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
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
THE NEW MILITARY STRATEGY
AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

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Charles E. Heller



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Charles E. Heller

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FOREWORD

By reaching a state of readiness unparalleled in U.S. military history, the nation's Armed Forces appear to be victims of their own success. It is not that the world has become a safe and secure place with no need for armed forces; rather, many strategists would argue that the new multipolar world is potentially more dangerous than the bipolar cold war era. The difficulty for military strategists is articulating this to a society that has a split personality when it comes to its military. On one hand, Americans have always grudgingly paid for peacetime readiness yet expected flawless performance once a conflict has begun. The other part of this multiple personality is a distrust of standing armies and a idealization of the citizen-soldier be he (or she) a draftee, volunteer, Reservist, or National Guardsman. Thus, when presented with a world perceived to be at peace, the pressures exerted by the people and their representatives to downsize become tremendous.

On August 2, 1990, the same day Iraq commenced its brutal invasion and occupation of neighboring Kuwait, President George H. Bush delivered an address to the Aspen Institute in Aspen, Colorado. The speech was a significant policy statement addressing the changes in East-West relationships and the need to refocus the nation's armed forces away from the cold war and toward a "new military strategy." As Commander-in-Chief the President indicated he had no wish to repeat the mistakes of the past in merely downsizing or making across-the-board cuts in the armed forces; rather he called for restructuring.

This monograph addresses the impact of the new strategy on Army force structuring and force mix with an emphasis on Total Force Policy. To do this the author has reviewed the historical foundations of the policy, the peacetime Army in the past, and the relationship between the Active and Reserve Components. The work also examines the experience gained by the Army in OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. In the concluding sections the author alerts the reader to the potential problems that may loom in the future. Addressing these issues he suggests ways to avoid repeating the tragic record of past American first battles within the context of a full and complete integration of the Army's three components, thus fulfilling the intent of General Creighton Abrams' vision of a Total Force.



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Colonel Charles E. Heller is the U.S. Army Reserve Advisor to the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. A graduate of both the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College, he also holds a B.A. in history from Hofstra University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in United States history from the University of Massachusetts/Amherst. An Army Reserve Ordnance officer in the Active Guard/Reserve Program, his last assignment was as Chief, Mobilization Training Division, U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center. He has served on active duty with the 8th Infantry Division in Germany. He is the author of a number of articles on military history and wrote a *Leavenworth Paper* on chemical warfare in World War I while on the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is also the co-editor of *America's First Battles* published by the University Press of Kansas.

PREFACE

This paper is written with a bias. The bias springs from a historian's knowledge of successes and failures the U.S. Army has experienced in the past while coming to grips with preparing for modern war in the 20th century. World War I served as an example of military leaders ignoring the consequences of advances in technology. The generals attempted to overcome new weapons supplied by science by using masses of men. The millions of dead in that war attest to the bankruptcy of this strategy. Since the new weapons were costly, governments, especially those of the democracies, were unwilling to pay for both large armies and the latest military hardware in peacetime. The alternative to the problem of maintaining an expensive standing army in peacetime was an increased reliance on the less costly alternative, reserve forces.

While this concept has appealed to the U.S. Congress, the Army consistently sought at the end of each of America's conflicts to provide the nation with a realistic size force of Regulars to avoid the inadequacies of the previous mobilization. Unfortunately, the Army, as reasonable as its appropriation requests may seem, has consistently lost out to a Congress intent on peacetime cost cutting. As a consequence, it is the Congress and not the Army that has determined peacetime end strength which, in turn, has had a decided impact on force structure. This situation is rooted in fact and must be faced once again during the demobilization following the cold war.

The U.S. Army, victorious in the cold war and Gulf War, is once again facing the possibility of losing the peace. In the past there seemed to be an inability on the part of the Army as an institution to break the paradigm it had operated in after past demobilizations and during interwar periods. Unfortunately, with the very best intentions the Army's leadership is once again caught in a dilemma faced by previous generations of officers. The intentions of the leadership are honorable and the

Army's downsizing solutions presented to Congress are difficult to dispute in a sterile laboratory environment given the cyclical nature of war and peace in the world community. The war to end all wars was the name given to World War I at its conclusion and now the same dream is being applied to the cold war. The dream is attractive to Americans, but it is merely an illusion. The Army still has an awesome responsibility to be prepared to protect the nation. However, this nation's citizens and their political leadership have never wanted to face the cost for the kind of absolute readiness guaranteed in peacetime by what they perceive to be a large standing army, even if it has been one of the smaller armies of the world. This time the Army's leadership has got to do it differently, break the paradigm and not merely create a downsized version of the cold war Army that will become increasingly smaller if peace continues.

THE NEW MILITARY STRATEGY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

Introduction.

The "new military strategy" has the potential of being implemented in such a manner as to once again not break the paradigm. A close look at the Army's intended implementation of the strategy, and the historical record, will reveal the possibility of a shadow military establishment reminiscent of the 1930s emerging, rather than a viable force structure to meet the future. At present there are, to be certain, significant differences between the past and the present in terms of technology and force structure both in the continental U.S. (CONUS) and forward deployed. However, in its approach to the Reserve Components (RC), the Army is showing a tendency to make the same mistakes in regard to a reoccurring problem of peacetime restructuring.

The Active Component (AC) is again faced with a peacetime dilemma. The Army's basic mission to "protect and defend" remains. However, this time the enemy of the past 46 years, the Soviet Union, has collapsed and left the Army without an obvious military threat to protect and defend against. Among those on whom the responsibility for national security falls, there is an acknowledgement that the world remains a dangerous place, as evidenced by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union. The problem is that the American electorate needs an enemy, a clear and present danger, on which to focus. Without a visible enemy to threaten national interest and security, even reasonable requests for defense spending have, in the past, usually been opposed and denied. The Army's leadership should realize this, yet as evidenced by their surprise over congressional refusal to go along with currently proposed RC force reductions proportional with AC strength cuts, they appear to have ignored the past, and placed the Army on a

path to repeat past mistakes. The key to breaking the paradigm while maintaining a significant deterrent force is full implementation of the Total Force Policy and an integration of the Army's three components. DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM placed the Army at a crossroads. Which path will it follow? Already tentative steps such as proposed RC force reductions, placing roundout brigades further back in contingency deployment, and attempting to remove most reserve units from the contingency force appear not to refine the Total Force Policy, but to back away from it and down a path the Army has taken unsuccessfully so many times before.

