


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
RESEARCH REPORT

INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING--A GROWING
NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN FOR
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT


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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING--
A GROWING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN
FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

by

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Colonel, USAF

AN AIR POWER SYMPOSIUM TOPIC SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY
CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Dr. James E. Winkates

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March, 1990

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Since 1981, U.S. authorities repeatedly recognized international drug trafficking as a national security concern, domestic legal restrictions were lifted to allow military support to civil law enforcement agencies, and the U.S. armed forces provided increasingly unprecedented levels of assistance. However, the levels of drug abuse nationwide continue to increase, the drug threat from Third World and domestic sources continues to expand, and drug-related destabilizing events in the Third World may well serve as a catalyst for future low-intensity conflict (LIC). The U.S. military finds itself with an unwanted but legislated and formal mission--lead agency for air and maritime detection and monitoring of drug smuggling to the United States.

Accordingly, formally stated national security concerns, the long-term nature of the drug problem, and the newly legislated U.S. military mission warrant a careful review of future domestic and overseas involvement in the war on drugs. Several significant and presently debated counterdrug issues deserve high-level consideration. These include the further possibilities for legislated changes that eliminate legal restrictions and increase the military role; expanded foreign involvement; organizational questions; and military budgeting/acquisition alternatives. This paper addresses these issues and their implications for our future Air Force.

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I. INTRODUCTION:

Since 1981, Presidents Reagan and Bush and the U.S. Congress repeatedly indicated that international drug trafficking and the flow of drugs into the United States were a national security concern. Accordingly, Congress lifted legal constraints to Posse Comitatus restrictions and the military provided increasing assistance to civil law enforcement officials which reached impressive levels in our Nation's "war on drugs." Today, the military finds itself with a new and unwanted involvement--a legislated military mission: to serve as lead agency for detection and monitoring of air and maritime smuggling of illicit drugs into the United States.

This evolutionary development resulted from reluctant military participation in this war. This is why the U.S. Congress, with ever-growing public support, repeatedly expressed dismay with the military "for having to be dragged into the fight at every step." These developments warrant an Air Force review of alternatives for its future involvement in the drug war, if for no other reason than to ensure its future participation is proper and effective.

Uppermost, though, recent Soviet policy changes have caused an ongoing reevaluation of the U.S. national security threat and national military strategy. Likewise, the military can expect a public calling for even greater support to future counterdrug efforts. In the past, the Air Force provided anti-drug support while enjoying relatively large force structure and budgets (but nearly always "out of hide" or existing total obligation

authority (TOA)). The future portends reduced force structure and more constrained budgets, and the setting will probably not allow gratis DOD support to expanded counterdrug efforts. Further, national-level reviews are increasingly categorizing drug interdiction as a part of the LIC spectrum, thereby legitimizing a possible U.S. military role within problematic Third World countries. In turn, many experts agree that LIC is the most likely spectrum for future conflict as the world superpowers move further away from major conventional or nuclear confrontations. Therefore, one can conclude that the whole issue of drug interdiction, its association with LIC, and the implications for DOD and the Air Force warrant review.

To support such a review, the following discussion will highlight the drug threat and causes for national security concerns. Then, follow-on sections will note the changes in policies and laws that increased Air Force involvement and also limited military contributions. This review should reveal a future thrust for this Nation's efforts that could imply increased military involvement. Finally, the last sections will provide a review of specific issues that may warrant discussion by participants and will conclude with possible implications of these issues to our future Air Force.

To provide a ready-reference document for participants to facilitate discussions, Annex 1 provides a point/talking paper recap for each proposed issue. Annex 2 also provides additional readings that may provide valuable insights on this topic.

II. PAST/PRESENT FRAMEWORK:

A. The Drug Threat.

When reviewing estimates of the U.S. drug threat, one finds wide variances in quantities and monetary values for the products involved in this illicit trade. References cite this illegal worldwide business as ranging from \$100 billion to in excess of \$300 billion annually. Using anyone's estimates, however, this business is highly profitable. Similar confusion occurs when reviewing the federal community's estimates of quantities of the three major categories of drugs (marijuana, cocaine, and heroin) and their origin of production.

This confusion exists for several reasons. First, the drug producers and smugglers have not cooperated in providing needed intelligence information to accurately estimate available quantities. Likewise, the estimation techniques used are not exact. While field survey techniques of estimated drug crops under cultivation have improved significantly over the years, the conversion and diversion rates for these crops from the field to the market (or from the "farm to the arm") have proven an inexact science. On the other hand, however, estimation techniques provide a reasonable indication of an expanding or contracting business and of changes in trends in regional or country-specific sources for illicit drugs.

1. Latin America, Including Mexico/Caribbean. The Western Hemisphere provides both the largest single market (the United States) and a near ideal production/smuggling environment in Latin America for this illicit business. The Latin American




region, along with the United States, serves as the near total source of marijuana production for the U.S. market. Colombia provides roughly 40 percent and Mexico produces at least 25 percent for U. S. consumption. Lesser producers, such as Jamaica and Belize, provide an estimated 10 percent (Figure 1). The marijuana plant grows well (even in the wild) in the weather conditions of the southern and northern portions of the Western Hemisphere. Further, marijuana provides high profits compared to other agricultural crops that could be deemed substitutes, and governmental efforts have proven ineffective in eradicating or otherwise motivating farmers to grow legitimate, alternative crops. Again, the major share of the U.S. market captured by Latin American marijuana directly correlates to the shorter transportation lines of communications from production fields to the U.S. consumer. The plant is bulky, and for greatest profits, is smuggled in large volume. Therefore, the Latin American and Mexican producers have a natural economic advantage over potential competitors in other regions. Favored transportation conveyances include bulk maritime shipments through the Caribbean and, with growing maritime interdiction successes, increased use of land conveyances across the 2,000-mile southwest U.S./Mexico border (Figure 2).

Turning now to the more serious drugs, let us first examine the growing threat of cocaine. Three Latin American countries grow the coca plant that provides the world's near total supply of cocaine: Peru (60 percent); Bolivia (30 percent); and Colombia (10 percent). Further, 80 percent of the

Figure 1

Illicit Drug Production By Country

Marijuana
Coca Leaf
Opium




Source: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Committee, 1989

Figure 2

Drug Trafficking

Major Routes
Source Countries
Money Laundering Centers



CEA Map 1-1987

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Intelligence.

cocaine consumed in the United States is finally processed in and shipped from Colombia. Cocaine has received continued worldwide heavy press coverage due to associated violence and other adverse social impacts. Because cocaine is a less bulky and more dense product to transport than marijuana, the smugglers favor a variety of transportation conveyances. In 1988, 45 percent of the cocaine seized by U.S. authorities was carried by private aircraft, more than double the amount seized in concealed compartments and bulk/containerized freight on maritime conveyances (the next most common smuggling method). Likewise, because of interdiction successes in the yet-favored Bahamian and Caribbean corridors, the air and land transshipments of cocaine through Mexico are increasingly important smuggling routes.

In terms of opium (and its most dangerous derivative, heroin), Mexico's "black tar" provides roughly 30 percent of opium/heroin for U.S. markets. Smugglers ship this extremely dense drug to the United States using commercial air means, human couriers, and numerous land conveyances.

2. Asia/Middle East. Because of environmental and transportation disadvantages, Asia and the Middle East do not provide apparent competition for marijuana or cocaine producers in the Western Hemisphere. On the other hand, Asian and Middle Eastern countries produce nearly 70 percent of the world's opium. Production is shared among six countries: Burma, Afghanistan, Iran, Laos, Pakistan, and Thailand. Of major concern, with the exception of Thailand, the worldwide production of these opium-producing nations far exceeds U.S. consumption and is

projected to increase further. This expanding production, along with minimum U.S. influences in many of the cited countries, creates a pessimistic setting for opium supply reduction. Besides, opium-derivative products are quite dense and the probability of detection by interdiction means is not high. Asian and Middle Eastern smugglers exploit body couriers on commercial airlines, along with baggage and international mail, to supply these drugs to the U.S. market.

3. Domestic (U.S.). In 1988, the U.S. moved from third to second in the world's rankings as a producer of marijuana, following Colombia and preceding Mexico as a source for the American market. With this domestic setting, the U.S. also has several other increasing smuggling problems: (1) import of precursor chemicals to produce methamphetamine in domestic laboratories; (2) import of ergotamine tartrate used in LSD production; and 3) import of MDMA ("ecstasy") and amphetamines. The U.S. failure to counter this illicit domestic drug production effectively dilutes U.S. influence with foreign producing nations.

To further complicate this domestic threat, 355 million people entered or reentered the United States during 1988, along with 100 million vehicles, 220 thousand vessels, 635 thousand aircraft, and 8 million containers. Further, in excess of a million people entered the country illegally between established ports of entry. Since drug smuggling is no longer seasonal, over 40 metric tons of marijuana and nearly 1 1/3 metric tons each of cocaine and opium enter the smuggling pipeline on an average day.

How does this drug threat influence U.S. national security in the Third World?

B. National Security Concerns. Public information indicates that Third World insurgents and terrorists use the enormous profits from drug smuggling to finance their ventures. For example, U.S. publicly released photographs implicated government officials of the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime with profiting from cocaine smuggling to the United States. Likewise, insurgent groups, such as the M-19 and FARC in Colombia and the Shining Path in Peru, may use profits from drug smuggling to fund their causes. Also, terrorist organizations in the Middle East and Asia may use drug smuggling to finance their activities. However, a careful review of publicly available official documents reveals that the use of illegal drug profits by insurgents and terrorists, while a concern, is secondary to corruption in causing instability to regional governments.

Recent events in Cuba and Panama, plus assaults on Colombian governmental institutions by drug cartel kingpins, provide reasons why corruption and instability from illicit drug profits cause U.S. national security concerns. A review of these evolving security concerns could be helpful.

In April 1986, President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that formally linked international drug smuggling and U.S. national security concerns. A press announcement by Vice-President Bush in June 1986 emphasized a specific element of that NSDD: the adverse impact of corruption on legitimate regional governments resulting from illicit drug

smuggling profits to highly organized, criminal entities.

The September 1989 White House National Drug Control Strategy provides added emphasis:

...In Southeast and West Asia, South and Central America, and the Caribbean Basin, drug exporting networks and domestic drug use are causing serious social, economic, and political disruptions. Intense drug-inspired violence or official corruption have plagued a number of Latin American countries for years; in more than one of them, drug cartel operations and associated local insurgencies are a real and present danger to democratic institutions, national economies, and basic civil disorder ...And so, because our national security directly depends on regional stability throughout the Americas (emphasis added) and across the globe, drugs have become a major concern of U.S. foreign policy.

President Reagan signed another NSDD in late 1987 which defined LIC from a national perspective, included drug interdiction as integral to the LIC spectrum, and specified U.S. military involvement. A White House release, "National Security Strategy of the United States" (January 1988), highlighted the essence of this NSDD:

...When a U.S. response is called for, we take care to...assist one another in maintaining internal order against insurgency, terrorism, illicit narcotics traffic (emphasis added) and other characteristic forms of low intensity conflict...Consistent with our strategies for dealing with low intensity conflict, when it is in U.S. interests to do so (original emphasis), the United States will...Assist other countries in the interdiction and eradication of illicit narcotics production and traffic....

Secretary of Defense Carlucci in his FY90/91 biennial budget submission to Congress also highlighted LIC and the associated role of the military and illicit drug smuggling to insurgencies:

...Illegal drug trafficking is another aspect of many insurgencies. The substantial revenues produced, and the concomitant exploitation of international financial

networks that facilitate instability and insurgency, must be dealt with as integral elements of our low-intensity conflict strategy. We must work with affected countries to curb the drug trade and resist the political disruption and violence associated with large-scale drug trafficking....

Therefore, one can conclude that connectivity exists between drug trafficking, LIC, and a legitimate role for the military. However, as this review indicates, illegal drug profits may be used more for creating political instability (such as recent terrorism by drug cartels in Colombia), therein creating an environment for insurgents to flourish. However, drug trafficking profits, while they may be used, are probably less important to directly financing classical insurgencies.

C. Past Laws/Policies Increasing Military Involvement. This section will highlight several key events, including legal and policy changes, that have led to increased counterdrug support by the U.S. military. The intent of this section is to characterize the present thrust that may lead to even greater military involvement in the future.

1. 1981 - 1985 Period. The FY82 Defense Appropriations Act significantly altered U.S. Code Title 10 legislation which was enacted in 1878 because of unpleasant experiences in using Union forces in the South after the Civil War. The 1981 change reversed this long-standing Posse Comitatus legislation that dictated a "hands-off" ruling for military involvement in domestic civil law enforcement. This legislation authorized the U.S. military to share information with civil authorities that was gained "incidental" to normal military training missions; to

loan military equipment and provide training assistance; and to allow "dedicated" military support to civil law enforcement requests while providing reimbursement to DOD.

This legal change was driven by growing public concern over the inundation of "cheap" cocaine from Colombia cartels which had fomented a nationwide abuse problem. Of importance, the "Miami Citizens Against Crime" demanded expanded federal assistance in 1981: the Colombian "cocaine cowboys" were shooting-it-out in broad daylight on the streets of Miami, the primary smuggling conduit for drugs to the United States. Priority state and local law enforcement efforts in Florida failed to counter the situation.

President Reagan resolved to provide federal assistance by establishing the South Florida Task Force, headed by then Vice President Bush. This task force focused initial efforts to involve a very reluctant U.S. military. Specifically, an interdiction operations center was established in Miami with gratis military and civil agency personnel to coordinate overall drug interdiction efforts; Air Force radar data in Florida was linked to a new air traffic sorting center; and a \$20 million Air Force aerostat radar system was legislated and activated at Cape Canaveral. Other initiatives included: deployment of Air Force UH-1N special operations helicopters and crews to Nassau which provided transportation for Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Bahamian drug strike-force teams; agreements for recurring U.S. Navy ship and E-2/P-3 aircraft surveillance support; and commitment to provide six recurring monthly USAF E-3 (Airborne

Warning and Control Systems) radar surveillance sorties where needed by law enforcement. The integration of military and civil agency expertise, along with contributions by military capabilities, resulted in significant successes. These Florida interdiction successes spurred cries for assistance from politicians in other parts of the country who noted diversion of drug trafficking to their areas. The President activated a nationwide drug interdiction coordination system in June 1983, modeled after the South Florida Task Force.

The Vice President also headed this new entity, called the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System. He established seven coordination centers in major border cities, staffed by approximately 100 civil law enforcement representatives and 50 DOD personnel. These centers gained support for several combined drug interdiction operations with numerous foreign cooperating countries--code named the "Hat Trick" series. Joint agency national-level formal assessments showed that these operations and DOD support disrupted and denied drug smugglers free use of their traditional routes, increased the smugglers' risks, and resulted in increased drug seizures. From a nil and reluctant involvement in 1981, military contributions expanded to significant nationwide levels by 1985.

2. 1986-1989 Period: During this period, several events motivated the U.S. military to become even more involved. In April 1986, President Reagan signed an NSDD which served as the first policy statement connecting international drug smuggling to national security concerns. This directive tasked DOD to

integrate civil agency command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) capabilities into DOD networks. Likewise, the military was called on to assist foreign governments in countering international drug smuggling. In response, DOD provided high priority access to DOD secure satellite communications; the National Security Agency led joint efforts to develop a secure communications plan; and DOD supported Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia (July-November 1986).

Operation Blast Furnace represented the first use of DOD armed helicopters and personnel to search out and destroy clandestine cocaine laboratories in a foreign country. As publicly announced, this effort temporarily shut down the labs, the wholesale market price for coca leaves fell to an unprofitable level, and "time was bought" for start-up of a Bolivian organic interdiction capability with U.S.-loaned helicopters, funding, and military training teams. While follow-on Bolivian efforts can be described as ineffectively "halfhearted," the Blast Furnace experience whetted the appetites of U.S. civil authorities and Congress on the capabilities and resources that the U.S. military could bring to the counterdrug arena.

The election-conscious Congress in the fall of 1986 failed to appreciate these growing levels of military support. The House of Representatives nearly assigned a formal U.S. military mission to shut down all U.S. border to drug smuggling within 60 days. Because of an initiative that offered nearly \$95 million in Air Force TOA, the U.S. Senate successfully countered this House

legislation. Instead, DOD and the Air Force acquired a tasking to technically assist the U.S. Customs Service by installing seven added aerostat radar systems along the southwest U.S./Mexico land border and the southern Bahamas. Follow-on legislation cemented greater military involvement. With congressional and presidential elections in the fall of 1988, the House proposed legislation providing the military with "search, seizure, and arrest" authorities. The Senate again ensured that the active military was not given such authorities; however, the military was legislated a formal mission.

3. Present Mission. The FY89 Defense Authorization/Appropriation Acts designated DOD as the lead agency for detection and monitoring of air and maritime drug smuggling to the United States. Further, the legislation directed DOD to integrate the C³I capabilities of the civil enforcement agencies. To assist in this effort, DOD was "given" \$300 million out of existing TOA to perform this mission. DOD tasked the existing area Commanders-in-Chief (CINCS) for the Atlantic, Pacific, North American Air Defense, and Southern commands to plan for and fulfill this new mission.

Also, the U.S. Congress passed legislation in October 1988 creating a national drug "czar," the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Dr. William Bennett, the first ONDCP Director, was tasked to develop, coordinate, and implement a national strategy for all U.S. federal, state, and local efforts. In turn, President Bush announced the unclassified "National Drug Control Strategy" in September 1989 which

specified a military role. Dr. Bennett and his staff publicly discussed the classified portion of this strategy which specified the following involvement:

- (1) Increased U.S. military assistance to appropriate drug source countries.
- (2) Such countries must initiate a request for military support and take the lead in using this support--the fight is "theirs" to employ this assistance overseas and U.S. personnel involvement is to be minimized.
- (3) The U.S. military is not to be committed in direct armed conflict while providing this assistance.

What has the military learned from eight years of increasing involvement? Maybe DOD and the military services failed to really focus on several indicators. For example, more recently, DOD evidently hoped that its new lead air and maritime detection and monitoring mission would soon pass. DOD did not include a budget line item for this new mission in FY90 President's budget submission to Congress. Whether an oversight or not, President Bush had to amend the DOD submission to Congress after his inauguration. While this oversight to request funding may provide an indication of lack of military commitment to the drug war, limitations on both past and present DOD/USAF support require examination.

D. DOD/Air Force Capabilities/Limitations. While amending Posse Comitatus, Congress specifically did not authorize the military domestic "search, seizure, or arrest" authorities. DOD Directive 5525.5, "Military Support to Civil Law Enforcement Authorities,"

provided common policy guidance to all DOD military services (the Navy and Marine Corps were not included in the original Posse Comitatus Act) and further allowed the military to schedule incidental training events to accommodate requirements of civil authorities. Likewise, the Directive extended the original Posse Comitatus limitations to include "beyond U.S. borders" and provided guidance on specific categories of support the military could provide, along with waiver or reimbursement procedures for "dedicated" DOD support. Specifically, the legislative changes and this DOD directive precluded support that would degrade the "combat readiness" of the military.

While previous sections specified evolution of increased military support, other military initiatives forthcoming since 1982 included: loan of E-2, P-3, C-12, C-123, and Blackhawk aircraft, along with E-2 and F-15/F-16 radars; recurring loan of tactical communications equipment; use of WC-130s and B-52 "Busy Observer" mission aircraft for maritime detection; deployment and operation of mobile radar units along U.S. borders and overseas; and use of strategic and tactical reconnaissance aircraft/satellites. Further, the military stepped up special operations training for U.S. and foreign civil law personnel. The Air Force led DOD efforts to field 13 new or upgraded long-range radar units as part of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN) which are and will be used by foreign and U.S. entities in countering air drug smuggling. DOD closed out FY88 annual support by providing over 28,000 flight hours of aerial reconnaissance, including nearly 4,000 E-3 flight hours; over 2,000 Navy

ship-days of support to the Coast Guard (a civil law enforcement agency in peacetime); and over \$300 million in equipment loans, plus other transportation, training, intelligence, and planning support. All of this support was provided gratis from existing Air Force TOA. In escalating to these levels of military support, several other factors limited DOD contributions.

Besides specific Posse Comitatus legal and DOD policy constraints, U.S. military support was generally limited by foreign policy initiatives, funding prerogatives, intelligence gathering prohibitions, infighting among U.S. agencies, and technology considerations. Specifically, counterdrug efforts did not enjoy priority among foreign policy initiatives. Secretary Schultz delivered only one major speech on drugs during his six-year tenure and he recently indicated why this possibly occurred--he supports legalizing the use of drugs (called "morally criminal" by Dr. Bennett). A recent poll showed that 97 percent of Americans oppose legalizing drug use. Further, foreign military assistance funding throughout the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (except Honduras and El Salvador) was nearly zeroed-out during the Reagan Administration. Likewise, DOD limited its contributions to gratis support from existing TOA and never provided a budget submission to expand its efforts.

Equally limiting, the National Intelligence Community (NIC), including military service intelligence, had numerous other legal constraints that specifically precluded collection of intelligence on U.S. citizens. These prohibitions limited U.S. military contributions, particularly along the U.S./Mexico land

border. The NIC continues to have concerns that its "methods and means" of intelligence collection will be compromised during civil litigation processes. While progress is noted, the U.S. civil law enforcement agencies also found it difficult to define needed "essential elements of information" on the drug-smuggling enemy for military intelligence to collect against, even in overseas areas. This lack of definition, along with the publicly renowned "turf" infighting among civil agencies, also thwarted potential military contributions. Further, DOD pursued new technology only for military purposes, not the drug war. A Defense Science Board study in 1988 highlighted this deficiency and recommended a more focused national effort by DOD and others.

So, where does the military find itself today and what is the thrust for the future? DOD now has a formally assigned military mission. Using the \$300 million appropriated by Congress for FY89, the military is purchasing added aerostat radars; integrating civil agency C³I capabilities by extending access to existing DOD secure communication networks; establishing joint task forces (Key West, FL and Alameda, CA); and applying \$40 million in support of state governors' plans to employ National Guard forces in non-federal status. Supposedly, military plans for FY90 and FY91 provide for more of the same.

The thrust for future military involvement in the drug war comes down to three indicators. First, several recent polls indicate that the American public favors increased military involvement in the drug fight (positive responses have been 70 percent or higher). The public sees drugs as our number one

toughest national problem. A waning military threat from the Soviets could further strengthen this public opinion. Second, the 1989 National Drug Control Strategy formally calls for and outlines roles for military assistance overseas. Third, Secretary of Defense Cheney issued a specific policy memorandum (a first for DOD) providing clear guidance for a proactive military role in support of the national strategy. Consequently, several significant issues warrant in-depth debate on the nature and degree of future DOD/Air Force involvement.

III. ISSUES POSSIBLY INCREASING FUTURE INVOLVEMENT: The following highlights significant issues that may warrant debate by participants and could provide for increased future military involvement in counterdrug efforts. This listing is not all inclusive and is intended only to serve as a departure point for participants.

A. Legal (Posse Comitatus/Domestic).

1. Search, Seizure and Arrest. Elements within Congress want to use the active military in a direct law enforcement role to interdict illicit drugs domestically. These proponents for providing the military with search, seizure, and arrest authorities point to civilian manpower shortfalls that the military can provide in peacetime. Besides, the U.S. Congress has already authorized funding for National Guard personnel to assist the Customs Service with successful inspection of inanimate objects at ports of entry using state governors' authorities and non-federal status. On the other hand, opponents indicate that use of active duty forces would result in

unacceptable erosion of long-standing separation of military versus civilian enforcement of domestic laws. Others indicate that military "mistakes" would either confound prosecution of suspected smugglers or result in the inadvertent death of innocent people. Should active duty DOD forces be used or should the Air Force posture for all-out, partial, or no-change to search, seizure, and arrest authorities?

2. "Shoot-down" of Air Smugglers. Influential elements within Congress believe that aircraft confirmed to be airdropping or landing contraband in the U.S. should be forcibly stopped. Those proponents note that U.S. efforts do not provide true drug "interdiction" but serve as a mere confirmation that smuggling occurred. (If shoot-down of suspected air smugglers is authorized, the Air Force could be directly involved). As such, opponents argue that an inadvertent mistake could be made by either civilian or military interceptors, thereby killing innocent people. Others argue that not enough is being done to stop drugs in concealed cargo and containers (Customs inspects less than three percent), so why risk shoot-down of suspected air smugglers? Opponents also note that such a shoot-down law is premature since other measures (e.g., aircraft electronic identification, and flight plans) have not been adequately addressed. Likewise, such authorizations to shoot down suspected air drug smugglers could violate individual legal rights and international flight safety agreements. What should be the Air Force position on this issue?

3. Military Mission: Land Detection/Monitoring. Congressional proponents also believe that DOD should be formally assigned and funded with a land detection and monitoring mission, just as has been done to oppose air and maritime smuggling. However, opponents indicate that DOD and JCS have already assigned CINCFORCECOM a limited support mission to counter smuggling on the southwest U.S./Mexico land border and has established a joint task force at Ft. Bliss, TX. As a counter, proponents note that the military services could continue to exercise their recently acquired NATO "deep-look" technology weapons along this border that might otherwise go unused due to force withdrawals from Europe. On the other hand, opponents point to legal limitations for collection of intelligence on Americans, even smugglers, and indicate that use of troops to "militarize" the border would further erode U.S. relations with Mexico. Likewise, what real land detection and monitoring capabilities (besides DOD dogs/handlers) already exist in the Air Force that could be applied? Should the Air Force become further involved in these efforts?

4. International Eradication/Interdiction. International entities, congressional representatives, and even U.S. State Department authorities propose that an "international counterdrug task force" be established to eradicate and interdict these drugs at their sources. While proponents support inclusion of U.S. military forces in such an international entity, this force could be logically employed within the United States (the world's second largest producer of marijuana). Would Americans agree to such efforts within our borders? While opponents indicate that

this force could be effective, they point out that domestic use of U.S. active duty military personnel would be in direct conflict with Posse Comitatus limitations. Should the Air Force support and become involved in this effort?

5. Increased Use of National Guard. Proponents in Congress believe that they have found a reasonable means and funding methodology to bring National Guard forces into the drug war by circumventing Posse Comitatus via use of state governor authorities. Noting the increased transfer of military combat capabilities to National Guard forces, opponents ask: should the active forces stand-by while this transferred capability is diverted to counterdrug efforts? What if there are attendant reductions in military combat readiness? Where should the line be drawn? What should be the Air Force position?

6. "Legalization" of Drugs. There are proponents across the political spectrum for legalization of drugs. They point out that legalizing drugs would eliminate the profitability in trafficking illicit drugs and the associated crime. These proponents note that present concerns on erosion of Posse Comitatus restrictions would be erased and that present military resources used for counterdrug operation could be redirected to other important national security issues. Opponents to legalization, however, point out that proponents have not thought the issue through, i.e., it is a "nutty" idea that would have very serious adverse social implications. These opponents also claim that DOD and the Air Force would have to continue its prohibitions on the use of drugs. The military would not risk

employing drug users to maintain and operate its high value weapons systems. Because of national security concerns, the military would still have to maintain its expensive drug screening and education programs. Continued military prohibitions on the use of drugs would put it out of step with a society that would supposedly accept drug use, thereby adversely impacting military personnel recruitment from among younger age groups already projected demographically to decrease. Are there other military implications associated with legalization of drugs?

B. U.S. Military Support to Foreign Efforts.

1. U.S. Military "Force" in Foreign Efforts. Proponents for increased use of armed U.S. military forces in overseas interdiction efforts point to the fact that U.S. forces have already been safely and successfully used, i.e., in the Bahamas and Bolivia. Importantly, these U.S. military forces would be employed overseas only to provide transportation support and training (arms would be only for self-defense--not direct armed actions). The supported foreign government would have to request and take the active armed interdiction or eradication role on their own soil. Also, the U.S. military offers a level of expertise that cannot be brought to the war otherwise and the setting presents realistic training for these U.S. forces in preparing for other LIC arenas. To the contrary, opponents indicate that the effort needs to be long-term, not a short-run "burst" provided with U.S. forces; therefore, U.S. military efforts should be limited to only assist foreign authorities in

establishing a long-term, organic capability of their own. Also, opponents point to foreign nonacceptance of direct U.S. military assistance because of sovereignty issues. They note that U.S. public support would falter with loss of a single American soldier (or airman) from a fire-fight with drug smugglers overseas. What should be the short-term and long-term objectives for U.S. military employment in the overseas drug war? What should be the rules of engagement for such scenarios? If drugs represent a true war, why not put the military directly in the fight, particularly overseas? Ultimately, what roles will Congress and the American public support long-term? What position should the Air Force assume?

