Low Intensity Conflict, AirLand Battle, AirLand Operations Foreign Internal Defense and Development
19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)			
<p>This paper explores nation assistance and concludes that the United States, regard- of the increased attention to LIC, cannot effectively conduct this mission because it lacks a coherent, integrated policy, an all encompassing military doctrine, and an effective force structure for execution.</p> <p>Efforts at the national level are ineffective because there is no over arching policy nor mechanism which links the instruments of national power. Military doctrine attempts to force fit LIC and nation assistance into AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations with the result being an inordinate emphasis on combat operations. Given this Doctrine, forces are raised and trained which are not suited for nation assistance. Some recommendations for change are presented.</p>			
20 DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT		22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 841-3414	22c OFFICE SYMBOL C

An Abstract of
NATION ASSISTANCE - A MISUNDERSTOOD MISSION

This paper explores nation assistance and concludes that the United States, regardless of the increased attention to LIC, cannot effectively conduct this mission because it lacks a coherent, integrated policy, an all encompassing military doctrine, and an effective force structure for execution.

Efforts at the national level are ineffective because there is no over arching policy nor mechanism which links the instruments of national power. Military doctrine attempts to force fit LIC and nation assistance into AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations with the result being an inordinate emphasis on combat operations. Given this doctrine, forces are raised and trained which are not suited for nation assistance. Some recommendations for change are presented.

Author	
Title	
Source	
Number	
By	
Approved	
Date	
A-1	

I INTRODUCTION

"...the most far reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."¹

In the last several years, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) has received increasing amounts of attention. The standard logical presentation is that with the demise of the Soviet Union, global conventional (or nuclear), war recedes even further from the realm of the possible. The end result is an increased probability of other less intense conflicts. A second line of reasoning starts from the premise that instability in the developing nations of the third world present the most likely probabilities for conflict. But, regardless of the point of departure, LIC is viewed as increasingly important to the United States.

The Army's Operational Continuum is divided into two major categories, the Warfighting Environment and the LIC Environment. There are three general states; War, Conflict, and Peacetime Competition. Peacetime Competition and Conflict comprise the LIC Environment. Conflict, along with War, comprise the Warfighting Environment. This construct attempts to order the environment in which our Army must operate. Within LIC, nation assistance and peacetime engagement are listed as the preferred operational methods.² Nation assistance is a new term being proposed by the U.S. Army to encompass all U.S. efforts in providing developmental and security assistance.

This paper explores nation assistance and concludes that the United States, regardless of the increased attention to LIC, cannot effectively conduct this mission; because it lacks a coherent, integrated policy, an all encompassing military doctrine, and an effective force structure for execution.

Efforts at the national level are ineffective because while there might be a clear understanding of the usefulness of nation assistance, there is no effective integrating policy nor mechanism to link together and synergistically employ the instruments of national power. This leads to fragmented efforts. Current and developing U.S. military doctrine attempts to force fit LIC and nation assistance mission into AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations, with the result being a doctrine addressing only the military aspects of the environment, in total isolation of the political, economic, and psychological dimensions. Finally, with this limited doctrine, forces are being raised and trained which are best suited for combat operations and ill-suited for nation assistance.

This paper concentrates on the U.S. Army, because it is at the forefront in developing doctrine and force structure for LIC. It does not analyze past LIC actions nor draw generic conclusions from them. Many studies have done this in the past. The varied nature of LIC has made attempts at drawing conclusions difficult. The approach used here is rather more global, with emphasis on the policy, organizations, doctrine and forces. My purpose is to lay out a different framework for analysis, from which pragmatic solutions might emerge.

II THE NATION ASSISTANCE MISSION

Nation assistance is an old mission. Since the very beginnings of our own nation, our Army has been involved in nation assistance. Indeed, a case could be made that our Army has spent more years in nation assistance than it has in fighting wars. Throughout the development of our own nation, the Army has been a critical element, providing intelligence (exploration), security, and infrastructure (roads, canals, railroads, etc.). Our nation expanded because the Army took it upon itself to provide the stable environment for settlement.

