Joint Operations against Charleston
Abstract
Desiring to improve the joint operational proficiency of the U.S. Military, Congress mandated jointness by fiat In doing so, the Congress failed to grasp the root cause for the failure by the military in the conduct of joint operations. The problems associated with coordinating the joint employment of armies and navies are ancient. In this country, lessons learned from joint operations date, at least, from the Civil War. Examination of one notable example, the Union's campaign against Charleston reveals an intense interservice rivalry between the Army and the Navy. This rivalry not only clouded the judgement of the component commanders but of their civilian superiors as well. The commanders refused to cooperate and concentrate their efforts. The service secretaries sought only to further their own political careers. As a result, the campaign concluded as a failure for the Union and a moral victory for the Confederacy. Not until the services can put their own self interests aside, and work together toward a common end, will jointness become a reality.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 31, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA243196
Entities
People
- Jon O. Steiner
Organizations
- United States Army War College