Operational and Strategic Lessons of the War in Afghanistan, 1979-1990
Abstract
This analysis focuses on the purely operational and strategic lessons of the war in Afghanistan. It insists that lessons of these kinds were present and that they offer significant insights both for such wars in general and for the course of Soviet military development in the 1980s and 1990s. These lessons also offer important clues concerning the reforms required in order to preserve democratic civilian control over the military. It should also alert analysts everywhere as to the nature of local wars in the Third World in the 1990s, a phenomenon that shows little sign of abating. Though in many ways like all wars, this war was unique; it was not merely a series of random tactical exercises that were ultimately futile. Rather, like all wars, it shows us something of the shape of our present and future, if we are only insightful enough to understand it correctly.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA246463
Entities
People
- Stephen J. Blank
Organizations
- United States Army War College