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HOW NORTHEAST ASIANS VIEW THEIR SECURITY

Thomas L. Wilborn



Strategic Studies Institute
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FOREWORD

Because of the dramatic changes which have taken place in Europe since 1989, the United States must not only readjust its security policies in all regions of the world (not just Europe), but also reevaluate the factors which are given priority in the security policy-making process. The perceptions of policymakers and those who influence them in other nations are one of the important considerations which deserve more attention in the post-cold war environment than they received formerly.

In *How Northeast Asians View Their Security*, the author focuses on this factor as it applies to a strategically important region for the United States. He describes the perceptions which Northeast Asian defense intellectuals hold toward their security environment, and assesses the significance of some of those views for the United States, particularly the U.S. Army. He concludes that, among other things, the Army can make a unique contribution toward realizing U.S. regional security objectives.

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SUMMARY

When the cold war dominated international politics, the primary objective of U.S. security policy in Northeast Asia, as elsewhere, was the containment of the Soviet Union. Now, however, with the Soviet threat greatly diminished and the constraints of a bipolar international system replaced by the uncertainties of a transitional international order, knowledge of the perceptions of defense intellectuals in China, Japan, and South Korea should be an important ingredient in the formulation of U.S. security policy for Northeast Asia. Only with a grasp of the perceptions of the region's defense intellectuals is it possible for U.S. policymakers to anticipate the effect of policy initiatives for the region, to mold policy initiatives that influence the perceptions of the United States held by members of Northeast Asian security communities, and to facilitate the achievement of U.S. objectives in the future.

This study examines the views held by Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean defense intellectuals, who are professionally involved with security affairs, about their security environments, and analyzes their implications for the United States and the U.S. Army.

KEY FINDINGS

Changing and Uncertain Security Relationships.

- Northeast Asian defense intellectuals agree that the international system is evolving to a more decentralized system in which international politics will no longer be dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States.
- Most Northeast Asian defense intellectuals believe that the U.S.-Soviet and Sino-Soviet detentes are favorable developments which will last for a decade or two, but probably not longer.

- Virtually all regional defense intellectuals perceive that there will be problems and dangers in multipolarity. Regional powers will be less inhibited than formerly by the alliances of the cold war, and more likely to attempt to pursue specific national interests by force.

Japan as Greatest Danger.

- The security communities of China and South Korea are most worried about the future role of Japan. After the anticipated disengagement from Northeast Asia by the United States, they expect that Japan will assume a far greater political role in the region, supported by a much stronger military capability.
- Perceptions about Japan held by Chinese and South Koreans are as much the product of historically conditioned attitudes as they are of strategic analysis.

Self-Doubt of Japanese.

- The chief concern of Japanese Defense Intellectuals is that Japan will not be able to develop an appropriate role in the emerging international system. Failure to act may have devastating consequences for regional security and domestic politics.
- Japanese defense intellectuals believe that future tensions may be caused by China, the Soviet Union, and a united Korea imbued with a strong sense of nationalism.
- Uncertainty implicit in post-cold war international politics concerns the Japanese more than any specific anticipated threat.

Anti-Americanism in Korea.

- South Korean defense intellectuals perceive that the U.S.-Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) alliance and U.S. forward deployed forces are essential for deterrence, and

prefer an active U.S. role in the future to restrain Japan and any other disruptive regional power.

- Due to the influence of an exuberant national pride and nationalism, South Koreans also perceive that the United States interferes with the R.O.K.'s full exercise of sovereignty, and thus diminishes their dignity as Koreans. Anti-Americanism is a threat to U.S.-R.O.K. relations in the future.

U.S. Military Presence Guarantees Stability.

- There is broad agreement in all three countries that the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia is a major contributor to regional stability. At the same time, most defense intellectuals in Northeast Asia believe that the United States will decrease its military presence within the decade because of detente with the Soviet Union and serious domestic economic problems.
- To Northeast Asian defense intellectuals, the U.S. military presence is the most reliable symbol that the United States expects to remain an East Asian and Pacific power.

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGES TO FUNDAMENTAL PERCEPTIONS

Strength of Anti-Japanese Stereotypes.

- Because they are grounded in national stereotypes, the perceptions of Chinese and Koreans about Japan, which could lead to destabilizing behavior, are resistant to change.
- Anti-Japanese attitudes are acculturated through several institutions of Chinese and Korean societies, and do not soften with the passage of time.

- Hostility toward Japanese derived from historical memories has been reinforced by animosity resulting from economic friction.

Japanese Security Perceptions Continue to Evolve.

- The intense debate in Tokyo over the proper Japanese response to the crisis in the Persian Gulf may lead to a shift in the consensus on defense.
- Japan's neighbors have cited the evolution of Japanese defense policy from the idealistic pacifism of the constitution to the current pragmatic policy as one of the reasons to believe that Japan could become a threat in the future.
- Chinese and Koreans tend to assume that future generations of Japanese, having no direct experience with the horrors or humiliations of the Pacific War and motivated by strong nationalism, will support increasingly independent and assertive foreign policy.
- A contrary argument supported by the attitudes of many younger Japanese today holds that future generations of Japanese defense intellectuals are likely to be pragmatic and hedonistic, and committed to the status quo because they benefit from it.

U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND REGIONAL STABILITY

- Official U.S. policy holds that regional stability is a principal American security objective for all of East Asia, and a requirement for the satisfaction of U.S. national interests in the region. To insure stability, an American presence is critical because Northeast Asians believe that it is necessary, and because there is no other security structure in the region except for U.S. bilateral relationships. To governments and defense intellectuals of the region, a U.S. military presence is the credible symbol of U.S. engagement in Northeast Asia.

- Two-way trade with Northeast Asia is greater than two-way trade with all of Europe. Northeast Asia sold much more to the United States than the United States sold to Northeast Asia, but Northeast Asia was still a very large importer of American goods—\$75 billion (of a worldwide total of \$364 billion) in 1989.
- The Soviet Union has scaled down its operational tempo in Northeast Asia and decreased the size of the Pacific Fleet, but because of modernization its military capabilities directed against U.S. forces and Japan represent at least as powerful a threat as formerly. North Korean forces deployed against R.O.K. and U.S. forces are still formidable and threatening.

INFLUENCING NORTHEAST ASIAN PERCEPTIONS

If Northeast Asian defense intellectuals are to be assuaged, they must be assured that the United States will remain a Pacific power and continue to play a security role in Northeast Asia throughout the *transitional phase of international politics* into which Northeast Asia has entered. There are at least four steps that the United States can take.

Retain Credible Forward Deployed Forces.

The exact requirement for forces to be credible is unclear, but it should include:

- a deterrent force in Korea, perhaps smaller than the current deployment, with components from both the Army and Air Force;
- sufficient capabilities to check Soviet military forces;
- a deterrent against regional states which might undermine stability, which should have a large naval component, an organic contingency force, and a pattern of operations which gives it high visibility; and,
- an over-the-horizon nuclear capability.

Reinforce Favorable Perceptions.

Having a credible presence in place will not necessarily displace Northeast Asian fears that the United States will disengage in the future. Some of this uncertainty may disappear when the parameters of the new international system become recognized. In any case, the perception that the U.S. commitment to Northeast Asia may be transitory will be more quickly overcome if the following actions are undertaken by the United States:

- Clarify and publicize U.S. policy and the extent of U.S. interests in the region.
- Deploy land forces to the region on a long-term basis. The 2d Infantry Division in Korea is dedicated to the defense of South Korea against the threat from the North, implying that it will be withdrawn when the threat no longer justifies its presence. The Marine division stationed on Okinawa more nearly has the appearance of a long-term commitment, but the persistent pressure by Okinawans for its removal raises serious questions. Retention of Army units in Korea with a regional, not a Korea-only, focus would best demonstrate that the United States expected to remain a Pacific power.
- Keep the U.S. military reasonably visible and active. A military organization which participates in regular educational exchanges, professional visits, periodic combined exercises, and regional inter-military activities should not be perceived as a temporary expedient.

Combat Anti-Americanism in Korea.

The charges of Korean nationalists that the United States imposes limitations on the sovereignty of the R.O.K. can at least be undercut by adjustments in U.S. military posture toward Korea. Patterns of cooperation must be forged on the basis of near equal partners rather than superpower and client.

- The U.S. military should relinquish its leading role in favor of a supporting role in the Combined Forces Command (CFC).
- U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) headquarters should be relocated outside of Seoul.
- Operational control (OPCON) of Korean forces should be returned to the R.O.K. chain of command.

Influence Other Perceptions.

Regional powers' views of each other may be too ingrained for Americans or U.S. policy to affect, but the attempt would be worthwhile if it created any better intraregional understanding. PACOM's military-to-military activities, including the annual Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), already make a contribution.

A NEED FOR ARMY PRESENCE

One of the most effective ways for the United States to demonstrate its lasting commitment to stability in Northeast Asia, and its intention to remain engaged in the affairs of the region, would be to include a brigade or larger Army force in that presence, together with units from other services. Its purpose should not necessarily be to deter some specific putative enemy (although it clearly should not ignore any specific military threat to allies in the region), but rather to help maintain conditions conducive to stability, be available for contingencies in East Asia, and take the lead in combined Army exercises and Army-to-Army relations throughout the entire Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility. Its most important contribution, as the least mobile, most permanent military service, would be simply to represent and symbolize America's extensive interests in the region, and the commitment of the United States to protect them.

U.S. security cooperation programs will be essential to give credibility to the promise of continued U.S. engagement. Since armies dominate all East Asian military establishments, USARPAC should continue to have the predominant position

in peacetime military-to-military relations between the United States and friendly nations of the region, even though in war the Navy and Air Force may take the lead.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The dramatic events of 1989 in Eastern Europe and 1990 in the Soviet Union mark the end of the cold war and the possible beginning of a new period of great power harmony.¹ This lessening of global tensions, with the risk of U.S.-Soviet military conflict reduced to almost zero, promises stability in the relationships of the major powers. However, the end of the cold war also means the end of the bipolar international system which, for all its faults, imposed some structure and predictability on international politics. As Saddam Hussein has vividly demonstrated, regional powers have a freedom to assert their interests, resorting to force if they choose to. Such a course of action was less probable when the United States and the Soviet Union dominated the international system as the two superpowers.²

The decentralized, multipolar international system which is emerging as the replacement for the post war bipolar system presents uncertainties as well as opportunities, and at the very least should encourage informed observers to alter the ways in which they look at the world. In East Asia, cold war imperatives have had less salience than in Europe for decades, but the recent changes in the international order nonetheless have affected the perceptions of East Asians.

In the past, U.S. analysts of security affairs in East Asia have given inadequate attention to the perceptions of East Asian defense intellectuals. Throughout the post war period, at least since Sino-American rapprochement in 1972, they had focused on the threat of aggression and intimidation from the Soviet Union, relegating the North Korean threat and a host of other matters, including the preferences and prejudices of East Asians, to clearly secondary status. The cold war and containment paradigms as guides to foreign policy formation and analysis were so compelling that many regional factors,

while not entirely ignored, were never allowed to dominate the global confrontation with the Soviet Union. But developments of the last two years, plus Gorbachev's "new thinking" and the fiscal problems of the United States, now require a new conceptual framework.

The Soviet Union can no longer be posited as the serious danger to regional security that it was in the previous three decades. Unlike its behavior in the past, it now pursues decidedly nonconfrontational policies as it faces internal problems which threaten its very existence. Neither should the Soviet Union be ignored as a challenge to the security interests of the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia, however. Its regional military capabilities, except for the SS-20s withdrawn under the INF Treaty and ground forces opposite China, have not been reduced as they have in Western Europe.³ Nor should the United States any longer be considered the regional hegemon due to its fiscal and economic problems and the emergence of Japan as a major economic power, and the increased economic power of South Korea and Taiwan. On the other hand, there are important U.S. security interests and objectives in East Asia which devolve from regional factors given only limited attention in the past.

Stability—the absence of conflict and tensions which threaten military posturing or action—is one of the major U.S. objectives for Northeast Asia. Among the factors which tend to influence stability are the perceptions of regional defense intellectuals.⁴ An understanding of those perceptions can help anticipate future threats to stability, and formulate U.S. policy to diminish the destabilizing impact of intraregional tensions.

It is useful to consider perceptions for at least two reasons: (1) perceptions may vary from "objective" reality (i.e., from the perceptions of the observer) and (2) decisions are always based on perceptions of reality rather than reality itself. It follows, then, that U.S. policy should be designed to influence the perceptions of regional defense intellectuals in and out of government, as well as actual conditions. To develop policy which will be sensitive to the perceptions of present and future members of East Asian security communities, it is desirable to

know, if possible, what factors condition East Asians' views of their security environment, and what may cause a nation's political elite and security community to alter their national security perceptions.⁵ The following general factors, which help organize the succeeding analysis, have been suggested as the principal influences on the formulation of individual security perceptions:⁶

1. **Reality.** Assuming the availability of adequate information (which is often, but not always, available to defense intellectuals), individuals do tend to see what is actually there. Most perceptions are not misperceptions. However, information may be inadequate and subjective considerations frequently lend themselves to distortion.

2. **Personal and National Experience.** Judgment about intent, explanations of behavior, national stereotypes, etc., may be strongly influenced by history. Insofar as personal experience is important, changes in generations within elites can be significant. Great national historical experiences, such as war, may enter the national mythology and influence perceptions for decades and generations.

3. **Geography.** Insular or continental position and proximity to other nations affect the views of the security environment.

4. **Cultural Attitudes.** An individual's beliefs and values will affect his perception of what his own nation's international role should be, as well as the perception of how other states will and should behave.

5. **Economics.** The national economic implications of various possible security postures may influence the conclusions and recommendations of members of a policy elite.

This study attempts to answer three broad questions about the perceptions of the security environment held by the Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean security communities. First, how do they view their security environment overall? What do they perceive as their most significant threats and vulnerabilities, and how do they view other actors in Northeast Asia? Second, what is the basis of these perceptions? And,

finally, do the members of these elites anticipate change in the coming decade? The answers to these questions provide the substance of Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Chapter 5 presents the implications of this analysis for the security policy of the United States and the roles of the U.S Army in the region.

Two basic methodological assumptions of this analysis are that the range of perceptions of a nation are included in the range of perceptions of that nation's "defense intellectuals," and the latter is the best available indicator of what the perceptions of future policymakers will be. The term defense intellectuals refers to those individuals in the society who are professionally involved with security affairs. In addition to the relatively small number of policymakers who rarely have time for lengthy discussions with visiting analysts, they include bureaucrats in ministries of defense and foreign affairs and the military services, security specialists in universities and research organizations, and security specialists with the media. Northeast Asian defense intellectuals who are not now policymakers are the teachers, mentors, and critics of present and future policymakers, and they represent the institutions which shape, and will shape, security decisions.

Information about the perceptions of defense intellectuals in China, Japan, and South Korea was primarily obtained from an intensive survey of literature by regional defense intellectuals published in English; newspaper articles and editorials carried by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service for the last two years; and a series of not-for-attribution interviews conducted during September 1990 in Hong Kong, Seoul, and Tokyo. Thirty-four of the interviews in Seoul and Tokyo were with defense intellectuals of the host country (there were also discussions with U.S. observers based in the host countries). In Hong Kong, the interviewees were drawn from the very well-informed community of observers of Chinese security affairs who have extensive contacts with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese security-related research institutions.⁷ The data derived from these sources provide a comprehensive view of the major strands of opinion concerning the security environment in Northeast Asia in each of the three societies chosen for analysis.

CHAPTER 1

ENDNOTES

1. "Great power harmony" is used instead of "detente," which will always be defined in this report as a state of reduced tensions. In practice, detente and great power harmony (or entente) may merge into each other.

2. Unless superpower only refers to military capability, there is just one existing superpower, the United States.

3. The numbers of Soviet naval combatants are down, but more sophisticated vessels with better weapons systems have replaced them. The strength of Soviet aviation in the Far East has similarly declined as the quality has been upgraded. *Soviet Military Power: 1990*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, pp. 97-99.

4. The term defense intellectuals is used throughout this report for the individuals within a nation who are professionally concerned with national security questions. They will also be referred to as members of defense or security communities. A more extensive definition appears on p. 4.

5. The best treatment is still probably Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. See also Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions and External Threats*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1987; and John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.

6. Tilman, p. 7.

7. Chinese defense intellectuals were not directly interviewed because of the current atmosphere in China which would inhibit frank discussions, and the tension in U.S.-Chinese relations.

CHAPTER 2

CHINA

WORRIED, AGING LEADERSHIP

Internal instability is a greater problem in China than in any other Northeast Asian country, and the present leadership apparently has given the highest priority to domestic, as distinguished from regional or international, security problems. Many close observers believe that the current regime is literally paranoid about political enemies within Chinese society. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, especially the fate of Ceausescu and his regime in Romania, apparently was viewed with genuine alarm and, after careful analysis, resulted in a strengthened conviction by the aging leadership that the repression of the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square had been the correct response. The lesson learned by these leaders was that concessions to bourgeois democracy and liberalism resulted in the eventual defeat of the working class and the Communist Party, phenomena which they are determined to prevent from occurring in China.¹ Indeed, even beyond the leadership circles where the retention of political power is not an issue, the fear of instability is apparently widespread. It has been reported that many anticipate serious disruptions when Deng Xiaoping dies,² and most others believe that there will be political confusion, with government incapable of dealing with the pressing problems of development and perhaps unable to maintain order.

Nonetheless, regional and international security concerns are important to the leadership. Some issues, such as reducing the level of forces on China's border with the Soviet Union, are simply too significant not to continue pursuing. Moreover, one of the most convenient and effective ways for the regime to regain legitimacy lost during the Tiananmen affair is to achieve foreign and security policy successes. The interest of the security community, professionally committed to

understanding China's security environment and the threats and opportunities it contains, presumably was not diminished by the events of June 4 or those which occurred later in Eastern Europe.

