Analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Crisis Management Experiences. Technical Report
Abstract
This report presents the first systematic analysis of the outcomes of U.S. and Soviet crises from 1966 through 1978. The analyses are designed to identify general trends and patterns in these data. The information developed has been deliberately structured so that it can be used as a tool by crisis planners and decision-makers. To this end, it is embodied in an executive aid for crisis decision-makers (CACI, 1979 report). This aid is a highly user- oriented database management system that allows planners to focus upon their own specific concerns. Moreover, the system is designed so that users can adapt it to incorporate additional outcomes data (developed from either open or classified sources) for use in their analyses. While a deliberate attempt has been made in the development of the database and its analysis to avoid drawing normative judgments concerning the 'correctness' of either U.S. or Soviet goals, the existence of the outcomes data provides a diagnostic base for evaluation of various goals' achievement and thereby helps in the process of selecting and evaluating crisis action options.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1987
- Accession Number
- ADA241133
Entities
People
- Farid Abolfathi
- Robert B. Mahoney Jr.
- Thomas M Johnson