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
MARINE TACAIR AND THE 1986 OMNIBUS AGREEMENT

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MARINE TACAIR

and

THE 1986 OMNIBUS AGREEMENT

by

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and

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Colonel Gary E. Thiry

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

APRIL 1990

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Marine TacAir and the 1986 Omnibus Agreement

AUTHORS: Richard C. Murrow, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF,
and Robert M. Bray, Lieutenant Colonel, USA.

The question of who should control Marine aviation assets during sustained joint operations ashore has surfaced time and time again--in World War II, in the Korean conflict, during the Vietnam conflict, and more recently, during joint operations involving the Air Force and the Marines.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the 1986 Omnibus Agreement for command and control of USMC TacAir in sustained operations ashore. Leadership from both the Marine Corps and the Air Force voiced support for the agreement.

Four years have passed since the Omnibus Agreement was published. This study, intended as a guide for the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, includes synopses of selected journal articles, reviews the present status of the agreement, states the current position of the two services and their doctrinal differences, and addresses the question of success of the 1986 Omnibus Agreement.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lt Col Richard C. Murrow holds a bachelor's degree in aeronautical engineering from the USAF Academy and a master's degree in astronautical engineering from Purdue University. His background includes operational flying, academics, research, and command. Lieutenant Colonel Murrow flew the F-111 A/E and F-111D in Tactical Air Command for seven years. As a TAC/SAC exchange instructor pilot, he flew the FB-111A for three years. In addition to a remote assignment to Thailand, his flying assignments include Nellis AFB, NV; Cannon AFB, NM; Mt Home AFB, ID; and Plattsburgh AFB, NY. A command pilot with 2300 hours, he has also flown the F-15 while performing research at the simulator for air-to-air combat at Luke AFB, AZ, and the UV-18 in support of the USAF Academy's Airmanship Program. After two years as the Third Group Commander, USAF Academy, responsible for 1100 cadets, he is presently attending the Air War College, class of 1990.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lt Col Robert M. Bray graduated from Stephen F. Austin State University and was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry, United States Army, in August, 1970. During his earlier years, he served in various Infantry assignments in the United States and overseas. Serving as a rifle platoon leader, as a commander of three companies, and as a staff officer, Lt Col Bray attained a solid Infantry foundation. He continued with duty positions as an Infantry battalion operations officer, a battalion executive officer, and a battalion commander. Recent assignments include the G-3 of a separate armored brigade and the chief of tank gunnery at the Armor School. Lt Col Bray graduated from the United States Army's Command and General Staff College and is currently attending the United States Air War College. He holds a bachelors and a masters degree in business administration.

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CHAPTER I

ORIGIN OF THE OMNIBUS AGREEMENT

Since the creation of the Marine Corps air arm, its employment has been subjected to much discussion and controversy. In periods of war and peace, control of the aviation element of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) has inevitably led to the debate: Who controls Marine Corps aviation assets in a sustained theater of operations? Very few people debate the justification of a separate Marine arm in support of amphibious operations, but the Air Force and the Marine Corps maintain opposite positions as the fight moves "from the beach" toward a sustained, joint-operational phase in the land campaign. The Air Force demands centralized control over all theater air assets; conversely, the Marine Corps expects its organic air assets to primarily support the ground scheme of maneuver. These two opposite views have plagued both services in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts as well as in peacetime joint planning and doctrinal development. After much debate and analysis, the Omnibus Agreement in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations, 1986, evolved as an answer to this joint issue. Does the Omnibus Agreement provide a satisfactory solution for

the control of the Marine Corps aviation assets in a sustained joint theater of operations?

The agreement in its entirety states:

The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the joint force commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the joint force commander for the support of other components of the JTF, or the JTF as a whole.

Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as prescribed in JCS Publication 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." 1

Historically, the question of who controls the Marine aviation element has remained a major issue in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. The Center for Naval Analyses in its memorandum "Command and Control of Marine Aviation in Joint Operations" concludes that in both conflicts, the Marine aviation elements initially supported the ground scheme of maneuver. At some point the theater commander placed the Marine aviation elements under control of a centralized theater air component staff. Gradually, the MAGTF commander regained control toward the end of the hostilities.² When the First Marine Provisional Brigade was committed to the Korean conflict at Pusan, the Marine aviation elements totally supported the Marine ground element. The MAGTF commander continued to maintain control over Marine aviation elements at the Inchon-Seoul campaign.

In January, 1951, the First Marine Air Wing sorties were apportioned by Fifth Air Force's central agency, the Joint Operations Center, which

coordinated all tactical air requirements throughout Korea. Late in 1952, through informal arrangements, the MAGTF commander began to regain operational control of the First Marine Air Wing by giving the Fifth Air Force only excess sorties--sorties not required to support the Marine ground scheme of maneuver. Vietnam would undergo a similar pattern. Prior to 1968, all Marine aviation was under the direct control of the commander, 3d Marine Amphibious Force (MAF). This doctrinal control continued until February, 1968, when the Marine air sorties came under the theater single-manager control of the Seventh Air Force. The single-manager concept continued but with modifications. The modification enabled the commander, 3d MAF to maintain 70 percent of all preplanned sorties; the remaining sorties were allocated daily by the Seventh Air Force. Eventually, the Seventh Air Force retained only "coordinating authority" over Marine aircraft.

Throughout the numerous discussions on the employment of the Marine air element in sustained joint operations, the Air Force always argues for centralized control over all theater air assets under a single air component commander. The Air Force advocates the employment of forces in joint operations as functional components--land, sea, air--not service components. The Air Force views the Marine Air Ground Task Force as a "fourth component." In response to the 1981 Joint Chiefs of Staff Omnibus Agreement, known as the "Interim agreement," in Doctrine Information Publication No. 11, 1982, the Department of the Air Force states the following position:

The Air Force has based its position, in part, on our interpretations of the current guidance contained in DODD 5100.1 (Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components), JCS Publication 2, and the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Each of

these documents substantiates fundamental and doctrinal precepts that our forces are employed as an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces, that our forces are integrated to perform the military mission with unity of effort, and that our forces are employed through the unified and specified commands, not through the services who provide those forces. 3

Publication No. 11 continues to advocate the need for centralized control of theater air assets at the highest level. Without centralized air power control, the theater runs the risk of being defeated in detail by even an inferior air force and the risk of being inefficient and ineffective in pursuit of the theater commander's objectives. 4

The Marine Corps has countered that the Corps' air arm is an integral part of the MAGTF. Losing the aviation elements would seriously degrade the combat power of the MAGTF. The air elements enable the MAGTF commander to compensate for the minimum MAGTF organic field artillery and the possible limitations and shortfalls of naval gunfire in support of the ground fight. Also, the organic air arm enables the ground commander to reconnoiter beyond the forward edge of the battle, to launch air interdiction attacks, and to conduct counterair operations. Marines state the responsiveness and the accuracy of the air element are critical in support of the ground commander's scheme of maneuver. The Marines consistently argue that the Air Force cannot respond timely enough to immediate close air support tasks, nor deliver ordnance safely enough to support the ground element. As stated in the "Center for Naval Analyses," 1981, studies indicate the response time for close air support greatly increases when a theater, single-manager control arrangement exists. 5 Moreover, the Marines accuse the Air Force of not addressing close air support seriously. Thus, the Marines continuously argue that the success of its ground element

depends on its organic air arm and that to lose control of these assets would be a serious risk.

The presented service doctrines and related arguments are resolved by the 1986 Omnibus Agreement. The agreement is the best solution. First, the roles and missions of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) as stated in DOD Directive 5100.1 requires the Marine Corps to maintain combined arms with supporting air components for the purpose of prosecution of the naval campaign.⁶ Given the spectrum of conflict, from crisis-action operations to high-intensity conflict, the FMF must respond to various scenarios throughout the geographical theaters. The MAGTF commander's success depends on speed and flexibility. The air element, in support, can be tailored to the needs of the mission. Furthermore, the command relationship exercised over the air element enables the MAGTF commander to train and execute the air element to his standards. The Omnibus Agreement allows the MAGTF commander to retain control over his air arm. This is critical, particularly in the crisis-action and low-intensity scenarios, when a responsive, efficient task force is required. Secondly, the agreement provides the Joint task force commander ability to employ the Marine air assets as required. If the scenario requires the theater commander to apportion more sorties to a critical theater counter-air fight, the agreement provides the flexibility to redirect the effort. The Omnibus Agreement enables the MAGTF commander, the Joint task force commander, or theater commander to employ the Marine air assets efficiently, regardless of the spectrum of conflict.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theaterair Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, April 1986), III 4-5.
2. Center For Naval Analyses, "Command and Control of Marine Aviation In Joint Operations" (Alexandria, VA: October 1982), 43.
3. Department of the Air Force, Doctrine Information Publication No. 11, "Command Relationships, The Marine Air/Ground Task Force, And What They Mean to an Airman!" (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), 6.
4. Ibid., 14.
5. Center For Naval Analyses, 46.
6. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Military Departments (Washington, DC: GPO, September 1987), 16 (paragraph 6b).

CHAPTER II

SYNOPSIS AND EXCERPTS

"Command & Control of Marine TacAir in Joint Land Operations"
by Maj Michael D. Becker, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette:
(October 1988): 50-55.

- Thesis: In the past, under a single-manager concept, the results were fragmentation and dissipation of air power and overall degradation of the theater air effort. To prevent future problems, operational control of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) aviation assets should remain with the MAGTF commander.
- Background of Air Force Doctrine
 - In 1942, ground commanders controlled the tactical air organizations.
 - Emphasis was on air cover and local air defense, not theater air superiority.
 - The German air force controlled the airspace over northern and southern Tunisia.
 - Allied forces could not provide close air support.
 - American aviation was helpless and friendly forces were defeated at Kasserine Pass.
 - This defeat caused General Eisenhower to reorganize air forces.
 - The Northwest African air forces developed procedures and began to operate under centralized control and decentralized execution.
 - FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, 1943, established the priorities for air operations: (1) counterair, (2) air interdiction, and (3) close air support.
- Marine Aviation Background
 - Not until near the end of World War II were the Marine aviation squadrons allowed to provide direct support to Marine amphibious landings and campaigns ashore.
 - Under the command of USMC Maj Gen F.P. Mulcahy, the joint force air component commander (JFACC), Marine aviation flew in direct support of Marine ground units.
 - The 5th Air Force Joint Operations Center (JOC) coordinated all theater air assets.

- Under informal working arrangements, the JOC permitted the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) to support the X Corps and Marine ground troops directly.
 - 1st MAW provided excess sorties to the JFACC.
 - During the Vietnam conflict, Gen William C. Westmoreland created a single manager for tactical combat aviation.
 - He directed the MAGTF commander, Lt Gen Robert E. Cushman, to give up all tactical sorties not in direct support of Khe Sanh.
 - According to all Marine echelons of command this action violated JCS Pub 2 by destroying the integrity of the MAGTF.
 - This policy remained in effect until the Marine combat units were withdrawn from Vietnam in 1971.
- Operational Control of MAGTF Assets
 - The other services have questioned who has operational control of Marine tactical aviation.
 - On 21 February 1986, the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously approved JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations.
 - JCS Pub 26 affirmed the full authority and flexibility of the joint force commander (JFC) to organize and employ those forces assigned to best accomplish the mission.
 - As described in JCS Pub 26, the JFC will normally designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC).
 - Under the JFC's guidance and authority, the JFACC will coordinate with the other service component commanders and will recommend to the JFC apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas.
- Command and Control
 - The Air Force emphasizes air operations from a theater or global perspective with centralized control and decentralized execution.
 - The Marine Corps emphasizes MAGTF operations with air assets playing a crucial role in attaining MAGTF ground objectives.

- Although capable of sustaining operations ashore in support of a land campaign as part of a combined force, operational taskings to a MAGTF with aviation assets should only be provided by the MAGTF commander.
- Command relationships for the MAGTF are in total support of JCS policy and the principles established in JCS Pub 2 on joint land operations.
- The JFC has operational control of the MAGTF as an entity, but not the individual units within the MAGTF.
- The Integrity of the MAGTF
 - The law and JCS Pubs 2, 12, and 26 affirm the integrity of the MAGTF.
 - It is indeed the legal right of the JFC to request any sorties not used for direct support of Marine ground forces.
 - Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for the support of other components of the joint force.
 - The MAGTF commander must apportion sorties that will be made available to the JFC for specified missions to include air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and long-range interdiction.
- The Relationship Between the MAGTF Commander and the JFACC
 - The JFACC is not a functional manager.
 - The JFACC has no operational control authority.
 - The JFACC is not in the chain of command of the MAGTF commander.
 - The relationship between the MAGTF commander and the JFACC will be one of coordination.

Lt Col Richard C. Murrow, USAF
Bessie E. Varner, ed.

F)O)C)U)S ➤ On Command and Control Of Aviation

Military observers generally agree that success in modern warfare is contingent upon the ability to field and effectively employ a balanced combined arms team. This is no simple matter. It involves complex decisions, first, as to what constitutes a proper balance and, second, as to what is needed for the selected forces to function as a well-coordinated team. Shaping the MAGTF, preserving its integrity, and ensuring its components can work together despite the friction of combat are challenges of the highest order . . . and absolute prerequisites to future success. Command and control of aviation is a crucial part of this.

Command and Control of Marine TacAir in Joint Land Operations

by Maj Michael D. Becker

Since the birth of Marine aviation, whenever Marines have been committed in joint operations, they have functioned under the single manager for air concept. The challenge for the future will be—as in the past—to ensure the integrity of the MAGTF.

Long before August 1942 when Capt Marion E. Carl became the Marine Corps' first ace at Guadalcanal, there were challenges to the command relationships involving employment of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) during nonamphibious operations. In each instance, MAGTF integrity has been the issue, i.e., who is to exercise operational control of Marine tactical aviation. Since MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift's dealings with RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner during the battle for Guadalcanal, a lack of understanding of MAGTF doctrine and its inherent flexibility by military leaders has continuously caused controversy. Marine response has been to try to educate those unfamiliar with MAGTFs and Marine Corps organizational and doctrinal precepts. The Marine Corps, with its MAGTF structure, brings to any battlefield a synergistic effect of integrated air and ground combat elements that is far greater than the sum effect of air and

ground combat elements fighting separately. This fact is not fully appreciated outside the Marine Corps. Both the 1986 Omnibus Agreement approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and JCS Publication 26, *Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations* cause confusion concerning the command and control of Marine Corps tactical aviation in a nonamphibious operation. This article seeks to highlight the importance of the MAGTF structure and the effects of the 1986 Omnibus Agreement and JCS Pub 26 so that joint staff officers and Marines are better able to articulate MAGTF concepts and command relationships during nonamphibious operations and have a more positive view of the single manager issue.

Problem Background

On 21 February 1986 the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously approved JCS Pub 26, *Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations*, a comprehen-

sive air operations doctrine documenting the contributions of Service components to the counterair effort. It reaffirmed the full authority and flexibility of the joint force commander (JFC) to organize his forces to best accomplish the mission. It also recognizes that the joint force commander

CATF	commander amphibious task force
CinCPac	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CLF	commander landing force
ComUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
FMF	Fleet Marine Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JOC	joint operations center
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MAW	Marine aircraft wing
SAC	Strategic Air Command
TAC	Tactical Air Command

may designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC) to coordinate the joint air operations campaign. As explained in *JCS Pub 26*:

The Joint Force Air Component Commander derives his authority from the Joint Force Commander who has authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The Joint Force Commander will normally designate a Joint Force Air Component Commander. The Joint Force Air Component Commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the Joint Force Commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based on the Joint Force Commander's apportionment decision). Using the Joint Force Commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with the other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the Joint Force Air Component Commander will recommend to the Joint Force Commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas.

At the same time the *1986 Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of Marine Tactical Aviation in Sustained Operations Ashore* was approved by the JCS. It states:

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the Joint Force Commander, for tasking through his Air Component Commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the Joint Force Commander for tasking through the Air Component Commander for the support of other components of the joint force, or of the joint force as a whole.

Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or Joint Force Commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts (e.g. the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any Marine tacair sorties when it has

been determined by the Joint Force Commander that they are required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as prescribed in *JCS Pub 2, ed Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.

Commandant of the Marine Corps White Letter 4-86 states:

Marine Commanders at all echelons must understand the contents of the Omnibus Agreement and that the JCS endorses the integrity of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). All Marine officers are expected to articulate and understand these precepts and should not endorse employment concepts that deviate from doctrine and the Omnibus Agreement.

Since the inception of the National Security Act of 1947 and the establishment of the U.S. Air Force as a separate and equal branch of the Armed Forces, controversy has existed between the Air Force and the Marine Corps. The basic disagreement evolved from differing concepts for the control of Marine tactical aviation resources in the conduct of air missions during joint land combat operations. The Air Force emphasizes air operations from a theater perspective, rendering general aviation support for the highest level commander, centralizing management of all air assets in order to shift the weight of airpower throughout the entire theater. Centralized control and decentralized execution is considered the keystone of Air Force operational doctrine. Conversely, the Marine Corps emphasizes MAGTF operations. Marine tactical aviation assets play a crucial role in attaining MAGTF ground objectives. Focusing

primarily on the land or amphibious portion of a naval campaign, the Corps thinks less in terms of theater or global strategy and more on the operational level of war.

MAGTF: Background and Principles

For over 212 years the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps have cooperated in the development of a naval force of combined arms. This combined arms concept, which has been refined during four major wars and numerous small campaigns, includes many types of dedicated support aircraft. A MAGTF, task organized, structured, and equipped for amphibious operations and defense of advanced naval bases in support of naval campaign is the result of this combat experience. The MAGTF is capable of sustained operations ashore in support of a land campaign either alone or as part of a larger joint or combined force.

The requirement to deploy and employ Marine forces as part of the fleet resulted in establishment of Fleet Marine Forces (FMF). The National Security Act of 1947 reaffirms that the Marine Corps is to provide rapidly deployable amphibious forces for contingency missions in support of national strategy. These forces are employed as integrated air-ground teams. MAGTFs consisting of combat, combat support, and combat service support units are routinely task organized from the FMF.

The statutory missions of the Marine Corps applicable to MAGTFs are:

To provide FMFs of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to



AV-8B Harrier prepares to release laser-guided Maverick air-to-surface missile (under right wing) at Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA.

Assumptions and Definitions

Command relationships for the MAGTF must comply with JCS policy and the principles established in *JCS Pub 2* on joint land operations. The theater or joint force commander will exercise operational control of assigned forces through his component, uni-Service, and subordinate joint task force commanders. The Joint Force Commander has operational control of the MAGTF as an entity, but not individual units within the MAGTF. The Joint Force Air Component Commander, or single manager for air, may be from any Service and his staff may represent all the Services. Two key terms, as defined by the JCS are:

Joint Force—A general term applied to a force that is composed of significant elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise unified command or operational control over joint forces.

Command and Control—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

the prosecution of a naval campaign . . . and to perform other such duties as the President may direct.

From this mission statement, amphibious doctrine is clearly defined in the Landing Force Manuals and Naval Warfare Publications. Command relations are covered in considerable detail. The commander of the landing force (CLF), who is also the MAGTF commander, is under operational control of the commander of the amphibious task force (CATF) once the force is formed and the CLF reports for operations. The CLF is considered coequal to the CATF for planning. The MAGTF as an entity—not individual MAGTF units such as battalions, platoons, or squadrons—is under the operational control of the CATF. Operational taskings to specific MAGTF units, including aviation units, are provided by the MAGTF commander or his designated representative.

The Basis for Air Force Doctrine

The U.S. Army entered World War II with a doctrine that air operations were to be planned and executed in support of the ground forces. The 1942 edition of *Field Manual (FM) 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces*, stated:

The Air Support Command (ASC) would be subordinated to a field army or independent corps and would work for the ground force commander, who

would decide how to employ these aviation assets.

This doctrine differed from the concepts formulated at the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Air Force Base. Established in 1926 with the mission of training officers in the strategy, tactics, and techniques of air power, the school was faced with the challenge of developing a doctrine on which to base its instruction. Consequently, it became deeply enmeshed in the development of air power doctrine. The Air Corps Tactical School rejected the War Department's and Army General Staff's view that aviation's combat role was to defeat hostile aircraft and obtain reconnaissance information for artillery and infantry. The Army Air Corps developed air power doctrine without the concurrence or approval of the Army.

During the North Africa campaign in late 1942, the tactical air organizations were placed under ground commanders who employed them for air cover and local air defense rather than concentrating them in a centralized offensive counterair effort to achieve theater air superiority. Gen William W. Momyer, USAF, who later served as the joint force air component commander for Gen William C. Westmoreland in Vietnam during the battle for Khe Sanh, was a group commander in Tunisia. He observed:

The Allied Air Forces were trying to

provide close air support before obtaining air superiority. Consequently, the German Air Force controlled the air in northern and southern Tunisia. Friendly air losses were so high that the mission of the air forces and the structure of the command and control system had to change drastically . . . not only had Allied air power failed to achieve air superiority, but they had failed to provide the close air support desired . . . Not until we had gained air superiority could we concentrate on providing close air support.

The inability of American aviation to mass against the enemy logistics buildup and lines of communications contributed to the American defeat at Kasserine Pass in February 1943. This tactical defeat convinced Gen Eisenhower that reorganization of the air forces under a central, theater command was necessary. Consequently, he formed the Northwest African Air Forces under the command of Gen Carl "Tooeey" Spaatz, instituting a doctrine that had been espoused by the Air Corps for years—centralized control and decentralized execution.

FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, published by the War Department in July 1943 with the concurrence of the Army ground forces, sanctioned the concept of centralized control stating:

Land power and air power are coequal and interdependent forces: neither is an auxiliary of the other. The gaining of air superiority is the first requirement for the success of any land operation . . . Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow is to be fully exploited.