Harry Harding, one of the most respected American China watchers, has identified three groups in the current debate on foreign and security policy in China.³ He has designated them hard-liners, reformers, and tough internationalists. The first group, which opposes relations with both imperialist America and revisionist Soviet Union, seemed to dominate public discourse immediately after June 4, 1989, but has been replaced by the tough internationalists. The latter favor many of the hard-liners' political views but are also committed to reestablishing and extending economic cooperation with the West in order to continue the development of the Chinese economy. The reformers, many of whom are identified with the Tiananmen students, have not yet reentered the public debate, but privately influence some members of the regime. Many foreign ministry officials and think-tank analysts belong to this group.⁴

In a more fundamental sense, virtually all Chinese intellectuals, including the current leadership and its domestic opposition, perceive international relations as symbolic measures of China's quest for its rightful status, taken away by the imperialist powers in the 19th century.

...we believe that a key factor in the modern history of China has been the foreign domination and humiliation of the Chinese people and China's anxiety to find its proper position in the international system....

The wound left by foreign imperialism is still fresh in the minds of PRC leaders, causing them to remind the Chinese people constantly of the bad things the foreign powers had done to them. It also made the Chinese leaders especially suspicious of the ultimate intentions of foreign powers.⁵

DANGERS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Like their counterparts elsewhere in Northeast Asia, most Chinese defense intellectuals view the changes taking place

in China's security environment with ambivalence.⁶ They view the policy initiatives of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev which provide relief from the threat of Soviet "encirclement" very positively. Soviet decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, to reduce military capabilities at Cam Ranh Bay and economic and military support for Vietnam, and to decrease military strength along the long land boundary with China have all been seen as benefitting China's security. But other features of the security environment are clearly less benign to many Chinese defense intellectuals, especially the reformers. In terms of grand geopolitical considerations, the current U.S.-Soviet detente seems to have at least temporarily reduced the importance of the "strategic triangle" of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. They believe that U.S.-Soviet relations are much more important to both nations than either's relations with China, thus reducing the incentives for either to play a "China card" against the other, or the opportunities for China to play one great power off against the other. As an unofficial Chinese observer noted before the startling events of 1989 and 1990, rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union presents China more limited opportunities than superpower competition, and is the least satisfactory environment for successful Chinese global policy.⁷

The tough internationalists' understanding of China's environment differs from that of the reformers on this point. To the former, and therefore the controlled media most of the time, the conclusion that the cold war has ended is not only premature but erroneous.⁸ They consider the current detente to be cosmetic and temporary. U.S.-Soviet competition, according to tough internationalists, will continue for the foreseeable future, if not forever. As explained in the media, the competition is inevitable because both nations (and, a reader could infer, probably all nations—including China) are propelled by a compulsion to dominate other nations.⁹ This compulsion is operationally significant with respect to the United States and the Soviet Union because tough internationalists believe that each has (or, in the case of the Soviets, will again have) the capabilities to impose hegemony in many regions of the world, at least when not checked by the other.

Whether the cold war has ended or not, the accelerating decentralization of the international system is disquieting to many Chinese; reformists, tough internationalists, and hard-liners alike. Chinese observers are concerned that the dismantling of the bipolar structure of the cold war, which had imposed some patterns and limitations on international actors, might result in dangerous anarchy which could draw China into conflict because of disputes with its neighbors. Some Chinese commentators give a great deal of emphasis to the possibility of such conflict with several bordering areas, including India, Japan, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.¹⁰ If the central authority in the Soviet Union atrophies further, ethnic tensions in Soviet republics adjacent to China could spill over into China, and that might also have serious implications for China's security. According to a Chinese scholar who studied in the United States, "The severity and complexity of China's security environment, rarely found in other countries, cannot be overemphasized."¹¹

A more decentralized international system provides China with advantages also, of course. Regionally, China is obviously a major actor. Even globally, Beijing's recent diplomatic successes, including the special attention it received during the Persian Gulf crisis,¹² are cited as evidence of China's international influence.

Among all of the groups, the perception of decreased major military threats, but increased potential for limited military action unrelated to major power competition, predominates in security analysis, and has resulted in greater attention to "local war" and how to deal with it. According to most observers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), it is the strategy of local war which is now determining acquisition, force structure, doctrine, and training for China's conventional forces.¹³ As a result, the PLA has increased its mobility, transporting troops by air for the first time in a recent deployment to Tibet and demonstrating an inflight refueling capability.¹⁴ The Chinese Navy, the service of the PLA which tends to be most forward looking in implementing local war strategic concepts, has also improved its capability, especially against Vietnam's naval force. Conflict with Vietnam over the Spratleys is considered

the most likely local war at the present time.¹⁵ These changes are taking place slowly, since the resources allocated to the PLA have been and are limited, but the direction and objectives seem clear.

No convincing evidence is yet available, but Chinese domestic politics may have had a negative effect on the new interest and modernization.¹⁶ One of the more significant consequences of the Tiananmen Square episode has been to increase the priority on political loyalty and decrease the priority on professionalism within the PLA. For example, the trend toward awarding choice assignments and promotions on the basis of professional competence and knowledge has at least been stalled, with the criteria of personal connections and political loyalty gaining increased attention. This emphasis has reduced the influence of modernizers within the military, and could also affect the allocation of funds within the services and programs of the PLA. The ground forces may be the primary focus of the drive for political loyalty but the current leadership of the ground forces may also be least interested in the changes which emphasize navy and air force modernization.

VIEWS ABOUT REGIONAL ACTORS

Soviet Union: Present Help, Future Threat.

Virtually all observers of Chinese security affairs agree that the Chinese security community considers the Soviet Union its most serious long-term threat (although Japan is considered increasingly dangerous). There is also widespread agreement among Chinese that, for the present and at least a decade into the future, a Soviet military attack is so unlikely that the possibility can almost be ignored. In fact, over a decade ago Chinese strategists¹⁷ had already decided that the Soviet Union was highly unlikely to launch military action against China in the foreseeable future, even though relations between the two countries at the time were extremely strained: China was still calling for a united front against social hegemonism!¹⁸ Their reasoning then was based on the proposition that the Soviets were so preoccupied with the United States, Europe, and Southwest Asia that they had insufficient resources to

target on China. Currently, the belief that there is no near or midterm Soviet threat is anchored primarily in a perception of Soviet weakness.¹⁹

The belief of Chinese defense intellectuals and policy-makers that Soviet policy will be antithetical to China's interests in the future appears to be based primarily on the historical relationships between the two countries, especially the experiences of the 1940s and 1950s, and their geostrategic relationship. China shares a 12,193 kilometer boundary with the Soviet Union and Mongolia, until recently the most docile of Soviet clients, and a 7,520 kilometer border with the Soviet Union alone. It also reflects the basic cultural attitude, described earlier in this chapter,²⁰ that foreigners have ulterior motives with respect to China. Recent commentaries on Soviet foreign policy by both commentators for domestic consumption and foreign academic audiences continue to contain assertions that the Soviets still have an extremely powerful military, including a massive nuclear capability, and, as previously noted, that at some time they *inevitably* [emphasis added] will try to dominate the world,²¹ or at least the United States. Hong Kong observers of Chinese security affairs also identified a visceral suspicion of the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, however, the tempo of Sino-Soviet relations has accelerated, despite the preferences of the hard-liners who oppose contact with the Soviets as traitors to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Trade between the two countries has increased fairly rapidly, as have the educational and cultural exchanges associated with friendly state-to-state relations. Military-to-military contacts are proliferating, with the possibility that China will even purchase aircraft and other relatively advanced military technology (commodities presently unavailable and/or very expensive from the West) from the Soviet Union. Some Chinese military leaders apparently believe that Soviet military assistance can be extremely valuable to the PLA because much of its basic structure and equipment were based on Soviet models.²²

Equivocal Support for a U.S. Regional Role.

Chinese perceptions concerning the United States are also mixed and ambivalent. To the reformers, whose influence is now very low, but who may achieve a share of political power in the future, the United States is an indispensable source of technology and capital and a lucrative market, all required for the national reformation which will allow China to achieve its rightful place in the world. As a democracy with a free market economic system, it is in many ways the model for what reformers hope China will become.²³ From this perspective, the United States presents no threat to China; to the contrary, it was the counterweight which held the Soviets at bay during the latter decades of the cold war, and can still act as a deterrent against Soviet expansionism in the future. U.S. policy's ideological emphasis on human rights, roundly condemned by tough internationalists and hard-liners, keeps values before the world which most reformers would like to see established in China. The reformers do not support all U.S. security or economic policies by any means, but they believe that the most stable and secure environment for China in the coming decades will be one which evolves as a result of Sino-American cooperation in the Western Pacific. U.S. military proficiency is also admired by reformers in the PLA, who study U.S. military performance and doctrine as guides for PLA policy, especially with respect to unfolding doctrine for local war.²⁴

To the presently dominant tough internationalists, the United States represents an essential source of capital and technology and a valuable market, but it is at the same time perceived as a superpower in the international system with objectives which will not always be congruent with China's objectives.²⁵ The tough internationalists are adamantly opposed to U.S. human rights policy, which they view as unacceptable interference in China's internal affairs. And, as all other factions of China's security community, they oppose U.S. support of Taiwan. But on East Asian security issues, Chinese and U.S. objectives have been relatively compatible, and Sino-American security cooperation could be mutually beneficial. The tough internationalists' forecast of Soviet

encroachment in the long term implies the utility of a strategic relationship with the United States.

For the hard-liners, the United States is an imperialist aggressor bent on subverting the PRC with the promise of economic assistance and technology, as it (with help from other capitalist nations) allegedly did to the Communist regimes of East Europe. "Bourgeois liberalism" and strategies of "peaceful evolution," both seen emanating from the United States, are perceived as immediate threats to the security of China. The perception of a U.S. directed threat of "peaceful evolution" may extend beyond the core hard-liners. It has been the subject of some recent media commentary.²⁶

Except for the hard-liners (and perhaps not all of them), Chinese defense intellectuals think that a credible military presence by the United States in East Asia enhances stability and for the present is beneficial. More specifically, they have concluded that a U.S. presence reduces the probability of conflict in Southeast Asia, balances the growth of the Indian Navy, and, most importantly, provides a framework which contains and controls the military development of Japan. At the same time that they value an American military presence because it restrains Japan, Chinese defense intellectuals criticize the United States for demanding greater security contributions from the Japanese. Apparently, one reason why Chinese defense intellectuals and policymakers are concerned about the general security environment for the region is their belief that, because of debt burdens and congressional pressure, the United States will significantly reduce or perhaps withdraw its military forces from East Asia during the next decade.²⁷

An exception to the generalization that the U.S. military presence in East Asia is beneficial to China has been advanced by strategists in the PLA Navy, the service apparently most concerned with long-term modernization. They believe that in the future the U.S. Navy's presence in the Western Pacific and surrounding waters will become "destabilizing,"²⁸ by which they mean that the presence of the U.S. Navy could interfere with the force projection capability of the Chinese Navy.

Japan: Public Enemy Number One.

The ambivalence which Chinese express toward the Soviet Union and the United States is absent in their attitudes toward Japan. Chinese of all persuasions, in support of and in opposition to the present government, in public and in private communications, agree in their basic evaluation of the Japanese: they do not like Japan, they do not trust Japan, and they fear Japan. Moreover, Chinese perceptions toward Japan appear to be more influenced by national historical memory than are perceptions toward any other actor in China's security environment.²⁹

While Sino-Japanese relations extend back into medieval times, the historical memories concerning Japan that dominate Chinese national consciousness relate to events of this century, the most vivid being the Sino-Japanese War and partial Japanese occupation which was finally terminated by the defeat of Japan by the United States and its allies in 1945. In turn, the most salient symbol of that period has become the Nanjing massacre, when, according to Chinese estimates, 340,000 Chinese (more than the number who died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki) were killed by the Japanese invaders. This memory has been handed down from generation to generation, and is therefore not held only among older Chinese. Moreover, it is rekindled whenever the Japanese government or a prominent Japanese³⁰ challenges the Chinese version of Japan's occupation, as in the attempt by some Japanese to change history textbooks³¹ and former Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to a Shinto shrine dedicated to Japan's war casualties (including those responsible for the character of the Japanese invasion of China).

In spite of the facts that the Japanese have had more contacts with China than nationals of any other country since diplomatic relations were restored in 1972, and that China wants and needs economic cooperation with Japan, the negative attitudes resulting from the war and occupation do not seem to have been diluted significantly, if at all. While some Chinese have developed positive images of Japan and Japanese because of the nation's economic success or personal relationships, the overall effect of extensive Japanese

economic involvement in China appears also to be negative. In 1986, Professor Allen Whiting found that Chinese who had frequent contacts with Japanese most often characterized them as "cunning," using a Chinese character which connotes tricky, crafty, or sly, rather than shrewd. These Chinese were also likely to refer to Japanese as "thinking only of the wallet," "looking down on us," "determined to hold China back," and even "cheating."³²

In addition to the pervasive dislike of Japan and Japanese, there is a broad consensus that Japan represents a long-term military threat to China. Japan's present economic capabilities alone challenge the regional role that China's leaders see for their country; resurgent militarism, they seem to believe, will bring a real threat to China and the rest of East Asia in coming decades.

The notion of Japan being a long-term threat is attested to by virtually all observers of Chinese security affairs,³³ but, considering its widespread acceptance, has received relatively little attention in Chinese media, at least until recently. This is partly because security affairs have been normally treated as sensitive matters, and partly because Japan was officially portrayed as a bulwark against Soviet hegemony until the major realignments in the international system initiated by Gorbachev.

There was extensive media treatment about Tokyo's decision in 1987 to allow defense expenditures to exceed 1 percent of GNP, when official Chinese commentary condemned the move as the first of a series of decisions which would result in a remilitarized Japan, preying on its former victims.³⁴ The theme has received more extensive attention in response to the bill to establish a UN Peace Cooperation Force that the Kaifu cabinet introduced in September 1990. Commentary and news articles³⁵ have emphasized four themes: (1) overseas deployment of Japanese forces, under any guise, would alarm the people of China and other Asian nations; (2) the proposal was sponsored by sinister Japanese forces who want Japan to become a major military power; (3) the proposal was unconstitutional and opposed by most Japanese people; and (4) deployment of Self-Defense Forces

(SDF) overseas in peacekeeping roles would inevitably be followed by deployment of SDF in more traditional military roles. The reckless and aggressive intent of some Japanese who could, at some future time, dominate the government in Tokyo, was also emphasized at the time of the Diaoyu Island incident.³⁶ The prospective future military role of Japan has also received attention in general surveys of the international or regional situation appearing in journals devoted to international affairs.³⁷ They tended to focus attention on the size of Japan's defense budget, always noting that it is the third largest in the world; the alliance with the United States which has constrained and channeled SDF capabilities, but may become less effective because of U.S.-Soviet detente and U.S. economic problems; and/or the inevitability of Tokyo eventually seeking political and military roles commensurate with its economic strength. The contention that, at the least, Japan will inevitably adopt a more conventional military posture unless it continues to be constrained by its alliance with the United States also appears in more objective, scholarly analyses.³⁸

Apparently, the threat from Japan has not yet become enough of a clear and present danger to justify incorporation into military doctrine or plans. Some observers expect that military publications and PLA research organizations, particularly those of the Chinese Navy, will begin discussing, in 5-10 years, the military potential of Japan and ways to bridle it. Following these discussions, the putative Japanese threat will begin to be reflected in doctrine, force structure, and acquisitions.³⁹

Sympathy for Pyongyang; Profit with Seoul.

Before the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the allegiance of the Pyongyang regime was considered absolutely critical to China's security.⁴⁰ Soviet domination of North Korea would have placed Moscow on the north, east, and west of Manchuria (the industrial heartland of China), an absolutely unacceptable situation. Therefore, Beijing considered its task to be to influence developments on the peninsula so that North Korea was not thrust toward the Soviet Union, which could provide military and other assistance beyond the technological

capacity and resources which China could make available, without threatening its relatively beneficial relationship with the United States. Beijing also avoided contact with South Korea, while urging North Korea not to disturb stability on the peninsula (one of the few objectives which it shared with Moscow at the time). Beijing's influence with Pyongyang was generated by extensive personal ties, cultural commonalities, and a record of consistent political and economic support dating back to their common struggle against Japan. This required demanding and sometimes delicate diplomacy, which reportedly included private (but never public) assurances to Washington that China supported the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea. According to at least one Chinese analyst, these assertions were always "fundamentally misleading." Those forces were seen as beneficial because they contributed to a balance of power and restrained the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.), but they were also believed to increase the anxiety of North Korea's leaders, to reinforce the vicious cycle of the arms race on the peninsula, and to tighten the dependency of Pyongyang on Moscow.⁴¹

Judging from the output of the media and the opinions of most China watchers,⁴² however, Chinese defense intellectuals and the leaders of the present regime are no longer immediately concerned with Korea as a security problem except as an important potentially unstable region on China's periphery. P.R.C.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) relations will continue to be close because of historical, cultural, political and personal factors, not the least of which is the fact that the two regimes are among the few Stalinist regimes still in existence. Moreover, because virtually all strategists and defense intellectuals consider the Soviet Union a long-term threat, developments in Pyongyang must continuously be monitored. Nonetheless, apparently the new Soviet policy toward the Koreas and the economic opportunities believed to be available with Seoul have led to a reappraisal of Beijing's strategy toward the Korean peninsula. China-South Korean trade has been greater than China-North Korean trade for several years, and is expected to increase significantly as China and the R.O.K. have exchanged trade offices. Moreover, media commentary no longer uncritically

repeats all North Korean propaganda. Reports on contact between the two Korean governments regularly begin by restating Pyongyang's propaganda line, but, when analysis is provided, tend to also include more balanced interpretations sometimes directly at odds with North Korean positions.⁴³ For instance, an analysis of North-South contacts written in January 1990 placed the blame for continued confrontation on the South, but without intemperate language, and demanded an end to the U.S.-R.O.K. Team Spirit Exercise, but did so without calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, always the highest priority demand for Pyongyang.⁴⁴ A sweeping critique of D.P.R.K. policy toward Seoul, which explicitly has never recognized the legitimacy of the R.O.K., was implied in an article on Soviet policy toward South Korea appearing in a Beijing weekly:

In view of the present conditions on the Korean peninsula, the Soviet Union is adopting a very realistic attitude in the process of developing its relations with South Korea. Soviet authorities and academic circles have repeatedly indicated that Soviet policy toward the Korean peninsula "can only be based on the fundamental realization of the actual existence of two autonomous states on said peninsula."⁴⁵

Lesser Problems: India and Vietnam.