The consequences of continuing down the traditional path of seeking more active duty strength than Congress and the public are willing to support are disconcerting. Potentially, they could mean the Army's energy and political goodwill will be wasted trying to justify AC end strength while the RC is neglected. As in previous years of the Total Force Policy, Congress will, as it is doing now, step in to make the policy work by forcing the issues such as extending the length of time that RC combat units could be called to active duty to serve during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

Another example of congressional intervention that paid dividends in the Gulf War was interest in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The AC points to the successful call-up of the IRR for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM as a consequence of its commitment to the RC and mobilization readiness. The IRR success story has more to do with Congress than with the AC. In the early 1980s Congress expressed its concern for the state of the post-Vietnam IRR, the major source of pre-trained manpower upon mobilization. It made several requests to the services asking for information on the IRR including skill retention, physical fitness, and other personnel data. When none was forthcoming, Congress directed a "test muster" of the IRR in the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986. The Army's new command, ARPERCEN (Army Reserve Personnel Center), conducted the musters, which since then have been institutionalized despite opposition from the Army and the other services.¹

This perhaps inadvertent lack of focus on the RC by the Regular Army, except in times of crisis, is a matter of historical record. While lack of emphasis on citizen-soldiers in peacetime caused problems in early American wars, the consequences became much more serious in the 20th century when the nation emerged from the Spanish-American War as a global power with increased responsibilities. In this century, what appears as a series of U.S. mobilization disasters may be true in each individual case. However, when viewed as a historical continuum, a knowledgeable observer can detect slow, but steady progress toward improved mobilization and an effective RC policy commencing with corrections of the deficiencies made evident by the Spanish-American War. From World War I to the Gulf War, each post-war Army, along with the Congress, has continually progressed toward mobilization readiness and combat effectiveness of all three components of the Total Army. To be certain, there have been periods of AC lack of direction and emphasis coupled usually with reduced availability of funds, but movement toward the mobilization readiness of a cost effective RC has continued. However, it is obvious from the recent use of the RC during the Gulf crisis that the Army still has not fully accepted the citizen-soldiers as equal partners as envisioned by the Total Force concept.

Early Foundations of the Total Force Policy.

The foundations of the Total Force Policy go back to the period between the Spanish-American War and World War I. After the grossly mismanaged 1898 Spanish-American War mobilization and deployment, many voices were heard within the Army and Congress for reform and modernization. As a consequence the four cornerstones forming the foundation for the Total Force Policy were established in the pre-World War I period. The first cornerstone is the 1903 Dick Act, as amended by the Militia Act of May 27, 1908. These two pieces of legislation were cooperative efforts by the Congress and the Army to improve the National Guard and expand its capabilities. The second was Senate Bill 1424, April 23, 1908, which created a federal medical officer reserve corps. This

legislation was later revised to include other technical services branch officers and, in 1912, enlisted soldiers.

In 1912, the third cornerstone emerged as a result of work done by the newly established General Staff. This was a study prepared by Captain John McAuley Palmer, "Report on the Organization of Land Forces of the United States." In the document Palmer stated that the maintenance of a large Regular force was not economically sound, did not provide an expansion capability, and was not in keeping with American tradition. The report was later updated by the General Staff's 1915 *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States*. These two documents were used to form the basis for the fourth cornerstone, the National Defense Act of 1916. This act defined the Army of the United States as consisting of a "Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and such other land forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law."² The act dealt in detail with the National Guard including its "nationalization," what we call today "federalizing." Support from the Regular Army was also increased, and the General Staff, through the newly renamed Militia Bureau, provided guidance to the various state National Guards. Even with this new emphasis on peacetime readiness and the RC, mobilizations for the Mexican Punitive Expedition in 1916 and World War I were very difficult because, among a host of problems ranging from a lack of equipment to inadequate training facilities, the Army's components had not reached an even minimal level of integration.

Relationship Between the Army's Components in Historical Context.

The roots of the antagonism between Regulars and citizen-soldiers go back to the American colonial period when British Crown officers denigrated the ability of the militia and especially its officers as in the case of General Braddock's refusal to take advice offered to him by George Washington, a young militia officer from Virginia. Later, it was the Revolutionary War's General Washington, frustrated with the

militia's poor performance, who declared, "To place any dependence upon the militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff."³ What is significant is that this animosity expressed by General Washington between Regulars and citizen-soldiers continued.

In the 19th century, a Civil War veteran, Emory Upton, fueled the antagonism between the Regular and citizen-soldier. Upton, a West Point graduate, was appalled at the slow pace of mobilization and the poor performance of militia, politically appointed officers, and volunteer citizen-soldiers during the Civil War. After the war Upton was sent off by General-in-Chief William T. Sherman to report on the armies of the world. Upton wrote back to Sherman that the United States could "...not maintain a great army in peace, but we can provide a scheme for officering a large force in time of war...."⁴ Several years after his return, Upton expanded his ideas in a study, *Military Policy of the United States*. Upton stated that the United States never had a coherent military policy. He believed a policy was needed and that it should take into account the American experience in past wars. His proposal emphasized a regional deployment of units (i.e. corps or army areas) with a cadre of Regular Army personnel. The Regulars would train citizen-soldiers and, after mobilization, lead the units in combat.⁵ Upton claimed the militia should only be used as the last resort because, among a host of reasons, its officers were "utterly ignorant of the military art." Also, the militia's dual role as state and federal force prevented the possibility of ever fielding an effective military organization.⁶ He made no distinction between militia and the volunteer armies of the Civil War, yet did acknowledge the latter citizen-soldiers were an effective fighting force at the war's conclusion when their lengthy service made them "regulars."⁷

The other side of the animosity is addressed by a contemporary of Upton's, John A. Logan, also a general officer in the Civil War, but a volunteer with no previous military experience. His argument stated that the United States has "...an exclusive military establishment to which are attached the essentials of a caste or class-distinction, and within the mechanism of which reside all of the possible dangers

belonging to the military establishment of an absolute monarchy." Further, Logan believed that Regular Army officers could claim no better battlefield record in the Civil War than volunteers because of the "lamentable failure of so large a portion of them in actual battle."⁸

In the years that followed, even with the reforms that built the foundations for the Total Force and the realization that large modern standing armies were impractical, the tensions between the components remained. At the time the United States entered World War I, the Regulars of the period, with a few exceptions, had read and accepted Emory Upton's criticism of citizen-soldiers.

When General John J. Pershing sailed for France in May 1917 to establish the headquarters for the American Expeditionary Forces, he selected 157 officers. Surprisingly, included were about 50 Officer Reserve Corps officers in the technical services such as medical, signal, and transportation. (After World War I when units were added to this reserve and the Enlisted Reserve Corps it became known as the Organized Reserve Corps [ORC]) However, not a single National Guardsman accompanied the advance party. As the war progressed, increasing tensions rose between the Guard and the Regular Army leadership. The "basic issues" that proved to heighten hostility between the Guard and Regulars, according to a paper prepared by MG Bruce Jacobs, ARNG, (Retired) were:

The struggle for command positions.

The requirement for re-training based upon wholesale branch changes.

The culmination of the campaign by the likes of Upton...to undermine public confidence in militia and to seek a new national strategy based upon a large standing army.⁹

To add to the growing discord, even though the National Defense Act of 1916 expanded the mission of the Guard beyond the Constitutional role to only be used within the borders of the United States, the Regulars believed it

necessary, according to Jacobs, to draft the entire rank and file.

