Sequencing Operations: Considerations for the Operational Planner
Abstract
The study begins with an examination of the theory concerning campaign design. This examination suggests that THE CORRELATION OF ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS and TEMPO are the two principle considerations for sequencing operations. Next, two historical examples are analyzed to determine whether the campaign planners correctly considered THE CORRELATION OF ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS and TEMPO in their campaign plan. The two examples include OPERATION BARBAROSSA, the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, and OPERATION CHROMITE, MacArthur's 1950 offensive campaign to liberate Korea. The monograph then analyzes Joint Chiefs of Staff (Test) Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations and U. S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations to determine whether they include adequate considerations for sequencing operations in a conventional offensive campaign. The tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine-- synchronization, agility, initiative, and depth--serve as the criteria for the analysis. The study concludes that both joint and Army doctrine are inadequate. The principal problems are that the doctrine fails to define several of the key concepts or describe how these concepts interrelate. Center of gravity, decisive points, and tempo are concepts that the manuals refer to without adequate definitions or examples. More important, the manuals refer to these concepts without explaining how they relate to each other or how they relate to sequencing operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 20, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA243306
Entities
People
- John D. Johnson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College