Superpower detente and rapprochement with the Soviet Union have affected Chinese perceptions of India and Vietnam, the most important actors in China's security environment other than those already discussed.⁴⁶ The absence of all but a long-term Soviet threat has meant that the former primary concern about India and Vietnam as allies of the Soviet Union in a strategy to encircle and isolate China no longer has much salience with Chinese strategists and defense intellectuals. However, since the tough internationalists (and probably others) believe that superpower detente and the benign intentions of the Soviet Union are probably temporary, many Chinese will continue to view India and Vietnam in the context of Sino-Soviet competition, as limited and restrained as that competition may be at the present time.

Evidence of Chinese perceptions of other nations as a part of China's security environment is extremely limited. As might

be expected, the PLA Navy is particularly concerned about the growth of the Indian Navy,⁴⁷ and the long-term potential and intentions of India as a military power trouble others also.⁴⁸ However, without the specter of Soviet encirclement, there is no sense of immediate threat. PLA forces do not exercise on the basis of scenarios involving India.⁴⁹

As a historic enemy of China and ally of the Soviet Union, Vietnam is often the subject of unfavorable media comments and official declarations, recently focusing on Vietnamese actions in Cambodia⁵⁰. Most Chinese consider it a hostile power. However, since Sino-Soviet rapprochement and the sharp reduction of Soviet assistance to Vietnam, it is no longer viewed as a particularly dangerous hostile power, and therefore no longer a threat to China's survival or independence. Vietnam is obviously a threat to certain Chinese objectives, however, including Chinese control of the Spratley (Nansha) Islands and the future status of Cambodia as a state independent of Vietnamese control. But without massive Soviet assistance, Vietnam probably can no longer interfere with the latter objective. Most outside observers appear to believe that the capabilities being acquired for "local war" contingencies will first be used in an offensive mode, if ever, against Vietnam to secure the former objective.

CHAPTER 2

ENDNOTES

1. Interviews in Hong Kong, September 13 and 14, 1990.
2. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Fear of Chaos Grows as China's Leaders Age," *The New York Times*, July 12, 1990, p. A11.
3. See Harry Harding, "The Impact of Tiananmen on China's Foreign Policy: Challenges for the U.S.," *NBR Analysis*, No. 3, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian and Soviet Research, 1990, pp. 5-17. Harding says that these distinctions are oversimplifications, but useful ones.
4. Interview in Hong Kong, September 13, 1990.
5. Yufan Hao and Guocang Huan, "Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition," in Yufan Hao and Guocang Huan, eds., *The Chinese View of the World*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, p. xviii.
6. There seems to be a general consensus on this point among observers of China. See Robert S. Ross, "China's Strategic View of Southeast Asia: A Region in Transition," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 12, September 1990, pp. 101-119, especially pp. 101-102. For a Chinese statement, see Yikang Wu, "The European Situation and the International Strategic Picture," *Shanghai Guoji Zhanwang* [World Outlook], No. 2, January 23, 1990, pp. 3-6, translated in *Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)-CAR-90-025*, March 30, 1990, pp. 1-2.
7. Hongqian Zhu, "China and the Triangular Relationship," in Hao and Huan, eds., pp. 51. See also Tai Ming Cheung, "China's Security Posture and Outlooks in the 1990s," and Tingwei Huang and Zhiyong Li, "The Changing Security Scene in East Asia—An Analysis of the US Perspective," papers presented to the ASEAN-Hong Kong Forum, August 7-9, 1990, Hong Kong, p. 3.
8. See, for example, Feng Chen, "The Strategic Value of the Asian-Pacific Region Is Constantly Rising: The Most Important Task for Each Nation is to Strive for Economic Development," *Beijing Shijie Zhishi* [World Affairs], No. 24, December 16, 1989, p. 11; and Longlong Guo, "Welcoming the Final Decade of the Century, A Look Ahead at the International Situation of the Nineties," *Shanghai Guoji Zhanwang* [World Outlook], No. 1, January 8, 1990, pp. 3-4, translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-020*,

March 14, 1990, pp. 10-11; and *JPRS-CAR-90-038*, May 17, 1990, p. 1-3, respectively.

9. See Benwang Sa, "The Sharpening Competition for Overall National Superiority Among All Countries Throughout the World," Beijing *Liaowang* [Outlook], No. 4, January 20, 1990, pp. 38-39, translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-023*, March 29, 1990, pp. 1-3.

10. Weiqun Gu, "Security in the Asian-Pacific Region," in Hao and Huan, eds., p. 22.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

12. Robert Delfs, "The Gulf Card: China Reaps Benefits From Middle East Crisis," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 20, 1990, p. 19.

13. For a careful examination of local war strategy, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "Chinese Defense Policy and Military Strategy in the 1990s," unpublished paper, National War College, Ft. McNair, July 1990.

14. Interview, Hong Kong, September 14, 1990. Doctrinally, the PLA would not classify operations in Tibet as "local War" because their purpose is internal security.

15. However, Godwin, p. 13-14, notes that in 1988 exercises the Soviet Union was the intended enemy three times, and Vietnam only once.

16. On the ascendancy of political considerations within the PLA, see Cheung, pp. 28-29, and Tai Ming Cheung, "Comrades in Arms: China Signals Willingness to Resume Soviet Ties," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 19, 1990, p. 30.

17. Godwin, p. 3, says that the 3d Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 1978 determined that the Soviet Union was no longer an *immediate* threat.

18. Social hegemonism was a phrase used by Beijing as a description of Soviet behavior meant to parallel capitalist imperialism as a description of U.S. behavior. By the middle 1970s, the latter was no longer applied to the United States.

19. Ross, p. 105.

20. See p. 9.

21. See Zhongyue Song (Senior Colonel, PLA, serving as Senior Fellow, Academy of Military Science), "Soviet Perestroika and Its Asian Policy," paper presented at ASEAN-China Hong Kong Forum 1990, Hong

Kong, August 7-9, 1990, p. 13. and citation in note 9, above. See also Zhi Rong, "From Yalta, Helsinki to Malta—On Evolution of Soviet Policy for Eastern Europe," Beijing *Shijie Zhishi* [World Outlook], No. 3, February 1, 1990, pp. 6-9, translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-030*, pp. 1-4; and Yishan Xia, "Reasons Behind U.S. and Soviet Arms Cuts and Outlook for the 1990s," Beijing *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* [International Studies], No 1, January 13, 1990, pp. 10-18, translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-031*, April 30, 1990, pp. 1-9.

22. Cheung, "Comrades in Arms," p. 30.

23. See Gu, p. 28; and Guocang Huan, "China's Policy toward the United States," in Hao and Huan, eds., pp. 141-173.

24. Interview, Hong Kong, September 14, 1990.

25. Harding, pp. 9-10.

26. For instance, Tongwen Pan, "Initial Analysis of the Beyond Containment Strategy," Beijing *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* [International Studies], No. 1, January 13, 1990, pp. 10-18, translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-025*, March 30, 1990, pp. 5-11. The beyond containment strategy, which seems to be identical to the threat of peaceful evolution, is characterized as aggressive, even though it does not invoke the use of force. See also Huang and Li, p. 8. The authors of the latter paper are members of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, a major Beijing research organization.

27. Zongjiu Zhao and Haujan Lu, "Military Strategies of Major Countries in the Next 10 Years," Beijing *Shijie Zhishi* [World Outlook], November 16, 1990, pp. 2-3, translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-019*, March 8, 1990, pp. 1-3; and Hong Kong interviews. But Huang and Li, p. 5, predict that the United States will retain forces adequate to protect its interests in East Asia.

28. Interview, Hong Kong, September 13, 1990.

29. Chinese perceptions of Japan are systematically analyzed in Allen S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. See pp. 41-65 for a discussion of the influence of history on Chinese images of Japan.

30. A recent barrage of anti-Japan commentary was stimulated by the comment by Shintaro Ishihara, co-author of *The Japan That Can Say No*, to the effect that there was no massacre at Nanjing. Nicholas D. Kristoff, "To Quiet Its Own Critics, China Aims at Japan," *The New York Times*, November 21, 1990, p. A5.

31. An advisory group to Japan's Ministry of Education approved the use of the word "advance" to describe what Chinese and Koreans

considered "aggression" in 1982. There was another controversy in 1986. See Whiting, pp. 46-51 and 55-60.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 127. There is a reciprocal, although less widespread and intense, lack of affection. Japanese stereotypes of Chinese include "greedy," "unappreciative," "lazy," and "ignorant."

33. The writer discovered only one China specialist who claimed to have no evidence that Chinese considered Japan a military threat.

34. Whiting, pp. 131-144.

35. As a representative sample, see Yuzhe Jiang, "News Analysis: Japan's Attempt at Power Diplomacy," XINHUA Domestic service in Chinese, October 9, 1990, translated in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-CHI-90-191*, October 11, 1990, pp. 12-13; Feng Chen, "Japan is Attempting to Change its Positive National Policy That Forbids Sending Armed Forces Overseas," Beijing International Service in Mandarin, October 18, 1990, translated in *FBIS-CHI-90-203*, October 19, 1990, p. 8; Ming Dong, "Reaction to Japan's Intention of Dispatching Troops Abroad," Beijing *Renmin Ribao*, October 24, 1990, p. 6, translated in *FBIS-CHI-90-207*, October 25, 1990, pp. 5-6; and Pinghua Sun, president of China-Japan Friendship Association, Beijing International Service to Japan, 0930 GMT, November 4, 1990, translated in *FBIS-CHI-90-214*, p. 2.

36. Hsieh Ying, "Diaoyu Island is Sacred Territory," Hong Kong *Wen Wei Po*, October 22, 1990, p. 2, translated in *FBIS-CHI-90-207*, October 27, 1990, p. 2; "There Should Be No Ambiguity on the Question of Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands," Hong Kong *Ta Kung Pao*, October 24, 1990, p. 2, translated in *FBIS-CHI-90-207*, October 25, 1990, p. 4. Both papers reflect Chinese Communist Party views.

37. As examples, see Jiannan Qian, "How Japan Will Enter the 1990s," Beijing *Shijie Zhishi* [World Affairs], No. 23, December 1, 1989, pp. 19-20, translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-020*, March 14, 1990, pp. 7-10; and Juhua Chen, "Japanese Defense Perspective," Shanghai *Guoji Zhanwang* [World Outlook], No. 2, January 23, 1990, pp. 18-20, translated in *JPRS-CHI-90-037*, May 14, 1990, pp. 11-14.

38. Huan, p. 151, and Guocang Huan, "Sino-Soviet Relations," in Hao and Huan, p. 129; and Huang and Li, p. 14.

39. Interview, Hong Kong, September 13, 1990.

40. For a brief but careful analysis of Chinese policy toward Korea before 1989 by a Chinese scholar, see Yuhan Hao, "China and the Korean Peninsula," in Hao and Huan, eds., pp. 175-199.

41. Hao, p. 194.
42. None of the specialists interviewed in Hong Kong volunteered information about Korea as a factor of significance in Chinese perceptions of their security environment. When directly asked, they responded in terms of stability and the residue of Sino-Soviet competition for the allegiance of Pyongyang.
43. Some brief reports still appear to be entirely written in Pyongyang. See Shaohua Yu, "Development and New Focal Points in North-South Korean Relations," Beijing *Shijie Zhishi* [World Affairs], No. 4, February 16, 1990, pp. 12-13, translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-038*, May 17, 1990, pp. 9-10.
44. Jintang Zhang, "Dialogue between South and North Korea in Retrospect and Prospect," Beijing *Liaowang* [Outlook], No. 50, December 11, 1989, pp. 44-45, translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-004*, January 18, 1990, pp. 1-2.
45. Geng Niu, "Great Changes in the Relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea," Shanghai *Guoji Zhanwang* [World Outlook], No. 2, January 23, 1990, p. 7, translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-027*, April 13, 1990, p. 1.
46. See Ross, pp. 103-107, for the impact of Sino-Soviet rapprochement on China's relations on other nations.
47. Fuquan Tang, "Reunderstanding One Country's Naval Strategy," *Jiefangjun Bao*, September 15, 1989, p. 3, translated in *JPRS-CAR-89-109*, November 13, 1989, pp. 55, 56.
48. Zangjiu Zhao and Haijan Lu, "Military Strategies of Major Countries in the Next 10 Years," Shanghai *Guoji Zhanwang* [World Outlook], May 23, 1990, pp. 21-22; translated in *JPRS-CAR-90-065*, August 22, 1990, p. 2.
49. A number of observers of the PLA nonetheless believe that the navy will be the major Chinese armed force of the future, and that there will inevitably be increasing conflicts of interest with India and its navy. Interviews, September 13-14, 1990, Hong Kong.
50. Aicheng Liu, "Vietnamese Troops Still Present. Battles Frequent—the War Situation in Cambodia After Vietnam's So-Called 'Complete Troop Withdrawal,'" Beijing *Renmin Ribao*, October 28 1989, p. 3, translated in *JPRS-CAR-89-113*, November 27, 1989, pp. 5-6.

CHAPTER 3

JAPAN

AFTER THE COLD WAR: UNWANTED DECISIONS

The end of the cold war and the U.S.-led international response to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait have been traumatic events for Japanese defense intellectuals and political elites. Although for several years academic observers and editorial writers had speculated on the appropriate international roles for Japan in a post-cold war, multipolar international system, few if any of those in policy-making roles appear to have been prepared for the dilemma which confronted them: how can Japan fulfill its responsibility as one of the leading Western nations and satisfy the expectations of Washington, on the one hand, and still conform to the prevailing defense consensus and dominant pacific attitudes of the opposition in the Diet and the electorate, on the other hand? How and when this dilemma will be resolved is unclear, but the great national debate over the proper international role for Japan has clearly indicated that the most pervasive perceptions which Japanese hold about the world they live in is that it is more uncertain and more dangerous than the bipolar system of the cold war era which, whatever its problems, allowed Japan to avoid making the difficult kinds of decisions which now confront it.

Economic Success Supplants Militarism.

In addition to these changes in international politics, Japan's great security dilemma results from its history, political culture, and constitution. For the current debate, the salient history includes the domination of Japan's government by the military in the prewar years; its record of aggression, brutal occupation, and humiliating defeat during the Pacific War; and its unparalleled economic success during the postwar period when much of the responsibility for its security, including the

deployment of effective military capabilities, was assumed by the United States.

Pacifistic, Homogeneous and Unique.

The most relevant political attitudes relate to the pervasive pacifism which has emerged during the postwar period. There is a widespread belief that the catastrophe of Japan's defeat was the result of militarism, and therefore the proper course for Japan must be pacifism. The depth of the distrust for the military, once so highly revered, is one of the more significant developments of postwar political culture in Japan.¹ Some of the opposition to the UN Peace Cooperation Corps unsuccessfully proposed by the cabinet in the 1990 special session of the Diet centers specifically on the fear that if the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are allowed to increase their activities, they will inevitably also increase their authority and lead the government to some kind of disaster. As a former Vice Minister of the Defense Agency put it, "the real question is whether or not the people have self-confidence in their post-war democracy, and whether the politicians have self-confidence in civilian control."² At least on this subject, many Japanese citizens and politicians apparently are very short of self-confidence.

Perhaps the most pervasive belief of Japan's political culture is that Japan and the Japanese people are unique and should not be judged by normal international standards. Long a part of the national mythology, this notion has been reinforced by the insular position and geographical isolation of the country, the perceived ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, and a history of very limited contact with other cultures until the 19th century. Moreover, at least for some Japanese, the behavior of Japan immediately before and during the Pacific War is thought to place special and unique responsibilities and constraints on Japan.³

Constitutional Limits on Self-Defense.