Using the Northwest African Air Forces as a model, *FM 100-20* stated that a theater of operations would normally have one air force, reporting directly to the theater commander and responsible for all air operations in the theater. It clearly established three phases of priority for tactical air operations: (1) counterair operations: "to gain the necessary degree of air superiority"; (2) air interdiction: "to prevent the movement of hostile troops and supplies into the theater of operations or within the theater"; and (3) close air support: "to participate in a combined effort of the air and ground forces to gain objectives in the immediate front

of ground forces." The manual further stated:

In order to obtain the necessary close teamwork the command posts of the Tactical Air Force and the ground force command should be adjacent or common.

Marine Aviation in World War II

The first offensive operation in the Southwest Pacific by U.S. Marines in World War II was at Guadalcanal under the command of RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner as Commander, Amphibious Task Force 62. Marine MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift was the Commander, Landing Force. Within the naval command structure of the Pacific Ocean, VAdm Robert L. Ghormley occupied the position of area commander as Commander, South Pacific, under Adm Nimitz, who was the Commander in Chief, Pacific. Complicating matters further was the presence of VAdm Frank J. Fletcher as tactical commander of the joint attack and support forces. All the land-based aircraft in the South Pacific from all Services were placed under the Commander, Aircraft South Pacific (ComAirSoPac). RAdm John S. McCain, who served essentially as a JFACC. Ashore at Guadalcanal was the Cactus Air Force, consisting of Army Air Corps, Navy, and Marine planes and flyers, all under the command of Marine BGen Roy S. Geiger as ComAir Cactus.

After Guadalcanal, however, geography, Navy policies, and the then technical unsuitability of the Chance-Vought F4U Corsair for carrier service resulted in the integration of Marine aviation into the Navy's land-based aviation force for most of the war. By using Marine squadrons for air superiority, interdicting supply lines, and bombing bases, more Navy squadrons were available for carrier operations. Gen Vandegrift, as Commandant, and LtGen Holland M. Smith, the senior Marine in the Pacific, both pressured the Navy to maintain the integrity of the MAGTF and shift the Marine aviation squadrons to direct support of Marine amphibious landings and campaigns ashore. They were unsuccessful until the final battle of the war, Okinawa. Only in the South Pacific campaigns of Guadalcanal, Bougainville, New Britain, and Peleliu, when its land bases were within range of the frontlines, did Marine tactical aviation

support Marines on the ground.

During the battle for Okinawa, which began in April 1945, MajGen Francis P. Mulcahy, commanding general of 10th Army's Tactical Air Force (TAF),



MajGen Mulcahy fulfilled the role of JFACC on Okinawa.

fulfilled the role of JFACC. Under his command, Marine aviation units finally flew support missions for Marine ground units. The effectiveness of close air support in the 82-day Okinawa battle was warmly praised by ground commanders. This marked the first instance of Marine tactical aviation supporting Marine ground troops in sustained operations ashore under the command of a JFACC.

Korean Conflict

When the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel, Gen Douglas MacArthur's joint Far East Command, established in 1946 by the JCS, consisted of the Eighth Army, U.S. Naval Forces Far East, and the Far East Air Forces.

Upon the arrival of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade at the Pusan Perimeter, its supporting air combat element was dispersed. Two fighter squadrons were placed aboard aircraft carriers and a squadron of night fighters was assigned to Fifth Air Force based in Japan. Although the integrity of the brigade was destroyed, these aircraft continued to support Marines on the ground.

After the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade departed the Pusan Perimeter, it was task organized as part of a larger combined arms team for the Inchon-Seoul operation. As part of Joint Task Force-7, commanded by VAdm Arthur D. Struble, commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, MajGen Edward M. Almond, Gen MacArthur's chief of staff, commanded the landing force, X

Corps. The U.S. Army's X Corps consisted of the 1st Marine Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), and the 7th Infantry Division. Under the command of X Corps, the 1st MAW entered the war and provided support to the Marine ground forces. Upon seizure of the Seoul airfield, MajGen Field Harris, commanding general, 1st MAW was designated tactical air commander of X Corps and thus became the air component commander.

Gen MacArthur's air component commander, Commander, Far East Air Forces, LtGen George E. Stratemeyer, was still in critical need of air assets to support his interdiction and close air support mission. To coordinate the separate air campaigns being conducted by the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the Tactical Air Command (TAC), the Navy's carrier-based air, and the 1st MAW's tactical aviation, he established the Fifth Air Force Joint Operations Center (JOC) to coordinate all theater air assets. Upon successful termination of the Inchon-Seoul operation, the 1st Marine Division was placed under command of the Eighth Army. The 1st MAW was placed under operational control of Fifth Air Force, again destroying the air-ground team. Under informal working arrangements, Marine liaison officers in the JOC permitted the 1st MAW to support X Corps and Marine ground troops directly and in accordance with Marine Corps concepts, though remaining under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force. This support was later formalized by a modified mission directive allowing for operations within Marine Corps doctrine. Excess sorties were provided to the JFACC in an attempt to better employ the total tactical air forces within the theater.

The armistice found tactical air from all Services controlled by the JOC established by Fifth Air Force, much to the chagrin of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Marine component commander in the Pacific. A joint air-ground operations conference, consisting of representatives from all Services met in Seoul after the armistice and recommended: "That in future operations, integration of all Services should be secured by an organization and system similar to that finally developed in the last months of the Korean hostilities."

Vietnam

In 1962, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac), a unified commander, established a subunified command designated as the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV). Its commander was charged with conducting a basically antiguerrilla war in South Vietnam. By establishing this command relationship, CinCPac failed to use his Army component commander in the Pacific to conduct this land function. CinCPac did not use the subunified commander to control the Navy and Air Force forces in theater, but controlled them himself through his Navy (CinCPacFlt) and Air Force (CinCPacAF) component commanders. The ground commander, Gen William C. Westmoreland as ComUSMACV, was provided air support by CinCPac, located 7,000 miles away.

Late in 1967, as the buildup began for the battle of Khe Sanh, Gen Westmoreland, ComUSMACV, felt the North Vietnamese posed a tactical threat to the Marine garrison at Khe Sanh. He directed a massive air operation in support of the Marines under the code name NIAGARA. He had personally walked the ground at Khe Sanh and believed more effective use could be made of all air assets if they were under a single manager. Gen William W. Momyer, Commander, Seventh Air Force, was designated his JFACC.

With full knowledge that he was trampling Marine Corps doctrine, Gen Westmoreland announced the creation of a single manager for tactical combat aviation for all South Vietnam in order to deal with the seriousness of the threat faced by the Marines at Khe Sanh. He felt he was justified in directing the MAGTF commander, LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., commanding general, 3d Marine Amphibious Force, to give up all tactical aircraft sorties not in direct support of Khe Sanh to Gen Momyer for the following reasons:

- To provide the capability to concentrate and mass the air effort in support of all ground forces deployed.
- To support the increased deployment of U.S. Army forces in I Corps.
- To provide the flexibility to concentrate the air effort as the enemy threat dictated.

The sheer magnitude of the air effort required to support Operation NIAGARA—allocation, airspace control, targeting, congestion of airspace—all

resurrected the single management issue that the Marines, after Korea, wished to avoid. Gen Westmoreland, like Gen MacArthur and LtGen Stratemeyer in Korea, sought to coordinate the four separate air campaigns being conducted by the Strategic Air Command, the Tactical Air Command, the carrier-based air of the Navy, and Marine tactical aviation.

Gen Westmoreland's decision was vehemently opposed by all Marine echelons of command as violating *JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces* in that the integrity of the MAGTF would be destroyed. Marines felt that the loss of operational control of their organic aircraft would degrade their combat effectiveness. The issue was finally resolved when President Johnson, worried about the Marines' ability to defend Khe Sanh, jumped the chain of command and telephoned Gen Westmoreland. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, David



LtGen Cushman (r) struggled with the air control issue in Vietnam.

Packard, presumed that the unified commander, CinCPac, would be the best judge of how combat forces assigned to him should be organized, commanded, and deployed to meet the threat. Furthermore, he did not believe that the assignment of Marine air units under the single management of ComUSMACV's Deputy for Air would constitute a precedent for centralized control of air operations under other combat conditions, nor would it pose a threat to the integrity of the Marine air-ground team. Mr. Packard informed the Commandant of the Marine Corps and CinCPac that the Marines would comply with Westmoreland's request.

The single management system that was invoked, however, never took operational control of air resources away from the MAGTF commander, LtGen Cushman. Nevertheless, Marines still felt that the air-ground team was threatened. They thought the next step would be the reinstitution of the JOC of the

Korean War. The mission directive from ComUSMACV, MACV Directive 95-4, clearly stated that the MAGTF commander would exercise operational control over all his air resources. When the Marine combat units were withdrawn from Vietnam in 1971, three years after its implementation for the tactical emergency presented by the battle of Khe Sanh, the modified single management system for air support was still in effect.

The Marines did not relinquish operational control of MAGTF air elements and the MAGTF commander continued to provide support for his ground troops.

Legality

Having looked at the historical precedents regarding the use of Marine tactical aviation in joint operations under a single manager for air concept, it is necessary to determine if such a concept is intended within the scope of present laws and regulations as outlined in *JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations*.

The legal basis for the single manager for air or JFACC is found in the framework of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and Title 10 of the United States Code. It is also embraced within Title 50, United States Code, which is the basis for the "Functions Papers" that, in turn, are the foundation for *JCS Pub 2*. The intent of Congress is clearly to promote greater efficiency and effectiveness and avoid duplication in military operations. The law and *JCS Pubs 2, 12, and 26* maintain the integrity of the MAGTF. Operational command is explicitly granted to the unified commander and subordinate unified commander. The establishment of the JFC and his JFACC is within the law. It is the legal right of the JFC to request excess sorties not in direct support of Marines on the ground.

Command Relationships

During joint land operations, command relationships of the MAGTF must be in accordance with JCS policy and be clearly understood. Basic to the understanding of the command relationships in joint operations is the underlying principle set forth in *JCS Pub 2* that the theater or joint force commander will exercise operational control of assigned forces through his component, uni-Service, and joint task force commanders.

The theater commander, according to *JCS Pub 1*, is the commander of a unified or specified command who has been assigned the military responsibility for a geographical area outside the continental United States.

The MAGTF commander is a uni-Service commander in accordance with *JCS Pub 1*, which establishes the basis for the integrity of the MAGTF.

The MAGTF commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets in joint land operations in accordance with *JCS Pub 2*. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground combat element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for the support of other components of the joint force, or of the joint force as a whole.

The theater or JFC, in the exercise of operational control, has authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission or to maintain the integrity of the force.

The MAGTF commander's apportionment decision must identify sorties that will be made available to the JFC for the specified mission areas of air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and long-range interdiction. Sorties in excess of those required for direct MAGTF support must be offered to the JFC. The JFC will distribute those sorties as required for support of the joint force. Additionally, when shortages of Marine tactical aviation exist to support MAGTF missions, those shortages must be identified to the JFC.

In *JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations*, the JCS defined a JFACC without restricting the organizational authority of the JFC.

The JFACC derives his authority from the JFC who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The JFC will nor-

mally designate a JFACC. The JFACC's responsibilities will be assigned by the JFC (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the JFC's apportionment decision). Using the JFC's guidance and authority, and in coordination with the other service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the JFACC will recommend to the JFC apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas.

Therefore, the JFACC is not a functional manager, has no operational control authority, and is not in the chain of command of the MAGTF commander. The JFACC plans, coordinates, recommends apportionment to the JFC (after consultation with the component commander), and based upon the JFC's decision, will allocate and task only those sorties apportioned by the JFC to support the joint force as a whole or those sorties identified by the MAGTF by the MAGTF commander as excess. Apportionment authority remains with the JFC. If the JFACC is also a Service component commander, as in Korea and Vietnam, he has operational control of his forces only.

Conclusions

Marines would like for everyone to believe that since the birth of Marine aviation in 1912, we have operated as a MAGTF. This is not true. In World War I, Marine tactical aviation supported the British, French, and Belgian sectors of the Western Front. The deployment of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to Korea was the first time the FMF went to war as an integrated air-ground team. This article has outlined the problems in maintaining the integrity of the MAGTF and in managing the air resources in joint land operations in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. In each conflict commanders eventually took steps to overcome supposed fragmentation and dissipation of air power and the degradation of the overall theater air effort. The steps taken invariably led to a single manager for air concept of operations.

Like it or not, since the birth of Marine aviation, when the Marine Corps has been committed in joint operations, we have functioned under the single manager for air concept.

The Marine Corps emerged from World War II with an institutionalized sense of self-importance that even today affects our generals and our newest recruits. Our predecessors made a major contribution to the conduct of warfare, the amphibious assault against a hostile shore. In World War II, the Corps fought four different ground wars: the jungle war of the South Pacific, the atoll war of the Gilberts and Marshalls, the mobile war of the Marianas, and the cave war of Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. The Corps did this by continually growing and adapting. Today, the Marine Corps needs similar leadership with the capacity to deal objectively—without Service prejudices—with matters of significance to the security of our country.

The concept of establishing a single manager for air resources within the unified or subunified command structure is legal in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and *JCS Pub 2*. Congress has directed the Services to eliminate unnecessary duplication and develop an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

Marines recognize that under a unified command for joint land operations, the Air Force component commander will probably have the preponderance of the tactical air resources and be designated the JFACC. The relationship between the MAGTF commander and MAGTF aviation elements and the JFACC will be one of coordination. Operational control of MAGTF aviation elements will remain with the MAGTF commander. *JCS Pub 26* has reaffirmed the integrity of the MAGTF.

We must be careful to acknowledge the fact that each combat situation is unique and must be assessed in its own right. If our next adversary possesses a significant air threat, and we cannot maintain air superiority as we did in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, can the MAGTF handle the air threat . . . alone? The MAGTF commander may be the one approaching the JFC to request additional sorties, not vice versa. Each war makes its own special demands, and the Corps must be prepared to meet them. Marines must be pragmatic, not counterproductive, in dealing with the single manager for air concept. The Marine on the ground deserves no less from us. USMC

"Aviation Command and Control" by Maj Richard L. Davis,
USAF. Marine Corps Gazette, (January 1989): 18-19.

- Thesis: The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) does fit into the "joint" operations concepts. However, the theater commander should remember that the Marine Corps is a unique force and there are times when autonomous operations are totally justified.
- Friendly Forces
 - All friendly forces in a theater should have common strategic objectives, work together, and be directed by a single theater commander.
- The Air Force Viewpoint
 - The Air Force supports centralized theater control of air assets in order to attain and maintain combat initiative in the field.
 - Centralized control permits exploitation of capabilities of all theater air forces while concentrating on key enemy positions and centrally controlling timing and tempo of strikes.
 - If centralized control is not maintained, as in the 1942-43 North Africa campaign, air units will be used piecemeal in relatively independent air operations to the detriment of the theater campaign.
- The Use of Marine Forces
 - The Marines do need a dedicated air wing to accomplish their mission.
 - If the Marines are to be used no differently from other Army and Air Force units, then they are not needed as a unique service.
 - If thinking only in terms of using the total combat force to attain overall operational objectives, Marine air should be fully integrated into the theater command structure under the operational control of the joint force air component commander (JFACC).
 - If however, the Marines are viewed as a rapidly deployable strike force, integrating all aspects of land, sea, and air capabilities, then their autonomous nature is justified. The theater commander should use them as a unique air-ground integrated asset which is capable of satisfying unique operational requirements.

Lt Col Richard C. Murrow, USAF
Glenn Morton, ed.

"Aviation Command and Control" by Col John D. Cummings, USMC.
Marine Corps Gazette, (January 1989): 19.

- Thesis: Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) assets should normally not be split. If necessity dictates, it should only be temporary.
- View on Air Force Doctrine
 - Air Force doctrine still reflects the views of Douhet, et al.
 - The mission in order of priority is: (1) air superiority, (2) interdiction, and (3) close air support.
- View on Marine Doctrine
 - Marine doctrine places air superiority as the number one priority of the air arm.
 - The priority of interdiction and close air support depends on the ground combat situation.
 - Placing interdiction before close air support could imply ball bearing factories are more important than defeating enemy ground forces engaging Marine forces.
- World War II Experiences
 - In some cases, ground commanders had air support requests rejected because air commanders considered the targets unproductive.
 - Normally, battalion commanders did not pursue the issue with General Eisenhower.
- Centralized Control
 - Centralized control of aviation isn't always the most efficient approach.
 - The advantage of centralized control of air assets is personality dependent.
 - The MAGTF commander should support the theater commander.
 - However, great care must always be taken before splitting any MAGTF assets, and it should not be permanent.

Lt Col Richard C. Murrow, USAF
Glenn Morton, ed.

Commentary on Aviation

Aviation Command and Control

Command and control of aviation remains an issue of key importance. Here are some reactions to Maj Becker's Oct88 article on that subject.

□ I enjoyed reading "Command and Control of Marine TacAir in Joint Land Operations" by Maj Michael D. Becker (October 1988 issue), but I was left with the uncomfortable impression that a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) somehow does not fit into the "joint" operations concepts currently in vogue. I'm not sure that was the author's intent and think the issue of MAGTF command and control should be read slightly differently.

"Jointness," of course, is a topical buzzword, but it does have a very substantive meaning. All friendly forces in a theater should work together, with a common strategic objective and directed by a single theater commander. To support the common objective, the Air Force obviously favors centralized theater control of air assets. There are reasons for this prejudice, the most important being the value of attaining and maintaining combat initiative in the field. It is such centralized control that best enables us to flexibly exploit the capabilities of all theater air forces, concentrating on key enemy positions and centrally controlling timing and tempo of strikes. Without such control, any serious enemy air force inevitably retains the

initiative and wreaks predictable havoc upon our own operations. The 1942-1943 North Africa campaign showed this lesson clearly. In that campaign, air units were used in relatively independent air operations within the larger theater campaign. This arrangement inhibited cooperation, increased losses, and delayed victory.

Maj Becker's description of a MAGTF appears to be much like an autonomous North African unit, obliged to fight an autonomous operation within a larger theater context. There is an inevitable sense that this is inappropriate; hence, there have been numerous efforts to place Marine air assets under centralized direction. I submit, though, that the situations Maj Becker described in Korea, Vietnam, and perhaps World War II were based mostly on a misapprehension of what the Marine Corps should be doing for us.

The Marine Corps mission, as Maj Becker points out, is to provide "rapidly deployable amphibious forces" for contingencies in support of national objectives. Marine units do lack some common army unit features, such as corps-level artillery, which means they require things like a dedicated air wing to fulfill their



mission. However, if the Marines are to be used no differently from other Army and Air Force units, then we don't need them as a unique service. If they are to be used as Army forces, such as at Khe Sanh, to take and hold territory, or to be divided up supporting other Army or Air Force units, then they probably should be fully integrated into the theater command structure, including full integration of Marine air under the joint force air component commander (JFACC). This only makes sense if we think in terms of ensuring the most effective and efficient use of total combat force to attain our overall operational objectives.

On the other hand, as a total unit the Marines provide perhaps our best single national fighting force, integrating all aspects of land, sea, and air capabilities. If they are to be used as they are trained and equipped, as a rapidly deployable strike force, then their autonomous nature is fully justified. But they should then be used as a unique integrated asset for unique operational requirements. Marines are capable of employment across the conflict spectrum, from Inchon-type landings to Grenada, and should be dedicated to such as a unique asset for the theater commander. This is the difference of which I speak: It is not so much a question of command and control, as a question of who we think the Marines are. They should not be parceled out piecemeal like so many Air Force or Army units in different uniforms. Doing so is a misapplication of force.

Maj Richard L. Davis, USAF

>Maj Davis is a military doctrine analyst at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education at Maxwell AFB, AL.

Commentary on Aviation

Aviation Command and Control

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
□ Maj Becker's article was timely, informative, and generally factual. I totally disagree with his paragraphs dealing with the basis for Air Force doctrine, however. The myth that U.S. forces were defeated at Kasserine Pass because the Army Air Corps was parceled out to ground commanders has gone unchallenged for so long that it has achieved a status approaching the Ten Commandments. It is only a myth.

During a tour in the Pentagon, while researching close air support history, I came across a report dated 11 June 1943 written by Col H.V. Dexter, USA, G-3, II Armored Corps, on "Air-Ground Support in North Africa." Col Dexter had investigated how air was used during the Kasserine Pass debacle and produced an incredibly detailed report that has now been declassified. His summary reads in part: "On the Tunisian Front there was no instance in which any air unit had been attached or allocated to any ground commander and over which he had command or demand authority. Air missions flown in direct close support of the ground troops were rare." TacAir was certainly not parceled out to the ground forces.

My own opinion on why this report was suppressed is that the Corps commander Gen Fredendall performed poorly at Kasserine (he was replaced by Patton) and the Army wanted to avoid any controversy associated with publicly firing a general this early in the war. Remember that at this time the British were privately referring to U.S. forces as "our Italians." To make the Army look even worse, a Marine by the name of Vandegrift had done pretty well at Guadalcanal. Best to blame the defeat on poor doctrine, publicly send Fredendall home a hero, and quietly exile him.

The Air Corps had long subscribed to the philosophies of Douhet, Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell. Simply stated—strategic bombing wins wars, all other means of force is redundant. The Air Corps seized on the defeat at Kasserine as a chance to escape domination by Army ground generals, prove their philosophy, and take a step toward autonomy. The Air Force of those days was driven not only by desire to become a separate Service, but to be the dominant Service after the war in terms of budget share. For more on this read *The Air Force Plans for Peace* by Perry M. Smith (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970).

What do all these old skeletons have to do with our MAGTF and control of Marine air? Everything! Air Force doctrinal priority still reflects the views of Douhet, et al.—(1) air superiority, (2) interdiction, and (3) close air support (CAS). We in the Marine Corps generally agree with the first priority, but the second and third become a little blurred since the ground combat situation usually sets our priorities for use of fighter/attack aircraft. By placing interdiction ahead of CAS in priority, the implication is that ball bearing factories are more important than forces in contact with Marines. This is a significant difference in philosophy, and that's what it's all about. Even during World War II when the Air Corps was part of the Army, ground commanders had air support requests rejected, not because of lack of assets, but because air commanders deemed the targets as not productive enough. Granted that a ground commander was running the operation, but not every battalion commander wanted to go to Gen Eisenhower to resolve disputes about air. Neither do most Marines.



Whenever people tell me about the great efficiencies gained by centralized control of aviation, I think of some of the unpleasant experiences I've had with the Military Airlift Command (MAC) and grab my wallet. By the way, Strategic Airlift Command (SAC) bomber and tanker assets and MAC transports are not placed under the operational CinC's control when they support him. Control is retained by CinCSAC and CinCMAC respectively. The advantage of centralized control of air seems to depend on who is centralizing control.

I advocate the MAGTF supporting the operational CinC any way we can. I also agree with Maj Becker that we need to be pragmatic. As for doing away with "Service prejudices," I haven't seen any evidence that Douhet's philosophical descendants are especially committed to supporting grunts. By evidence I mean not what is being said, but what has actually been done in the past, what is being done now (ask your Army contemporaries), and what is going to be done in the future (check their budget priorities). Before we start splitting our MAGTF though, there should be good cause, and it should not be permanent.


Col John D. Cummings

>Col Cummings is commanding officer MW5G-27 at Cherry Point. He has previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) where the close air support mission area received considerable attention.

"Joint Task Force Operations" by Maj John F. Otis Jr., USMC.
Marine Corps Gazette, (January 1987): 24-26.

- Thesis: The commander, Marine Forces (ComMarFor), directly influences the commander, joint task force (CJTF). This influence should be used to prevent both functional alignment of the Marine component and undermining the integrity of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).
- The Role of ComMarFor
 - Many developers of unified command operation plans, concept plans, and their respective supporting plans fail to recognize the role of ComMarFor as a service component commander.
 - Even if the proper role is recognized during planning, it is abrogated during joint task force (JTF) amphibious operations by directing ComMarFor to report to the Commander, Navy Forces (ComNavFor).
 - This abrogation severs the direct relationship between ComMarFor and the CJTF, effectively terminating the role of ComMarFor as a service component commander.
- The Marine Role in Joint Operations
 - The Marine component commander must maintain equal status with the other service component commanders and have direct access to the CJTF.
 - This procedure ensures proper advisement on matters pertaining to employment.
 - If a CJTF applies the principle of functional alignment to the Marine component, the integrity of the MAGTF will be undermined.
 - The ComMarFor is in a position to directly influence the CJTF during operations, and he should provide appropriate advice that would prevent improper employment of any Marine forces.
- The Planning Review Process
 - Commanders, planners, and operators must provide input to the planning review process to correct any existing plans that presently prevent the desired component to JTF commander relationship from being established.

Lt Col Richard C. Murrow, USAF
Bessie E. Varner, ed.



Command and Control

Joint Task Force Operations

by Maj John F. Otis, Jr.

A widespread doctrinal problem currently exists in that many unified command operation plans, concept plans, and their respective supporting plans either fail to recognize the role of commander, Marine forces (ComMarFor) as a Service component commander or, having recognized it during planning, abrogate it during joint task force (JTF) amphibious operations by directing ComMarFor to report for operational control to the commander, Navy forces (ComNavFor), the Service component commander of Navy (not naval) forces.

This operational control relationship of ComMarFor to ComNavFor during amphibious operations severs the direct relationship between ComMarFor and the commander, joint task force (CJTF) and, in effect, terminates his role as a Service component commander.

That said, my experience indicates that many officers, both Marine and Navy, do not agree with this premise, or, if they do agree, they ask, "So, what's the problem?" The first order of business, then, is to provide the basis for my argument, followed by an opin-

ion on how to address the consequences of the current situation and to offer a recommendation on how it can be rectified.

On 11 July 1798, the Marine Corps was established as a separate Service; it is one of four military Services within the Department of Defense. The Marine Corps Manual, applicable to the entire Navy Department, tasks all Marine commanders and representatives on joint staffs and joint working groups to:


... ensure that the status of the Marine Corps as a separate service with all the rights, privileges, duties, and responsibilities as such is recognized and maintained in all directives, plans, and agreements involving the Marine Corps.

JCS Pub. 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, defines a JTF as "a force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services." It further defines a component commander within a JTF as "the senior officer of each Service... qualified for command by the regulations of his own Service." It follows, then, that the sen-

ior Marine commander (ComMarFor) within a JTF is a Service component commander with a direct command relationship with CJTF.

Some would argue that the phrase "Navy or the Marine Corps" suggests that either the senior Navy commander or senior Marine commander (but not both) within a JTF would be a naval Service component commander. However, the actual purpose of the phrase is to point out the fact that a force composed of only Navy and Marine Corps forces is not a JTF. It is an amphibious task force (ATF), which by definition always includes naval forces and a landing force. An ATF and a JTF are two distinct, and quite different, entities. An ATF by definition is naval in nature, a JTF is not. An ATF is always commanded by a Navy officer; a JTF is not. In an ATF, the commander, landing force (CLF) is responsible to the commander, amphibious task force (CATF) for landing force operations; in a JTF, each Service component commander is responsible to CJTF for operations. Regardless of which Services are involved (e.g., Army, Navy, and Air Force; or Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force; or Army, Marine Corps, and Navy; or all four), the senior commander of each Service component within the JTF is a Service component commander with a direct command relationship with CJTF.

The mission of a given JTF can include the conduct of amphibious operations. In such cases, the JTF would include an ATF commanded by a Navy officer (CATF). Although not directly pertinent to the purpose of this article, it is interesting to note that CATF's position within the JTF varies among current plans. In some plans, CATF is under the operational control of ComNavFor; in others he is treated as a separate component commander. Regardless of his position in the JTF structure, CATF is responsible for the conduct of amphibious operations. Who, then, is responsible to CATF for landing force operations?



FM 31-11/NWP 22(B)/AFM 2-53/LFM 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, states that CLF will report for operations to CATF for the conduct of amphibious operations normally at the time of embarkation. This doctrinal CATF/CLF relationship during amphibious operations has been allowed to spill over into the JTF command relationship structure by our failure to recognize the distinction between the JTF's ComMarFor and the ATF's CLF. Our equating these two command positions has resulted in today's widely accepted procedure of directing ComMarFor to report for operational control to ComNavFor. However, even in a JTF, it is CLF, not ComMarFor, who reports for operations to CATF; ComMarFor reports for neither operations nor operational control to either ComNavFor or CATF.


If the current procedure is incorrect and a misapplication of the CATF/CLF relationship, what then is the doctrinally correct way to assign responsibility for landing force operations during JTF amphibious operations? *JCS Pub 2* states that:

The selection and nomination of specific units for subordinate forces to meet the operational requirements of the commander... are normally the function of the component commander. These units revert to his command whenever such subordinate forces are dissolved.

In light of this statement, it becomes evident that for JTF amphibious operations, ComMarFor, as the Marine component commander, would assign forces to the landing force and direct the assigned CLF to report for operations to CATF, the Navy officer responsible for the conduct of the amphibious operations. ComMarFor's role as Service component commander with a direct relationship to CJTF remains intact during the conduct of the amphibious operations. Command of the forces he has assigned to the landing force reverts to him upon termination of amphibious operations and dissolution of the ATF.


If one compares the functions and responsibilities of a CLF as provided in *LFM 01* with those of a Service component commander as provided in *JCS Pub 2*, it is clear that these two command positions are distinct and separate, regardless of whether they are held by two different Marine officers, or by one Marine officer dual hatted.

What are the consequences of the current situation in which ComMarFor's role is terminated during JTF amphibious operations? This question can be best answered by approaching it from a positive point of view; that is, what are the benefits of doing it the right way, with ComMarFor's role remaining intact.



In today's military environment of increasing emphasis on joint operations, we must ensure that the Marine component commander within the JTF maintains equal status with the component commanders of the other Service components and has direct access to CJTF. This basic requirement was recognized even at the highest levels when the Commandant of the Marine Corps was granted full status as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ComMarFor's direct access to CJTF to advise him on matters pertaining to "the proper employment of his component and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned" (*JCS Pub 2*) is extremely important in view of our policy of deploying/employing as Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). Our sister Services tend toward aligning their forces along functional lines, e.g., ground, air, or maritime. It is possible, if not probable, that some future CJTF will want to apply this principle of functional alignment to his Marine component thereby undermining the integrity of his assigned MAGTF. During operations, only ComMarFor is in a position to directly influence CJTF to avoid such malemployment.


During JTF amphibious operations, CLF's primary concern is the conduct of landing force operations. Should the JTF plan call for subsequent operations ashore upon termination of amphibious operations (e.g., activation of a ComUSForCountry), CJTF's purposes are much better served by ComMarFor (or his designated representative) and his staff, who can initiate/continue planning and coordinate



1. This example assumes that CATF is not designated as a component commander with a separate task force designator. ComNavFor and CATF may be dual hatted.

2. ComMarFor and CLF may be dual hatted

ATF	Amphibious Task Force
CATF	Commander Amphibious Task Force
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CLF	Commander Landing Force
ComAFFor	Commander, Air Force Forces
ComArFor	Commander, Army Forces
ComMarFor	Commander, Marine Forces
ComNavFor	Commander, Navy Forces
JTF	Joint Task Force



directly with CJTF, the other component commanders, and higher Marine headquarters for follow-on support, while CLF concentrates his efforts on landing force responsibilities. Upon termination of amphibious operations, the landing force reverts to ComMarFor's command and is integrated into his ongoing activity to organize for subsequent operations ashore.

In short, ComMarFor as a component commander is in a position to directly influence CJTF on the optimal employment of his Marine forces both during and subsequent to JTF amphibious operations; to permit CLF to concentrate on his primary functions

and responsibilities during amphibious operations; and to facilitate coordination and preparation for subsequent operations ashore.

Beyond these pragmatic employment considerations is the more philosophical fact that by equating ComMarFor to CLF, and thereby accepting his subordinate position to ComNavFor or CATF during JTF amphibious operations, we have failed to ensure recognition and maintenance of his role in the spirit or content of either the *Marine Corps Manual* or *JCS Pub 2*.

What can we do to rectify the current situation? It is an unfortunate fact of life that the longer a principle has been allowed to atrophy through lack of exercise, the more difficult it is to reestablish. However, the Service component commander issue can be ad-

ressed in a variety of ways, both in short term and long, formal and informal. Although it takes time, input to the deliberate planning review process can correct existing plans. In the interim, commanders, planners, and operators, to include Marine purple-suiters, can ensure that accurate relationships are recognized during exercises, conferences, wargames, real world operations, and during the preparation of future operation plans. Perhaps, also, a review of professional school curriculums might indicate more emphasis is due the subject because, while all of us are educated on the CATF/CLF relationship almost from the beginning of our service, relatively few of us are exposed to the implications of command relationships during joint operations.

USMC

"The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare" by Maj John B. Saxman, USAF. Marine Corps Gazette: (August 1989):58-63.

- Thesis: The way the Marine Corps employs its aviation in maneuver warfare affects the other services. The Marine Corps must understand that the aviation arm is more than flying artillery. It is a separate maneuver unit which can provide task force and theater commanders unique capabilities.
- Synchronization of Forces
 - Synchronization of forces is the key to winning at any level of war.
 - An effective command and control system is essential.
 - The available air, land, and sea forces must be properly synchronized to best help the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), joint task force (JTF), and theater commanders achieve the objectives.
- Role of the Overall Commander
 - The overall commander should formulate a theater plan and identify the enemy's center of gravity.
 - Support should come from all air, land, and sea forces under his command.
 - In the past, the Marine Corps has not supported this type operation when serving as a subordinate unit to a JTF or theater commander.
- Marine Corps Aviation
 - During joint operations, the MAGTF commander is subordinate to the JTF or theater commander. Marine aviation becomes a supporting arm, not an independent combat element.
 - Any attempt by the JTF or theater air component commander to use Marine air assets for missions other than direct support of the Marine ground combat element (GCE) is not received well by the Marines.
 - Despite written guidance from the Marine Corps commandant, most Marines consider the air-ground team to be indivisible.
- Recommended Future Application of Marine Air Assets
 - There are times when a situation dictates using the air combat element (ACE) independently of the GCE, and the Marine Corps officer must be educated to better understand this principle.

- The Marine aviation role is to provide the JTF or theater commander with the needed resources.
- Marine aviation must work independently of or in synchronization with the GCE.
- The aviation arm must be guided by doctrine that is applicable to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- Command and control must take into account the unique capabilities of aviation.
- Fixed-wing aircraft should concentrate on air superiority, interdiction, battlefield air interdiction, and, to a lesser degree, close air support.

Lt Col Richard C. Murrow, USAF
Bessie E. Varner, ed.

The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare

by Maj John B. Saxman, USAF

The survival of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) is in jeopardy. Military reformers, such as William S. Lind, are advocating, in the guise of promoting maneuver warfare, that the Marine Corps should eliminate its helicopter, reconnaissance, air superiority, and all-weather interdiction aircraft and replace them with the modern day equivalent of the *Stuka* divebomber. These reformers believe the only role for the air combat element (ACE) in maneuver warfare is to supplement the lack of organic firepower in the ground combat element (GCE). If Marine aviation is relegated to this role, then the Marine Corps is no longer fighting as a MAGTF but merely as a ground combat unit with very expensive airborne artillery. A Marine Corps without its own multi-purpose ACE would not be significantly different than any other light, mobile ground force. The MAGTF is unique because it is the only single-Service task force that can combine a GCE and ACE into a highly mobile, rapidly deployable combined arms team. However, some military reformers, along with some Marines, fail to see the advantages of using the ACE as an independent maneuver unit. In order to truly employ the tenets of maneuver warfare, the ACE must operate

as an independent maneuver unit synchronized with, not subjugated to, the operations of the GCE.

The Marine Corps' decision on how it will employ its aviation has widespread implications for the other Services. If the Marine Corps elects to restructure its ACE to emphasize only close air support (CAS), then the Air Force and Navy will have to provide the Marine GCE with all the other ground support missions (reconnaissance, antiair warfare, deep air support, and electronic warfare).

When the Army Air Force first struggled with the difficult question of how to best employ its airpower, it was fortunate to have an influential and visionary leader to give it guidance. As the Marine Corps now ponders a similar question, it unfortunately is receiving its advice from a "Billy" Lind, not a Billy Mitchell. William S. Lind needs no introduction to members of the Marine Corps. He is a controversial figure who Marines seem to either like or despise. He has significant influence with the Marine Corps and access to some of its senior leadership. While a few might regard his effort to promote maneuver warfare as little more than expanding the Marine Corps' vocabulary of German phrases, many would grant him considerable

credit for influencing the Marine Corps to adopt maneuver warfare as its official doctrine. In his book *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, he describes how the ground combat element should fight using maneuver doctrine. While this book was relatively well received by the members of the GCE, aviators are finding the ideas expressed in his recent article "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation" (MCG, May89) questionable at best. Although numerous people have expressed their opinion on the role of the ACE in maneuver warfare, none are as influential, have developed their ideas as extensively, or have put as much effort into reforming the Marine Corps as Mr. Lind. Therefore, his article could be considered as the "center of gravity" of the reform movement's position on aviation. Exposing the fallacies of his maneuver warfare concepts concerning Marine aviation doctrine, command and control, education, missions, and equipment is the *Schwerpunkt* (main effort) of this paper.

Doctrine

Doctrine is the glue that holds everything together. It determines the command and control, education, missions, and equipment a Service needs. Therefore, doctrine must be sufficient-



ly encompassing to cover all situations under which the Service may be called to fight. The main problem with Mr. Lind's doctrinal concept of maneuver warfare is that he tends to focus on the tactical level of war and emphasize winning battles, rather than focus on the operational and strategic levels and emphasize winning wars. Not only does he focus on battle, but he discounts the impact that air and naval forces can have on a conflict:

when we speak of an air focus of efforts, we are not saying that air is the focus for the MAGTF. There has been some misunderstanding on this point. Because in almost all situations it is the ground battle that is decisive, all efforts of the MAGTF are focused on the ground battle. As noted above, the air focus of efforts is the answer to the question, "What can air do that no other arm can do that will have a decisive effect on the ground battle?" In other words, the air supports the ground, at least the majority of the time. There may be some situations where an action by aviation would be the focus of the MAGTF's efforts, i.e., where air would be looked to for a decision. One case where this may occur

is in the phase of an amphibious landing before the troops come ashore. But once ground combat is joined, history suggests air will seldom, if ever, be the MAGTF's focus of effort. The history of attempts to achieve decisions by air alone is one of repeated failures.

While history might show that air alone has often failed to achieve decisions in battle, it also shows that ground combat alone has not won many wars. The war in the Pacific during World War II provides an excellent strategic example. Did the United States win the war in the Pacific because of the island-hopping battles fought by the Army and Marines, the Navy's control of the sea lines of communication, or the Air Force's bombardment of the Japanese mainland? What was the *Schwerpunkt* or focus of efforts in this example? Was it land, sea, or air forces? Obviously, the point of effort changed from one force to another throughout the campaign. None of the forces individually won the war. All made unique and essential contributions to the overall effort.

The campaign in Italy during World

War II illustrates this idea at the operational level of war. Allied ground forces were stagnated at the Gustav line. Even though enough dedicated fighter and bomber CAS was provided to reduce the town of Cassino to rubble, the ground combat units could not win the tactical battle and advance. Allied airpower's independent interdiction campaign, code-named OPERATION STRANGLE, was equally ineffective. Only after the Allies viewed the problem from the operational level did they finally realize how to overcome the Germans. The solution, an operation code-named DIADDEM, called for a synchronized combined air and ground offensive. While the Allied ground units waged a renewed attack and increased the German's need for resupply and mobility, Allied air forces interdicted the railroads and highways needed to get the supplies and reserves to the front. The Germans now faced an unsolvable dilemma. Allied destruction of the rail system forced them to devote much of their motor transportation to moving supplies. This drawdown of their motor transport as-

acts, combined with an increased battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effort, degraded their tactical mobility at the time they needed it most. Unable to wage an effective, flexible defense, the Germans were forced to withdraw from their long-held positions.*

This example provides several excellent points. In this situation, no amount of Allied CAS was enough to help ground combat forces win the tactical battle. Likewise, an independent air interdiction operation was also unsuccessful. It took a synchronized air and ground effort at the operational, not tactical, level to eventually achieve a decision. The final point worth pondering in this example is "What was the focus of efforts?" Was it the ground maneuver unit that increased the enemy's need for supply and mobility or was it the air maneuver unit that destroyed the enemy's supplies and reserves?

The preceding two examples demonstrated how air, land, and sea forces can work together at the strategic and operational levels to achieve a decision. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War provides a tactical example of a ground maneuver unit conducting operations solely to support the air maneuver unit. The operation was code-named GAZELLE. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) could not adequately operate as a combined arms team with the ground combat unit because the Egyptian air defense belt was, for all practical purposes, impenetrable by air. To overcome this dilemma, the Israeli ground forces attacked the surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, destroyed 10 of them, and eventually established a safe corridor through the air defenses for the IAF. This gave the IAF the maneuver room it needed to destroy 53 of the remaining 61 SAM sites. With the SAM threat reduced, the Israeli combined arms team went on to completely surround the Egyptian Third Army and cut it off from its source of supply.

These three examples demonstrate the need for doctrine to be applicable at the strategic and operational levels

as well as the tactical level. Mr. Lind's emphasis on maneuver warfare at the tactical level overlooks the fact that a nation must be decisive at the operational and strategic levels in order to win a war. His belief that the ground combat unit is almost always the focus of effort can lead to *command and control, education, mission, and equipment* decisions that fail to take advantage of the unique air and sea capabilities of our forces.

Command and Control

As all the examples point out, synchronization of forces is the key to winning at any level of war. An effective command and control system is the key to synchronization. In "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation," Mr. Lind's discussion of command and control focuses on how to make CAS more responsive. Once again, his emphasis on the tactical level of war causes him to overlook the most important points. The real issue for maneuver warfare command and control is synchronizing the available air, land, and sea forces to best help the MAGTF, joint task force (JTF), or theater commander achieve his objective. In an ideal situation, maneuver warfare emphasis would begin at the top. The overall commander would devise a campaign plan for his theater of operations that would identify the enemy's center of gravity. He would then designate his main effort. The air, land, and sea forces within his command would all develop proposed courses of action that would support the effort. The commander would consider these courses of action and formulate his concept of operations. His concept would take advantage of the unique contributions of each force and synchronize their efforts into an effective campaign. Traditionally, the Marine Corps has not operated this way, nor supported this type operation when serving as a subordinate unit to a JTF or theater commander.

When operating as an independent task force, the MAGTF frequently fails to treat its ACE as a separate maneuver unit and relegates it to a support role. Although the titles and the organizational chart lead you to believe the MAGTF consists of two combat elements and a support element (Figure 1), practice dictates otherwise. During a recent debrief of a MAGTF

exercise at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, a student who had served on the ACE staff put up a slide (Figure 2) showing "how it really worked in the exercise and how it often works in the real world":




Figure 1.




Figure 2.

The major problem in the relationship between the ACE and GCE in the MAGTF is that the GCE tends to drive the whole MAGTF. Although the official organizational chart depicts the ACE and GCE to be coequal combat elements, other Marine Corps publications better explain the true relationship. *FMFM 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine* states that only the GCE is responsible for developing courses of action for the MAGTF commander's approval. The primary role of the ACE and the combat service support element (CSSE) during the formulation of courses of action is to determine if they can support them. Although the ACE commander is responsible for formulating the antiair warfare concept of operations, it is the GCE commander who proposes to the MAGTF commander how the remaining aviation sorties should be apportioned and allocated. The GCE commander is responsible for selecting the interdiction targets and determining when, where, and how much CAS will be used. If the Marine Corps truly considers aviation to be a "combat element," then the ACE should be responsible for proposing courses of action and recommending the interdiction and CAS, as well as the antiair warfare, concepts of operation to the MAGTF commander.

