Logistic Support of an Armored Division in a Deep Attack
Abstract
This study examines the capability of an armored division to be sustained, relying only on its organic assets, in a five day deep operation that requires the division to maneuver seventy-five kilometers forward of the FLOT. This investigation includes a study of sustainment concepts and problems experienced by the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, assigned to 3d U.S. Army, during the pursuit through France in August and September 1944. This examination establishes the sustainment requirements for the deep attack operation and analyzes the ability of the modern armored division to satisfy these requirements. The study analyzes four alternatives to supplement the division's organic capability to support the deep attack operation. This investigation reveals that an armored division can support a division-size deep attack, using only its organic support assets, for fifty-four hours before exhausting its fuel supply, followed by shortages in both water and dry cargo. To complete the five day operation, an armored division must be augmented by a combination of the following: (1) attachment of logistic support systems from corps, (2) sustainment over air lines of communication, (3) sustainment over ground lines of communication, or (4) sustainment through the application of scavenger logistics.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 07, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA241430
Entities
People
- Anthony H. Kral
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College