The constitutional problem is the famous Article 9, by which Japan forever forswears the use of force as an instrument of national policy and denies to itself the authority to maintain armed forces.⁴ However, successive cabinets have held that,

Article 9 notwithstanding, Japan has the right of self-defense under the commonly accepted rules of international law, and therefore it can legally maintain Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The official interpretation of the restrictions imposed by Article 9 states that the SDF may not be deployed "to foreign territorial land, sea, and airspace for the purpose of using armed force." Among other things, the Japanese government has also denied itself "offensive" weapons, a category which clearly includes nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction even if it is ambiguous with respect to more conventional weapons systems.⁵ That this interpretation is the most liberal which the Japanese population will presently accept—perhaps more liberal than the current consensus approves—was illustrated by the unfavorable response Prime Minister Kaifu received when he attempted to assert a new interpretation that the use of the SDF for collective *security* sponsored by the United Nations, as distinguished from collective *defense* not legitimized by the UN, was allowed by Article 9. The distinction between collective security and collective defense may have been too subtle for even educated members of the population to comprehend, but it was understood that the new interpretation, which Kaifu withdrew after it stimulated great controversy, would expand the roles of the SDF. For many that was simply not acceptable whatever the legal justification. These three factors (historical experience, political culture, and constitutional restrictions), effectively exploited by the major opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (formerly rendered the Japan Socialist Party in English—in the Japanese alphabet its name has not changed), have produced a popular consensus which not only restricts the deployment of the SDF, but also seems to oppose any kind of significant international role for Japan which implies the possibility of conflict.⁶

Most defense intellectuals do not appear to share all of that popular consensus, although there are a variety of opinions concerning whether Article 9 should be eliminated or changed, or how it should be interpreted. More extreme nationalists, few of whom belong to the defense community, favor rewriting the Constitution because it allegedly was American made and hobbles the exercise of sovereignty by Japan. More centrist nationalist thinkers, the most vocal being older academics and

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians, advocate that Japan should behave like an "ordinary country"⁷ as far as its ability to use force is concerned. This position is variously expressed by asserting that effective diplomacy depends on the ability to implicitly threaten the use of force,⁸ by descriptions of Japanese diplomacy as "weak kneed,"⁹ and by characterizing the Japanese public as "thoroughly drunk on peace."¹⁰ Most of these observers probably assume that, because of domestic and international opinion, Japan will be restricted in the use of force for the foreseeable future, although they probably also would prefer that the national consensus give the government more leeway than it presently has. As with the general public, a plurality of defense intellectuals, which includes most members from the postwar generations, prefer Japanese security policy to continue to emphasize economic and political moves over military ones under existing circumstances.

UNCERTAINTY AND SELF-DOUBT

The Japanese sense of uncertainty and foreboding has not been caused by specific developments or threats. Paradoxically, most Japanese defense intellectuals believe that the most dangerous tensions which previously threatened the stability of Northeast Asia have now subsided. That is, relatively few consider the Soviet Union any longer a serious near-term threat, although Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Defense Agency (DA) observers and many academics and journalists continue to insist that the Soviets deploy greater military capabilities than their legitimate defense needs require, and a very few observers deny any reason to downgrade the Soviet threat at all.¹¹ Sino-Soviet confrontation, in the past one of the most serious potential conflicts in the region, similarly is no longer believed to be a near-term problem. Some Japanese observers (but certainly not all) think that the chances of conflict on the Korean peninsula have been greatly reduced in the last one or two years, as the Soviet Union withdraws its support from Pyongyang and transfers it to Seoul.

The concern of most of these observers focuses more on the possibility that other national leaders like Saddam Hussein—perhaps one or more located in East Asia rather than far off Iraq—may now think that they can get away with attacking neighboring states with whom they have disputes or that other threats to regional security will emerge.¹² In a multipolar world without superpowers, Japan will be expected to act in a more decisive and timely fashion, as most foreign policy specialists believe Japan should have done when Iraq invaded Kuwait.¹³ While there is a clear understanding among defense intellectuals (but not necessarily among the electorate) that important Japanese interests are involved in the current Gulf crisis and that they will inevitably be involved in future crises, the fear which appears to trouble defense intellectuals most is not so much that there may be damage to Japan's world order or economic interests, but that Japan will be unable to act responsibly, and that as a result of that incapacity will be criticized by American and European leaders and become isolated.¹⁴ That isolation could fuel a resurgence of Japanese nationalism, with dire consequences which might include a repeat of some of the mistakes that Japan made in the 1930s that ultimately led to the Pacific War. It is not just that some of these observers believe that Japanese political leaders may lack wisdom or courage, but (more ominously) that the Japanese political system is simply not capable of effective response in a crisis.

Japan's systemic structural features which they most criticize are (1) the processes of consensus decision making, (2) decentralization of authority in the bureaucracy among more-or-less autonomous ministries, and (3) the structure of the one-party-dominant political party system. In their view, the faction-ridden LDP, which seems to be unbeatable in the electorate, produces weak prime ministers (as Kaifu is almost universally perceived to be) and cabinets, yet no opposition party (or combination of opposition parties) is capable of presenting a credible alternative to the public. The administrative structure's many semi-independent fiefdoms make rapid innovative action virtually impossible. The requirements of Japanese style consensus decision making, imposing the necessity to consult with all politically significant

actors for all major decisions, would frustrate a dynamic leader even if the system were capable of producing one. In the words of two veterans of Japanese security policy struggles, each pointing to the weaknesses of different segments of the decision-making system, "Only the LDP can form a government, but the LDP is incapable of governing in today's world," and "Our decisions always have to be made from the bottom up—a leader can never command."¹⁵

VIEWS ABOUT REGIONAL ACTORS

America: A Wavering Foundation for Japan's Security?

Japanese harbor ambivalent and complex attitudes towards the United States which would require many pages to list, much less analyze. Many Japanese view America with attitudes of envy, resentment, or gratitude, among other feelings. Often the same individual has contradictory beliefs and emotions about America. Increasingly, these attitudes are modulated through a strong sense of understandable nationalism and pride for Japan's economic accomplishments, particularly when Japanese are confronted with harsh and, at least to them, unjustified criticism. A general frustration concerning U.S.-Japanese economic and cultural relations inevitably influences perceptions of the United States in the security arena, even for defense intellectuals. For a few like Shintaro Ishihara, co-author of *The Japan That Can Say "No,"* economic and cultural nationalism dominates all other considerations. Nonetheless, in an effort to keep this analysis reasonably manageable, the discussion below focuses only on perceptions of the United States which relate directly to security, even though ignoring broader cultural, political, and economic aspects of the U.S.-Japanese relationship inevitably distorts reality. Hopefully, being aware of this omission will make it possible for the reader to limit this distortion.

Virtually all defense intellectuals believe that the United States is the most important factor in Japan's security environment. The Mutual Security Treaty with the United States is, and has been since the peace treaty was signed, the foundation for all of Japan's defense policy. Moreover, while

there is disagreement as to whether or not American influence is decreasing (and if so how much), and whether it is desirable or undesirable that Japan's security should depend completely upon the United States, all observers agree that the United States will continue to be a major player in Northeast Asian security affairs and Japan's defense for the foreseeable future. Even the SDP, which vigorously opposed the 1960 extension of the security relationship and has opposed Japanese defense policy ever since, now officially accepts that Japanese-American relations must continue to be based on the alliance, although an alliance which would be significantly changed.¹⁶ The alternative to an alliance with the United States is to proclaim an independent security policy and raise and deploy an independent military force, which very few politicians or defense intellectuals seem to think is either desirable or possible. Excluding the extremes of the political spectrum, practically all observers believe that the United States is the only nation that can provide stability and security in Northeast Asia, which they believe will be seriously threatened in an undisciplined post-cold war era.¹⁷ For some, this conclusion is reached by a process of elimination through which all other possible choices are rejected, primarily because the other nations have regional claims which make them unacceptable to at least one other nation.¹⁸ Certainly no defense intellectuals would welcome a dominant security role by China or the Soviet Union. For many, especially members of the younger generations, the choice of the United States is the result of a careful evaluation of the benefits which Japan has enjoyed as a result of its alliance with the United States, and the international economic system largely sponsored by the United States.

A number of these observers, together with their counterparts in the United States and elsewhere, believe that the strength and influence of the United States in Northeast Asia are declining, and that it may be unable or unwilling to continue to assume the burden of its traditional security role, particularly with a diminished Soviet threat. Indeed, many Japanese advocate increases in Japanese "burdensharing" precisely because they fear that the United States will otherwise abandon its security role in Northeast Asia.¹⁹ On

the other hand, they also foresee that, with a diminished Soviet threat, public opinion—even the opinion of some defense intellectuals—may become less and less hospitable to contributing to U.S. military activities in Japan, much less the larger Northeast Asia region.

The perception that the United States is relatively less powerful now than formerly is not universal. At least one noted observer maintains that the relative power of the United States, at least as far as security is concerned, is greater than in the last of the cold war years.²⁰ Then, the principal challenge to U.S. military hegemony was the Soviet Union, which deployed very powerful forces in the region. Since the revelations of its failed economy and the near political chaos throughout its territory, the Soviet Union can no longer assert significant influence, according to this argument, even though its military capabilities in the region are as formidable as ever. Japan, South Korea, and other East Asian nations are relatively much stronger economically, but in military terms, or even in terms of security in the broader sense, clearly do not have the capability or the political stature to usurp the preeminent position of the United States.

These observers, who come from both government and universities, all support an adequate U.S. military presence in the region, but most of them are uncertain as to what constitutes adequacy, except that some reduction from current levels is acceptable and that the most important component is the U.S. Navy. Only two respondents volunteered without prompting that the Marine deployment in Okinawa is extremely important as a quick reaction force which could be mobilized for unforeseen contingencies. As long as the North Korean threat remains, Japanese defense intellectuals support maintaining the existing U.S. Army presence on the Korean peninsula. When that threat recedes, however, only a few believe that a large deployment of U.S. Army combat forces in the region will be required.²¹

A few observers, unusually impressed by the changes of recent international politics, view the United States as the only real threat which Japan actually faces. It is not that they believe that the United States will adopt an anti-Japan policy (although

all Japanese seem disturbed by American public opinion polls which suggest that Japan may now become the number one threat to the United States), but that an upsurge of protectionist sentiment or a recession in the United States will trigger a global economic downturn which will affect the Japanese economy.²²

Soviet Union: Still a Security Problem.

Spokesmen for the Defense Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintain that Soviet military capabilities in the region of Japan are as formidable as ever—perhaps stronger than ever—and still a danger, if not a threat, to Japan, whatever the significance of Gorbachev's "new thinking" and policy initiatives toward Asia in general and Japan in particular.²³ The Soviet Union still poses a direct challenge to Japan's sovereignty by occupying the Northern Territories illegally, and deploying military forces there. That position is echoed by a number of nonofficial interpreters, some of whom state the position more forcefully and comprehensively than official observers.²⁴

Most observers do not accept the official evaluation, however, and reject the notion that the Soviet Union is any longer a short-term military threat. They argue that Japan was never a target for Soviet military action except in the context of the cold war, and with its end (which has been heralded with hundreds of articles, editorials, and pronouncements) the military threat also effectively subsided. While Soviet military might cannot be ignored, most agree that the intention to use it against Japan seems to be totally absent. Indeed, it is widely expected that the Soviet Union for the first time will attempt to achieve a genuine rapprochement with Japan, possibly including some action with respect to the Northern Territories, in order to obtain Japan's assistance and cooperation in the development of the Soviet economy, particularly in the Far East. Because of this diminished Soviet threat, there have been frequent calls for the reduction of the SDF budget, or at least a reduction in the rate of increase of defense spending.

Nonetheless, in spite of the recent changes in Soviet foreign policy, most defense intellectuals consider that the

Soviet Union is bound to pose a security problem for Japan during the mid- and long term, and perhaps also during the more immediate future.²⁵ Expressed in interviews more than published works, this position, normally not carefully developed, is based on a perception of a history of binational conflict and competing interests, and Japan's geographical position as a barrier to the Soviet Union's free access to the Pacific Ocean. These are realities which most defense intellectuals believe will always impel tensions in Japan's relations with the Soviet Union, even in times of detente and cooperation.

Partly as a reflection of these attitudes, but primarily as a result of an awareness of Japan's extensive relations of economic and security interdependence with the United States and the limited potential in Japanese-Soviet economic relations, virtually no Japanese believe that Japan's relations with the Soviet Union will ever endanger Japan's relations with the United States. Specifically, there seems little danger that a Soviet "peace" offensive might seduce Tokyo to abrogate the alliance with the United States, even if the idea gained some popularity among the electorate.

China: Future Threat?

China enters the Japanese view of the security environment in at least two ways. According to almost all observers, China could become a cause of instability in the region. This might result from internal political or economic breakdown leading to a power struggle or political collapse within the country. It might also be caused by deliberate Chinese action against a neighboring state, perhaps initiated to divert attention from internal failures or to settle outstanding grievances. The most likely target for such Chinese attacks would probably be Vietnam, Taiwan, or India. In any such situation, Japan would be expected to respond, which would be an unusually difficult contingency for the Japanese leadership.

A smaller number of the defense community recognize the possibility, in the mid- or long term, of Japan itself becoming

the target of Chinese aggression.²⁶ They take seriously anti-Japanese rhetoric within China, and assume that in the future China will view Japan as a rival which will have to be contained. Most of these Japanese see the U.S. alliance as the only way to deal with the anticipated Chinese threat. They cannot imagine, and do not desire, that Japan will ever deploy a military force adequate to reinforce bargaining with China over security issues, much less be capable of combatting China independently. Of course, there are ultra-nationalist groups in Japan which have recently tried to provoke confrontation with China over disputed islands in the East China Sea,²⁷ and generally seek to assert Japan's presumed superiority over China, but they are few in number and have relatively little influence—i. e., they currently hold little or no representation within the defense community.

Potential Security Challenges from Korea.

When Japanese defense or foreign affairs specialists discuss the security environment for Northeast Asia, the Korean peninsula is always cited as a place of potential instability, particularly in view of the probable succession struggle in the North when Kim Il Sung dies, presumably in the next decade. For the near term, there were expressions of concern about a possible nuclear capability. They all consider instability on the Korean peninsula to be a threat to regional and Japanese security, even though some did not discuss the nature of such a threat in a specific way.²⁸

In discussions with the author, Japanese security specialists also suggested questions as to the political reliability of South Korea. Not only do they fear that South Korea might seize an opportunity to unify the peninsula by force, but they are very negative—much more so than most American observers—about the potential for success of the democratic features of the South Korean political system. Moreover, most of these specialists disapprove of Roh Tae Woo's *Nordpolitik*, which they believe represents more independence than is appropriate for the R.O.K. On a personal level, some seem annoyed that in international fora Soviets more assiduously seek the favor of South Korean specialists than Japanese.

Sometimes expressly and always by implication, Japanese make known that American forces in Korea are valued as a deterrent to the leadership of the R.O.K. as well as to the Kim regime. When asked to speculate on possible threats to Japan's security for the remainder of this century and the early years of the next, a united Korea was always mentioned. Some observers believed that Japanese-Korean problems would take the form of political and economic harassment, but others, including a senior officer of the SDF, anticipated a military threat which would require specific force structure and equipment decisions. Their explanations for this belief were usually general. They relied partly on the geographical relationship of the two nations, but mostly on the history of conflict which has spawned hatred of Japanese among Koreans. These conclusions on a potential security threat from a united Korea also suggest that defense intellectuals may reflect popular Japanese negative stereotypes about Koreans.

CHAPTER 3

ENDNOTES

1. On the fear of militarism in Japan, see "Why Militarism Still Haunts Japan," *The New York Times*, December 12, 1990, p. A23, and Steven R. Weisman, "Japanese Fear of Militarism Fuels Opposition to Sending Troops to the Gulf," *The New York Times*, November 2, 1990, p. A9.

2. Seiki Nishihiro, *Mainichi Shimbun*, September 1, 1990, p. 3, translated in Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo.

3. This theme runs through many of the arguments opposing Japanese intervention in the Gulf crisis, often by implication rather than explicit statement. See the quotation of the socialist politician in Weisman, and the frequent statements by Takako Doi, leader of the Japan Socialist Party. For example, KYODO News Service of October 21, 1990, and October 29, 1990, reported in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-EAS-90-204*, October 22, 1990, pp. 3-4, and *FBIS-EAS-90-209*, October 29, 1990, pp. 3-4. Respondents at interviews in Japan in September 1990 referred to the myths of uniqueness.

4. The language of Article 9 is uncompromising:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as war potential, will never be maintained. The right of the belligerency of the State will not be recognized.

5. Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1989*, Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1989, pp. 81.

6. "Effort to Get UN Bill Through Diet Abandoned," KYODO News Service, November 6, 1990, reported in *FBIS-EAS-90-216*, November 7, 1990, pp. 2-3.

7. Interview with former member of Diet, September 20, 1990.

8. Interview with Tach Yamasaka, former director of Defense Agency, reported in *Sankei Shimbun*, July 14, 1990, p. 3, translated in *FBIS-EAS-90-164-S*, August 23, 1990, p. 26.

9. Tomoyuki Kojima, "Prospects for Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1990s," in Dalchoon Kim, ed., *Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia*, Seoul: Center for East and West Studies, Yongsei University, 1990, p. 59.

10. Takeshi Inagaki, moderator of a panel discussion reported in *Kyoto Voice*, August 1990, pp. 126-138, translated in *FBIS-EAS-90-164-S*, August 23, 1990, p. 27.

11. For the official position on the Soviet threat, see "Government Analyzes Soviet Forces in Far East," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 25, 1990, p. 2, translated in *FBIS-EAS-90-138-A*, July 18, 1990, pp. 4-5.

12. Interviews, September 16-20, Tokyo. See also interview with Atsuyuki Sassa, former director general of the Cabinet Security Affairs Office, KYODO News Service in English, reported in *FBIS-EAS-90-168*, August 29, 1990, p. 8.

13. An American officer attending the National Institute of Defense Studies in Tokyo reported that all lecturers to the class from outside the regular faculty, at least one per day for approximately one month, had indicated embarrassment or anger at Japan's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. So did all of the respondents in the author's interviews.

14. See Muneichi Suzuki, "Jolted by the Argument of 'Dispatching Self-Defense Forces,' Prime Minister Kaifu Avoided a Decision: Complete Drama of the 30 Days of the Middle East Crisis at the Prime Minister's Official Residence," *Sande Mainichi*, September 16, 1990, pp. 26-29, translated in *FBIS-EAS-90-204-A*, October 20, 1990, pp. 7-11, especially p. 10.

