Strategic Airlift and Sealift: Both Have Long Suffered from a Capabilities Versus Requirements Disconnect. What Is the Prognosis?
Abstract
Today the United States is not capable of deploying its conventional forces to areas of vital interest in the numbers or in the time frame essential for success. Even Operation Just Cause, considered a 'small, local, short duration' contingency operation, severely taxed our available strategic airlift assets. During the 1980s we have made moderate strides in improving our lift capabilities. Moreover, if our force structure intentions hold true, the next several years wil provide additional lift capability. Yet, being cognizant of the threats we face during the reminder of this century, it is apparent that the improvements in our lift capability fall far short and are promised too late. Barring outright cancellation, the DoD programs planned for the next few years will only serve as a band-aid to our chronic strategic lift ailment. We must either relook the requirements or develop the necessary lift capability. The latter promises to be a long and costly task; but if we are going to get our forces where needed and sustain them once they are in-place, we need to make strategic lift a high-priority national objective. Unfortunately, the prognosis for any improvement, especially sealift, of the magnitude required to overcome our capabilities versus requirements disconnect is not encouraging.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA241097
Entities
People
- Duane C. Johnson
Organizations
- Air War College