As our nation matured and expanded, so too did our concepts of nation assistance. With each new war or new incident, new possessions and responsibilities were added, and nation assistance expanded. Haphazard at best, successes, as well as failures occurred. There was no overall governing policy or concept. The desire was one of simply making each new territory or defeated nation a mirror image of us.³

Nation assistance today, though, assumes a much greater importance. In a multi-polar world the threat to our security is instability. While many nations of the third world can and have developed peacefully, many others critical to our own well being have not. Tenuously stable, developing nations in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East come to mind. Indeed, the recently freed second world developing nations will also effect world stability. The chronic economic and political needs of the eastern block countries might well magnify this missions'

importance even more.

One of our four national interests is "A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions."⁴ Within that national interest are objectives which state that the U.S. will "support aid, trade, and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress," and, "aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking."⁵

Because of the relatively recent revival of interest in LIC, the concepts of nation assistance are better understood than in the past. Nation assistance develops the host nation in all areas; political, economic, social, and military. Preeminent among these is a commitment to a legitimate and viable government, which recognizes and to a great extent, satisfies the wants and needs of its people. Properly conducted, it demands the integration and harnessing of all the instruments of national power. The end result is a stable, developing nation where the "national" development is in concert with the rising aspirations and increasing maturity of the population.

As an outside party to this process of development, the U.S. must remain in the background, insuring that the host nation is both the principal instigator and principal beneficiary of all U.S. efforts. The host nations' perceived legitimacy and its governments' viability must never be visibly challenged by the U.S. The creation of a stable nation must be

done in a free and open environment and is achieved only by its people.*

As the U.S. Army currently defines nation assistance, it is a mission to assist the host nation in "its efforts to restructure, reinforce or rebuild its formal and informal institutions." The host nation must be capable of nurturing its society through the turmoil of change. The assistance provided will be principally in the form of economic development to achieve a culturally acceptable lifestyle. Assistance to the host nation to build trusted political institutions representative of the general people's desires will also be provided. Recognition that the military must work in cooperation with other civilian organizations of the U.S. Government and must be mindful of the host nation's sovereignty are key concepts to this definition.

Nations which normally need this assistance are suffering (or will suffer) some form of internal strife. This strife could be something as simple as the occasional riot or strike. It could also be the start of some form of conflict, either instantaneous or protracted. That conflict might surface as terrorism, or given the proper conditions, as an insurgency. Nation assistance is an attempt by the United States to attack the root causes of terrorism and insurgency by assisting the host nation in changing those conditions which lead people to support the coercion or the overthrow of a government. It is, however, axiomatic that some level of violence might well have to be allowed. Developing nations are more prone to

violence since the social and political structures might be immature.

All departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, indeed even certain non-governmental sectors (private non-profit enterprises and churches for example) have been active in nation assistance. The Peace Corps, USAID, and USIA (U.S. Department of State) are prime examples of non-military agencies who work in nation assistance. The Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, Justice, and Transportation, along with a host of other federal agencies are also key players. These agencies generally provide developmental assistance in the economic and social areas. U.S. military contributions to nation assistance normally come in the form of security assistance. However, given the types of military units committed, developmental assistance can also be provided by the U.S. military.

The military portion of nation assistance, traditionally labelled foreign internal development, is also an important contributor. Since development normally occurs in a society whose stability is threatened by internal (or external) elements, foreign internal defense and development is a military mission naturally coupled with nation assistance. Recent examples such as Honduras, Panama, and Kuwait show the depth and comprehensive nature of those contributions.

Almost all of the sub-categories of LIC (insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and contingency operations) will warrant the execution of the nation assistance mission. Long term

commitment to nation assistance will normally flow from reaction to insurgency. It is insurgency that threatens the political, social, and economic underpinnings of a host nation. The threat can come from internal dissent, whether or not it is externally supported, or from external agents acting within a nation. Counteracting that threat can be done directly by the application of military force, and indirectly by nation assistance. Nation assistance can correct the root causes of the insurgency, and provide the environment for stability and growth.