The Marine Corps' view of aviation

*Battlefield air interdiction (BAI) is a USAF term for attacks on troops and equipment immediately behind the main battle area. It differs from deep interdiction because it has a near-term impact on the tactical battle. For a discussion of the Italian campaign, see LtCol Price T. Bingham's article in *Parameters*, March 1989.

as only a supporting arm, not an independent combat element, becomes very obvious when the MAGTF is employed subordinate to a JTF or theater commander. Marines traditionally have viewed any attempt by the JTF or theater air component commander to use Marine air for missions other than direct support of the Marine GCE as bordering on treason. Even though the Commandant of the Marine Corps has issued a White Letter to the contrary, most Marines still consider the air-ground team to be indivisible. The Korean and Vietnam Wars provided examples of this problem. While there are many excellent reasons to keep the MAGTF fighting as a team, there will be times when supporting the main effort will dictate the Marine Corps' ACE performing independent missions. While Marine leadership now seems to understand this problem, many Marine Corps officers remain unconvinced. The solution to changing this prevailing attitude is to better educate the officers responsible for making command and control decisions.

Education

Mr. Lind's concept to improve maneuver warfare education in the Marine Corps focuses on making aviators more knowledgeable of ground combat. If the curriculum at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College is representative of the amount of aviation related instruction given at the other Marine Corps schools, then the problem is not the aviator's lack of knowledge of ground combat operations but rather the ground officer's lack of exposure to aviation. During the 1988-89 school year, the Command and Staff College had only one, three-day exercise that emphasized the employment of airpower. This limited exposure to aviation presents problems from the top to the bottom of the command and control system. The majority of MAGTF commanders are ground, not aviation, officers. Some have little concept of what aviation can and cannot do or how it should be employed. In the absence of a strong ACE commander, they are likely to squander their aviation resources. Even if the MAGTF commander is an aviator, it is the GCE commander who makes the preponderance of critical aviation decisions. He is responsible for formulating the

concept of operations for interdiction and CAS.

Even the officers at the very bottom of the chain of command must understand the capabilities of Marine aviation. The platoon leader requesting CAS needs to know what targets are appropriate for air and which are better served by artillery or direct fire weapons. He must also understand aviation weapon effects and capabilities.

In all these cases, it is the ground officer who has the ultimate decision of when, where, and how air is used, not the aviator. Therefore, it is more essential for the ground officer to understand the employment of air than for the aviator to understand ground combat.

The Marine Corps education system should also make the GCE and ACE more aware of the fact that they both view the battlefield from a different perspective. The GCE is constrained by the realities of geography that limit its speed and mobility. Even though maneuver warfare doctrine emphasizes a larger area of influence and interest than previous doctrine, Marines on the ground tend to be interested only in their immediate tactical situation. The ACE, on the other hand, operates on a battlefield basically unrestricted by geography. The ACE can more readily see the battle on the operational, as well as the tactical, level. The ACE has the mobility to influence the battlefield from well behind friendly lines to hundreds of miles into the enemy's rear area. Because of these different views and areas of influence, the ACE and the GCE may quite often disagree on how to fight the battle. While this disparity is useful in generating a variety of courses of action (and an excellent reason to include the ACE in the process), it will also create considerable conflict in the MAGTF. A MAGTF that is aware of the problem and made up of officers well educated in the capabilities and limitations of all the elements of the MAGTF will be better prepared to make the right decisions on how to fight the war. They will also be better prepared to decide what aviation missions will best contribute to the main effort.

Missions

Marine aviation provides six tactical functions for the Marine Corps: antiair warfare, offensive air support, reconnaissance, assault support, elec-

tronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. In "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation," Mr. Lind challenges many of the traditional thoughts on how, why, when, and by whom these functions should be accomplished. His ideas concerning antiair warfare and offensive air support are quite controversial and deserve individual discussion.

Mr. Lind uses the term air superiority to describe the mission the Marine Corps calls antiair warfare. Mr. Lind sees aviation's efforts to gain control of the air as "a private battle with the enemy air force" and questions the wisdom of current Marine doctrine that directs the antiair effort to be the priority mission for the ACE:

... Usually, we are told that we must win air superiority before we can do much ground support . . . it comes first.

Maneuver warfare challenges this dictum on two counts. First, the purpose of aviation is to help achieve a decision on the ground. Therefore, the ground situation, not some abstract rule, determines the priority of air-to-air compared to air-to-ground missions . . .

Second, enemy air may not be a significant threat to our ground forces . . .

Three points must be made here. First of all, it is surprising that Mr. Lind, who developed his concept of maneuver warfare by studying the German blitzkrieg in World War II, would come to the conclusion that achieving air superiority is not a fundamental part of maneuver warfare. Germany's major offensives into Poland and Russia both began with an extensive air superiority campaign.

Second, giving priority to air superiority is hardly an abstract rule. History has repeatedly demonstrated the consequences of ignoring it. Commanders have occasionally found themselves in such dire defensive situations that they had no choice but to fly air-to-ground missions before they gained air superiority. The results have been devastating.

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) found itself in such a position at the outbreak of the 1973 war. The Arabs surprised the Israelis by attacking on the brink of both a Moslem and Jewish holiday. The Syrians and Egyptians waged a simultaneous attack on two fronts that left the IDF in a critical

situation. On the Golan Heights, the Syrian Army massed 700 tanks and 7,000 men against an IDF consisting of less than 180 tanks. Before the IAF could conduct an offensive anti-air warfare campaign, they were forced into action to save the outnumbered ground forces from being overrun. The IDF called on the massive use of CAS to turn the tide of the battle. With the support of air, the ground forces were able to eventually halt the Syrian advance, but the losses to the IAF were overwhelming. In the first day of fighting in the Golan Heights, the IAF lost 40 aircraft, 38 percent of the total number of aircraft lost in the war.

Third, although enemy air may not pose a threat to the ground force, it may still pose a threat to the ACE or CSSE and must be neutralized. Mr. Lind eventually draws the same conclusion.

In summary, the commander must determine in each situation what priority to give air superiority. As a general rule it should come first, but the operational situation may dictate otherwise. The commander must understand the consequences of attempting to perform other ground support missions without first gaining control of the air.

Mr. Lind's concept of air-to-ground support is the other major Marine aviation functional area that deserves discussion. The Marine Corps uses the term offensive air support to describe its air-to-ground missions. It recognizes two different types of missions, deep air support (interdiction) and close air support. Mr. Lind divides air-to-ground support missions into three different types: interdiction, armed reconnaissance, and close air support. His thoughts on interdiction are summed by the following quotations:

In general, attacking fixed targets—lines of communication, rail yards, supply dumps, etc.—does not have much effect on the enemy's ability to fight effectively.

Attacking fixed targets—interdiction bombing—has a long history of failure.

Other historical examples suggest that attacking some kinds of fixed targets, such as bridges, can be effective when integrated with the ground situation.

In general, attacks on enemy units are what count.

Eliminating air superiority and interdiction missions from the Marine

Corps would destroy the concept of the MAGTF. A MAGTF that doesn't have the capability to perform air superiority or interdiction missions can hardly be described as an "air-ground" task force.

The air-to-ground missions that Mr. Lind does champion are CAS and armed reconnaissance (AR). Both of these missions require close coordination with the GCE because they are flown in areas where troops are in contact with the enemy. The missions are similar except CAS requires someone, either on the ground or in the air, to identify the target. During an armed reconnaissance mission, the pilot is on his own to visually detect, identify, and then attack his target.

Mr. Lind's proposal to make CAS and AR the primary maneuver warfare aviation missions is neither his-



torically supportable nor applicable to today's modern battlefield. Mr. Lind frequently cites the success of Hans Ulrich Rudel, a German Stuka pilot on the Eastern Front, to demonstrate how effectively air and ground forces can work together. However, today's modern battlefield is considerably different than the one Hans Rudel found himself fighting above in his JU-87 Stuka dive bomber. Rudel's primary threat came from antiaircraft flak guns, a threat he could generally visually locate and avoid. Today his Stuka dive bomber, or any other aircraft that continually exposed itself to the vast array of air defense weapons possessed by a modern ground force, would have little chance to survive.

Technology has changed not only the lethality of the battlefield, but also

increased the capability of today's warriors to fight around the clock, in any weather. The two missions that Mr. Lind stakes the future of Marine aviation on, CAS and AR, are the only two ground support missions that can't be accomplished at night or in the weather. Mr. Lind points out that it is exceedingly difficult to find and identify enemy units at night and in bad weather on an intermixed battlefield. This doesn't prevent aviation from flying missions against units that aren't intermixed on the battlefield.

If the ground forces have the potential for night/weather operations, so must aviation. Today's aircraft have the technology to do the job. Our potential adversaries do not. It would be foolish not to exploit this advantage. The best solution for the Marine Corps is to retain its capability to perform all ground support missions as well as expanding its ability for night/weather operations.

The Marine Corps should also incorporate in its doctrine a mission that is targeted against the forces immediately to the rear of the main battle area. This mission, unlike Mr. Lind's armed reconnaissance, would not be dependent on good weather or daylight. Rather than sending a pilot out to roam the battlefield and visually acquire, identify, and attack targets, the Marine Corps should structure its mission to be similar to a U.S. Air Force's battlefield air interdiction mission.

BAI is a form of interdiction that is integrated with the GCE's scheme of maneuver in order to synchronize its effect. It is targeted against enemy mobile concentrations that are far enough from the friendly troops in contact to not require visual friend or foe target identification. BAI is designed to destroy the enemy's reserves, mobility, and fire support. It is accomplished close enough to the main battle area to have a near-term effect on the GCE's tactical situation. BAI relies on procedural control to identify friend from foe. A flight of aircraft is given a designated target area in which it may attack any targets that it finds. Reconnaissance aircraft, ground recon units, or other strike flights can all be used to determine which target areas contain appropriate targets. In the future, the Air Force's joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS) will have the capability to provide this in-

formation, at night and in the weather.

There are considerable benefits to flying BAI as opposed to Mr. Lind's armed reconnaissance. The most significant is that the pilot does not have to expose himself to the threat for an extended period of time attempting to determine if his target is friend or foe. If it is in his target area, it is a threat. BAI is planned against enemy units that have not yet become intermixed with friendlies or dispersed into their attack formations. These concentrated threats are vulnerable to area munitions. The pilot can make one pass, limit his exposure, yet retain a high probability of destroying multiple threats. When threats are intermixed with friendlies, or if they are dispersed on the battlefield, pilots are forced to use precision guided or point and shoot weapons. These weapons require an individual pass for each target and greatly increase the pilot's exposure to the threat.

BAI also has benefits over the other ground support missions. Unlike interdiction, BAI can have a near-term effect on the battle. Its procedural control measures require continual coordination with the GCE. While this sounds restrictive, it actually forces the air and ground to synchronize their efforts. From a pilot's point of view, it is a better mission than CAS. He can prestudy his target areas and execute his own tactics. Unlike CAS, BAI requires much less command and control and no communication in the target area. Finally, the pilot can better mass his forces and create force packages that can help him penetrate the enemy's defenses.

The biggest advantage of BAI compared to armed reconnaissance is that the Marine Corps doesn't have to change any of its equipment to incorporate this mission into its maneuver warfare concept. Mr. Lind, however, suggests a brand new aircraft to execute his concept of aviation maneuver warfare.

Equipment

Mr. Lind advocates giving up the Marine Corps' all-weather interdiction and air superiority aircraft. In their place he proposes a ground support aircraft with the following characteristics:

- slow speed with good agility
- inexpensive so it can be bought in quantity

—capable of only day, below-the-weather operations

—vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) capability

—highly accurate weapons delivery while "jinking"

—able to absorb a lot of hits

—small signature

—primary weapon would be a large caliber gun

This type aircraft would have some major drawbacks. It could not perform any missions other than armed reconnaissance or close air support. The flexibility that comes from a multimission aircraft like the F/A-18 would not exist in the Marine Corps. Although the use of V/STOL aircraft operating from expeditionary fields and moving with the GCE is a desirable concept, the supply problems have yet to be worked out. The AV-8B's former program manager, Col Lewis C. Watt, acknowledged the situation in an interview last fall when he said, "The problem with forward basing of the Harrier has been getting adequate logistical support to the aircraft at its remote site." Any V/STOL aircraft that attempts to move with the advancing forces will tend to restrict the mobility of the GCE. The GCE will have a much larger supply train to move and a larger rear area to protect. The net result could be less mobility on the maneuver battlefield.

Many reformers maintain that large quantities of simple aircraft acquired at low cost yield more capability for the dollar than a smaller number of highly capable, expensive aircraft. Mr. Lind made this argument six years ago when he proposed the Air Force buy lots of simple fighter aircraft instead of a smaller number of expensive, but much more capable, F-15 aircraft. Unfortunately, large numbers of inexpensive aircraft require large numbers of expensive people to fly, maintain, support, and provide all the other infrastructure needed to conduct aviation operations. The net result is a significant loss in capability for a very small unit savings in cost. In addition, the aircraft Mr. Lind describes for the Marine Corps is really not a simple, low technology aircraft. He wants V/STOL capability and the ability to deliver weapons accurately while "jinking," something even our most advanced aircraft currently cannot do.

Mr. Lind believes that "jinking"

about the battlefield will allow the pilot to defeat the threat, which he identifies as primarily small caliber automatic weapons, not radar-guided antiaircraft artillery and SAMs. If Mr. Lind had done more research, he would have found that although jinking decreases an aircraft's chance of being hit by radar guided weapons, it actually increases its exposure to barrage-type fire such as from automatic weapons. Speed and minimum exposure, not jinking, are the key to survival against this type of threat. Finally, a pilot that is seriously jinking will have little ability to see, let alone identify and destroy targets.

The Marine Corps doesn't need to change its present mix of equipment to be effective on the maneuver battlefield. It just needs to employ its current equipment where it is best suited. Fixed-wing aircraft should concentrate on air superiority, interdiction, BAI, and to a lesser degree CAS. Armed reconnaissance missions and modern day Stukas have no place in today's Marine Corps.

With these thoughts in mind, what is the role of Marine aviation in maneuver warfare? Marine aviation's role is to provide the task force or theater commander with a maneuver unit with capabilities that are distinct from his naval and ground forces. Marine aviation must be able to operate independently of the GCE to gain a decision or to work in synchronization with it to support the GCE's efforts. To fulfill this role, Marine aviation must be guided by doctrine that is applicable on the strategic and operational levels as well as the tactical level of war. Its command and control system must take into account the unique capabilities of aviation. The ACE and GCE must be considered as two equal combat arms and have equal influence in the planning process. Aviation and ground officers must be better educated in order to understand each other's tactical capabilities and constraints. The Marine Corps should include battlefield air interdiction as one of its offensive air support missions. Most important of all, the Marine Corps must consider aviation to be more than flying artillery. Only when the ACE is considered to be a separate maneuver unit will the Marine Corps have the true concept of maneuver warfare.

USMC

"Air Issues Reviewed" by Maj Gen John R. Dailey, USMC.
Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1989): 22-24.

- Thesis: Once phased ashore, only the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander should allocate Marine aviation assets.
- Aviation Assets Assigned to an Aircraft Carrier
 - An aircraft assigned to an aircraft carrier will not phase ashore after the amphibious landing.
 - Aviation assets are part of the aircraft carrier weapons system and will remain so throughout a cruise.
 - It is the responsibility of the Navy to provide fixed-wing support for the landing force during and after the landing.
- Employment of Marine Air Superiority Assets
 - Only when control of the amphibious operation area is established and upon the decision of the landing force commander will MAGTF fixed-wing aviation be phased ashore.
 - These aircraft will normally come from staging areas.
 - The aircraft that are assigned to the MAGTF commander are normally different from those aboard the aircraft carrier.
- Responsibilities of the MAGTF Commander
 - Using established doctrine, the MAGTF commander allocates aviation assets.
 - Any MAGTF commander who lets his fixed-wing assets get away from him should be relieved of command.

Lt Col Richard C. Murrow, USAF
Bessie E. Varner, ed.

Aviation

Air Issues Reviewed

by MajGen John R. Dailey

In Jun and Jul88 the Gazette published articles by William S. Lind on military reform. They touched on several aviation issues. In Oct88 MajGen John R. Dailey responded. In Nov88 Mr. Lind contributed additional discussion focused on Marine aviation. Now Gen Dailey has the last word—at least for this round—and stresses among other things a truly important area in which he and Mr. Lind are in close agreement.

Mr. Lind has raised some excellent points in his reply to my October 1988 article, "Reform Hell!" In fact, he has

identified one of the major challenges facing our Corps today. I want to lend my support to that issue, but first there



are some additional comments to be made on the positions I took in my original article.

It should have been clear that I had no intention of comparing the Osprey and the A-10. Indeed, they are completely different weapon systems with different missions, and, although they might appear on the same battlefield, their employment would be signifi-

cantly different. The Osprey has extraordinary speed and agility for its intended mission; the A-10 does not. Mr. Lind carefully states that although he does not support the A-10, he supports the A-10 *concept* and, in particular, the slow-speed aspect of the concept. The point I should have made more clearly is that battlefield observation from an aircraft, at any speed, is very poor. The U.S. Air Force has spent millions of dollars in studies to prove this, and I agree. Speed degrades the performance, but even at slow speed it is unsatisfactory.

My reference to the requirement for target marking pertains to close air support (CAS). In those situations in which friendly and enemy forces are intermixed (Mr. Lind's term) and marking is not possible, then the use of any supporting arm is questionable. That is why I suggested the employment of aviation assets to attack the follow-on echelons and prevent them from entering the fray. Under the circumstances, I think this would be a better use of Marine air. We have the capability to find and destroy enemy forces that are not engaged with friendly forces. They do not need to be marked for us to attack. We have sensors to find them in periods of reduced visibility, whether it be because of darkness or weather, and can prosecute the attack with a high probability of kill on the first pass. These techniques also enhance the survivability of the attacking aircraft. The night attack versions of the F/A-18 and the AV-8B are examples of this capability. Both of these aircraft, which will be entering the force soon, will present an additional challenge to us because fire support coordination and control of the battlefield will have new significance. The location of friendly forces will be essential information for the effective employment of future weapon systems. In regard to today's capability, Mr. Lind states: "The A-6's problem is that it is impossible to identify enemy units at night or in bad weather and, therefore, impossible to attack them." Qaddafi may have a different view. It is important to emphasize here that our weapon systems, including the A-6, are optimized to attack enemy units and not fixed targets, as Mr. Lind suggests.

I will accept Mr. Lind's not liking the Harrier II, for whatever reason, and I want to go on record that I don't



High tempo operations for fighter aircraft are restricted to isolated desert areas such as Nellis AFB, where this El Toro-based F/A-18 is participating in RED FLAG 83-5.

like the A-10 or the A-10 concept. There are costs associated with every weapon system, and one of the costs I am referring to is human life. I realize that Mr. Lind advocates an aircraft that will avoid hits by being "highly agile in both a classic and an energy maneuverability sense," and that is exactly what we have in the F/A-18 and the AV-8B.

It is the 30mm gun that Mr. Lind wants on our battlefield, and that is a worthy cause. One of the main problems with the A-10 is that the GAU-8A, which is the gun on it, is a monster and is why the A-10 is built the way it is—the aircraft was literally built around the gun. Another important point is that a pilot has to get very close (2,000 feet) to a tank to kill it with this weapon, thereby putting his aircraft within the lethal range of the 23mm and other enemy air defense weapons. Lessons learned from battle tell us that an aircraft gun dueling with air defense weapons is a losing proposition. We had money in the budget several years ago to procure the 30mm gun pods that Mr. Lind described, but for lack of priority they were deleted during the Department of the Navy review cycle. The 25mm gun was selected for the AV-8B primarily because of its size and effectiveness, but an added benefit is that the ammunition is common with the LAV-25 and the Navy's 25mm M242—a significant logistic consideration.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Mr. Lind is not a strong supporter

of fighter aircraft for the Marines, and he is not alone in his position. I can understand why he would feel the way he does because there are several factors that support his view. One is that economic considerations led us to the decision to functionally base our aircraft; that is, base all of one type of aircraft at a single base. This was one of the most difficult decisions ever made in regard to Marine aviation, and it was not without penalty. One of the most significant is that the fighter-attack aircraft are located at Beaufort, El Toro, and Iwakuni—none of which are close to the ground forces they support. The F/A-18 can operate out of New River, Camp Pendleton, or Futenma, or off highways, but noise avoidance and other "administrative" considerations prevent regular or high-tempo operations. This situation provides a built-in bias against the fighter pilots, and they are viewed as not being interested in supporting the ground forces. The pilots themselves don't help much because of who they are—arrogance, perceived or real, is a characteristic of the fighter pilot. They are the gunfighters of old, the infantry of the sky, the guys whose job it is to take the battle for the air to the enemy. The pilot must have confidence that he is going to win and must believe that he can beat the enemy. In the fighter-attack community such a spirit is absolutely necessary for preparing the mind for this mission, much as an athlete prepares mentally for an athletic event, especially boxing or wrestling.

Mr. Lind has a valid message for the fighter-attack community: The rest of the Corps may not view you the way you view yourselves. They don't necessarily understand that the "Big A" is back in VMFA. You may want to take a look at the way you deal with the rest of the world. It should not be too hard to change your image, because I know of no organized air-to-ground weapons competition in which the F/A-18 has ever been beaten.

Mr. Lind's question about who will "own" Marine fighters needs clarification. The Navy supports the procurement of fighters for the Marine Corps because it recognizes, as do Marines, that the Nation is woefully short of air superiority assets. How they are employed within the Department of the Navy is subject to many factors, but one factor remains constant. When an aircraft is assigned to an aircraft carrier, it will not phase ashore after the amphibious landing. It is part of the weapons system of that carrier and will remain so throughout the cruise. It is the responsibility of the Navy to provide fixed-wing support for the landing force during and after the landing. Only when and if control is established ashore and upon the decision of the landing force commander will fixed-wing aviation be phased ashore. The aircraft that perform this mission are different from those aboard the aircraft carriers and will be ferried in from the staging areas. That is why self-deployability is such an important requirement of our aircraft. (It is interesting to note that the Harrier and the Osprey can be ferried anywhere in the world without in-flight refueling.) So it is not the decision of the local admiral that determines allocation of assets; it is doctrine and the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander. On this point, I think that any MAGTF commander who lets his fixed-wing assets get away from him should be relieved.