15. Two respondents, interviews, September 16-20, 1990, Tokyo.

16. The SDP position is equivocal, and clearly does not have unanimous support among Socialist Dietmen. See the statements of Chairwoman Takako Doi and Secretary General Tsuruo Yamaguchi, KYODO News Service of July 9, 1990, reprinted in *FBIS-EAS-90-131*, July 9, 1990, pp. 9-10, and *FBIS-EAS-90-132*, July 10, 1990, July 10, 1990, p. 7. Doi had stated earlier that "under a coalition government, the JSP would maintain [the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States] based on diplomatic continuity" and would also preserve the SDF. See Shigeru Okumura, "An Unrealistic Line: JSP Cannot Free Itself; The Cause of the Breakdown of 'Coalition Government,'" *Sankei Shimbun*, June 20, 1990, p. 1, translated in *FBIS-EAS-90-164-S*, pp. 14-15.

17. Virtually all editorials, discussions by university experts, and statements by politicians, except those representing the extreme left or right, favor the mutual security treaty with the United States, at least for the time being. For the contrary view, see Shindo Eiichi, "Frozen in the Cold War: Another Look at Japan-U.S. Friction," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. XXXVI, No.3, July-September 1989, pp. 275-291.

18. See Tomohisa Sakanaka, "The Twin Goals of Security and Arms Control: Twelve Suggestions for a More Comprehensive Policy in the Far East," unpublished paper, no date, and Yukio Satoh, "The Changing Currency of Power: The Future Nature of US Influence in Western Europe and North-East Asia: A View from the Asian and Pacific Region," IISS Thirty-Second Annual Conference, September 6-9, 1990.

19. Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, "Changing U.S-Soviet Relations and Japan's Role," CIS Discussion Paper No. A-3, Center of International Studies, Research Institute of Aoyama Gakuin University, April 1990, pp. 2-6.

20. Seizaburo Sato, "Heading toward Further Development of Japan-US Alliance," *Chuo Koron*, June 1989, translated in *Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines*, Issued Monthly by American Embassy, July 1989, pp. 18-19.

21. If a single Korean state replaced North and South Korea, many might change their positions on the need of U.S. forces on the peninsula. See Chapter 4.

22. Interviews, September 16-20, 1990, Tokyo.

23. See "Defense Agency's Report to Security Council," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 30, 1990, p. 2, translated in *FBIS-EAS-90-128-A*, July 3, 1990, p. 33-34.

24. See the comments of Osamu Kaihara in *Sankei Shimbun*, June 18, 1990, p. 5, translated in *FBIS-EAS-90-151*, August 6, 1990, pp. 2-3. Several, mostly older, respondents in interviews reflected strong anti-Soviet views.

25. For a thoughtful and stimulating analysis of the significance of Soviet military power to Japan, see the collection of essays by Akira Nishioka, *Japanese Theory on Defense Strategy*, Tokyo: The 2nd Research Department, The National Institute for Defense Studies, May 1990, especially pp. 15-22 and 111-118.

26. See Terumasa Nakanishi, Keitaro Hasegawa, and Masataka Kosaka, participating in a panel discussion reported in the *Kyoto Voice*, August 1990, pp. 126-138, translated in *FBIS-EAS-164-S*, August 23, 1990, pp. 27-32.

27. See Chapter 2.

28. South Korea as a threat to Japanese economic interests also receives some attention, often with respect to potential competition in the Soviet Union. See Susumu Matsumoto, "S. Korean-Soviet Ties Seen With Apprehension," *The Daily Yomiuri*, June 12, 1990, p. 8, reprinted in *FBIS-EAS-90-135-A*, July 13, 1990, p. 13. On the other hand, Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan-Korea Relations: A Japanese Perspective of Security Aspects," in Kim, pp. 121- 137, makes no mention of any divergence of interests between South Korea and Japan, perhaps because he presented his paper at a conference hosted by his Korean colleagues.

CHAPTER 4

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

PROUD AND OPTIMISTIC SOUTH KOREA

Among the nations of Northeast Asia, the most optimistic atmosphere about the future prevails in the Republic of Korea. Although defense intellectuals see a variety of problems in their security environment, they are virtually all confident that South Korea will continue to improve its economic well-being, its internal political and social structure, and its international stature. Younger defense intellectuals not directly affiliated with the R.O.K. armed forces seem to have the most positive perspective on South Korea's future security environment. Older military observers, still important but significantly less influential than they were before 1988, are also basically optimistic about the future, but more likely to emphasize threats and dangers.

This optimism doubtlessly has roots in the economic transformation of South Korea which began in the 1960s—pride in the South Korean economic miracle is one of the fundamental reasons for the confidence of South Koreans—but its dramatic and most visible expression came with the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympiad in 1988. Koreans in the R.O.K. are deservedly proud of their great national achievement, and of the worldwide attention focused on the "Land of the Morning Calm." Flushed with these successes, Koreans talk as if they are convinced that they can manage, even if the tasks are sometimes difficult and require patience over a long time. These include the confrontation with the North, *Nordpolitik*, a resurgent Japan, the possible vicissitudes of U.S. policy, and any other security problems which may come along. Moreover, they have also been buoyed by the almost bloodless political transformation from authoritarianism to the current experiment with democracy. For all of the concerns that many South Koreans have with the

current political scene in Seoul, one of them is *not* the danger of a military coup, which enhances their sense of personal security and also their sense of national self-esteem.¹

Nonetheless, contemporary national politics remains one of the near and mid-term problems that worries most South Koreans. Since the merger of Roh Tae Woo's Democratic Justice Party and two of the former opposition parties (Reunification Democratic Party [RDP] and New Democratic Republican Party) in early 1990—which was widely viewed as cynical manipulation on the part of President Roh and RDP leader Kim Young Sam—and the rowdy parliamentary sessions which took place shortly thereafter, there has been widespread dissatisfaction with the political system.² However, many seem to think that the current problems will disappear when a new generation of leaders takes charge, and therefore will not have long-term significance. Many are also concerned with the present performance of the economy, and anticipate growth rates which may fall to as low as 6 percent per year instead of the rates of 10 percent or more which they have enjoyed for several years. Moreover, they voice dissatisfaction that the R.O.K. depends so heavily on the United States and Japan. But as with politics, most are optimistic that economic problems will be satisfactorily solved in the long term. As the subsequent analysis indicates, their optimism about Korea's long-term national security environment coexists with perceptions of serious problems for the near- and mid-term future.

While foreign and national security policy is no longer exclusively the domain of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense and the R.O.K. military, participation is still relatively limited. The National Assembly has not yet—and may never—overcome the presumption that foreign policy is inherently the prerogative of the executive. But, although domestic problems take priority, the National Assembly and its committees do consider foreign and defense policy programs, as do the national media, and the circle of individuals and institutions which can influence national security policy is growing.

POST-COLD WAR MILIEU AND NORDPOLITIK

The Republic of Korea government is the only one in Northeast Asia which has explicitly, systematically, and aggressively attempted to exploit the opportunities implicit in the unfolding post-cold war international system. *Nordpolitik*,³ the policy which combines Seoul's active campaigns to establish and expand economic and political ties with Communist and former Communist states with new overtures to the D.P.R.K., would make no sense under the constraints of even a highly decentralized bipolar international system. But because the post-cold war international and regional structure was already unfolding when President Roh officially launched *Nordpolitik* in 1988, the policy has been not only logically reasonable, but extremely successful.

There is a general consensus among South Korean security specialists, shared by almost all observers except the committed anti-Communists (many affiliated with the military) and some of the older generation,⁴ about the characteristics of the emerging international and regional systems which is very similar to the visions held by their counterparts in Tokyo and Beijing. How long the detente relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union, and China and the Soviet Union, will continue is the subject of some dispute.⁵ The younger, nonmilitary segments of the defense community are more likely to perceive fundamental changes in the international system, and the older, military segments are more likely to expect the resumption of great power tensions. Most seem to believe that the detente relationships will remain fairly stable for at least a decade.

In any case, the present lower level of tensions provides an atmosphere conducive to vigorous economic and political competition with a reduced threat of military conflict. Specifically, detente between China and the Soviet Union reduces the opportunities for North Korea to play one Communist power against the other, and therefore constrains its opportunities for diplomatic maneuver against the interests of the R.O.K. This environment also reduces the probabilities of an attack by North Korea, because its major allies (who have favored stability on the peninsula for some time anyway) are

now even less likely than before to support adventuresome actions by Pyongyang. The primary disadvantage of U.S.-Soviet harmony in the minds of many South Korean observers, including the younger nonmilitary ones, is that it reduces the incentive for the United States to maintain its current military presence in the R.O.K., which they view as the most effective deterrent against a North Korean attack.⁶

The consensus also recognizes that the transition from cold war to post-cold war international system presents many uncertainties and potential dangers. Regional powers will increasingly have the capabilities to pursue their interests independently, and they will be free of some of the international restraints implicit in the bipolar system of the cold war. Whereas defense intellectuals in the other Northeast Asian countries viewed these characteristics as troubling and potentially contributing to serious regional insecurity, most South Koreans seem to give similar concerns much less attention, except for the possible future behavior of Japan. South Korean perceptions of Japan's regional role will be considered below.

VIEWS ABOUT REGIONAL ACTORS

North Korea: Weak, Isolated, and Dangerous.

Still a Threat. Most defense analysts in the R.O.K. do not seem to have significantly changed their perceptions of North Korea in the last 5 or 10 years. Even to younger defense intellectuals at universities, who seem most sensitive to the possible importance of subtle changes in Pyongyang, Kim Il Sung's regime still appears to be totalitarian, aggressive, and essentially rigid.⁷ Moreover, most of these observers have concluded that the North Korean military forces are still superior to those of South Korea and are still a clear and present danger. North Korea definitely is perceived as a real military threat.⁸

The evidence that the D.P.R.K. is developing a nuclear capability was cited as a serious concern by several respondents during interviews in Seoul, but surprisingly was barely noted, or not mentioned at all, by most of them. A

possible explanation of this lack of emphasis, supported by analyzing the kinds of issues which were frequently mentioned, is that South Korean defense intellectuals believe that R.O.K. superiority in nuclear technology and the U.S. nuclear umbrella tends to offset, and therefore reduce, the significance of a possible future North Korean nuclear threat.

On the other hand, the belief that Pyongyang's political position has deteriorated seriously in recent years (the result of changes in the international system and *Nordpolitik*) is also widespread, and most South Korean defense intellectuals seem to think that the probability of any kind of military action by the North has decreased. The North Korean economy is seen to be bankrupt, with many North Koreans living in destitute circumstances.

Perhaps the major impression of the perceptions of South Korean defense intellectuals is that they are not based on extensive information: despite increasing contacts with North Koreans and recent reports on conditions in the D.P.R.K., especially from the Soviet Union, most observers do not seem to understand the operation of the regime in Pyongyang much better than they did before the Olympics and the inauguration of *Nordpolitik*. At least as reflected in published material and interviews with the author, the D.P.R.K.'s decision-making processes may be as much a mystery in Seoul as in Washington.

The Appeal of Unification. This very negative evaluation of North Korea as a social, political, and economic system conflicts with the almost universal appeal of reunification as a highly emotional political symbol. According to a long-time observer of Korean affairs, all Koreans fervently favor reunification, but few of them—certainly few middle-class South Koreans—are willing to sacrifice what they believe to be relatively satisfactory conditions to achieve it.⁹ Even fewer would accept what they believe are the current unsatisfactory conditions in North Korea merely for the psychological satisfaction of living in a unified Korea. Most South Koreans would also reject forceful reunification of the peninsula, unless it occurred in a war started by the regime in Pyongyang.

Many South Korean defense intellectuals appear to have reconciled these discordant attitudes (optimism about the future and commitment to the symbol of reunification against distaste for their understanding of life in North Korea and opposition to reunification imposed by military force) through support of *Nordpolitik* and functionalism.¹⁰ The latter, the foundation of R.O.K. unification policy, is the approach to improving intrapeninsula relations by gradually increasing the number and scope of contacts between North and South Korea, and thereby developing the trust and confidence which ultimately will permit the two governments to undertake successful political and security negotiations directly. Supporters of *Nordpolitik* and functionalism must believe, in conformance with the prevailing optimism, that Pyongyang's regime will succumb to the liberal influences to which it would be exposed with increased international and inter-Korean contact, and transform itself into a more open, rational regime. The most conservative observers, usually older and related to the military, seem to believe that a substantial reduction of tensions, much less reunification, is impossible with the current North Korean regime. These analysts, declining in numbers and influence, are likely to think that military action will be required to fundamentally alter the nature of the D.P.R.K.

**Dealing with the Soviets:
The Most Exciting Game in Seoul.**

Most of Seoul's intelligentsia is engaged in a stimulating discovery of Soviet lore: some of the best Soviet artists perform at the Sejong cultural center,¹¹ international conferences on all matter of subjects feature noted Soviet experts, Soviet delegations visit weekly, there is intense competition among South Korean universities for academic interchanges with the most prestigious Soviet institutions, and the South Korean press is filled with articles and analyses about R.O.K.-Soviet relations and many other aspects of Soviet affairs. Korean businessmen travel frequently to many parts of the Soviet Union, and there is intense speculation about the potential for economic gain. In short, Seoul is in a state of euphoria about the Soviet Union and anticipated

political and economic benefits to be accrued from improved R.O.K.-Soviet relations.

In spite of the fact that the Soviet Union is still Pyongyang's only supplier of sophisticated military equipment, most defense intellectuals do not view Moscow as a threat to South Korea's security interest. They apparently believe that the Soviets will eliminate, or at least reduce, their provision of military supplies to North Korea in the near future, and, in any case, value their new relations with economically vibrant Republic of Korea more than the older relationship with the economically stagnant Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Increasingly frequent articles from Soviet publications critical of Pyongyang receive a great deal of attention in South Korea's media.

While warnings to be skeptical about rushing too quickly into Soviet enterprises occasionally appear in the press,¹² and scholars and analysts are aware of the military capability which Moscow has deployed in and adjacent to Northeast Asia, very few South Korean specialists in government, academia, or the press any longer view the Soviet Union as a potential adversary.¹³ The Soviet Union has successfully achieved the image of peacemaker.¹⁴ Except in the commercial arena, where many practical problems in doing business with the Soviets are discussed,¹⁵ most warnings about the Soviet security role on the peninsula and Northeast Asia deal with the possibility that Soviet policy could revert to its more traditional pattern in the future, and the danger that improving relations with the Soviet Union could have a damaging effect on the more critical relationship with the United States.¹⁶ Many observers obviously believe that it is in the R.O.K.'s interest to reduce its dependency on the United States and that relations with the Soviet Union may be valuable in accomplishing that purpose.¹⁷

Disappointing R.O.K.-China Ties.

China is not a particularly salient component of the R.O.K.'s security environment as perceived by most South Korean defense intellectuals, except as the source of regional instability in the event of serious political problems and/or economic collapse within China. Although most observers

accept that China would support Pyongyang if there were conflict on the peninsula, they believe that the aid would probably be restricted to political and limited economic, rather than military, assistance. Moreover, they believe that Beijing's major objective for the Korean peninsula is stability, so that it is likely to counsel against disruptive behavior by Pyongyang in the first place.

Although R.O.K.-Chinese trade is significantly greater than R.O.K.-Soviet trade (and also Sino-D.P.R.K. trade)¹⁸ and increasing, China—unlike the Soviet Union—has declined to consider diplomatic relations with the R.O.K., and still shows a high degree of deference to Pyongyang's sensibilities.¹⁹ *Nordpolitik* is therefore not considered as successful with respect to China as to the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe. China is not yet considered a positive element in South Korea's security environment.²⁰

Japan: Despised Ogre, Future Threat, Economic Partner.

In describing the projected security environment for the next 10 to 20 years, there is a high level of consensus among South Korean defense intellectuals of all ages and institutional affiliations about Japan: Japan will be a threat to the national security of Korea.

As do the Chinese, Koreans base their judgment as much on historical memory as strategic analysis, with the 35 year period of colonialization vivid in the national consciousness, even though only a small portion of the population is old enough to have directly experienced that time of deprivation and humiliation.²¹ The tendency to view Japanese behavior with skepticism which grows out of this historical memory is reinforced by the occasional actions of Japanese officials and notables which also enrage the Chinese,²² plus perceived slights and affronts which grow directly out of R.O.K.-Japanese relations or the treatment of ethnic Koreans in Japan. The intensity of the Korean obsession with the wrongs committed by Japan is reflected in the repeated demands for Japan to apologize for the colonial period, and the extended analyses and debate as to whether the apologies which have been tendered were in fact sufficiently sincere and comprehensive.²³

Of the four or more official apologies extended so far, none have really been considered adequate.

South Korean animosity is also reinforced by the perceived aggressive economic behavior of Japan, the R.O.K.'s second most important trading partner, which has resulted in an unfavorable trade balance between the two countries. While emulating many Japanese practices, Koreans nonetheless criticize Japan's hesitancy to make sophisticated technology available to Seoul and the alleged haughty and crude behavior of Japanese businessmen and tourists.²⁴

Viewed through this antipathy, it is not surprising that the development of Japanese defense policy over the years is interpreted by almost all Korean observers as a trend moving inexorably toward the adoption by Japan of an active, independent diplomatic posture supported by reasonably large military forces.²⁵ They believe that this trend will be accelerated by the expected reduction or possible withdrawal of U.S. forces now in the region. South Korean defense intellectuals believe that if U.S. forces withdraw from the R.O.K., Japan will attempt to fill the resulting vacuum. Normally this is not a conclusion of analysis, but an assertion presumably based on the observer's understanding (or stereotype) of Japanese national character. Moreover, South Korean officials (speaking personally and off the record) and other defense intellectuals are convinced that such a posture supported by a sizable military capability will lead to instability in the region and threaten the national security interests of the R.O.K., or if reunification occurs, a single Korean state. South Korean observers are already concerned about the present military capability of Japan, particularly air and naval assets, and the large Japanese defense budget, virtually always described as the third largest in the world and still growing.

