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THESIS

A DEMOCRATIC CALL TO ARMS:
PUBLIC OPINION AND INTERVENTION POLICY

by

Carl Royce Graham

June, 1991

Thesis Advisor:

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A DEMOCRATIC CALL TO ARMS:
PUBLIC OPINION AND INTERVENTION POLICY

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., Montana State University, 1984

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


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
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
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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

Heaven help us as a nation if we, once again, indulge in the expenditure of precious American blood, without a clear demonstration of popular support for it.

Alexander Haig, 1981

There is a widespread consensus among academics, soldiers, and politicians that Limited Intensity Warfare (LIW) has become increasingly important to the United States' foreign policy.¹ This area of warfare, as a subset of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), received increasing amounts of attention throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Several factors have combined to make many regions of the globe simultaneously more important and more dangerous for the United States, as recent events in Iraq have so amply demonstrated. And while much attention is being paid to the sharp end of the spear, i.e. technical and tactical means in LIW, relatively little study has been devoted to the all-important task of garnering and maintaining public support for intervention policy.

Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan produced what many consider the landmark study of U.S. intervention in 1977.² This study examined over 200 interventions between 1945 and 1976, measuring the effects of "time, region, type of political situation at which the U.S. military action was direct-

ed, the level of involvement by the Soviet Union and China, and the participation by other actors."³ None of these factors captured the role of public opinion in intervention policy. Philip Zelikow continued and updated the Blechman/Kaplan work, studying 44 interventions between the years 1975 and 1982.⁴ His methodology followed that of Blechman/Kaplan, and concluded that success depends on realistic objectives rather than the level of force used. This methodology and conclusion, again, ignore the role of domestic public attitudes towards intervention policy, and the role of those attitudes in forming and influencing that policy.

Herbert Tillema came closer to recognizing the role of popular opinion in intervention with his 1973 work Appeal to Force.⁵ Tillema identified numerous constraints on U.S. intervention policy, many of which revolved around the idea of American values and resultant domestic attitudes influencing the policy methods and objectives that would be available to U.S. decision-makers.⁶ Again, though, the idea of measuring public attitudes towards intervention policy, and identifying the factors that influence those attitudes, does not receive explicit attention.

The United States has shown a varying propensity to intervene militarily in other countries, especially since Vietnam. There are obviously many reasons for this varying propensity, as has been well documented in the studies cited

above, as well as many others. But one of the most important determinants of successful LIW policy, and the topic of this study, is the role public opinion plays in the intervention decision.

A. INTERVENTION AND POPULAR CONSENSUS

It has become axiomatic to say that a public consensus is required for the United States to engage in sustained intervention abroad. Short successful operations as in Panama can arguably be justified after the fact. If the intervention is over before public opinion is aroused, then it is obvious that opinion will not affect the operation's outcome, although the decision to intervene may be questioned eventually. But longer or larger commitments require public support in this country. This increased importance for public opinion to foreign policy in general, and intervention in particular, has been recognized by the executive and congressional branches. President Reagan's appeals to public opinion, for example, were prolific and effective, at least over the short term⁷. Meanwhile, the Congress has responded to increased public interest in foreign policy issues by reasserting its own powers in that arena.

There is evidence that as much as eighty percent of the public could be currently characterized as knowledgeable on a given foreign policy issue, although the number will fluctuate among issues and over time. This number compares

to "knowledgeable" levels of as low as twenty percent in the years following Vietnam⁸. While eighty percent does seem a bit optimistic, an overall increased awareness and interest among the public has influenced foreign policy in general, and intervention decisions in particular. It is important, then, to understand the sources of public attitudes towards intervention. Such insight may help predict whether an intervention decision will be approved by the American people, which arguably increases its chances of success. Or, more importantly, an understanding of public attitude sources could help structure intervention policy in a framework that will be acceptable to the American public.

What are the sources of public attitudes towards intervention? The pioneers of public opinion research identified many root sources and influences on public opinion, including family, religion, education, etc. These factors form the basic belief systems of individuals within the public as a whole.⁹ These belief systems in turn form the basis for opinion on particular issues, such as intervention. But opinion by itself is meaningless to decision-makers. What does matter is whether opinion will move the public towards or away from supporting their policies. To gain this insight it is necessary to find concrete issues or factors within a particular policy question and examine how those factors will be perceived and acted upon by the public.

Obviously "the public" is not a single-minded monolith, with one set of beliefs and attitudes¹⁰. But it would be immensely useful to decision-makers if a few issues within a policy question could be identified that capture those factors that will most affect public attitudes towards the various options available. Beliefs and feelings are difficult to quantify, and even more difficult to project accurately onto a particular issue. But if one can identify the components within an issue that will affect beliefs and feelings, it will aid in attempts at predicting how that issue will be received, and whether or not it will be supported.

Military intervention is certainly an issue that affects the American psyche. But, as was stated earlier, the United States has shown a great variance in its propensity to intervene. If public support is a part of the intervention decision (as this study argues), then it should be possible to identify factors that affect that support. This can be done with an eye towards predicting levels of support for a given policy. Or, more importantly, decision-makers equipped with an understanding of the sources of public attitudes towards intervention can use that understanding in their framing of intervention policy. This is not meant as a prescription for cynical or manipulative tactics to garner support for an otherwise unpopular venture. The American public is part of the intervention decision, like it or not.

An understanding of public attitudes - both sources and effects - towards intervention should result in better policy. Sometimes that will mean more intervention, sometimes less. But success is not measured by whether U.S. troops land on foreign soil. It is measured by whether the benefits of intervention policy outweigh the costs. The benefits of a policy advocating non-intervention are often great, just as the price of intervention is often justified.

B. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY

The object of this study is to describe and demonstrate the effects of three primary factors that can be used to predict, gauge, and possibly influence public attitudes towards intervention policy. The study will also analyze the manner in which opinion influences policy through the legislative and executive branches. Ultimately, policy will follow opinion. Unfortunately, poor understanding of this fact and also of the factors that influence opinion have often led to costly mistakes before public desires were translated into policy.

The study will begin by describing a two-stage model for intervention decision-making. The first stage uses a rational cost/benefit analysis of measurable and known factors surrounding the potential intervention, temporarily ignoring the effects of public opinion.

The second stage of the decision-making model describes

the three factors that have arguably mirrored opinion in the past and will continue to do so in the future. These factors: fear of escalation, global/regional reaction, and liberal values, will be described individually in terms of both their sources, and their effects on opinion.

The next step will be to demonstrate that these three "Sliding Factors"* do indeed influence public opinion, and that the opinion these factors influence (or mirror) does precede a change in policy. It does not require a great leap of faith to then assert that public attitudes eventually influence intervention policy. Two cases will be presented where this does indeed seem to be the case. First, the United States and Nicaragua seemed headed for armed conflict in the fall of 1984 when the Reagan administration accused the Sandinistas of importing MIG-21 jet aircraft. Overwhelming public dissatisfaction with this potentiality arguably played a large role in influencing the President not to pursue that course of action, as well as ennobling the Congress to force changes in the administration's Central American policies.

In the second case, U.S. intervention in Lebanon in the years 1982-1984 became increasingly unpopular as costs soared and objectives became muddled and untenable. Again,

*So named because they are not static among interventions, or even over time within a single intervention.

the administration eventually altered its intervention policy to a course that paralleled public attitudes.

Finally, it is important to understand the process through which public opinion is translated into policy. Congress acts as a conduit between the public and the President, filtering at times, amplifying at other times public attitudes towards intervention policy. Chapter V will present an argument that Congress is an inefficient agent of public will, and should take measures to reassert its role in intervention policy.

II. A MODEL FOR DECISION-MAKING

The intervention decision can be seen as a two stage process. First, a rational analysis of measurable static factors can be made with the goal of eliminating as many of the unknowns in the intervention decision as is possible. These variables can be called Core Factors. And second, an analysis of the factors that affect public support for intervention can be analyzed, with the goal of determining whether or not support is available for intervention and if not, how or if that support can be garnered. These variables are often neither static nor measurable. For this reason, the term Sliding Factors is an appropriate label. This study is most concerned with these Sliding Factors and their influence on public attitudes towards intervention. But it is also useful to briefly introduce the rational analysis, or Core Factors, and recognize that public opinion is not the sole determinant of intervention policy.

A. CORE FACTORS

Core Factors appeal to the rational nature of man. In the puzzle of war, these are the pieces that can be laid out beforehand, poked and prodded, weighed and pondered until, eventually, a sane and justifiable estimate of their effects on the conflict's conduct and outcome can be made. They

appeal to the realist belief that "foreign policy is a state's reasoned response to international imperatives."¹¹ Core Factors are generally static over the course of the potential conflict, so their effects on the decision to intervene will depend on solid knowledge rather than guesswork. This point is very important because it prevents speculation and misguided perceptions from affecting rational decisions based upon these factors.

Core Factors are used to answer one antecedent and two primary questions. The antecedent question is "How will the war be fought?" This question addresses the war's conduct, i.e. strategies, tactics, and weapons employed. Once decision-makers know how the conflict will be fought, they can address the primary questions of whether victory is possible, and whether a victory would justify the costs incurred in its pursuit.

Certainly nothing in war is totally predictable, and there is a difference between "real war" and "war on paper," as the nineteenth century strategist Carl von Clausewitz so aptly described with his concept of friction. But because Core Factors are static and at least somewhat tangible, their potential effects can be predicted on a best/worst case basis, and quite often with much more confidence than that. This point is best illustrated with the most straightforward Core Factor, geography.