III NATION ASSISTANCE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

A. Policy

While the National Security interests and goals of the United States are relatively clear cut and easily understood, the actual transformation of these interests and objectives into policy guidance and plans has been and continues to be difficult; and in retrospect, inconsistent.

Since the early 1980's, the U.S. has supported several insurgencies. But, there has been no enduring U.S. interest in creating democratic or capitalist governments in developing nations. Indeed, study of our past support to insurgencies shows that there is no consistency in whom we provide support; at times to a democratic government, at times to a decidedly undemocratic but friendly (to the U.S.) government, and sometimes even to unfriendly governments.* The extension of support seems to be dependent on a political decision, rather than a rational decision using some form of our national interests or objectives as a measure.

Our history with regard to support for counterinsurgencies, has also been inconsistent; and our record of success, marginal. Kennedy expanded our support for counterinsurgencies. But, the Vietnam War made Nixon declare a "Vietnamization" policy; which meant that counterinsurgencies must be conducted by host nations with the U.S. only providing assistance. Of 11 past counterinsurgencies supported by the U.S., only 2 can be considered a

success; and those successes are, as new studies are completed, questionable.⁹ The U.S. has also supported counterinsurgencies with a decidedly undemocratic leaning. The key determinant of support in the recent cases was not whether the host nation was democratic, but rather that it was perceived to be anti-communist.¹⁰

What then becomes apparent is that regardless of the national interests or objectives, U.S. policy has been, and is now, inconsistent with respect to either supporting an insurgency or countering one.

Perhaps the reason our policy decisions have been inconsistent with our national interests and objectives is that the executive branch of government is fragmented. There are many departments and agencies which claim policy authority and are executors. Principal among them are the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, and Health. Policy formulation and execution is also done by agencies on the second tier; such as CIA, USAID, USIA, Peace Corps, DoD agencies, military departments, regional CINC's, and many others.

In the Goldwater - Nichols Act of 1986, the Congress created a number of "super" entities in hopes of coordinating all activities. The LIC Board was created in the National Security Council. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict ASD(SO/LIC), and the Joint Special Operations Command (SOCOM) were created in the Department of Defense.¹¹ Nevertheless, four plus years later,

the inter-departmental and inter-agency mis-coordination continues.¹² Interestingly, the NSC's LIC Board has never met, while two subordinate boards have routinely met and conducted business, but their efforts have produced no new national policy guidance.¹³ LIC appears not to be overly important.

Much of this problem can be attributed to the number of departments and agencies involved. From an organizational perspective, the corrections made by the Congress do not go far enough. While a coordinating methodology was created, no one was given overall responsibility, let alone authority for the mission. In the field, the traditional stovepipes of command continue to exist. While the Ambassador is nominally in charge, each of his country team representatives still reports back to his departmental or agency head. That head, might (or might not) belong to, or be represented in, the LIC Board.

There is even a more pervasive problem, which has one critical ramification. From the stated national interests and objectives to the execution of operations in LIC, there is no linking policy guidance. LIC is only a subsection of the Defense objectives and is not part of the political or economic objectives section of the national security strategy. This means that the terms of reference for what is essentially a political and economic stability problem¹⁴ is defined principally in military terms. Rather than look at the problem as one of economic and political development, it is looked at through the lens of Low-Intensity Conflict, which would naturally have a tendency to color the conceptual framework.

The final problem which exists in the policy arena is that the political system severely restricts executive action. Because of past perceived and real abuses to the use of power, Congress has severely restricted what the executive branch can do.