The war proved to be an extremely frustrating experience for Guard officers. Even Regular officers, such as the commander of the 26th "Yankee" Division, Major General Clarence E. Edwards, who defended the professionalism of his National Guard officers, were relieved for no apparent reason although his Division had an excellent combat record. While Edwards had retained most of his Guard colonels and one of four brigadiers, his replacement, another Regular, immediately relieved two Guard colonels and the brigadier, replacing them with Regulars.¹⁰

In the interwar period, tensions remained between the Regular and citizen-soldier. Chief of Staff Peyton C. March ignored the advice of his staff and in the 1920 Army appropriations request asked for a 500,000 man Regular Army with almost no mention of the Guard or the ORC. The struggle between the components was now heightened by two issues, the economic cost cutting of the Hoover administration followed by the Depression, and the new third component with a growing lobby of its own, the ORC. The interwar Chiefs of Staff, although wanting a more responsive and less political reserve, appeared unwilling to go against the Guard in Congress and wound up, in many cases, ignoring the ORC. As a consequence, the ORC's planned 33 divisions only existed on paper, neither equipped nor fully manned at the planned cadre strengths. Each component struggled through the 1930s as a separate entity, yet part of the same Army (the National Defense Act of 1920 had reaffirmed the principles established in 1916). In 1940, at the end of the decade, mobilization still did not bring about integration.

In mobilizing for World War II the National Guard was brought on active duty without resorting to a draft of the guardsmen. Selective Service became law on September 16, 1940 and members of the ORC were not called-up by unit, but rather as individuals. ORC officers were assigned as fillers to both Guard and Regular Army units. Even after Pearl Harbor, in this global war with all the inherent risks, it appeared business as usual in the struggle between the components.

Although ORC officers took their share of the real and sometimes imagined discrimination, once again the National Guard officers came under fire. General Lesley J. McNair, Commander Army Ground Forces, became a latter day Upton complaining to Chief of Staff George C. Marshall that "the National Guard provided general officers who were not professional soldiers and who, almost without exception, were not competent to exercise the command appropriate to that rank."¹¹ Much was made in the Regular Army and the national press concerning the relief, early in the mobilization, of National Guard division commanders. However, a comparative analysis of the Regular Army and National Guard division commanders at mobilization in 1940 reveals that the former did not stay in command of their units long enough to deploy either, primarily due to retirement and reassignment.

Other slights came up as the war progressed. Perhaps one of the most annoying personal attacks on Guard officers in general came from General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell who had his command in China prepare a pamphlet for newly arriving officers, *Notes to Bear in Mind When Dealing or Working With the Chinese*. A passage in the pamphlet stated "Many of the higher commanders hold their positions through political maneuvers, rather than military ability. THIS UNFORTUNATE CIRCUMSTANCE COMPARES WITH THE SITUATION IN OUR NATIONAL GUARD" (emphasis in original).¹²

The ORC presented another side. Although no units were mobilized (unit numerical designations were used), ORC officers served throughout the wartime Army. From War Department 1944 statistics, ORC officer ranks as a percentage of one unidentified Regular Army division were:

- Colonel - 0%
- Lieutenant Colonel - 42.9%
- Major - 95.9 %
- Captain - 83.8%
- First Lieutenant - 56.3%
- Second Lieutenant - 10.9%¹³

A study conducted several months later of the 1st, 4th (Regular), 29th, 34th, 37th (NG), 90th (ORC) Infantry Divisions

and the 1st and 2nd (Regular) Armored Divisions showed the following percentages of ORC officers by rank:

<u>1st, 4th, 90th INF/1st, 2nd ARMOR</u>		<u>29th, 34th, 37 INF</u>	
BG	12.5%	BG	0
COL	0	COL	0
LTC	52.0%	LTC	21.5%
MAJ	82.5%	MAJ	56.6%
CPT	70.0%	CPT	45.7%
1LT	26.1%	1LT	16.0%
2LT	9.3%	2LT	8.9%

ORC as a percentage of the total number of assigned officers:

37.4%

22.2%¹⁴

Out of 1,065 general officers on active duty in 1943, 18 were from the ORC.¹⁵ It is difficult to assess the significance of these statistics, but it appears that Reserve officers were concentrated in the middle officer ranks and the chances of rising to a rank above lieutenant colonel were slim.

Personnel policies did not take into consideration the reservists in an expanded army. An illustration of this oversight is that prior to May 1942, Reserve officers who were not physically qualified for active duty were assigned to the Inactive Reserve and thus were not eligible for the draft. Without giving it any thought, the War Department, after the above date, began discharging these officers. Many were then immediately eligible for the draft since the physical standards for enlisted personnel were lower. After numerous complaints, a War Department Circular published May 24, 1944, finally ended the policy.¹⁶

To be certain, there were other regulations that annoyed citizen-soldiers and probably individual slights were inflicted on them as well. One example of how extensive reservists complaints were is the significant use of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs as a spokesman for reserve officers and the placing of this individual's office on the War Department Special Staff in 1945.

Lessons of Global War and the Total Force Comes of Age.

In 1944, John McAuley Palmer, brought out of retirement by Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, drafted another document concerning the relationship of the RC to the Regular Army. This document was published as War Department Circular No. 347, *Military Establishment*, August 25, 1944. The circular sought to define post-war Army force structure. It called for an AC "no larger than necessary to meet normal peacetime requirements" and an expansion capability of "organized units drawn from a citizen army reserve, effectively organized for this purpose in time of peace; with full opportunity for competent citizen soldiers to acquire practical experience through temporary active service and to rise by successive steps to any rank for which they can definitely qualify...."¹⁷

The circular then gave four reasons for the United States to maintain this type of military establishment. The first reason stated that although the "efficiency" of the force is the responsibility of what it calls "professional control" or the Regular Army, "leadership is not exclusively concentrated in a professional soldier class. All citizen soldiers...are encouraged to develop their capability for leadership...." Secondly, reservists who become troop leaders in war will, in peacetime, form the basis for molding public opinion on military issues. The next reason is significant in light of post DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM force restructuring. It states "As with a properly organized citizen army reserve *no officers or men need be maintained in the Regular Army to perform duties which can be performed effectively and in time by reserve officers and reservists* (emphasis added), the dimensions and cost of the peace establishment, under such a system, are necessarily reduced to a determinable minimum." Lastly, the circular acknowledges that American wars have "in the main" been fought using citizen-soldiers and that including or integrating the citizen-soldiers in peace "is merely a proposal for perfecting a traditional national institution to meet modern requirements which no longer permit extemporization after the outbreak of war."¹⁸

Thus, the earlier efforts at integration of the Army's components was reaffirmed during a war for national survival. Faced with fiscal austerity and a lack of interest by Congress and the public, the Army made efforts to create a post-war combat ready force of citizen-soldiers. Progress was made, but many of the same problems that had cropped up in earlier 20th century mobilizations appeared in the Korean War and Berlin Crisis. Viet Nam presented additional problems because only a small mobilization of the RC occurred after the 1968 Tet offensive. Obviously, the historical record held the answers, but there seemed to be a bureaucratic unwillingness to close with and capture the essence of the problem, the absence of full acceptance of the RC into the Army and integration of the three components. In 1973 a soldier with vision, General Creighton Abrams, veteran of three wars, reaffirmed the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920.