Now for what is by far the most significant issue of this entire series and one with which Mr. Lind and I are in total agreement. In his rebuttal of my original comments, Mr. Lind spoke of a consistent failure, on the part of both air and ground commanders, to use air to do something decisive in terms of the outcome on the ground that only air can do.

He is right on the money with this one. We have all been guilty of this because we fail to force the issue during planning and executing various exercises. Either we let the "administra-

tive" restrictions of the exercise rule the play, or the exercise objectives do not call for the advanced level of aviation play. Often, however, the overriding reason for the failure to use air decisively is that exercises are designed for the ground Marines' benefit with little concern for aviation training objectives. This is not unique to aviation but is true for all supporting arms. As the name implies, we are there to support the ground scheme of maneuver and the ground commander's learning objectives.



Ground troops are not needed for aviation to practice advanced maneuvers.

Another overriding factor is that troops on the ground are not needed for aviation to practice its advanced maneuvers. So how do we inject ourselves into the play to achieve maximum effectiveness for the aviation combat element? There are some great examples, such as the CAROLINA COMBAT, COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS, COMFORT LEVELS, 4th MEB in Norway, and a host of other smaller but expertly conducted operations. Unfortunately, they are the exception. In the main, we don't do a very good job of this. How many exercises include proper employment of tactical aviation as a major consideration of the exercise objectives? How many include aviation as the main point of effort? How many times has aviation been used to turn the tide of battle? For some organizations the answer to these questions is "quite a few," but for most of the Marine Corps the answer is "not very of-

ten." This is an area that offers tremendous potential for us to improve our combat effectiveness. If the exercise's limitations don't permit execution, then at least the intellectual consideration of possibilities will create an awareness of the capabilities and make them part of our normal approach in considering tactical options. This is an important topic, and I hope something that has been said will spur readers to enter the dialog or, better yet, do something about this problem at the next opportunity.

Mr. Lind has identified the air command and control system as part of our aviation problem and, to a certain extent, he is right. Our equipment is not mobile enough. In fact, it is more accurate to say that it is movable rather than mobile. There are funded programs to solve some of the problems, but the real fix is through proper use of the equipment we have. How many times has the direct air support center not been displaced during an exercise because the displacement would interfere with the ground exercise schedule? I use this as but one example of how exercise schedule, operating area, cost, length, transportation, and all the other administrative, but real, constraints cause us to avoid critical actions. Similarly, we seldom let communicators experiment during an exercise because we can't afford for the communications to be down. This is another valid, worthwhile issue that should be examined at every opportunity.

I agree with Mr. Lind's concern over the cost of these new systems. There is no "free lunch" in the weapons game; we get what we pay for. Under today's system, the costs are easier to see, but it is very difficult to compare the cost or performance of an actual weapon system to one that is on paper. We have a powerful aviation arsenal in our Corps, and with the introduction of the Osprey it will be the best in the world—not because it costs the most but because it is a well-conceived package married to a strong training program and manned by the world's best warriors. We are going to get to the top and stay there because of the high-quality Marines we have moving up through our ranks who are accepting the responsibility to make it so.

USMC

>Major Gen Dailey, a naval aviator, is currently Commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA.


"Defending the ATF" by Maj Robert E. Milstead, Jr., USMC.
Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1987): 62-71.

- Thesis: Embarked Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) aviation assets should remain under the operational control of the MAGTF commander. The bulk of the article addresses the use of MAGTF aviation assets by the Navy. The arguments used to support use of embarked MAGTF assets in the emergency defense of the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) can also be applied to determine who should control these assets during amphibious operations once phased ashore.
- Protection of the ATF
 - The Navy looks to the embarked MAGTF to augment its defenses during critical periods. Use of MAGTF assets helps economize Navy resources.
 - Marines believe protection of the ATF is ultimately a Navy mission.
 - Use of MAGTF assets for the defense of the ATF must not be construed as a substitute for an appropriately constituted naval covering force. Diversions of MAGTF assets decrease the capability the MAGTF has to complete its mission.
 - The final decision to use MAGTF assets should be an operational issue and must depend upon availability of assets and the degree of threat.
- The Question of Command Relationships
 - The MAGTF commander should always have operational control of embarked MAGTF aviation assets.
 - Only the MAGTF commander should determine when and where the MAGTF aviation assets will be utilized.
 - The primary emphasis of the entire MAGTF is supporting the Marine ground forces.
- Recommended Use of MAGTF Aviation Assets
 - Policies and procedures for the use of MAGTF aviation assets must be actively developed and clearly understood by all services involved prior to a joint operation.
 - Long-term solutions require coordination and thorough planning.

Lt Col Richard C. Murrow, USAF
Bessie E. Varner, ed.

Defending the ATF

by Maj Robert E. Milstead, Jr.



The use of MAGTF assets in the emergency defense of the amphibious task force is a reality for which Marines must prepare.

For years, an informal understanding has existed acknowledging that Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) aviation assets will be used, if required, to assist in the emergency defense of the amphibious task force (ATF) to ensure its survival en route to and within the amphibious objective area (AOA). However, there has been a gradual shift from the recognized emergency-only use of MAGTF assets to a more routine dependence on MAGTF assets in the defense of the ATF. There is even a body of opinion within the Navy that goes so far as to say that air defense of the ATF should be more a MAGTF responsibility than a Navy responsibility. Regardless of whose responsibility it is, the MAGTF must arrive safely in the objective area without a critical reduction in its combat potential. Recognizing this as paramount, any MAGTF/landing force commander* would certainly provide all the assistance he could, especially when the alternatives are being sunk or suffering heavy damage en route.

Although defending the ATF is a Navy responsibility, the MAGTF is part of the team, and accordingly, must be prepared to contribute to its defense. However, the use of MAGTF assets in oper-

ations of this nature cannot, and must not, be construed as a substitute for an appropriately constituted naval covering force. The capabilities and numbers of MAGTF assets are too limited to do more than assist in a last-ditch emergency defense. To depend solely on the MAGTF for the defense of the ATF would leave it extremely vulnerable and would adversely affect the MAGTF's ability to complete its mission once in the AOA.

An Emerging Problem

Controversy surrounding the use of embarked MAGTF assets for emergency defense of the ATF

“The capabilities and numbers of MAGTF [air] assets are too limited to do more than assist in a last ditch emergency defense.”

has been ongoing since the first deployment of AV-8s as elements of a MAGTF's air combat element (ACE). "Commandant of the Marine Corps White Letter 1-80," which discussed the flexibility of MAGTF operations, cited the use of embarked AV-8s in assisting in the emergency defense of naval forces as an example of that flexibility. Although canceled on 31 December 1980, the philosophy of that White Letter became well known to Navy and Marine officers and has been cited frequently in the years since. Consequently, deploy-

* To facilitate simplicity, the terms landing force and MAGTF are synonymous. Although not always the case, for purposes of this article, commander landing force (CLF) and MAGTF commander are also considered to be the same.

ing MAGTFs have been faced with requests, or in some instances requirements, to provide MAGTF aircraft to perform the roles of surface, subsurface, surveillance and control (SSSC); surface combat air patrol (SUCAP); and combat air patrol (CAP).

Due to a lack of formal Navy and Marine Corps policy regarding this issue and in response to requests for guidance from deployed MAGTF commanders, two fleet commanders proposed in 1983 a series of guidelines for employment of MAGTF assets in defense of the ATF. Also in 1983, the Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG) published a tactical memorandum (TacMemo) entitled "AV-8s and Helicopters in Emergency Defense of the Amphibious Task Force." This TacMemo was a "how to" document concerning execution techniques rather than a statement of policy and command relationships.

In 1986, the topic was addressed at numerous conferences and symposiums. A Marine Corps doctrine conference called for a formal policy on the topic before doctrine could be developed. An amphibious aviation symposium at NAB Little Creek recommended that a tactics development and evaluation team be formed to develop a mission concept for embarked AV-8 employment and to update the aforementioned TacMemo. Accordingly, SWDG sponsored a conference in October 1986 titled "Defense of ATF/AV-8B Tactical Employment Working Group." Notice the word "emergency" was deleted from the conference title; a subsequent message from the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) reinserted it. During this conference and at an amphibious warfare conference held in November 1986, five major points were agreed upon by Navy and Marine Corps representatives:

- Survival of the ATF is paramount.
- U.S. Navy has primary responsibility for ATF defense.
- MAGTF aviation assets constitute *emergency* backup only.

- Command relationships are based on the normal commander amphibious task force (CATF)/commander landing force (CLF) relationships as defined in *NWP 22(B)*.
- While training is essential, unnecessary dilution or attrition of MAGTF capabilities should be avoided.

Even with these five points agreed upon, there is still much that needs to be defined and mutually understood. One should begin by looking at both sides of the issue, Navy and Marine.

There has been much conjecture in Navy circles about the self-sufficiency of the ATF and its need for carrier battle group (CVBG) or surface action group (SAG) support. The Navy feels that certain scenarios may require the ATF to transit to an objective area without adequate supporting surface combatants. A current example is the amphibious ready groups with their embarked MAGTF that often sortie without a CVBG or other covering force. In such situations, the CATF will have to rely on organic shipboard and embarked MAGTF assets to initially defend the task force until help can arrive. In another example, the missile-equipped gunboat capability of almost every Third World nation presents a significant surface threat to the ATF, but the threat might not be significant enough to warrant a covering force. (In either case, one would hope that escorts would be present once the ATF arrived in the AOA as they provide the necessary naval gunfire support needed during the initial assault.) The Navy believes that the AV-8B and AH-1 are capable of performing SSSC, SUCAP, and CAP missions in conjunction with the emergency defense of the ATF, and that Marine aviators should train accordingly. In addition to MAGTF aircraft, Stinger assets and ground weapons are also contemplated for use in emergency defense of the ATF.

The Navy viewpoint by no means overlooks the vulnerability of an ATF and its need for adequate protection. The Navy views the problem as one of



Enemy gunboats armed with missiles pose a threat to the ATF.

resources. It simply does not have the necessary warships to conduct all its missions, so it looks to the other Services for any help it can get. If escort assets are available, they will be assigned to the ATF. The Navy is not attempting to avoid its responsibility to defend the ATF; it is looking to the embarked MAGTF to augment its defenses during critical periods. Utilization of MAGTF assets is one means the Navy has to economize its resources. After all, the Navy and Marine Corps are a team.

Marines view the problem differently. Their focus is on the MAGTF. Protection of the ATF is a Navy mission. Diversions of MAGTF assets may jeopardize the capability of the MAGTF to successfully complete its mission. If the threat is significant, fleet commanders should first determine if the amphibious objective is feasible and worth the considerable assets required. With a substantial threat and an inadequate covering force available, then perhaps the mission should be delayed. Doctrinally, amphibious operations are predicated on air and naval superiority within the AOA.

The team concept of the ATF is recognized. It is obvious that the MAGTF can only accomplish its mission if it successfully reaches the objective area. Even with an appropriate naval covering force, losses can be high. During the Falklands War, the British had both significant escort ships and radar-equipped Sea Harriers for protection of their ATF. Yet their losses were significant: four warships, one Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) ship, and one merchant ship were sunk, and eight other warships and two RFA ships suffered various degrees of damage. Marines must be, and always have been, prepared to help under extreme circumstances.

What constitutes an "emergency," however, is another Marine concern. The subjective definition is open to the interpretation of the individuals involved. To a Marine, emergency defense means helping out when the covering force is unable to adequately neutralize the threat. It does not mean providing the defense for an unescorted ATF en route to the AOA; that is routine defense. Abuse of "emergency" employment of MAGTF assets can result in an overall degradation of capabilities. Additionally, any perception of erosion of the Navy's responsibility to defend the ATF could easily reduce the incentive to program funds for that purpose. Historical examples of the Navy failing to program for combat search and rescue and vertical onboard delivery helicopters are prominent examples of this.

To this point, the issue has been viewed parochially. The degree to which MAGTF assets con-

tribute to the defense of the ATF should be an operational issue and approached accordingly. The final decision should be heavily influenced by the threat, the MAGTF assets available, the capabilities and limitations of these assets, and the command relationships of those involved.

The Threat

The broad spectrum of sophisticated threat weapons systems that may be employed against the ATF is considerable. Assuming the conflict has not crossed the nuclear threshold, the conventional cruise missile, with its capability for subsurface, surface, and air launch, will be the dominant threat. The submarine is probably the most pervasive threat since it is not range limited. Therefore, another significant threat will be submarine-launched missiles or torpedoes. If a choke point must be transited, the mine becomes as major a concern en route as it is in the AOA itself. The air threat, although range-limited, is still significant. Air-launched cruise missiles with ranges of 250 nautical miles or greater add considerably to the capabilities of Soviet Bear, Badger, and Backfire aircraft. Surface combatants carrying a

¶ ¶ With a substantial threat and an inadequate covering force available, then perhaps the mission should be delayed. ¶ ¶

multitude of weapons systems could also pose a significant threat to the ATF. The over-the-horizon capability of many surface-to-surface missiles presents a formidable threat. In addition to missiles and torpedoes, the Soviets rely heavily on gun systems.

This significant surface and air threat will not be limited to Soviet waters. Soviet policy to furnish sophisticated weapons to client states will no doubt continue. Although the threat will be less significant in waters contiguous to Third World countries than in waters contiguous to the Soviet Union, it will still be significant.

In defense against this threat, amphibious shipping relies on three organic weapons systems: the close-in weapons system (CIWS), the 5"/54 caliber gun, and the surface-to-air missile. These systems provide some degree of protection, but the overall self-defense capability remains minimal and requires assistance from other sources.

An available source of protection the Navy will call upon is the embarked MAGTF. At present, there are three MAGTF assets generally discussed for use: the AV-8B Harrier, AH-1 Cobra, and the Stinger missile. When depending on MAGTF assets for assistance, it is important to note that the

actual number and type of weapons assigned to any landing force vary and are determined by the mission and weapons availability prior to embarkation. There are also numerous misconceptions within the Navy and Marine Corps concerning the capabilities of these assets and their ability to contribute to a viable defense of the ATF. MAGTF augmentation of ATF defenses must be undertaken with the capabilities and limitations discussed below clearly in mind.


AV-8B Harrier

The Marine Corps has recently replaced the AV-8A/C with the new AV-8B. An extremely versatile aircraft, the AV-8B can operate ashore from small and primitive sites or afloat from decks as small as those of an LPD. It has a high engine-thrust-to-weight ratio and excellent acceleration. The payload and range performance of the AV-8B are at least double that of the AV-8A.

Although the Harrier was designed for close air support (CAS) ashore, its versatility allows its use in antisurface warfare and antiair warfare missions at sea. Specific missions that may be assigned to the AV-8B include all three of the missions mentioned previously—SSSC, SUCAP, and CAP.

The first, SSSC, is basically a "recon and report" mission. Use of MAGTF assets in this role tends to stretch the spirit of "emergency" utilization; however, with its speed and maneuverability, the AV-8B is capable of making a contribution in this area. Still, we must consider the probability of encountering "bad guys" during an SSSC mission. To make a positive visual identification under most conditions, the Harrier would likely be required to enter any hostile ship's extensive defensive envelope. At night, and without radar, this becomes almost an impossible task. Even with their inertial navigation system Harriers on SSSC missions would probably still require positive two-way communication for additional navigation vectors or sighting reports. This mission dependency on communication must be weighed against the necessity to maintain strict emission control conditions.

In the SUCAP mission, the AV-8B has a limited capability against surface threats. At present, the Harrier does not have a standoff weapon capability for this mission. The Maverick or laser guided bomb (Paveway) would provide some standoff capability, but they both require laser designation of the target from an external source. The Harrier will rely, therefore, on one of the Mk-90 series bombs, Rockeye, or 5-inch Zuni rockets. All are currently available in the MAGTF's ordnance packup. Delivery of these weapons, howev-



Guided missile cruisers have performed well in training intercepts of aircraft.

er, could place the Harrier well within many threat envelopes prior to weapons release.


The amount of ordnance the Harrier can carry is another concern. Ordnance loads are heavily dependent on the type of takeoff planned. Including fuel stores, weapons, and ammunition, the maximum load for vertical takeoff (as from an LPD) is approximately 6,750 pounds. With a short-roll takeoff (as from an LPH or LHA), the load is substantially increased to 17,000 pounds. Any SUCAP mission requires launch from an LPH or LHA. Keeping these decks clear for Harrier launch may significantly reduce helicopter operations.

Location of the target presents another problem. The Harrier requires accurate data on target location, course, speed, etc. Since vectors might be necessary, emissions control restrictions may again have to be considered. Conduct this scenario at night or during minimal weather, and the chance for success is significantly reduced.

CAP is the mission where the Harrier's contribution can be the most significant. However, the limited number of Harriers embarked (normally six for a Marine amphibious unit (MAU)) would preclude a continuous airborne CAP or SUCAP under most conditions. A deck-launched intercept would be more appropriate. Armed with the AIM-9 Sidewinder and a 25mm internal gun, the Harrier is more than capable of defending itself and posing a formidable threat in a close-in visual engagement. The Harrier's greatest limitation in this area is its lack of an onboard radar and a beyond-visual-range missile.

All too often, proponents of Harrier use for CAP quote the success of British Harriers in the Falklands. What they fail to mention is that all 20

The submarine is a pervasive threat to the ATF since its range is unlimited.



air-to-air kills were attributed to the radar-equipped Sea Harrier and none to the non-radar-equipped Harrier GR3. Without radar, the Harrier is dependent upon others for timely target detection and accurate intercept information for visual acquisition and engagement. As in SSSC and SUCAP, two-way communication requirements may work to the overall detriment of ATF security. Additionally, without radar, the Harrier will likely be restricted to operations in daylight and under visual flight conditions. Another consideration will be how to utilize the AV-8B and still keep the missile engagement zone of the ATF clear to maximize its organic surface-to-air missile capability.

AH-1 Cobras

At present, there are three models of the AH-1 Cobra in the Marine Corps: the AH-1J, the AH-1T, and the new AH-1W. By 1989, all AH-1Ts will be retrofitted as AH-1Ws, all AH-1Js will be with the Reserves, and the AH-1W will be the fleet's attack helicopter. Until then, both the AH-1T and AH-1W may be found afloat.

Heavily armed, the Cobra can carry a variety of ordnance. The chin turret contains the primary weapons system, a 20mm cannon. The four external ordnance stations carry the remaining ordnance. Both the AH-1T and AH-1W are capable of firing the Hellfire missile. All Cobras are capable of carrying the 2.75-inch rocket, the 5-inch Zuni rocket, and the AIM-9 Sidewinder.

Although the Cobra is a heavily armed and capable aircraft, its capabilities in the defense of an ATF are often exaggerated and misunderstood. Like all helicopters, the Cobra is extremely vulnerable to antiair systems. This vulnerability is significantly increased without terrain to afford protection. During an emergency, however, the Cobra would undoubtedly be called upon to assist in the defense of the ATF.

In SSSC, the Cobra is significantly limited by its lack of an onboard navigation system. Over open water, the crew would need two-way communication for vectors, or an operating tactical air navigation system (TACAN) for navigation, since Marine helicopter pilots are not proficient in dead-reckoning navigation. This mission dependency on communications would have to be weighed against the importance of emissions control conditions.

The Cobra's ability to identify suspected hostile ships visually must also be considered. Even using the 13x telescopic sight unit on the AH-1T and the AH-1W, positive visual identification may require the aircraft to enter certain threat weapons envelopes. With less speed and maneuverability than the Harrier, and lacking terrain for protection, the Cobra would be extremely vulnerable. Night operations or reduced weather conditions would further limit the Cobra's ability to conduct SSSC.

It is in the SUCAP mission where the capabilities of the Cobra are most exaggerated. An example is the overwater capability of the TOW missile system. The TOW missile's range is substantially reduced when fired over water. The missile may be fired over water out to its maximum range as long as no more than 1,100 meters of the wire falls into the water. To achieve this, the Cobra must increase firing altitude significantly, thereby increasing vulnerability. A sample calculation from the *AH-1 Tactics Manual* shows that if a Cobra were at an altitude of 50 feet when it fired a TOW missile at a fast patrol boat, the missile would have a maximum range of less than 2,500 meters—well short of the published maximum range of 3,750 meters. Engaging targets at such reduced ranges could expose the Cobra to hostile fire prior to launching a missile. Additionally, limited maneuverability during missile tracking and lack of protective terrain would increase vulnerability significantly.

The 20mm cannon and the 2.75-inch and 5-inch rockets are less effective against a moving target than they are against a stationary one. To achieve any degree of accuracy, the range would need to be significantly reduced or the altitude increased to facilitate diving fire. Use of these weapons against anything more than a lightly armed patrol

boat would be unwise. The bottom line is that over open water, without terrain for protection or to aid surprise, the Cobra is extremely vulnerable to even the moderately armed patrol boat.

One weapon that has promise for use in the SUCAP mission is the Hellfire missile. Its range would allow the Cobra to fire it well outside most threat envelopes. Additionally, since it is a "fire and forget" missile, maneuverability would not be restricted during employment as in the case of a TOW missile. Like Maverick and Paveway, the Hellfire must rely on external laser designation. Unfortunately, the Cobra presently has no self-designation capability. Until the Cobra acquires an on-board laser designator, and thereby a self-designating capability, the Hellfire is useless at sea.

Although capable of carrying the AIM-9, the Cobra would be of little value in a CAP role. Unless absolutely necessary, the Cobra would best avoid this role and leave it to the AV-8B, Stinger, and organic shipboard antiair weapons to provide protection against enemy air.