Officially, criticism of Japan's defense policy is inhibited by the friendly official relations between the two nations,²⁶ and the implicit security relationship between them which exists by virtue of the alliances both have with the United States. In fact, there are even limited military-to-military contacts between the two armed forces, and, reportedly, limited security cooperation. However, the government has formally protested and

expressed concern over the proposals for Japan to deploy the small SDF contingents²⁷ to the Persian Gulf and Japan's negotiations with the D.P.R.K. over establishing diplomatic relations.

The reaction of South Koreans to the Tokyo-Pyongyang negotiations over establishing diplomatic relations illustrates the lack of trust which Koreans have toward Japanese.²⁸ Tokyo's willingness to establish contacts with Pyongyang and partially open North Korea to Western influence seems a positive response to President Roh's request that R.O.K. allies help break the isolation of the D.P.R.K., but South Koreans have been extremely suspicious on any concrete steps taken by those allies. With respect to the Tokyo-Pyongyang negotiations, Japan has been officially enjoined to pace any developments with progress in North-South negotiations, to demand that North Korea accept international inspection of its nuclear reactors, and not to offer excessive financial assistance. Seoul's press has implied that Japan has some sinister intention which will not be advantageous to the Republic of Korea.

Ambivalent Attitudes About America.

The Republic of Korea has no defense strategy or policy apart from its alliance with the United States. All Korean combat forces committed to the defense of South Korea against external aggression are under the operational control, even in peacetime, of the American Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). The CINC receives strategic guidance from a committee composed of representatives of both nations.²⁹ The perceptions of South Korean defense intellectuals reflect this reality. They are also based in large part on three other understandings about the American-South Korean nexus broadly shared in Seoul and, for that matter, in Washington.

The first is that changes in the international system, economic problems in the United States, and perhaps frustrations among Americans with assuming security burdens during the cold war, will lead to a reduction of U.S. resources committed to security, in Korea as elsewhere, and to more

determined demands that U.S. security partners assume greater shares of the burdens of mutual defense.³⁰ The second understanding is that the R.O.K. has attained a high level of economic, political, and social strength, and increasingly will be able to assume much of the responsibility for security which has previously fallen to the United States. And the third understanding is that a powerful wave of nationalism and self-confidence has pervaded the South Korean political culture, and that one expression of that nationalism is anti-Americanism. South Korean defense analysts all concede that these three trends will require adjustments in the American-South Korean alliance and the disposition and organization of U.S. forces deployed within the R.O.K.

Less Unequal U.S.-R.O.K. Relations Emerging. In the first years after the Korean War, most South Koreans perceived the United States as the faithful ally of the Republic of Korea which had sacrificed its own sons to save their land from the horrors of totalitarian rule in 1950-53, provided generous economic assistance which facilitated post-war reconstruction, and prevented another unprovoked attack by the Communist dictator in the North by maintaining a deterrent force on Korean soil.³¹ South Koreans welcomed U.S. servicemen as liberators and protectors. Even in the mid-1980s, American GIs routinely praised duty in South Korea because of the friendliness of the people.³² Moreover, South Koreans viewed themselves as poor and extremely weak, dwarfed by their more powerful and sophisticated alliance partner from across the Pacific. The United States, in the perception of South Koreans, was clearly the senior partner of the alliance and was expected to assume authority for all alliance affairs and the responsibility for maintaining the security of South Korea.³³ This early South Korean perception of the U.S.-R.O.K. relationship, oversimplified but essentially correct as stated here, has changed continuously over the years, especially after the beginning of South Korea's rapid economic growth and the Vietnam War.³⁴

Among defense intellectuals, the relationship is still unequal, but obviously much less so than formerly. Virtually

all of them believe that the alliance and the presence of U.S. military forces—especially U.S. Army forces—within the probable path of the enemy attack on Seoul is necessary for the R.O.K. to deter aggression or coercion by the D.P.R.K.³⁵ They seem to believe that the prospect of U.S. participation, only totally credible in their eyes if American forces immediately come under attack, is the only certain, or most certain, deterrent. To maintain the benefits of deterrence, South Korean defense intellectuals are prepared to continue to sacrifice some aspects of sovereignty (operational control of their armed forces and ultimate authority over the defense of their territory) until, in their judgment, a deterrent is no longer required or the R.O.K. is competent to provide a deterrent without assistance. However, given the fact that the alliance partners are no longer grossly unequal, they would prefer that the influence of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) be restricted as much as possible without endangering deterrence, and that the United States give sympathetic attention to their preferences and priorities.

Defense intellectuals differ along now familiar generational and institutional lines as to the extent of costs which the R.O.K. must continue to incur, and the length of time that the alliance relationship should remain unchanged. Military observers, who typically seem to place the greatest emphasis on the threat, appear most willing to rely on the current arrangements, and argue against any change in the size of U.S. deployments or the structure of the CFC.³⁶ Many of them believe that there are members of Congress, the media, and even some officials in parts of the executive branch of the U.S. Government, who do not believe that vital U.S. interests are any longer engaged in Korea, and would try to use the smallest alteration in the alliance as an excuse to inaugurate sweeping changes which would call the American commitment into question and seriously weaken deterrence on the peninsula.

"Leading" to "Supporting" U.S. Role. Younger members of the defense community not closely affiliated with the military, while they may share many of the misgivings of their more conservative colleagues about the steadfastness of the U.S. commitment, believe that the threat is less urgent than before

and that therefore the consequences of changes in the U.S. military presence would be less catastrophic. While they do not directly challenge the R.O.K. armed forces' assessment of the military balance, they tend to place greater weight on nonquantifiable factors like quality of equipment, superior training, and esprit de corps, and thereby conclude that the North Korean advantage is less than the raw numbers may imply. More importantly, they place a great deal more emphasis than their military colleagues on political factors which will inhibit Kim Il Sung or his successors from launching a military attack. Therefore, they can accept, even endorse, the present official U.S. policy of shifting from a "leading" role to a "supporting" role in the CFC and the defense of Korea, and in marginally reducing the size of USFK. They would especially welcome a greater role by Koreans in the CFC and full command authority over South Korean forces by the R.O.K. chain of command as soon as practical.³⁷

Among defense intellectuals who have thought seriously about the peninsula's security environment after detente between the two Korean governments, or even unification, is achieved, there is a general consensus that the United States is the nation best positioned to assure a degree of regional stability. They expect Japan to provide the greatest threat to stability, and believe that the continued existence of the U.S.-Japan alliance is probably the best way to channel Japanese energy and ambition in a benign fashion. In any case, these defense intellectuals appear to highly value a U.S. military presence, with an emphasis on naval forces. The scenarios constructed by South Koreans for the early years of the next century which raise the greatest security concerns are those which project that the United States has substantially reduced its military presence or completely disengaged from Northeast Asia, leaving Japan free to fill the resulting void.³⁸ At the same time, however, very few defense analysts seem to believe that, absent a clear threat, the Republic of Korea could be the host for the U.S. military forces needed for regional security. They believe that the nationalistic attitudes and aspirations of many South Koreans and their elected representatives preclude such a U.S. military presence.

Nationalism and Anti-Americanism. There is a very strong element of anti-Americanism in the Korean nationalism now being manifested in the R.O.K.³⁹ This may be a natural and inevitable development since South Korea was under American tutelage for so long, and since an unrealistic vision of America as a wholly virtuous country was foisted upon the population by successive South Korean regimes. For a committed nationalist unwilling to admit that Korea itself could be at fault, the obvious scapegoat on whom to heap blame for South Korea's problems is the United States. Another factor is the belief of many younger Koreans that the United States (which nationalist opponents to the present government believe is much more influential in Seoul than it probably is) was responsible for maintaining the Park and Chun regimes in power and still does nothing to foster genuine democracy in South Korea.⁴⁰

Whatever the underlying causes, a phenomenon which once was limited to radical students and a few other dissidents is now much more pervasive, finding daily expression in the press and the casual exchanges of Koreans on the streets of Seoul. Except for members of the radical left, neither the United States as a nation or individual Americans seem to be despised or hated.⁴¹ There are no responsible voices which favor the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces (much less a break in relations with the United States), although asserting independence from the United States has become one of the most popular political virtues, and few Koreans any longer automatically make the presumption that U.S. policy serves R.O.K. national interests.⁴² On the contrary, in trade and economic policy, the common presumption is that U.S. policy is antithetical to South Korean interests.⁴³

Up to now, that presumption against U.S. policy has not extended to the security arena except when military and economic questions combine, as on the issue of burdensharing. Even here, most Seoul newspapers apparently accept the principle of American allies assuming more of the burden of defense, although they universally believe that the sums allegedly suggested by the United States are unrealistically high given South Korea's level of economic

development and variety of economic problems. Seoul's editorial writers vented real outrage at the amount reportedly "demanded" by the United States for the support of Operation Desert Shield, and imputed to the United States arrogance and total insensitivity to Korea's situation.⁴⁴ Moreover, many Koreans specifically reject the contention of some Americans that South Korea has a moral obligation to assist in the Gulf crisis because of U.S. contributions to the R.O.K. in the past. According to *Tong-A Ilbo*, a major independent daily, the United States, with the Soviet Union, was responsible for the division of Korea in the first place, and its forces have been placed on the peninsula not just to protect the R.O.K. but to serve U.S. interests.⁴⁵ The charge of arrogance is resurrected at any and every occasion in which the United States is believed to slight the sovereign independence of the Republic or to "interfere" in South Korea's political process. Status of Forces issues have stimulated relatively extreme nationalist rhetoric, as have veiled criticisms of R.O.K. policy by American spokesmen.⁴⁶ Defense intellectuals tend to be centrist to conservative in their political orientation, and probably share fewer of the attributes of anti-Americanism with less intensity than some of their more nationalistic countrymen. However, at the very least, anti-Americanism "looms large in that it underscores an implicit demand by South Koreans to readjust overall relations between South Korea and the United States."⁴⁷ Since it is more prominent among younger South Koreans, anti-American attitudes are likely to increasingly influence the analysis of Korean defense intellectuals and decision makers in the future, and guarantee skeptical appraisals of U.S. proposals and initiatives.

CHAPTER 4

ENDNOTES

1. The possibility of a coup has been discounted by all Koreans and all foreign observers with whom the author has discussed Korean politics for about 2 years. The impression of confidence and optimism was also reinforced by virtually all contacts, as well as the writings of scholars and publicists.

2. Interview, Seoul, September 7, 1990. Also see *Chungang Ilbo*, September 20, 1990, p.1, translated in *FBIS-EAP-186*, September 25, 1990, pp. 39-40.

3. Although the concept of *Nordpolitik* has had precedents in earlier South Korean policy, it was synthesized into an integrated policy to provide the basis of intrapeninsula relationships in a July 7, 1988, television address by President Roh Tae Woo.

4. This judgment is based not only on the not-for-attribution interviews with the author in September, but also informal contacts and a review of English language material.

5. For an example of the position that the current detente may not be stable, see Yong-Ok Park, "Japan's Defense Buildup and Regional Balance," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 1990, pp. 115-128.

6. Interviews, Seoul, September 7-10, 1990.

7. *Tong-A Ilbo*, January 25, 1989, and interviews, Seoul, September 7-10, 1990.

8. See Dae-Sook Suh, "Changes in Sino-Soviet Policies toward Korea and Implications for the United States," paper prepared for a Cato Institute Conference on the U.S.-South Korean Alliance, Washington, D.C., June 21, 1990, for a contrary position. Dr. Suh is professor at the University of Hawaii, but probably reflects a body of opinion in Seoul.

9. Interview, September 8, 1990.

10. For a concise and well reasoned defense of functionalism, see Sung-Joo Han, "Problems and Prospects for Peace and Security in Korea," paper presented at ASEAN-China Hong Kong Forum, August 7-9, 1990.

11. American officials in Seoul have been embarrassed that the Soviets were able to subsidize visits of their best artists, while the United States had difficulty in acquiring even second level performers.

12. For instance, see "Fault Finding?" *The Korea Times*, September 23, 1990, p. 2, reprinted in *FBIS-EAP-186*, September 25, 1990, p. 38; and "Firms Competing to Trade with USSR," *The Korea Herald*, November 15, 1990, p. 6, reprinted in *FBIS-EAP-221*, November 15, 1990, p. 27.

13. The author has not personally spoken with anyone who depicted the Soviet Union as an adversary.

14. Young Koo Cha, "The Future of ROK-U.S. Military Relations," in William J. Taylor, Jr., Young Koo Cha, and John Q. Blodgett, eds., *The Korean Peninsula: Prospects for Arms Reduction Under Global Detente*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, p. 110.

15. "Astute Economic Ties with USSR," *The Korea Times*, December 18, 1990, p. 6, reprinted in *FBIS-EAP-243*, December 18, 1990, pp. 16-17.

16. "For Seoul, Can Moscow Replace Washington?" *Korea Daily*, December 18, 1990, p. 1, reprinted in *FBIS-EAP-243*, December 18, 1990, p. 15-16.

17. See Suck-kyo Ahn, "Prospects for South Korea's Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia," in Dalchong Kim, ed., *Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia*, Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1990, p. 167.

18. In 1988, R.O.K. trade with China was \$3,196 million, while R.O.K.-Soviet trade was only \$278 million. Ahn, p. 164. R.O.K.-Soviet trade probably reached no more than \$1 billion in 1990. Shim Jae Hoon and Susumu Awanahara, "Perestroika Payoff," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 14, 1990, p. 10. China's trade with the D.P.R.K. in 1988 was \$278 million. *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1989*, Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1990, p. 135.

19. Some of the scorn for Beijing's solicitousness for Pyongyang is indicated in "We Do Not Need to Be Kind to Beijing," *Tong-A Ilbo*, July 31, 1990, p. 2, translated in *FBIS-EAP-154*, August 9, 1990, pp. 21-22; and "PRC Designate For Seoul Trade Office Viewed," YONHAP radio service, December 3, 1990, reported in *FBIS-EAP-233*, December 4, 1990, p. 22.

20. In interviews and discussions with the author, China was never considered except as a source of instability.

21. For an interesting discussion of the emotional content of Korea's response to Japan, see Shim Jae Hoon, "So Near, Yet So Far: History, Not Distance, Divides Japan and South Korea," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 31, 1991, pp. 38-39.

22. Chapter 2.

23. "27 May Dailies Assess No's Visit to Japan," *FBIS-EAP-90-105*, May 31, 1990, pp. 30-31, and "25, 26, May Dailies View 'Deepest Regret,'" *FBIS-EAP-90-105*, May 31, 1990, pp. 31-32, dealt with 12 different editorials, all but one of which categorically rejected the Emperor's apology.

24. "Japan Is Checking Its Technology toward ROK," *Tong-A Ilbo*, September 30, 1990, p. 2, translated in *FBIS-EAP-90-193*, October 4, 1990, p. 32.

25. Park, especially pp. 120-122. The respondents in all interviews generally agreed with this position.

26. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meeting in their offices, declined to criticize Japanese foreign or security policy.

27. "Seoul Concerned Over Japan's Gulf Policy," YONHAP radio service, October 18, 1990, reported in *FBIS-EAP-90-203*, October 19, 1990, pp. 32-33.

28. See "Seoul Dismayed by Rapprochement," Tokyo KYODO, September 27, 1990, and "Japan's Moves With DPRK Closely Examined," YONHAP, September 29, 1990, reported in *FBIS-EAP-90-190*, October 1, 1990, pp. 22-23; and "Japan's Double-Faced Approach," *The Korea Times*, October 11, 1990, p. 6, reprinted in *FBIS-EAP-90-197*, October 11, 1990, p. 26.

29. The best treatment of CFC organization in open literature, somewhat dated but still correct on fundamentals, is John H. Cushman, *Command and Control of Theater Forces: The Korea Command and Other Cases*, Cambridge, MA: Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, 1986, especially chapters 2, 3, and 4.

30. See Cha, p. 116, for a South Korean criticism of the current U.S. approach to burdensharing.

31. For a brief review of the evolution of U.S.-R.O.K. security relations, see Thomas L. Wilborn, "U.S. Forces in Korea: An American Strategic

Perspective," *The Ilhae Institute Occasional Paper Series* 87-03, 1987, pp. 2-6.

32. Discussions with the author by U.S. servicemen, 1985-86.

33. Wilborn, p. 17.

34. *Ibid.* Vietnam was an important watershed because the myth of U.S. invincibility was shattered, but more importantly because R.O.K. forces performed so well.

35. Interviews, Seoul, September 6-10, 1990, and other discussions with South Korean officers and analysts.

36. Senior R.O.K. military had not been advocates of change in the CFC or other aspects of the relationship with the United States, at least until recently. There has been support for changes at field-grade levels for some time, and interest may be spreading. See Lee Suk Bok, *The Impact of US Forces in Korea*, Washington: National Defense University, 1987; and Taek-hyung Rhee, *US-ROK Combined Operations: A Korean Perspective*, A National Security Affairs Monograph, Washington: National Defense University, 1986.

37. Most nonmilitary defense intellectuals speak with anticipation of more prominent roles by the South Korean officers, and the possibility of exercise of operational control by R.O.K. authority.

38. For a relatively realistic example, see Cha, pp. 107- 108. Scenarios provided informally by others tended to be more extreme as far as projected U.S. behavior is concerned.