2. Expanded Security Assistance Programs. Proponents indicate that security assistance is among the least employed but most effective instruments in the U.S. "bag of tricks." Specifically, during the past decade, security assistance funding for source and transshipment countries in the Caribbean and Latin America has been almost nil, while the U.S. has placed great pressure for proactive, counterdrug efforts on these nations. Likewise, many Caribbean and Latin American countries rely principally on available military equipment and forces to interdict drug smugglers and eradicate drug crops. Also, many of these nations were economically undermined by trade barriers against their exports to the U.S., e.g., coffee and sugar, which further degraded their financial capabilities to fight the drug war.

Opponents note that military assistance would not be employed

with needed priority. Opponents also point out that most of these nations see American "demand" as the primary source of the drug problem. At least these nations gain internal economic benefits from drug production and smuggling. Likewise, opponents point out that U.S. law requires that military assistance be provided only by "military-to-military" channels in these countries. Because of historical precedents, many of the newly-established democracies in these countries intentionally use only their domestic police to counter drug crops and smuggling. They do not want their military forces to become overly strong because of historical and potential coups (an equally strong domestic police force serves as a counterweight). Opponents to increased security assistance also indicate that regardless of such efforts, the results would be nominal without "preferred nation" economic status. Finally, opponents indicate that the drug war is only a U.S. political issue and as soon as the U.S. national military focus diverts from Europe, the Pacific will receive priority attention (as during Vietnam). Therefore, what should the Air Force position be relative to military assistance programs to Caribbean/South American countries? Should U.S. law be changed to allow "military-to-law enforcement" assistance in these countries? Should the Air Force pursue increased military assistance program support without comparable changes for increased U.S. economic assistance to cooperating Caribbean/Latin American countries?

3. Joint Crisis Alert/Response Capability. While such a capability already exists to counter other LIC crises,

particularly offensive counterterrorism events, proponents indicate that such capabilities should be made available for counterdrug employment when requested by cooperating countries. Advocates for use of these assets point out that this capability could be applied against "immediate" drug cartel targets, such as in Colombia, when a timely response is needed. Likewise, they claim that such employment provides good training for these U.S. forces. To the contrary, however, opponents believe such use would result in unwanted publicity on the capabilities and procedures used by these forces and compromise security for employing these forces in their primary role--counterterrorism. What position should the Air Force assume on this issue?

C. Organization.

1. Lead Operational Agency for U.S. Government. The U.S. government has established overall lead agency authorities for countering terrorism and has had reasonable successes--the FBI, domestically, and the State Department, overseas. However, a similar focal point does not exist for LIC or counterdrug efforts. Proponents for a clear counterdrug focal point highlight the present confusion and lack of coordination and direction. While the Director, ONDCP, as the Nation's "drug czar," has the legislated tasking to develop and monitor implementation of a national drug control strategy, he lacks necessary cabinet-level authority to coordinate or direct the efforts of operating departments. Proponents for a focal point claim that no one is yet in charge to ensure operational direction and that U.S. efforts suffer accordingly. The ONDCP

Director has indicated that his office was not intended to coordinate and oversee multi-agency operations. As such, he is already receiving increasing public criticism for his failure to gain greater cooperation and success. On the other hand, opponents to an overall operational focal point indicate that individual civil agencies would see their efforts further threatened, thus heightening agency "turf battles." Should the ONDCP Director have the overall operational oversight authorities for the drug war, with Justice having domestic lead and the State Department providing overseas focus? Should the military become more involved without a clear entity taking the lead nationally? What position should the Air Force encourage and support?

2. CINC Narcotics for U.S. Military. At present, the military services budget, organize, train, and equip the military forces and the respective CINCs operationally employ these forces within their geographic areas of responsibility (AOR). On the other hand, the newly established CINC for Special Operations (CINCSO) is directly implicated in the drug war, especially overseas, with drug interdiction as an integral element of the LIC spectrum; however, CINCSO does not have a lead tasking in the drug war. Proponents for a change could argue that CINCSO should take the military lead in Latin/South America as the overall overseas operational commander, while CINCSOUTH (and others), should provide intelligence support only. Opponents, on the other hand, could argue that such an arrangement would only erode existing CINC authorities in assigned AORs? Who is right? What position should the Air Force support?

3. Single "Aircraft" Manager for the Drug War. At present, there is a plethora of "air forces" engaged in the drug war: Customs (100 aircraft, 1,000 people); Coast Guard (50 aircraft, 500 people); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (75 aircraft, 200 people); State Department (75 aircraft, 200 contracted personnel); plus aircraft and personnel from the Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Park Service, Marshals Service, etc.--and the U.S. military. Overall, there is no single "aircraft" manager for the drug war. Should there be? Proponents indicate that many of the aircraft used (loaned) and the functions performed by civilian agencies are already common to the military services. DOD assumption of operations and maintenance for these efforts could result in significant savings to the taxpayer. On the other hand, opponents indicate that many of the aircraft, facilities, and personnel used in the drug war are used for other missions, e.g., life-saving by the Coast Guard. Besides, DEA could argue that their civilian agents are used in "undercover" smuggling operations (not a military role), and the State Department could argue that contracted civilian aircrews are used to minimize direct political complications that are possible during overseas eradication operations. Should the Air Force encourage and "step-up-to" an expanded aircraft management role?

4. Single Manager for Radar Surveillance Support. A number of participants also provide air radar support to the drug war. The Air Force continually provides 37 long-range radars, 2 balloon-borne aerostat radars, 4 sector operation control centers, two or

more mobile radars, and 40-50 monthly E-3 sorties. The Marines provide mobile radar support and the Navy contributes up to 50 E-2 sorties per quarter. The Air Force and Navy are also integrating their over-the-horizon (OTH) radar systems in the drug battle, and the Air Force is presently fielding CBRN radars in support of this fight. Elsewhere, the Customs Service/Coast Guard have funding to install and operate a dozen aerostat radar systems along southern approaches to the United States. These civil agencies also operate DOD-loaned P-3/E-2 radar surveillance aircraft and provide personnel to man their own C³I centers (very similar to existing military facilities). Should the Air Force logically assume lead funding and management for these air detection and monitoring assets in the war? Proponents point to the obvious economic advantages for single-lead Air Force management (with other military service support). Opponents claim that the civil law agencies would react to such a move as a "slap in the face" to their professional talents which would only further degrade agency cooperation with the military in this battle. Therefore, one could ask: should the counterdrug mission be permanently civilian or DOD directed?

D. Other.

1. Secure Communications. DOD took the lead, as a result of an NSDD, and coordinated "The National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Law Enforcement." The September 1989 National Drug Control Strategy assigned DOD the role of executive agent to ensure implementation of this secure communications plan. Should DOD also be assigned overall responsibility as funding agent for

this plan? Proponents indicate that this most needed secure communications plan will not be properly implemented without DOD in control of funding. They contend that civil agencies neither possess the expertise nor place sufficient emphasis on secure communications to ensure timely implementation. Opponents to DOD as the lead indicate that funding should be prioritized only by the lead civil law enforcement agencies. These opponents also claim that secure communications can help but are not a substitute for aggressive and direct civil agency actions with already scarce resources against drug smugglers. What position should the Air Force support?

2. Weapons Systems Acquisition. A Defense Science Board study in 1988 noted that DOD research and development (R&D) efforts did not integrate counterdrug detection and monitoring needs into the military requirements process. The study recommended formal emphasis in this area, to include priority support by the several U.S. Government research laboratories and associated industrial entities. Proponents indicated that this provided the only means to ensure future basic Air Force R&D efforts for a real contribution to the drug war. Opponents noted that DOD emphasis on R&D efforts to support the drug war would further increase the costs of already expensive weapons for future military conflicts. What position should the Air Force support?

3. Funding/Budgeting. While nearly all previous military anti-drug support was provided from existing Air Force TOA, the future portends a much smaller active duty force structure and budgets. Should the Air Force pursue specific funding for its counterdrug

mission in anticipation of this more constrained environment? An associated and confusing issue involves funding of special operations forces. While the Air Force is charged to budget, organize, train, and equip its contributing military forces, the CINCSO was recently legislated his own overall budget. Since special operations units are an implied major player in future LIC counterdrug efforts, should the Air Force reassume its role of budgeting for these forces? Proponents for activism on each of these items point to the need for proaction to ensure military support for the counterdrug mission. These proponents argue that CINCSO and his forces need to be brought "back into the fold," thereby eliminating possible perturbations to the normal budgeting process. Otherwise, desired military force structure, along with needed priorities and efficiencies, could be adversely impacted. Further, these proponents for budget activism point out that CINCSO does not have an assigned AOR or lead role in the drug war; thus, he logically would not pursue budgeting with adequate priority to support this secondary or tertiary assigned mission. On the other hand, opponents to budget activism indicate that formal budgeting proposals for the drug war would imply a desire for an expanded DOD counterdrug mission, thereby leading to further erosion of Posse Comitatus limitations. Likewise, opponents point to the fact that special operations forces are traditionally minuscule in importance, priority, and budget levels. They argue that the Air Force should let Congress

have its own way with special operations forces. These forces are "high risk" and "low return," i.e., the Iran hostage fiasco. What position should the Air Force assume on the budgeting issue?

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FUTURE INCREASED INVOLVEMENT:

Overall, the U.S. Government must continue to realize that drug supply reduction efforts, to include military drug interdiction, do not provide an ultimate solution to our Nation's drug abuse problem. As indicated by President Bush in announcing the National Drug Control Strategy in September 1989, "demand reduction" is key. However, supply reduction efforts are still important in this cause, if for no other reason than to show commitment and resolve. One must ask: Why should our Nation eliminate domestic police on our streets because of a reduction in crime? These police are still needed to deter crime and to show resolve and commitment.

Thus, the Air Force finds itself in a dilemma? National authorities have repeatedly declared illicit drugs a national security concern; the drug problem does not present a near-term solution; and Congress has legislated DOD with a formal military mission. Should the Air Force pursue initiatives that would show greater resolve in the drug war? Or, should the Air Force be further "dragged into the fight" by the Congress and the Bush Administration? Congress and the Administration have a good reading on public opinion--the public expects the military to provide more help.

However, debates often focus on political expediencies and not necessarily the key issues at hand. Should the Air Force

continue to oppose further erosion of Posse Comitatus restrictions and greater displacement of civil authorities in domestic law enforcement. Specifically, the drug issue appears to blur traditional distinctions between what is properly domestic civil law enforcement and what are external threats to national security, thereby customary military missions. On the other hand, one could conclude that there is a need for greater direct military involvement in the drug war overseas. However, is this in our short-term and long-term national interests, even with perceived changes in the military threat from the Soviets? Will pressures for increased U.S. military involvement in the overseas drug war cause the internal fall of Third World governments that we support and want to see continued? Also, one must cite a continuing concern so aptly noted by Representative Newt Gingrich, "...using the military in a long-term war against corruption will corrupt them." Is continued military caution best? Or should the Air Force actively budget, organize, train, and equip forces that may be equally applicable for future employment in other probable LIC areas? These counterdrug issues are not easily answered but should not be taken lightly by the military--the implications for our future Air Force may be quite significant!

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13. 1989 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Committee Report. Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, 1989.

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ANNEX 1

POINT/TALKING PAPER RECAPS

Search, Seizure, and Arrest

- Issue: Should active duty military be used for direct drug law enforcement at U.S. borders? If so, should it include all: search, seizure, and arrest?
- Pros:
 - Military possesses peacetime manpower to fill civilian shortfalls.
 - National Guard already successfully assists Customs Service in inspecting cargo using state governor authorities.
- Cons:
 - Further erosion of Posse Comitatus limitations (traditional civil law authorities).
 - Military "mistakes" would thwart legal prosecutions; result in inadvertent deaths.
- Discussion notes:

Shoot-down of Air Smugglers

- Issue: Should the U.S. (and USAF) use force to stop confirmed air drug smugglers?
- Pros:
 - U.S. only "observes" air smugglers, not true interdiction.
- Cons:
 - Could inadvertently kill innocent people.
 - Smugglers would merely use alternate, less inspected cargo modes.
 - Other measures (flight plans, electronic identifications) need addressed first.
 - Would violate individual rights/international flight rules.
- Discussion notes:

Military Mission: Land Detection/Monitoring

- Issue: Should DOD be formally legislated and funded with a military mission for land detection and monitoring (like exists for air and maritime)?
- Pros:
 - CINCFORCECOM already has been assigned a limited support mission on southwest U.S. land border.
 - Provide for continued training in use of Air Force/NATO "deep-look" technologies after withdrawal from Europe.
- Cons:
 - Legal limitations on DOD intelligence collection on Americans would be eroded.
 - Erode relations with Mexico by "militarizing" the border.
 - Air Force has minimal capabilities for land interdiction.
- Discussion notes:

International Eradication/Interdiction Force

- Issue: Should an international counterdrug task force (including U.S. military) be established to eradicate/interdict drugs at their sources?
- Pros:
 - A true "international" effort.
- Cons:
 - Could be used within the U.S. against marijuana and drug labs.
 - Further erode Posse Comitatus limitations.
- Discussion notes:

Increased Use of National Guard

- Issue: Should increased funding and use of National Guard "militia" under state governor authorities be encouraged for direct counterdrug efforts?
- Pros:
 - Already successfully used in circumventing Posse Comitatus limitations.
 - Reduces pressures on use of active duty military.
- Cons:
 - With added transfers of missions to the Guard, could impact future combat readiness.
- Discussion notes:

Legalization of Drugs

- Issue: What are the military implications if drugs are legalized?
- Pros:
 - Eliminate concerns over erosion of Posse Comitatus restrictions.
 - Military resources used in counterdrug operations could be redirected to other national security issues.
- Cons:
 - Legalization has very serious adverse social implications, i.e., a "nutty" idea not well thought out.
 - DOD would continue its drug use prohibitions for national security reasons, i.e., not risk employing drug users to maintain and operate high value weapons systems.
 - Would require continued expensive drug screening and education programs.
 - Would put military out of step with a society that would accept drug use, thereby adversely impacting personnel recruitment from among younger age groups already projected demographically to decrease.
- Discussion notes:

U.S. Military "Force" in Foreign Efforts

- Issue: Should U.S. military "force" be expanded in the counterdrug LIC arena overseas? What should be the rules of engagement?
- Pros:
 - Armed U.S. forces already safely and successfully used overseas (Bahamas and Bolivia).
 - Used for transportation support and training requested by the foreign government taking the lead--not direct armed conflict.
 - Provides needed expertise/realistic training for LIC forces.
- Cons:
 - Foreign efforts must be foreign governments' war (U.S. should help establish organic capabilities, not direct and conduct operations).
 - Foreign opposition to U.S. military direct involvement.
 - Public consensus/commitment uncertain.
- Discussion notes:

Expanded Security Assistance Programs

- Issue: To assist cooperating countries in the counterdrug effort, should security assistance programs be altered and be given priority expansion? If so, under what circumstances?
- Pros:
 - While recently nil in most Latin American, U.S. security assistance is key to their anti-drug efforts.
 - Need security assistance support to counter economic problems caused by U.S. trade barriers.
 - Minimizes U.S. military involvement.
- Cons:
 - Countries see U.S. "demand" for drugs as real problem, not theirs.
 - Security assistance is used halfheartedly because of internal economic benefits from drug production/smuggling.
 - Countries prefer police assistance and do not want a strong military because of historical coups.
 - U.S. laws require only "military-to-military" assistance, not to law enforcement.
 - Military assistance is nominally effective without other economic assistance.
 - Latin America is less important than Europe and the Pacific to security concerns.
- Discussion notes:

Joint Crisis Alert/Response Capability

- Issue: Should the U.S. amend existing military counterterrorism capabilities for timely anti-drug requirements overseas?
- Pros:
 - Good training for such forces.
 - Capability and "lessons learned" already exists.
- Cons:
 - Could result in unwanted publicity on capabilities/procedures for these forces.
 - More frequent use would compromise security for these forces in their primary role (countering terrorism).
- Discussion notes:

Lead Operational Agency for U.S. Government

- Issue: Should DOD insist that an overall lead operational focal point be established for the U.S. Government as exists for counterterrorism?
- Pros:
 - Director, ONDCP, develops and monitors implementation of national anti-drug strategy but lacks cabinet-level operational authority to coordinate/direct departmental execution.
 - Efforts suffer with "no one in charge."
- Cons:
 - Progress would be reversed with added direct oversight; civil agency "pride" would result in added "turf" conflicts.
- Discussion notes:

CINC Narcotics for U.S. Military

- Issue: If the U.S. military is to continue in the drug war, should it establish a CINCNARC?
- Pros:
 - Services provide forces and various CINCs employ these forces in their respective geographic areas of responsibility (AORs); however, efforts are diluted because CINC Special Operations (CINCSO), the military lead for LIC, has no lead role in the anti-drug arena.
- Cons:
 - CINCSO-led LIC force efforts against drugs would erode existing CINC authorities in their AORs.
- Discussion notes:

Single "Aircraft" Manager for the Drug War

- Issue: Should the Air Force assume single integrated management for anti-drug aircraft assets in the war, vice the plethora of continuous growing "air forces"?
- Pros:
 - Nearly a dozen U.S. civil agencies operate over 300 aircraft (involving over 2,000 personnel) in the drug war, besides military contributions.
 - Many civil aircraft are loaned by or commonly operated by DOD.
 - Consolidation with a single DOD manager could provide added efficiencies.
- Cons:
 - Many agencies use these aircraft for non-drug missions, e.g., Coast Guard for lifesaving.
 - DEA uses aircraft for "undercover" drug smuggling operations overseas (not a military mission).
 - State Department uses civilian contracted employees for overseas eradication efforts to minimize formal U.S. Government employee visibility.
- Discussion notes:

Single Manager for Radar Surveillance Support

- Issue: Should the Air Force assume single integrated management for radar air surveillance support to the drug war?
- Pros:
 - USAF already provides radar data from 37 fixed long-range radars, 2 balloon-borne aerostat radars, 4 air defense centers, 2 or more mobile radars, and 40-50 monthly E-3 sorties. Other DOD entities provide lesser support. USAF is presently integrating use of OTH and 13 CBRN radars into the drug battle.
 - Customs/Coast Guard operate DOD₃-loaned radar surveillance aircraft and two C³I centers. (Duplication?)
- Cons:
 - Management consolidation could provide a "slap in the face" to civil agency professionalism.
 - Should the counter drug mission be permanently civilian or DOD directed?
- Discussion notes:

Secure Communications

- Issue: Should DOD (involving the Air Force) assume overall funding lead for implementation of "The National Telecommunications Plan for Drug Law Enforcement"?
- Pros:
 - DOD was lead for developing the plan and is already assigned executive agent for implementation by ONDCP.
 - Civil agencies lack expertise or needed emphasis for priority fielding of needed secure communications.
- Cons:
 - Civil agency experiences emphasize "direct" law enforcement efforts against drug barons/cartels--scarce resources should be used here.
- Discussion notes:

Weapons Systems Acquisition

- Issue: Should anti-drug support be included in the DOD requirements process for R&D of new weapons?
- Pros:
 - Only way future DOD efforts could ensure a real contribution (per results of a 1988 Defense Science Board study).
- Cons:
 - Would further increase R&D costs for already expensive DOD weapons for future wars.
- Discussion notes:

Funding/Budgeting

- Issue: Should DOD (and the Air Force) aggressively pursue specific funding for increased involvement in the future drug war?
- Pros:
 - Force structure and budgets will decrease--cannot afford to do otherwise.
 - Relatedly, CINCSO needs brought back into the budgeting "fold" for its counterdrug LIC forces; otherwise, priorities and efficiencies may be obscured and the drug war may not be optimally supported.
- Cons:
 - Formal budget proposals imply DOD desire for an expanded military mission, possibly further eroding Posse Comitatus limitations.
 - Congress, not DOD, should continue advocacy for special operations LIC forces in the drug war--DOD has traditionally ignored them.
- Discussion notes:

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ANNEX 2

RECOMMENDED READINGS

- a. September 1989, President's National Drug Control Strategy: "Introduction" (pp. 1-14), "International Initiatives" (pp. 61-70), and "Interdiction Efforts" (pp. 73-79) (herein, pages 56-89).
- b. September 18, 1989, SECDEF Memorandum: Guidance for Implementation of the President's Strategy (herein, pages 90-94).

National Drug Control Strategy



September 1989
The White House

Introduction

In late July of this year, the Federal government's National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) released the results of its ninth periodic National Household Survey on Drug Abuse — the first such comprehensive, national study of drug use patterns since 1985. Much of the news in NIDA's report was dramatic and startling. The estimated number of Americans using *any* illegal drug on a "current" basis (in other words, at least once in the 30-day period preceding the survey) has dropped 37 percent: from 23 million in 1985 to 14.5 million last year. Current use of the two most common illegal substances — marijuana and cocaine — is down 36 and 48 percent respectively.

This is all good news — very good news. But it is also, at first glance, difficult to square with commonsense perceptions. Most Americans remain firmly convinced that drugs represent the gravest present threat to our national well-being — and with good reason. Because a wealth of other, up-to-date evidence suggests that our drug problem is getting worse, not better.

Crime. Fear of drugs and attendant crime are at an all-time high. Rates of drug-related homicide continue to rise — sometimes alarmingly — in cities across the country. Felony drug convictions now account for the single largest and fastest growing sector of the Federal prison population. Three-fourths of all robberies and half of all felony assaults committed by young people (statistically, the most crime-prone age group) now involve drug users. Reports of bystander deaths due to drug-related gunfights and drive-by shootings continue to climb.

Health. The threat drugs pose to American public health has never been greater. Intravenous drug use is now the single largest source of new HIV/AIDS virus infections, and perhaps one-half of all AIDS deaths are drug-related. The number of drug-related emergency hospital admissions increased by 121 percent between 1985 and 1988. As many

Introduction

as 200,000 babies are born each year to mothers who use drugs. Many of these infants suffer low birth weight, severe and often permanent mental and physical dysfunction or impairment, or signs of actual drug dependence. Many other such babies — born many weeks or months premature — do not survive past infancy.

The Economy. Drug trafficking, distribution, and sales in America have become a vast, economically debilitating black market. One U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimate puts annual gross drug sales at \$110 billion — more than our total gross agricultural income, and more than double the profits enjoyed by all the *Fortune* 500 companies combined. Such figures cannot truly be calculated with any real precision, but it is all too clear that drug use acts as a direct and painful brake on American competitiveness. One study reports that on-the-job drug use alone costs American industry and business \$60 billion a year in lost productivity and drug-related accidents.

Overseas. In Southeast and West Asia, South and Central America, and the Caribbean Basin, drug exporting networks and domestic drug use are causing serious social, economic, and political disruptions. Intense drug-inspired violence or official corruption have plagued a number of Latin American countries for years; in more than one of them, drug cartel operations and associated local insurgencies are a real and present danger to democratic institutions, national economies, and basic civil order. In Pakistan, the number of heroin addicts has more than tripled in the past four years alone. And so, because our national security directly depends on regional stability throughout the Americas and across the globe, drugs have become a major concern of U.S. foreign policy.

Availability. Finally, undeniably, the fact remains that here in the United States, in every State — in our cities, in our suburbs, in our rural communities — drugs are potent, drugs are cheap, and drugs are available to almost anyone who wants them.

Insofar as this crisis is the product of individual choices to take or refuse drugs, it has been — and continues to be — a crisis of national character, affecting and affected by the myriad social structures and agencies that help shape individual American lives: our families, our schools, our churches and community organizations, even our broadest messages to one another through popular culture and the media. At least in part, NIDA's most recent Household Survey is proof that grass-roots America can meet the challenge of drugs, and meet it well.

Not so long ago, drug use was an activity widely thought of as harmless fun or isolated self-indulgence. Today it is seen — just as widely, and far more accurately — to be a personal, social, medical, and economic catastrophe. In less than a decade, parents, educators,

students, clergy, and local leaders across the country have changed and hardened American opinion about drugs. The effectiveness of their activism is now largely vindicated. Despite the persistent widespread availability of illegal drugs, many millions of Americans who once used them regularly appear to have recently given them up altogether. Many others — young people for the most part — have been successfully induced not to try drugs in the first place.

What, then, accounts for the intensifying drug-related chaos that we see every day in our newspapers and on television? One word explains much of it. That word is *crack*.

Cocaine in Our Cities

For all its welcome good news, the NIDA Household Survey also brings us terrible proof that our current drug epidemic has far from run its course. Estimated "frequent" use of cocaine in any form (measured by the number of survey respondents who report ingesting that drug one or more times each week, and calculated as a percentage of the total cocaine-using population) has doubled since 1985. Not coincidentally, 1985 was the first year in which crack became an almost ubiquitous feature of American inner-city life. It is an inexpensive, extremely potent, fast-acting derivative of cocaine with a limited-duration "high" that encourages compulsive use. It is, in fact, the most dangerous and quickly addictive drug known to man.

Crack is responsible for the fact that vast patches of the American urban landscape are rapidly deteriorating beyond effective control by civil authorities. Crack is responsible for the explosion in recent drug-related medical emergencies — a 28-fold increase in hospital admissions involving smoked cocaine since 1984. Crack use is increasingly responsible for the continued marketing success enjoyed by a huge international cocaine trafficking industry, with all its consequential evils. And crack use is spreading — like a plague.

We seem to be witnessing a common and tragic phenomenon of drug-use epidemiology. Interest in a given illegal substance often begins first among a particular — usually elite — segment of the population. It is next picked up and spread more broadly through so-called "casual use" in the mainstream middle class. After a time, the drug's dangers are made widely known through public health advisories or painful personal experience, and mainstream use then drops sharply. But the drug continues to slide further down the socio-economic scale, and its chronic or addictive use eventually becomes concentrated among the most vulnerable of our citizens: young, disadvantaged, inner city residents.

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So it is now with cocaine. We must be extremely careful with our new statistics, of course, lest they limit and distort either public thinking about the drug problem or public policy that such thinking will do much to shape. Demographics are not destiny. In 1985, a current cocaine user was likely to be white, male, a high-school graduate, employed full-time, and living in a small metropolitan area or suburb in the western United States. Except that he has now moved to the Northeast, the profile of this "median" current cocaine user remains essentially unchanged today.

No inevitable link exists between urban life — however disadvantaged — and drug use. The majority of American city residents — rich or poor; male or female; black, white, or Hispanic; well- or poorly-educated — do not take drugs. And far too many Americans outside our cities do. Our drug problem remains acute, it remains national in scope and size, and it continues to involve drugs of every sort. No effective anti-drug campaign can ignore our current epidemic's full complexity.

Nevertheless, the epidemiological trend is unmistakable. We are now fighting two drug wars, not just one. The first and easiest is against "casual" use of drugs by many Americans, and we are winning it. The other, much more difficult war is against addiction to cocaine. And on this second front, increasingly located in our cities, we are losing — badly.

Few American communities can afford to assume they are immune to cocaine. The drug black market has proved itself remarkably flexible and creative. Crack is an innovation in cocaine retailing that takes uncanny advantage of the nation's changing drug use patterns. And because it is so horribly seductive and "new," it threatens to reverse the current trend and send a fresh wave of cocaine use back out of our cities and into the country at large. Indeed, to some extent at least, it is happening already: almost every week, our newspapers report a new first sighting of crack — in the rural South or in some midwestern suburb, for example.

What's more, as we guard against crack's spread, we must begin to prepare ourselves for what may well come *after* it. Almost every stimulant epidemic in history has ignited a sedative epidemic in its wake, as users begin employing chemical "downs" to modulate the peaks and valleys of addiction. With cocaine, the sedative of choice has traditionally been heroin. And here, too, the drug market has shown a genius for innovation. In the past year or so, a cheap, powerful, and instantly intoxicating form of smokable heroin — which obviates the need for intravenous needles — has begun to appear on our streets.

For now, however, our most intense and immediate problem is inner-city crack use. It is an acid that is fast corroding the hopes and

possibilities of an entire generation of disadvantaged young people. They need help. Their neighborhoods need help. A decent and responsible America must fully mobilize to provide it.

Thinking About Drugs and Public Policy

What, generally speaking, should we do? What's the best way to fight drugs and drug use? It is a broad and complicated question. It is also a question the United States has struggled with inconclusively for many decades.

Facing understandable public outrage and alarm over the terrible consequences of widespread drug use, Federal, State, and local governments have repeatedly sought to concentrate dramatic responsive action against one or another point on the drug-problem continuum: first through law enforcement; later through a combination of education and treatment efforts; and most recently through heavy emphasis on interdiction of imported drugs at our borders.

Conceived largely as an end in itself, each of these national initiatives has succeeded — in a limited but worthy sphere. We have had, in slow succession, more law enforcement, more education and treatment, and more interdiction. But through it all, undeniably, our national drug problem has persisted. Until late July, convincing evidence of dramatic forward progress was painfully scarce. Indeed, until late July, most evidence continued to suggest that the United States was at best only just beginning to recover from the worst epidemic of illegal drug use in its history — more severe than the heroin scare of the late 1960s and early 1970s; far more severe, in fact, than any ever experienced by an industrialized nation.

