

AD-A246 168



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



DTIC
ELECTE
FEB 21 1992
S D D

THESIS

NATO'S OUT-OF-AREA DILEMMA

by

Susan Lynn Theodorelos

December, 1990

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Paul Stockton

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

92-03967



92 2 14 150

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				
1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE				
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) 35		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
			Program Element No	Project No
			Task No	Work Unit Accession Number
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) NATO'S OUT-OF-AREA DILEMMA				
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Theodorelos, Susan L.				
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Master's Thesis		13b. TIME COVERED From To		14. DATE OF REPORT (year, month, day) December 1990
15. PAGE COUNT 110				
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUBGROUP	Out-of-area, NATO, extra-european, collective security, alliances, NATO and the Middle East	
19. ABSTRACT (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)				
NATO has a legitimate right to project force beyond the geographical boundaries of the NATO alliance. That NATO has been unwilling or unable to do so since 1949 results from a combination of factors relating to disagreements between the members over the geographical scope of the alliance, shifts in allied foreign policies and inter-allied tensions brought on by the Cold War. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait moved NATO's out-of-area problem from a subordinate position to the primary threat facing the alliance. Historically, the Alliance felt that responses to out-of-area security threats should be dealt with on a unilateral basis, even when the Alliance has agreed that their collective vital interests are threatened. The dilemma for NATO is the lack of a unified approach to the out-of-area problem. NATO's boundaries are boundaries of obligation and not boundaries of confinement. Through a review of the language of the treaty and problems inherent in alliance relationships, this thesis will explore the differing perceptions of alliance members regarding the scope of the alliance and why NATO has survived for 40 years yet been unable to deal with the out-of-area problem.				
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS REPORT ☐ DTIC USERS			Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Donald Abenheim			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area code) (408) 646-2521	
			22c. OFFICE SYMBOL NS/AH	

DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR

83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

NATO's Out-of-Area Dilemma

by

Susan Lynn Theodorelos
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., California State University, Sacramento, 1980

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of


MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL


December 1990

Author:




Susan Lynn Theodorelos


Approved by:



Dr. Donald Abenheim, Thesis Advisor



Dr. Paul Stockton, Second Reader



Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

▷ NATO has a legitimate right to project force beyond the geographical boundaries of the NATO alliance. That NATO has been unwilling or unable to do so since 1949 results from a combination of factors relating to disagreements between the members over the geographical scope of the alliance, shifts in allied foreign policies and inter-allied tensions brought on by the Cold War. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait moved NATO's out-of-area problem from a subordinate problem to the primary threat facing the alliance. Historically, the Alliance felt that responses to out-of-area security threats should be dealt with on a unilateral basis, even when the Alliance has agreed that their collective vital interests are threatened. The dilemma for NATO is the lack of a unified approach to the out-of-area problem. NATO's boundaries are boundaries of obligation and not boundaries of confinement. Through a review of the language of the treaty and problems inherent in alliance relationships, this thesis will explore the differing perceptions of alliance members regarding the scope of the alliance and why NATO has survived for 40 years yet been unable to deal with the out-of-area problem.



Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES AND THE TREATY.....	9
	A.BEFORE THE TREATY.....	12
	B.THE RIO PACT.....	16
	C.THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.....	17
	D.THE ARTICLES.....	19
	1.United Nations Articles.....	20
	a.Chapter VII.....	20
	b.Chapter VIII.....	21
	2.North Atlantic Treaty Articles.....	24
	a.Article 4 - Consultation.....	24
	b.Article 5 - The Pledge.....	26
	c.Article 6 - The Boundaries.....	31
III.	ALLIANCE DILEMMAS.....	36
	A.DEFINING THE OUT-OF-AREA PROBLEM.....	37
	B.NATO AND THE KOREAN WAR.....	40
	C.SHIFTS IN ALLIED FOREIGN POLICIES.....	44
	D.VITAL INTERESTS.....	50
	E.DEFINING THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE THREAT.....	54

F.DEALING WITH THE THREAT.....	58
G.CONULTATION.....	59
H.BURDENSARING.....	64
I.COLD WAR TENSIONS.....	66
IV. NATO AND THE MIDDLE EAST	
A.BACKGROUND.....	72
B.AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE GULF.....	73
C.NATO INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF.....	76
D.THE 1990 PERSIAN GULF CRISIS.....	84
Lack of Cold War Tensions.....	88
V. CONCLUSIONS.....	93
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	97
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	101

I. INTRODUCTION

NATO, as a regional alliance developed in 1948/9 under the umbrella of the United Nations, has a legitimate right to project force beyond the geographical boundaries of the NATO alliance. That NATO has been unwilling and or unable to do so since 1949 results from a combination of factors relating to disagreements between members over the geographical scope of the alliance, shifts in allied foreign policies and inter-allied tensions brought on by the Cold War. One can suggest that NATO's out-of-area problem is actually a dilemma from within that stems primarily from a lack of consensus on what is the exact nature of the out-of-area problem. This lack of consensus is brought about (and its resolution is hindered by) the disagreement on the scope of the alliance and its ability legitimately to participate in the protection of its interests outside the alliance boundaries. For example, the United States views Central America and the Caribbean basin as important to the security of the Alliance based on their geographic importance in shipping supplies to Europe. The European allies view Central America as distant and not remotely connected to the security of the Alliance.

Additionally, the alliance has had difficulty in tackling the out-of-area problem because of continued shifts in the foreign policies of its allies. These shifts began at the

end of World War II with the allies differing opinions regarding colonialism. Since its involvement in the Korean War, NATO has been reluctant to exert influence in the international arena in the defense of its interests as an alliance or on behalf of its member states.

Finally, the East-West confrontation between the superpowers caused anxiety among the allies regarding nuclear escalation of conflicts. The fear of the Soviet Union poised on the borders of Europe kept the Alliance together in spite of any internal tensions between the allies. The European allies needed the commitment of the United States. The paradox here is that the very same fear that kept them together is the same fear that kept them from acting collectively in out-of-area conflicts. That is to say, the fear of Soviet reprisal for actions taken in conjunction with the United States initiatives caused many allies to decline participation in global conflicts. In the context of the Cold War, few conflicts in the periphery remained outside the scope of the interests of the superpowers, and once involved, the potential existed for the conflict to spread or escalate to a major East-West confrontation.¹

Undoubtedly, the Cold War has had a significant impact on NATO's inability or unwillingness to project its influence internationally. Therefore, it would only seem appropriate

¹Charles A. Kupchan, "Regional Security and the Out-of-Area Problem," eds., Stephen J. Flanagan and Fen Osler Hamson, *Securing Europe's Future* (London:Croom Helm, 1986), p. 282.

that the end of the Cold War would have the reverse effect on the alliance and its out-of-area problem. The stand that the end of the Cold War may only jeopardize NATO's potential to solve this problem. Before the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the alliance agreed unanimously that the Soviet Union was their primary adversary. Although recognized by most alliance members to be a danger, the out-of-area problem remained subordinate to the Soviet threat. Now, however, the consensus among many critics is that the Soviet Union does not pose the substantial military threat as it did before. Furthermore, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait gives prominence to out-of-area conflicts. Central to this issue is whether NATO can align itself against a threat that is not as clearly and neatly defined as the Soviet threat once was.

Chapter I will discuss the legitimacy of NATO's right to act out-of-area by reviewing the factors influencing the development of the North Atlantic Treaty, particularly as they relate to the geographical boundaries outlined in the treaty. The debate centered around the boundaries of the alliance is an old problem that has yet to find a solution. The boundaries outlined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty are boundaries of *obligation* and not boundaries of confinement. Through a review of the language of the treaty and the negotiations that preceded the signing of the treaty, this thesis will argue that NATO is not limited in scope by the treaty to deal with only those threats that emerge within the boundaries of Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Chapter II suggests that NATO has failed to act out-of-area in the past because NATO lacks consensus -- consensus in the sense of what precisely is the out-of-area problem. NATO has never developed a common approach to define the nature of the threat and furthermore, what method should be used to oppose that threat. NATO has yet to agree on what the vital interests of the alliance are much less on how to defend them. NATO, as an alliance for self-defense, is dedicated to the security of the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. In that context, there are certain vital interests that should be protected regardless of the geographical boundaries outlined in the treaty. For example, access to oil and raw materials is vital to stability of every country in the world but particularly to European nations who import the bulk of their oil from the Persian Gulf. Free access to shipping lanes and the sovereignty of every nation are other examples of issues where NATO's out-of-area effort would not be considered out-of-line.

NATO's lack of consensus is created by the interplay of several factors. First, divergent foreign policies and objectives of the different NATO allies have barred the development of a common strategic approach to dealing with issues, other than a direct Soviet threat, that in the past have threatened the interests of the alliance and/or its members. Without a consensus, this will continue to be a problem in the future and further hinder NATO's ability to find an amicable solution to the out-of-area problem. Much

of the dispute surfaced at the end of World War II with problems stemming from differing allied opinions regarding colonialism. From the beginning France, in a sense, created an out-of-area problem, from the Anglo-Saxon perspective, by insisting that Algeria be included in the boundaries of the treaty.. This problem has metamorphasized into a debate about the very "nature" of the threat facing the alliance at the end of the century. The United States tended to view the cause of turmoil in the world as a by-product of the Soviet Union's efforts to undermine Third World countries and further the expansion of communism. On the other hand, most Europeans would argue that the problem is more North-South. That is to say, the root of all evil lies in the inability of Third World countries to make themselves economically viable in the international market.

Secondly, the Cold War has played an important role in NATO's inability to form a common strategic approach to the out-of-area problem. When the United States finally committed troops to Europe at the end of World War II, many Europeans finally felt secure that they would not be left alone should the Soviet Union advance across the border into Germany. But, in addition to the the fear of the Soviet threat, there remained a great deal of apprehension about a resurgent Germany, especially in 1949-50 when rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany was mentioned. After the Korean War, when the United States turned to a more interventionist global foreign policy, many Europeans found

it difficult to support American initiatives. This is because the Europeans tended to see the American's as too willing to resort to force which caused further dissention among the allies. More specifically, many allies fear reprisal if they back, politically or militarily, the foreign policies of other allies. Compounding the problem is a common belief among many Europeans that unilateral actions by the United States are antagonistic toward the Soviet Union.

Finally, it is important to mention the continued impact of the burdensharing debate on NATO's out-of-area problem. The United States in 1947 initiated the Marshall Plan to rebuild the war-torn economies of Europe. With this plan the United States had visualized a revitalized Europe providing for its own defense. The American legislature soon, however, began to feel pressure, especially after Vietnam, to let the European countries shoulder more of the expense for their defense. While this topic in and of itself is one worthy of a more detailed discussion, it is the use of burdensharing problem to avoid participation in out-of-area conflicts that is important to understanding the nature of NATO's out-of-area problem. As well, it is the use of that debate and dissention in the alliance that further erodes the cohesion of the alliance to develop a consensus to deal with its out-of-area problem. All these factors have inhibited NATO's ability to effectively deal with its out-of-area problem. In fact, they have made NATO's "out-of-area" problem an "internal" problem.

Chapter III will review the current crisis in the Persian Gulf as it relates to NATO and its out-of-area problem. NATO, as envisioned by its founders, was developed to counter threats to its security together. To continue to respond to security threats unilaterally defeats the purpose of the alliance. The NATO allies have responded in an unparalleled show of support for United States initiatives in the Gulf, however, that response continues to be at a national level. Does the alliance have a valid response, collectively in the Gulf? Considering the dilemmas of the past, can NATO support the United Nations and the United States efforts to turn back the events since August?

Some critics would argue that the Conference on Security and Confidence in Europe (CSCE) or the Western European Union (WEU) are the security frameworks for the future. Neither of these assemblies has the organization framework established to deal with the military aspect of security which must be considered. Furthermore, since Article 52 of the United Nations Charter allows the UN to utilize collective security arrangements to preserve peace, is this something that can or should be done? Essentially, this is presently the case in the Persian Gulf. The United Nations has agreed to enforce sanctions against Iraq. This global consensus provides domestic as well and international rationale for supporting the military effort against Iraqi forces. If the united efforts of the allies is successful, it will provide a solid

foundation to build a unified strategy for dealing with the out-of-area problem.

II. GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES AND THE TREATY

Alliance relationships are a difficult paradox. Problems are inherent in relationships that are dedicated to the preservation of national freedom and self-determination. Yet, in order to accomplish this goal, a country must relinquish certain degree of control to organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Undoubtedly, national sovereignty is not something in which a country is willing to have its allies participate.

"The idea of free men and free minds in an open society, which is the essence of the North Atlantic civilization, defies the rote of history."² From 1789 to the development of NATO, the unique geopolitical circumstances of the United States almost precluded association in an alliance. Avoiding "entangling alliances" became more than a policy; it became a national expression for many Americans about the position of the United States in the world, a view which contrasted the simple virtues of the Republic.³ Likewise, the European nations view international relationships from a completely different perspective based on their own historical

²Robert Strausz-Hupe, James E. Dougherty and William R. Kintner, eds., *Building the Atlantic World* (New York:Harper & Row Publishers, 1963), p.2.

³David Fromkin, "Entangling Alliances," *Foreign Affairs* 48, no. 2 (July 1970): p. 688.

experiences. For the most part, European alliances, prior to NATO, were narrowly defined groupings that were developed to achieve a specific goal. There were few shared interest between the members beyond the attainment of a specified goal. As a result, alliance relationships were very short lived, and NATO, as such, is an anomaly.

Involvement in NATO became the first extra-hemispheric relationship for the United States since the Treaty of Mortefontaine in 1800. As a collective defense organization, NATO was established as a response to an increasing threat from the Soviet Union after the end of World War II. "In many ways the war was like a great and violent tide which, when it receded, left the United States beached or embedded all along the periphery of Eurasia."⁴

By participating in NATO, the United States hoped to achieve two goals. The primary motive was to develop an effective counter threat to Soviet efforts to subvert the war-torn economies and political institutions of Europe. The second less obvious goal of the United States was to rebuild a strong European balance of power against the Soviet Union. This second goal of American policy toward Europe was important because it would be influential in determining the latitude of commitment from the United States. However, the United States efforts to rebuild a European security

⁴Aaron Friedberg, "America's Strategic Position," *Parameters* XVI, no. 4 (Winter 1986): p. 30.

arrangement would not be possible without the inclusion of West Germany. This being the case, European fears about a resurgent Germany would also have to be eased. This goal was accomplished as the United States progressively involved itself in the North Atlantic Alliance. America's commitment was the instrument through which Germany could be accepted into a security arrangement. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 not only emphasized the importance of the Mediterranean to the stability of Europe, it helped direct the thrust of American assistance programs toward the rehabilitation of western Europe as a key element in the balance of power against the Soviet Union.⁵

Agreement to join the North Atlantic Treaty marked a revolutionary change in foreign policy, not only for the United States, but for Canada, Norway, Denmark and Iceland as well. The decision for these countries to sign the treaty was a difficult one. The United States spent much of the initial discussions opposing the creation of such a treaty. The paradox is that the alliance was not designed around the Cold War politics of the United States, but after the invasion of South Korea in 1950, the alliance became the principal instrument of the cold war policies of the United States.⁶ An historical review of the factors influencing the

⁵Timothy P. Ireland *Creating the Entangling Alliance* (Westport, Connecticut:Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 10.

⁶Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope* (Toronto:McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1977), p. 11.

development of the North Atlantic Treaty explains some insight into why the treaty language is so vague regarding the out-of-area problem.

A. BEFORE THE TREATY

In the spring of 1948, a fear of aggressive communist policies created apprehension among the western countries. Economic instability only served to enhance political chaos in Europe and there was fear in the United States that the governments of France and Italy would fall to communist subversion. Lester B. Pearson, co-author of the North Atlantic Treaty commented, "This treaty, though born of fear and frustration, must, however, lead to positive social, economic, and political achievements if it is to live -- achievements which will extend beyond the time of emergency which gave it birth, or the geographical area which it now includes."⁷ The authors and signers of the treaty did not reject the potential global reach of the alliance as evidenced by Mr. Pearson's comment.

The treaty had much of its foundations in the Rio Pact and the Anglo-Polish treaty of mutual assistance. But before the treaty was signed or a design was agreed upon, several models for regional alliances were recommended. In fact, the United States labored with difficulty over whether or not a unilateral declaration by the President with Congressional

⁷Emphasis added. Comment made at the signing of the Treaty 4 April 1949 as cited in Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 11.

backing was sufficient assurance of security commitment to Europe. Canada also considered making a declaration similar to that which the United States was contemplating.

Tripartite talks were to be held between the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom about the creation of a mutual defense pact. The commonwealth had just gained three new members; India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Britain obviously considered the members of the commonwealth as potential alliance partners and, therefore, suggested that the members of the commonwealth unite within a series of three systems. One system would involve the U.K, the U.S. and the Benelux; the second, a Mediterranean system and, finally, an "Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual Assistance." The conveniently formed commonwealth also moved Escott Reid to suggest to Lester Pearson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, that all nine members of the commonwealth should be original members of the alliance.⁸ However, the realization that including exposed and weak countries such as Pakistan and India would only increase the liability for the other members of the alliance. Therefore, it was agreed at the tripartite discussions that a self-defense alliance under article 51 could provide a framework for a universal security system. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin stated in a message to Secretary of State George Marshall that "a real defense system worked out by the United States of America,

⁸Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 100

Canada, the United Kingdom and the western European states would...be the first great step towards what could ultimately become a real world collective security system, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations."⁹

Unfortunately, the ideal of a world wide security system soon gave way to the realities of the time. There was growing sentiment in the United States and Canada that tended to favor a more conservative and isolationist approach to European security and harbored a lingering contempt for western Europeans. Then Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King said on March 30, 1939, "the idea that every 20 years this country should automatically and as a matter of course take part in a war overseas for democracy or self-determination of other small nations, that a country which has all it can do to run itself should feel called upon to save, periodically, a continent that cannot run itself, and to these ends to risk the lives of its people, risk bankruptcy and political disunion, seems to many a nightmare and sheer madness."¹⁰ This was a very popular sentiment in Canada and the United States. However, a large number of Europeans, particularly in Britain and France, realized that the United States was the only formidable power to oppose the Soviet Union and would have to be included in order for any

⁹Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, III, p. 80.

¹⁰House of Commons Debate 1939, Vol III, 2419, in Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 127.

collective self-defense alliance to be effective. Ultimately, the State Department came to a similar conclusion. This recognition of the need for American support paved the way for increased American participation.

In essence, the complexities of European security issues, demanded American involvement because of the need to reassure Europe, primarily France, on the German question. Nonetheless, nothing could be accomplished without Congressional support and approval. In fact, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson was negotiating on one hand with the foreign governments involved in the alliance deliberations and on the other hand with the Foreign Relations Committee.

The political situation in the United States before the 1948 November elections made it essential that there should be close consultation between the U.S. Administration and the Senate in the making of the North Atlantic Treaty. Assistance and support was sought from Senator Vandenberg not only because of his position with the Foreign Relations Committee but also because he was in the favored position for selection as the Republican candidate for President in the upcoming elections. Although less than enthusiastic, he did see the need for some U.S. association within a European security system. The Vandenberg Resolution of 1948 gave the State Department the necessary support to assure France that the United States was committed to the security of Europe.

This in turn moved the French government toward accepting the London Agreements on the German question.¹¹

B. THE RIO PACT

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (also known as the Rio Pact) was signed on September 2, 1947. "The Rio Pact, a regional arrangement aimed both at joint peacemaking within the Western Hemisphere itself and at collective defense against extra-hemispheric aggression, proved that effective multilateral action, consonant with the UN purposes, was still possible."¹² Several articles in the "Rio Treaty" would later serve as a model for the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 3 of the Rio Pact states that armed aggression against an American state would be considered aggression against all American States. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provided the basis for their collective and individual self-defense against such an attack. An important caveat to this article was the provision in paragraph two which allowed each state to "determine the immediate measures which it may take in fulfillment of the obligations contained in article 3...."¹³ In essence, the signatories are not obligated to provide

¹¹Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance* (Westport, Connecticut:Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 112.

¹²Alan K. Henrikson, ed., *Negotiating World Order* (Wilmington, Delaware:Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), p. 117.

¹³The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947.

assistance to another member under attack. Furthermore, the treaty lacked a distinction between an attack by signatories and an attack by non-members of the treaty.

Another important article in the Rio Pact that will have bearing on the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 4. In this article, signatories considered a geographic zone delineated within the treaty as important for the allies to understand the extent of their obligations. One significant difference between the two treaties is the lack of provision in the Rio Pact for a peace time military force. The United States, during the formulation of the North Atlantic Treaty, was insistent that the new treaty contain non-restrictive language to provided as much latitude as possible.

C. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Secretary of State Dean Acheson commented that the treaty "is designed to fit precisely into the framework of the United Nations and to assure practical measures for maintaining peace and security in harmony with the Charter."¹⁴ However, European and American approaches to the development of a regional alliance treaty were diametrically opposed. The Europeans, particularly France, desired strong language and binding guarantees from the United States should an attack on Europe occur. With a strong pledge of commitment, the Europeans felt the greater effect the treaty would have

¹⁴Dean G. Acheson, "The Meaning of the North Atlantic Pact," Department of State Bulletin 20, no. 508 (March 27, 1949):57-58.

on deterring the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, was anxious to avoid such "binding commitments" to European defense. The American delegation tended to emphasize the need for a weaker pledge of commitment. The weaker the pledge, the less difficult it would be to secure Congressional approval. Congress was unwilling, if not downright adamant about committing the United States to some future war in Europe. Perhaps this is why so much of the North Atlantic Treaty so closely resembles the Rio Pact.

The Soviet blockade of Berlin prompted the French to insist upon further assistance from the United States in the form of military equipment. This request ultimately took the form of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Because this article was a unique provision of the Atlantic Alliance and had no precedence, it constituted a true departure from traditional American foreign policy, a departure that eventually would entangle the United States in a permanent military alliance.¹⁵ Finally, after much debate, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington, D.C.

Forty years later, riding on the tide of apparent success over Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, NATO's internal problem in the form of "out-of-area" conflicts remains unsolved. The Iraq invasion of Kuwait, like the fall of the

¹⁵Timothy P. Ireland *Creating the Entangling Alliance* (Westport, Connecticut:Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 81.

Berlin Wall, has changed all that was once so familiar and routine in the world of international relations. The Soviet Union is allied with the West, the United Nations is unified as never before, and collective security is resurrected from the ashes of the League of Nations and the United Nations as the peace keeping force structure for the future.

D. THE ARTICLES

The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty reflects the spirit of the treaty. It states that "the parties of the Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments."¹⁶ The preamble and articles of the North Atlantic Treaty remain the most relevant source for trying to understand the true intent of the treaty whether stated or implied. And while the preamble is specified as its greatest aim, it is interesting to remember that neither the preamble nor any of the subsequent articles identifies a specific adversary from one particular area or that the adversary will only utilize military means.¹⁷ In this way the scope of the alliance is very global and not directed solely at the Soviet Union. However, any understanding or interpretation of the North Atlantic Treaty

¹⁶North Atlantic Treaty, April 1949.

¹⁷Peter N. Schmitz, "Is NATO an Island," in Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *Evolving European Defense Policies* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), p. 69.

Articles must be viewed in the context of the articles of the United Nations Charter. Articles 51-54 of the UN Charter provide for the development of regional alliances and collective self-defense and are specifically related to NATO's out-of-area problem.

1. United Nations Charter

a. Chapter VII

Titled "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."¹⁸ It is under this article that the members of the North Atlantic Treaty exercise their right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack. President Truman noted at the treaty signing ceremony that "To protect this area against war will be a long step toward permanent peace in the whole world."¹⁹

It is interesting to speculate why the founders of the Treaty specified Article 51 in particular when in actuality, Articles 52-54 of Chapter VIII in the United

¹⁸United Nations Charter, June 1945.

¹⁹Address of the President of the United States, U.S., Department of State Bulletin 20, no. 511 (April 17, 1949): p. 481-82.

Nations Charter govern the creation and scope of regional alliances. The primary argument proffered is that utilizing Article 51 vice the articles in Chapter VIII precludes the Soviet Union from utilizing its veto power to block collective self-defense actions taken by the Alliance members. Obviously this fear motivated the potential signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty to strive for language similar to the Brussels Treaty which specifically cites article 51 as the justification for the creation of the treaty. Article 51 is not actually the governing article for the creation of a regional alliance. In addition to mentioning the inherent right of individuals to protect themselves against armed attack, it also specifies that "measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."²⁰

b. Chapter VIII

Chapter VIII, which incorporates articles 52-54, on the other hand is titled "Regional Alliances" and specifically deals with the development and actions of regional alliances. Chapter VIII should have been cited as

²⁰Charter of the United Nations.

the pertinent article for creation of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, article 53 of Chapter VIII states:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this article.²¹

The statement "without authorization of the Security Council," caused a great deal of apprehension on the part of the prospective signatories of the Treaty in that the Soviet Union, as a member of the Security Council with veto power, would be able to intervene in the defensive actions taken by the alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty would not have been subject to the veto powers of the Soviet Union taking the literal definition of the two articles.

The North Atlantic Treaty could have been created under Chapter VIII which clearly provides for the development of such arrangements. Article 51 which speaks to the inherent right of an alliance to use individual or collective self-defense against an armed attacked would have provided for the security of the alliance against enemies including the Soviet Union. However, the binding requirement to receive the blessing of the Security Council speaks to the use of regional arrangements for enforcement actions and not the right of a regional alliance to provide for its self

²¹Emphasis added. Article 53 of the United Nations Charter.

defense against armed attack. However, this subtle distinction was not enough assurance for the allies that the Soviet Union would not be able to intervene and eventually led the signatories to push for a statement citing article 51 as the relevant article for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Ambassadors' Committee at its final meeting during the treaty negotiations agreed to an "understanding" which, while not denying that the treaty created a regional arrangement, recorded the intention of the parties to stress in their public statements the primary purpose of the treaty. The summation of their understanding was "to provide for the collective self-defence of the parties, as countries having common interests in the North Atlantic area", a primary purpose which was "recognized and preserved by Article 51, rather than any specific connection with Chapter VIII or other Articles of the United Nations Charter."²²

Article 51, taken literally, however, states that the United Nations will not prevent any nation from its inalienable right to protect itself from armed attack. The founders of the North Atlantic Treaty selected this article to avoid Soviet intervention in the Alliance's inherent right for self-defense. It should not be used as a means to

²² Escott Reid, as a member of the drafting committee provides an exhaustive account of the negotiations and debate surrounding Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 191.

prevent the alliance from taking enforcement action when its interests are threatened. Additionally, Article 52 provides that Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. In essence, NATO could become the "world's police force."

2. North Atlantic Treaty Articles

a. Article 4 - "Consultation"

Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty delineates the guidelines for alliance consultation. When the policy of one ally in a military alliance increases the risks of war for other allies, the policy becomes the concern of all the allies.²³ The importance of consultation as paramount to creating cohesion and trust among members was realized by the founders of the treaty and therefor incorporated in Article 4. In September 1948, Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Foreign Minister, commented that "the sharing of risks, resources and obligations must be accompanied by, and flow from a share in the control of policy." He went on to say, "If obligations and resources are to be shared, it is obvious that some sort of constitutional machinery must be established under which each participating country will have a fair share in determining the policies of all which affect all." He also realized that "without their consent, the policy of one or

²³Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 162.

two or three may increase the risks and therefore the obligations of all."²⁴

Article 4 also exhibits the universal scope of the alliance because it does not delineate where the threat must come from. The agreed interpretation of the article states that it is "applicable in the event of a threat in any part of the world, to the security of any of the Parties, including a threat to the security of their overseas territories."²⁵ In other words, when the United States took military action in Panama in December of 1989, any of its NATO allies could have requested consultation under Article 4, if in their opinion the actions of the United States threatened their security. While these interpretations are not formally a part of the treaty, they do constitute the understanding of the representatives participating in the discussions as to the meanings of the articles. "The universal extent of the provisions on consultation in the North Atlantic Treaty reflected the fact that if the United States, Britain or France became involved in armed conflict with the Soviet Union anywhere in the world, the conflict would almost inevitably spread to the North Atlantic treaty

²⁴Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson* (Toronto, 1973), II, pp. 52-3.

²⁵Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, IV, p. 222-223.

area and thereby bring the pledge of assistance in the treaty into operation."²⁶

b. Article 5 - "The Pledge"

The very heart of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the promise of assistance to another member under attack. In most instances, this particular provision would be referred to as a guarantee. However, the United States objected to the term, guarantee. Therefore, the provision was referred to in the negotiations as "the pledge."²⁷ Article 5 states, "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...."²⁸ The type of assistance to be rendered and the obligation to provide assistance was argued over the entire 12 months of negotiations. From the European perspective, the stronger the pledge, the more impact the treaty would have as a deterrent, particularly where the West Germany was concerned. The Europeans favored a treaty that was patterned after the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 or the Brussels Pact of 1948 not only because they contained language specific about using "all military means available" but more so because these particular treaties were directed specifically against a

²⁶Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 166

²⁷Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 143.

²⁸North Atlantic Treaty

renewal of aggression by Germany.²⁹ Interestingly enough, while the Europeans were concerned about the threat from the East, it is evident that they worried about American commitment to European security more because of Germany than from the Soviet Union. The Europeans were assured of U.S. commitment should the Soviets cross the border into Germany but they were not as convinced about American assistance against a revitalized and rearmed Germany. It seems as though the Europeans failed to remember that the United States fought with Europe in two world wars against Germany.

The American perspective about including a pledge was such that the less restrictive the treaty the less resistance the United States administration would have in securing the Congressional approval for ratification.³⁰ As mentioned before, assistance and support was solicited from Senator Vandenberg and received in the form of the Vandenberg Resolution. Up to the point when the resolution was passed, consultation between the administration, treaty negotiators and Congress was fluid and frequent. After the resolution was approved and the primary objective of gaining initial congressional support was accomplished the consultations were few and far between. This lack of communication erupted in an unexpected and impromptu debate on the floor of the Senate which centered almost entirely around the language of

²⁹Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, p. 222.

³⁰Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 143.

Article 5. Congress was unwilling to commit in writing to such a strongly worded pledge of support to its European allies. Senators Connelly and Vandenberg were now adamant that Article 5 should expressly state that was no moral or otherwise obligation to go to war.³¹

The debate about the wording of Article 5 is summarized most appropriately in a message sent by the Canadian High Commissioner to the Department of External Affairs, "If there is no satisfactory pledge in the treaty, and if the treaty is interpreted by the Senate merely as a mechanism for getting the European states out of difficulties which really don't concern the United States directly, then its value is greatly reduced and we might have to re-examine out whole position."³² The message goes on to say, "The purposes of the treaty are not going to be fulfilled by an undertaking which is so watered down that it does not create even a moral obligation to take effective action, but is put forward as a charitable donation from the United States."³³ Ultimately, the article was broadened sufficiently to appease the U.S. Congress while keeping the Europeans quasi-assured of an American commitment.

³¹Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 152

³²Message sent from the Canadian High Commissioner, (London) to Department of External Affairs, (Brussels) 16 February 1949, in Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 154.

³³Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 154.

However, the term "guarantee" was not the only disagreeable item in the treaty. The U.S. Congress continued to exhibit isolationist tendencies. Specifically, Congress felt that because the President had the power to use military force without congressional approval to repel an attack against the United States, the chief executive would have the same right to by-pass Congress. Therefore, the wording of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was couched so as to conform more with the "Monroe Doctrine formula".³⁴ What this implied was a pledge more along the lines of the Rio Pact which obligated members to regard attack against one as an attack against all and to take whatever steps deemed appropriate to provide assistance. As a result, technically speaking, the United States was not bound militarily to the security of Western Europe. Ironically, the United States channeled its efforts to bring West Germany into NATO and in an effort to secure a rather aloof position for itself while France was seeking increased American involvement in Europe as a way of keeping Germany down.

Finally the members of the North Atlantic alliance agreed to consider an armed attack on one as an attack

³⁴For a more detailed discussion about the negotiations in Congress regarding Presidential powers pertaining to the North Atlantic Treaty and the State Departments impact statement see, U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty*, Hearings Held In Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 80th Congress, 2nd session on S. 239 and 81st Congress, 1st session on Executive L, The North Atlantic Treaty.

against them all, to come forth with assistance should such an attack occur and that the form of assistance would be that which is deemed necessary up to and including the use of force to maintain the security of the Atlantic alliance. Interestingly enough, only when the United States committed troops to NATO under Article 3 did the Europeans feel confident that the United States would actually come to their defense.

The allies turned their discussions to dealing with the threat from indirect aggression. After all, the Europeans were as worried if not more so about the use of indirect aggression by the Soviet Union to perhaps encourage and assist in subversive actions to help topple governments or to aid rival factions in coming to power.

As was indicative of most of the negotiations, developing a definition that was suitable to all parties involved proved to be almost impossible. Escott Reid's argument for including a statement in the treaty about indirect aggression was that "the new treaty will look pretty futile if it is a treaty to guarantee us against the kind of attacks on our independence which might have been made 30 years ago but not the kind of attacks which may be made during the next weeks and months."³⁵

Mr. Reid's point was well made in that the Soviet Union had dropped no bombs when Czechoslovakia had fallen in

³⁵Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 157.

1948. However, the British were instrumental in killing any proposals that surfaced regarding the indirect aggression aspect of a security threat. Primarily because they felt and were able to convince enough of their allies that including any definition of indirect aggression might be misconstrued as an attempt to meddle in the affairs of other states. As a result, it was agreed by the tripartite drafting group that the proposed treaty should not contain explicit provisions on indirect aggression but that the treaty would merely provide for consultation in the event an ally felt threatened by indirect aggression.

c. Article 6 - "The Boundaries"

Article 6, perhaps one of the most explicit articles in the treaty, specifies that the NATO area is defined as the territory of NATO states, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic south to the Tropic of Cancer.³⁶ This article is most often quoted as the reason for avoiding the "out-of-area" problem. Article 6 defines those geographical areas that are considered "hands off zones" to potential aggressors, whether or not the aggressor is a member of the alliance. As with the Rio Pact, the boundaries help to also define for the signatories the extent of their obligations. "There is no constitutional limitation in the Treaty against the allies acting as an alliance in pursuit of the active

³⁶Trevor Taylor, *European Defense Cooperation* (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 67.

principles of contribution to and promotion of peace and stability in international relations as described in Article 2."³⁷ However, the United Nations Charter requires compliance when determining how this is to be achieved.

The acceptance of Greece and Turkey in 1951, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955/6 and Spain in 1982 indicates that the boundaries are expandable. In fact, specific mention of Turkey in Article II of the Protocol is made because, historically, Turkey is not considered a European state. "Judging by the intractable nature of the disputes between Greece and Turkey, the extension of NATO membership beyond the Atlantic area has been a mixed blessing."³⁸

Article 6 also expands the meaning of armed attack to the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic Area north of the Tropic of Cancer." Interestingly enough, the Treaty leaves the American state of Hawaii uncovered.³⁹ More important is

³⁷Peter N. Schmitz, "Is NATO an Island," in Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *Evolving European Defense Policies* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), p. 71.

³⁸Marc Bantinck, *NATO's Out-of Area Problem*, Adelphi Papers 211, Autumn (London:IISS, 1986): p. 7.

³⁹Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance* (New York:Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 23.

the fact that the treaty, as signed, does not preclude the Soviet Union from becoming a member. In light of events taking place in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, this concept is not as impossible as it once seemed.

Additional supporting evidence of a perceived global application of the North Atlantic Treaty is provided in the comments and communiques since the inception of the Treaty to the present. The Joint Communique by the North Atlantic Council in September 1949 stated that the "objective of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to assist in achieving the primary purpose of the United Nations -- the maintenance of international peace and security." Similarly, the NATO communique in January 1958 states that , "the free world must organize its resources -- moral, military, political and economic -- and be ready to deploy them wherever the situation demands." The communique goes on to say the the alliance "cannot therefore be concerned only with the North Atlantic area or only with military defense...and take account of developments outside its own area."⁴⁰

Initial discussions regarding the membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization also reveals that the scope of the Alliance was to deal more with the threat to the Alliance rather than limiting its actions to a particular geographic scope. When the negotiations began about who would be extended membership invitations into the alliance,

⁴⁰NATO Letter, 6., no. 1 (January 1958): p. 10.

the United States was at the forefront in insisting that the "stepping stone" nations be included in the alliance. These countries included Norway (for Spitzbergen), Denmark (for Greenland), Portugal (for the Azores), Iceland, and Ireland.⁴¹ Initially, France was opposed to the inclusion of nations outside the Brussels Pact. The United States claimed that Spitzbergen was not necessarily vital for use by the United States but that it would be very important to the Soviet Union for advanced positioning against allied forces. As well, Greenland provided the United States with forward positioning for its air defense and that in many ways these "stepping stone" countries were more important to the security of the United States and Canada than some of the countries in western Europe.⁴² Eventually, even France came to realize the geographical importance of each of these countries to the rearmament of Europe.

"The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 created the first multilateral military alliance to span the North Atlantic Ocean in time of peace."⁴³ Since that time, the alliance has undergone many changes, faced problems of cohesion and unity, been involved in extra-european affairs and conflicts. Yet, in spite of the problems it has faced, the alliance has remained in tact. The duration of the North Atlantic Treaty

⁴¹Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 195.

⁴²Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, III, 215.

⁴³Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 9.

Organization's existence is quite unusual given the historical experience of alliances. The Korean war forced the alliance to face the realities of its security problems. That such a conflict occurred so soon after the alliance was formed must have further implanted in the minds of the NATO members that alliance relationships are essential to the security of not only the allies but to the entire world.

The geographical boundaries in the alliance have often times provided its members with an easy excuse to avoid involvement in out-of-area conflicts. However, having looked at the language of the treaty and the negotiations involved in the development of the treaty is clear that the geographical boundaries outlined in Article 6 of the treaty are not boundaries of confinement, rather, they are boundaries of "obligation" that delineate the responsibilities of each member to assist and support its allies when their security is threatened. But the clarity of the geographical boundaries and their meaning only creates additional problems within the alliance.

There are problems inherent in alliance relationships and NATO is no exception. The following pages will review some of those problems, such as defining the threats to the alliance, the differing opinions of how to deal with those threats, problems in alliance cohesion created by burdensharing and consultation and the effect of divergent foreign policies on the ability of the alliance to deal with the out-of-area problem.

III. ALLIANCE DILEMMAS

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, NATO has been applauding its apparent victory over the Soviet Union claiming alliance cohesion and unity of purpose as the key to success. The reality is that NATO has not always experienced this "unity", especially when dealing with the out-of-area problem. From 1945 until the mid 1960's, decolonialization caused a significant shift in European desires and willingness to control even their most important economic territories. The realities of the Korean war also served to change forever the ability of NATO to act effectively as an alliance. Since, that time, the European viewpoint has been that diversion of NATO forces outside of Europe would essentially leave the alliance defenseless. The United States, in a major change of foreign policy away from its traditional isolationist stance began to view many conflicts around the world as further attempts by the Soviet Union to undermine the free world and that the alliance should act to counter the Soviet Union's efforts. These conflicting views on what NATO's foreign policy should be remains a major stumbling block within the alliance and further hinders its ability to effectively cope with 'extra-european conflict'.

When the out-of-area problems surfaces, as it has many times in the past, NATO allies select one of many reasons to

justify their inaction. As discussed in Chapter I, some allies claim that geographical limitations prohibit out-of-area actions. Other allies profess that acting internationally only serves to provoke the Soviet Union and deepen the rift between the two superpowers. These inconsistent views on the source of international conflict, especially in the Third World, only provides more justification and technicalities for the allies to hind behind.

Although each of these claims has a degree of validity to them, it is the lack of a unified approach to the out-of-area problem that remains NATO's out-of-area problem. This chapter will deal with the problems that have contributed to NATO's inability to deal effectively, if at all, with the out-of-area problem. Glasnost and Perestroika are having a lasting effect on this dilemma and their impact will be brought forth in Chapter III. However, for the purpose of this section, it is important to regard any analysis of NATO's involvement or perceptions about out-of-area conflicts in the context of international relations prior to the Fall of 1989.

A. DEFINING THE OUT-OF-AREA PROBLEM

NATO's out-of-area problem is indeed old. "The out-of-area issue presents members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with the difficulty of balancing their collective interest in North Atlantic security with their

variously shared and perceived commitments in other parts of the world."⁴⁴ And while this problem has been around since the inception of the North Atlantic Treaty, there has yet to be a successful conclusion to this dilemma.

The definition of the term "out-of-area" can be viewed as anything that happens beyond the boundaries outlined in Article 6 as an "out-of-area" problem. With the Carter doctrine announced, the Alliance was debating a new issue under the heading of "out-of-area operations," thus reducing the complex problem of "military contingencies" for the alliance and placing them outside the treaty boundaries.⁴⁵ The actions that allies take, or in some instances fail to take out-of-area can in some instances undermine political cohesion within the alliance and thus breakdown Western security in its largest sense.

The United States, by virtue of its economic and military stature is the leader among the allies in involvement in out-of-area actions. Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer were vocal in their criticism of American unilateralism in 1956 and 1957. de Gaulle questioned the sustainability of NATO within Europe if the allies could not agree on matters outside of Europe. In 1958, de Gaulle suggested a directorate within NATO in which the United States, Britain

⁴⁴Marc Bantinck, *NATO's Out-of-Area Problem*, p. 3.

⁴⁵Peter N. Schmitz, *Defending the NATO Alliance*, (Washington, D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1987), p. 63.

and France would shape global policies of the Alliance.⁴⁶ Predictably, the United States rejected the idea claiming the it was an effort to expand the boundaries of NATO when, in fact, the United States was using this excuse as more of an attempt to avoid sharing in the decision making process.

Initially, the out-of-area problem became a bigger problem because of a perception on the part of the western alliance that the Soviet Union was furthering its influence in the Third World. "Until quite recently, the most important aspect of NATO's out-of-area problem stemmed from reactions by West European allies to activities of the United States."⁴⁷ With the advent of Glasnost and Perestroika, there is a belief among many Americans and Europeans alike that the threat is gone. The threat, although taking a different form, remains a threat. While it is evident that the Soviet Union is not able or willing at this point to mount a military advance through the Fulda Gap, the threat takes on a different form in the shape of economic and political instability. Furthermore, the lack of a Soviet military threat only serves to place the heretofore secondary threat of Third World conflict at the forefront.

Herein lies the problem. NATO lacks a comprehensive, consensus on how to deal with problems outside the

⁴⁶Peter N. Schmitz, *Defending the NATO Alliance*, p. 33.

⁴⁷Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO in the 1990's* (Washington:Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), p. 319.

geographical region of the North Atlantic that threaten allied interests and security. As discussed earlier, the language of Article 6 outlining the boundaries is explicit regarding the "scope" of the alliance for the purpose of keeping potential adversaries out, but it is more than vague when the question arises about the ability of allies to assist other members outside those geographical guidelines.

In the early years of NATO, East-West relations were not conducive to an organized and leisurely approach to forming the military and political foundations of the alliance. Over the course of 12 months in 1949 - 1950, the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear weapon, the Chinese government succumbed to a communist revolution and North Korean forces invaded South Korea.⁴⁸ The fledgling NATO alliance received a "baptism by fire" into the realm of international relations. In many ways, NATO's first action as a collective defense organization was also a conflict "out-of-area." The impact of the Korean War on the alliance was formidable and lasting.

B. NATO AND THE KOREAN WAR

"Although NATO was originally based on the defense of Europe and North America against a perceived threat of Communist aggression, the first direct military challenge to the western allies came in Asia when, on 25 June 1950, North

⁴⁸The North Atlantic Treaty took effect on August 24, 1949. Just six days later the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. One month later, Mao Tse-Tung proclaimed the People's Republic of China.

Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and entered South Korea." The Korean war is unique to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization not only because it was the first conflict in which the Allies were engaged, but because it was also an conflict outside the geographical perimeters of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the Korean War, the Western nations had obligations under the United Nations Charter but not under the North Atlantic Treaty.⁴⁹ The primary reason the Alliance became involved was American emphasis that this attack might be the beginning of a larger assault on the west by the Soviet Union through Germany. In this way the United States sought to involve its new allies of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is the effort by nations to to ambiguously tie their allies to conflicts that creates much disharmony within the alliance.

Senator Vandenberg was adamant before the outbreak of the Korean War that the alliance should only have and "efficient nucleus" of forces capable of expanding in an emergency, but quickly altered his position "after the Communists showed their readiness to use force to gain their ends in the attack on Korea."⁵⁰ Escott Reid recalled, "in the months that followed the invasion of South Korea, the first step that had to be taken was to build up the military strength of the

⁴⁹Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance*, p. 23.

⁵⁰Arthur. H. Vandenberg Jr. ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston, 1952), p. 512-3.

West so that the Russian-Chinese leaders would be encouraged in future to be more cautious." He goes on to say, "We believed that one reason for their lack of caution was their military preponderance. The primary purpose of our rearmament was to deter them from running risks which might land us all in the catastrophe of an atomic war."⁵¹

The Allies first engagement was not without controversy or fear. Of the European allies, only Britain, Canada, and Turkey sent forces to Korea. It also led to an American insistence that Turkey and Greece be granted membership in the alliance and the West Germany be rearmed in integrated into the alliance. "The Korean War resulted in the metamorphosis of the North Atlantic alliance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."⁵²

It was mutually understood by the nations of the west that the United States was the only country that possessed sufficient economic and military strength with which to deter the Soviet Unions attempts to expand communism to the western world. While many allies could not afford to provide economic or military support, many also believed that the American preoccupation with Asia would be at the expense of NATO which brought into question American commitment to Europe. Conversely, the United States had fresh in its memory the

⁵¹Escott Reid, "The Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy," *India Quarterly* (April-June, 1958): 191-2.

⁵²Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 238.

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Far East from the American perspective was a Communist menace. The realization soon hit the United States that NATO was ill equipped to handle any assault on Europe much less an assault of the scale believed the Soviet Union would use. The impact that the Korean War had on the defense expenditures of the alliance was formidable and lasting. United States expenditures increased in real terms from \$14 billion in 1950 to \$43 billion in 1952 which brought total expenditures for the alliance in 1952 to \$54 billion dollars.⁵³

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was definitely affected by the Korean War. "The alliance had been energized by an enormous increase in United States military aid: it had created an impressive military and political organization in the form of supreme commands and a secretary-general secretariat; it had expanded the scope of the alliance through the addition of Greece and Turkey to permit more defensible postures in Europe; and it looked to the future inclusion of West Germany as an inspired way both of increasing the force capabilities of NATO and of ending the long and deadly Franco-German rivalry.⁵⁴

The Korean war also served to blur American anti-colonialism. The French used American rationale of "global communist threat" to turn their conflict in Indochina into a

⁵³Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 236.

⁵⁴Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 53.

fight against communist aggression. In this way the French made the war in Southeast Asia an American War. The United States believed the Soviet Union was an influential force behind many conflicts in the world and this rationale has been used to justify many American efforts to intervene in global conflicts. Several problems result from the divergent foreign policies of the NATO allies when dealing with out-of-area problems such as defining interests, threats, and responses to global conflict. The Korean war, and the state of international affairs caused a definite shift in U.S. foreign policy toward intervention as demonstrated by the United States' initial involvement in Indochina on the behalf of the French government. However, it is important to understand the impact that anti-colonialism had on the foreign policies of not only the United States but on the policies of many European countries as well.

C. SHIFTS IN ALLIED FOREIGN POLICIES

In the beginning, the alliance met resistant to collective international involvement because of U.S. anti-colonial attitudes. "The repudiation of colonialism has certainly accompanied and at times even spurred American intentions to keep the European allies' profile low on the international stage."⁵⁵ In fact, Andre Beaufre, commander-in-chief of the

⁵⁵Peter N. Schmitz, *Defending the NATO Alliance*, p. 31.

French expeditionary forces during the Suez crisis later wrote that France's disappointment with America's policy in the crisis finally convinced the French to pursue a nuclear program on their own, to pull their troops out of NATO and to distance themselves from American influence on European allies.⁵⁶

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty heralded a major shift in U. S. foreign policy from an isolationist to a more global perspective. However, there remained a significant reluctance on the part of U.S. administrators to support British and French colonial endeavors. This is demonstrated by the lengthy disputes surrounding Italian membership and the French insistence to include Algeria in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Original membership for the Italian government was hotly contested during the negotiations of the North Atlantic Treaty in the spring of 1948. Ironically, it was the fear that Italy and France would fall to communist subversion that worried European governments and ultimately elicited a greater commitment from the United States in the Atlantic Alliance. Additionally, there was opposition to Italian membership for two reasons. First, Italy was not viewed by the European allies to be a North Atlantic country. Including a Italy would make it almost impossible to refuse membership to Greece and Turkey. Including the Mediterranean

⁵⁶Peter N. Schmitz, *Defending the NATO Alliance*, p. 32.

countries, it was believed, would make it difficult to use the alliance as a chrysalis for a North Atlantic community ⁵⁷

After the communists were defeated in the French and Italian elections, many Europeans tended to view their membership as a liability rather than an asset. This stemmed from the ever present debate about the geographical scope of the alliance. However, it is interesting to note that the British and possibly other members of the Brussels Pact opposed Italian membership based on a belief that Italy would attempt to make its acceptance of membership conditional on the return to Italy its former colonies and also to solicit revisions of the Italian peace treaty.⁵⁸ The French seized the opportunity as a means of clearing the way for inclusion of Algeria and therefore, campaigned on the part of Italy for membership. The French government had concluded that if it pressed hard on both Italy and Algeria it might be able negotiate a position where it would withdraw its demand for Italian membership in return for acceptance of Algeria.⁵⁹

⁵⁷Opposition came from the Benelux countries, Britain Canada and Norway primarily because it was believed that Italy's admission would weaken public support for the treaty in their countries. Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 200.

⁵⁸This information was known by J.D. Hickerson, then director of the office of European affairs in the State Department. The United States had stated that it would oppose any such attempt and that it had received assurance from Italy that no such attempt would be made. Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 202

⁵⁹Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 203.

Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the Algerian departments of France were to be included in the territory covered by the Pledge of Article 5⁶⁰. France was so insistent that Algeria be included in the treaty that it threatened to refuse signing the treaty if Algeria were excluded. Other countries were not at all intrigued by the obligation of helping France suppress Arab uprisings in Algeria.⁶¹ The Netherlands were at the forefront of the objections being raised about the incursion of Algeria primarily because if the territories and/or troops of an ally around the world were attacked then there would be no limitation on where the armed attack could occur further expanding the obligation to provide assistance. The French remained insistent that Africa north of 30 degrees be included. The British were supportive at first but later reconsidered their priorities and supported the exclusion of Algeria. France's foremost argument was that Algeria was to France as Alaska was to the United States. Furthermore, that Algeria was integral in the defense of the French homeland. Lord Gladwyn Jebb, under-secretary at the British Foreign Office, was of the opinion that France's real motive was to

⁶⁰After Algeria's independence, this portion of the treaty was considered null and void

⁶¹Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 213.

secure assistance from its allies to suppress any nationalistic uprisings in North Africa.⁶²

Ultimately, France won the battle to have the three departments of Algeria included, but the war to secure allied assistance may have been lost nonetheless. The decision still rested with each country to provide assistance as deemed necessary; therefore, the argument could easily be made that an Arab nationalistic uprising is a French internal problem and does not necessarily constitute a significant threat to the North Atlantic community as such.

The United States foreign policy has been the object of criticism from its allies on more than one occasion. The problem with the United States is not so much one of wrongful conduct but its inability or unwillingness to articulate adequately the legal basis for its policies in ways that would reassure at least its democratic friends.⁶³ Much of the confusion over developing a common policy is that, for the most part, European policy and positions are initiated in the EPC rather than in the Alliance where the United States would be included. This only serves to create even greater disparity, disunity and lack of political cooperation and reconciliation.

⁶²Taken from the Canadian High Commissioner, (London), to Department of External Affairs, Jan. 14, 1949, Tel 113. NASP., file 293(s), part 5., cited in Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 218.

⁶³Robert F. Turner, "International Law, the Use of Force, and Reciprocity: A Comment on Professor Higgins' Overview," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (Summer 1987): p. 162.

The out-of-area problem is exacerbated by the dissimilar foreign policies of the allied governments. For example, in 1954 there was a growing dispute between Britain and the United States about what "western policy" should be towards China and Formosa. The United States favored and entered into a bilateral treaty agreement with the Nationalist Chinese government of Formosa. The signing of this agreement was tantamount to non-recognition of the communist government in Peking. Britain, on the other hand, favored a "middle of the line" approach which would basically allow both regimes admittance to the United Nations. On 28 January 1955, a joint resolution was passed by Congress granting the President authority to secure Formosa and other "related positions" important to their defence. The dispute over the China question is indicative of the "difficulties of achieving political solidarity within a regional alliance in the face of conflicting allied interests and policies outside the scope of the alliance."⁶⁴

Further evidence of alliance disputes and differing policies are found in the realm of international trade. "This is particularly evident in the politics of arms sales in many parts of the globe where French, American British, and -- increasingly -- German vendors engage in competition for the sale of weapons of a magnitude threatening stability

⁶⁴Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance*, p. 190

in the affected area as well as relations among the allies."⁶⁵ For example, French arms sales to Iraq intervened with American Middle East policies in the mid 1980's.

D. VITAL INTERESTS

"There is no Alliance strategy to deal with undeniable threats to energy and raw material resources required by the West, to cooperate with the Third World, and to work together on the menace of debt problems, communist subversion, and state-subsidized international terrorism."⁶⁶ Furthermore, members of the same alliance may have differing perceptions of their commitments to other nations. In their article "Limits to Intervention," Allison, May and Yarmolinsky suggest that the United States may feel a greater sense of national commitment to Britain than to, say, Greece or even to Norway, despite an equal obligation to all.⁶⁷ These differing perspectives on the commitment and obligation of allies to each other provides a difficult barrier to defining what are the collective vital interests of the alliance.

The United States alone is committed to different alliances all over the world each with varied singular and collective interests. Additionally, the problem is

⁶⁵Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 169.

⁶⁶Peter N. Schmitz, *Defending the NATO Alliance*, p. 7.

⁶⁷Graham Allison, Ernest May and Adam Yarmolinsky, "Limits to Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, 48, no. 2 (January 1970): p. 248-9.

exacerbated when situations and conflicts arise involving nations which are not bound by treaty with obligations to provide assistance. For example, during the existence of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) there was problem posed by the dual membership of Turkey in NATO. The United States was only a member of the military committee of CENTO. It is interesting to speculate what would happen if the Soviet Union attacked a CENTO member such as Iran. If Turkey, bound by CENTO Treaty obligation, came to the aid of its ally, and was then subject to Soviet offensive action, then the United States and the other members of NATO would have no alternative but to regard this as an attack within the meaning of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁶⁸ The conflict of interests that exists between alliance memberships also inhibits NATO's ability to develop a consensus on the out-of-area dilemma.

There also lingers a problem within the domestic political arena of many countries including the United States. The concept of national security is becoming a vague and obscure phrase used to obligate forces and economic assistance in some cases and deny them in other cases. "A victim of complications arising from the Vietnam syndrome and from its own internal contradictions, it [national security] has come to mean in many minds unreasonable military demands,

⁶⁸Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance*, footnote 8, p. 25.

excessive defense budgets, and collusive dealings within the military-industrial complex."⁶⁹

The crisis in the Falklands in 1982 stems from a dispute between Argentina and Great Britain over the territorial claim of the islands. Lawrence Freedman in his analysis of the conflict states, "here is a clear act of aggression and disregard of the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes."⁷⁰ The United States became involved in the conflict from the beginning by sending Secretary of State Alexander Haig as a mediator. South American allies were insistent that the United States remain distant in the conflict. Careful not to upset those ties the American administration walked a fine line between innocent bystander and active participant. As the British naval forces approached the island, Secretary Haig confided that four weeks of negotiation had proven fruitless and the United States firmly committed itself in support of Britain.

The United Nations Security Council voted with ten of fifteen states favoring the resolution condemning Argentina's invasion⁷¹, Panama voted against, while the Soviet Union,

⁶⁹Maxwell D. Taylor, "The Legitimate Claims of National Security," *Foreign Affairs* 52, no. 33 (April 1974): p. 577.

⁷⁰Mr. Freedman is a Professor of War Studies at King's College, University of London. "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982," *Foreign Affairs* 61, no. 1 (Fall 1982): p. 200.

⁷¹It is significant to note here that of the fifteen nations favoring the resolution, four, Guyana, Uganda, Togo and Zaire, are Third World countries.

Poland, China and Spain abstained.⁷² Another important factor to remember is the apparent lack of interest on the part of the Soviet Union as evidence by their abstention in the Security Council vote. Despite dependence on Argentinian foodstuffs and traditional support for 'anti-colonial' causes, little if anything, was directly at stake in the crisis for the Soviet Union.⁷³

One significant difference between the 1982 Falkland Islands Crisis and the Grenada invasion of 1983, in terms of alliance solidarity, is the ability of alliance members to conceptualize their stake in the problem.⁷⁴ There is some speculation, however, on the commitment of Italy. Had the war lasted much longer some critics suggest that Italy would have distanced itself from the conflict and the alliance. The European allies failed, however to recognize their "stake" in the security of Grenada.

"During the brief British-Argentine war over the Falkland Islands the United States had to choose between a neutrality over a colonial relic in the South Atlantic, with all the implications it had for relations with Latin America, and NATO solidarity."⁷⁵ After failed attempts to negotiate a

⁷²J.E. Spence, "The UN and the Falklands Crisis," in G. R. Berridge and A. Jennings, eds., *Diplomacy at the UN* (New York:St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 62.

⁷³J.E. Spence, "The UN and the Falklands Crisis," p. 63.

⁷⁴Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 168.

⁷⁵Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 168.

peaceful resolution, the United States opted to support the Great Britain and the alliance. Although shaky at best, the alliance stood together which indicates there is hope for consensus on out-of-area issues. Now, in 1990, the alliance is further exhibiting by its efforts in the Persian Gulf that there is hope for developing a consensus on what threats should dealt with collectively by the alliance.

E. DEFINING THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE THREAT

During the late 1980's, there was a prevailing American perception of Europe's decline as a force in world affairs, seemed to stem from a profound difference in interpretation of politic -- of what policy, diplomacy, and Western strategy is all about."⁷⁶ The problem is also aggravated by conflicting European and American attitudes regarding the nature and scope of the threat. The United States has sought to deter and at times, defeat, efforts by the Soviet Union and its proxies to impose their form of government upon other states with the use of force.⁷⁷ While Third World tensions in and of themselves have always been viewed as important to global security, they have also been considered by the United States as a by-product of increasingly prevalent Soviet expansionism. Europeans perceive that U.S. policies towards Central America, for example, could have negative

⁷⁶Peter N. Schmitz, *Defending the NATO Alliance*, p. 61.

⁷⁷Robert F. Turner, "International Law, the Use of Force...", p. 169.

impacts on West European public opinion and thus weaken the bonds of the Alliance.⁷⁸ Furthermore, they argue that Central America is far from the European theater and has no bearing on the Alliance as a whole. However, unilateral involvement by West European governments and by quasi-official bodies like the West German political foundations have cause concern among American Administrations.⁷⁹

The United States continues to pursue a more global policy perhaps in large part because based on the experiences in two world wars, we have reached a conclusion that today's world is simply too small for us to remain ambivalent about armed aggression beyond our borders.⁸⁰ It is difficult for the United States European allies to accept and often times the American administration finds itself alone when dealing with the "security threat" in South America. Then again, there hasn't been unanimity among allies about France's activities in parts of Africa or with Britain's insistence on recovering the Falkland Islands. That individual allies tend to interpret Soviet involvement in Third World areas differently also points out two other factors: the concern of most Europeans that the relatively stable East-West environment not be jeopardized and that the United States is

⁷⁸Robert Hunter, "NATO's Future: The Out-of Area Problem," in Stanley R. Sloan, ed., *NATO in the 1990's* (Washington, D.C.:Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989), p. 320.

⁷⁹Robert Hunter, "NATO's Future: The Out-of Area Problem," p. 320.

⁸⁰Robert F. Turner, "International Law, the Use of Force...", p. 168.

the most global nation in NATO.⁸¹ It is important to understand the impact that differing allies viewpoints have on alliance issues and that these disparities only make it more difficult for the alliance to solve the out-of-area problem.

The United States faces a similar problem on the domestic front as well. Increasingly, administrations are finding it more and more difficult to garner public support for international activities and alliance responsibilities abroad. The American public has not always relished the idea of being the world's police force. In early 1954, the United States began sending technicians to assist the French in Indochina. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles issued his famous threat of "massive retaliation" against Soviet communism. Congressional leaders in Washington sensitive to the post-Korean mood of the American public, however, were reluctant to see the United States become involved in another frustrating military engagement in Asia.⁸² There is a problem when a country, like the United States, has a global economic and military reach, it is difficult to differentiate between national security interest and world police.

⁸¹Robert E. Hunter, "NATO's Future: The Out-of-Area Problem," p. 325.

⁸²Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance*, (New York:Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) p. 188.

Critics have long commented that NATO's consultation problems and divergent foreign policies have made it ill equipped to generate a consensus on how to deal with the Soviet threat to Europe. While this may be true, it is more evident in NATO's dealings with out-of-area conflicts over the past 40 years. Alliance perspectives differ on the basic questions of what explains the cause and effect of conflicts in the developing world. "While domestic problems -- ranging from factional and religious infighting to pressing social inequities and economic underdevelopment -- have been seen as creating the conditions for such crises, Moscow's involvement is believed to be their immediate cause, and is thus the source of major American concern."⁸³ In other words, the Europeans would tend to believe that conflicts in the Third World more an economic problem while the United States tends to view them as a military problem.

⁸³Peter H. Langer, "Discord Over Out-of-Area Issue," *Transatlantic Discord and NATO's Crisis of Cohesion*, (Washington, D.C.:Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1986), p. 39.

F. DEALING WITH THE THREAT

Another significant factor contributing to the out-of-area problem is European perceptions about where threats exist and the action to be taken are often diametrically opposed to those of the United States. The danger is that these opposing viewpoints may hinder the Alliance's ability to properly deal with the out-of-area problem. "Ironically, America, as the long-dominant leader of the Alliance, has contributed most to developing an Alliance that it now would prefer to be different."⁸⁴

As stated above, the United States initially resisted involvement and assistance to its European allies in areas outside of Europe as a protest against European colonialism. The United States felt that colonialism on the part of its allies would compromise NATO's ability to compete with communism for the allegiance of new nations created by the liquidation of former empires.⁸⁵ While Britain and France retain a somewhat limited ability to project power in extra-European affairs, other NATO members remain sensitive to being "dragged" into any kind of military involvement out-of-area.⁸⁶ The debate usually results in the United States being pitted against the rest of the alliance when the use of force

⁸⁴Peter N. Schmitz, *Defending the NATO Alliance*, (Washington, D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1987), p. 27.

⁸⁵Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 167.

⁸⁶Marc Bantinck, *NATO's Out-of-Area Problem*, p. 16.

is being considered. The Gulf region provides an excellent example of creating more disharmony than unity. Mr. Brooks, Acting President of the North Atlantic Assembly noted that differences had developed within the Alliance following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when member countries were unable to fully agree on an appropriate response and these differences only exacerbated already existing tensions.⁸⁷ Other problems arise when force is used to combat terrorism. The Europeans view much of the problem as a failure to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute and that the United States' policy toward Israel only adds fuel to the fire.

G. CONSULTATION

There is a primary problem in the Alliance with consultation on who and when to consult. The decision to "consult or not to consult" is left up to the discretion of the members rather than being a required action within the treaty. By its very nature the treaty is dependent upon effective and timely communication and exchange of information.

Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that "Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is

⁸⁷Thomas Peter Glakas, "Instability in the Gulf region A new challenge for Western Security?" *NATO Review*, no. 1 (February 1981): p. 21.

threatened."⁸⁸ The alliance founders realized the importance of such an article, however, the ambiguity of "in the opinion of any of them" leave a great deal to interpretation and this has caused strains within the alliance on more than one occasion. As Escott Reid points out, "The strains may become so severe that they will give rise to doubts about the likelihood of some of the members of the alliance being willing to carry out their obligations under the alliance if war should break out."⁸⁹

Consultation is a significant factor in the effectiveness of the alliance but it also remains a substantial barrier to developing a solution to NATO's out-of-area problem. Each of the NATO allies has at one time or another throughout the history of the Alliance avoided the difficulties involved in consulting ones allies about foreign policy. The adage, "it is easier to beg for forgiveness than to ask for permission" seems to fit appropriately as is evidenced in the case of Britain and France in the Suez crisis or the United States in Grenada.

The United States might have been able to draw a more positive reaction from its European allies had there been more effective consultation. When the United States invaded Grenada in 1983, it evoked a Security Council reprimand citing the intervention as a violation of international law.

⁸⁸North Atlantic Treaty.

⁸⁹Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 162.

Britain abstained from the voting. France and the Netherlands voted in favor of the resolution condemning the action, but the United States used its veto power to block the adoption of the resolution. It is ironic that the United States utilized the same tactic in the Security Council that the founders of the alliance were trying to avoid when they created NATO under Article 51.

The United States terms its security interests in the Caribbean Basin in terms of trade and trade routes. Almost 50% of all US trade (including substantial amounts of crude oil) traverses the Caribbean basin.⁹⁰ Additionally, the United States attempted to tie allied interest to Caribbean citing that the reenforcement of Europe would be threatened if these trade routes were hindered in any way.

The effects of the invasion of Grenada are still being felt in the Alliance. "Apart from the action itself, Europeans in unison have deplored American unilateralism, which, it appears, intentionally neglected the rule of consultation in the Alliance."⁹¹ The tendency for America to act unilaterally is a double edged sword. On the one side, the United States cannot rely on allied assistance in out-of-area issues. On the other side, the European allies are not confident about the predictability of American foreign

⁹⁰See *Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America* (New York:Macmillan Publishing Co., 1984), p. 110.

⁹¹Peter N.Schmitz, *Defending the NATO Alliance*, p. 48.

policy. America, for a long time, has frustrated the Soviet Union with the unpredictable nature of its foreign policy. But it is questionable whether this approach is appropriate or beneficial for European allies. The out-of-area issue becomes a problem when a country stretches the limit of "common interests" as the United States may have done with Grenada and Panama.

Another example, is the British and French reactions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. There was a reluctance on the part of the alliance to discuss the Middle East problem despite the fact the Western Europe was heavily dependent on Middle East oil, which subsequently traveled through the Suez Canal. As tension increased, Britain and France prepared for military action by deploying forces to the Mediterranean. The forces that were deployed had been originally assigned to NATO or withdrawn specifically for service in Algeria and the decision to use these forces was made without consulting the North Atlantic Council.⁹²

The complete breakdown of consultation in the alliance again created an atmosphere of complete disintegration and disunity in the alliance. Britain and France did not inform the United States of their decisions until the last moment to, more than likely, avoid any attempt by the Eisenhower administration to delay or even implore them to abandon their

⁹²Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance*, p. 197.

plans. The United States, to this point refused to become involved in Middle East hostilities. The Soviet Union proposed joint action with the United States to end the aggression. "Although the United States categorically rejected the Soviet proposal, the two leading world powers did align themselves within the United Nations against the Anglo-French-Israeli actions."⁹³ Remarkably, the United States had diplomatically allied itself with the primary adversary of NATO. "This particular breakdown of consultation and internal confidence was so severe that it acted as a useful cathartic upon the members of the Alliance."⁹⁴

More effective consultation is being attempted through regularly scheduled meetings of the North Atlantic Council, however, greater commitment on the part of each member to the necessity of timely consultation is necessary in order to achieve a higher level of solidarity within the alliance. Regardless of the decisions a country has for involvement in issues or conflicts outside the alliance, effective consultation is paramount in building cohesion and unity.

Timely consultations can eventually mean engagement and a commitment to share responsibilities and burdens.⁹⁵ For example, as Robert Turner points out about US involvement in

⁹³Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance*, p. 199.

⁹⁴Alastair Buchan, *NATO in the 1960's* (New York:Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 104.

⁹⁵Peter N. Schmitz, *Defending the NATO Alliance*, p. 89.

Nicaragua, "Many European critics of the United States are under the false impression that--as long time supporters of the Somoza dictatorships--the United States launched an armed proxy effort to overthrow the Sandinista regime because it perceived the new Nicaraguan government as being Marxist-Leninist and contrary to American interests in the region."⁹⁶

H. BURDENSARING

Obviously with better consultation members could achieve greater insights into and have better opportunity to influence decisionmaking. The United States has always been interested in seeing its European allies accept a larger share of the expense in maintaining the alliance. In the mid 1950's, after the fear of a Soviet attack on Germany has subsided, the United States began applying more pressure upon its allies shoulder the burden of increased expenditures. Europe's relief over America's strong support turned into resentment.⁹⁷ European attentions turned away from the conflict to their ravished economies.

What makes burdensharing a problem is the reluctance of allies to provide military support while not having a say in the political or military strategy, which was the case with the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. The cost of defense is expensive and that added expense is usually not looked upon

⁹⁶Robert F. Turner, "International Law, the Use of Force...", p. 163.

⁹⁷Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, p. 45.

in domestic political circles as necessary in peace time. Likewise, it is difficult for countries to justify the economic burden of building up and maintaining a military force that is not completely under their control.

In October 1948, Canadian Prime Minister, St. Laurent stated his realization that it was no longer important for individual members of the alliance to have balanced forces but that the alliance as a whole should be the one to have a balanced force.⁹⁸ Prime Minister St. Laurent's comment is accurate, however, practically speaking near impossible. Defense departments in each nation are reluctant to relinquish control of their forces. A lack of domestic public support and basic trust within the alliance have prevented the build up of an efficient low cost military defense force. Efforts to coordinate, standardize and develop joint coordinated defense production has resulted in a North Atlantic armed force that cost much more than they otherwise would; their efficiency in combat is lower; and an opportunity has been lost to strengthen the unity of the Atlantic community.⁹⁹

Burdensharing is a problem that has evolved with the alliance. The debate has been present throughout NATO's involvement in extra-european affairs and as a result of its own, internal politics. Additional problems are created when,

⁹⁸Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 240.

⁹⁹Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 240

in the instance of the bombing of Libya in 1986, the United States, in the view of many observers, was hampered in the use of U.S. forces, deployed abroad to protect European lives, when they were needed to protect American lives.¹⁰⁰ All of the intricacies of this problem is not a topic for this paper, however, the burdensharing debate is a major stumbling block and one that will have to be dealt with before any viable international political consensus can be agreed upon among the allies regarding out-of-area actions.

I. COLD WAR TENSIONS

But more importantly, is the influence of the Cold War on NATO's reluctance or inability to act in out-of-area conflicts. The chilly relations between the United States and the Soviet Union has caused apprehension on the part of many European nations. Fear of reprisal or retribution prevented many nations from supporting U.S. global foreign policies. Expanding U.S. intervention in the Third World was viewed by Europeans as antagonizing the Soviet Union. This fear came about in large part from the Korean War when the United States had difficulty in controlling General MacArthur. "This chilling experience strengthened the belief in Ottawa that the United States must be restrained, and that the most effective means to influence the United States

¹⁰⁰Robert E. Hunter, "NATO's Future: The Out-of-Area Problem," p. 321.

policies was to strengthen the procedures for consultation in the North Atlantic Alliance."¹⁰¹

Similarly, many Europeans were hesitant about the United States global policy as being too quick to resort to force. "The United States, for reasons deriving in part from its estimates of the situation in the Middle East and in part from domestic political factors, is inclined to regard force as the most appropriate and useful instrument of policy."¹⁰²

By its nature as a political and military alliance, NATO has inherent problems that develop when the out-of-area problem is discussed. Difficulties that are inherent in alliance relationships can be credited for causing problems regarding consultation. Often times, the failure to consult one's allies is an attempt to avoid pressure to abandon unfavorable policies or actions. By the very nature of their historical experiences, countries have differing perspectives of what threats are detrimental to the security of the alliance.

Even more difficult is developing a consensus on how, exactly, to deal with those threats. Are there times when immediate military force is necessary? Does one country's opinion of a security threat warrant the expenditure of funds by another country that may not necessarily agree? These

¹⁰¹Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, p. 240-1.

¹⁰²Joseph I. Coffey, "Security in the Middle East: can the Allies do better?" *NATO Review* 37, no. 5 (October 1989): pg. 23.

are just a couple of questions that are present in almost every conflict NATO has been involved in over the past 40 years. Now that the Soviet Union is no longer the formidable threat it was perceived to be as short as one year ago, what are NATO's chances of developing a strategy against an unknown and less defined threat? Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, these questions that could only be speculated about. However, a look at the alliance reactions to the crisis in the Persian Gulf will provide some insight into the possibility that NATO will actually resolve its out-of-area problem.

III. NATO AND THE MIDDLE EAST

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein unleashed Iraqi forces against Kuwait. Considered to be a direct threat to global security and to the vital interests of many countries, the United Nations Security Council, in a surprising move, voted unanimously to condemn the actions of Iraq. The world has joined together to reverse the course of events and prevent further aggression. At last the concept of collective security as envisioned by its founders is apparently working.

"There is universal acknowledgement that the Middle East, because of its geo-strategic location, its proximity to Europe, its position athwart the air and sea lines of communication to the Indian Ocean area and its vast reserves of oil, is of the highest importance to the Atlantic Alliance, and that member nations may well use force to protect their interests there as they have in the past."¹⁰³ Yet NATO, as an alliance against aggression, has failed to respond with more than moral encouragement. Much the same is true about the Alliance response to the Gulf crisis of 1980. Despite the virtual unanimous consent that vital Alliance interests are threatened in an area outside the geographic bounds of the North Atlantic Treaty, an overwhelming majority

¹⁰³Joseph I. Coffey, "Security in the Middle East: can the Allies do better?" p. 23.

of the North Atlantic Assembly members agreed that individual responses rather than a collective Alliance response was more appropriate.¹⁰⁴

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has, historically, been reluctant to participate as an alliance in conflicts "out-of-area" despite any impact these conflicts may have on the interests of the alliance as a whole or the individual member nations. If this alliance is so successful, why hasn't NATO moved, as an alliance, to exert political and military influence in support of the United Nations resolutions against Iraq?

The members of the Alliance, all, either through military or economic means, support the efforts of the United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf. NATO's geographical proximity, specifically the southern flank, to the Middle East dictates that NATO cannot be decoupled from the conflicts within this region. The Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran-Iraq tensions not to mention the Cypriot-Turkish dispute are all potentially explosive issues that greatly involve the United States and the Soviet Unions interests. Thus a formal recognition by NATO's political leadership of the linkage between these local' conflicts and overall Western strategic interests would go a long way toward breaking down the

¹⁰⁴Thomas Peter Glakas, "Instability in the Gulf region A new challenge for Western Security?" p. 21.

artificial military boundaries that assume that NATO's wartime responsibilities stop at the Turkish border.¹⁰⁵

However, agreement beyond the common acknowledgement that the Middle East is important and even vital to Western Security interests is difficult to obtain. Priorities differ, threats are viewed differently and the source of threat cannot always be agreed upon. But more importantly, nations are exceedingly hesitant to relinquish control of their military and economic resources to a central command in order to more effectively deal with global security threats. But ideally, that is why each country has contributed to the creation of the Allied forces on as much of an equitable level as possible. It would only seem logical that NATO forces should have an important role, representative of the alliance as a whole, in conflicts such as the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis. This would not preclude countries such as the United States, Britain, and/or France from contributing on a unilateral basis additional forces, equipment or monetary resources to supplement NATO forces should they so choose.

The Persian Gulf is an ideal case study because of its important role in the Western perception of global security. A review of the historical experience of the United States and the Alliance since the end of World War II is insightful

¹⁰⁵Geoffrey Kemp, "East-West Strategy and the Middle East-Persian Gulf," in *NATO--The Next Thirty Years*, ed. Kenneth A. Myers (Boulder:Westview Press, 1980), p.220.

in helping to understand any alliance response, collectively or unilaterally, to the current crisis in the Persian Gulf.

A. BACKGROUND

As the appeal of colonialism faded at the end of the second World War, Third World countries endeavored to achieve economic and political independence. In the Middle East, as in most other Third World countries, the competition between the superpowers superseded many nations efforts to gain autonomy. This region has been a hotbed of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. While the west continues to become more and more dependent on the Middle East for oil, the Soviet Union views it more as a means to obtain sea ports on the Indian Ocean than as a way to strangle Western economies.¹⁰⁶

The realization by the United States and the Western world that stable political relations with Arab Gulf states not only ensures continued availability of a vital commodity essential to the industrialized world, it also contains the Soviets and the larger strategic problems they pose in the area.¹⁰⁷ Although not formally, the NATO alliance has

¹⁰⁶Charles A. Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf and the West* (Boston:Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 2.

¹⁰⁷During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States each viewed this area with great strategic important..albeit from far different perspectives than their opponents imagined. Even now that the Cold War is over, the area remains of vital importance, not only to the superpowers, but to the entire world. The vast reserves of oil, as already witnessed, if interrupted can impact significantly the economies of every nation. Coupled with the ongoing debate over the Israel-Arab

collectively regarded the Arab world as important to their security. Interestingly enough, it is only in this region that the NATO alliance has even shown an interest in developing an collective policy for the region.

The period of 1946 to the early 1970's saw little change in the Persian Gulf region. Britain retained its dominance in the area despite a Soviet presence in Iran. By 1973, however, the British began to reconsider their posture in the Middle East. As the British slowly pulled east of the Suez, the United States filled in the void, at least where security responsibilities are concerned. The Soviet Union on the other hand, was building its political influence to the point where, by the mid 1970's, the Middle East was considered to be the one area where a Soviet/US confrontation would be most likely. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1978, with its implications both for U. S. domestic politics and for political stability in the Middle East, became and increasingly important factor in the formulation of American policy toward the region.¹⁰⁸

B. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

The building of United States policy toward the region began with the "Iranian Crisis" in 1946. First, Stalin opted to leave Soviet forces in Iran past the deadline agreed upon

dispute, this region has enormous impact on the political and international relations of each nation as well.

¹⁰⁸Charles A. Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf and the West*, p. 11.

with the British for the mutual withdrawal. This furthered the belief that the Soviet Union was attempting to extend itself into the region. The Truman administration fashioned its foreign policy after George Kennan's theory of containment. Integral to that was the realization that the United States could no longer be willing to react to Soviet advances where ever they might occur. Rather, the United States would have to define and defend certain geostrategic locations with force if necessary.

Fearful that communist regimes in Greece and Turkey would benefit from a continued Soviet presence and topple the governments, the Truman administration pressed for a Soviet withdrawal. The Soviets pulled out in May. Their withdrawal was followed by an administration response in 1947 introducing the Truman Doctrine which asserted that the United States "must support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."¹⁰⁹

The second factor that shaped America's policy toward the Middle East was the debate about the creation of an Israeli state. The administration was divided about the impact of the state of Israel claiming that it would jeopardize relations with the Arab world. In other words, American support for Israel might interrupt the flow of oil into

¹⁰⁹John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947* (New York:Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 310.

Europe and could endanger the success of the Marshall Plan. Truman vacillated between the State and Defense departments arguments for maintaining friendly Arab relations and the domestic political pressures of public opinion. "Truman's stance on the question of establishing a Jewish state seems to have been determined by electoral considerations more than any other single factor."¹¹⁰ With 5,600,000 Jewish people residing in states with large numbers of electoral votes, Truman publicly supported the creation of a Jewish state largely to aid the Democratic party in the upcoming congressional elections.¹¹¹ The impact of politics on the creation of foreign policy is profound and not necessarily the best barometer for formulating international relations. And so, the United States began a shaky relationship with Israel that has undoubtedly had a significant impact on the shaping of United States policies towards the Middle East.

During the Eisenhower administration, Middle East policy was no nearer to a clear definition than before. The Suez Crisis in 1956 further evidenced the United States inability to differentiate between regional incidents and those more important to United States interests. Eisenhower was hesitant to send forces in support of British and French initiatives because he feared such action would "outrage

¹¹⁰Charles A. Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf and the West*, p. 16

¹¹¹John Snetsinger, *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel* (Stanford:Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 42-44.

world opinion and whether it would achieve permanent, soundly based stability."¹¹² As mentioned earlier, the Suez Crisis caused a rift between the United States, Britain and France. Problems with consultation and resentment on the part of Britain and France for America's lack of support was the beginning of the end of British willingness to maintain and presence in the Gulf.

Perhaps more importantly was the impact Israeli participation in the crisis caused. For the first time, Israel was involved with the West in a coordinated attack against an Arab state. This only served as another step in turning the Arab-Israeli dispute into an East-West confrontation. This problem has not subsided through the years and is one which the United States now faces against Iraq in the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis. With the advent of the Eisenhower Doctrine, forces were deployed to the Middle East to make clear to all, especially the Soviets, that the United States was "fully determined to sustain Western rights in the region."¹¹³

C. NATO INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The internal problems of NATO practically insure that responses to out-of-area threats will remain limited and unilateral at best. This problem is particularly evident in

¹¹²Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (Garden City, New York:Doubleday, 1965), p. 37.

¹¹³Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 178.

Alliance response to the Middle East, especially in the last decade. Since the general withdrawal of their forces from the Middle East, Britain and France have remained particularly sensitive to developments in the area to the point that prestige and honor have shaped their reactions to events as much as economic or strategic factors.¹¹⁴

The Suez crisis did much to shape the policies of the United States as well as Britain and France toward the region. The Middle East, perhaps more than any other region in the world, has caused United States to vacillate unsteadily between the exigencies of Alliance solidarity and the attractiveness of an independent US policy.¹¹⁵ The controversy and disparity in alliance policy in the Middle East is particularly evident in the events leading up to the Suez crisis in 1956. At the international conference of Canal "user" nations held in London in August, 1956, there was little evidence of NATO's political solidarity. The United States was opposed to the use of American military force in the crisis because of a refusal to implicate itself with what was perceived as "blatant perpetuation of imperialist thinking.

More importantly, however, was the perception that U.S. involvement would be seen as antagonizing the Soviet

¹¹⁴Charles A. Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf and the West*, p. 164.

¹¹⁵Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance*, p. 194-5.

Union. The paradox here is that the United States often times receives this same excuse from its allies in response to American initiatives in the Third World. Already it is easy to recognize the impact of differing perceptions each ally has regarding involvement in conflicts. Perceptions change and are motivated by differing national interests and the real or perceived ramifications of involvement to domestic political support. The British and French viewed the threat by Nassar in Suez as directly impeding "western interests." The United States, on the other hand, saw no such impact and was annoyed by its allies refusal to "conform" to U.S policy in the region.

This pattern is particularly evident not only in NATO's history in the Middle East but in most of its dealings with out-of-area conflicts. This is partly because of the United States preeminent role in the Alliance and partly because the Europeans are particularly desirous of not being subjugated by that American role. "European dependence upon American power, in combination with Washington's perceived exploitation of its dependence, compelled Britain and France to act without informing the United States, if only to demonstrate that they still had an independent role in the Middle East."¹¹⁶

Alliance cooperation in the Middle East went only as far as the agreement that the West was dependent on oil and that

¹¹⁶Charles A. Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf and the West*, p. 166.

any disruption to that oil supply played havoc with their economies. The 1973 war broadened the impact to the entire alliance and the international economy to the point that every country within NATO watched with particular interest the developments in the Middle East region. This was the beginning of a somewhat unified approach to developing an alliance policy toward the region, however, a formal policy has yet to be concluded.

What was clear to the Western Europeans is that an unqualified support of Israel and United States policy toward the Middle East could pose more of a threat to their economic relationship with the Arab world than the Soviet Union. This further clarifies the reason why U.S. and European views diverge in the development of policy.

Conversely, the 1973 War raised within NATO the question of the deployment of U.S. troops to the Middle East. The United States all too often would assume that initiatives in the Middle East were in support of the Alliance and thereby warranted the use of NATO resources. Although there was no formal agreement, Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, asserted that U.S. forces in Europe were dual purpose and that these troops could be diverted from Europe to the Middle East without NATO approval.¹¹⁷ The Europeans, however, were of a different

¹¹⁷U.S. Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S.-- European Relations and the 1973 Middle East War (Washington, D.C.:Defense Publishing, 1974), p. 37.

mindset. so much so that during the 1973 war, their fear of eliciting Arab retaliation took the form of a denial of refueling rights to the United States in European airspace.

Europeans have and still do view problems in the Third World from an economic standpoint while the United States continues to view it from the perspective of Soviet intervention. Because of its role as the chief arbiter in the Arab--Israeli conflict, its position as the dominant arms supplier to states throughout the region, and the political leverage and military strength associated with its superpower status, the United States emerged as the Western state primarily responsible for formulating and executing policies to protect Western interests.¹¹⁸

But to attribute the divergence entirely to North-South vs. East-West would be an over simplification. The late 1960's saw an increase in dependence on Middle East oil which contributed to a growing pro-Arab stance by West European governments. In particular French policy underwent a dramatic change from its earlier pro Israeli orientation during De Gaulle's' tenure, and especially at the time of the Six Day War 1967.¹¹⁹ The United States, as mentioned above, has a large Jewish political base; an attribute which is not found to the same extent in Europe. The Europeans began to

¹¹⁸Charles A. Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf and the West*, p. 7.

¹¹⁹Walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr , *Atlantic Community in Crisis A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship* (New York:Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 300.

promote and develop "European" responses to events in the Middle East primarily as a means to get out from under U. S. domination. "Thus it was the strong support of the United States for Israel as much as the pro-Arab inclination within Europe that led to a divergence within the alliance on policy toward the Arab--Israeli conflict."¹²⁰ Policy was being made by the Europeans, not as an effective means to deal with Third World conflict, rather as a means to gain autonomy from the United States.

Another problem with NATO's record in the Middle East is that many Europeans attribute the antagonism directed against the West, including terrorist activities, as a failure to resolve the Palestinian question, a failure which has for the most part been blamed on the United States 'blank cheque' policy towards Israel.¹²¹ While this in and of itself is a topic worthy of greater mention than can be achieved here, it is important to realize its impact domestic political actions can have at an international level and on NATO's out-of-area problem.

The Alliance has been involved in recent years with the four-power intervention in Lebanon in 1982-3, the minesweeping operations in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea in 1984 and the two efforts, in 1980 and 1987, to protect

¹²⁰Charles A. Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf and the West*, p. 169

¹²¹Joseph I. Coffey, "Security in the Middle East: can the Allies do better?", *NATO Review* 37, no. 5 (October 1989): p. 23.

shipping passing through the Straits of Hormuz. While the forces engaged varied considerably in size, in nature and combat involvement, these operations had a number of similarities which bear mention.¹²² Noted analyst Joseph Coffey suggests four common factors that were evident in each of these operations. To begin with, the Americans were primarily the motivating force behind these efforts in the Middle East. Secondly, these operations ultimately involved many of the allies. Third, when involved the Europeans resisted any effort for a coordinated approach as evidenced by the French, Egyptians, Saudi Arabians and Italians working essentially alone. Finally, with one exception (Lebanon 82/3), these operations were basically a success despite their low level and mundane nature having relatively little hostility.

Taking this first factor, American motivation behind these operations, the United States has historically, been the only influential power that could rival any Soviet response to Third World conflict. This stems from the United States economic position and the problems discussed at length in Chapter two regarding the differing viewpoints on the source of conflict. Americans tend to view the Soviet Union as the provicator behind instability and aggression not only in the Middle East but around the globe.

¹²²Joseph I. Coffey, "Security in the Middle East: can the Allies do better?" p. 22.

That NATO can agree to the necessity for a unified approach to the out-of-area problem at least where the Middle East is concerned is a major accomplishment considering their track record to date. But the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan only served to prove, once again, that the alliance is in disarray where the out-of-area conflicts arise. The first problem is that the alliance, originated from the Soviet threat, could not develop a consensus on what steps should be taken against that very same enemy for the overt aggression against a third party outside of Europe. The United States tried to generate support for collective action while the Europeans were reluctant to be involved. The problems posed here are multiple. A unified collective approach is necessary for any economic sanctions to be remotely effective.

There was also an apparent lack of communication or consultation between any of the allies regarding the type of action taken, unilateral or collective. Reciprocal recriminations arose over the lack of consultation on Middle East issues -- Western Europe accusing the United States of developing a condominium relationship with the Soviet Union, and the United States expressing displeasure with the lack of consultation by the European Community in the formulation of a European approach to the Middle East. ¹²³

¹²³Walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr eds. *Atlantic Community in Crisis A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship*, p. 301.

The West Germans were concerned about the trade relationship they had established with the East, the British were supportive of the United States, but hesitantly based on the reaction of their European counterparts and the French, in no uncertain terms, did not want to be remotely connected with the European alliance and proceeded on a unilateral course of action by sending a delegation to the Soviet Union. Geography was also proffered as a reason for avoiding the issue at hand when Chancellor Schmidt suggested that the issue be taken before the United Nations council.¹²⁴

D. THE 1990 PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General, reacting to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the threat posed to European security, stated recently that "We have to face the question how NATO's security mission can address these new dangers arising from regional conflicts directly affecting the security of our member nations." He goes on to say, "Let me state clearly that I am not advocating an alliance which would claim responsibility for every global problem and attempt to police every regional dispute. Yet to

¹²⁴"Bonn and U.S. Plan Arms talks in Wake of Soviet Afghan Moves," *New York Times*, 5 January 1980.

realistically recognize the limits of collective alliance action should not become an excuse for passivity."¹²⁵

Despite the important role the alliance has in this particular crisis, NATO, as an alliance has failed to react. Initial reactions were piece-meal and hesitant. One critic noted, "If they [Europeans] want aggression to be defeated, energy prices and supplies kept secure and a voice in matters of war and peace, they will have to stop playing games and start paying their share."¹²⁶ Was this slow reaction on the part of the allies a conservative move or just another, "let the American's handle it"? It would be difficult if not impossible to speculate an answer. However, it would not be difficult to visualize an coordinated joint response where there a consensus in writing on exactly how the alliance should handle these conflicts.

One particularly important reason why NATO should be at the forefront of any operation in the Persian Gulf is organization and operation of multinational forces. While there are always inherent problems with forces of different nations operating together, NATO forces at least have the benefit of joint exercises with a command structure capable of managing such operations. At a very basic level, the

¹²⁵Excerpts from speech in Istanbul by NATO Secretary General on the fundamental changes in Western security requirements in "NATO Remains Indispensable," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 133, no. 18 (October 29, 1990): p 7.

¹²⁶"Where's Their Fair Share?" *New York Times*, 6 September 1990.

United States, although retaining authority over gulf operations outside the Saudi border, must first seek Saudi approval on command decisions where Saudi defense is concerned.¹²⁷ This combination of national self-interest and overall strategic objectives do not mesh. With more than 20 nations having forces in the Mideast now, armed with dissimilar weapons and equipment basic geographical zones of responsibility have been assigned, similar to the "layer cake defense" used by NATO in Germany at the end of World War II.¹²⁸

There are other reasons that NATO should take the initiative for a more active role as an alliance in the crisis. Even if it is only political and economic support as is the case of Japan, in one way or another, all the allies are supporting the initiatives. Why not act as an alliance? The formidable posture of NATO poised to ward off any move by the Soviets across the border into Germany is viewed as being successful. Would not the same hold true for the Saddam Hussein's of the world? It appears to be easily forgotten that the reason the nations of the Atlantic joined together to form NATO is that there is safety in numbers. There was a basic belief that if a country believed an attack made on one

¹²⁷"Gulf Diplomacy," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 133, no. 20 (12 November 1990): p. 19.

¹²⁸John D. Morocco, "U.S. Opposes Formal U.N. Command Role in Middle East," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 133, no. 18 (29 October 1990): p. 23.

country would be dealt with the wrath of all countries, then the security of those countries would best be served as an alliance against aggression. The basic theory of deterrence does work in many cases. In those instances where it does not work, then those allied together must be committed to assisting in defeating aggression.

Secondly, geographical limitations are not a valid reason for avoiding political or military actions in the gulf. NATO has acknowledge that their access to raw materials is a vital interest. Even now, it has been suggested that NATO cannot become involved in this dispute unless Iraq attacks Turkey.¹²⁹ As discussed in Chapter I, the geographical limitations outlined in the Treaty is a boundary of obligation among treaty members. All that is needed for NATO to participate in the gulf operations is a consensus that (1) a vital interest is being threatened and, (2) the alliance must do something about it. "New institutions would not solve any of the Third World problems facing the West and certainly would not remove the existing perceptual differences between the United States and its allies concerning how to deal with those problems. Informal military or nonmilitary cooperation outside the NATO area will either be possible or not, based

¹²⁹See "Europe, Minus Germany, Increase Military Support for Blockade of Iraq," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 133, no. 9 (27 August 1990): p. 26.

on the political judgments made by the allies and by their capabilities.¹³⁰

1. Lack of Cold War Tensions

The world saw unprecedented change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union when Iraq invaded Kuwait. On one hand the uncertainty of how to deal with an old foe now friend was disquieting. On the other hand, there was equal uncertainty about how to deal with security threats that were unpredictable and uncertain. As Iraqi tanks rolled across the border into Kuwait, one thing was certain, the repugnance was unanimous. As well, the response was more immediate than ever before. Not even when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan was there such a show of support. Obviously, the effects of the Cold War's end are being seen.

The United Nations Security Council has found new vigor and stature in the world community. And for the first time in 45 years, the Soviet Union is again on the side of the Alliance. "By getting the Soviets to join in the condemnation of the invasion, by rushing to the defense of Saudi Arabia and by winning mandatory sanctions from the United Nations, the United States and its partners have denied Hussein and political cover for his invasion and

¹³⁰Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO's Future Toward A New Transatlantic Bargain*, (Washington D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1985), p.151.

deprived him of any room to hide.¹³¹ Certainly, this might breed reassurance within the Alliance that unity and cohesion in actions out side of Europe is not only possible but necessary.

There are some significant milestones achieved in this crisis that make separate it from other attempts at allied efforts out-of-area. First and foremost is the effective use of consultation by the allies, especially the United States. The Bush administration immediately realized that in order for any action to be effective against Iraq, they would need not only the support and assistance of their NATO allies but the support of countries outside the alliance, namely the the Soviet Union and China. The best way to achieve this support was through the United Nations. The Bush administration embarked envoys around the world on missions of consultation to drum up support for an effective strategy in the Gulf. Secretary of State James Baker 3rd met with the NATO foreign ministers in on the to discuss the results of a United States-Soviet summit in Helsinki. As well, Secretary Baker briefed the NATO allies on plans for pressuring Iraq to leave Kuwait. The result of the consultative meeting were commitments from West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium,

¹³¹Rick Atkinson and David Hoffman, "High-Stakes Gambling in the Gulf," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition* 7, no. 1 (20-26 August 1990): p. 6.

Norway Greece and Denmark to supplement the forces already supplied by France, Britain and the United States.¹³²

All too often in the past, the alliance has been faced with conflicts that threaten the security of one or more members nations. As with the United States in Grenada and the British/French action in the Suez, consultation was withheld primarily to avoid pressure from other allies to abandon military action. However, failure to consult ones allies only fosters resentment and mistrust.

Another milestone that was achieved is that the United States has resisted the temptation to "shoot first and ask questions later." The United States has been criticized for resorting to force too quickly in the past. By first seeking economic sanctions through the United Nations Security Council, the United States was undoubtedly able to secure more support and cohesion among not only its NATO allies but the rest of the United Nations as well. Perhaps this show of discretion will go a long way towards building confidence among the Atlantic allies that support of United States initiatives does not always begin with firepower.

This is not to paint a rosy and blissful picture of all that has happened regarding the alliance participation in the Gulf crisis. Despite admission that "an embargo without sanctions would be a sham," France has stated emphatically

¹³²Thomas L. Friedman, "NATO Members to Weigh Adding Troops to Gulf Force," *New York Times*, 11 September 1990.

that it will retain sole control over French military forces, deciding when or even if they will participate in any military action that might occur in the Gulf.¹³³ France has had ambiguities in its NATO policy and statements such as this can prove detrimental to allied confidence as well as to the success of the alliance regarding joint military operations.

Similarly, each nation has a domestic political battle to wage at home. President Bush enjoyed overwhelming support from the American public at the beginning of this joint venture. Seventy-six percent of the people polled in a New York Times/CBS News Poll "approved of the job Mr. Bush was doing as President."¹³⁴ However, as was discussed above, one cannot dismiss the idea that politicians often times make decisions based on the ability of the public to support their initiatives.¹³⁵ Already there is animosity and bitterness surfacing from the American people that Americans should not have to go to war to keep the price of oil low. It is questionable that such a high level of public support will be maintained if American soldiers are killed. The

¹³³Alan Riding, "More Europeans to Join Gulf Force," *New York Times*, 22 August 1990.

¹³⁴This is also the same figure reached after the invasion of Panama. Michael Oreskes, "Bush Regains Record Rating in Crisis," *New York Times*, 22 August 1990.

¹³⁵See footnote 7, regarding Truman's decisions about the creation of a Jewish State. Also see Chapter One regarding Congressional decision about the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

uncertainty of why American forces are in the Gulf can jeopardize public support which, as was seen in the Vietnam War, disastrous.

For these reasons it is paramount that NATO develop a comprehensive and unified policy for dealing with out-of-area conflicts. Furthermore, the United States, as well as its allies, must subscribe and stand firmly behind a mutually agreed upon out-of-area policy. This agreement must include what the vital interests of each nation are as well as the alliance as a whole. The command structure already exists within NATO to formulate strategies for dealing with threats to the European theater as well as those that lie outside the NATO area. This will require that each nation be willing to compromise to some degree, national perspectives for the sake of international cooperation.¹³⁶ If the alliance continues to recognize that there are security threats to their vital interests yet, support unilateral actions on the part of member nations, then the alliance is nothing but a name. The "safety in numbers" quotient is nullified and potential aggressors will capitalize on this weakness. It could well be that Saddam Hussein was banking on the chaos and disunity that has plagued alliance efforts in the past. This is the time to send a very clear signal to the other potential Hussein's that the alliance really was a success

¹³⁶Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO's Future Toward A New Transatlantic Bargain*, p. 154.

against the Soviet Union and will do the same for those that choose to threaten its well being.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The out-of-area problem is one that has existed in NATO since its inception. The Korean War brought to bear the impact that conflicts outside the geographical boundaries outlined in the treaty could have on the security of the alliance as a whole and its members. That NATO has survived over the past forty years in and of itself makes it an anomaly. Historically, alliances were created to achieve a primary goal, after which, the common purpose is gone and with it, the alliance. NATO has survived periods of tension, detente and ultimately witnessed the withdrawal of its primary adversary to a position of diplomatic alliance in the Persian Gulf. When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, many observers felt that it signaled the end of not only Soviet hegemony in Europe, but the end of NATO as well. Primarily this is because the common threat, namely the Soviet Union, no longer poses a serious threat. Apparently, it is not the end of NATO.

But NATO's road to survival has not been completely paved with success. There remain inherent problems that, if not solved, may be detrimental to its continued success. The out-of-area dilemma is exemplary of this. With the Soviet Union assuming on a more passive posture, the threat to security from Third World instability and extra-European

conflicts now becomes the primary concern for the European alliance. The Persian Gulf is evidence of the type of problem that NATO must prepare for in the future. The military structure that has been developed is designed primarily to resist Soviet advance through the Fulda Gap into Germany. NATO has not prepared itself for military action outside the European theater, yet, the military encounters NATO members have been involved in the past have been just that, outside the NATO boundaries.

Other problems are evident in NATO's ability to develop an out-of-area strategy. Consultation is imperative to effective alliance relationships and developing cohesion and trust between members. At one time or another, many of the NATO members have adopted the philosophy that it is easier to ask for forgiveness than beg for permission. The allies can not afford to avoid consulting their allies in hopes of avoiding negative responses. The converse also holds true. Each member must accept that their continued security will require, at times, assistance and support in extra-european affairs. Herein is where a mutually agreed on strategy for dealing with out-of-area conflicts would help diminish the negative effects of the burdensharing debate.

The relaxing of Cold War tensions provides an excellent opportunity for NATO allies to resolve the out-of-area problem. A comprehensive definition of common interests, such as protection of access to raw materials, is essential to fostering a more cohesive alliance. With commonly defined

and agreed upon interests, there is far less ambiguity and hesitation on when and how threats to the security of the alliance will be met. As well, NATO has a role in maintaining the status quo (as it was prior to the invasion of Kuwait), after all, suppressing Soviet desires to expand communism was, essentially, maintaining world order.

NATO has survived 40 years of turbulent international relations. To make NATO's out-of-area problem an asset can best be achieved through consultation and cooperation. America must value partnership and participation if it is to have allies that will act to preserve and promote the freedom and democracy. Likewise, the Europeans must share responsibilities as well as opportunities to maintain Western security guarantees. It simply will not suffice to have the European partners in the alliance wait for probable unilateral action by the United States.

It is difficult at best to speculate about the nature of international relations in the future. However the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is the dose of reality necessary to ensure that the alliance, as well as the world, realize that the Soviet Union is not the only threat to Western security, that the economic stability of the world can be drastically affected by the actions of a renegade nation and that the deprivation of sovereignty of any nation is a threat to every nation. NATO has an important role in the Persian Gulf as does every nation. Not because Europe receives the bulk of its oil from the Middle East, but, because of the need to

impress upon the Saddam Hussein's of the world that the sovereignty of every nation is sacred and that this type of aggression will not be acceptable.

NATO has withstood the test of time. Its apparent success against the Soviet Union is a testimony that alliances based on shared interests are possible. Nothing is permanent but NATO remains a symbol of stability and a reminder that not all is subject to change.¹³⁷ As envisioned by its founders, NATO might well be the genesis of a more global collective security arrangement.

¹³⁷Fen Osler Hampson and Stephen J. Flanagan, "Managing the Transatlantic Partnership," *Securing Europe's Future* (London:Croom Helm, 1986), p. 302.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Acheson, Dean G. "The Meaning of the North Atlantic Pact,"
Department of State Bulletin 20, no. 508 27 March 1949.
- Address of the President of the United States, U.S.,
Department of State Bulletin 20, no. 511 April 17, 1949.
- Allison, Graham, Ernest May and Adam Yarmolinsky. "Limits to
Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 48, no. 2 (January 1970).
- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
- Atkinson, Rick and David Hoffman. "High-Stakes Gambling in
the Gulf," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*
7, no. 1 (20-26 August 1990).
- Bentinck, Marc. *NATO's Out-of-Area Problem*. IISS, Adelphi
Paper 211, Autumn London:IISS, 1986.
- "Bonn and U.S. Plan Arms talks in Wake of Soviet Afghan
Moves." *New York Times*, 5 January 1980.
- Buchan, Alastair. *NATO in the 1960's*. New York:Frederick A.
Praeger, 1960.
- Charter of the United Nations.
- Coffey, Joseph I. "Security in the Middle East: Can the
Allies do better?" *NATO Review* 37, no. 5 (October 1989)
- Cottrell, Alvin J. and James E. Dougherty. *The Politics of
the Atlantic Alliance*. New York:Frederick A. Praeger,
1964.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *Waging Peace*. Garden City,
NY:Doubleday, 1965.
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, III.
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, IV.
- Friedberg, Aaron. "America's Strategic Position," *Parameters*
XVI, no. 4 (Winter, 1986).
- Friedman, Thomas L. "NATO Members to Weigh Adding Troops to
Gulf Force," *New York Times*, 11 September 1990.

- Fromkin, David. "Entangling Alliances," *Foreign Affairs* 48, no. 2 July 1970.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*. New York:Columbia University Press, 1972.
- Glakas, Thomas Peter. "Instability in the Gulf region A New Challenge for Western Security?" *NATO Review* no. 1 (February, 1981).
- "Gulf Diplomacy," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*. 61. no. 1 (12 November 1990).
- Hahn, Walter F. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *Atlantic Community in Crisis A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship*. New York:Pergamon Press, 1979.
- Hampson, Fen Osler and Stephen J. Flanagan. "Managing the Transatlantic Partnership, *Securing Europe's Future*," London:Croom Helm, 1986.
- Henrikson, Alan K. ed. *Negotiating World Order*. Wilmington, Delaware:Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986.
- Hunter, Robert "NATO's Future: The Out-of Area Problem," in Stanley R. Sloan. ed. *NATO in the 1990's*. Washington, D.C.:Pergamon-Inter-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989.
- Ireland, Timothy P. *Creating the Entangling Alliance* . Westport, Connecticut:Greenwood Press, 1981.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. *NATO and the United States*. Boston:Twayne Publishers, 1988.
- Kemp, Geoffrey. "East-West Strategy and the Middle East-Persian Gulf," in *NATO--The Next Thirty Years*, ed. Kenneth A. Myers. Boulder:Westview Press, 1980.
- Kupchan, Charles A. *The Persian Gulf and the West*. Boston:Allen & Unwin, 1987.
- Kupchan, Charles A. "Regional Security and the Out-of-Area Problem," in *Securing Europe's Future* eds. Stephen J. Flanagan and Fen Osler Hamson. London:Croom Helm, 1986.
- Langer, Peter H. "Discord Over Out-of-Area Issue," *Transatlantic Discord and NATO's Crisis of Cohesion*.

Washington, D.C.:Pergamon-Brassey's International
Defense Publishers, 1986.

Morocco, John D. "U.S. Opposes Formal U.N. Command Role in
Middle East," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 133, no.
9 (29 October 1990).

NATO Letter 6. no. 1.January 1958.

"NATO Remains Indispensable," *Aviation Week & Space
Technology*, October 29, 1990.

North Atlantic Treaty

Oreskes, Michael. "Bush Regains Record Rating in Crisis," *New
York Times*, 22 August 1990.

Pearson, Lester B. *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester
B. Pearson*, Toronto, 1973.

Reid, Escott. *Time of Fear and Hope*. Toronto:McClelland and
Stewart Limited, 1977.

_____. "The Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy," *India
Quarterly*, April-June, 1958.

*Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America*. New York:Macmillan Publishing Co.,
1984.

Riding, Alan. "More Europeans to Join Gulf Force," *New York
Times*, 22 August 1990.

Schmitz, Peter N. *Defending the NATO Alliance*. Washington,
D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1987.

Schmitz, Peter N. "Is NATO an Island," in *Evolving European
Defense Policies*. Catherine McArdle Kelleher. Lexington,
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987.

Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO in the 1990's*. Washington:Pergamon-
Brassey's, 1989.

Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO's Future Toward A New Transatlantic
Bargain*, Washington D.C.:National Defense University
Press, 1985, p.151.

Snetsinger, John *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of
Israel*. Stanford:Hoover Institution Press, 1974.

Spence, J.E. "The UN and the Falklands Crisis," in *Diplomacy at the UN*, eds. G. R. Berridge and A. Jennings. New York:St. Martin's Press, 1984, p. 62.

Strausz-Hupe, Robert James E. Dougherty and William R. Kintner, eds., *Building the Atlantic World*, New York:Harper & Row Publishers, 1963.

Taylor, Maxwell D. "The Legitimate Claims of National Security," *Foreign Affairs* 52. no. 33 (April 1974).

Taylor, Trevor. *"European Defense Cooperation,"* London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986.

Turner, Robert F. "International Law, the Use of Force, and Reciprocity: A Comment on Professor Higgins' Overview," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*. 25, no. 2 (summer 1987).

U.S. Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S.--
European Relations and the 1973 Middle East War.
Washington, D.C.:DP, 1974.

Vandenberg, Arthur. H.Jr. ed. *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Boston, 1952.

"The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982," *Foreign Affairs*. 61. no. 1 (Fall 1982).

"Where's Their Fair Share?" *New York Times*, 6 September 1990.

"Europe, Minus Germany, Increase Military Support for Blockade of Iraq," *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 133. no. 9 (27 August 1990).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	<u>No. of copies</u>
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145	2
2. Library, Code 52 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California	2
3. Director, Net Assessment OSD/NA Room 3A930 Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301	1
4. Europe and NATO Plans and Policy Branch OP-614 PNT Room 4E481 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington, D.C. 20350	1
5. European Regional Desk DAMO-SSM PNT Room 3B545 Office of the Army Chief of Staff Washington, D.C., 20380	1
6. European Division/NATO Policy Branch J-5 PNT Room 20965 Joint Staff Washington, D.C. 20301	1
7. Deputy Assistant Secretary European and NATO Policy OSD/ISP/EUR PNT Room 40822 Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301	1

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 8. | Captain Richard Diamond
OP-603, Room 4E486
Strategy and Concepts Branch
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350 | 1 |
| 9. | Thomas C. Bruneau, Code NS/BN
NSA Department Chairman, Code 56B
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002 | 1 |
| 10. | Professor Donald Abenheim, Code NS/AH
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002 | 1 |
| 11. | CNO Executive Panel, OP-OOK
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22302 | 1 |
| 12. | Professor David Yost, Code NS/YO
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002 | 1 |