The War Powers Resolution (PL 93-148) of 1973 severely restricted the use of military force. While normally thought of in terms of large scale military operations, the time constraint and imminent hostilities clauses restrict nation assistance operations in a LIC environment.¹⁵ Military forces involved in LIC are normally dealing with a protracted struggle, with no immediate end in sight. The possibility of armed conflict, given the instability of the host nation, also makes assistance difficult. Indeed, the restrictions in El Salvador on the number of people and their length of stay are prime examples. Additionally, there are restrictions on the type of activities that military forces may conduct. They cannot support insurgencies. The CIA has the restrictive charter for this activity.¹⁶ And military forces may not be used to train host nation police forces.¹⁷

Besides policy restrictions, there are restrictions on the types and manner in which aid can be spent. Aid monies come from many appropriations. Most have strings attached to their use. With sophisticated planning and imaginative book-keeping, that money can be put to good use. However, in many cases, the money, which is relatively insignificant, could be better spent without those restrictions.¹⁸ The end result of these fiscal

restrictions is to add to the confusion of coordination and to the complexity of executing nation assistance projects. While the intent of these restrictions is to ensure that the monies are spent properly, the actual effect is that they are spent inefficiently.

B. Doctrine

"...in default of knowing what should be done, they do what they know."¹⁹

In the last few years, the development of Army doctrine has been governed by two major themes. The more traditional has been the on-going development of AirLand Battle which addresses the use of large, modern conventional forces against mirror image forces. The AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, agility, depth and synchronization describe a type of warfare massive in scale. Some of the imperatives of AirLand Battle are: Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities; Press the fight; and Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly.²⁰ There are seven others, but the point is that Army doctrine, the current AirLand Battle, focuses on warfighting.

Juxtaposed to the continued development of AirLand Battle, and the future AirLand Operations, has been a concerted effort at describing Army operations in LIC. The draft FM 100-20, Military Operations In Low-Intensity Conflict was recently published. In marked contrast to AirLand Battle, the imperatives of low-intensity conflict are: Political dominance; Unity of effort; Adaptability; Legitimacy; Perseverance; and

Restricted use of force.²¹ When compared to the AirLand Battle tenets and imperatives, there is an obvious dichotomy.

This becomes even more evident with the publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B, "AirLand Operations The Evolution Of AirLand Battle For A Strategic Army." This pamphlet states that, "Operations are guided by the tenets of AirLand Operations which are embodied in the LIC Imperatives:..."²² Other than a few paragraphs which reiterate the basic concepts of LIC, there was no apparent attempt to integrate the two. Yet how AirLand Operations will be conducted is manifestly different from LIC operations.

LIC doctrine recognizes the political dominance; it recognizes that involvement will be protracted; and that the use of force will be severely restricted. These concepts are foreign to AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations. Indeed, other than the statement quoted above, there is little in the TRADOC pamphlet which offers much guidance for LIC operations.

There is a second doctrinal dichotomy. The Army's operational concept for LIC calls for combat operations in **support** of political, economic, and informational programs; not for nation assistance.²³ The net result is that there is both a policy and an operational doctrine vacuum.

Last Spring and Summer, there was a flurry of activity to flesh out Army operations in LIC, with special emphasis on nation assistance. An over arching concept was, in fact, produced. Conceptually, this proposed idea built on an improved country team and new command and control organization.

The country team, headed by the Ambassador, would integrate the host nation goals with the U.S. national interests and objectives, producing a country plan. Concurrently, the CINC would produce a nation assistance plan (using the theater strategy and campaign plans) which would also be integrated into the country plan.²⁴ All plans must be approved by the Department of State. While this might sound like an improvement, there is basically nothing different or new about this methodology. This integration was a requirement in the past. The critical factor is that the nominal superior for each member of the country team remains the agency or department head.

This concept paper is only a product of the Army. Other services and agencies within the Department of Defense have not agreed to this concept. Even assuming that they do, the best expected result is sub-optimization. Only those resources, manpower and monies controlled by the Department of Defense, will be optimized, and only to the extent that the underlying restrictions allow. Much of the resources for nation assistance come from other than defense appropriations and manpower. Those will remain the purview of the individual department and agency heads, regardless of the improved country team.