39. For a careful analysis of the causes of anti- Americanism, which also contains sections which seem absolutely outrageous to an American, see Jinwung Kim, "Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Causes," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 8, August 1989, pp. 748-763.

40. Student activists charged the Reagan administration with unacceptable interference in support of Chun Doo Hwan in 1981, and also with favoring Roh Tae Woo in 1987.

41. In a September 1990 poll, the United States was the most liked country, although only 19.5 percent said so and it was also the second most disliked country. The same poll showed that 64.1 percent considered the U.S.-R.O.K. security relationship essential. *Chungang Ilbo*, September 20, p. 1, translated in *FBIS- EAP-90-186*, September 25, 1990, pp. 39-40. In a poll of university students, who are supposed to include the most aggressive anti-American agitators, 59.3 percent believed that the United States promotes South Korean modernization. Almost as many (53.2

percent) thought that the United States "gives a bad impression," however. *Choson Ilbo*, September 17, 1990, p. 34. There is certainly no hint of animosity in most personal relationships between individual Koreans and Americans.

42. *Chungang Ilbo*, December 18, 1990, p. 5, translated in *FBIS-EAP-90-293*, p. 19, and *Hangyore Sinmun*, December 20, 1990, p. 2, translated in *FBIS-EAP-90-246*, pp. 14-15, both gave great praise to an opposition lawmaker who prevented the payment of \$50 million for labor expenses for the USFK in spite of the intervention of the U.S. ambassador. The payment was apparently illegal until a new Status of Forces Agreement was concluded, expected very shortly. The lawmaker was a hero for standing up to the United States!

43. As examples, see Pong-mi No, "Causes of Trade Friction with US," *The Korea Herald*, December 3, 1990, pp. 20-22; "Recurrence of ROK-US Trade Friction," *Chungang Ilbo*, December 24, 1990, p. 2, and Tae-kyu O, "ROK-US Cool Wind," *Hangyore Sinmun*, December 26, 1990, pp. 27-29.

44. "The Amount Requested by the United States is Exorbitant—The Share of the Gulf Expenses Should be Assumed at a Level Acceptable to the People," *Chungang Ilbo*, September 18, 1990, p. 2, translated in *FBIS-EAP-90-183*, September 19, 1990, pp. 27-28; "Persian Gulf Support Exceeds Our Ability," *Kyonghyang Sinmun*, September 24, 1990, p. 3, *FBIS-EAP-90-190*, October 1, 1990, p. 26.

45. "Solarz's Logic in Calling on Korea to Dispatch Troops," *Tong-A Ilbo*, September 21, 1990, p. 3, translated in *FBIS-EAP-90-185*, September 24, 1990, pp. 29-30.

46. One of the respondents in the not-for-attribution interviews in September 1990 expressed unusual anger because the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Western Pacific had criticized South Korean policy toward Vietnam.

47. Cha, p. 106.

CHAPTER 5

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

A principal working assumption of this study is that national security policy is based on the perceptions of regional policymakers and their advisors. Knowledge of these perceptions should be an important ingredient in the formulation of U.S. security policy for Northeast Asia. Only then is it possible for U.S. policymakers to anticipate the reaction to policy initiatives for the region, to mold policy initiatives that favorably influence the perceptions of the United States held by members of Northeast Asian security communities, and to facilitate the achievement of U.S. objectives in the future.

This final chapter contains a summary of the perceptions presented in the previous three chapters which are most salient for U.S. policy for Northeast Asia. The summary is followed by an analysis of the implications of these findings for the United States and the U.S. Army.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Changing and Uncertain Security Relationships.

There is virtual unanimity among the security communities of Northeast Asia that the international system in the region is in transition, evolving from the bipolar system of the cold war to a more decentralized, multipolar system. In this transitional phase, and in the multipolar system which is to emerge, regional politics will not be dominated by U.S.-Soviet competition, and the influence of other actors will increase.

Most Northeast Asian defense intellectuals believe that the U.S.-Soviet and Sino-Soviet detentes are favorable developments. The reduction in tensions between the Soviets and China and the United States contributes toward a

favorable atmosphere for increased economic interchange, and allows each regional government to deemphasize military expenditures. Improved relations in the two bilateral relationships have been particularly beneficial for Seoul in the execution of *Nordpolitik*. While there is less than total agreement about the stability of the two detentes, the majority of defense intellectuals in all three countries expect them to last beyond the near term, but see patterns of confrontation reemerging within one or two decades. At the same time, virtually all defense intellectuals perceive that there will be problems and dangers in multipolarity. Regional powers, they believe, will be less inhibited than formerly by the alliances of the cold war, and more likely to attempt to pursue specific national interests, using their relatively sophisticated military capabilities when they believe that such use will be beneficial. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent U.S.-led international response stimulated more attention to this aspect of the emerging international system than might otherwise have been the case, but the basis of these concerns is grounded in more fundamental historical and geopolitical analysis.

Japan as Greatest Danger.

The regional power that the defense communities of China and South Korea are most worried about is Japan. After the anticipated disengagement of the United States from Northeast Asia (or, in some scenarios, modification of the U.S.-Japan alliance so that Japan assumes the major peacetime military role), Chinese and South Korean defense intellectuals fear and expect that Japan, already possessing awesome economic strength, will assume a far greater political role, supported by a stronger and more offensive military establishment, which will inevitably conflict with the interests of China and South Korea. Their perceptions appear to be molded as much by historical memories as by current realities. Chinese and South Korean defense intellectuals perceive other potential dangers also, but they do not seem to achieve the salience of the imagined future threat from Japan. Even the long-term threat to China from the Soviet Union, which all members of the Chinese security community acknowledge, or

the near-term worries which South Koreans have about their northern neighbor, do not seem to attract as much attention or concern as the long-term Japanese threat.

Self-Doubt of Japanese.

Not surprisingly, Japanese defense intellectuals perceive future tensions caused by nations other than Japan, including China and a united Korea imbued with a strong sense of nationalism, as well as the Soviet Union. Ironically, they are more preoccupied with the future regional and global roles of their own country than with others, however. They seem to be unanimous in the worry that the Japanese political system may be incapable of developing regional and global roles for Japan consistent with its economic strength and unique history. Whatever their other differences, virtually all agree that the failure of Japan to adjust properly to the emerging international system will result in serious problems for Japan domestically, with serious consequences for regional security. The political elite and security community in Japan fear uncertainty as much as any specific threat, and to them uncertainty seems to be the most prominent characteristic of international politics in the post-cold war world.

U.S. Military Presence Guarantees Stability.

Virtually all defense intellectuals from all three nations view the military presence of the United States in Northeast Asia as a major contributor to regional stability. No other nation has the ability to act as a balancer and honest broker, defense intellectuals repeatedly stated, because no other major power active in the region is without territorial claims in Northeast Asia, and no other power would be accepted by almost all of the regional states (North Korea presumably would be the only exception).

However, at the same time there is almost as broad an agreement among the three security communities with the proposition that, because of detente with the Soviet Union and serious domestic economic problems, the United States will, within the decade, decrease its military presence. To most Northeast Asian defense intellectuals, reduction of its military presence below a certain ill-defined level will indicate

disengagement of the United States from the region. Many of their security concerns summarized in the preceding paragraphs assume that the United States will abandon its role of balancer and honest broker. Were the United States to remain fully engaged in Northeast Asia, Chinese and South Korean fears of Japan, and Japanese fears of China and a united Korea in the future, would be less significant.

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGES IN PERCEPTIONS

Stability of Anti-Japanese Stereotypes.

The security perceptions of defense intellectuals in Northeast Asia are continually changing as they adjust to modifications in the security environments of their nations. As indicated in Chapter 1, the "reality" principle (given adequate information, most people perceive what is actually there) is a major determinant of perceptions. However, the perceptions which might cause destabilizing behavior (e.g., a regional arms race) are mostly grounded in national stereotypes and historical myths which appear to be so well incorporated into the respective cultures that they are unlikely to change significantly in the next several years, or even in the next decade.

The intense hostility which Chinese and Koreans feel toward Japan that causes them to question the intentions behind every Japanese act toward them is as strong today among younger citizens, and younger defense intellectuals, as among older ones. Anti-Japanese attitudes are acculturated through a variety of institutions of the societies, inculcating each age cohort with almost the same prejudices held by the previous one. Moreover, in addition to antipathy based on national memory and imbedded prejudice, geographic and economic factors also tend to lead Chinese and South Koreans to view Japan with concern. Proximity and deep economic inroads have increased interdependency and familiarity between Japan and its neighbors, but instead of leading to mutual understanding and empathy they have produced new disputes and alleged provocations. As the three economies

move into greater competition, mutual hostility could be exacerbated.

Japanese Security Perceptions Continue to Evolve.

The best chance of change may be in the orientations of Japanese defense intellectuals. A consensus on defense in Japan had been evolving steadily since the SDF was created, but the intense debate now occurring in Tokyo could result in a major shift of that consensus. Indeed, the fact that the consensus has moved away from the idealistic pacifism of the Constitution to today's pragmatic acceptance of the need to defend sea lines of communications out to 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo Bay is one of the developments which Chinese and South Korean defense intellectuals cite as cause to fear the role of Japan in the future. It is not clear, however, how the defense consensus will evolve as new generations of policymakers and defense intellectuals replace those now in power.

There is an argument, likely to be strongly supported among the Chinese and Koreans, that future generations of Japanese will be less impressed than older Japanese with the horrors of war and the tragic results of Japan's last flirtation with militarism. They will also be less willing than their elders have been to accept responsibility for the damage which Japan inflicted on East Asia, especially China and Korea. As they begin to assume authority in Japan, this argument holds, Japan's foreign policy will become increasingly independent, assertive, and profoundly destabilizing.

On the other hand, there is also a contrary argument which holds that most younger Japanese, including defense intellectuals, are not particularly nationalistic at all. Their behavior is motivated by self-interest and hedonism more than any ideal or ideology, including nationalism. Proponents of this argument believe that the succession of new generations will lead to only limited change—as little as is possible without endangering ties with the United States or threatening Japan's economic position—in foreign and security policies because they realize that maintaining Japan's unparalleled prosperity depends upon maintaining existing international economic and

political relationships. They also understand that a prominent international role by Japan could stimulate reactions which would disturb regional, even global, tranquility.

As might be expected, there is no data which provides a convincing answer as to the security orientations of future Japanese defense intellectuals, except that most of them will be neither extreme nationalists or valueless pragmatists. In the author's opinion, younger Japanese defense intellectuals are less nationalistic and more cautious than their elders. This can only be a tentative conclusion at this writing, but it deserves consideration as much as the more threatening perceptions held by many in Northeast Asia.

Anti-Americanism in South Korea has been a function of generational change. Younger Koreans, especially university graduates from whom defense intellectuals are recruited, are more likely to be strongly nationalistic and harbor anti-American attitudes than their seniors who may have feelings of gratitude toward the United States. In the absence of some significant changes in the U.S. presence in Korea or in U.S.-R.O.K. relations, issues given additional consideration later in this chapter, there is no reason to expect a significant lessening of anti-Americanism in the next decade.

U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Simply because the security communities of China, Japan, and South Korea believe that the removal or substantial withdrawal of U.S. forward deployed forces from Northeast Asia will result in regional instability is not a sufficient U.S. justification for keeping them there. All or even a portion of them should remain only if the costs of retaining them are justified by the benefits to U.S. national interests. In fact, official U.S. policy does hold that, since the Soviet Union no longer presents as serious a threat to the United States in Northeast Asia as formerly, regional stability is now the principal American security objective for all of East Asia, and clearly a requirement for the satisfaction of U.S. national interests in the region. According to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific,

Any diminishing of the credibility of the U.S. forward deployed deterrent would only produce an increase in regional tensions, with other powers tempted to fill any perceived gaps. For the foreseeable future, we—and most nations in the region—view the United States as the irreplaceable balancing wheel. No other power is viewed as an acceptable substitute for our critical stabilizing role.¹

Critical U.S. Role as a Regional Balancer.

The balancer role for the United States in East Asia is particularly critical, not only because defense intellectuals in each country have concerns about the future intentions of others in the region, but more significantly because East Asia, especially Northeast Asia, has no security structure except for the formal and informal bilateral relationships with the United States.² Unlike Europe, where the East-West confrontation dominated all other security issues and spawned two rival security organizations, the cold war never was the principal security concern for most East Asian nations, including two of the Northeast Asian nations considered in this study. Envisioning differing threats and preoccupied with varying problems, the basis for an Asian version of NATO was never really present, condemning, for example, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to a short and inglorious life from the beginning.

The network of bilateral treaties and less formal security arrangements between the United States and practically all non-Communist East Asian nations has been flexible enough to recognize the unique problems, capabilities, levels of development, and perceived threats of each East Asian partner. It has provided the basic framework which allowed them to confront their economic, political, and social problems with some confidence. While this network would not be automatically abolished by the withdrawal or substantial reduction of U.S. forward deployed forces, its credibility would be shaken. Correctly or incorrectly, the widespread perception in Northeast Asia (and probably in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific also) is that the presence of U.S. military forces in the region signifies U.S. engagement; without a credible U.S. military presence, they assume that the United States has

disengaged, and that they could no longer anticipate an American role in regional security affairs. Moreover, unlike Europe, with a whole family of established regional organizations including the European Community (EC), neither East Asia nor even the four governments in the region of Northeast Asia have viable economic or social organizations that might provide a framework around which regional security discussions might take place in the absence of the U.S. honest broker role. The fledgling Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization may someday provide such a structure, but given the varying levels of development and capabilities, not to mention threat perceptions of its members, this is not likely for many years.

An alternative to the network of bilateral security arrangements between the United States and East Asian nations has been proposed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet scheme, which would expand Soviet influence into areas where it now barely exists, is a collective security arrangement modeled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Not yet well received by East Asian governments, including those of Northeast Asia, the scheme might be viewed as a more attractive option should the region's defense intellectuals perceive a reduction of the U.S. commitment to regional stability.³

America's Economic Stake in Northeast Asia.

In the foreseeable future, U.S. world order and economic interests in Northeast Asia will also continue to justify maintaining a military presence in Northeast Asia. The current cost for forward deployed forces of some \$42 billion, which also includes forces stationed in the Philippines, does not necessarily seem excessive to provide the conditions "without which economic growth cannot occur,"⁴ and without which profitable economic relationships for the United States cannot be maintained or expanded, for the scope of U.S. trade with Northeast Asia is impressive. The two-way trade with Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan (excluded from the analysis of perceptions, but an important contributor to the region's economic dynamism) was \$220 billion, more than the total trade for all of Europe in 1989.⁵ The United States experienced

a trade deficit with the region and each nation in it, a fact given a great deal of attention in the media and Congress. But the fact that the trade deficit with Northeast Asia in 1989 exceeded \$69 billion should not obscure the less frequently mentioned fact that U.S. exports were over \$75 billion, \$6.7 billion less than all of the exports to the 12 nations of the EC in the same year. Japan was the single largest overseas purchaser of U.S. goods, spending over \$44.5 billion. The UK, with almost \$21 billion in purchases, was second.⁶ This volume of trade has been increasing and, barring a serious recession in the United States, should continue to do so through the coming decade.

Cold War Residuals.

Thus far, the significant reductions of Soviet military capabilities in Northeast Asia have been limited to those forces aligned against China. While the sizes of the Pacific Fleet and Far Eastern air forces are somewhat smaller than previously, and are exercising much less frequently, they have been modernized and, according to some U.S. sources, represent a stronger threat than formerly.⁷ They may be more significantly reduced in the future, but are likely to remain substantial. Moreover, with the military apparently assuming increased influence in Moscow, a partial return to the policy of reliance on military strength in the region has become a possibility. These forces are also directly related to one of the few remaining territorial disputes in the region, the Japanese claim to the Northern Territories, the four small islands at the southern end of the Kurile chain which are administered and occupied by the Soviets.⁸ The other important residue of the cold war is the confrontation on the Korean peninsula.

INFLUENCING NORTHEAST ASIAN PERCEPTIONS

If Northeast Asian defense intellectuals are to be assuaged, they must be assured that the United States will remain a Pacific power and continue to play a security role in Northeast Asia throughout the transitional phase of international politics into which Northeast Asia has entered. The United States can take at least four steps:

Retain Forward Deployed Forces.

Obviously, the first step for the United States is to moderate the concerns of the region's defense intellectuals about potential instability following reductions in the U.S. military presence. It is not completely clear what constitutes credibility for U.S. forward deployed forces, but defense specialists have identified some criteria. To South Koreans and Japanese, there must be an effective deterrent force in Korea—and for many being effective means positioning U.S. ground forces so that they will be in harms way if an attack from the North occurs. Increasingly, however, many defense intellectuals are emphasizing that U.S. forces should primarily be designed to complement R.O.K. armed forces with air, intelligence and other capabilities which the R.O.K. armed forces are perceived to lack. As a result of the success of Operation Desert Storm, technological sophistication may become a more salient characteristic of military credibility, leading to much more attention paid to the quality of weapons systems in the U.S. and R.O.K. inventories than may have been the case in the past.

Undoubtedly, a smaller but still technologically advanced combination of air and ground forces would be accepted by most Northeast Asians as an adequate and credible deterrent. Reductions beyond those already announced by Secretary of Defense Cheney⁹ are anticipated as South Korea's economic and technological capacity permit the R.O.K. to modernize many of its own forces. However, unless there is a breakthrough in North-South relations, withdrawal of the Army's combat forces below the size of a brigade or the substantial depletion of air power in the next decade would fuel anxieties about the U.S. commitment to South Korea and the region. Much will depend upon the state of North-South relations and the relative development of the two Korean territories. Especially if North Korea does not continue receiving supplies of sophisticated equipment from the Soviet Union, R.O.K. forces may be generally perceived as adequate to provide a greater share of the deterrent against the D.P.R.K. regime than is now the case.