1. Geography

Geography affects the conduct more than the outcome of LIW. Many of its effects are intuitively obvious, but some are a bit more subtle. For simplicity, all of geography's effects may be broken into four broad categories.

The first geographic category is strategic location. It matters if a potential conflict area is strategically important to the United States or, conversely, to another large power. An area in close proximity to U.S. territory, for example, may be examined in a different light than one further away. Conversely, an area of potential conflict that borders on a power like the Soviet Union could alter the probability and extent of U.S. involvement. During the 1967 and 1973 Arab/Israeli wars, for example, the U.S. response was tailored as much to the potential Soviet threat as to the hot war on land¹².

Another geographic effect is accessibility. The type and extent of U.S. forces' involvement will certainly depend at least in part on their ability to physically enter the arena. That U.S. planners realize this fact is evidenced by their commitment to a force structure capable of projecting power vast distances and into most regions. The mobility and flexibility necessary to do this remains a high priority for U.S. decision-makers¹³.

Still another geographic effect is terrain. It is

obvious that a desert war would be fought differently than a jungle war. Different equipment, tactics, and training would be required. The self-evidence of this fact belies its importance. Whether or not U.S. forces are trained and equipped to fight in the local terrain should play a crucial role in determining whether or not to commit them.

Finally, weather can be considered as a subset of terrain. Extreme weather conditions require specialized training and equipment, as U.S. troops discovered while operating in the Saudi desert¹⁴. This will certainly affect the conduct of a potential conflict and, depending upon how well training and equipment serve U.S. forces, the outcome could be affected as well.

All of these geographic factors can be examined prior to a U.S. commitment and their effects on the conduct and outcome of American involvement predicted with considerable accuracy.

2. Elements of National Power

Elements of power include political, economic, and military power, as well as alliances and agreements with other nations. U.S. decision-makers should understand both the sources and the stability of these elements. This will allow the United States to concentrate on the most important element(s) (what Clausewitz called the center of gravity) to achieve the political objectives of the war.

These factors serve as measures of strength and

vulnerability. Their sources and stability should affect how the U.S. pursues its objectives and whether these objectives are attainable. Many of the factors are measurable and their sources and vulnerabilities should remain relatively static throughout the conflict.

a) Political

The first area to consider is political power. First, the stability of a government should be important because a potentially unstable regime may be more vulnerable to an LIW strategy that seeks to undermine it directly.

But more importantly, the source of political power should be a factor in LIW strategy. It is difficult to successfully attack a political power that is based on genuine public support and effectively satisfies the needs of its constituents. But a power based on oppression and coercion may have exploitable weaknesses.

Political power's effects will depend upon whether United States forces are assisting a regime against an insurgency or they are fighting the government itself¹⁵. Briefly, if the U.S. is assisting a government, successful intervention may depend upon whether the host government is legitimate and effective¹⁶. If, on the other hand, U.S. forces are fighting the government itself, they will be most effective against an unstable regime.

b) Economic

The second element of national power is economics. Again, sources and stability are the keys. Sources include such factors as self-reliance and level of development. The former factor affects sanction or blockade options available, and the latter affects strategies and weapons that will be useful.

Economic stability deals with the vulnerability of the sources. If an LIW policy includes attempts to inflict economic damage, then the target economy must have some sort of Achilles' heel. The target economy may be subject to disruption through bombing or other direct military action. Or, it may be vulnerable to sanctions or blockade.¹⁷ Again, Desert Storm provides a current illustration. The major domestic debate revolved around whether the coalition should give sanctions an opportunity to work or whether force should be used. Events have shown that force was effective in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait, but that does not negate the possibility of sanctions being effective¹⁸.

c) Military

The third element of power is military strength. A potential foe's military power will certainly affect the conduct and outcome of U.S. strategy. The size and sophistication of the adversary's military will dictate the required U.S. commitment to prevail. Unfortunately many Third

World arsenals grew at alarming rates throughout the 1980s.

Arms sales to Third World countries between 1983 and 1987 totaled some 50 major warships, 242 supersonic aircraft, and 2300 surface-to-air missiles.¹⁹ Also, some 40 nations currently have or are actively seeking ballistic or cruise missile technology²⁰. This certainly complicates America's ability to project power.

It is comforting to note that U.S. political and military leaders have planned for and maintained a commitment to the types of forces required for LIW. The President and Secretary of Defense have both placed Third World tailored forces high on their military priorities²¹. And the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the U.S. has the physical ability to "prosecute satisfactorily any regional conflicts, provided it has the political will to act promptly and decisively and the national will to endure the conflict."²² Admittedly that is a large proviso and its implications will be examined in later sections.

d) Alliances

The final element of power affecting LIW is alliances, or what Clausewitz called communities of interest. Alliances can give a state power and influence out of proportion to its indigenous resources. This power may prevent U.S. intervention if it is too great. Or the U.S. may balk at provoking the other alliance partner in some cases. But

alliances may provide exploitable weaknesses, too.

Alliances provide vulnerabilities because they call for cooperation between sovereign states. But this cooperation will only continue so long as it remains in both parties' interests to do so. Again, Clausewitz recognized that "One country may support another's cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own."²³ This fact was recognized in ancient times as the Spartans attempted to separate Athens from her allies.²⁴ And it was certainly recognized by the North Vietnamese as they realized they could not take the South as long as Americans opposed them on the battlefield. The North's strategy attacked American public support for the alliance at home rather than U.S. soldiers in the field. This effort was further aided by a faulty U.S. assessment of the "commonality of interest" between the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese²⁵. Still later, Gorbachev appeared to be intent on decoupling the U.S. from the Western alliance through arms control and peace propaganda.

In any case, unless there is a return to the secret diplomacy of the 18th and 19th centuries, alliances and "communities of interests" will be known prior to potential U.S. intervention and these alliances' probable effects, as well as potential vulnerabilities, should be calculable by planners and decision-makers.

Identifying and estimating a potential foe's ele-

Identifying and estimating a potential foe's elements of power are necessary steps prior to the intervention decision. These elements, by their sources and stability, point out the center of gravity, or most vulnerable point of the target state. This information is vital to determine how to fight as well as the likelihood of success. And because these elements and their effects are measurable prior to the conflict, they can be inputs to the rational cost/benefit process that decides whether intervention is justified.

3. Interests

Interests play a vital role in determining the potential conduct and outcome of a U.S. intervention. Real interests are constant in the short term so their effects should be predictable. Perceived or represented interests, alternatively, are very pliant over the course of even a short conflict and will be discussed in Section B.

Since "The political object.. [determines] both the military objective...and the amount of effort it requires,"²⁶ real interests will (or should) determine the objects of war and serve as inputs to strategy. Interests will also determine the willingness to pay for these objectives because LIW, as the name implies, is limited not just by the objectives and the ability to inflict pain, but it is also limited by the tolerance for pain, or tolerance for potential pain that may be administered²⁷.

A sound strategy based upon real interests and the predicted effects of other core factors (geography, elements of power) should provide preliminary answers to the questions "How will we fight?" and "Can we win?" Careful analysis of these factors should also enable preliminary calculation of the costs involved. These costs can then be compared to the benefits gained from the objectives to determine if victory is justified given the probable costs.

4. Reactive Will

This broad framework omits many particulars by design. But one glaring particular affecting conduct and outcome must be addressed: the enemy's objectives and strategies in the face of U.S. involvement. First, an enemy's objectives will affect his strategies just as U.S. interests affect its strategy. But when interests and strategies collide, an iterative process takes place wherein each side attempts to account for the new inputs of the other. The enemy will react to U.S. intervention, so U.S. planners and decision-makers must consider second and third order effects of their potential actions. Again, many of these effects are subject to rational analysis and, while nothing can be certain in war, reasonable analysis should provide preliminary answers to the all-important questions "Can we win?" and "Is it worth it?"

5. Summary

There are many facets of state relationships and war

that cannot be measured. But some aspects clearly are both measurable and predictable to varying degrees. These are the Core Factors. Core Factors look at what is known and measurable. They seek to eliminate as many variables as possible so that when the more intangible Sliding Factors are considered, there is a base of knowledge upon which to stand. Alternatively, if a thorough examination of Core Factors yields the answer that a war cannot be won, or the costs of victory would not be justified, then there is no reason to move on to the next, more difficult step of garnering and maintaining public support for intervention. If, however, analysis of Core Factors does reveal that victory is attainable, and at a cost commensurate with our national interests, then the next step is to gain and insure public support for the actions deemed necessary to prevail.

B. SLIDING FACTORS

We all do no end of feeling, and we mistake it for thinking. And out of it we get an aggregation which we consider a boon. It is held in reverence. It settles everything. Some think it the voice of God.

Mark Twain

It seems public opinion held much the same sway over Twain's 19th century America as it does now. Democracies are unique in their reliance upon public support for sustained intervention. There is a clear recognition, especially after Vietnam, that the U.S. needs strong popular support and a consensus of important political actors to

sustain U.S. military intervention²⁸.

Sliding Factors address this required public support. They influence initial and continuing support for intervention by altering the perceived current or potential cost/benefit ratio of fighting. The key word here is perceived because, unlike Core Factors, Sliding Factors may not be rational or correct. They are feelings rather than tangible objects or logical concepts.

Sliding Factors also will change as the conflict wears on. Sometimes change will be uncontrollable and unexpected. But more importantly, some of these factors may also be manipulated to increase or decrease support for the conflict. This is why decision-makers would do well to recognize and address these factors' effects. At the least, seemingly random or irrational swings in these factors can undermine support for a conflict that, according to Core Factors, is worthwhile. At worst, these factors may be manipulated by some party who understands their effects and wishes to directly alter public opinion. These effects and their susceptibility to manipulation are perhaps best illustrated by the first Sliding Factor - fear of escalation.

1. Fear of Escalation

This factor addresses the psychological effects of potential vertical, horizontal, or temporal escalation. There are two distinct aspects to this factor. The first aspect is fairly straightforward: the physical ability to

escalate. But while the psychology of escalation is certainly affected by capability - if there were no capability there would be no fear - a nation's propensity to escalate is the least known and more important source of uncertainty.

Herman Kahn, in his book On Escalation, describes an escalation ladder that provides a useful metaphor.²⁹ Kahn's ladder contained forty four rungs and six thresholds. The work described through this ladder a process in which small escalatory steps are taken to a given threshold at which time a reassessment of costs and goals is necessary before proceeding up to the next stage of warfare. The ability and the willingness of a leader to climb this ladder will certainly affect the perceived and potential costs of the conflict and thereby the level of public support, even in LIW.

Fear of escalation can be manipulated by anyone with an understanding of American culture. A common fear is that a conflict might get out of control or that its costs may exceed the value of its original objectives, as in WWI or even the cold war³⁰. This fear can be altered by raising the stakes, or even by seemingly irrational acts that cause uncertainty. Saddam Hussein attempted to raise the stakes of the Gulf crisis by publicly loading aircraft with chemical bombs and threatening to walk on the dead of his adversaries. But Israel illustrated how to downplay fear of

escalation through its civil defense programs and test firing of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system. The Patriot missile system also played a large role in quelling escalatory fears among the public that were based upon Iraq's SCUD ballistic missiles. The aim of each party in these examples was to alter perceptions about current and potential costs, with the ultimate goal of eroding on the one hand, or maintaining on the other, public confidence and support.

2. Global/Regional Reaction

This factor, like the other Sliding Factors, forms American public opinion by appealing to both rational and irrational psychological reactions to U.S. intervention. World opinion will affect U.S. popular support in three primary ways. First, the world response to U.S. intervention can affect the probable success of that intervention. The American public knows that global and regional support (or at least apathy) are desirable prerequisites to successful intervention. This is undoubtedly a major reason the U.S. sought and obtained the Arab League's and the U.N.'s endorsements for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, among other interventions. These endorsements added not just legitimacy to the operation, but also moral and material support that increased the probability of success and decreased potential costs. Initial and subsequent levels of public support for the operation were due in part at least

to this international cooperation.

But international reaction can also fuel the flames of isolationism in this country. Even though Senator Vandenberg's "great moats" protecting America's shores of the 1930s have become small rivers, many in the United States have sought to once again heed George Washington's advice and avoid foreign entanglements. More specifically, many Americans do not wish to take on foreign adventures where the risks are almost unilaterally American, but the benefits are widely distributed. The effects of this affront to "fair play" can be channeled into undermining support for U.S. intervention. The Japanese and Germans, for example, came under heavy criticism in this country for their alleged reluctance to foot "their share" of the Desert Storm bill. Had this reluctance been more widespread, it may well have affected public support for U.S. policy.

This leads to the third broad influence of international reaction on public support: the idea of popular consent. Majority rule is part of the American political and ethnic culture. It goes against this culture to intervene contrary to world opinion. That is not to say we have not or should not ignore world opinion in some cases. We have and should. But contravening popular opinion requires justification, so the intervention must be presented in a way that justifies ignoring world opinion. These justifica-

tions are almost always value-oriented, and as such will be addressed in the "Values" section of this chapter.

Global/Regional reactions to U.S. LIW involvement will vary among cases according to mutual interests at stake and the perceived legitimacy of U.S. actions. The concept of mutual interests at stake is fairly straightforward. Members of the international community will, all else being equal, support U.S. intervention if that action serves or at least does not threaten their interests. Two simple cases illustrate this point. The world reaction to potential U.S. intervention in Nicaragua was very negative in the 1980s, even among many allies. Few mutual interests were at stake. The reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers and subsequent naval protection, however, was very popular, especially among oil importing states. To quote Mark Twain once more: "You tell me whar a man gits his corn pone, en I'll tell you what is pinions is."³¹ Interests outlast friendships among states, and mutual interests will shape international reactions to U.S. foreign policy decisions.

World reaction will also vary according to the perceived legitimacy of U.S. intervention. Historical empathies and animosities play a role to be sure, but there are deeper threats to legitimacy that may be exercised. Much of the international community has developed high expectations of morality for U.S. behavior. It has been argued these expectations, along with natural sympathy for

the underdog, negatively affect world reaction to American intervention and compel U.S. leaders to articulate compelling justification for committing combat forces³².

Whatever the source, there are opportunities to manipulate the effects of Global/Regional reactions and influence domestic support towards or away from intervention support. First, the international reaction itself can be manipulated by addressing its sources, as they were described above. This can be done by either presenting the intervention in a light that invokes mutual interests, or by justifying it on moral grounds. Both of these methods have been used in the past with varying results.

The second option is to manipulate not the world's reaction, but the U.S. public's response to that reaction. This can be done by de-legitimizing the world reaction as self-serving or short-sighted, while simultaneously extolling the moral and/or practical virtues of the preferred course of action. This method cannot, however, ignore the final Sliding Factor's effects. In the final analysis, U.S. public opinion towards or away from support for intervention will depend upon the intervention's appeal to or repulsion of America's liberal values.

3. Liberal Values

The final Sliding Factor is the American value system itself. This is the root of public opinion and,

while values themselves will not change during a conflict, perceptions based upon those values will. All effective appeals for support and voices of dissension must in some way invoke American values³³. Intervention must be justifiable to the liberal ethic if it hopes to invoke the public will, and public will is necessary to sustain support. Legitimacy of the objective and the means employed to achieve that objective are all-important in a democracy. But it is often difficult to ascertain right from wrong. Death and destruction are obviously bad, but they are also justifiable in some cases.* These cases, as well as their opposites, are the products of a value system that must be addressed by decision-makers wishing to predict or influence public opinion.

American values are largely based upon the liberal ethic³⁴. Michael Howard argues that Americans identify not with an ethnic group or shared historical experience, but with a value system. The liberal creed has always been a part of that system³⁵. The reasoning has been that wars should not be fought for politicians, statesmen, or armorers, but for liberal democratic ideals and in response to public opinion. Unfortunately, many prior U.S. interven-

*This argument conjures up Saint Augustine's notion of Just War, which lists conditions under which war is permissible. Not surprisingly, The liberal ethic's view of permissible war closely parallels that of Just War, as will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

tions have run afoul of this creed.

U.S. decision-makers lose public support when either the perceived potential costs or the objectives of intervention run counter to American values. Costs alone can be repulsive but not necessarily fatal to values, depending on the objectives at stake.

Democracies have shown an almost uncanny willingness to bleed where their ideals are at stake. Frederick II said of citizen soldiers, "with such troops one would defeat the world, were victory not as fatal to them as to their enemies."³⁶ But high costs in the face of the often-times extremely limited objectives of LIW may not be acceptable in the United States. The sight of body bags returning home and devastation in the "host" country may raise the perceived costs of intervention beyond acceptable limits. The United States is especially susceptible to this phenomenon because, to paraphrase General Fred C. Weyland, the American way of war is especially nasty because we use "things" while opponents use people³⁷. Ironically, General Weyland went on to invoke Pericles by stating "there are worse things than war." But neither he nor anyone else was able to convince the American public that there were worse things than the war about which these remarks were made (Vietnam).

The Vietnam experience illustrates another factor that may, however irrationally, raise the public's percep-

tion of expected costs. The last war's legacy, especially if it was a failure, will certainly affect support for the next conflict. A "Vietnam syndrome" or "never again" attitude will impinge on the policy options available and disincite public opinion to favor new conflict³⁸.

American values dictate that the costs of intervention must be justified by legitimate objectives. This means that U.S. goals and policy must be cloaked in the beliefs and vocabulary of the liberal ethic. One need not go far to find examples of this phenomenon. The Truman Doctrine, for example, invoked the liberal terminology of "fighting the forces of tyranny, Power to the majority, and Freedom to all."³⁹ The same could be said of many regional actions the U.S. has brought against the assumed communist monolith, up to and including support for Nicaraguan "Freedom fighters." Other acceptable justifications for intervention include stopping a deadly conflict already in process, requests for intervention from (presumably legitimate) host governments, and assisting against some "outside" nation's intervention⁴⁰. Any of these justifications, and probably more, may invoke the liberal ethic and slide public opinion toward or away from intervention support, especially after the initial "rally around the flag" phase has worn off.

There is one additional lesson that, hopefully, will not need to be relearned. When interests or objectives have been wrongly attributed or misapplied to American values,

the backlash has been severe. The effects of this backlash go beyond those discussed above under the last war's legacy.

Politicians are often caught in a bind. They cannot (or should not) jeopardize American support and confidence in their political and military institutions by misrepresenting interests. But they often must take seemingly paradoxical actions to meet real threats; actions which the public may not or, for security reasons, cannot understand⁴¹. The classic example is a president's decision to build up regional forces as a means to deter war. To the public, this appears to invite escalation, raising potential costs beyond justification. As a result, support for intervention could be withdrawn from below, culminating in a failed policy and possibly greater costs down the road. But the real point of the buildup was to reduce costs by deterring war in the first place. Unfortunately, the public may see this as a deception aimed at them rather than at the potential enemy. Success in this situation would require an astute politician, as well as properly conceived and articulated strategy and objectives - something Edward Luttwak perhaps glibly calls "a great rarity in any case, and especially in the rogue's gallery of the highest political leaders."⁴²

Alexis de Tocqueville said:

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy. They require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient.⁴³

This section has attempted to describe the difficulties of garnering and maintaining public support for U.S. LIW involvement. The problem, as de Tocqueville undoubtedly realized, is that democracies are as woefully deficient in their ability to influence public opinion as they are dependent upon the support that opinion may or may not produce.

Sliding Factors influence public opinion, either intentionally or by chance. Unfortunately, since these factors' sources and effects are sometimes irrational and unpredictable, decision-makers must plan for or hedge against many probable outcomes. But the most intriguing and useful of these factors are those that may under some circumstances be manipulated to influence opinion toward or away from intervention support. This manipulation may be for legitimate or illegitimate ends. That is not important for now. What is important is that by examining and understanding these factors and their potential effects, public support can be altered through rational or irrational appeals invoking fear, interests, ego, and values. Astute decision-makers and planners recognize and address these factors in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives.

C. MODEL FOR DECISION-MAKING


Figure 2.1 presents a model for deciding whether or not the United States should intervene in an LIW situation. The model accounts for the two types of factors presented and the capabilities and thought processes they produce, both rational and irrational.

The model is divided into two phases to illustrate the two levels of analysis available to decision-makers. The first phase is consecutive and flows from one step to the next culminating in either intervention or withdrawal. The second phase is iterative. This phase assumes initial intervention, but then must constantly seek and maintain public support. If this support is permanently withdrawn, the intervention is (or should be) terminated under most circumstances.

1. Consecutive Process

The consecutive process is fairly straightforward. Decision-makers are presented with a problem that U.S. intervention could conceivably alleviate. Their first step is to perform a rational analysis of Core Factors, holding public support constant, to determine 1) Can the U.S. obtain its objectives militarily? and 2) Will the objectives justify the expected costs? If the answer to either of these questions is no, they drop out of the process and pursue courses of action other than military intervention.

A Model For Decision-Making



*Is there an initial base of public support for intervention

**Can Sliding Factors be manipulated to gain public support

Fig. 2.1

If, however, these questions are both answered in the affirmative, decision-makers must seek public support for the proposed intervention.

If support is forthcoming, as it generally is in the beginning, intervention can proceed.* If, however, public support is not forthcoming, decision-makers must address and attempt to influence whichever Sliding Factor(s) is/are eroding support. This will generally be an intense effort by the President and his followers to ease fears of potential costs and invoke liberal democratic values to gain support for the proposed course of action. If this effort is not successful, intervention should not be initiated except in extreme cases where the National Command Authority has absolute confidence that theirs is the proper course of action. Even in that case, though, the iterative process will begin.

2. Iterative Process

The iterative process begins after intervention has been initiated and persists until U.S. forces are no longer in combat. This process assumes that support for intervention must be maintained. If it is not, decision-makers will be obliged to withdraw U.S. forces.

* "...there were great numbers of young men who had never been in a war and were consequently far from unwilling to join in this one." Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Penguin, 1954) 128.

Again, if support is not maintained it will be because one or more Sliding Factors have changed. Decision-makers who wish to continue the intervention must address these Sliding Factors in the manner described above until either the objective has been achieved or support is simply no longer available. If support is not regained, the intervention will generally be ended without achieving the original goals, possibly only to have the entire process repeated at a later date.

This simple model represents the processes that decision-makers should follow when deciding whether or not to commit U.S. combat forces in LIW. It admittedly has some limitations. These will be discussed in the concluding section of this chapter. But overall, the model and the factors provide a framework for decision-making. They enable a frame of reference and a list of important factors for decision-makers to consider prior to committing themselves and the nation to war, even a limited one.

D. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has presented a model for decision-making that takes into account rational analysis where possible and irrational effects where necessary. The Core Factors presented - geography, elements of power, interests, and reactive will - are all subject to some degree of analysis prior to the intervention decision. These factors should remain static over the course of the proposed conflict so their

manifestations and effects are relatively predictable. Core Factors seek to answers the questions "Can we win?" and "Is it worth it?"

Sliding Factors - fear of escalation, global/regional reaction, and values - are often irrational and unpredictable sources of public opinion. These factors will make or break support for intervention. Sliding Factors often change unpredictably, but they also are often susceptible to manipulation over the course of a conflict. Decision-makers must address and seek to influence these factors if they wish to successfully gain and maintain support for intervention. Conversely, persons wishing to undermine popular support can also seek to manipulate Sliding Factors for their own agendas. Finally, the nature of the conflict itself will influence the public's perceptions of these factors.

Core and Sliding Factors combine to form a two-process model for decision-making. This model consists of a rational analysis of Core Factors followed by an iterative process of seeking and maintaining public support through Sliding Factors. This process continues until either support is irretrievably lost or the intervention's objectives have been reached.

It would be presumptuous and naive to assert this model accounts for all the factors involved in the intervention

decision. But the model is useful because it generally represents and simplifies reality without attempting to account for every incident-specific eventuality. If the model looks simple and obvious, that is its intent. To achieve this simplicity, though, certain limitations must be accepted.

First, the model assumes interests and, therefore, objectives are static. This is not always the case for objectives, even in a limited conflict. Often, what Luttwak calls a "reciprocal reduction in aims" occurs as each side lowers its objectives until both are congruent⁴⁴. But this change in objectives does not necessarily represent changing interests. Rather it may be a conscious decision to forego some interests in the face of unforeseen costs. It is almost inevitable, though, that objectives will change "since they are influenced by events and their probable outcomes."⁴⁵ Hopefully, the probability of lowered objectives will have been hedged against in the original rational analysis.

Another limitation of the model is that it cannot account for the factors' effects on each other. Sliding Factors, for example, will be affected by Core Factors. In other words, support for intervention will be affected by the continuing conduct and outcomes of that intervention. Similarly, overwhelming interests, for example, may override rational concerns about accessibility or relative military

strength. These are just two examples, but many more cases could be found where one factor affects another. But to consider these mutual effects would be unduly complicated and, in the case of Sliding Factors, unnecessary since the model's iterative nature dictates a constant reevaluation of these factors' effects.

One irremediable limitation of the model, though, is that it cannot account for flawed analysis or invalid and unreliable information. A poor analysis that produces the wrong answer to either "Can we win" or "Should we win" can cost lives, prestige, and credibility as decision-makers seek support for flawed strategy. That the model cannot account for this is regrettable, but the process cannot be faulted if its inputs are poor. History has shown that smart people do in fact make wrong decisions based upon poor information. But even as simple a model as this can provide a frame of reference for informed decisions, or for a post mortem in case of failure.

This study is concerned with public opinion's role in the intervention decision. For this reason, it is now necessary to acknowledge the Core Factors' contributions and bid them farewell. The remaining chapters will be dedicated to examining more closely the effects of Sliding Factors. This closer examination will begin with two case studies. These cases will be presented in sufficient detail so that

each factor's sources and effects on public attitudes can be ascertained. The cases also take place in about the same time frame, so that both are affected by the same polity and occur within similar international and domestic environments.

In The first study - Nicaragua - public opinion moved steadily away from supporting direct military intervention, and the United States did not commit forces there. In the context of the model, intervention was rejected as a policy option in the consecutive process.

In the case of Lebanon, U.S. forces were committed despite public concerns. But as the American involvement became more confused and costly, public opinion moved further away from supporting intervention, and eventually overwhelmingly called for U.S. withdrawal. The consecutive process yielded an intervention decision, but support was irretrievably lost during the iterative process and policy-makers were finally obliged to order a U.S. withdrawal.

III. NICARAGUA

A. CASE PARAMETERS

On September 19th, 1983 President Reagan signed a "finding"* which authorized arming and supporting Nicaragua resistance groups, with the stated objective of pressuring the Sandinistas into stopping their support for the leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. This finding, which asked Congress for \$45 million in aid for the Contras, was a continuation of policy for the Reagan administration. The CIA had supported the Contras before, and had used its "unilaterally controlled Latin assets" (UCLAs) to attack harbors and blow pipelines as recently as two weeks prior.

This finding, though, began a series of events that led many people to believe the U.S. would invade Nicaragua. These events culminated in November 1984 when Washington threatened a military response to an alleged shipment of MIG-21 jet aircraft from the Soviet Union. The MIGs did not materialize, and the immediate fear of military intervention abated. By the end of November, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger laid out his well-known six conditions for U.S.

*A Finding is a statement by the executive branch describing what it perceives as a problem, and outlining policy options to deal with the situation.

intervention (see Appendix C), and specifically stated that the Nicaraguan case had not met the criteria of these six tests. This case study will take the Secretary at his word and end with his speech.

B. DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

Most Americans in 1984 did not know which side their government supported in Nicaragua. Americans were, however, quite willing to offer opinions on how the situation there was developing, and even on what policy options should be exercised. This combination of ignorance and interest indicates that Central America was not high on the public's "worry" list, but it still was an emotionally charged and highly visible issue.

Table 3.1 displays America's level of comparative ignorance regarding Central America in 1984. Recall from the introduction that American foreign policy awareness has generally increased since the years following Vietnam. Unfortunately, this increased awareness has not always preceded or even kept pace with foreign policy dilemmas. Such was the case with Nicaragua. The January and April polls indicate that one-fourth or less of the American populace were aware their government was supporting the

Nicaraguan resistance.* By November of that year, much had happened to raise the level of awareness about conflict in the region, but it seems that most Americans assumed everybody down there was unfriendly, or even an enemy.