The Army's ultimate business is warfighting, regardless of the attention paid to nation assistance. Accepting that LIC will be a much more common occurrence in the future, current and future doctrinal concepts have been unable to integrate the key differences of nation assistance with this principal mission of

warfighting. Even within the LIC doctrine itself, emphasis is still placed on combat operations and not on nation assistance. Organizational changes proposed by the Army have attempted to better coordinate the Defense services and agencies involved. However, nothing forces the integration of these separate services and agencies. Even if that integration did occur, sub-optimization is the most probable result.

C. Forces

The same concept paper which addressed the responsibilities of the country team also proposed increasing the responsibilities of the USMILGP. The group would be charged with synchronizing U.S. Government resources, assessing host nation capabilities and needs, identifying existing programs which are successfully contributing to host nation assistance, developing options to match U.S. resources to host nation needs, and providing feedback to the CINC.²⁵

Concurrent with this increased responsibility, the Army has brought forth an conceptual organization to conduct nation assistance. This is a 'nation assistance brigade,' called a Deployable Joint Support Group. As part of each CINC's unified command structure, this group would be a new command and control headquarters with the full traditional 'J' staffs. Consisting of military, civilians, and contractors, it would focus primarily on nation assistance. It would monitor the functioning of the host nation infrastructure, identify host

nation problems and concerns, and assess the impact of nation assistance projects. When committed, it would report to the country team, or a U.S. agency in country.

To execute nation assistance missions, normal military units, such as Engineers, Medical, Military Police, Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs would be assigned. Other units could be attached as necessary. The actual unit structure would depend on the needs of the host nation as expressed in the nation assistance plan approved by the Ambassador.

Each DJSG and its assigned units would be tailored to the region and to the specific country of assignment. While the subordinate units are executing the nation assistance plan, the DJSG would be conducting normal command and control functions, plus it would be serving in a secondary capacity as the advance element for the introduction of combat forces, should the need arise.^{2*}

This conceptual organization attempts to solve two problems. The first problem is the already described fragmentation within a host nation when many departments and agencies are involved. The second problem occurs when combat forces are required. The key assumptions are that the DJSG has been introduced into the host nation prior to the need for combat forces, and that efforts at improving host nation stability with nation assistance have failed.

There are two general types of forces available to support nation assistance missions. Special Forces have principal

missions in both insurgency and counterinsurgency. They are organized into groups which have a geographic orientation. The 54 A Teams of a group are small units of highly trained, highly skilled, experienced individuals tasked to support or counter an insurgency. (In supporting one, they have to work for some other government agency.) The A Teams train the military of the host nation, and are structured with the following types of specialties; operations, weapons, communications, engineer, and medical. Structurally, these teams are highly qualified to teach or advise on military operations. Structurally, they are less qualified to support nation assistance because they lack certain key skills.

Those skills are found in the second type of force available. Combat support and combat service support units can create and/or maintain a physical or social infrastructure. Physical infrastructure are roads, bridges, public facilities such as schools and hospitals, water systems and sewerage, power, communications systems and the like. Military units with some expertise in these areas are engineers, transportation, signal, and quartermaster. Structured to provide combat support and combat service support to combat forces, these units have unique capabilities to create and maintain the physical infrastructure necessary for a modernizing society.

Social infrastructure centers on the care and development of the people, both as individuals and as a society. Military units which fit this category are medical, military police, psychological operations, and civil affairs. Again, the very

capabilities which make these units valuable to a warfighting force make them just as valuable to the population of a modernizing nation.

There are a number of problems when using these units in a nation assistance role. First, nation assistance is not their primary mission, warfighting (or supporting the warfighter) is. Second, they are normally tied to units with wartime missions, and given the readiness conditions they must maintain, are not available for long term deployments. Nation assistance is a protracted undertaking, which requires a long term commitment. Further, these units are executors, not trainers. They cannot easily transfer the skills and knowledge necessary to create infrastructure. Without that transfer of skills and knowledge, the enduring problems of the host nation will persist. Finally, some of these units useful in nation assistance are found predominantly in the reserves. They are not available for protracted efforts necessary in nation assistance.

IV IMPLICATIONS

Given our past performances and our current and future changes in policy, doctrine, and force structure, success in LIC using nation assistance is problematical.