The new Household Survey changes our picture of the drug problem a bit, making it more precise and comprehensible. But it does not change the lesson that must be learned from all our many years of experience in the fight. That lesson is clear and simple: no *single* tactic — pursued alone or to the detriment of other possible and valuable initiatives — can work to contain or reduce drug use. No single tactic can justly claim credit for recent reductions in most use of most drugs by most Americans. And no single tactic will now get us out of our appalling, deepening crisis of cocaine addiction.

Unfortunately, however, the search for such a tactic still consumes the bulk of American public energy and debate about drugs. Two radically opposed strains of thought are principally at issue in this unavailing search. Each, interestingly enough, casts unfair aspersions on the skill and utility of our law enforcement agencies and their officers — the first by complaining that law enforcement doesn't work at all and should be junked; the second by complaining that law enforcement

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doesn't work enough and should be the focus of all our future effort. Each of these positions, in turn, is incomplete and therefore misguided.

Most Americans correctly view drugs as a personal tragedy for those who use them. Most Americans are eager to provide drug users with the medical attention that can help them stop, and young people with the social and educational training that can help prevent them from starting in the first place. Neither goal is a primary concern of law enforcement. So does it then follow that we should undertake a massive shift of emphasis away from drug enforcement and toward, instead, treatment for addicts and counseling for students?

Some people think so. Consider the argument in its starkest and most extreme form. Hardly a week goes by these days in which some serious forum or other — a national news magazine, for example, or the opinion page of a major newspaper, or a scholarly conference or television panel discussion — fails to give solemn consideration to the advocacy of wholesale drug legalization. Legalization's proponents generally say something like this: Enforcing our many laws against drugs is a terribly expensive and difficult business. Were we to repeal those laws, drug-related crime would vanish, and the time and money saved in reduced law enforcement could be more effectively spent on health care for addicts, and on preventive instruction for the rest of us.

Exactly how under this scenario we could convincingly warn potential new users about the evils of drugs — having just made them legally acceptable — is not entirely clear. Nor is it clear how an already overburdened treatment system could possibly respond to what candid legalization proponents themselves admit would probably be a sharply increased rate of overall drug use. The cost of drugs — measured in purchase price, the time it takes to search them out, and the risks involved due to unreliable "quality" and legal sanction — is a key predictor of drug use. Cheaper, easier-to-get, and "better" legalized drugs would likely mean more drug users and more frequent drug use.

And would legalization actually reduce crime? Crimes committed by addicts to pay for their habits might theoretically decline a bit. But since addicts use drugs — especially cocaine — as often as they can, less expensive drugs might just as well mean more frequent purchases and a still-constant need for cash-producing burglaries and robberies. What's more, since cocaine use is known to produce dangerous behavioral side-effects — paranoia, irritability, and quick resort to violence on minimal provocation — legalization might also entail an increase in more serious crime by addicts.

Drug traffickers, by contrast, are involved in crime for profit alone. An average gram of cocaine now sells for \$60 to \$80. The free-market price would be roughly 5 percent of that — \$3 or \$4. If legalized drug

sales were heavily regulated and taxed to restrict availability and maximize government revenue, then a gram of cocaine might sell for \$30 or \$40. In that case, criminal organizations could still undercut legal prices and turn a substantial profit. In truth, to destroy the cocaine black market entirely, we would probably have to make the drug legally available at not much more than \$10 a gram. And then an average dose of cocaine would cost about 50 cents — well within the lunch-money budget of the average American elementary school student.

In short, legalizing drugs would be an unqualified national disaster. In fact, any significant relaxation of drug enforcement — for whatever reason, however well-intentioned — would promise more use, more crime, and more trouble for desperately needed treatment and education efforts.

None of this is to suggest that stronger and better coordinated law enforcement *alone* is an answer to the drug problem, though this view, too, has its many adherents. In the teeth of a crisis — especially one which has for so long appeared to spiral wildly out of control — we naturally look for villains. We need not look far; there are plenty of them. Anyone who sells drugs — and (to a great if poorly understood extent) anyone who uses them — is involved in an international criminal enterprise that is killing thousands of Americans each year. For the worst and most brutal drug gangsters, the death penalty is an appropriate sentence of honest justice. And for the multitude of crimes associated with trafficking and use, many of the other tough and coherently punitive anti-drug measures proposed in recent years have their place and should be employed.

We should be tough on drugs — much tougher than we are now. Our badly imbalanced criminal justice system, already groaning under the weight of current drug cases, should be rationalized and significantly expanded. But we cannot afford to delude ourselves that drug use is an exclusively criminal issue. Whatever else it does, drug use degrades human character, and a purposeful, self-governing society ignores its people's character at great peril. Drug users make inattentive parents, bad neighbors, poor students, and unreliable employees — quite apart from their common involvement in criminal activity. Legal sanctions may help to deter drug use, and they can be used to direct some drug users to needed treatment. But locking up millions of drug users will not by itself make them healthy and responsible citizens.

Few people better understand this fact, and the limitations of drug enforcement that it implies, than our drug enforcement officers themselves. They are regularly showered with criticism. They are said to waste time and energy in petty bureaucratic disputes and "turf battles." When they are actually in the field risking their lives in a fight whose

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odds are heavily stacked against them, their every misstep and failure — however small — is nevertheless routinely held up to political and journalistic ridicule.

We do them a grave injustice. Jealousy and bickering among Federal, State, and local drug agencies make for interesting gossip, to be sure. But the plain truth is that they are not the norm. And when interagency cooperation does occasionally break down, it can usually be traced either to the overriding spirit and energy of our front-line drug enforcement officers — which we should be extremely reluctant to restrict within formal and arbitrary lines — or, more basically, to a failure of coherent policymaking in Washington.

In the too-long absence of any real national consensus about the proper overarching goal of American drug policy, the only available measure of drug enforcement success has been statistical: so many thousands of arrests, so many tons of marijuana seized, so many acres of opium poppy and coca plants destroyed. In this kind of policy vacuum, some degree of competition over "body counts" among involved enforcement agencies is almost inevitable. The real miracle is that intramural rivalries have been so relatively restrained and insignificant.

No doubt Federal, State, and local drug enforcement can and should be made tougher, more extensive, more efficient. This report offers a number of major proposals to accomplish just that. But, again, stronger and better coordinated drug enforcement *alone* is not the answer. It is a means to an end. It should not become the end itself.

We must be tough. We must be humane. And we must pursue change — in some cases, sweeping change. But before it can begin, we must get smart about the drug problem — smarter than we have been in the past.

First, we must come to terms with the drug problem in its essence: use itself. Worthy efforts to alleviate the symptoms of epidemic drug abuse — crime and disease, for example — must continue unabated. But a largely ad-hoc attack on the holes in our dike can have only an indirect and minimal effect on the flood itself. By the same token, we must avoid the easy temptation to blame our troubles first on those chronic problems of social environment — like poverty and racism — which help to breed and spread the contagion of drug use. We have been fighting such social ills for decades; that fight, too, must continue unabated. But we need not — and cannot — sit back and wait for that fight to be won for good. Too many lives will be lost in the interim. The simple problem with drugs is painfully obvious: too many Americans still use them. And so the highest priority of our drug policy must be a stubborn determination further to reduce the overall level of drug use nationwide — experimental first use, "casual" use, regular use, and addiction alike.

That said, we must be scrupulously honest about the difficulties we face — about what we can reasonably hope to accomplish, and when. People take drugs for many complicated reasons that we do not yet fully understand. But most drug users share an attitude toward their drugs that we would do well to acknowledge openly: at least at first, they find drugs intensely pleasurable. It is a hollow, degrading, and deceptive pleasure, of course, and pursuing it is an appallingly self-destructive impulse. But self-destructive behavior is a human flaw that has always been with us — and always will. And drug addiction is a particularly tenacious form of self-destruction, one which its victims very often cannot simply choose to correct on their own.

Last fall, an important and valuable piece of omnibus Federal drug legislation was enacted, "The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988." Among its several hundred provisions was a declaration that it would be the policy of the United States Government to "create a Drug-Free America by 1995." That is an admirable goal. It is already a reality for the vast majority of Americans who have never taken an illegal drug. And government has a solemn obligation to keep those Americans — and their children after them — safe and secure from the poison of drug trafficking and drug use.

But government also has an obligation to tell the truth and act accordingly. There is no quick fix or magic bullet for individual dissipation, and policymakers should not pretend that we are on the verge of discovering one for drugs. The continued search for a single "answer" to our troubles with drugs — in law enforcement, in education and treatment, in border interdiction, or somewhere else — is a bad idea. We have bounced back and forth in emphasis this way for too long. It has not worked well. And it will hold us back in the near- and long-term future, by diverting our attention from new and serious work that can and must be done *right now*.

The United States has a broad array of tools at its disposal, in government and out, each of which — in proper combination with the others — can and does have a significant effect on the shape and size of our drug problem. We must use them all. We must have what we have never had before: a comprehensive, fully integrated national drug control strategy. It must proceed from a proper understanding of all that we do and do not know about drugs. It must take calm and intelligent measure of the strengths and limitations of specific available drug control initiatives. And it must then begin to intensify and calibrate them so that the number of Americans who still use cocaine and other illegal drugs, to the entire nation's horrible disadvantage, is — more and more as time goes by — dramatically reduced.

Drug Use: Source and Spread

Drug use takes a number of distinct forms. There are those who take a given drug just a few times — or only once — and, for whatever reason, never take it again. Others take drugs occasionally, but can and do stop, either voluntarily or under some compulsion. There may be a small number of people who use drugs regularly — even frequently — but whose lives nevertheless go on for the most part unimpeded. But there remain a large number of Americans whose involvement with drugs develops into a full-fledged addiction — a craving so intense that life becomes reduced to a sadly repetitive cycle of searching for drugs, using them, and searching for them some more.

After many years of research, we still have no reliable way to predict which drug users will follow which patterns of use, and we are just beginning to understand why some users become addicts and others do not. But we do know a good deal about how drug use begins; how it spreads from individual to individual; what addicts are like and how they behave; and what factors influence the drug marketplace in which critical transactions between dealers and users are carried out — all of which should help us decide how further to contain, prevent, treat, and reduce the prevalence of drug use nationwide.

Drug use usually starts early, in the first few years of adolescence. But notwithstanding popular mythology about shadowy, raincoated pushers corrupting young innocents on school playgrounds, children almost never *purchase* their first drug experience. Generally speaking, drug dealers still make most of their money from known, regular customers, and they still — all things being equal — prefer to avoid the risk of selling their wares to strangers, however young. Similarly, new and novice users themselves are typically reluctant to accept an unfamiliar substance from an unfamiliar face. In fact, young people rarely make *any* independent effort to seek out drugs for the first time. They don't have to; use ordinarily begins through simple personal contact with other users. Where drugs are concerned, as with so much else, young people respond most immediately and directly to the blandishments of peer pressure. And so first use invariably involves the free and enthusiastic offer of a drug by a friend.

This friend — or "carrier," in epidemiological terms — is seldom a hard-core addict. In the terminal stage of an uninterrupted drug use career, the addict is almost completely present-minded — preoccupied with finding and taking his drug; other planning and organizational skills have largely deserted him. He very often cannot maintain anything resembling a normal family or work life. Some addicts may attempt to become dealers to earn money, but most fail at this work, too, since they lack sufficient self-control to avoid consuming their own sales inventory. What's more, an addict's active enthusiasm for his drug's

euphoric high or soothing low tends significantly to recede over time; for biochemical reasons, that high or low becomes increasingly difficult to reproduce (except at risk of a lethal overdose), and drug taking becomes a mostly defensive effort to head off the unpleasant psychological effects of a "crash" — or the intensely painful physical effects of actual withdrawal.

In short, the bottomed-out addict is a mess. He makes the worst possible advertisement for new drug use. And he is not likely to have much remaining peer contact with non-users in any case, as he isolates himself in the world of addicts and dealers necessary to maintain his habit. Simply put, a true addict's drug use is not very contagious.

The non-addicted casual or regular user, however, is a very different story. He is likely to have a still-intact family, social, and work life. He is likely still to "enjoy" his drug for the pleasure it offers. And he is thus much more willing and able to proselytize his drug use — by action or example — among his remaining non-user peers, friends, and acquaintances. A non-addict's drug use, in other words, is *highly* contagious. And casual or regular use — whether ongoing or brand new — may always lead to addiction; again, we have no accurate way to predict its eventual trajectory.

These facts about drug use phenomenology are both a problem and an advantage for any intelligent national drug control campaign. Unfortunately, they mean that those specifically addict-directed efforts of law enforcement and treatment — though urgently required for neighborhood safety and reasons of simple compassion — will remain difficult, time-consuming, and labor intensive, and will promise to reduce the number of American drug users only, for the most part, on a one-by-one, case-by-case basis. They also mean that non-addicted casual and regular use remains a grave issue of national concern, despite NIDA's report of recent dramatic declines in its prevalence. Non-addicted users still comprise the vast bulk of our drug-involved population. There are many millions of them. And each represents a potential agent of infection for the non-users in his personal ambit.

But there is good news, too. Though compared to addiction, non-addicted drug behavior is the more common and contagious form, it is also more susceptible to change and improvement. The same general techniques employed to slow and mixed effect with addicts may achieve markedly better results with non-addicts. Casual and regular drug users are much more easily induced to enter treatment, for example, and they are much more likely to reduce or cease their use as a result of it.

In fact, all the basic mechanisms we use against illegal drugs — to raise their price; to restrict their availability; to intensify legal and social sanctions for their sale, purchase, and use; and to otherwise depress general demand for them — have a more immediate and positive

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behavioral effect on non-addicts than on addicts. And in the search for long-term solutions to epidemic drug use, this fact works to our benefit. Any additional short-term reduction in the number of American casual or regular drug users will be a good in itself, of course. But because it is their kind of drug use that is most contagious, any further reduction in the non-addicted drug user population will also promise still greater future reductions in the number of Americans who are recruited to join their dangerous ranks.

Demand, Supply, and Strategy

It is commonly and correctly assumed that the extent of our problem with drug use can be described in terms borrowed from classical economics; that is, as a largely market function influenced by the variable "supply" of drug sellers and the variable "demand" of drug buyers. So far, so good. But it is just as commonly — and *incorrectly* — assumed that each of our many weapons against drug use can be successfully applied only to one or the other side of the supply/demand equation.