Total Force Policy Comes of Age.

In 1973 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, with the advice and support of Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams and other service chiefs, announced the Total Force Policy. According to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Total Force

... means the integration of planning, programming and budgeting for the manning, equipping, maintaining and training of a mix of active and reserve forces essential for meeting *initial* (emphasis added) contingency demands for forces. The Total Forces Policy implies an increased interdependence of active and reserve forces. It absolutely requires that the availability and readiness of reserve forces must be as certain as the availability of active forces.¹⁹

At the outset the policy was hailed by the U.S. defense community and especially the Army. The draft had ended and the smaller, All Volunteer Army was struggling to fill its ranks in an antimilitary post-war climate. The policy appeared to solve the problem of remedying what former Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer later called a "hollow army" composed of under strength units.²⁰ Now the Army could flesh out its combat divisions with less expensive reserve units, and have funds to develop and build new weapons systems to fight a

major war in central Europe. Most importantly, the policy also ensured that politicians would have to gauge the national will prior to committing U.S. ground forces because to fight a war other than a very small contingency would require mobilization of the two Reserve Components.

General Abrams set out to intertwine the three components so completely that to fight any war a President would have to obtain congressional support and, in turn, as Clausewitz states, "the will of the people." In a recent article on Abrams by Lewis Sorley, Abrams is quoted as saying to General Walter Kerwin, "If we're ever going to war again, we're going to take the reserves with us." Abrams' boss, James Schlesinger, put it another way, "There is no question but that Abrams was deliberately integrating reserve and active forces in that manner."²¹

For members of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) the policy appeared to achieve a long sought after goal, full acceptance by the AC in one Army. As Secretary Schlesinger stated, "The basic concept of a Total Force has in itself provided a new sense of purpose. Guardsmen and Reservists now see growing evidence that they *will* (emphasis in original) be called and have a role to play in future emergencies."²² This is what the Army's visionary goal was in 1916 with the passage of the National Defense Act and General George C. Marshall's intention articulated in the 1944 War Department circular. Two major objectives were now in the Army's reach. First, there was the possibility of creating an economical, combat ready, deterrent force in peacetime, rather than after mobilization. Secondly, the Army would never again be sent to war without the support of the nation because of the need to mobilize the RC even for a small contingency operation.

Apparently the Army was convinced that the 1973 strategy would permit the RC, including roundout combat forces, to deploy early with their parent units. Secretary Schlesinger noted "We know from experience that a reserve component brigade can be made ready for deployment much sooner than a reserve component division. Hence the emphasis is being placed on brigades, rather than on divisions, for the *early*

deployment role (emphasis added).²³ As a consequence of the Army's strong support of the Total Force Policy and its eagerness to put into place roundout, capstone, and affiliation concepts, Congress began to pour billions of dollars into the RC.

However, testimony given in 1988 before the Senate Armed Services Committee was a clear indication that the AC was having second thoughts about Total Force Policy. Mr. Richard A. Davis, Senior Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked by Senator Alan J. Dixon, "Are you saying...although the Active divisions to which these National Guard round-out brigades are assigned are part of the U.S. 10 divisions in 10 days force for NATO, *the Army currently plans to round out these specific divisions with other Active brigades, instead of their designated round-out brigades?*" (emphasis added). Mr. Davis responded "yes." Senator Dixon then tried to establish the purpose of the brigades. GAO had no clear answer and Dixon remarked, "I think your essential testimony here is that, in fact, that does not take place. *The round-out brigade in the National Guard is then a fiction, and I don't mean to over-simplify it.*" (emphasis added). Mr. Davis responded, "... that may be true." Later in the hearings Senator Dixon asked Major General James D. Smith, Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), to confirm GAO's findings on the roundout brigades. The General confirmed the earlier testimony and stated, "Round-out brigades are the result of force structure constraints within the Active Component and provide an efficient mechanism to insure the availability of the most Ready Reserve component brigade possible through its sponsorship relation with a parent Active component division." General Abrams, known for his cigar chewing, probably would have bitten through one to hear that a significant part of his Total Force Policy had been discarded by the AC leadership.²⁴ Why then should anyone be surprised that, in August 1990, the 48th Brigade, Georgia ARNG did not follow the 24th Division to Saudi Arabia?

Another case of the AC showing reluctance to put into practice the Total Force Policy came in 1989 when Reserve units were needed but not called for OPERATION JUST CAUSE. Instead individual "volunteers" were activated and placed in composite units commanded by AC officers. In another instance which highlights this neglect, the USAR was having difficulty getting RC funding for its less glamorous Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) Selected Reserve units. The AC has continued to lack focus on a Total Force when testifying on the Defense budget, appearing to downplay the fact that the USAR now provides most of its go-to-war CSS and a significant percentage of CS (See Figure 1). During the Reagan administration buildup, the USAR appeared as a poor stepchild. The National Guard had




Figure 1.

Dollar Value of Equipment Received Annually




Figure 2.

its own constituency in its congressional delegation and, as one can see, did proportionally as well as the AC (See Figure 2). As a consequence, the USAR leadership and congressional supporters thought it best for the Total Army, in addition to dedicated funding, to have USAR control its own appropriations and began to press for an independent command. This was partially achieved just prior to OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. But it was these operations that finally widened the existing cracks and created new ones in the Total Force Policy.

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

With the key to resolving the readiness of forces in a peacetime democracy and insuring the support of the nation for any military operation in its hands, the AC fumbled at the lock and lost it in the sands of Kuwait. The victory was marred by a heightening of tensions between the components. The causes are numerous, but not new. Some are rooted in fact

and some in perceptions, but they remain irritants and are having a decided impact on the Reserve Components' reaction to the new military strategy.

The first significant issue is the AC's understandable concern about the timing of a Presidential 200,000 call-up under 673b. "Selected Reserve; order to active duty other than during war or national emergency." Under this section of Title 10 U.S. Code, the President has the authority to call to active duty members of the Selected Reserve for 90 days and can extend that period for another 90 days. No more than 200,000 reservists can be on active duty during this period. Even though the authority came within 10 days of the announcement of the commitment of troops, it required additional time to mobilize RC units to assist in the deployment and to also deploy. Given time required for planned post mobilization training and deployment, the law allows no time for warfighting in theater unless followed by additional legislation such as a declaration of war. Obviously, this legislation tied the hands of the AC. However, the AC did little, apparently, to force the issue. This issue directly relates to the failure initially to call-up combat units, especially the roundout brigades of the ARNG and, after prodding by Congress with the extension of the 673b time to a total of 360 days, the sending of the brigades to the National Training Center rather than deploying them.