Stinger Teams

The Stinger missile is the most capable and reliable MAGTF weapon currently available to assist in the point defense of ATF shipping. This highly portable, lightweight, shoulder-fired missile is effective out to ranges of six kilometers. Hostile targets can be acquired, tracked, and engaged in any aspect. One simply needs to be familiar with the missile's operating envelope. It is a relatively uncomplicated system and simple to operate. Once the gunner has visually acquired the target, he aligns it in the open sight, interrogates it with the integral IFF system, and if the target is hostile, fires the missile. Employed against "leakers," those hostile aircraft that have gotten through primary air defense systems, the Stinger can significantly increase the antiair posture of the ATF.

There are, however, at least five limitations that could severely affect its use. One is its current limitation to daylight employment. Although a night sight has been requested, the current sight relies upon the gunner visually aiming the weapon. As a result, during hours of twilight, dawn, and darkness, Stinger is not effective. During Beirut deployments, some Stinger units used an expedient night sight that only provided "hot spots," not target identification. Second, at present, the Stinger has not received a complete HERO (hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance) certification from the Navy for shipboard use. A third possible limitation is the potential for interference between the Stinger's IFF system and shipboard avionics systems. Fourth, the 14-meter backblast of the

missile will also directly affect the location of firing positions. Lastly, the six-kilometer range will do little to protect the ATF from aircraft launching standoff cruise missiles or air-to-surface missiles.

Other MAGTF Assets

Besides the Harrier, Cobra, and Stinger, there are some other MAGTF assets that deserve brief mention. The use of machineguns and ground TOWs could prove beneficial against a limited surface threat. The machinegun's primary limitation is its small caliber and lack of range. The ground TOW is also range-limited by the immersion of its guidance wires as discussed earlier. Rough seas and a fastmoving target could combine to make target tracking difficult.

A bright spot is the possible development of the air defense variant of the light armored vehicle or LAV(AD). As presently conceived, it will carry a five-barrel 25mm Gatling gun, four Stinger missiles, and the necessary mounts for two pods of Hydra 70 rockets. With its forward-looking infrared FLIR and laser range finder, the LAV(AD) will provide a highly effective night air defense system and should be able to contribute to the defense of the ATF.


Command Relations and Other Considerations

Undoubtedly, the most important of all the operational issues is the question of command relationships. Command relationships are based on the normal CATF-CLF relationship as defined in *NWP 22(B)*. Add to this the Navy composite warfare concept (CWC) or a multi-MAGTF landing force, and the command arrangements and interactions of the Navy and Marine team become complex and poorly understood by many.

In amphibious operations wherein an initiating directive has been published, the command relationships of *NWP 22(B)* are clear. Prior to the release of an initiating directive, however, the CATF and CLF are coequals for planning. Tasking of MAGTF assets for emergency defense of the ATF will, therefore, be through the CLF, with both commanders in concurrence. Unity of command is recognized, however, in that if the CLF does not concur, he will nonetheless comply as tasked and register his disagreement with their common superior. Tactical control of MAGTF assets may be exercised by the CATF, but embarked MAGTF aviation assets will always remain under the operational control of the MAGTF commander. He alone should determine when and where MAGTF aviation assets will be utilized in a nonemergency situation.

As simple as the doctrinal relationship may ap-

Although the Cobra is a heavily armed aircraft, its capabilities in defense of an ATF are often exaggerated.



pear, its interpretation can be heavily influenced by personalities. An example: at one extreme is a amphibious squadron commander who views the Harriers as his and the LPH/LHA as his own little carrier. At the other extreme is a MAU commander who views his assets as sacred to the amphibious assault, and the responsibility for ATF survival entirely a Navy concern.

The reasonable approach is found somewhere between these two extremes. The Navy is responsible for the protection of the ATF and its embarked MAGTF. The MAGTF should, however, be ready to assist in the emergency defense of the ATF if such an emergency condition should arise. Increasing the responsibilities of the MAGTF to include emergency defense of the ATF will impact on several areas. The three most heavily affected by this additional responsibility will be training, fiscal, and combat readiness.

While training is essential, unnecessary dilution of MAGTF capabilities should be avoided. Training is especially critical when considering the use of Marine aviation in a war-at-sea scenario. Marine aviation training is oriented toward land warfare, and most aviators train almost exclusively in that environment.

Training for the emergency defense mission should begin with a detailed threat analysis. The Navy must identify and narrow the threat to a point that allows us to articulate a realistic defense against it. Training should be conducted not only for the MAGTF, but for the ATF as a whole. The ability to integrate all organic and MAGTF assets into a viable defensive plan will require practice. Training, however, consumes resources, drains time for other requirements, takes flight deck availability, and uses up maintenance opportunities. Consequently, every effort should be made to ensure that training for emergency defense missions complements and does not detract from primary mission requirements. Key Navy/MAGTF emergency defense coordination training, for instance, may not necessarily require actual aircraft launch. During all training, safety must be paramount, and every effort made to avoid unnecessary attrition of already scarce assets.

The price tag for this additional responsibility may be high. With a fixed ceiling on our current budget, increased MAGTF capabilities in this collateral mission can only be had at the expense of capabilities elsewhere. We must acknowledge the economic reality of our budget. Planning for the use of MAGTF assets without considering the fiscal ramifications is tantamount to ignoring the problem altogether. How do we assume this additional responsibility and train accordingly without increasing our funding requirements? If additional funding is required, where will it come from?

A popular but unrealistic approach suggests increasing the capabilities of the MAGTF's organic

“ The Navy is responsible for the protection of the ATF and its embarked MAGTF. The MAGTF should, however, be ready to assist in the emergency defense of the ATF if such an emergency condition should arise. ”

weapons systems. Some examples include modifying the Cobra to carry the Penguin or Sea Skua missile, providing a self-designating capability to the Cobra for Hellfire, or modifying the Harrier to include radar or the Harpoon missile. Such approaches are unrealistic due to the significant costs associated with such modifications and the inevitable interference with primary missions.

Training for this additional responsibility will also cost money. The money for additional flight hours and training ordnance must come from somewhere. Do we decrease present training requirements to allow for this additional training, or do we simply add it on to existing programs?

The primary emphasis of the entire MAGTF is directed at supporting the Marine rifleman ashore. There can be no other priority. Any approach to defending the ATF must keep this in mind. The degree to which this additional responsibility affects the MAGTF's combat readiness is largely scenario-dependent. The most obvious effect will be the loss of MAGTF assets while defending the

ATF. An asset lost while defending the ATF en route is unavailable during the amphibious operation and thereby directly affects the combat readiness of that MAGTF.

There are less obvious ways that a MAGTF's combat readiness may be affected. The Marine concept of embarkation centers on the amphibious assault. Will acceptance of this additional responsibility affect embarkation? Current aviation ordnance loadouts are oriented toward operations ashore, not at sea. This applies to both type and quantity. Should significant utilization be envisioned, then the ordnance loadout must be increased accordingly. The training and fiscal considerations previously discussed also directly affect combat readiness. The three are inseparable. Any reasonable approach must account for impacts in these areas. The optimum solution must include MAGTF resources that are properly trained and capable of assisting in an emergency defense, but still capable of successfully completing their primary mission once delivered to the AOA.

Conclusions

The use of MAGTF assets in the emergency defense of the ATF is a reality for which we Marines must prepare. Without detailed Marine Corps guidance, the MAGTF is only capable of reacting to policies and procedures developed by the Navy. We must become actively involved in the development of these policies and procedures. Some recommendations include:

- CMC and Chief of Naval Operations formulate a joint memorandum of agreement delineating Navy and Marine Corps responsibilities with respect to the defense of an ATF.
- CMC publishes clear and concise policy guidance on utilizing MAGTF assets in the emergency defense of the ATF.
- Appropriate Marine Corps experts (i.e., MAWTS-1 for aviation) become involved in developing the detailed tactics and procedures necessary.

dures necessary.

- Fleet Marine Force commanders coordinate scheduling of deploying amphibious ready groups with carrier battle groups or surface action groups.

To make employment of MAGTF assets in emergency defense of the ATF a viable concept for all concerned, however, requires much more. To make it work, there needs to be an emphasis on

¶ ¶ An asset lost while defending the ATF en route is unavailable during the amphibious operation and thereby directly affects the combat readiness of the ATF. ¶ ¶

the team. The necessity to work as a team will be required in any future conflict. Any future amphibious operation will undoubtedly be conducted in a joint arena. As Marines, we must be prepared. This begins with an understanding of the other Services, especially the Navy. How well we understand the Navy's intricacies (i.e., CWC) may well determine our success in future conflicts. Long-term solutions require coordination and thorough planning. Planning for use of embarked MAGTF assets should begin as early as possible. The initial presail conference should include the issue of emergency defense. Flexibility must prevail throughout; compromises may have to be made. A continuing dialog will be necessary in order to optimize use of MAGTF assets at sea. Flexibility and capabilities mean nothing when prior planning does not occur.

The Navy mission and the MAGTF mission are inseparable. Both the Navy and the MAGTF should hold school to ensure that each is aware of the other's respective capabilities and limitations. The ground rules must be laid out and clearly understood by all. Finally, teamwork is the key. Our greatest resource is the experience and skill inherent in the Navy/Marine Corps team. USMC

"Doctrinal Issues Concerning US Navy and US Marine Corps Forces in the Airland Battle" by Lt Col Henry L. Reed, USMC. US Army War College Student Essay, AD-A180733 (23 March 1987): 1-26.

- Thesis: Differences in the services' doctrines hamper the development of joint doctrine. To be effective, joint operations must dictate proper planning, allocation, coordination, and integration.
- Military Planners
 - Joint/combined operations demand greatly increased centralization in command and control, planning, coordination, and integration of supporting assets.
- USAF Perspectives of Air Command and Control
 - The air component command is "the focal point for employing aerospace power."
 - The air component commander is responsible for apportioning aerospace forces.
 - The air battle has top priority.
 - The battlefield is split horizontally.
 - Airspace above 50 feet is under USAF control.
 - Management is centralized at the theater level and allows the commander to shift the weight of air power throughout the entire theater depending upon the situation.
 - Doctrine is oriented toward a NATO environment.
- USMC Perspectives of Air Command and Control
 - The ground battle has top priority.
 - The battlefield is split vertically with the focus on close air support short of the fire support coordination line (FSCL).
 - Splitting the battlefield horizontally allows the USAF to divert any aircraft within the theater without prior coordination with ground commanders.
 - The primary role is to support ground units in a timely manner.
 - Management is centralized at the lowest level to facilitate response time and provide the best support to the ground elements.

- Centralized management at the theater level is not responsive to ground commanders for preplanned and immediate close air support requirements.
- Recommendations for Integration of Fire Support Assets
 - The theater commander must understand how each service is organized and functions.
 - Joint doctrine must be developed wherein all services agree to common terminology and operating procedures.
 - Each service must review its doctrine to ensure it reflects joint doctrine in accordance with guidelines established by the JCS.
 - Forces operating in a joint environment must possess the tactical and technical expertise to integrate power at the critical time to defeat the enemy at the front line as well as in the deep battle.

Lt Col Richard C. Murrow, USAF
Bessie E. Varner, ed.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

**DOCTRINAL ISSUES CONCERNING US NAVY AND
US MARINE CORPS FORCES IN THE AIRLAND BATTLE**

An Individual Essay

by

Lieutenant Colonel Henry L. Reed, USMC

**Captain Peter D. Reiniger, USN
Project Adviser**

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release; distribution is unlimited.**

**US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
23 March 1987**

Background

World geography, our vital national interests, mutual defense agreements and the Soviet threat require that the United States military maintain a force in readiness which is capable of rapid response to a broad spectrum of contingencies. One only needs to look at the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt to appreciate that the future battlefield for the American military will be a complex and demanding threat environment supported by a Soviet-style integrated air defense system of antiaircraft guns, mobile and fixed missile sites, and air defense aircraft.

While the US Navy and Marine Corps have pursued the Maritime Strategy and the Army and Air Force are committed to the AirLand Battle, most military leaders and military analysts continue to treat them as separate entities. The purpose of this study is not to join in a debate as to which strategy is correct, but rather to examine the Navy/Marine Corps doctrinal issues with that of the AirLand Battle which could cause our fighting forces to be less than effective on the battlefield in a joint/combined arena.

Both the Maritime Strategy and AirLand Battle doctrine focus on the approach of generating and applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels. The AirLand Battle is a doctrine for land warfare which "success on the battlefield depends on the Army's ability to fight in accordance with four tenets: initiative, agility, depth and synchronization."¹ The Maritime Strategy focuses on preventing the seas from becoming a hostile medium of attack against the United States and its allies, ensuring we have unhampered use of the ocean to our allies and forward-deployed forces and the ability to project our forces ashore in support of US objectives and to

support combat ashore should deterrence fail. In the words of Admiral Wylie, "Maritime theory consists briefly of two major parts: the establishment of control of the sea and the exploitation of the control of the sea toward establishment of control on land."²

In view of the foregoing, military planners must face the fact that there will no longer be Army, Navy or Air Force wars and that both planning and operations must be joint in nature. Concomitantly, they must recognize that the Maritime Strategy and AirLand Battle are not mutually exclusive and as such joint/combined operations demand greatly increased centralization in command and control, planning, coordination and integration of supporting assets.

Unity of Command

Presently, a wide spread doctrinal problem exists among military planners when describing the role of Commander Marine Corps Forces (ComMarFor) in Joint Task Force (JTF) operations. The Marine Corps was established as a separate Service in July 1798. However, most doctrinal publications and Unified Command Plans fail to identify or recognize the proper role of ComMarFor under the JTF organizational charts. The common mistake is to designate a naval component commander (see Figure 1) which makes the assumption that under all circumstances US Marines will be under the operational control of a US Navy commander. This issue is of particular concern to the Navy and Marine Corps since the role of ComMarFor is different and distinct from the traditional command relationship between Navy/Marine forces in an amphibious operation.

A (JTF) may be constituted by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, specified command, or an existing JTF. It is composed of elements of two or more services operating under a single JTF commander. Normally it performs missions having specific.

COMMON JTF CHAIN OF COMMAND




Figure 1

limited objectives or missions of short duration.. It dissolves when it has achieved its purpose. The JTF commander is responsible to the JTF establishing authority. He has operational control over the entire force. He will usually augment his own staff with representatives from the other services. He exercises logistical coordination or control only as necessary to meet his subordinate commanders' logistical needs.³

FM 100-5 further delineates the role of component commanders of the JTF as being responsible for administration, training in their own service doctrine/tactics, designation of specific units for joint force requirements and the tactical employment of the service component forces. FM 100-5 definition of the JTF is comparable with that provided by JCS Pub. 2, Unified Action Forces. However, JCS Pub. 2 specifically defines a JTF as "a force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services."⁴ Further, JCS Pub. 2 clearly defines the component commander as the senior officer of each service who is qualified for command by the regulations of his own service. The JCS Pub. 2 clearly delineates that the Senior Marine (ComMarFor) can be a Service component commander with a direct command relationship with the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF). However, in practicality most unified command task organizations for JTF operations reflect the task organization that should be utilized for the conduct of the amphibious operation. Figures 2 and 3 reflect current task organization for the JTF organization during planning and the conduct of amphibious operations. The problem stems from the fact that the Navy and Marine Corps have allowed traditional command relations and terminology associated with amphibious operations to creep into the joint/combined arena without explanation or

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

FOR PLANNING





Figure 2

FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS*




*WHEN SEPARATE ATF NOT ASSIGNED

Figure 3

clarification. Since the amphibious operation is composed of Navy and Marine forces it is naval vice joint in nature. In the amphibious operation the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) is always a Navy officer and the Commander Landing Force (CLF) is a Marine officer who is always responsible to the CATF for landing force operations. In the JTF organization it is each service component commander who is responsible to the CJTF for operations. Under the JTF organization the position of ComMarFor as the component commander is different and distinct from that of CLF in the amphibious operation. ComMarFor reports neither for operations nor operational control to ComNavFor or CATF. JTF doctrine calls for the Service component commander to select and nominate the forces to meet JTF requirements.⁵ Therefore, the command relationship depicted in Figure 4 would not only ensure that ComMarFor is a component commander but in an amphibious operation would allow ComMarFor to designate CLF, assign forces to the landing force and direct CLF to report to CATF for operations. Further, this command relationship would ensure ComMarFor direct relationship with the CJTF and in the event of sustained operations ashore or at the termination of the JTF all forces assigned by ComMarFor would return to his control as the component commander.⁶

The command relationship reflected in Figure 4 would serve to improve unity of command within the JTF, retain the true naval characteristic of the amphibious task force, maintain the integrity of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept and provide the CJTF with the requisite knowledge for the proper tactical employment, logistical and administrative support of Marine forces.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP
FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS DIRECTED BY CJTF



*Note 1: ComMarFor assigns forces to conduct amphibious operation and designates Commander Landing Force (CLF)

Figure 4

Command and Control of Supporting Arms Assets

Power projection includes a broad spectrum of naval operations destined to support land or air campaigns or ensure the control and continued safe use of the high seas. To support the AirLand Battle the US Navy may be required and must possess the ability to project power ashore by carrier-based aircraft and amphibious landing if we are to maintain control of the sea and support our allies and land-based forces ashore.⁷ World War II is considered the bench mark for amphibious warfare. It was during that war that the Navy and Marine Corps also developed and refined the procedures for amphibious operations. One of the lessons from World War II is that tactical mobility and fire support are key factors in any operation. These same procedures form the basis for much of the doctrine that we adhere to today. Presently, the AirLand Battle focuses on the deep attack, agility and synchronization to defeat the enemy and protect vulnerable ground forces.

During joint operations the planning staff must be adept in joint planning doctrine which ensures proper C³, successful counter-air operations, protection of all forces, close air support (CAS), and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). More importantly, US military forces at the tactical level must understand and be able to execute joint doctrine. While tactical mobility and fire support are separate issues, their integration is vitally important to success on the battlefield. One only needs to look at the After-Action Reports of the recent operation in Grenada to gain an appreciation for the lack of US forces to effectively and efficiently plan, execute and support joint operations.

To achieve military objectives, our military forces must be capable of performing three fundamentals on the battlefield: neutralize, destroy and capture. The capability to conduct effective tactical air operations is an essential prerequisite to the successful execution of any of these three. "Considering the nature of modern war, air power can dominate not only the air, but the land and sea as well."⁸ However, to be effective, special emphasis must be placed on the command, control and integration of the air battle to support the land campaign.

Clearly, when one views the AirLand Battle and Navy/Marine operations as separate entities, the command and control of the air battle is not an issue. However, the Korean and Vietnam Wars have created much contention concerning the command and control of naval air in joint operations and specifically Marine Tactical Air (Marine TACAIR) in sustained operations ashore. Since naval forces routinely deploy beyond the range of land-based air cover and the necessity for protection from potential adversaries, it is imperative that naval forces possess an organic tactical air capability for both protection of the fleet and land forces that are projected ashore where land-based air is not available.⁹ The Marine Corps by Congressional mandate is required, inter alia, to equip a fleet marine force, with supporting air components for service with the fleet to assist in the prosecution of the naval campaign.¹⁰ Concomitantly, Congressional law requires the US Air Force (USAF) to organize, train and equip a force with the primary function of providing prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations.¹¹ From the end of the Vietnam War until 1951, the issue became a service rivalry and was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for


resolution. In 1981 the JCS approved the 1981 Omnibus Agreement which reaffirmed the authority of the joint force commander to organize his forces and reaffirmed the integrity of the MAGTF concept. While the 1981 Agreement also stipulated that Marine TACAIR would remain under the operational control of the MAGTF commander it institutionalized an undefined "air component commander" which changed a service rivalry into a situation that now revolves around the differences between USAF and Marine Corps doctrinal perspectives on the command and control of tactical air ashore.

In 1984 USAF doctrine indicated that the "air component is composed of those individuals, organizations, weapons systems, and facilities that make up the air components part of a joint force. The air component is employed as an interdependent force with the land and naval component."¹²

USAF doctrine continues to consider the air component command as "the focal point for employing aerospace power" with the air component commander as the person with the responsibility for apportionment of aerospace forces, targeting, allocation and tasking of aerospace resources to accomplish assigned objectives."¹³ While the JCS and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have issued guidance to resolve the matter, the battle rages on.¹⁴

The basic issues are illustrated in Figure 5. Key to the problem is how the two services view the battlefield. The AirLand Battle is centered on the deep attack to attrite and destroy the Soviet forces' second echelon. To support AirLand Battle and perform its more desirable mission of air interdiction the USAF integration of air assets is keyed to centralized management at the theater level, rendering air support at the highest level of command, and splitting the battlefield horizontally (with everything

PERSPECTIVE
OF
AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL



*SOURCE: HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS TALKING PAPER
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flying above 50 feet under USAF control). While this centralized management of air assets enables the commander to weigh the battle by being able to shift the weight of air power throughout the entire theater, it is not responsive to ground commanders for preplanned and immediate close air support requirements. By splitting the battlefield horizontally and controlling fixed wing aircraft flying above 50 feet, the potential exists for the USAF to concentrate on air interdiction well beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) by simply diverting any aircraft within the theater without prior coordination with ground commanders whose forces are operating within the theater or naval forces whose aircraft may be required to operate in the theater of operations.

The Marine Corps long recognized the potential for problems with its air assets and took measures to reduce the response time of fixed wing air and reduce the potential of close air support being diverted to conduct other missions when they may be needed by ground forces. While Navy/Marine aviation works on the principle of centralized control, control is vested at a much lower operational level to shorten the response time and facilitate better support to the ground elements. To compensate for the lack of heavy organic artillery support, the Marine Corps further attempts to facilitate the integration of air support into attack plans by splitting the battlefield vertically with emphasis on an integrated combined-arms battle with extensive close air support short of the FSCL. While the battle over who should control Marine TACAIR ashore continues to center around doctrinal issues, few stop to consider the primary functions which were set forth in 10 USC 5013 (i.e., service with the fleet and support to the naval campaign).