Supply reduction, by these lights, involves overseas crop eradication and associated foreign policy initiatives; interdiction of foreign-manufactured drugs at our national borders; and domestic law enforcement. For its part in this calculus, demand reduction is thought to involve medical or other treatment for current drug users; education about the dangers of drugs and techniques to resist them; and various interdisciplinary, community-based prevention efforts. Demand reduction, then, is understood to be exclusively "therapeutic," and seeks to help those in trouble — or those likely to get in trouble in the future. Supply reduction, by contrast, is understood to be exclusively "punitive," and seeks to bring stern sanctions to bear against those who grow, refine, smuggle, or distribute illegal drugs.

This division of anti-drug strategy into two rigidly independent — even opposed — tactical camps may do a good job of mirroring conflicting public sentiment about the need to be hard-headed or tender-hearted. But it makes a poor guide to policymaking and funding decisions about the drug problem, because — as the preceding pages should already have suggested — it does not do a good job of reflecting either the complicated reality of the drug market or the actual effect specific anti-drug initiatives can and do have on that market.

Granted, overseas and border activities against drugs work *primarily* to reduce supply. But they can have an important, radiating effect on demand, as well, because they make the purchase of certain imported drugs more difficult — and therefore less likely. In much the same way,

drug treatment and education work *primarily* to reduce demand, but in so doing they may encourage suppliers to scale back production and distribution in an effort to sustain consistent profits.

Domestic law enforcement is a special case. The sale and purchase of drugs are both illegal. And so our criminal justice system is obliged to ensure that neither aspect of the drug marketplace is left unpenalized and therefore undeterred. In fact, a paramount target of law enforcement activity — especially at the local level — must be the disruption of those street markets for drugs in which retail demand and supply finally meet in a combustible mix. So it stands to reason that properly conceived law enforcement cannot be meaningfully assigned to any uniquely demand- or supply-side role.

The proposed national strategy outlined in this report takes pains to avoid the artificial and counter-productive distinctions so often drawn among the various fronts necessary to a successful fight against epidemic drug use. Instead it seeks to draw each of them into full participation in a coherent, integrated, and much improved program. The next five chapters, taken together, describe a coordinated and balanced plan of attack involving all basic anti-drug initiatives and agencies: our criminal justice system; our drug treatment system; our collection of education, workplace, public awareness, and community prevention campaigns; our international policies and activities; and our efforts to interdict smuggled drugs before they cross our borders. Two subsequent chapters discuss a research and intelligence agenda designed to support and sustain this overall strategy. And Appendix A offers a series of quantified goals and measures of success — each of which this strategy, if fully implemented, can reasonably be expected to achieve.

No attempt should be made to disguise the fact that significant new resources will be required to pay for the many proposals advanced in this report. And no attempt is made here to deny that the Federal government has a major role to play in providing them. Last February, this Administration requested nearly \$717 million in new drug budget authority for Fiscal Year 1990. Now, after six months of careful study, we have identified an immediate need for \$1.478 billion more. With this report, the Administration is requesting FY 1990 drug budget authority totalling \$7.864 billion — the largest single-year dollar increase in history. A detailed Federal implementation plan — and the budget tables to accompany it — are included in Appendix B.

Appendix C provides a package of recommended State anti-drug legislation. Appendix D discusses possible Federal designations of high intensity drug trafficking areas, as mandated in the "Anti-Drug Abuse

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Act of 1988." And Appendix E proposes a plan for improved automatic data processing and information management among involved Federal drug agencies, also mandated in the 1988 Act.

Finally, an additional word of deepest gratitude is in order for the several hundred Americans listed in Appendix F. Much credit for the future, necessary success of this strategy will be due their attention, expertise, kind advice, and criticism. On behalf of President Bush — and the entire nation — I thank each and every one of them.

William J. Bennett
*Director, Office of National
Drug Control Policy*

International Priorities

- Disruption and dismantlement of drug-trafficking organizations.
- Reduced cocaine supply. Law enforcement, military, and economic assistance will be provided to the three Andean cocaine-producing countries to isolate major coca-growing areas; to block delivery of chemicals used for cocaine processing; to destroy cocaine hydrochloride processing labs; and to dismantle the trafficking organizations. Efforts in transit areas will be improved and Joint Intelligence Collection Centers will be created in the Caribbean Basin.
- Reduced heroin supply through efforts to convince other countries to exert influence on opium growers and reduce heroin processing and distribution.
- Reduced marijuana supply through strengthened foreign law enforcement and eradication, and through efforts to discourage minor producing nations from becoming major producers.
- U.S. assistance and encouragement for European community and multi-lateral efforts aimed at source country and transit country production and distribution, and at European consumption. European community support against international and regional drug organizations will be enlisted.
- Other international objectives:
 - Elevation of drugs as a bilateral foreign policy issue.
 - U.S. ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, along with other pending Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. Other nations will be urged to ratify the Convention.
 - Support for the U.S. foreign aid certification process in order to achieve more effective supply- and transit-country compliance with American drug control objectives.
 - Bilateral and multi-lateral efforts against international money-laundering activities.

International Initiatives

The source of the most dangerous drugs threatening our nation is principally international. Few foreign threats are more costly to the U.S. economy. None does more damage to our national values and institutions or destroys more American lives. While most international threats are potential, the damage and violence caused by the drug trade are actual and pervasive. Drugs are a major threat to our national security.

A comprehensive drug control strategy must include programs for effectively attacking international production and trafficking. These programs, directed at the foreign sources of illegal drugs, support the interlocked concepts of deterrence and incapacitation, and enhance domestic criminal justice efforts by carrying the attack on multinational trafficking organizations beyond our borders. They allow us to disrupt the drug trade from cultivation to arrival in the United States, rather than merely confronting it on our streets.

Effective international efforts allow us to enlist the resources of other nations in this battle. Our country cannot alone assume the responsibility or cost of combatting drugs. Nor can we expect to counter this threat effectively without supporting and being supported by other nations. A cornerstone of our international drug policy must be a determination to work with and motivate other countries to engage their own resources and efforts to defeat trafficking. Only through broad, cooperative international efforts can we reduce the foreign drug supply to our country while motivating other nations to assist us in our drug control efforts and combat the drug menace themselves.


For the most part, drugs are not brought into the country by consumers — individuals who smuggle in enough for personal use or use by friends. Most illegal drugs, the most dangerous in particular, are grown, processed, and shipped or carried into the United States by multi-national criminal organizations. A focus of our international

International Initiatives

anti-drug effort must therefore be these groups and their principal lieutenants who organize and direct the trafficking of dangerous drugs into the United States and to other nations. Every element of these organizations, including their production, processing, transportation, distribution, and financial networks, must be attacked. Consistent with our own laws and those of other nations, we must act to disrupt and dismantle the international drug trade so that trafficking organizations are put out of business. To the greatest extent possible, we must also disrupt the transportation and trafficking of drugs within their source countries, since the interdiction of drugs and traffickers en route to the United States is an immeasurably more complicated, expensive, and less effective means of reducing the drug supply to this country.

Cocaine, Heroin, Marijuana, and Other Drugs

Today, two drugs — cocaine and heroin — constitute the most serious threat to the United States. Virtually all cocaine in the United States is derived from coca grown in Peru (60 percent), Bolivia (30 percent) and Colombia (10 percent). Eighty percent of the cocaine in



this country is processed in and shipped from Colombia. In addition to the crime and violence that the cocaine trade causes us domestically, the cocaine-producing industry is directly responsible for violence, drug-related corruption, and intimidation by drug traffickers of persons and governments in the three Andean countries where coca leaf is grown. All combine to severely impede anti-drug efforts by Andean governments.


Cocaine trafficking, moreover, is but one threat in the Andean region. Economic instability and political insurgencies also present serious challenges to democratic institutions and stability in the area. The three are interrelated; addressing one without also addressing the others is unlikely to achieve reduced cocaine supply. The challenge is to motivate the governments of cocaine producer countries to cooperate with us in significantly damaging the cocaine industry, while proceeding with anti-drug programs of their own. A comprehensive and sustained multi-year effort, involving economic, military, and law enforcement support, will be implemented to achieve these goals. The objectives of this effort must be: isolation of major coca-growing areas in Peru and Bolivia; interdiction within these countries of the delivery of essential chemicals used for cocaine processing; destruction of cocaine hydrochloride processing facilities; dismantlement of drug trafficking organizations; and eradication of the coca crop when it can be made an effective strategy. We can and must accomplish these objectives with a minimum of direct involvement by U.S. personnel. This is a cardinal point. The countries of the area must carry the principal burden themselves.

To strengthen regional support for these objectives, we must intensify cooperation with the governments of the coca-producing countries. This should involve the convening of an Andean Drug Summit within the coming year. Our participation in such a conference would permit a full exchange of views on the problem, would allow us to explain our supply- and demand-related strategies, and would ideally produce U.S. - Andean agreement about our principal goals and strategies in the area. It would also allow consideration of regional enforcement coordination among the Andean nations, and of cooperative measures to reduce their own demand for drugs. To further support anti-cocaine programs, as well as drug control programs aimed at opium and other substances, the United States should plan diplomatic initiatives to secure enhanced commitments of tangible resources from other donor and consumer nations.

Since the overwhelming majority of cocaine shipments travel to the United States through Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean, we must also strengthen programs to improve counter-drug efforts in these transit areas. To this end, recent expansion of the Joint Intelligence Collection Centers, which have permitted the United States and


International Initiatives

Estimated Opium Production in Six Countries, 1985-88



Source: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Committee, 1989

Estimated Marijuana Production in Five Countries, 1985-88



Source: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Committee, 1989

governments in the Caribbean basin to develop and disseminate tactical intelligence on drug targets, has created valuable opportunities. The improved ability of 26 Caribbean countries to communicate with each other and with U.S. law enforcement agencies through INTERPOL has also strengthened cooperation in the area. In addition to supporting these efforts, the United States can provide significant support to transit-country law enforcement activities, ranging from training and technical assistance to operational support for their counter-drug activities. Here, too, the focus must be on the organizations and persons who direct and operate the drug trade.

Opium and its most dangerous derivative, heroin, pose a set of problems very different than those involving cocaine. The volume of worldwide heroin production, which far outstrips current U.S. consumption, continues to increase. With the exception of Thailand, every opium-producing nation maintained or increased its previous production levels in 1988, and the overall growth of opium production is expected to continue in 1989. In the two main opium-producing regions, Southeast Asia has replaced Southwest Asia as the principal supply source to this country.

But the United States has no compelling influence within most of the principal opium-producing countries of the world. As a result, supply-reduction efforts involving regional and international organizations or development assistance have little chance of significantly reducing the opium crop. A strategy to curtail the supply of heroin to the United States, therefore, must rest principally on three pillars: convincing countries that do have influence among the opium growers to exercise it directly and, in those countries where the United States retains some sway, encouraging law enforcement and eradication programs; using U.S. influence on countries which are processing and distribution centers — for example, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, and China; and more effectively applying interdiction measures at the U.S. border, especially at Ports of Entry. Better strategic and operational intelligence (addressed in a subsequent chapter) is crucial to realizing these goals.

Colombia is the major source of marijuana available for use in the United States, providing roughly 40 percent of the total American supply. Mexico produces 25 percent of the marijuana available for U.S. consumption and 10 percent comes from other countries. The remainder of the U.S. market — 25 percent — is supplied by domestic cultivation. To curtail the foreign supply of marijuana we must conclude agreements with major producing countries to strengthen foreign enforcement efforts through training, logistical, and intelligence support. We must also help develop accurate crop estimates as a basis for control-related activities. And we must support eradication programs where they are best applied. A second focus of our strategy must be to discourage still minor *cannabis* producers in Central and South

International Initiatives

America, East Asia, and Africa from becoming major marijuana producers. Multi-lateral efforts by consumer nations, along with bilateral initiatives and effective public diplomacy, must be adapted to specific country situations.

In certain areas and circumstances, eradication may be the best and most cost-effective approach to drug crop suppression. In others it can be self-defeating, driving farmers into the ranks of anti-government insurgency movements, or displacing them to other areas which cannot easily be reached. Eradication is likely to work best where there is little or no resistance from the host government, where enforcement efforts have broken the back of trafficking networks and crop profits have been driven down, where the possibility of crop displacement — growers shifting their production to other areas — is limited, and where strong employment alternatives exist or can be readily created. Careful case-by-case consideration must be given to eradication programs — for their potential effect on total drug production, for their marginal costs and benefits when compared with other counter-drug programs in the same country or area, and for their likely political consequences.

In addition to cocaine, opium, and marijuana, other dangerous drugs and substances threaten the nation. The importation of precursor chemicals to produce methamphetamine in domestic laboratories is a particular problem in the Western and Southwestern States, where it is exceeded only by crack cocaine as a major drug problem. The illegal importation of ergotamine tartrate, which is used to produce LSD, and the smuggling of MDMA ("ecstasy") and amphetamines must also be targets of our overall effort.

In order to address this last set of problems we must attack the ability of traffickers to move material in bulk either across the nation's controlled but mostly unsupervised land border or through air, land, and sea Ports of Entry. Doing so requires expanding enforcement efforts by the Border Patrol, increasing conveyance and container inspections, and, in the case of imported chemicals, establishing broad international controls and cooperative monitoring and enforcement programs with other countries.

Foreign Policy Initiatives

We have worked hard to achieve international consensus on the drug supply threat. An important milestone was reached with the passage of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, adopted in Vienna on December 19 of last year. The Convention calls for criminalization of the production, cultivation, transportation, and trafficking of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and other dangerous drugs. It also calls for

criminalization of chemical precursor trafficking and money laundering, and provides for seizure of assets, extradition of drug traffickers, transfer of criminal proceedings, and training and other forms of cooperation.

The Convention is of fundamental importance to effective international cooperation to combat drugs. The United States must ratify it as soon as possible and pass implementing legislation to give it teeth. We must also make foreign country ratification a priority issue in bilateral relations, especially with major drug producing and transit countries.

In other areas of foreign policy concern, certain countries and regions present special opportunities, both to international drug traffickers and to the U.S. interest in destroying the international drug trade. These include: Western Europe, which increasingly regards drugs as a direct and immediate threat and where the consumer market, especially in cocaine and heroin, continues to grow; and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where within a few years Asian heroin and other drugs have penetrated the social fabric, leading in June of last year to the first Eastern Bloc antinarcotics conference in Tashkent. Limited and focused cooperation in several other countries and regions may provide the United States with high rewards in combatting drug traffickers and drug trafficking organizations.

