Grant's Final Campaign: A Study of Operational Art
Abstract
The attached monograph, 'Grant's Final Campaign: A Study in Operational Art', examines General Grant's 1864-65 campaign as an example of combat at the operational level. The monograph begins by presenting the strategic setting--international and domestic--within which Grant conducted his campaign. The author analyzes Grant's campaign from four perspectives: the General's plan and how that plan was executed, the means with which he had to carry out his campaign plan, the system that he used to command and control his subordinate armies, and how each of these fit together into a synchronized whole. In the conduct of this analysis, the author argues that the two traditional understandings of this campaign are both lacking. Neither those who claim Grant's campaign was one designed to exhaust the South thus bringing them to terms, nor those who claim Grant tried to annihilate the South by destroying Lee's army in a 'gigantic concentration' of all armies at one decisive point are correct. In developing this argument, the author identifies two important points where General Grant's campaign departs from classical military theory. First, from the classic understanding of annihilation solely as destruction of the enemy armed forces to destruction of armed forces and resources--i.e. destruction of an enemy's war making capability. Second, from the classic concentration of forces at a single point for a decisive battle to a concentration of effects distributed over time and space for a decisive campaign. The author concludes that Grant's campaign of 1864-65 exemplifies a form of warfare at the operational level different from that governed by classic military theory. Thus, to study Grant's final campaign is to study modern operational art.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 02, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA244371
Entities
People
- James M. Dubik
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College