While well understood that nation assistance subscribes to the tenet of political dominance, attempts in the past and proposed changes for the future still make this a difficult mission to execute. The very concept of LIC is inimical to our nature. There is a policy gap caused by separation of the military and the civilian departments and agencies. The policy formulation, policy direction and the basic organizations for implementation remain separate and distinct.²⁷ Policy was set by both the Department of State and; in reality, the Department of Defense. At the execution level, while the country team was supposedly integrated, the actual reporting structure was still stovepiped back to separate department and agency heads.

There has been an attempt to correct this problem. A LIC Board was created; but it has never met. There are subordinate boards, which, in four plus years, have not produced an integrating policy which brings together all the departments and agencies into a coordinated whole. This continued separation might very well be representative of the nature of our governmental philosophy, and is at the heart of our concept of a legitimate government. While this might be bothersome to efficient government, it is the price of admission to our system. The existing problems with current restrictions, both

legislative and administrative, probably stem from this principle. Separation of powers might both be the cause and the effect.

Developing nations might, or might not share this same fundamental belief in separation. Indeed, in many of the countries we have already assisted, or have attempted to assist, the military represents the only form of effective governmental bureaucracy.^{2*} Attempting to create a pluralistic form of government in these societies places the U.S. on the horns of a dilemma. Disregarding the host nation's form of governmental organization makes us challengers of its legitimacy. This violates our desires to let the host nation determine its destiny. Acceding to the host nation's existing or chosen form of governmental organization might go against our fundamental principles, even though acceptance of its form might aid in its viability. Further, it would fundamentally disregard our stated national interests and objectives.

Within the Department of Defense, an ASD (SO/LIC) and a unified command (SOCOM) have been created. Subsequently, the Army has proposed the concept of the nation assistance brigade, under the control of a Deployable Joint Support Group. These changes will most assuredly make the Department of Defense services and agencies more efficient. But, at best, without the umbrella integrating policy, it would only sub-optimize the military departments and agencies who conduct nation assistance. Other critical non-defense departments and agencies would not be included and could not fully contribute their efforts.

Execution of past nation assistance missions, while extensive, has been fragmented. Physical infrastructure has been created; social infrastructure has been attempted. Our past efforts have concentrated on providing measurable products. Rather than provide the product, we need to show the host nation how to provide it themselves. Unfortunately, given the proposed organization of the nation assistance brigade, past practices will continue. While efficient, standard military units are not effective. The best that can be accomplished, given those units, is that more infrastructure will be provided at the expense of a host nation government and population more heavily dependent on continued foreign military presence.

This Deployable Joint Support Group provides one other questionable capability. It can provide follow-on U.S. combat forces the intelligence, infrastructure, and reception capability should it become necessary to introduce combat forces. But when foreign forces are needed to stabilize a country; the instability caused by insurgents or terrorists, is by and large, out of control. In classic insurgency theory, recognition of an insurgency normally occurs in the latter stages. The instability caused by insurgent armed forces is not the critical problem. That is only the outward manifestation of a serious malaise in the society. When an insurgency is recognized, both the legitimacy and viability of the host nation government are already seriously undermined. The right and wherewithal to rule is in serious jeopardy. The commitment of combat forces only alienates the host nation's population even

more. At best, activation of this capability only indicates when we have lost.

Combat forces, in and of themselves, can only correct the physical manifestations of an unstable government. Combat forces might delay host nation viability problems, but they also call to question host nation governmental legitimacy. The root causes of the instability will remain and most likely expand. Combat forces are not designed to be surgical, political instruments. They are blunt, violent instruments of national power.

There are other options. At present, there is a mix of civilian and military departments and agencies involved. One choice would be to place either the Department of State or the Department of Defense in complete charge. Again, since the basic mission is political, economic, and social, the Department of State would most likely be the appropriate choice. Civilian departments and agencies could then provide the total resources for the nation assistance mission. The military would be able to concentrate on its single, critical task, that of warfighting.

However, military units of the Army are fully capable of executing the complete spectrum of this mission. While they have concentrated on security assistance, developmental assistance has also been provided. Removal of certain restrictions on the use of the military, on the use of funds, and changes in mission, organizations, and structure would only enhance their already considerable capability. Given these

changes, the military units can be committed for long term, protracted efforts in nation assistance.

There is a third possibility. There is no governmental monopoly on the skills necessary to effectively execute the nation assistance mission. Physical infrastructure is easily built and maintained by contractors. Social infrastructure can be created and taught by many skilled people. This mission can conceivably be contracted.²⁰ Indeed, opening this mission to contractors might expand the conceptual horizon of nation assistance. Perhaps there are new theories and new technology which commercialization of this mission might uncover. Certainly contracting would be easier to do than attempting both to change many of the restrictions, and modify existing governmental and bureaucratic philosophies and mind sets.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While the recognition that LIC is the most probable environment and that nation assistance the most suited response, there is still an inability to correct the policy, doctrine, and force structure problems necessary to effectively perform this mission.

In the current policy vacuum, the risk will be that the military will predetermine the acceptable ranges of government response. Given the military emphasis on warfighting, nation assistance doctrine and understanding of the LIC environment will continue to be slighted. At the very worst, emphasis on the political, economic, and psychological instruments of national policy will be ignored.

Correcting this problem is simple to describe, but difficult to execute. The LIC Board can do its job and ensure integration of policy and direction of all supporting executive departments and agencies. Failing that, the mission must go completely to the Department of State or the Department of Defense. Since the principal actions in nation assistance are political, economic and social, the Department of State is most appropriate.

Perhaps one of the most important outcomes of these proposals will be the increased recognition that the decision to enter into nation assistance is critical and time sensitive. If the stability of a nation critical to our national interests is at risk, a decision committing nation assistance forces early is

required. Delay will most probably mean that combat forces must be committed later, with less probability of success. Nation assistance requires sophisticated political leaders who understand the primacy of politics and the limited uses of combat forces. Equally important will be an increased recognition of the requirement that the host nation be willing to change.³⁰ These criteria should be paramount.

Once the problem with policy formulation is solved, the effective integration of the departments and agencies who execute that policy can be achieved. The existing restrictions need to be removed, making the execution of nation assistance more efficient and effective. While more resources will most likely not be committed, removal of the current restrictions will make better use of those resources. Programs which provide long range solutions to enduring host nation problems will now be possible.

Forces then have to be organized and trained. Government civilians, the military, or contractors are all feasible. The key criteria is that they be teachers and trainers, committed for the long haul. Nation assistance is not a short term mission with easily measurable progress points. It is a protracted struggle for the continued stability and growth of a nation. From our perspective, it is low intensity conflict; in the host nation's view, it is a struggle for survival. We need to adopt the host nation's view.

ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pg. 88.
2. U.S. Army Department, "AirLand Operations The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army," TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B (Coordinating Draft), (Washington: 5 April 1991), pg. 7.
3. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Low-Intensity Conflicts 1899-1990, Congressional Research Service, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 September 1990), pp. 69-70.
4. The White House, National Security Strategy Of The United States, (Washington: March 1990), pp. 2-3.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp. 18, 28.
7. Nation Assistance Concept, (Working Brief), U.S. Combined Arms Center, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1990), pg. 5.
8. U.S. Congress, Ibid., pg. 38.
9. Ibid., pg. 47.
10. Ibid., pg. 46.
11. Todd R. Greentree, The United States And The Politics Of Conflict In the Developing World, Army-Air Force Center For Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC), Langley Air Force Base, VA: August 1990, pg. 40.
12. Ibid., pg. 38.
13. Interview with COL Barber, Senior Army Advisor to the Naval War College, Naval War College, RI: 16,19 April 1991.
14. American Defense Preparedness Association, "Meeting SO/LIC Needs For The Nineties." Proceedings of the 2nd Annual SO/LIC Symposium, Washington: 9-11 December 1990, pg. 361.
15. U.S. Congress, Ibid., pg. 82.
16. COL Barber, Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. U.S. Congress, Ibid.

19. Ibid., pg. 85.
20. U.S. Army Department, Operations, FM 100-5, (Washington: May 1986), pg. 23.
21. U.S. Army and Air Force Departments, Military Operations In Low-Intensity Conflict, (Final Draft), FM 100-20, AFM 2-XY, (Washington: August 1989), pp. 1-8, 1-9.
22. U.S. Army Department, 'AirLand Operations The Evolution Of AirLand Battle For A Strategic Army,' Ibid., pg. 10.
23. Ibid., pg. 23.
24. Nation Assistance Concept, Ibid., Pg. 10.
25. Ibid., pg. 9.
26. Ibid., pg. 15.
27. Greentree, Ibid., pg. 36.
28. Ibid., pg. 42.
29. Rod Paschall (COL, USA Ret), LIC 2010 Special Operations And Unconventional Warfare In The Next Century, (Washington: Brassy's, 1990), pg. 125.
30. U.S. Congress, Ibid., pg.47.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- American Defense Preparedness Association. "Defending U.S. Interests: The SO/LIC Challenge." Proceedings of the 1st Annual Symposium, Alexandria, VA: 4-5 December 1989.
- American Defense Preparedness Association. "Meeting SO/LIC Needs For The Nineties." Proceedings of the 2nd Annual SO/LIC Symposium, Washington: 9-11 December 1990.
- Cababa, Robin R. (LTC). "Force Structure For Counter Insurgency." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1990.
- Cababa, Robin R. (LTC). "Nation Assistance: The Engineer Contribution." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, RI: 1991.
- Cababa, Robin R. (LTC). "Revolutionary Warfare And Conventional Armies." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1991.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1984. (Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.)
- Drew, Dennis M. (Col). Insurgency And Counterinsurgency American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals. Air University Air Power Research Institute CADRE Paper AU-ARI-CP-88-1. Maxwell Air Force Base: March 1988.
- Greentree, Todd R. (DOS). The United States And The Politics Of Conflict In The Developing World. Army-Air Force Center For Low-Intensity Conflict (CLIC), Langley Air Force Base, VA: August 1990.
- Hatch, H.J. (LTG). "Security, Stability, Sustainability: Conditions For Peace." Speech, given in Latin America (?), December 1990 (?).
- Interview with COL Barber, Senior Army Advisor to the Naval War College, Naval War College, RI: 16,19 April 1991.
- "Introduction To Low Intensity Conflict." Center For Army Lessons Learned Bulletin, #90-4. Combined Arms Training Activity, Fort Leavenworth, KS: May 1990.
- Lane, Dennison D. and Weisenbloom, Mark. "Low Intensity Conflict In Search Of A Paradigm." International Defense Review. 1/1990, pp. 35-39.
- Nation Assistance Concept (Working Brief). U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1990.

- Paschall, Rod. (COL, Ret. USA). LIC 2010 Special Operations And Unconventional Warfare In The Next Century. Brassey's, Washington: 1990.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. 'The Myth Of U.S. Capability In Unconventional Conflicts.' Military Review. September 1988, pp. 3-17.
- Special Operations Forces Status Report. Unpublished Pamphlet, Cleared By OASD-PA, Washington: 6 March 1991.
- Strategic Studies Institute. 'The Operational Art Of Warfare Across The Spectrum Of Conflict.' Warfighting Study Group, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1 February 1987.
- The White House. National Security Strategy Of The United States. Washington: March 1990.
- U.S. Army and Air Force Departments. Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict. (Final Draft), FM 100-20, AFM 2-XY. Washington: August 1989.
- U.S. Army Department. 'AirLand Operations The Evolution Of AirLand Battle For A Strategic Army.' TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B, Coordinating Draft, Washington: 5 April 1991.
- U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Readiness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. U.S. Low-Intensity Conflicts 1899-1990. Congressional Research Service. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office., 10 September 1990.
- Vouno, Carl E. (GEN). 'The Strategic Value Of Conventional Forces.' Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: September 1990.