American initiatives must be tailored to specific situations. With respect to Europe, for example, U.S. strategy will aim at four principal objectives: first, assisting the European Community to develop strong demand reduction policies, strategies, and programs, with the goal of substantially undercutting the European drug market, forcing down drug producer profits, and weakening the international trade; second, assisting the European Community to strengthen its own supply reduction mechanisms, especially enforcement programs and intelligence and information exchange; third, engaging states of the European Community in multilateral efforts with the United States to control source country and transit country production, processing, and trafficking, particularly of cocaine and heroin; and finally, engaging European Community support for international and regional organization actions involving producer countries and areas, especially where the United States has little or no direct influence.

We must be prepared to share our knowledge and our concern with the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations and be willing to engage them in cooperative counter-drug activities. And we should be prepared to take advantage of special opportunities provided by other countries with which we may have minimal or no diplomatic relations. Cuba, for example, might effectively block rather than facilitate the passage of drug-carrying aircraft toward the United States. The Cuban government has the ability significantly to disrupt current trafficking. It remains to be seen if it will do so aggressively.

Vigorous international law enforcement is a priority concern. To the same degree that we make drug users and drug dealers accountable for their actions within our own country, we must help other countries strengthen their enforcement capabilities and their laws to hold drug offenders accountable within their own territory. Where needed, law enforcement training, special equipment, and logistics support should be made available to foreign agencies. Law enforcement information exchange mechanisms with foreign governments should also be improved.

We should press for agreements with major drug-producing countries to strengthen international law enforcement cooperation. Included in such cooperative efforts should be: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, which enable American law enforcement authorities to obtain evidence abroad in a form admissible in U.S. courts, and which facilitate investigative and prosecutorial assistance between the United States and treaty partners; extradition agreements; agreements to strengthen the conspiracy laws of other countries; and strong asset seizure and financial targeting measures. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties that have been before the Senate for many months need to be ratified.

We should also urge the participation of the developed countries — including European Community member states, Japan, Australia, and Canada — in the formation of a standing consultative group to support anti-drug activities by drug producing countries.

We must continue to assist countries in their anti-drug programs through existing international and regional organizations — including the United Nations — although our support for these organizations must hold significant promise of increasing the international commitment to drug control. U.S. support cannot substitute for the focus and influence afforded by bilateral and multi-lateral agreements specifically directed at drugs.

Concerted international efforts, directed by national leaders, are needed to make substantive changes in world opinion regarding drugs. Priority consideration should be given to convening at an early date a drug summit that represents source, transit, and consuming countries — but only following carefully developed preparatory steps, including consultations with all participant states, and only after we have met with the leaders of the Andean states.

The legal requirement for certification of major drug producer and drug transit countries can be used to combat international trafficking and production operations. This certification requirement, which went into effect following passage of the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, establishes a direct relationship between American assistance to major illicit drug producing and transit countries and their positive performance on drug control. The President must certify the adequacy of these countries' efforts to suppress illicit drug production, trafficking, and money

laundering, or their full cooperation with American anti-drug efforts. If the President fails to certify a country, or if the Congress disapproves a certification, the United States must withhold most economic and military assistance, along with support for World Bank and other loans. The President retains the option to grant trade concessions.

The threat of decertification can strain relations with countries with which we have major foreign policy interests. Properly used, however, it can be an important tool in motivating foreign governments to help attack the drug trade. Moreover, the certification process substantially supports our position that, just as we are committed to reducing our own voracious demand for drugs, every foreign government must be committed to controlling the drug problem within its own territory. Governments, in short, must be held accountable for their own performance. In bilateral relationships with illegal drug producing and transit countries, therefore, the United States must emphasize the requirement for cooperation with our anti-drug efforts, and for effective independent actions to suppress the drug trade. And we must be prepared to decertify countries that willfully permit drug traffickers to continue operations within their national territory. To strengthen the effectiveness of the certification process, we should also seek to establish with each producing and transit country annual and long-term performance goals.

A vigorous, coordinated public diplomacy program is also essential if the United States intends to broaden support for its international counter-drug objectives. In the past, programs in this area have been hampered by the lack of importance given by this country to the drug issue as a foreign policy concern. We must develop and articulate a broad, meaningful public diplomacy program in a manner that will increase the level of international intolerance for illicit drugs and motivate international public and private sector actions to eliminate drug production, trafficking, and consumption. Our public diplomacy programs should help other countries reduce their demand for illicit drugs, and should develop international support for U.S. bilateral and multilateral strategies and programs. They should have as their particular focus the consumer nations. Every effort should be made to provide these countries with needed information on successful U.S. demand reduction strategies and programs.

Chemical Precursor Diversion and Money Laundering

Chemicals diverted from legitimate commerce are critical to the production of cocaine, heroin, and drugs such as methamphetamine, PCP and LSD. In fact, most of the cocaine smuggled into this country is processed with chemicals exported by American companies, and nearly all methamphetamine, LSD, and PCP is illegally manufactured using chemicals from domestic U.S. suppliers. Some companies and distributors are unwittingly involved; others are criminal accomplices. In both cases, we must endeavor to stop the distribution of chemicals used to process drugs, whether they are smuggled into the country or produced domestically.

Three strategies are needed. We need to impose stringent controls on the export of chemicals used in the illicit production of cocaine in South America. Strong measures are needed to stop the diversion of chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs within the United States. Both of these strategies are supported by a legislative keystone, the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988, which establishes a system for identifying, monitoring, and controlling chemical shipments which might be diverted to the illegal drug trade. We must also press for international cooperation agreements which support strong chemical diversion controls (such as the U.N. Convention mentioned above), encourage the enactment of foreign national laws similar to our own, and seek the establishment of investigative and monitoring programs in other countries in close cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies.

Another critical area of concern is money laundering. The magnitude of their drug-generated wealth gives foreign traffickers the capability to penetrate — and potentially dominate — both legitimate and illegitimate commercial markets, to corrupt U.S. and foreign officials, and to destabilize foreign governments. Defeating this problem needs attention at the national level, and the rewards to be gained by success in this are potentially very large. In addition to our domestic efforts — discussed separately in this report — we must bring other nations' capabilities and resources into play to help identify, trace, freeze, seize, and confiscate drug crime proceeds abroad. We need to press for international cooperation agreements, such as the United Nations Convention, which support strong measures to criminalize and penalize money laundering. And in our bilateral relations we will urge governments to attack financial aspects of the drug trade, by adopting strong measures to criminalize money laundering, and by imposing sanctions on those who use the international financial system to disguise and move criminally derived funds across national borders.

Interdiction Priorities

- Development of a comprehensive information-based approach to Federal air, maritime, land, and Port-of-Entry interdiction.
 - Upgraded intelligence support to interdiction, through intensified interdiction-specific investigations and undercover operations.
 - Enhanced computer support to interdiction through acceleration of machine readable documentation programs; installation of document machine readers at appropriate Ports of Entry; and development of the International Border Interdiction System (IBIS) and other computerized border information systems.
 - Creation of interagency/interdisciplinary teams to analyze and target smuggling modes, methods, and routes.
- Concentration on high-value individuals and shipments.
 - Review of existing methods for deterring air smugglers.
 - Improved operations aimed at money couriers and shipments.
 - Improved container inspection techniques and intelligence.
- Enhanced border systems, operations, and activities.
 - Dramatically reduced document fraud, especially fraudulent use of U.S. birth certificates and other "breeder documents."
 - Expanded use of drug detection dogs, anti-vehicle barriers, and container inspections.
 - Provision of automatic exclusion authority and general arrest authority to Immigration and Naturalization Service officers.
 - Improved detection and monitoring systems and secure operations procedures.
 - Expanded secure communications systems.

Interdiction Efforts

For several years the United States has placed a high priority on the interdiction of drugs entering this country — and with good reason. Last year, 355 million people entered or reentered the country, along with more than 100 million vehicles, 220 thousand vessels, 635 thousand aircraft, and eight million containers. In addition, more than a million people entered the country illegally between Ports of Entry. In theory, any of these people or conveyances could be carrying drugs. The problem is to determine which person, vehicle, vessel, container, or other shipment might be transporting drugs, and then decide how to apply limited available resources to tracking, apprehending, or seizing that person or shipment.

As we have expanded our interdiction efforts, we have seized increasing amounts of illegal drugs. Stepped-up interdiction has also forced drug traffickers to make significant operational changes. Drug traffickers operating from Colombia, for example, once flew their cargoes into the United States along the eastern coast of Florida. More vigorous air interdiction efforts have caused a change in trafficking routes — first toward the Bahamas, where drug cargoes were directly transferred to small vessels, or air dropped to fast boats; then, more recently, to Mexico, where drug cargoes are carried across the U.S. border by both vehicles and human carriers.

Despite interdiction's successful disruptions of trafficking patterns, the supply of illegal drugs entering the United States has, by all estimates, continued to grow. Every time we disrupt or close a particular trafficking route, we have found that traffickers resort to other smuggling tactics that are even more difficult to detect. Indeed, our recent experiences with drug interdiction have persuasively demonstrated that interdiction alone cannot prevent the entry of drugs, or fully deter traffickers and their organizations.

Interdiction Efforts

Nonetheless, no country can afford to leave its borders unprotected. While investments needed for a comprehensive interdiction system are large, and the return — measured by numbers of traffickers apprehended — may appear relatively small, fighting drug traffic at our borders has major symbolic and practical value. It demonstrates to foreign nations and trafficking organizations that we are committed to combatting the drug trade. It bolsters our support for the international treaties banning drug smuggling to which we and our allies are signatories. And it introduces another level of risk to the individual drug smuggler who attempts to bring illicit drugs into the country.

No interdiction system will be so thorough that it can totally restrict the entry of illicit drugs. But as we insist on maintaining a domestic law enforcement system — even though it cannot reasonably be expected to put an end to all crime — so, too, we must insist on maintaining an adequate system of border interdiction. Over the past several years, enhanced interdiction has allowed us to resist and frustrate drug traffickers who try to penetrate our borders. Ensuring that what gaps remain in the system are filled is a responsibility that cannot be neglected.

Smugglers and drugs enter this country by many routes. Cocaine is transported by air and sea through the Caribbean, by air and sea across the Gulf of Mexico, by air and land across the Southwest border with Mexico, and by sea in the Pacific. Forty-five percent of cocaine seized in 1988 was carried by private aircraft, more than double the amount seized from private vessels, the next most common smuggling method. While the air corridor from Colombia across the Caribbean and through the Bahamas remains the single most favored route of cocaine smugglers, transshipment through Mexico has become an important smuggling route.

Heroin is transported from Mexico principally by land, and from Southeast and Southwest Asia and some African countries by couriers flying commercial air services with the drug concealed on or in their bodies or in their luggage. Heroin is also sometimes sent by international mail. Increasing amounts are now being seized in airborne and seaborne containers.

Marijuana, drug precursor chemicals, and other dangerous drugs are principally brought into the country by Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico routes; overland from Mexico; and by air carrier from Europe and East Asia.

Interdiction aimed principally at drug seizures provides little impediment to smuggling organizations. Unless seizure rates are very high, interdiction alone represents only a slight portion of any trafficker's cost of doing business. To be fully effective, interdiction must aim at

Interdiction Efforts

Estimated Federal Drug Seizures (in pounds)

	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>Change</u>
Cocaine	140,000	198,000	+29%
Heroin	1,400	2,150	+35%
Marijuana	2,000,000	1,660,000	-17%

Source: Based on data provided by U.S. Coast Guard, U. S. Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and INS/Border Patrol (limited reporting). Figures do not include drug seizures in foreign jurisdictions.

trafficking organizations and individuals themselves, creating a serious risk of punishment or financial loss.

Where overseas efforts are concerned, this implies the need for activities in drug source and transit countries that are specifically designed to disrupt and, if possible, dismantle trafficking organizations — through application of strict enforcement and criminal sanctions, and through stringent interdiction of trafficking routes and modes. Here at home, effective interdiction must involve enforcement directed against particular criminal organizations and individuals — over and above necessary seizures of smuggled drugs. And much the same focus should apply in international transit zones between source countries and the United States border. All American actions outside our territorial limits will benefit from better international cooperation, and all are subject to international law. But here again, our principal interdiction objective must be to identify and apply enforcement efforts against those elements of the drug smuggling process that are of highest value to trafficking organizations.

Strategies Against Mid-Level Traffickers and Shipments of Value

Drug trafficking is a hierarchical enterprise divided into three principal "classes." At the bottom are low-level carriers — or "mules," in the demeaning terminology of the trade — who transport drugs on their persons or in their luggage. Mules perform only menial tasks in a smuggling operation. They can easily be replaced — and often must be — so they are deliberately kept largely ignorant of their higher-level associates' activities. What little information mules possess is rarely of substantial value to law enforcement agencies and officers. Apprehending mules causes no significant damage or disruption to drug trafficking networks.

At the top of the drug trafficking pyramid are major organization heads or "kingpins." Kingpins rarely take part in actual drug transportation activities, and they therefore have little to fear from ordinary interdiction measures. What's more, kingpins are often able further to protect themselves by political co-option, bribery, and intimidation.

Between the two extremes of drug trafficking status are key, mid-level individuals who direct specialized operations and otherwise keep their criminal organizations' machinery running smoothly. These people are pilots, money couriers, and field managers. They perform functions that are critical to particular smuggling activities. Consequently, they often have broad knowledge of their organizations' structure, membership, and methods of operation. And so, because they are directly involved in the conduct and coordination of illegal drug and money shipments, mid-level traffickers should be a primary object of our interdiction efforts. A mid-level trafficker focus suggests a number of priorities for future planning in each area of American interdiction activity.

Air Interdiction. Air interdiction strategy entails the initial detection of a potential drug smuggling aircraft, its identification as a possible drug smuggler, the dispatch of an interceptor aircraft to track the suspect — unobserved, if possible — and the apprehension of the pilot after he lands. Consistent with international law and in the interests of aviation safety, no action may now be taken to stop or interrupt the progress of a target aircraft in flight. If any part of the detection and monitoring process breaks down and a target aircraft is "lost," the smuggler escapes. And when an aircraft is successfully followed to landing, the pilot may abandon his aircraft at the point of arrival and flee the scene. Under these circumstances many air smugglers are not apprehended, and can quickly return to their trade with another — possibly stolen — aircraft.

To be more effective, Federal air interdiction strategy will focus more clearly on deterring smugglers using general aviation aircraft from transporting illicit drugs toward or into United States, and on removing them from the drug trade by appropriate enforcement action. The Administration will undertake a thorough review of existing methods for deterring air smugglers.

Maritime Interdiction. Drug smuggling by sea differs from air smuggling in a number of ways. The pilots of general aviation aircraft carrying illegal drugs — many of which fly circuitous routes off-airways and at low altitudes — can be assumed to know the nature of their cargoes. It is not always clear, by contrast, that entire ship or vessel crews are aware that they are working on a smuggling craft. And those members of a ship's crew who *do* know of on-board drug shipments are likely to be mere couriers. Again, courier apprehension poses little or no risk to trafficking organizations as a whole, and seizures of drugs smuggled by sea are likely to cause no more than minor operational disruption — unless a given shipment is very large.

Without prior intelligence about the nature and size of a sea shipment, however, it is impossible to determine in advance what its value might be. Our maritime interdiction strategy will continue to focus on drug-transporting vessels of all types — by unilateral use of U.S. maritime assets and operations, or by use of maritime operations conducted jointly with source and transit countries. This involves the placement of maritime detection and apprehension assets in off-shore departure zones near drug source countries, and in various Caribbean "choke points." Maritime interdiction strategy also involves careful sorting of maritime drug smuggling vessels from legitimate maritime traffic en route to the United States.

Land Interdiction. Transporting illegal drugs on one's person or in baggage, through land Ports of Entry, or over the land border between Ports of Entry, requires some determination but little or no skill. Most people caught smuggling drugs in this manner are unimportant to the trafficking organizations that employ them. But the volume of individual entries and the quantity of drugs that cross our land borders are so large that land interdiction must remain an effective weapon in our anti-drug arsenal.

Our land interdiction strategy must accurately identify drug carrying persons and conveyances, especially containerized cargo. A number of innovations and improvements are necessary to realize this goal. First, we need to make full use of sophisticated computer data bases and good tactical intelligence which can provide specific warnings about important individuals and shipments entering the country. Second, the Federal government will intensify cooperative programs and data exchanges with private industries involved in international trade and travel in order to improve the detection and sorting of conveyances and

Interdiction Efforts

persons. Third, the Federal government will also intensify multi-agency interdiction efforts involving Federal, State, and local personnel (e.g., Operation Alliance along the U.S.-Mexican border and the proposed Operation Northstar along the U.S.-Canadian border). Fourth, the Administration will seek increased resources for the use of drug detection dogs in vehicular inspections, in cargo and container examinations, and in air passenger processing. Fifth, we intend to put into place adequate physical border controls, including barriers to prevent drug-carrying vehicles from making high-speed runs into the country across the Southwest border. Sixth and finally, we should expand the operations of the Border Patrol between Ports of Entry, making use, as needed, of Defense Department technical and intelligence support.

Document Fraud, Money Couriers, and Other Problems and Opportunities

The ability of foreign nationals to enter the country using valid but fraudulently acquired documentation papers permits drug traffickers to defeat our current border control systems. Federal agencies must work with State and local authorities to reduce the potential for document fraud at all levels. Birth certificates, delayed birth records, and passports are areas needing particular attention. The Administration will develop minimum information standards for birth certificates used for Federal purposes, and will intensify efforts to ensure the overall security of Federally issued documents.

Illegal money shipments are also a necessary focus for interdiction initiatives. A large seizure of drug money being sent out of the United States hurts traffickers badly — it costs them a significant piece of domestic drug sale profits and seriously diminishes their return on investment. Moreover, individual money couriers tend to be trusted members of their organizations; they cannot be readily and easily replaced. Apprehension and incarceration of a money courier deprives his organization of an important resource. The Administration intends to strengthen the Federal government's activities against money couriers (including such successful programs as the Customs-directed Operation Buckstop), using intelligence systems and resources to provide better information about involved individuals and planned money shipments.

The Administration plans to pursue several other important interdiction goals in the coming months and years. We will, first, rapidly move to develop a comprehensive information-based approach to air, maritime, land, and Port of Entry interdiction, using automated information and intelligence delivery systems to provide data on those

persons, organizations, and shipments of value against which our interdiction resources should be specifically directed. The proposed future development of a Federal strategic drug intelligence center (discussed separately in this report) will represent an important step in this direction.

The Administration will also complete the fixed and mobile detection networks along our Southern border and in the Caribbean as funds are available, and improve the effectiveness of our national Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Centers, and the Defense Department's Detection, Monitoring, and Intelligence fusion centers. The Administration will ensure that we make optimal use of existing interception/tracking and apprehension assets — principally fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters — to respond to positively identified air smugglers. Special emphasis will be placed on establishing an international multi-industry effort to counter the threat of container-borne drugs through development and deployment of a container tracking system. The Administration will seek to upgrade the operational security and operational deception procedures of Federal law enforcement agencies, and pursue an integrated and secure communications network as funding is available. Finally, because drug trafficking through Mexico now poses a threat comparable to that present in the Caribbean, and because Colombian traffickers now appear to be taking control of Mexican smuggling networks, the Administration will redirect resources to the Southwest border as an equal-status high-threat area. Coordinated U.S.-Mexican operations — with each government acting on its own side of the border — will be a priority, along with improved tactical information sharing.

Level interdiction budgets for the next several years will require careful direction of effort toward targets of special opportunity: those particular individuals and operations whose apprehension will cause significant disruption to drug trafficking networks. The Administration will work to eliminate duplication in Federal interdiction programs, to ensure full coordination of Federal interdiction activities, and to establish procedures which serve to integrate all national efforts in this expensive and critically important arena.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 18, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

On September 5, 1989, the President issued the National Drug Control Strategy pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The President's strategy provides for an integrated program of counternarcotics actions designed to move the country substantially closer to the goal of a drug-free America. This guidance is designed to assist in the swift and effective implementation of the President's strategy within the Department of Defense.

The supply of illicit drugs to the United States from abroad, the associated violence and international instability, and the use of illegal drugs within the country pose a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the country. The threat of illicit drugs strikes at the heart of the Nation's values. It inflicts increased crime and violence on our society and attacks the well-being and productivity of our citizenry. One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. Also, the Congress has by statute assigned to the Department the duty to serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States. For these reasons, the detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense.

The Nation ultimately will be rid of the scourge of illegal drugs only through the sustained application of the energy, courage and determination of the American people. As the President's Strategy reflects, the Nation must seek to eliminate both the demand and the supply for illegal drugs, for the Nation will conquer neither if the other is left unchecked.

The Department of Defense, with the Department of State and U.S. law enforcement agencies, will help lead the attack on the supply of illegal drugs from abroad under the President's Strategy. The efforts of the Department of Defense will complement those of other U.S. agencies and cooperating foreign countries. The Department of Defense will work to advance substantially the national objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States through the effective application of available resources consistent with our national values and legal framework.

An effective attack on the flow of illegal drugs depends upon action at every phase of the flow: (1) in the countries that are the sources of the drugs, (2) in transit from the source countries to the United States, and (3) in distribution in the United States. The United States Armed Forces can assist in the attack on the supply of drugs in each of these phases.

I. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS AT THE SOURCE

The Department of Defense will assist in the attack on production of illegal drugs at the source. The production of illegal drugs is a complex criminal enterprise. The criminal enterprise requires illicit labor, capital, entrepreneurship and a substantial infrastructure to grow the plants that are the raw materials for illegal drugs and to refine and manufacture the illegal drugs. Reducing the availability of these elements of illegal drug production in the countries from which illegal drugs originate would reduce the flow of illegal drugs to the United States.

The Department of Defense can assist in the three elements of an effective attack on the supply of drugs in source countries: (1) assistance for nation-building, (2) operational support to host-country forces, and (3) cooperation with host-country forces to prevent drug exports. Pursuant to the National Drug Control Strategy, near-term efforts will focus on the Andean nations from which most cocaine entering the United States originates. A key requirement for the success of U.S. efforts directed at the supply of illegal drugs, and in particular U.S. counternarcotics operations, will be the cooperation of the foreign countries involved.

As the National Drug Control Strategy indicates with respect to the Andean countries, a sustained, multi-year effort to provide economic, security, and law enforcement assistance is an essential element for a successful fight against illegal drugs abroad. Drug-producing criminal organizations control what amounts to private armies that challenge the law enforcement and military forces of their countries. Often such organizations are intertwined with insurgent forces that challenge directly the governments of their countries. The National Drug Control Strategy calls for the United States to reinforce the abilities of the governments of the countries cooperating in the fight against illegal drugs to combat drug-producing organizations. Security assistance will help enable such a government to protect itself from criminal drug enterprises and drug-related insurgencies, and to enforce its laws against drug producers and traffickers. Future economic assistance will help to strengthen the national economy and keep the labor, capital and entrepreneurship available in the country channeled toward useful production and away from drug production. Success in other efforts to attack the supply of illegal drugs depends in the long-run upon the establishment of healthy economies in drug-producing countries and the restoration of governmental authority in those countries. To assist in the implementation of this element of the National Drug Control Strategy, the Department of Defense will execute security assistance programs in accordance with Presidential instructions and applicable law, and in coordination with the Department of State.

Effective implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy requires that the Department of Defense be prepared to provide counternarcotics operational support to the forces of cooperating countries. The U.S. Armed Forces can provide foreign forces substantial assistance in training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, logistics, medical support and civic action in connection with foreign forces' operations against the infrastructure of drug-producing criminal enterprises. Such U.S. military support would be designed to increase the effectiveness of foreign forces' efforts to destroy drug processing laboratories, disrupt drug-producing enterprises, and control the land, river and air routes by which the enterprises exfiltrate illegal drugs from the country.

In addition to assistance for nation-building and support for foreign forces' strikes on drug-producing enterprises, the U.S. can assist law enforcement agencies of

cooperating foreign countries in combatting the export of drugs from those countries. The Department of Defense can assist with an improved intelligence collection effort, which will be essential not only to assist the governments of the source countries, but also for U.S. actions in the second line of defense -- the attack on drugs in transit to the United States.

II. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS IN TRANSIT

The substantially increased effort to attack drugs at their source in the drug-producing countries as a first line of defense should help reduce over time the export of illegal drugs to the U.S. Nevertheless, drug-producing criminal enterprises in those countries currently are so vast in scope that, even if U.S. efforts to attack drugs at the source are highly successful, the flow of drugs by sea, air, and land will continue. As the second line of defense against the flow of illegal drugs, the U.S. armed forces will implement the National Drug Control Strategy through substantial efforts to counter the flow of illegal drugs in transit to the United States, both outside the United States and at the Nation's borders and ports of entry. The Department's service pursuant to statutory direction as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States will prove particularly important to the success of this effort.

Deployment of appropriate elements of the U.S. armed forces with the primary mission to interdict and deter the flow of drugs should over time help reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. At a minimum, deploying the armed forces with this mission should have the immediate effect of substantially complicating the logistical difficulties of criminal drug traffickers and increasing the costs and risks of their drug smuggling activities.

As a high priority, United States military counternarcotics deployments will emphasize combatting the flow of drugs across the Caribbean Sea and across the southern border of the United States. The Department of Defense will proceed with planning to deploy a substantial Caribbean Counternarcotics Task Force, with appropriate air and maritime drug interdiction assets and aerial and maritime detection and monitoring assets, to combat the flow of illegal drugs from Latin America through the Caribbean Sea. The Department also will proceed with planning for other deployments of U.S. forces to complement the counternarcotics actions of U.S. law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments.

Success of the attack on drugs in transit will require sustained deployment of appropriately trained and equipped members of the U.S. armed forces and substantially improved cooperation between the armed forces and U.S. law enforcement agencies. The substantial increase in military participation in the attack on drugs in transit is intended to be in addition to, rather than in place of, Federal law enforcement agencies' efforts.

The success of interdiction and deterrence efforts will depend greatly upon the ability of the Department of Defense and law enforcement agencies to marshal effectively the myriad command, control, communications and intelligence resources they possess into an integrated counternarcotics network. The Department of Defense will serve as the single lead Federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs and will be prepared, with the cooperation of U.S. law enforcement agencies, to integrate expeditiously

into an effective network the Federal command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets that are dedicated to the mission of interdicting illegal drugs from abroad. The Department of Defense will seek to develop and employ when appropriate the capability to exercise tactical control of Federal detection and monitoring assets actively dedicated to counternarcotics operations outside the United States and in border areas.

To ensure that action to implement the President's National Drug Control Strategy begins immediately, the Commanders-in-Chief of all unified and specified combatant commands will be directed to elevate substantially the mission priority within their commands of actions to fight illegal drugs.

III. THE ATTACK ON DRUGS IN THE UNITED STATES


After the first and second lines of defense -- actions directed at illegal drugs in source countries and in transit -- the third line of defense against drugs will be in the United States itself. The role of the armed forces in the third line of defense includes both actions to reduce the supply of illegal drugs and actions to reduce the demand for those drugs.

Within the United States, to assist in reducing the supply of illegal drugs, the counternarcotics actions of the Department of Defense will emphasize support to Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, and the National Guard in State status. The Department of Defense will assist requesting law enforcement agencies and the National Guard with training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, and logistics for counternarcotics operations. In appropriate cases, armed forces personnel and equipment will be detailed directly to law enforcement agencies to assist in the fight. The Department of Defense will ensure that its administrative and command structures permit rapid and effective response to appropriate requests for counternarcotics assistance from law enforcement agencies and the National Guard. The Department will continue to assist the Governors of the several States in employing the National Guard in the fight against illegal drugs.

With respect to reduction of demand for drugs within the United States, the Department of Defense bears an important responsibility to reduce the use of illegal drugs within the armed forces and among its civilian personnel. The Department of Defense has met with substantial success in its demand reduction efforts with armed forces personnel through aggressive drug abuse education and drug-testing programs -- an 82% reduction in drug abuse since 1980. The Department will step up its efforts to combat illegal drug use by departmental personnel and will make available to other large organizations its experience in reducing the demand for illegal drugs. The Department also will emphasize drug abuse awareness and prevention programs in the Department's school system, which educates over 190,000 of America's children.

The Department of Defense will be prepared to assist the Department of Justice with its responsibilities for incarceration and rehabilitation of drug criminals, through means such as training Federal, State and local personnel in the conduct of rehabilitation-oriented training camps for first-offense drug abusers and providing overflow facilities for incarceration of those convicted of drug crimes.

The President's National Drug Control Strategy emphasizes a multi-national and multi-agency approach to reduction of the drug supply. The Department of Defense has a crucial role in defending the United States from the scourge of illegal drugs. The Department will employ the resources at its command to accomplish that mission effectively. Should it prove necessary in implementing the President's Strategy effectively, any needed additional statutory authority will be sought. The men and women of America's armed forces will fight the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs, as an important part of the national effort to secure for all Americans a drug-free America.



Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense