At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: United States Military Aid to the Royal LAO Government 1955-75
Abstract
This study focuses on America's extraordinary and little known military involvement in the Kingdom of Laos. From 1955 until the Lao Communist takeover in 1975 the United States pursued a highly unorthodox and controversial strategy which charged the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of State and Defense with secretly supplying military assistance to this technically neutral country. Successive administrations developed this remarkable policy in response to Communist violations of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962 and crafted it to avoid overt U.S. violations of the same agreements. This study addresses the following fundamental questions: what were the international, regional, and internal Laotian political and military issues which brought about the Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1962? How was Laos affected by the Agreements of 1954 and 1962? What were the specific actions of the United States as a result of these Agreements? What was the role of the Department of Defense, State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Central Intelligence Agency in these activities and why? How, and for what reasons, was the Royal Thai government involved in this effort? What was the effectiveness of the U.S. military aid programs in terms of security for the Lao government? What were the ultimate effects of this involvement in relation to U.S. objectives in the rest of Southeast Asia?
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA243492
Entities
People
- Timothy N. Castle
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology