Coalition War and Burden-Sharing: The President vs the Congress
Abstract
This thesis examines past U.S. Approaches to coalitions and efforts to forge alliances in peace and war in the 20th century. Specifically, it analyses the conflict between the executive and legislative branches with respect to coalition building and burden-sharing. The thesis suggests that the amount of Congressional activism depends upon the perception of an external threat among member of the legislative branch. Likewise, the thesis highlights the tension between Congressional desires to impose the burden upon allies while retaining exclusive control over coalition policy and forces. The thesis suggests that the amount of Congressional activism depends upon the perception of an external threat among members of the legislative branch. Likewise, the thesis highlights the tension between Congressional desires to impose the burden upon allies while retaining exclusive control over coalition policy and forces. The thesis concludes with a case study of Operation Desert Storm and burden-sharing. Finally, the author warns of dangerous precedent established by the shift in burden-sharing responsibilities in the recent past between the executive and legislative bodies.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 19, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA246487
Entities
People
- James A. Pierce
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School