Integrating Fire Support Assets

Fire support, air defense and other functional area operations encompass many particular considerations and processes. They involve integration with the total combined armed force, awareness of certain enemy potentials, specific tactical operations, unique technical operations and unit support/sustainment operations. Modern warfare has lead American military leaders and analysts to seek and apply new terminology and methods to warfare well before those old concepts can be evaluated or substantiated. The new phrase among military leaders and planners is now jointness and the new ideology is that in order to be a great leader one must be capable of distinguishing between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. While military leaders must be versed and adept at planning and conducting war at the appropriate level, it has become fashionable to disregard the fact that while senior leaders conduct war at the operational and strategic levels, junior leaders and soldiers always fight and win wars at the tactical level. Understanding how the other services are organized and function can mean the difference between success and failure of the American fighting man on the battlefield during joint operations. While the organization and equipment to control and coordinate tactical air operations is provided to each military service, it is the unique techniques and operating procedures of the services that will prevent the US fighting man from achieving his mission of closing with and destroying the enemy on the battlefield. Regardless of whether the next battlefield is in a NATO or low-intensity environment, our fighting forces will have to contend with an enemy defense that is a well integrated defense of missiles, antiaircraft guns and air defense aircraft. As a

result, the operating environment for helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will be changed dramatically. Can or, better stated, will our forces operating in a joint environment possess the tactical and technical expertise to integrate supporting arms at the critical time to effectively negate the enemy's defense umbrella in the immediate vicinity of the front lines or to destroy his second echelon forces in the deep battle?

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)

A cornerstone of AirLand Battle is the deep attack strategy. This strategy will undoubtedly rely heavily on fighter/bomber aircraft to strike deep to destroy and disrupt the enemy forces and slow his combat momentum. Whether our friendly forces are conducting offensive or defensive operations it is imperative that we develop a deep attack system for use in joint operations that can locate the enemy forces' position, but more importantly, an integrated and well developed system that will allow friendly aircraft to penetrate the enemy defenses and simultaneously attack his ground and anti-aircraft capability.

To solve the problem, the USAF and Army have committed to the concept of Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD). J-SEAD is designed to contribute "to winning the AirLand Battle by increasing the overall effectiveness of friendly air-land operations through reduced attrition and improved capabilities of Army and Air Force air resources."¹⁵ While the USAF and Army envision three categories of J-SEAD (i.e., campaign, localized and complementary) they all reflect the USAF concept of centralized management of air assets on the battlefield by focusing the planning of J-SEAD at the Corps and Division level, and assigning overall responsibility to the Air Force

component commander for J-SEAD campaign plans and target priorities in joint force operations. Since the concept calls for the Army to take responsibility for J-SEAD from the FLOT to the limits of observed fire and the USAF from the limits of Army observed fires and beyond¹⁶ this centralized management concept is appropriate for best control of the deep battle strategy which is envisioned to be conducted mainly by fighter/bomber aircraft with Army surface-to-surface systems augmenting the suppression efforts. In joint operations the Air Force component commander may request additional support for suppression from other service component commanders. Because of the similarities in command and control, training and operating procedures, naval air assets can be easily integrated into J-SEAD plans for the deep battle strategy. While all air assets of our military forces may be capable of integrating to effectively execute the deep battle strategy, the question remains to be the effectiveness of our ground forces in joint operations to effectively employ tactical air, helicopters, artillery, mortars and naval gunfire to gain and maintain air superiority, and to prevent the movement of enemy forces into and within the objective area in the close-in battle. To some degree this ability of ground forces to conduct SEAD or J-SEAD with aircraft, artillery, naval gunfire and mortars is hampered by the difference in our doctrine for command and control of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft and the general reluctance of commanders and fire support coordination agencies to train in peace the way we intend to fight in war. For the ground commander to effectively conduct SEAD he must develop a fire support plan that includes the positive control of all supporting arms assets. With the numerical superiority of enemy tanks

expected on the battlefield, the US Army has undertaken a significant effort to develop new attack helicopters to neutralize and destroy tanks. However, this increased number of helicopters has not created an increased method of control of helicopters. The US Army command and control of helicopters on the battlefield has not changed much since their employment in Vietnam.¹⁷ This lack of positive command and control of helicopters and the obvious vulnerability to friendly fires has somewhat hampered US Army fire support agencies in practicing approved doctrine of planning and executing simultaneous SEAD without having to cease-fire with indirect fire weapons to allow aircraft to attack a target. While the methods of executing simultaneous SEAD is taught at the US Army Field Artillery School and is alluded to in the J-SEAD doctrine, it is rarely practiced in field units on a routine basis.¹⁸ On a target enriched battlefield the integration of helicopters, fixed-wing, direct and indirect fires is a must if we are to destroy the enemy forces and reduce the vulnerability of our aircraft to antiaircraft fires. The Navy and Marines have always practiced in peacetime what we preach as doctrine. To conduct simultaneous and continuous SEAD, the Navy and Marine Corps doctrine stress the use of restrictive fire plans to ensure the separation of friendly fires and aircraft through the establishment of formal and informal airspace coordination areas (ACA). See Figure 6. To achieve both destruction and air superiority on the battlefield the ground commander cannot rely on a system which will require indirect fire weapons to cease-fire when friendly aircraft arrive on-station. If we are to fight and win the close-in battle in joint operations then our training, procedures and technical expertise for planning and executing SEAD at the tactical level

AIRSPACE COORDINATION AREA
FOR
CONTINUOUS AND SIMULTANEOUS SEAD




Figure 6

must be sound, comprehensive and similar. Navy/Marine Corps doctrine and procedures in recent years have placed the planning and especially the execution of SEAD at the infantry battalion level. To accomplish this task an Air Liaison Officer (ALO) who is a Marine Aviator is assigned at each staff level down to the infantry battalion level. At the battalion level the ALO functions within the battalion FSCC under the control of the Fire Support Coordinator and is responsible for planning air operations to include the execution of simultaneous SEAD. A review of Army/Air Force operating procedures demonstrates the lack of such planning and execution of simultaneous SEAD at the battalion level. The ALO officer is normally not assigned below the brigade staff level¹⁹ leaving only the forward air controllers (FAC) at the battalion level. Without a dedicated ALO at the battalion level the ability and confidence level to conduct simultaneous SEAD cannot be achieved. Further, to adopt some current philosophical thinking that we should revert to WWII, Korea and Vietnam days' procedures of having small unit commanders control close air support missions to reduce FAC requirements²⁰ would only serve to drastically reduce the capabilities and confidence levels already achieved in conducting continuous and simultaneous SEAD.

Conclusions

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is a thing of the past. Today's scarce resources, financial constraints and the sophistication of the potential enemy dictate that our fighting forces will have to learn how to fight and win with all services contributing to the winning effort as a single element. Thus the word "jointness" will have to move beyond being a buzz word to becoming a reality. If jointness is to become reality it must move

from the academic classrooms to the daily work places. We must develop joint doctrine wherein all services have agreed to common terminology, concept and Standing Operating Procedures. With the reorganization of the JCS and the Chairman, JCS increased authority within the operational chain of command, each service needs to review their doctrinal publications to ensure that they in fact reflect joint doctrine in accordance with the guidelines established by the JCS. Presently, one can select any publication from any service to only find no comment or a single paragraph that discusses joint operations. Unless we correct this major flaw in our doctrinal publications the Grenadas will continue to hamper our ability to win wars. Let's face it-- Grenada was at the low end of the spectrum of conflict, but identified major shortcomings in our ability to conduct joint operations. We must ensure that at each level of command that the planning staffs are trained and possess the ability to plan and conduct joint operations. Such training must start with our formal schools (junior, top level) reducing the emphasis on the individual service and developing a curriculum wherein our officers really do understand the mission, capabilities and operational doctrine of our forces and how to employ them in joint operations.

The Army/Air Force 37 Initiatives appear to be a comprehensive and dedicated effort toward joint operations. Although many of these initiatives reflect issues contrary to Navy/Marine Corps doctrine, the Navy/Marines while unique must demonstrate more interest and cooperation in the development of joint initiatives if our doctrine is to be appreciated, adopted and incorporated in joint operations.

Finally, the key to effective understanding of joint operations is training and planning. Much attention and discussion has been devoted to the merits of maneuver versus attrition warfare. For the American fighting man to question is not one or the other; rather, does he understand the basics at the tactical level? Billions of dollars are spent annually in training exercises and operations, but few are conducted among our forces at the tactical level. The services must implement a vigorous joint training program at the National Training Center and Twenty Nine Palms, CA that will develop the skills for the planning, integration and coordination of supporting arms in joint operations. The planning staff from battalion/squadron level to corps needs to conduct joint CPXs/wargames to gain an appreciation of joint warfighting but, more importantly, to gain the much needed appreciation for joint doctrine and identify changes for improvements. This latter could be accomplished by adding Navy/Marine forces and/or planning staffs to participate in Reforger Exercises.

CHAPTER III

OMNIBUS AGREEMENT--IS IT THE SOLUTION?

Who should control Marine aviation assets during sustained joint operations ashore? The question has surfaced time and time again--in World War II, in the Korean conflict, during the Vietnam conflict, and during other joint operations involving the Air Force and the Marines. In an effort to satisfy all services, several measures were taken by the military leadership.

JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations, issued on 1 April 1986, applies to "operations on or near overseas land areas and addresses the integration and employment of all assets that can be used by the joint force commander in conducting counterair operations." In addition to JCS Pub 26, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the 1986 Omnibus Agreement for command and control of USMC TACAIR in sustained operations ashore. In the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Message of 4 Mar 1986, the chairman stated that JCS Pub 26 clearly recognizes "the full authority and flexibility of the joint force commander to organize his forces so as best to accomplish his mission." The full definition of joint force air component commander (JFACC) was determined and defined as follows,

"The joint force air component commander derives his authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct

coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with the other service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas."E

Four years have passed since the Omnibus Agreement was published. In retrospect, was this agreement the answer to the question of who should control Marine air assets during sustained joint operations ashore? Was the Omnibus Agreement the solution?

Responses to the Omnibus Agreement

As it is stated, the agreement is somewhat vague and is open to some interpretation. Consequently, the two services have each made statements concerning their translation. Service leaders have published letters to explain point by point what the Omnibus Agreement really means to say.

Two weeks after the agreement was reached, General P.X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued white letter number 4-86 (Atch 1). He stated that he fully endorsed the contents, spirit, and intent of the agreement. He

emphasized that the term "joint force air component commander" was clearly defined.

General Kelley concluded that the 1986 Omnibus Agreement clearly endorsed the integrity of the MAGTF and that the joint force commander is the person in charge: "If he personally believes that he has higher priority missions for any, repeat any, Marine TACAIR, he has the authority to utilize them as he sees fit."³ General Kelley closed his letter to Marine commanders at all echelons by stating that the issues which necessitated the agreement had been satisfied.

The Air Force issued a letter to justify its interpretation and to discuss any points which differed from the Marine Corps' understanding of the Omnibus Agreement. On 5 May 1988, Brig/Gen Thomas E. Eggers, Air Force Deputy Director of Plans, issued correspondence (Atch 2) stating that "Recent Navy and Marine Corps actions at the service level seem to indicate the existence of an organized effort to limit the use of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) in joint doctrine and in OPLAN/CONPLANS."⁴ The letter contained the Air Force point of view of command relationships for the JFACC. According to Brigadier General Eggers, the chairman of the JCS intended for the JFACC to task, coordinate, and unify the efforts of all the air forces provided by the services to accomplish the joint force mission. In the letter, each argument

he felt the Navy and Marine Corps had expressed in the past was carefully analyzed and thoroughly confronted.

The Marines argued that the term air force component commander should be used in place of air component commander (ACC) when the CINC elects to use a service component command organizational structure. The Air Force countered with the argument that the terms ACC and JFACC are synonymous. The term ACC and not JFACC is used in the 1986 Omnibus Agreement.

The type of organization set up by the JFC is another possible point of controversy between the two services. JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, allows the CINC to organize as he desires. Internal joint force organization may be organized through service component commanders or through functional component commanders. According to JCS Pub 2, "the commander of a functional component command exercises operational control (OPCON) over assigned and attached forces, and is charged with responsibility to make recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of assigned forces and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned."⁵ OPCON is defined in JCS Pub 2 as "the authority delegated to a commander to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the

authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission."⁶ Therefore, a functional component commander for air would have OPCON of all air forces in the joint force.

If the command is organized by service component, the service component commander will have OPCON of service forces. JCS Pub 2 states that "A service component command consists of the service component commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under his command that have been assigned to the unified command. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the service component commander and should contribute to the mission of the CINC."⁷

The Air Force position stated that the JFACC could exist under either type of command organization. If organized through service component commanders, the JFACC would be one of the commanders who has been assigned some additional "functional" responsibilities by the JFC. According to Brigadier General Eggers' letter of 5 May 1988, "although those responsibilities normally include an ability to task, that tasking ability does not mean the JFACC has been given OPCON of other forces."⁸ A JFACC does not require OPCON of air forces to complete the tasks assigned by the JFC. The ability to task is the minimum essential authority

required.

The Marine Corps subscribes to a philosophy of joint operations which focuses on overall joint force mission attainment through employment of service components."⁹

A Marine argument is that JCS Pub 26 limits the joint force air component commander to conducting counterair operations. According to the Air Force, JCS Pub 26 is a publication that covers only counterair, but this does not limit the JFACC in his responsibilities. The JFC will assign the JFACC's responsibilities. The 1986 Omnibus Agreement states that sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC. The agreement further addresses air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance missions.

Even though the CINC can organize however he wants, some in the Marine Corps believe that it is not "normal" that a JFACC be established by the JFC. This argument would contradict JCS Pub 26 which specifically states, "the joint force commander will normally designate a JFACC."¹⁰

Philosophical Differences

A letter dated 9 March 1989, issued from the office of the commanding general, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and signed by Maj Gen M.P.

Sullivan conveyed the Marine Corps position of support for the JFACC concept (Atch 3). General Sullivan stated that the Air Force and Marine Corps philosophies of force employment were different but were operationally compatible.

The first difference is in force employment. For proper employment of the MAGTF in combat operations, the combined arms must be properly integrated at the tactical level. Marine Corps structure is derived from law. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, states the primary missions of the Marine Corps and specifies its organizational requirements. Title 10- Armed Forces, US Code, Section 5063, expands the National Security Act.

The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces (FMF) of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations....The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.¹¹

Accordingly, the Marine Corps organizes, equips, and trains ground forces and organic supporting air components calling them MAGTFs. These forces are provided to unified commanders for employment.¹²

AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine, states that

"Centralized control-decentralized execution helps to make aerospace forces responsive, serves to ensure that forces are properly used and integrated, and fosters initiative at the action level. Centralized control allows an air commander to focus an air effort on those priorities which will lead to victory. The air effort will normally involve a mix of offensive actions and defensive actions based on specific objectives, threats, and opportunities. Through centralized control, an air commander gives coherency, guidance, and organization to the air effort."¹³

Centralized management of all air assets enables the commander to shift the weight of air power throughout the entire theater to achieve the maximum effectiveness. AFM 1-1 further states that "Centralized control is essential to positive control of aerospace power. Centralized control is established under a single air commander who directs the employment of forces at a level of command from which the overall air situation can best be judged...An air commander assigns missions and tasks and directs lower echelons to execute operations."¹⁴

A major philosophical difference between the services is the level at which control of tactical aircraft should be centralized in joint operations. At what level should aircraft be apportioned, allocated and tasked? The Air Force believes that to obtain maximum flexibility and optimization, air assets should be centralized at the highest level. "When the ACC is an Air Force officer, he has twofold responsibility:

In the operational chain of command, to support and employ all aerospace forces under his operational authority as directed by the joint force commander. The air component commander is responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on apportionment of aerospace forces and the targeting, allocation, and tasking of aerospace resources to accomplish assigned objectives.... Also, the air component commander normally has authority and responsibility for air defense and airspace control within the joint force commander's area of responsibility."¹⁵

The Marine Corps believes that Marine air assets should be centralized at the MAGTF level.

Other philosophical distinctions exist that are necessarily different but absolutely correct based on service missions and roles assigned by law. Since its inception, the Air Force has assigned first priority to the air battle. In a report to Congress, the Air Force stated that "The most significant principle of warfare learned since World War I is the importance of air superiority to the conduct of effective combat operations. With air superiority achieved, our ground and air forces can fight and be reinforced free from disruption by enemy air attacks. Air Force aircraft in the air-to-surface role must evade or suppress enemy defenses and deliver concentrated, effective firepower in support of surface battles, day or night, when and where required by the theater commander."¹⁶

The Marine Corps considers organic MAGTF aviation as a supporting arm for its ground operations. The ground battle is paramount. Marine aviation makes up the aviation combat element (ACE) of a MAGTF and is

immediately responsive to the needs of the Marine ground combat element (GCE) commander. MAGTF aviation is integrated closely so as to offset and augment the relatively light organic fire support. Having control of its own aviation assets allows for short response times and provides the firepower necessary to augment the artillery or naval gunfire.

Another point Maj Gen M. P. Sullivan's letter of 9 March 1989 addressed is the development of the battlefield. USAF integration of air assets is keyed to centralized management at the theater level, rendering air support at the highest level of command and splitting the battlefield horizontally. Lt Col Henry L. Reed, USMC, explains that "By splitting the battlefield horizontally and controlling fixed-wing aircraft flying above 50 feet, the potential exists for the USAF to concentrate on air interdiction well beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL)..."¹⁷ This would allow aircraft within the theater to be diverted without prior coordination with ground commanders.

Marine Corps aviators and planners view the battlefield vertically emphasizing integrated combined arms operations in relationship to the MAGTF area of responsibility (AOR). The ground scheme of maneuver is supported by an air plan that includes extensive close air support short of the FSCL, deep air support (DAS) conducted beyond the FSCL, reconnaissance, antiair

warfare (AAW), assault, and air defense. By owning its own aviation assets, the Marine Corps reduces the potential of close air support being diverted to conduct other missions when they may be needed to provide immediate direct support to the ground forces. With control vested at the MAGTF commander level, firepower needs can be assessed quickly and response time can be rapid.

Recently, the political and military situation in Europe changed drastically. Doctrine and plans will be reviewed and possibly changed to reflect the new situation. However, since 1945, the Air Force has made a significant commitment to the defense of our NATO allies. Consequently, doctrine has been linked closely to high intensity, coalition warfare on a crowded battlefield. The view has been of large theater operations. Although capable of operating at any intensity of conflict, Marine Corps doctrine is oriented to the naval campaign and to expeditionary operations that are normally widely dispersed and require a high degree of maneuverability.

The philosophy of joint integration of force for combat differs between the Air Force and the Marines. The Air Force would rather operate with a functional organization in which tactical, fixed-wing air support is integrated at the joint force level. General Sullivan contends the Air Force "holds a philosophy that

joint force mission attainment can be best achieved by the application of all fixed-wing, tactical power-- regardless of service componency--by a designated, functionally-oriented air component commander exercising OPCON over all TACAIR assets."¹⁸ The Air Force believes this issue does not have to be resolved and contends that a JFACC can exist and function effectively under either a functional organization or a service component command structure.

The Marine Corps emphasizes employment of service components. Proper use of the warfighting capabilities of the components will promote overall joint force mission attainment. According to General Sullivan, the Marine Corps "supports the integration of force at the joint level through mission planning, coordination, and direction of forces, rather than through consolidated command of subordinate components' organic assets."¹⁹

The noted differences in force employment philosophies and service doctrine are recognized and accommodated for by the joint doctrine agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Omnibus Agreement of 1986 states that:

- 1) The MAGTF commander will retain operational control (OPCON) of his organic air assets.
- 2) During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission.
- 3) The MAGTF commander will make sorties available

to the JFC for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance.

a) These sorties are not considered "excess" sorties.

b) This can be accomplished by the JFC assigning the MAGTF commander a sector of responsibility for operations that require such missions.

4) After mission analysis and air support requirements are determined, any additional sorties in excess of those essential to MAGTF direct support will also be provided to the JFC.

5) All MAGTF sorties provided to the JFC will be tasked through the air component commander for support of other components of the joint force, or in general support of the joint force as a whole.

6) When the operational situation dictates that all available sorties in the joint force be directed by the JFC to priorities higher than the mission assigned the MAGTF, the MAGTF commander will provide all sorties available for support of that priority mission.²⁰

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a definition of a joint force air component commander, it remains the main point of disagreement between the Air Force and the Marine Corps. Both services presently agree to the following:

1) The JFACC is the focus for joint air operations and can be used under any command arrangement selected

by the JFC.

2) The JFACC recommends apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas in coordination with other service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders.

3) The JFACC is normally responsible for planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision. In addition, the JFACC executes any further responsibilities assigned by the JFC.

The Marine Corps believes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not define a JFACC that would:²¹

- 1) always be a functional component commander.
- 2) always be the Air Force component commander.
- 3) be directly in the chain of command.
- 4) command forces other than those organic to the role of a service component commander.
- 5) exercise OPCON of forces other than those that may be assigned or attached to the role of functional component commander.
- 6) make the apportionment decision--that is the responsibility of the JFC.
- 7) be designated in all situations.

The Marine Corps points to the fact that the Omnibus Agreement states that "sorties will be made available to the joint force commander." The fact that sorties are made available in no way implies that

ownership of the assets is extracted from the MAGTF. The Marine Corps believes that the availability for tasking of MAGTF sorties in accordance with the Omnibus Agreement obviates any need for a JFACC to task MAGTF assets. Instead, they believe that the agreement is a means to coordinate employment of the assets. Since the Omnibus Agreement states that the MAGTF commander retains operational command (OPCON) of his organic air assets, they continue to belong to the Marine Corps. Conversely, the Air Force states that unity of effort is best achieved by a single commander who has control of air assets. Further, when all air assets are under a single air component commander, the overall mission is better served.

The JFC has the flexibility to organize his forces to meet any contingency. If the JFC desires a single manager, this can be done. The Marine Corps feels that this should not be the norm.