Another issue causing animosity is the decision not to activate some RC headquarters including a Signal Group and a Theater Army Area Command with CENTCOM (Central Command) capstone missions. There was also the willingness of the AC to strip late or nondeploying units of soldiers and equipment only to realize later that the depleted units were also required. Small issues abound such as the regulations that forbade RC medical specialists from receiving Special Pay. RC units in the theater of operations were given missions different from their parent units', and a number of units were broken up and personnel reassigned.

When OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were over, the AC praised those aspects of the mobilization compatible with its perception of what the Total Army means. Then the Army Staff set about initially designing a force that

seemed to ignore the lessons learned that would have reinforced the Total Force concept. The preliminary results appeared, from a historical perspective, to be a step backward on the steady progression in building a responsive, combat ready reserve force. However, the intent of the Congress to slow reserve downsizing may change the direction the Army was headed.

The New Military Strategy.

The first announcement of a new military strategy came on August 2, 1990, when President George H. Bush addressed the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado. The President spoke about the dramatic changes occurring in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and, as a consequence of the new global situation, announced a new strategy. He explained that the new strategy was a "framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring interest—the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed." The key element as it pertains to the Total Army is his assertion that:

The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a *scaled back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present* (emphasis added). If we simply pro-rate our reductions—cut equally across the board—we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely—and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. *What we need are not merely reductions—but restructuring* (emphasis added).²⁵

The AC, following Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, embraced the new military strategy and focused on adjusting to the realities articulated by the President. However, Army planners have run afoul of the Congress and the RC in their attempts to structure a post cold war force. It may be that the objections raised are because the force so constructed appears to many to be what President Bush did not want, "a scaled-back or shrunken-down version" of today's force. It also may be for this very reason that there has been "a freeze

on RC reductions imposed by the HAC (House Appropriations Committee)...."²⁶ What is really needed, as articulated by the Commander-in-Chief, is "not merely reductions—but restructuring."

As part of the process in building a Force Generation Model (FGM), ODCSOPS restated the DOD guidance considering deterrence "...the central motivating and organizing concept guiding US military strategy." ODCSOPS indicated deterrent forces can also be used to defend against a foe who seeks to threaten what is considered vital to the nation's interest. Within the broad context of deterrence, but apart from the strategic deterrence of nuclear weapons of the new military strategy, were "forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution."²⁷

The Defense establishment defines forward presence as the use of military forces to "deter aggression, address the root cause of conflict, and defuse crisis." To accomplish this objective Army missions may range from nation assistance and security assistance to peacekeeping and other support to civilian authorities. If these measures should fail, U.S. forces must be able to respond rapidly to meet regional contingencies. In a crisis response, the Army has the capability to immediately insert or make a forced entry by light units. The Army may also project heavy or armored units and sustain a joint force in any theater of operations to achieve "*overwhelming force* (emphasis in original) to terminate conflicts swiftly, decisively, and with minimum loss of life." Reconstitution, although not an accurate description (expansion is more appropriate), is the process of generating new "warfighting" capability in response to a global threat or multiple (more than two) regional contingencies requiring units beyond the forces in being.²⁸


The portions of the military strategy that apply specifically to the RC are the twin issues of force sizing and mix. The Army now believes that it will be able to retain a reduced yet credible forward presence in Europe, Korea and the Pacific region. Unfortunately, from a historical perspective, and with the reality of a world at peace, these forces may eventually be reduced to nothing more than a token few units. The Army incorporated into its planning, Defense Planning Guidance Illustrative

Planning Scenarios which dictated "...that the principal focus of US operational planning is regional crisis response—to include a *capability to respond to two concurrent major regional contingencies* (emphasis in original)." Evolving Total Army Analysis (TAA) (TAA is a multiphased force structuring process consisting of force guidance, qualitative and quantitative analysis, and senior leadership review) concluded, as Contingency Planning Guidance was received, that the rapidly deployable (this includes forward presence forces) package should include nine AC fully manned and equipped divisions, and a reinforcing capability of nine additional divisions (three roundout and six RC). The Army planners also received guidance to include expansion capability in the event of the possibility of a global war. As a consequence two cadre divisions, at reduced manning and equipment levels, were also included in the base force or minimal essential force.²⁹

It is the mix of AC and RC units within the base force that holds the potential for success or failure of deterrence or, should that fail, in fighting the first battle of the next war. Given the focus of the new military strategy on a primary threat from regional conflicts, perhaps two concurrent Major Regional Contingencies that erupt one after the other, the Army set the following criteria: "fully-trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly deliverable." As a direct consequence, "missions that require intensive training, highly technical or unique military skills, high peacetime operating tempos, and no warning or very short notice response time, necessitate that these units be drawn primarily from the active force structure."³⁰ The FGM for the Army end state programmed for FY 1999 has been restarted and reworked by the application of TAA several times because of OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and as changes have occurred in both the strategic environment and in the Army's portion of the Defense budget.

The early FGMs, developed by the Army Staff, followed the criteria outlined in the above paragraph. The resulting early deploying contingency forces were close to entirely AC, and the TAA revealed that they were simply not affordable. The resulting Army FGM presented to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of 20 divisions and the necessary support

Generating The 20 DIV+ Force



Source: ODCSOP8, Oct 1991

Figure 3.

(See Figure 3.) In the "rapidly deployable" category, in that portion constituting Forward Presence, all of the four combat divisions above-the-line (divisional forces) contain 100 percent AC elements while the below-the-line Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) are 95 percent AC while 5 percent are RC. The CONUS based portion of the force considered "rapidly deployable" has five AC divisions. Here again the above-the-line force is 100 percent AC. However, the AC below-the-line CS and CSS drops to 40 percent and the RC to 60 percent. The follow-on "reinforcement" segment contains two phases. The first contains three AC divisions each with one RC roundout brigade, and two separate RC

brigades. In this phase, below-the-line CS and CSS are divided with 30 percent AC and 70 percent RC. The second "reinforcement" phase contains six RC divisions. Even in this phase there lingers some AC below-the-line CS and CSS of 5 percent while the RC slice is 95 percent. Beyond this force is the "reconstitution" segment. Two peacetime cadre divisions are followed by an undetermined number of units formed after mobilization.

The Reserve Components' Role.

It appears that the RC under the new strategy is still shy of the original intent of Total Force Policy designers. The role envisioned by the strategy is more the traditional one for reserves to provide individual fillers, support and reinforcing units, and expansion capability (reconstitution). In essence the base force appears to be a scaled down version of today's post-cold war Army. The missions are in keeping with the roles the Total Force Policy sought to change as a consequence of another demobilization and budget reductions after Vietnam. Given the political climate in Congress and bolstered by the concerns articulated by RC resulting from the experience in OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, that part of the new strategy which reduces the RC role in contingency operations may have little chance of being accepted by Congress or the American public.

Even though the Army leadership has tended to ignore it, all the early documents relating to the Total Force Policy speak of *early deploying Reserve Component units* without qualifying the type of contingency. There is no economical way to eliminate USAR and ARNG above and below-the-line units from a contingency operation. One only needs to examine the list of RC units mobilized immediately after the 200K call-up was announced to see the problem. Does the AC in peacetime need port and terminal units, Graves Registration, Enemy Prisoner of War guard units and a host of other CS and CSS units? Adding AC CS and CSS units will cost a significant amount of defense dollars to train and to maintain a high level of proficiency.