Whatever the changes in South Korean military capabilities relative to the North, the perception of them should be altered subtly as the United States continues to shift from a "leading" role to a "supporting" role in the CFC.¹⁰ As an American-designed organization with American officers in the most visible positions, the most prevalent perception of the CFC exaggerates R.O.K. dependence on the United States for its security. To the degree that Americans are removed from some of these prominent positions and replaced by South Koreans, the perception of R.O.K. subservience to the United States in the defense of South Korea should be at least marginally corrected. When that happens, the perceived requirement for U.S. forces in Korea may become more modest.

The U.S.-Soviet regional military balance is not a priority question for most Northeast Asian defense intellectuals at the present time. If the Soviets were to accelerate their military operations in the area, however, a credible U.S. military presence would have to be adequate to check Soviet moves. This requirement for credibility of U.S. forward deployed forces as a barrier to instability would vary with the intentions and behavior of the Soviet Union: what the United States needs depends upon what the Soviets do. Given informed estimates of projected Soviet actions, U.S. naval and air deployments in the region are credible now, and would continue to be even with a modest reduction beyond the drawdowns already announced. If the Soviets stay relatively inactive but continue to modernize—the pattern of the last several years—a fair guess is that an additional 10-15 percent reduction by the United States would begin to be noticed, and might affect security perceptions widely. If the Soviets step up their operations, the credibility of the U.S. military presence would be adversely affected by any reductions. On the other hand, should the Soviets further reduce their operations and/or degrade their capabilities in the region, the question of the credibility of U.S. forces as a balance to Soviet forces may not arise.

Although the Korean confrontation and the U.S.-Soviet regional balance are considered important, most regional

defense intellectuals are less concerned about a specific military situation than they are preoccupied with potential threats which may emerge in the future, and the general political atmosphere which prevails in the region. The presence of U.S. military forces is valued because they symbolize the engagement of the United States in regional affairs, which tends to reduce tensions and provide channels of communication and even informal mediation, and because they neutralize the military capabilities of states which might otherwise present a challenge to stability. Most defense intellectuals declined to speculate as to what the force structure of a credible military presence should be in order to assure stability. Those who would provide advice suggested three characteristics: (1) its largest component should be from the Navy; (2) it should have an organic contingency force which could be rapidly deployed anywhere in the region; and (3) it should be visible to all through frequent port calls, fly-overs, exercises with Northeast Asian military forces, and high level visits. Those who placed emphasis on having an organic contingency force, as opposed to relying on capabilities stationed outside of the region, insisted that the U.S. military presence could not be credible if it did not have assets which allowed an *immediate* reaction to regional contingencies, even if extraregional reinforcements might be required later.

Present forward deployed forces in the region, even ignoring those which are designated for the defense of Korea, would seem to be adequate to provide Northeast Asians with confidence that the United States, in promoting its own interests in the region, will also protect their governments against unforeseen threats. The U.S. military presence could be reduced even more, assuming that it continued to include an organic contingency force, and still retained its credibility as a regional stabilizing factor in the absence of a specific threat to the security of the nations of the region.

None of the defense intellectuals interviewed mentioned nuclear deterrence as a function of the U.S. military presence. However, it was most certainly assumed by all of them—certainly the Japanese and South Koreans. The explanation for this omission may simply be that they believed

that the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is too self-evident to require explicit notice. Or perhaps they would prefer to reap the benefits of the U.S. nuclear capability without the actual deployment of nuclear weapons within the region. In any case, since China is a nuclear power; other nations of the region all have, or are acquiring, the technology to produce nuclear weapons; and a potential enemy of at least two regional nations, the Soviet Union, has deployed extremely sophisticated nuclear weapons systems as close as the Sea of Okhotsk and southeastern Siberia, it is inconceivable that nuclear deterrence should not be a necessary component (over-the-horizon or U.S.-based if possible) of a credible U.S. military presence.

Reinforce Favorable Perceptions.

The fact that U.S. forward deployed forces are seen as an adequate capability to deter in Korea, balance the Soviet Union, and provide conditions of regional stability at the present time underlines the problems of influencing perceptions. Even though the capability is adequate now, it does not provide Northeast Asian defense intellectuals with confidence that their possible enemies will continue to refrain from threatening action. For that, they must be convinced that a credible U.S. military presence will be in the region when they anticipate that problems will arise. In other words, Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese defense intellectuals must be convinced that the U.S. military presence will be deployed 10-20 years into the future, when they believe that Japan (in the minds of Chinese and South Koreans), China or Korea (in the minds of Japanese), or again the Soviet Union (in the minds of Chinese and Japanese) will become a destabilizing force in the absence of U.S. forward deployed forces.

The skepticism expressed by Northeast Asian defense intellectuals that the United States will retain a military presence in Northeast Asia adequate to insure stability into the next century may be implicit in the transitional nature of contemporary international politics. Neither Northeast Asians nor Americans are exactly sure and clearly have not reached a consensus about what security-related international patterns will emerge in the next decade or two. Not only Japanese

defense intellectuals, but also members of the defense communities of China, South Korea, the Soviet Union, and the United States, are engaged in more-or-less public debates about the appropriate international roles of their states in post-cold war international politics. With the passage of time, and as post-cold war patterns begin to evolve and be recognized, some of the sense of uncertainty should dissipate, and some of the skepticism about the relationship between U.S. declaratory policy and probable actual U.S. behavior may disappear. However, the cacophony of voices from the United States on international relations, particularly U.S. relations with Northeast Asian states which enjoy large trade surpluses with the United States (as they no doubt will for at least the rest of the decade), suggests that a number of Northeast Asian defense intellectuals will continue to harbor suspicions about whether the United States will remain actively engaged in Northeast Asian security affairs while there are serious social and economic problems at home.

Clarify U.S. Policy.

These suspicions can be further ameliorated by effective declaratory policy and more convincing analyses by American defense intellectuals demonstrating to audiences both in the United States and in Northeast Asia that U.S. interests in the region are substantial and that to protect these interests rational U.S. behavior includes the forward deployment of a military force adequate to maintain regional stability as long as the states in Northeast Asia desire it. Dissemination of this message should be a high priority for all U.S. Government personnel operating in Northeast Asia, particularly foreign service officers and military personnel with regular contacts with officials of host governments. The U.S. Information Agency can also support this effort through its program which brings American lecturers to Northeast Asian countries.

U.S. declaratory policy already reflects what would seem to be the proper themes to mold the perceptions of Northeast Asian security communities in the desired fashion: the United States has important and growing interests in Northeast and other portions of Asia; it is committed to stability in the region, and recognizes that a U.S. role as balancer is crucial to regional

stability; and, because of this role and the presence of potentially menacing Soviet capabilities, a U.S. military presence will remain for the foreseeable future.¹¹ In sum, as Assistant Secretary of State Richard H. Solomon told the House Subcommittee on Asian and the Pacific, "We intend to remain a Pacific power in every respect, for our engagement in the region remains crucial to the pursuit of fundamental U.S. economic and security interests."¹² The message must be frequently repeated and emphasized to the American Congress and informed public, as well as to the defense intellectuals of Northeast Asia. Convincing the former would make it much easier to convince the latter.

The perception that the United States will sustain its military presence and security role in Northeast Asia would also be fostered by a long-term commitment to deploy ground forces in Northeast Asia. At present, a division of Marines is stationed on Okinawa, where they (and the Japanese government) are under intense pressure from virtually all local political groups to leave, and return the bases to the peaceful pursuits of Okinawans. The Second Infantry Division, a unique organization in the U.S. Army's force structure, remains in South Korea, where its mission is solely to deter and defend against an attack from the North. By implication, it will have no purpose on the peninsula when there is no longer a North Korean threat, and most regional defense intellectuals expect it to eventually withdraw, or be asked to leave by the R.O.K. They have no doubt about the eventual success of the R.O.K. in neutralizing the North as a military threat, if not absorbing it on the model of Germany. In the not too distant future, perhaps by 2000 or 2010, most defense intellectuals anticipate that there will no longer be U.S. ground forces in the Pacific west of Hawaii. The U.S. military presence will consist of highly mobile air and naval capabilities which may have missions all through the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility, not just Northeast Asia, and even to contingencies elsewhere on the globe.

Long-term deployment of a reasonably large ground force organization (perhaps a brigade or equivalent), particularly a U.S. Army organization, would imply the kind of lasting

commitment which U.S. spokesmen insist that the United States has accepted in Northeast Asia. The perception of permanence would be stronger with Army rather than Marine units because traditionally the function of the Marine Corps has been rapid projection and withdrawal of force, rather than the more enduring missions of deterrence and territorial defense associated with the Army.

Retaining such Army forces in Northeast Asia after the North Korean threat has disappeared would pose extremely difficult—perhaps insurmountable—political problems. They would have to be placed in one of the countries which is a formal ally of the United States, Japan or South Korea. Even if it might be politically acceptable to station an Army brigade in Japan, which is highly unlikely, finding a suitable location would be all but impossible. Given the current anti-Americanism in Korea, and the symbol of U.S. armed forces as the instrument which has prevented the Republic of Korea from fully exercising sovereignty since 1950, the continued stationing of an Army organization in South Korea would also seem politically improbable. *But the nature of South Korean perceptions of the United States and anti-Americanism might undergo important changes while the North Korean threat and U.S. forces dedicated to deal with that threat still remain.* If the changes in the U.S.-R.O.K. relationship previously mentioned (plus others suggested below) are successful, a different quality of defense relationship might emerge in which U.S. forces without authority over R.O.K. forces or ultimate responsibility for the defense of South—or a united—Korea would be acceptable on Korean soil to help maintain stability in the region. Korean, but not necessarily American, defense intellectuals would undoubtedly view such forces primarily as a restraint against Japan.

As noted above, some defense intellectuals indicated that a credible military presence should be clearly visible throughout the region. Active forces, pursuing regular security assistance, defense cooperation, and military-to-military relations programs in addition to port-call and show-the-flag exercises (which are themselves important in influencing the

perceptions of defense intellectuals), strengthen the web of interactions between the United States and the Northeast Asian nations involved. These activities should primarily be directed toward Northeast Asian armies, which tend to dominate the military establishments of all three nations. Besides establishing the U.S. military presence's visibility, they also support the proposition that U.S. engagement in the affairs of the region is intended to be long-lasting, if not permanent. A military organization which participates in regular educational exchanges, professional visits, periodic combined exercises, and regional intermilitary activities should not be perceived as a temporary expedient. Moreover, these programs have the potential of advancing some other interests of the United States which have not been previously mentioned in this discussion, such as the spread of respect for human rights and democracy. These programs, including the Expanded Relations Program of U.S. Army Pacific (which coordinates all military-to-military activities for the Army in the PACOM area), are already in place in the PACOM area of responsibility. In the past, they were understandably integrated with the basic U.S. strategy of containing the Soviet Union. They are equally compatible with a strategy focused on regional stability.

Combat Anti-Americanism in Korea.

As we have seen, anti-Americanism in Korea is a manifestation of nationalism and the 45 year post-war relationship in which the R.O.K. was, until the last few years, a very junior partner at best, and a client at worst. The changes occurring in the U.S.-R.O.K. relationship, with former debtor South Korea now holding a persistent trade surplus with the United States and initiating a bold policy to establish rapprochement with the Soviet Union (already achieved) and China (a possibility in the not too distant future) provide the Northeast Asian regional system its transitional quality. As the U.S.-R.O.K. relationship continues to evolve into a partnership between relatively more equal partners, and defense intellectuals and other members of the policy elites of both nations begin to develop expectations based on equality, much of the dissatisfaction in Seoul (and Washington also) which

causes resentment and injured nationalistic pride will disappear.

U.S. armed forces alone cannot manage the transformation from the present unequal relationship to one of near equality. As are most bilateral relationships between industrial states, U.S.-South Korean ties have become increasingly complex. The agencies of the U.S. Government concerned with trade and other economic questions may be more prominent actors in the future affairs of the alliance than the Department of Defense. But the symbols of inequality, the present structure of the CFC and operational control of most R.O.K. armed forces by the CINCCFC, are military symbols, and they have to be adjusted as the relationship evolves. The steps, already underway or being planned, by which the United States will relinquish its leading role in the defense of South Korea in favor of a supporting role (the planned move of Headquarters USFK out of the center of Seoul, and changes in the Status of Forces Agreement) will significantly reduce the prominence of the United States as a target for nationalists. Moreover, these steps are not only symbolic, for they will in fact contribute to balancing the security relationship between the two nations. When these adjustments are incorporated into alliance practice, while at the same time the size of USFK is being at least marginally reduced, no doubt other changes in the organization of the CFC, including transferring operational control of South Korean forces to the R.O.K. chain of command, will also need to be made. These changes may not completely undercut anti-Americanism, but they would certainly do much to redress one of the perceived infringements of sovereignty allegedly imposed by the United States. When they have succeeded, they will also make it possible to give U.S. forces in Korea the visibility necessary for America's military presence to act as a stabilizing factor throughout Northeast Asia. However, until publicly acceptable adjustments in the alliance have been satisfactorily accomplished, a high profile for U.S. forces in Korea could be politically counterproductive.

Influencing Other Perceptions.

The sense of insecurity found among defense intellectuals in Northeast Asia seemed to be partly based on uncertainty about whether or not the United States would remain fully engaged in the region in the future. But it also grows out of strong feelings within each national security community that one or more nations in its security environment will become a threat to its future security in the absence of an American military presence, and in the case of some individuals, even in the face of an American military presence. Based as they are on deep-seated historical experiences, these hostile attitudes cannot be easily influenced by outsiders. However, perceptions of policymakers and analysts do tend to correspond with reality, at least over time, so that American officials in Northeast Asia might contribute to a greater sense of security among defense intellectuals by sharing information as broadly as possible. At least the objective of helping host defense intellectuals keep abreast of security developments in other Northeast Asian countries could be assumed by U.S. representatives stationed in, or dealing with, Northeast Asia. With its annual Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS), attended by representatives of Armies from all over the PACOM area, USARPAC already contributes to this process. Since the greatest perceived threat to stability in the region is Japan, a priority might be to provide Chinese and South Koreans with information about the extraordinary hold of pacifism within the Japanese population, and the vulnerabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Force.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE NEED FOR ARMY PRESENCE

As a government, the United States can influence Northeast Asian security perceptions most persuasively by maintaining an adequate military presence in the region, and by convincing Northeast Asian policymakers and other defense intellectuals that it is an established feature of U.S. policy. This task may actually be somewhat easier since the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, although at this writing it is too early to make an informed judgment. At least there

should no longer be widespread doubt that the United States can take decisive action. However, whether the U.S. response to the Gulf crisis influences beliefs of Northeast Asian defense intellectuals about the commitment of the United States to *their* region's security is another question.

One of the most effective ways for the United States to demonstrate its lasting commitment to stability in Northeast Asia and its intention to remain engaged in the affairs of the region would be to include a brigade or larger Army force in that presence, together with units from the Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Its purpose should not necessarily be to deter some specific putative enemy (although it clearly should not ignore any specific military threat to allies in the region), but rather to help maintain conditions conducive to stability, be available for contingencies in East Asia, and take the lead in combined Army exercises and Army-to-Army relations throughout the entire PACOM area of responsibility. Its most important contribution, as the least mobile, most permanent military service, would be simply to represent and symbolize America's extensive interests in the region, and the commitment of the United States to protect its allies there.

U.S. security cooperation programs will be essential to give credibility to the promise of continued U.S. engagement in the minds of Northeast Asian defense intellectuals. Since Armies dominate all East Asian military establishments, USARPAC should continue to have the predominant position in peacetime military-to-military relations between the United States and friendly nations of the region, even though in war the Navy and Air Force may take the lead.

CHAPTER 5

ENDNOTES

1. Richard H. Solomon, "Sustaining the Dynamic Balance in East Asia and the Pacific," a statement before the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, February 27, 1990, *Current Policy Number 1255*, Department of State, February 1990, p. 5.

2. In Southeast Asia, two international arrangements have assumed limited security functions. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is composed of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and informally coordinates security policies of its members. The members of the Five Powers Defence Agreements (FPDA), which explicitly deals with defense cooperation, are Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and United Kingdom.

3. See Stephen Blank, "Violins With a Touch of Brass: The Soviet Design for Collective Security in Asia," *Conflict*, forthcoming, for the argument that the Soviet plan would be highly detrimental to the United States.

4. Michael W. Chinworth and Dean Cheng, "The United States and Asia in the Post-Cold War World," *SAIS Review: A Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 11, Number 1, Winter-Spring 1991, p. 82.

5. Calculated from *Direction of Trade Statistics: Yearbook 1990*, pp. 402-403.

6. The continental neighbors of the United States, Canada and Mexico, were the first and third largest customers, accounting for exports valued at \$78 billion and \$25 billion respectively. *Ibid.*

7. For instance, Richard Solomon, "US and Japan: An Evolving Partnership," an address at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, April 10, 1990, *Current Policy Number 1268*, Department of State, March 1990, p. 2.

8. The islands in dispute are Habomai Islands, Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan Islands. Japan claims that they have always been part of Japan and not legally considered a part of the Kurile chain, which was ceded to the Soviet Union following the Second World War.

9. Two thousand Air Force and approximately 5,000 noncombatant Army personnel. "Seoul Agrees on Withdrawal of Some Troops," *The New York Times*, February 16, 1990, p. A7.

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10. See Statement of Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 19, 1990, pp. 10-13.

11. See the statements by Solomon cited in notes 1 and 7.

12. Solomon, "Sustaining the Dynamic Balance in East Asia and the Pacific," p. 5.

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