TABLE 3.1

January 1984

Question: Do you happen to know which side the U.S. is backing [in Nicaragua], the rebels or the government?

Rebels	Government	Don't Know
25%	27%	47%

Source: ABC/Washington Post poll. Reported by State Dept.⁴⁶

April 1984

Question: Which side does the U.S. government support in Nicaragua?

Rebels	Government	Don't Know
19%	8%	73%

Source: CBS/New York Times NewsPoll. Reported by State Dept.

November 1984

Question: Rate the following:

	Close Ally	Friendly	Not Friendly	Enemy	Not Sure
El Salvador	7%	25%	41%	15%	2%
contras	6	21	33	23	7
Sandinistas	4	16	47	22	11

Source: Index of International Public Opinion 1984-1985

This relative ignorance did not hinder many Americans

 *Unless otherwise indicated, poll data are from the mass public. Data for the informed public, when available, include only those who were aware of the situation and knew who the U.S. was supporting in Central America.

from passing judgment on U.S. policy in Central America. Table 3.2 shows that, with a few exceptions, less than 30% of America approved of how its government was handling the situation in Central America. The two exceptions were December 1983, on the heels of the widely-accepted Grenada invasion, and December 1984, following the so-called MIG scare. But even in these brief spurts of approval, the support rate was barely over a third of the American populace.

TABLE 3.2

Question: Do you approve of Reagan's handling of the situation in Central America?*

October	1983	27%
December	1983	36
January	1984	28
May	1984	29
December	1984	34

*Disapproval fell into 40-50% region, No Opinion accounted for 20-30% of those questioned.

Source: The Gallup Poll, 1984, 1985.

It is in this milieu of ignorance and agitation that this study begins. The American public is upset that policy is not working, but not upset enough to become informed about the region and the U.S. role there. The following sections will clarify that role up to and including the period under study, and attempt an explanation of why public sentiment opposed U.S. intervention in Central America and, specifically, in Nicaragua.

C. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP⁴⁷

The United States and Nicaragua have had a long and colorful relationship. U.S. forces and filibustering mercenaries invaded Nicaragua several times in the 19th century to protect trade and to insure claims on a proposed canal route. This latter objective cemented the United States to the Nicaraguan Conservative party that ruled until the Sandinista revolution in 1979. U.S. Marines landed in Nicaragua in 1909 to protect Conservative rebels, who were vying for control of the country. The Conservatives did gain control, but by 1912 the Marines were forced to return and protect their rule. The Marines were to stay almost continuously as virtual occupiers until 1933 when the Nicaraguan National Guard, headed by Anastasio Somoza Garcia, was raised to enforce internal security.

The major military effort against Conservative rule in the 1930s was posed by Augusto Sandino. His movement eventually resulted in offers of conciliation by the Conservative government. But this conciliation came to a violent end when Somoza had Sandino arrested and assassinated as he left a presidential dinner. Somoza seized power for himself in 1936 and began a family dynasty that was to rule Nicaragua for four decades.

Franklin Roosevelt said of Somoza "He may be an S.O.B., but he's our S.O.B."⁴⁸ If he was "our S.O.B." then the

United States was surely Somoza's patron as well. He and his followers accepted American aid during their 40 year rule and in return supported virtually anything that Washington said or did. In the meantime, conservative Somoza regimes consolidated their wealth and power at the expense of their people. Living conditions for most Nicaraguans were abysmal, there was little or no pluralism, and the National Guard had a carte blanc to act in any way it saw fit.

Opposition to Somoza and his National Guard came to a head in 1978. He had managed to alienate every constituency in Nicaragua to his rule - even the elitist - by systematically looting the economy. A loosely knit coalition finally succeeded in driving Somoza from his fortified bunker in Managua to a short retirement in exile.* The National Guard's dying acts included bombing the cities and destroying the country's fledgling industries⁴⁹. The human cost of the revolution was as many as 50,000 Nicaraguans killed and 100,000 wounded, or 6% of the population⁵⁰. A comparable loss in the United States would be nearly 15 million people killed or wounded. The economic toll was also catastrophic. The revolution (or reaction to it) caused \$480 million in direct economic damage, over \$500 million disappeared in capital flight, and the Somoza government left behind a

*Somoza was murdered in Paraguay in 1980.

\$1.6 billion debt⁵¹.

Following the revolution, The Sandinista party consolidated power. They began widespread reforms to equalize land distribution and improve public services to the poor majority. Many of their methods, though, began to resemble those of newly formed communist governments. They called off promised elections and instituted press controls. These and other measures upset the United States. Many American leaders perceived a definite tilt to the left on the Sandinista's part, and felt that the party had duped their people and the international community. This feeling was exacerbated by the Sandinista's seeking aid from the Eastern bloc and instituting a military buildup.

It is difficult to say whether the Sandinistas looked to Cuba and the Soviets for assistance because they feared Washington, or whether Washington turned against the Sandinistas because they feared a "little Cuba" in Central America. Whatever the cause, the result was a classic security dilemma where both sides took military and political stances that were avowedly deterrent, but could easily be construed as offensive⁵². Nicaragua said it feared an American-led invasion, so it militarized the countryside and raised a military apparatus far larger than its neighbors possessed. The country also needed aid so it went to the Soviets and Cubans (as well as many Western nations), supposedly after

having been turned away by the United States.

Washington, meanwhile, saw the Sandinista regime revoking civil liberties, raising a large military, and cozying up to members of the Soviet bloc. These events resurrected the domino theory of the fifties and sixties and raised the specter of all Central America becoming puppet communist states. This frightening impression was arguably amplified by the Reagan administration, which was elected on an anti-Soviet, anti-communist platform. Nicaragua provided an enticing opportunity for this new conservative administration to demonstrate its anti-communist credentials and step up the East-West struggle. U.S. leaders pressured the Sandinista regime to reverse its slide to the left through economic, political, and military means. Economic aid was shut off. Managua was politically isolated from its Central American neighbors. And the U.S. began supporting Nicaraguan rebels, as well as arming and exercising with neighboring states, particularly Honduras and El Salvador.*

Mutual animosity and distrust, then, provide the backdrop for this first case. Neither Washington nor Managua could be sure of the others' ultimate aims. But both took hard line positions that inevitably reinforced the most dire expectations each had of the other.

*Reagan first gave the CIA \$19.8 million in 1981 to organize and train an army to fight the Sandinistas. This army became what is now known as the contras.

D. FEAR OF ESCALATION

Nineteen eighty three and 1984 were tense years for American foreign policy.⁵³ U.S./Soviet relations were chilled by arms control failures and the impending deployment of Pershing IIs in Europe. The Navy and Marines found themselves caught between bitterly opposed factions in Lebanon. And, of course, the United States was becoming more involved in Central American turmoil, most notably in Nicaragua and El Salvador. This tense climate was not completely lost on the American people. Many Americans feared that any spark of conflict could get out of control and the United States could find itself in a war it did not want and for which it had not prepared.

Support for U.S. military action in Nicaragua was tempered by a fear that conflict could escalate to a regional or even global level. There was also fear that armed conflict with Nicaragua, even if geographically limited, could drag on into a Vietnam-like scenario with too many Americans dying in an unwinnable war for dubious political objectives.

There were many circumstances that conceivably linked U.S. intervention in Nicaragua with potential escalation, especially with the Soviets. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were running relatively high over the period under consideration. The American people were forced to rethink their attitudes towards Soviet lead-

ership following the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight 007 in August of 1983. The Soviets had also threatened to walk out of the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks in October of that year (and later did abandon the negotiations). Feelings of apprehension were certainly illustrated and perhaps exacerbated and symbolized by the movie The Day After in November 1983, which depicted the grisly existence of post-WWIII America.

There were far too many other sources of anxiety occurring in the world to assert a causal relationship between the few events just described and a fear of global escalation resulting from U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. But it is relevant to point out the linkages between that potential intervention and the possibility of conflict spreading to other parts of the globe. Many of these linkages were explicitly asserted by administration officials and supporters. Others may not have been cited at the time, but are valid in retrospect.

The Soviets, for whatever reasons, were providing economic and military assistance to the Nicaraguan regime. This placed Soviet interests at direct risk if the United States should attack Nicaragua. This point was brought home when it became public knowledge that a Soviet cargo ship had hit one of the mines CIA operatives had sown in Nicaraguan harbors⁵⁴. The risk to Soviet ships was made clear again when the Bakuriani was identified as a potential MIG trans-

port and, eventually, was confirmed as a weapons carrier, even if no MIGs reached Nicaragua. There was a real potential, however remote, for the Soviets to become militarily involved in the region to protect their assets. The Kremlin seemed to foster this impression by maintaining a military presence in Nicaragua, and even participating in joint exercises with the Cubans off the U.S. southern coast⁵⁵. Add to this the Soviet defense minister's boasts of increased missile submarines off the American coast, and there was bound to be some fear of Soviet reaction to a U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua.

Other states outside the region posed escalatory threats as well. Libya's Mohamar Quadaffi said he had sent troops to assist the Nicaragua regime against potential U.S. aggression⁵⁶. He certainly did not pose the same threat as the Soviets could in type or degree. But the worldwide spate of terrorist bombings over the period under scrutiny certainly reminded Americans of their relative vulnerability to attack by fanatical regimes and organizations.

Regional escalation was also a very real possibility. There was certainly potential for a conflict to start in Nicaragua and spread throughout Central America. One commentator even speculated the United States was poised for an invasion of Cuba, although there is no evidence that this was a widely held belief at the time⁵⁷. But a conflict

spreading to Honduras and El Salvador was certainly not out of the question, especially since these countries would probably serve as staging areas for U.S. forces and had ongoing internal rebellions of their own.

Finally, there was the possibility that, even if conflict remained geographically limited, it could drag out over time and exact a rising physical, mental, and material toll. This is perhaps where the so-called Vietnam syndrome best applies. Many Americans looked at Nicaragua as another Vietnam for the United States. The terrain was at least superficially similar. Nicaragua was a small state standing up to the monolithic America. And, perhaps most important, the goals of Nicaraguan intervention were poorly defined and/or poorly understood by most Americans.

The Boland Amendment of 1982 forbade the United States from working to overthrow the Sandinistas. The administration repeatedly denied this objective in its aid requests, insisting instead that U.S. policy was intended to bring the Sandinistas to the bargaining table, or to cut off the supply of arms to the rebels in El Salvador. But other public statements by Reagan and his representatives contradicted those claims, instead insisting on "rolling back" communism, and asserting that these governments could not be trusted⁵⁸. Even in retrospect with all the information now available, it is difficult to ascertain what the administration's real objectives were. The major problem is that

different individuals and offices routinely espoused contradictory views. Certainly the view was no clearer to the American people, who were forced to look through this fog to see where the policy was taking them.

If the administration was unclear of its goals, the Sandinistas were sure to make the potential costs of intervention clear. Twice during this period they mobilized the population for imminent invasion; first in June and then in November of 1984⁵⁹. These and other measures were certainly intended to up the ante; to let U.S. leaders know that Nicaragua would not be another Grenada, and U.S. soldiers would pay a high price if they crossed the border. It is doubtful this message was lost on the U.S. public.

It was shown earlier that a significant majority of informed U.S. citizens were against intervention in Nicaragua. Poll data indicate that this aversion to intervention was due at least in part to a fear that such a conflict could get out of control. This fear was most often expressed in questions comparing Nicaragua to Vietnam. But there was an overall increased fear of war in general overlaying the more obvious Vietnam comparison. Table 3.3 summarizes poll results and shows a snapshot of U.S. fears and expectations regarding conflict in the period 1983-1984, as well as some earlier data for reference points.

TABLE 3.3

Question: What is the most important problem facing this country today?

	Oct 1982	Oct 1983	Oct 1984
Threat of war	6%	23%	30%

Question: Will U.S. involvement [in Nicaragua or Central America] turn into another Vietnam?

	Aug 1983	May 1984
Very/Fairly Likely	72%	72%
Very/Fairly Unlikely	21	24

Question: Have Reagan's policies brought the U.S. closer to war or closer to peace?

	Nov 1983	Jul 1984	Oct 1984
Closer to war	47%	46%	38%
Closer to peace	28	28	39

Source: The Gallup Poll, 1983-1984.

It is not clear why the "Closer to war" percentages changed so drastically from July to October of 1984. The lack of significant events in this period would indicate the differential may be due to effective electioneering by the Reagan campaign, although that is pure speculation. Even with this minor burp, though, the poll results indicate a growing concern about war in general and in particular an apprehension about U.S. chances of being caught in a Central American quagmire similar to Vietnam. Admittedly it requires some interpolation and extrapolation to tie these particular questions to a fear of escalation. Unfortunately-

ly, the author could find no pollsters who asked the all-important (to this study) question, "Do you think U.S. intervention in Nicaragua could escalate into a broader regional or global war?" But the combination of tense international climate and public wariness of war in general would push the answer to that question (had it been asked) towards the affirmative. Combine this fear of escalation with at best poorly understood goals, and the outcome was a move away from public support for intervention.

E. GLOBAL/REGIONAL REACTION

The external reaction to U.S. policy towards Nicaragua during the period under study was, in a word, negative. The international reaction to American "covert" actions left little doubt that anything resembling an invasion of Nicaragua would lead to widespread and vocal condemnation.

Perhaps the incident that best illustrated this negative reaction to U.S. policy came in the wake of revelations about CIA operatives mining Nicaraguan harbors. U.S. allies condemned the action and even offered the Nicaraguans assistance in clearing the mines. This was more than a subtle show of dissatisfaction.

The entire European Community joined the anti-intervention sentiment in September of 1984 when, following meetings

with the Contadora group*, they painted the United States as the major culprit in the region and signed a protocol endorsing the Contadora group's efforts.⁶⁰

Another rebuke followed the Reagan administration's April decision to refuse the World Court's jurisdiction in cases involving Central America, and later attempts to have Nicaragua's case dismissed.

The regional reaction to American policy was little better. Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid railed against U.S. policy before the House and Senate in May, accusing the administration of sabotaging peace efforts⁶¹. His complaints appeared legitimate when the administration allegedly torpedoed the Contadora treaty in October, after Managua had agreed to sign it⁶². A new proposal, supposedly sponsored by the United States but presented by El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras, failed to placate critics of U.S. policy and indeed only added to complaints of American meddling.

Much of the world, including U.S.'s allies, did not hesitate to express dissatisfaction with U.S. policy towards the region in general and Nicaragua in particular. A 1983 resolution deploring intervention in Grenada passed the U.N.

*The Contadora group, so named for the island where they first met, consists of Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. The group sought (and is seeking) solutions to the many security problems in Central America.

General Assembly by a vote of 106-8, with 25 abstentions. The eight dissenters were the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) members who had collaborated in the invasion, Israel, and the United States. A similar 1984 resolution, passing 93-11 with 40 abstentions, urged "all states to refrain from intervening and suspend all supplies of arms" to El Salvador. France, Spain, and Australia were among the supporters of this latter resolution.

World response to U.S. "covert" actions and overt policy statements were likewise overwhelmingly negative. Virtually every European ally, for example, took a stand against U.S. mining of Nicaraguan ports. Three (France, Belgium, Britain) even offered to supply minesweepers⁶³. Rejection of the mining was even stronger in most other regions of the globe.

The CIA "assassination manual" also caused a torrent of negative reaction. One Austrian editorial called it "Gangsters [recommending] gangsters to hire more gangsters."⁶⁴

Even those who agreed that the Sandinistas posed a potential regional threat disagreed with the United States influencing Nicaragua's internal affairs. Reducing the Sandinista's influence and telling them how to run their country, it seemed, were two different matters⁶⁵. This sentiment carried over to U.S. condemnation of the Nicaraguan elections on November 4, 1984. Most observers saw the

elections as credible enough to recognize, and certainly as fair as other regional attempts at pluralism. The French External Relations Minister praised the election before his National Assembly and expressed hope that they would "contribute to detente in Central America."⁶⁶ And even if they were not fair, according to the Paris paper Le Monde, "U.S. use of force in Nicaragua could...be no more justifiable than the Soviets' use of force in Afghanistan [to fulfill its security requirements]."⁶⁷ These citations carry a European slant to demonstrate that even among America's most important allies, support for its Nicaraguan policies was visibly lacking.

In sum, it is clear that global reaction to U.S. Nicaraguan policies was overwhelmingly negative. Americans were sensitive to this reaction, as evidenced by a May 1984 poll (TABLE 3.4), which posed the question:

TABLE 3.4

Question: By getting involved in Central America we open ourselves up to charges of interference?

Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
66%	30%	4%

Source: Index of International Public Opinion 1983-1984

Americans who were following the issue undoubtedly were sensitive to these charges of interference, and it is reasonable to assume that if this sensitivity influenced them

at all, it moved them away from supporting armed intervention.

F. VALUES

American values played a key role in swaying public sentiment away from U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. The period under scrutiny saw appeals to liberal idealism and assertions of pragmatic objectives. But these appeals to the liberal ethic were questionable even to many who shared the ultimate objective of a democratic Nicaragua, free from Soviet or Cuban influence. The primary reason for this lack of U.S. policy support was an overall disenchantment with the means employed by the administration. Even many of those who thought Reagan's goals were legitimate and worth seeking repudiated his methods, most notably the CIA's role in Nicaraguan internal affairs. Interested Americans could see high potential costs for questionable goals, combined with the use of repugnant tactics and allies.

The Reagan administration's attempts at appealing to values were made clear in statements, if not in deeds. The President himself aimed for the public's heartstrings with such phrases as "rolling back communism." He asserted the Nicaraguan people were "trapped in a totalitarian dungeon," lacking personal freedom and fearing repression⁶⁸. Shultz called the Sandinista attempt at legitimacy through elections a "sham" and stated "the tide of history is with

us."⁶⁹ Unfortunately for the administration, the American people saw history more as a source of apprehension than hope where Nicaragua was concerned. A long history of regional intervention and the legacy of Vietnam combined to magnify potential costs of conflict, shrink the importance of any achievable goals, and cause revulsion at the means already being employed to achieve those goals.

The administration did little to prepare the public for the potential costs of invading Nicaragua. This may be simply because the administration had never planned on such an invasion. But the possibility was there, as evidenced by comparisons between Nicaragua and Grenada (including the ominously named exercises Grenadero I and II) and by reports of invasion contingency plans⁷⁰. The potential for direct military intervention certainly did exist, even though this was not the course of action finally taken.

The Sandinistas, conversely, did prepare the American public for the costs of invasion. They were very clear in their intent to make U.S. intervention bloody and drawn out. Their own population was mobilized twice in 1984 to respond to a potential U.S. attack. Their army grew to be the region's largest. They were obviously prepared to make great sacrifices to increase the costs of a U.S.-led invasion of their country. During the MIG scare of November 1984, for example, they diverted 26,000 students from the coffee harvest to prepare defenses⁷¹. This action had the

dual effect of increasing U.S. costs and in effect creating a martyr of the Nicaraguan economy by purposely abandoning the coffee crop to counter the "imminent" invasion. The latter effect, whether intentional or not, certainly did not increase public acceptance of administration policies.

Potentially high costs have been acceptable to the American people to achieve legitimate and worthwhile objectives, in some cases. The administration's stated and inferred objectives were seen as neither legitimate or worthwhile, though, in the Nicaragua case. Stated objectives included interdicting the arms flow to Salvadoran guerrillas and stopping communist expansion by reducing the threat Nicaragua posed to its neighbors. The implied (albeit illegal) objective was to force the Sandinista regime from power. None of these objectives were highly important to the American public, and certainly were not seen as worthy of the potential costs. Table 3.5 summarizes poll results regarding public perception of both the validity and importance of various U.S. policy objectives in Nicaragua. It is clear the public was not fearful that failing to meet these objectives would be particularly catastrophic to U.S. values, or even interests.

TABLE 3.5

January 1984

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. being involved in trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua?

	Approve	Disapprove	Not Sure
Informed	52%	40%	8%

Source: ABC/Washington Post poll. Reported by State Dept.

April 1984

Question: Do you favor or oppose the overthrow of the "pro-Soviet" government in Nicaragua?

	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
Informed	43%	46%	11%
Uninformed	22	50	20

Source: New York Times/CBS NewsPoll. Reported by State Dept.

May 1984

Question: Do you favor or oppose arms and support to contras who are "trying to overthrow the Sandinistas?"

	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
	31%	60%	9%

Question: Without 4000 troops and contra aid, the domino effect will occur in Central America?

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
	39%	53%	9%

Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1983-1984

September 1984

Question: The United States' Central American policy as designed to prevent communism has been a failure or success?

	Failure	Success	Neither	Not Sure
	52%	36%	2%	10%

Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1984-1985

Finally, American values were often alienated by the means employed by the U.S. government and its agents against Nicaragua. The CIA's mining operation met with considerable disapproval, even as William Casey asserted the action was minor compared to Soviet and Cuban expansionist influence in Nicaragua⁷². Support for the contras was also questioned as reports of atrocities became public⁷³. It became difficult to justify calling these people freedom fighters or the moral equivalent of our founding fathers in the face of mounting evidence of their misdeeds against their countrymen⁷⁴. The so-called CIA assassination manual, which became public in October of 1984, was yet another affront to American values. Not many Americans wished to be closely associated with assassination, mob violence, and many of the other tactics this manual advocated.

A climate of deception also seemed to persist that alienated many Americans. It was clear U.S. agents were fighting the Sandinistas, yet the administration insisted it was not trying to overthrow that regime. Congress was not kept fully informed of the mining, raising a furor in the Senate when that operation became public. Even the rejection of World Court jurisdiction implied the United States had something to hide. Whether these and other actions were the result of deception or incoherent policy is immaterial. What was important was that the American public did not feel at all comfortable with what the administration was doing in

Nicaragua, largely because many of the administration's actions were apparent affronts to the American value system.

Table 3.6 presents poll data that indicate to varying degrees what the U.S. public thought of various historical or potential actions by the U.S. towards Nicaragua and Central America in general. It is clear that in this case, the ends clearly did not justify the means in Americans' eyes.

TABLE 3.6

April 1984

Question: Do you favor or oppose of the United States helping opponents of the Nicaraguan government lay mines in its harbors?

	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
Informed	20%	72%	8%
Uninformed	11	66	23

Source: CBS/New York Times NewsPoll. Reported by State Dept.

May 1984

Question: The U.S. must accept any allies in Central America to counter the communist threat.

Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
31%	61%	8%

Question: Stop CIA activities that violate Nicaragua's rights, such as putting mines in Nicaraguan harbors?

Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
56%	38%	6%

Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1984-1985

July 1984

Question: It is wrong for the CIA to finance the contras?

Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
55%	32%	13%

Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1984-1985

It seems that values, then, played an intricate role in swaying American public opinion away from support for intervention in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan government, aided by U.S. activists, painted a picture of high costs for U.S. involvement. Add to this impression a backdrop of illegitimate or, at best, poorly defined perceived goals, sprinkled with the bright colors of clearly repugnant tactics, and the impact of values was a clear trend away from intervention support.

G. CONCLUSION

It is indicative of the importance most Americans placed on Central America in the early 1980s that the majority of people in the U.S. did not even know whom their government was supporting, much less what form this support took. But of those who were attentive to the subject, a clear and constant majority opposed U.S. intervention in the region. Table 3.7 illustrates this opposition, demonstrating that Americans' preferences tended towards the least intrusive methods for dealing with even the most serious incident during the period under study: the MIG scare.

TABLE 3.7

Question: Which action would you support if the Russians send MIGs to Nicaragua?*

	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
Naval Blockade	68%	26%	6%
Increase contra assistance	49	39	12
Air strike against bases/MIGs	40	52	8
Invasion	21	74	5

Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1984-1985

*This study addresses direct sustained military intervention. Of the policy options presented in this question, only "Invasion" meets this criteria.

This study has asserted three primary reasons for this opposition. First, the American people feared that the spark of a Nicaraguan intervention could set off an escalation that might get out of control and, eventually, drag the United States into a broader or longer war than it was prepared to fight. This was probably the least influential of the three factors discussed, but it was nevertheless apparent.

The second factor that tempered public opinion on intervention was a lack of global and regional support for that course of action. Traditional adversaries and allies alike expressed displeasure at the U.S. role in Nicaragua and clearly expressed their opposition to an American-led intervention.

Finally, America's values were alienated by U.S. actions in Nicaragua, and by the potential for direct intervention.

War was simply not seen as a worthwhile course given the potential costs and objectives. This seemed to be the strongest factor in pulling and maintaining public support away from the intervention decision.

IV. LEBANON

A. CASE PARAMETERS

In August 1982, the U.S. Marines were called upon to oversee the evacuation of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrillas from Beirut, Lebanon. The Israelis had invaded that country and threatened to root out the PLO fighters in what would inevitably be a bloody battle on the streets of Beirut. U.S., French, Italian, and, eventually, British forces were dispatched under an agreement that called for the PLO to leave in return for Israel not entering the Muslim enclave of West Beirut. This case begins with the Marines' arrival on 28 August 1982.

The Marines' stay in Lebanon, excepting a brief hiatus in September 1982, was to last about 18 months. During that time, naval and Marine units would engage various Lebanese factions and the Syrian army in often intense fighting. Over 260 Marines and sailors would die (241 in a single incident) during this intervention, along with many of their French and Italian partners in the multi-national force (MNF). Unfortunately, the peace was not kept and in the end the MNF pulled out of Beirut having achieved few if any of its original objectives.

President Reagan announced on 7 February 1984 that the

Marines would leave Beirut and "redeploy" to ships offshore. Although limited actions - most notably naval gunfire - continued after this redeployment, for this study's purposes the U.S. military intervention ended with that move, which was completed on 26 February 1984.

B. DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

As in Nicaragua, fewer than fifty percent of the American public could identify which side the U.S. government supported in Lebanon. The fact that U.S. Marines and naval units had intervened, though, inevitably resulted in a rising level of interest in events there. Table 4.1 indicates that forty to fifty percent of Americans demonstrated at least a limited knowledge and/or interest in the players and objectives surrounding the U.S. intervention. This number shot up sharply in the fall and winter of 1983, probably due to increased U.S. combat activity and losses.

TABLE 4.1

Question: How would you rate the Lebanese Government?

	Ally/Friendly	Not Friendly/Enemy	Not Sure
9/83	41%	44%	15%

Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1983-1984

Question: How closely do you follow events in Lebanon?

	Very/Fairly	Some/Little	Don't Know
12/83	69%	30%	1%

Source: ABC/Washington Post reported by State Dept.

The American public was slightly disinclined to involve its armed forces in the Lebanon quagmire following the Israeli invasion in June 1982. The disinclination became more pronounced following Reagan's intervention decision and, as might be expected, climaxed just prior to and following the announced withdrawal of U.S. troops in February 1984. Table 4.2 summarizes this trend. It is interesting to note that following the Marine barracks bombing on 23 October 1983 there was a brief rally in support for intervention, but it was short-lived.

TABLE 4.2

Question: Should the U.S. send a small number of peace-keeping forces to Lebanon (to cover PLO evacuation)?

	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
July 1982	40%	54%	6%

Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1982-1983

Question: Do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to Lebanon?

	Yes	No	No Opinion
Early October 1983	51%	37%	12%
Late October 1983	45	45	10
December 1983	47	44	9
January 1984	52	39	9
Mid February 1984	58	33	9

Source: The Gallup Poll, 1983 and 1984

Significantly, at least one poll indicated that the attentive and mass publics were of the same mind on this issue, showing virtually identical levels of support for

U.S. troop involvement among both groups.⁷⁵ Americans tended to be more split on President Reagan's role in the Lebanon intervention, with roughly a third showing support for his overall policies (Table 4.3). This seems to indicate that the idea of intervention in a peacekeeping role was not so obnoxious to Americans as the way in which the role was carried out.

TABLE 4.3

Question: How do you rate Reagan's handling of the situation in Lebanon?