Each service has a system of command and control that best supports its own goals. The Marine Corps system is designed to support the ground commander and is optimized for the close air support mission. The Air Force system is optimized when fighting a theater war. This system provides the most flexibility to the higher echelon commanders. An extensive Marine Corps study revealed that there was some difference in the responsiveness of the Marine Corps system compared to

the Air Force system. "In general, the Marine Corps system showed an ability to satisfy immediate CAS requests faster than the Air Force system. Furthermore, preplanned sorties did not require as much lead time using the Marine system."## However, the memorandum further stated that the level of activity and the size of the Marine ground force were major factors in determining which system best served the needs. The determination of which system is better able to handle the needs of the ground forces depends upon the priorities established.

Omnibus Agreement--The Solution

The question still remains, is the Omnibus Agreement of 1986 the answer to who controls Marine TACAIR aviation during joint operations?

One solution that would eliminate the question permanently is to give all Marine aviation assets to the Air Force. Then the MAGTF commander would not have to worry about OPCON of these assets. Naturally, this solution could never come about. Law would not permit it, the Marines would not permit it, and it would be a serious mistake for our military leaders to make. Obviously, that is not the proper decision.

The articles discussed in chapter 2 made common points concerning the situation:

- 1) The integrity of the MAGTF should never be

undermined.

2) Embarked MAGTF aviation assets should remain under the operational control of the MAGTF commander.

3) The JFC must remember that the Marine Corps is a unique force and there are times when autonomous operations are totally justified.

4) MAGTF assets should only be split if necessity dictates.

5) The MAGTF commander should be the one to allocate Marine aviation assets.

6) To be effective, joint operations must have proper planning, allocation, coordination, and integration.

When all is said and done, the proper solution is to abide by the Omnibus Agreement of 1986. The Marine Corps leadership has said, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff have put to rest the issue of command and control of MAGTF aviation. The subject is not at issue with the Marine Corps, nor should it be in any other quarter."²³

Since the agreement was decided upon by the entire JCS, it is obvious that the leaders intended for it to be broad and nonspecific. Since each conflict is different, the JFC has the flexibility to integrate the forces to best meet the needs of the situation.

Both the Air Force and the Marine Corps agree that the JFC has complete authority to organize how he sees fit. Each service has a preference as to the command

arrangement; the Air Force prefers a fully functional organization while the Marine Corps favors a service components structure. However, both agree that they can operate under any structure, and both agree that the JFC can designate a joint force air component commander. Granted, the Air Force would like to see a JFACC every time, and the Marine Corps would prefer that no JFACC be established. However, both subscribe to the concept of a JFACC.

The Omnibus Agreement permits proper employment and integration across the complete spectrum of conflict. The JFC must properly assess each situation and decide what the priorities are. A low-intensity conflict would probably dictate that all Marine aviation assets remain with the MAGTF and none be used elsewhere. During a high-intensity conflict, with a deterioration across the theater, the JFC would probably decide that interests would be better served by placing Marine aviation assets under the control of a single manager. "If the JFC personally believes that he has higher priority missions for any, repeat any, Marine TACAIR, he has the authority to utilize them as he sees fit."*

The way the Marine Corps employs its aviation in maneuver warfare will affect the other services. Therefore, it must understand that the aviation arm is more than flying artillery. It can be a separate maneuver unit which will provide the JFC unique

capabilities. The situation may arise when the JFC decides it is more advantageous to temporarily exercise the fire power of Marine aviation in a role other than in direct support of the Marine ground forces.

It is the responsibility of the JFC to apportion air resources. As JCS Pub 26 states, "Based on the joint force commander's guidance and in coordination with other component and supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air forces to various mission or geographic areas."²⁵ The Omnibus Agreement reaffirms the right of the JFC to redirect any efforts and reapportion and/or reallocate any MAGTF TACAIR sorties for higher priority missions. He is further directed to ensure unity of effort among his subordinate commanders in the accomplishment of his overall mission.

Once a JFACC is designated in an operation plan/concept plan (OPLAN/CONPLAN), his responsibilities should be fully described. The JFC must insure that all participating joint force component commanders know the duties of the JFACC. If the situation requires that these duties change in order to better achieve the assigned mission of the joint forces, these changes need to be clarified to the component commanders.

The JFACC will come from the service with the preponderance of air power and the ability to control

it. Each service can operate within the confines and liberties offered by the Omnibus Agreement. It is now time to realize that there does not have to be an issue over control of Marine TACAIR in sustained operations ashore. Yes, there are doctrinal and philosophical differences. However, they can be exploited to the benefit of the separate services and the entire joint force.

The solution to the control of Marine aviation assets does not rest with a new discovery. The instrument to solve this dilemma is already in place. Now is the time for the services to commit to the success of the Omnibus Agreement. Conclusively, the JFC must know how, when, and where to employ the available forces. The Air Force and the Marine Corps must jointly operate with the doctrinal differences existing between the two services and properly use all assets to accomplish the overall mission.

NOTES

1. JCS Publication 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations, 1 Apr 1986, I-1 (paragraph 2b).
2. Ibid., B-5.
3. Letter, General P. X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, White Letter No. 4-86, subject: 1986 Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of Marine TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore, 18 Mar 1986.
4. Letter, B/Gen Thomas E. Eggers, Air Force Deputy Director of Plans, P&O, subject: Joint Force Air Component Commander, 5 May 1988.
5. JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Dec 1986, 3-28 (paragraph 3-26d(2)).
6. Ibid., 3-9 (paragraph 3-12b).
7. Ibid., 3-24 (paragraph 3-26b).
8. Letter, B/Gen Thomas E. Eggers, 5 May 1988, (Argument #1, paragraph b).
9. Letter, M/Gen M.P. Sullivan, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, subject: The Joint Force Air Component Commander and Command and Control of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation, 9 Mar 1989, 4 (paragraph d(2)).
10. Letter, B/Gen Thomas E. Eggers, 5 May 1988, (Argument #4).
11. Title 10-Armed Forces, United States Code, Section 5063(a) & (b), 1982 Edition, Supplement V, Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives, 1 Oct 1986, 1213.
12. Letter, M/Gen M.P. Sullivan, 9 Mar 1989, 2 (paragraph 4).
13. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 16 Mar 1984, 2-20.
14. Ibid., 4-2 & 4-3.
15. Ibid., 4-4.

16. The United States Air Force Report to the 101st Congress of the United States of America, FY 1990, 34.

17. Lt Col Henry L. Reed, USMC, "Doctrinal Issues Concerning US Navy and US Marine Corps Forces in the Airland Battle," US Army War College Student Essay, AD-A180733, 23 Mar 1987, 12.

18. Letter, M/Gen M. P. Sullivan, 9 Mar 1989, 4 (paragraph 6d(1)).

19. Ibid., 4 (paragraph 6d(2)).

20. Ibid., 4-5.

21. Letter, M/Gen M. P. Sullivan, 9 Mar 1989, 6.

22. George Akst, "Command and Control of Marine Aviation in Joint Operations," Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)#82-3165, 22 Oct 1982, 46.

23. Letter, M/Gen M. P. Sullivan, 9 Mar 1989, 9 (paragraph 17).

24. Letter, Commandant of the Marine Corps, white letter No. 4-86, 18 Mar 1986 (paragraph 2).

25. JCS Publication 26, III-6 (paragraph 7a(3)).

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380-0001

CMC:PL
18 Mar 86

WHITE LETTER NO. 4-86

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: All General Officers
All Commanding Officers
All Officers in Charge

Subj: 1986 OMNIBUS AGREEMENT FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MARINE
TACAIR IN SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE

Encl: (1) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Message of 4 March 1986


1. On 4 March 1986, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the message contained in the enclosure to the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands. It is important that Marine Commanders at all echelons fully understand that, as both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I fully endorse the contents, spirit, and intent of this message, as it clearly defines the term, "Joint Force Air Component Commander," and establishes a "1986 Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore."

2. I do not believe that the new "1986 Omnibus Agreement" needs further elaboration or definition. Quite clearly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorse the integrity of the MAGTF. The bottom line is that the Joint Force Commander is in charge. If he personally believes that he has higher priority missions for any, repeat any, Marine TACAIR, he has the authority to utilize them as he sees fit.

3. The issues involved in formulating the decisions above have been put to rest. Let's give the Joint Force Commanders our enthusiastic, professional support in ongoing efforts to enhance all aspects of warfighting.

4. This White Letter supersedes White Letter 7-81, which is cancelled.

5. Self-Cancellation. 31 March 1987


P. X. KELLEY

117.2



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

REF: TO
ATTN: OF: XOX

SUBJECT: Joint Force Air Component Commander

05 MAY 1988

05 MAY 1988

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Recent Navy and Marine Corps actions at the Service level seem to indicate the existence of an organized effort to limit the use of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) in joint doctrine and in OPLAN/CONPLANS. This letter contains basic JFACC information which can be used by personnel working contingency operations, war planning, command relationships, doctrine, and exercises and is provided to permit the Air Force to speak with one voice on this issue.

2. JCS Pub 26 (redesignated as JCS Pub 3-01.2 on 1 May 88) was the first document to define the JFACC. In February 1986, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations following months of debate. Based on discussions with people who had access to the JCS discussions in the "tank", the Chairman's intent was to give the joint force commander a tool he could use to task, coordinate, and unify the efforts of the air forces provided by the Services to accomplish the joint force mission.

3. The Navy and Marine Corps arguments against the JFACC and suggested counter arguments are at Attachment 1. Attachment 2 contains information for incorporating JFACC into operational plans and exercises.

Thomas E. Eggers

THOMAS E. EGGERS
Lieut Gen, USAF
Deputy Director of Plans, DCS/P&O

2 Atch

1. Navy/Marine Arguments
2. JFACC Considerations

cc: AF/XOO

111 11 2



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5001

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3000
WF 12E
9 MAR 1989

From: Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Subj: THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE AVIATION

Ref: (a) JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

1. Last May, the Air Force distributed a letter on the subject to its major commands and key officers in joint assignments. The apparent purpose of the letter was to educate readers on the details of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1986. The letter described a unified command functional arrangement option, provided interpretation of JFACC provisions from both Air Force and ascribed Naval Services' viewpoints, and encouraged Air Force commanders and joint planners to pursue institutionalization of the JFACC option in joint and combined command arrangements and operational plans. Based on a number of reports and inquiries from Navy and Marine Corps commands, the letter appears to have stimulated a concerted effort in the direction encouraged. These communications also have been consistent in expressing concern over perceived interpretations, selective applications, or rephrased provisions of jointly approved concepts and doctrines.

2. The complexity and importance of joint operations dictate that Marines and Airmen alike understand the specifics of approved doctrine, understand the differing philosophies of force employment between the two Services, and are able to articulate the capabilities of each Service to employ its forces in support of joint force objectives. To this end, JCS actions in recent years have approved joint doctrine Service procedures and doctrine which are compatible with joint force employment concepts and have established or affirmed command relationships designed to capitalize on individual Service capabilities. The 1986 Omnibus Agreement for employment of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) aviation in sustained operations ashore and the JFACC concept available to a Joint Force Commander (JFC) are illustrative of such JCS actions.

3. This letter conveys information about and affirms the Marine Corps position of support for the JFACC concept. It also provides a comparison of the differing but operationally compatible Air Force and Marine Corps philosophies of force employment.

1113

Subj: THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION

4. The doctrinal framework for employment of a MAGTF is the effective integration of combined arms for combat operations at the tactical level. Marine Corps structure is derived from law, which establishes a Corps to provide "...forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet...", and for "...such other such duties as the President may direct." Accordingly, the Marine Corps organizes, equips, trains, and provides to unified commanders for employment forces of combined arms, together with organic supporting air components, called MAGTFs.

5. The underpinnings of Air Force doctrine support a focus on an overarching air battle with a subset thereof, the provision of close air support to maneuvering land battle formations. Air Force doctrine emphasizes centralized control "...under a single air commander who directs the employment of forces at a level of command from which the overall air situation can best be judged." This level of authority and responsibility rests with "...the air component commander in unified or combined commands." Centralized management of all air assets enables the commander to shift the weight of air power throughout the entire theater. Tactical air assets--of whatever Service component--are held to be national assets to be placed under centralized management.

6. There are other philosophical differences and it should be noted that these differences are necessary and correct based on Service missions and roles assigned by law.

a. The basic orientation of the two Services differs notably.

(1) For the Air Force, the air battle takes precedence. The consolidation of air assets, functionally, was its justification for independence from the U.S. Army in 1947. The Air Force since its inception has based centralized management at the theater level on operations research showing that management-oriented efficiency (single manager for air) provides better general support.

(2) The Marine Corps considers organic MAGTF aviation as a supporting arm in operations where the ground battle is paramount. Marine aviation is organized, trained, and equipped to be the aviation combat element (ACE) of a MAGTF that is immediately responsive to the needs of the Marine ground combat element (GCE) commander. The integrated employment of MAGTF aviation is designed to offset and augment the Marine GCE commander's relatively light

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organic fire support. The directly available, short response time criteria for aviation employment makes it an acceptable alternative to artillery or naval gunfire. The concept that "speed is life" is one which infantry officers and pilots alike understand well.

b. Another point at issue is how the battlefield is developed.

(1) Air Force operators and planners tend to view the battlefield "horizontally" on the premise that all aircraft with certain characteristics (e.g., speed, range, and flexibility) or capabilities (e.g., antiair, reconnaissance, interdiction/deep air support) should be under Air Force control. The focus is on interdicting well beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL) those enemy warfighting components vital to the prosecution of war.

(2) Marine Corps operators and planners see the battlefield "vertically" emphasizing integrated combined arms operations in relationship to the MAGTF area of responsibility (AOR). The MAGTF commander executes a ground scheme of maneuver, with a supporting air plan that includes extensive close air support short of the FSCL, and reconnaissance, interdiction, and air defense that extend well beyond the FSCL.

c. The Air Force and the Marine Corps have different doctrinal world views and alignments.

(1) Air Force doctrine tends to be aligned with international doctrine. The Air Force has maintained a significant commitment to defense of NATO Europe since 1945, and its doctrine understandably is linked closely to high-intensity, coalition warfare on a crowded battlefield.

(2) Marine Corps doctrine is oriented to the naval campaign and to expeditionary operations of varying intensity in which widely dispersed, operational maneuver forces are more the norm. Nonetheless, its doctrine, organization, and systems are designed to be flexible and able to interoperate with other forces on the high intensity, coalition battlefield; e.g., the Marine Corps Air Command and Control System, which interoperates with Naval forces afloat, Air Force, and neighboring Allied systems, such as NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE).

d. Flowing from the above, the philosophy of joint integration of force for combat differs between the two Services.

(1) The Air Force subscribes to a functional organization for battle (air, land, sea) in which tactical, fixed-wing

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air support is integrated, organizationally, no lower than the joint force level. It holds a philosophy that joint force mission attainment can be best achieved by the application of all fixed-wing, tactical air power--regardless of Service componency --by a designated, functionally-oriented, air component commander exercising OPCON over all TACAIR assets.

(2) The Marine Corps subscribes to a philosophy of joint operations which focuses on overall joint force mission attainment through employment of Service components consistent with their designed warfighting capabilities and in a manner designed to exploit those capabilities. It supports the integration of force at the joint level through mission planning, coordination, and direction of forces, rather than through consolidated command of subordinate components' organic assets.

7. While the force employment philosophies and individual doctrines of the two Services differ, joint doctrine recognizes and accommodates both through two significant JCS decisions. The first is through endorsement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of an Omnibus Agreement for employment of MAGTF aviation in joint sustained operations ashore. This agreement, published in JCS Pub 3-01.2 (Theater Counterair Operations) and JCS Pub 3-56.23 (Tactical Command and Control for Joint Operations), provides that:

a. The MAGTF Commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets.

b. The MAGTF aviation assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission.

c. The MAGTF Commander will make sorties available to the joint force commander for air defense, long range interdiction and long range reconnaissance.

(1) This provision of the Omnibus Agreement does not preclude the JFC from assigning the MAGTF commander an area of influence or sector of responsibility for operations that include such missions.

(2) Nevertheless, when provided under the Omnibus Agreement, these sorties are not "excess" sorties. They are distinct contributions to the overall joint force effort in recognition of the fact that the joint force commander must exercise integrated control of air defense and long range reconnaissance and interdiction aspects of the joint operation or theater campaign.

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d. After mission analysis and air support requirements are determined, any additional sorties in excess of those essential to MAGTF direct support will also be provided to the JFC.

e. All MAGTF sorties provided to the JFC will be tasked through his air component commander for support of other components of the joint force, or in general support of the joint force as a whole.

f. When the operational situation dictates that all available sorties in the joint force be directed by the JFC to priorities higher than the mission assigned the MAGTF, the MAGTF commander will provide all sorties he can generate for support of that priority mission.

8. The second significant action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was agreement on a definition of, and authority for the JFC to designate, a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) that:

a. Provides a focus for joint air operations regardless of how the joint force is organized. The JFACC designation can be used under any command arrangement selected by the JFC. This could be any combination of organizational options to include Service components, functional components, subordinate JTFs, subunified commands, etc., in accordance with reference (a).

b. Recommends to the JFC apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas after coordinating with the other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders.

c. Executes responsibilities that include, but are not limited to, planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking, based on the JFC's apportionment decision.

9. The latter arrangement requires amplification inasmuch as the subtleties of difference between the JCS approved JFACC and the Air Force doctrinal Air Component Commander are the crux of operational misunderstandings and friction in the field. The JFACC definition:

a. Is intentionally broad and non-specific to allow flexibility in integrating forces for combat; it recognizes and accommodates differences among Service doctrines and organization for combat.

b. Recognizes and enables a MAGTF to operate in accordance with the Omnibus Agreement under normal circumstances but allows

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flexibility for the JFC in abnormal circumstances to redirect efforts necessary to accomplish his mission.

c. Enables the JFC to employ the air capability of all Services by integrating operations.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not define a JFACC that would:

a. Automatically or necessarily be a functional component commander.

b. Always be the Air Force component commander.

c. Be directly in the chain of command; JFACC normal responsibilities include planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking.

d. Command forces other than those organic to him as a Service component commander.

e. Exercise OPCON of forces other than those that may be assigned or attached to him as a Service or functional component commander. The JFACC designation carries no inherent authority to exercise OPCON.

f. Make the apportionment decision; the JFACC definition conveys JCS intent that the JFC will make the apportionment decision.

g. Be designated in all situations; the decision to designate a JFACC remains with the JFC.

11. Consistent with the JCS definition, the JFACC:

a. Can coordinate effort, operations, sorties, and employment of air capability.

b. Cannot exercise operational control of forces, units, assets, or aircraft other than those assigned or attached.

12. The JCS definition notwithstanding, there is much gray around the JFACC designation and it remains subject to interpretation. Key points to reinforce understanding of JFACC are:

a. The essential aspects of air capability employment are planning and coordination of air operations and the apportionment, allocation, and tasking of the air effort.

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b. Air capability is provided as sorties, not as assets.

c. Implicit in OPCON is possession of assets. The 1986 Omnibus Agreement affirms that the MAGTF commander has OPCON of MAGTF air assets.

d. Authority to task assets is de facto OPCON.

e. Authority to task sorties in accordance with the Omnibus Agreement is a means to coordinate employment of MAGTF air capability.

f. Availability for tasking of MAGTF sorties per the Omnibus Agreement obviates any need for a JFACC to task MAGTF assets.

13. Planners and operators must recognize and understand the differences between joint and Service doctrine. The following matrix highlights the differences.

<u>CONCEPT/ELEMENT</u>	<u>JOINT DOCTRINE</u>	<u>U.S. AIR FORCE DOCTRINE</u>
	JFACC	"ACC"
Basic Premise	Centralized <u>coordination of sorties</u>	Centralized <u>control of assets</u>
Span of control	Up to CINC/JFC	All air power
Echelon of command	Up to CINC/JFC	Single "Air Commander" for theater
Duration	Up to CINC/JFC	Permanent command arrangement
Relationship of forces	A designation; JFACC is not a force	Air power operating independently of ground/maritime forces
Command relations w/ JFC, other component commanders	A designation; JFACC is not in chain of command	A command arrangement; ACC is a functional component commander

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C ³ Requirements	CINC/JFC decides command arrangements; C ³ supports	Continuous uninterrupted voice/record communications with all air elements in theater
Staff requirements	Up to CINC/JFC	Permanent staff needed
Commander's Service	Service with preponderance of force and ability to control	Air Force

14. The Marine Corps supports fully the concept of a JFACC and the JCS-approved doctrine for its use; JFACC doctrine is sound and can enhance joint force operations. The JFACC concept accommodates the 1986 Omnibus Agreement and does not alter the employment of MAGTF aviation during sustained operations ashore.

15. The JFC will normally designate a JFACC to facilitate unity of effort and may designate a JFACC under any of the methods that a theater or joint force commander are authorized by reference (a) to use in exercising operational command and/or operational control of assigned forces. However, the Marine Corps does not subscribe to any interpretation (i.e., Air Force doctrine regarding the "air component commander") of the JFACC definition other than the one approved by the JCS.

16. In sum, the JFC has full authority to organize and reorganize all elements of assigned and attached forces as he deems necessary to accomplish the missions assigned him. This includes, as an alternative command and control arrangement available to him, the designation of a Joint Force Air Component Commander to accomplish those planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking functions authorized in the joint doctrine approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Marine Corps supports fully the doctrine which authorizes such a designation, noting that there are occasions when a naval task force commander or a MAGTF Commander, as well as an Air Force component commander, might be so designated. However, planners and operators must understand clearly the provisions and the limitations of the approved doctrine. Misuse or misinterpretations of specifically approved doctrine can only lead to further friction in the field. Accurately applied, the provisions for designation of a JFACC accommodate the Omnibus Agreement for employment of MAGTF aviation.

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17. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have put to rest the issue of command and control of MAGTF aviation. The subject is not at issue with the Marine Corps, nor should it be in any other quarter.


M. P. SULLIVAN
Deputy Commander
for Warfighting

Distribution: SPECIAL