On the other hand, a great many USAR soldiers transfer their individual and, at times, collective civilian skills to their military occupational specialty. Thus, the skills are easier to maintain and their initial training need not be as costly. Also exactly what will be the needs of the next contingency operation? Which units on the USAR CSS list will be transferred? The very reason to have these units in the RC is because many are expensive, difficult to maintain in high states of readiness, and are tailored for very specific tasks. To structure the AC to sustain those deployed units for about 30 to 60 days without substantial reserve component augmentation is unnecessary, a financial burden, and may do little to enhance Total Army readiness. What is needed are innovative ways to reduce RC mobilization to deployment time.

Another contentious Total Army issue is the virtual elimination of RC Combat Arms units from any contingency operation early deployment. Since the roundout brigades were not deployed for OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the policy remains untested in battle and the actual combat readiness of these units undecided. After all, it was Central Command's Commander-in-Chief General H. Norman Schwarzkopf who, as the 24th Infantry Division Commander, stated of the 48th Brigade, "I expect them to fight alongside us. They are, in fact, combat ready."³¹ They may not have been as combat ready as General Schwarzkopf stated, or as their brigade commander, BG William A. Holland, believed. However, like the shift in emphasis in 1940 from retired or reassigned AC division commanders to relieved Guard commanders, the issue is how much more ready was the AC replacement, the 197th Separate Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia with its mismatched tanks? How well would that brigade have fared at the National Training Center, integrating new equipment and filler personnel (a common problem among most deploying units), learning new SOPs at the same time they were being tested? While the truth may never be known, there is a question as to whether or not the 48th Brigade would have done as well or better than its replacement. Certainly it appears that the Marine reserve combat elements were fully integrated into their parent units in DESERT STORM and

performed in parity with their Regular counterparts. Although the Marine roundout took place at a lower echelon, the fact remains that Combat Arms roundout units in contingency operations at battalion level and below can be effective. Instead of rejecting the concept entirely for contingency operations, the AC should seek new ways to make roundout effective not just as part of the reinforcing segment of the base force.

The new strategy rationale rests on an absolute belief that all contingency operations will require very rapid deployment. While this may be true, it is unlikely that the lift capability to accomplish this, land, sea, and air, will ever be adequate. Not all units, AC or RC, can deploy immediately. The reality is that there are RC CS and CSS units that can meet the time criteria. There are also combat units that, with greater AC emphasis, may be able to do so as well. In a number of instances in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, some RC units were better prepared than AC units. For instance, Captain Kelly Rupp, commanding Delta Company USAR roundout to the 299th Engineer Battalion, a unit that cleared obstacles for the 24th Mechanized Division in the war, reported from Saudi Arabia that "Morale is high. The soldiers have seen the active units and are more confident in themselves. The other (AC company) commanders are concerned. They have not done live mine or demo training in a year. Their soldiers are apprehensive about handling live ammunition....Our soldiers received plenty of live training...."³² The AC also was made aware of the fact that RC CS and CSS soldiers often have civilian jobs that are the same as their Military Occupation Specialties. Lieutenant Colonel William S. Gross, USAR commander of the 489th Engineer Battalion, was told by an officer deployed to Saudi Arabia that a USAR Engineer construction company composed of men who built highways in civilian life was running circles around its AC counterparts in Saudi Arabia. The AC response, he related, was to the effect that being at war was a novelty for the reservists and that was why their performance level was so high.³³

One of the most unsettling findings of the DESERT STORM Special Studies Project, "Lessons Learned," was that

cross-leveling "resulted in some non-activated units being rendered incapable of performing their missions" and that it is IRR fillers that are needed "if we are to avoid destroying units which may be needed later in the operation."³⁴ This ad hoc policy of stripping out reservists for fillers has been practiced in every major 20th century war. It was and still is, as the above statement indicates, a bad idea. It not only renders the losing unit ineffectual, but it destroys the morale of transferred soldiers. The effectiveness of any unit is usually determined by the cohesion among the individuals. The new strategy force generation model leaves the possibility of breaking up RC units wide open for future contingency operations. The new military strategy may change the emphasis on RC readiness. As the second team, the RC could become a vast filler and replacement depot during contingency operations, the type operation most likely to occur in the future. Also, emphasis on reinforcing and then reconstitution roles in the remote possibility of a prolonged contingency or a major war will establish a natural tendency to reduce funding for the ARNG and USAR. The Guard's state congressional delegations are objecting to this proposal. The activation of the new USAR command may strengthen this component's position within the strategy and, with congressional support, allow it to achieve some sort of funding parity with the Guard to correct the current imbalance (See Figure 2).

This lag in USAR funding has not reflected a commitment to Total Force Policy especially when it came to CSS units. The DESERT STORM Special Study Project revealed "RC units were not resourced or modernized to the same level as the AC units which they were designated to support or fight beside. For instance, many activated maintenance units did not have the capability to maintain the M-1/M-2/M-3 family of armored vehicles. Their tools, ASL, etc., were designated for the M48/M60 tanks and M113 carriers, which they maintained for RC units in peacetime."³⁵ Thus, there is a real possibility that, as in past wars, the emphasis on a predominately AC contingency force will continue to impact on USAR CSS mobilization readiness. This is unfortunate because the unique structure of the USAR with predominately CS and CSS units, its manpower pool of IRR and Individual Mobilization

Augmentee (IMA) soldiers, and federal status make it very responsive to AC needs and would allow the AC to concentrate on combat units and warfighting skills. The removal of a greater percentage of the RC from the rapidly deployable force may pose an even more significant problem for the Army. This is the possibility of an administration placing the Armed Forces in harms way, as in Vietnam, without the guarantee of continued backing of Congress or support of the American people. In peacetime, the Army has in the past tended to develop a garrison mentality that is heightened by a citizenry which has a short memory. On January 11, 1879, General-in-Chief William T. Sherman remarked, "The People who were so grateful in 1865 for military service, now begrudge us every cent of pay and every ounce of bread we eat."³⁶ The new military strategy may further isolate the Army from the people. Not only will funding become more and more difficult, but the average citizen will know and care little about those who serve. Reducing the role of the RC and backing away from Total Army integration by abandoning the original intent of the Total Force Policy will only make the problem worse. The RC, especially the educated officer corps who often are in leadership positions within their communities and at work, is a positive link with the people. Eliminate or reduce the RC role, and the support base for national defense will erode. General George C. Marshall had lived through such a period only to be faced, as Chief of Staff, with a war for national survival, and that is why War Department Circular No. 347, 1944, mentioned this significant role for the RC officer in peace.

There is a tendency to believe the support generated for the troops deployed for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM came solely because American Armed Forces were deployed overseas. This is not entirely correct. In an Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Institute of Land Warfare, Summary of AUSA Issue Conference, "Army Total Force and the Reserve Components," the comment was made that only when the RC was mobilized did public support climb from 50 to 80 percent.³⁷ It was only when Johnny Jones from down the street and Mary Doe at the reception desk were called-up with their RC units, that the yellow ribbons, flags, and signs

broke out. One only had to drive around a state like Pennsylvania to see posters displayed welcoming back their native sons and daughters serving in local units, not Regulars of the Federal Army. This emphasis on the citizen-soldier at the expense of the Regular is a fact, and it appears to be consistent throughout American history. Harry Summers, author of *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*, has more than once reminded us during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM that the failure in the Viet Nam conflict to mobilize the bulk of the RC early cost the Army public support. In *On Strategy* he states:

American antimilitarism springs from a variety of causes historical, cultural and social. It has been a constant since the beginning of the Republic. As far as the Regular Army went, it was even true in wartime. Someone once remarked that the old British doggerel about the professional soldier, "*It's Tommy this, and Tommy that, and chuck him out, the brute...But it's 'Savior of his Country', when the guns begin to shoot* (emphasis in original)," never applied here in America. It was the "citizen soldier"—the National Guard and the Army Reserve not the regular who fought America's wars and who was the traditional "Savior of his Country."³⁸

Colonel Summers said at the conclusion of DESERT STORM, "Not only would such a force (Total Force) get the Congress on board, it would get the American people on board as well. The citizen-soldiers of the National Guard and Reserve would serve as a bridge between the American people and their military. And that's exactly what happened during the Persian Gulf War."³⁹ Mr. Arnold Punaro, Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee put it another way in discussing DESERT STORM. He said "The active services had already gone to war, but the nation didn't go to war until the Guard and Reserve were mobilized."⁴⁰ Revert to a primarily AC contingency force for about 30 to 60 days without substantial RC augmentation and you run the risk that the "will of the people" might never solidify around what some might perceive as the administration's "military adventurism" using a "mercenary" (All-Volunteer) Regular force. Involving the RC early in any operation, including a contingency, is absolutely essential for the well-being of the Army and its fragile relationship with "the people."

AC and RC Relationships Today.

Rather than cement a positive relationship as a result of the first application of the Total Force Policy, the Gulf War seems to have heightened traditional rivalries and problems between the components. As indicated previously the new military strategy may have the potential of not integrating the components and possibly furthering the separation. On July 19, 1991, the new Army Chief of Staff (CSA), General Gordon R. Sullivan, released a white paper, "The Army's Strategic Issues." The last issue addresses the RC and the Total Force. It reads as follows:

The fourth strategic issue is to more completely *integrate the Total Force* (emphasis in original). Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM validated our Total Force policy—all components of our Total Army are critical to success on the battlefield. What is needed is refinement of the roles of the active and reserve components to support our new national military strategy. Each component must understand the interrelationship of the parts of the Total Army. We will work to establish pre- and post-mobilization training standards for the Reserve Components. I want to focus on the Roundout Brigades, defining their roles and requirements. Most important, we must work together to ensure the Total Army is ready for the Nation's call.⁴¹

Two thoughts come to mind in reading this statement. The first is the CSA's sincere concern about the relationship between the components and his effort to address them. The second thought is that nothing is defined such as "more completely *integrate the Total Force* " and "refinement of the roles of the active and reserve components." It remains to be seen whether the thrust of the CSA's statement is in tandem with the new military strategy or an attempt to break new ground. It appears that the Chief of Staff will have a significant task to reorient the Uptonian thinking of the Army Staff and the AC in general.

If the new military strategy does not more fully integrate the components, the situation between them will become worse. If the Army is not able to resolve its own internal divisions, Congress, as it has always done in peacetime, will determine the size and mix of the Army. Strategic analysis defining

national security interests and those forces necessary to guarantee it will defer to what Congress decides to allocate the armed forces. At this point, as in all previous interwar periods, dollars available may be the determining factor in base force size and the AC and RC roles within that structure. From a historical perspective, it appears entirely possible that the Army bureaucracy will fight integration and continue to plan for a reduced RC role in anything less than global war or multiple, simultaneous contingency operations. The response of the RC will be predictable and that will be a continuation of the perception that reservists are "second class citizens." The pivotal player will be Congress and all indications are that politicians will attempt to follow the path toward full implementation of the Total Force concept and integration by legislation as they did with Joint relationships.

At the Crossroads.

General Sullivan's emphasis on the fourth strategic issue of his paper "The Army's Strategic Issues" is exactly what is needed to bolster an eventual realization of the Total Force Policy. However, whatever his plans are to refine the roles of the components, integrate the Total Force, and define roundout, he and the Army Staff need to bear in mind the following: The American tradition has always been to reduce the AC in peacetime, usually below what the military deems a minimum essential base force. Congress will decide the end strength of the Army by appropriating those funds it believes it can afford and not necessarily through an objective assessment of national security requirements. If the world remains at peace until the end of the decade, the pressure to reduce the size of the military will be extreme. Enough of the AC has absorbed the negativism toward the RC of Emory Upton that it will take a significant change in attitudes through Army Staff emphasis, formal education and personnel assignments to make any positive inroads toward integration. The Total Force Policy with a full integration of the components must continue to reflect RC involvement, to include combat elements, in contingency operations. Tailoring the Army of the future must, by necessity, include a larger RC and more missions assigned to the reserves throughout the Army.

The RC has a vital role to play in forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. That role must be in full partnership with the AC. The time has passed when the traditional rivalries can be allowed to perpetuate a "them" and "us" attitude. If the AC continues to plan on a large percentage of Active forces and neglects the RC as Chief of Staff Peyton C. March did in 1919, then the results will be the same, a continual eroding of AC end strength through the budget process with minimal emphasis on the RC. This will weaken all of the components of the Total Army until an aggressor is once again tempted to take advantage of the United States' traditional peacetime military posture. At that time, as it was in 1941, the nation will be poorly prepared and once again the first battle of the next war will be a painful, bloody experience.

Rethinking the New Military Strategy.

There is much to be said for the current Force Generation Model with its forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The RC has a significant role to play in all three. The problem that was addressed early in this report is how the AC has chosen to interpret the RC role in the strategy. From a very practical point of view, the role of the RC should be increased, especially the Federal USAR of primarily CS and CSS units, using the experience gained from DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and the seriousness of the threat to national security posed by continued declining defense appropriations. Those experiences show that ARNG artillery units can be deployed early and perform admirably. Why not reduce the number of artillery units in the AC and place them in the RC? AC medical personnel are less prepared for operating in the field than their RC counterparts because the latter usually spends more time in that environment. Let the Army place most, if not all its wartime medical requirements in the RC with some AC cadre and contract medical support in CONUS. Why waste AC spaces in the Training and Doctrine Command's Training Centers performing the mission of training fewer and fewer recruits when, with some centralized coordination, the twelve USAR Training Divisions can conduct Initial Entry Training (IET), Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and the U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools may possibly

teach MOS courses. These changes should not affect the deterrent posture of the Army.

Deterrence must not only be measured on the ability of a trained contingency force to deploy quickly ready to fight, but also on the potential of the strategic and conventional forces available to a nation. Shrinking military budgets, by necessity, should cause the defense establishment to place greater reliance, not less, on a cost effective RC. But numbers do not alone produce the deterrence: combat potential of those forces need also be considered. The challenge of the new military strategy is how to build the Total Force with sufficient numbers of units and soldiers that are combat ready. Part of the solution, as shown by Israel's army, is an expanded and integrated role for the RC. Deterrence is also based on the staying power of a contingency force once committed. RC units and individual replacements are part of the staying power. Yet staying power is not only measured by the flow of soldiers and materiel into battle, but by national will as well. What good did the massive build-up in Vietnam do for us in accomplishing our national objectives, fuzzy as they were? General Abrams was correct in his observation that the Army must never enter a conflict again unless there is *initial* RC involvement. He knew full well that the RC mobilization after the 1968 Tet offensive came too late and was too little to have an impact on national will. The "passions of the people," as Clausewitz would call them, for the Gulf War were inflamed early because the bridge to their army, the RC, was involved. Nothing can take the place of an early citizen-soldier call-up in rallying national will short of another Pearl Harbor.

Forward presence has implications for the RC as well. The downsized AC will be scattered in small enclaves through the globe reminiscent of the 1930's army. However, the bulk of the force will be garrisoned in CONUS. What will they be doing? Training for certain, but the Congress and the public will want more. Peacetime domestic missions naturally enter the picture and the number one priority should be support and training of the RC. Here we're not discussing senior Army advisors; rather the RC needs AC sergeants and captains with the most up-to-date doctrinal and technical knowledge to

operate at a "gut" level. These AC soldiers are not to be considered full time manning assets; that mission must and should be accomplished by RC personnel, the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), because the Army has the tendency to pull AC soldiers from RC TOE slots as soon as the shooting starts to be used as fillers or to man units created after mobilization.

The other impact on the RC is that a CONUS based Army must deploy to become engaged. Since overseas deployment has always been a major problem in 20th century wars, it is likely to be a problem again. Deployment schedules of RC units, as in World War II, will be affected more by availability of shipping and campaign plans than by readiness ratings.⁴² Improvements in peacetime and post-mobilization training will allow RC units to integrate into any flow with ease in responding to a crisis overseas.

Crisis response translates into the need for immediate power projection. The RC must be part of that initial deployment not only because of national will, but because of the need for those units required to mobilize and deploy the bulk of the force, for example, dock workers and maintenance personnel. The contingency force 30-to-60 day requirements will not be affordable for the AC especially in the CS and CSS areas. As a consequence, as the budget dwindles for the rest of the decade, more and more of the contingency force may be RC. The AC needs to insure that the units selected for the force have equipment and tools that match those of the supported unit. For combat units the Army's rethinking of the roundout concept should focus on the lessons learned during the Gulf War. Perhaps roundout should occur at a lower unit level similar to the Marine roundout battalions employed in the Gulf. Then too, given the number of RC headquarters units that were not called up with their subordinate units, the AC needs to either declare these headquarters are peacetime caretakers or become more involved in their training and validation so they will be activated to avoid the apparent confusion caused in the logistic arena during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. As the DESERT STORM Lessons Learned project recommended, "In future operations,

the Army should take advantage of the command relationships which have been developed and exercised in peacetime."⁴³ Crisis response, therefore, requires that a greater proportion of the Army's appropriations and energy be funneled into the RC to enhance compatibility of equipment, education of its officers and the training of units.

Of equal significance to crisis response capability is reconstitution or expansion capability. This area has always been the Army's step-child. It was also the traditional role of the RC until the Total Force Policy. Reconstitution is a Total Army responsibility not just one for the RC. It is indeed unfortunate that cadre divisions are thought of only as RC. Under a Total Force concept, cadre of such a unit should be an integrated composition of all three components which is exactly what happened in past wars when new divisions were formed.

Division headquarters in the Israel Defense Force (IDF) are peacetime administrative elements and they are integrated with AC and RC personnel. In the IDF organization, brigades might be pure RC or AC and commanded by either an AC or RC officer with a mixed staff. U.S. RC brigades might prove easier to cadre with AC personnel and support from CS and CSS Selected Reserve and AC units upon mobilization. The internal composition and external mix combinations are endless, but all reflect the true integration the CSA seeks.

One of the most significant gaps in the strategy is the question of manpower after the year 2000. At the end of the decade there is a projected decline in the size of the IRR and in the military age male population in general. Individual pretrained manpower now comes from a number of USAR sources, the IRR, Individual Mobilization Augmentation, and retired personnel. All categories were used to a greater or lesser extent during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The Army, as indicated in the introduction, now sees the IRR's potential and is attempting to place a portion, the RT-12, in the Selected Reserve. Unfortunately, after the year 2000, this manpower pool will shrink to about 200,000 and will not be able to sustain a major contingency with the adequate numbers of RT-12 specific military occupation specialties (MOS) required

for fillers and casualty replacements. This number may be further reduced because the Army Staff has expressed an interest in using only former AC IRR soldiers in the RT-12 category. One senior USAR officer at the Summer 1991 AUSA RC issues conference indicated a draft will be necessary to take the place of the IRR. IMAs were called to active duty in limited numbers especially at Headquarters, DA level contrary to expectations that they would be used as part of a crisis "rest plan" for the staff. A total of 1,466 retirees out of the 9,637 who volunteered were returned to active duty.⁴⁴ The answer to the pretrained manpower pool question may rest in a larger IRR created by graduates of a military training option as part of a voluntary National Service Corps run by the Army and administered by a civilian agency. Although the Army has steered clear of identification with such a program, the alternative, a draft at the onset of a crisis, not only has greater political implications, but will drastically lengthen the time to expand the Army. Adding to the problem is the insistence of the Army leadership that cadre division personnel should not conduct Initial Entry Training even though the expectation should be that by the year 2000 the training base will be so reduced that this may be the *only* way to process large numbers of recruits.⁴⁵ This is the way cadre divisions operated in World War I and World War II. Should the manpower problem be recognized and National Service with a military option be adopted, the Army will not only achieve a source of pretrained manpower, but also a peacetime mission with the RC playing a major role. This role could be similar to the peacetime involvement of the 1930's Army in the Civilian Conservation Corps.

The Key to the Future.

The key to making the new military strategy work is full implementation of the Total Force Policy envisioned by General Creighton Abrams. Budgetary constraints may be severe by the decade's end. AC end strength will probably continue to decline and will eventually be followed by RC cuts. The only way for the Army to adhere to the strategy may be to, as General Sullivan stated, integrate the three components into one effective force. This process must begin now so that

the RC, with the support and assistance of the AC, can take advantage of its strengths and address its weaknesses. The Total Army concept can work, but only if the barriers between the components are eliminated by visionary, intellectually open, and decisive AC and RC senior leadership.

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