	Approve	Disapprove	No Opinion
July 1982	29%	59%	12%
Early October 1983	32	61	7
Late October 1983	39	58	2
January 1984	28	N.A.	N.A.
Mid February 1984	28	60	12

N.A. - Not Available

Sources: Index to International Public Opinion, 1982-1983 and 1983-1984, The Gallup Poll, 1983 and 1984

In the end, it seemed that Americans perceived the Lebanon intervention as an admirable but overly-ambitious cause. The public saw the Administration's effort as well-intentioned but doomed to failure by circumstances beyond its control⁷⁶. This was the public's attitude and, eventually, the Administration echoed these feelings by pulling the Marines out of harm's way.

C. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP⁷⁷

Two themes permeate Lebanon's history. First, it is and always has been a nation divided by sectarian strife. Its peoples' allegiances have virtually always subordinated national interest to sectarian interest. Alliances have been made for convenience, but antipathies have been everlasting.

The second major theme in Lebanon has been a tug of war between the nations' Arabic roots and its quest for acceptance among the major world powers, especially in the West. Lebanon has maintained a patron power relationship since its incorporation into the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century. But it has also relied heavily on its Arab neighbors for trade and cultural roots. This pull between East and West has exacerbated the effects of sectarian splits, much like constant pressure on a fabric can turn a minor tear into a major run.

Prior to 1920, the two major Lebanese sects were the Maronite Catholics and Druze Muslims. These sects, and a myriad of lesser minorities, are thought to have settled the Mount Lebanon region between the fifth and eleventh centuries AD. The sects were fairly autonomous and prospered when the Ottomans incorporated them in the sixteenth century. The Turks maintained the feudal or sectarian system of Mount Lebanon, allowing each community its own rulers, schools, laws, and so on.

Sectarian violence resulted in the massacre of thousands of Christians in 1860. This prompted the major Christian powers to action in Lebanon. France, Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, as part of the so-called treaties of capitulation with the Ottomans, forced the Turks to take more responsibility for Lebanese affairs and granted special status for the Lebanese nation. This continued until 1914, when the Ottoman Empire revoked the treaties with its entry into WWI with the Axis powers. During that war, 100,000 of the 450,000 Lebanese died of starvation or disease⁷⁸.

In 1920, as a result of the Axis' loss in WWI, the French were given a mandate in Lebanon by the League of Nations. Paris promptly created Grand Lebanon, or Greater Lebanon from Mount Lebanon and parts of Syria. This action brought the third major tile into the Lebanese mosaic - the Shi-ite Muslims.

The French mandate in Lebanon ended in 1943 when a National Pact was drawn up by Lebanese nationals. This National Pact called on the various sects to recognize and respect each other, and also allotted parliament seats and minister posts among the various communities. The French were powerless to stop this action, although a brief attempt to reassert control after WWII was thwarted by the British. Britain thus became the new Western influence on Lebanon, at least until the United States entered the scene following

the Suez crisis of 1956.

The U.S. involvement in Lebanon became significant in 1958 with the Revolt of the Pashas.⁷⁹ A civil war, fanned by Nasser's Arab nationalism and the ruling Maronites' intransigence to change, had developed in Lebanon. This was not of great concern to the United States, though, until King Faisal was overthrown and killed in Iraq, upsetting the regional anti-Soviet balance of power. Washington feared the new Iraqi regime would attempt to extend its influence into Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Lebanon's Maronite leader, meanwhile, requested U.S. assistance in putting down his enemies. Fifteen thousand Marines landed in 1958 and provided a stabilizing influence that allowed diplomacy to eventually sort things out. The Marines were tightly reined by the Lebanese Army and the U.S. State Department, so that their presence was more a force in being rather than actively combatant. They left in October 1958, suffering just one combat death.⁸⁰ A July 1958 poll, incidentally, found more approval than disapproval among Americans for the U.S. role during the civil war⁸¹.

Things settled down in Lebanon for a few years following the 1958 civil war. But the 1960s and early 1970s saw innumerable sticks being added to the fire that would keep this tempest pot boiling and, eventually, lead to a second civil war in 1975.

Although Lebanon itself was not involved in The Arab-

Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, those conflicts deepened the cleavages between Christian and Muslim factions. The wars also exacerbated the Palestinian refugee problem, which eventually led to yet another sect in Lebanon's societal mosaic.

Economic problems also contributed to Lebanon's strife, especially in the 1970s. Inflation rose as economic output decreased. This deepened the split between the haves (predominately Maronite) and the more numerous poor Muslim sects.⁸² The Sunnis and Shi-ites called for a bigger piece of the economic pie, as well as greater political participation for their growing majority. The Maronites, on the other hand, were most interested in maintaining their favored positions, but also feared for their physical and societal survival.

Fighting between factions and factions within factions began in earnest in 1975. Syrian and Israeli interventions often changed the character but not the content of conflict during the civil war. Eventually, other Arab states were able to broker a cease-fire in October of 1976. Very little was decided by the war, even though 25,000-40,000 people lost their lives and as many as half a million were left homeless⁸³. A temporary agreement was made, but fighting began again almost immediately. Matters would come to a head again in 1978.

On March 11 1978, eight Lebanon-based Palestinian guerrillas hijacked a bus in Israel. Thirty-one Israelis and six of the guerrillas died in the ensuing gun battle.⁸⁴ Three days later, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded southern Lebanon. As was the custom, Lebanon as a whole suffered for the actions of a few. The invasion resulted in some 2000 deaths and 265,000 additional refugees⁸⁵. By March 19 the United Nations Security Council accepted U.S.-sponsored resolution 425, which called upon Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and created a 6000 man peace-keeping force. Israel largely complied with the order over a two month period, leaving all of Lebanon except a narrow border strip.

Factional fighting continued in Lebanon over the next few years until the next major conflict occurred. Syria, in April 1981, placed a Soviet-made SA-6 surface-to-air missile system in the Bekaa valley after losing several helicopters to the Israelis. Israel was preparing to destroy these batteries when the United States undertook to intervene with diplomacy and head off a potentially serious regional confrontation. Philip Habib engaged in some shuttle diplomacy that succeeded in preventing an Israeli attack but failed to remove the missiles. Meanwhile, the factions within Lebanon continued to jockey for power, carry out reprisals and counter-reprisals, and seek new alliances. Such was the Lebanese tradition.

The role of Bashir Gemayal deserves further amplification at this point because of his role in later events that are important to this study. Gemayal represented a radical Maronite fringe that increasingly eschewed compromise and sought ultimate control over Lebanon. He consolidated (often by force) Christian factions and turned his aims against the state's Muslim majority, as well as the Palestinians and Syrians. In doing this, he needed and gained Israel as an ally. He did this through commonality of interest to be sure, but also through deception and ruthlessness, neither of which, incidentally, were at all peculiar to him or his faction. Thus when the threat of another Israeli invasion loomed in 1981 and 1982, most Christians, and Gemayal in particular, welcomed it as an opportunity to expand their own influence and rid themselves of other competing sects.

That opportunity did come in the summer of 1982. Tensions were high between Israel and Syria. The PLO had established a virtual state within a state in southern Lebanon, from which they carried out frequent if not particularly damaging attacks against Israel. The spark that lit the tinderbox occurred in June 1982 when the Israeli ambassador in London was assassinated by a Palestinian gunman. The IDF invaded and, for whatever reasons, marched north for Beirut.⁸⁶

The Israeli invasion set off an immediate reaction in Washington and other capitals, causing a flurry of diplomatic activity to end the crisis. Finally, in August 1982 a cease-fire was negotiated that would allow the Palestinian fighters to evacuate Beirut under cover of the multi-national force, comprised of French, Italian, and (at PLO leader Yasser Arafat's insistence) U.S. forces. This compromise was reached largely to spare a besieged Beirut a devastating house-to-house battle between PLO and Israeli forces. The agreement also spelled out guarantees for the safety of Palestinian civilians left behind in Beirut⁸⁷.

The Marines landed in Beirut harbor on 25 August 1982 with the mission of keeping the peace for, at most, 30 days. This limited commitment would end 18 months later, at great cost and with little gain. The United States and its peace-keeping partners had become the latest victims of Lebanon's social and political morass. That country's sectarian animosities had a rich history and would not be set aside simply because outside powers wished it so. The great cultural pull between those who admired and wished to court the developed world and those with a more traditional Arab bent had already stretched Lebanese society to the breaking point. The introduction of outside forces only changed the calculus of conflict. It did not change the underlying causes.

Appendix B provides a chronology of events during the

Marines' stay in Beirut. The following sections will highlight factors that influenced the American public's negative reaction to their ordeal.

D. FEAR OF ESCALATION

This case is set in generally the same time period as the previous Nicaraguan study. There is, in fact, a five month overlap in the fall and winter of 1983-1984. The previous case described a generally tense international climate, both in general East-West relations and in bilateral or regional U.S. concerns. The East-West tensions and resultant public concerns were previously addressed so require little elaboration here. The primary focus will be on escalatory fears based upon regional circumstances, most notably the Soviet-Syrian relationship and the ever-present Arab-Israeli conflict. The American public, it will be shown, did perceive and fear a potential for escalation resulting from U.S. intervention in Lebanon.

U.S.-Soviet relations were quite strained during the period under study. This backdrop of hostility arguably amplified feelings of uneasiness or uncertainty where U.S.-Soviet conflict was possible. It did not take too wild an imagination to see this possibility in Lebanon. Lebanon is near the Soviet periphery. But more importantly, Syria was a major player in the Lebanese intervention and was quite close to Moscow. Many Americans could envisage a scenario

where U.S. forces became locked in a full fledged war with Syria, eventually involving Soviet advisors and even troops. That Soviet arms would be involved was a given. The Syrians had vast quantities of the latest Soviet equipment. And Moscow was quick to resupply the Syrian army following its initial losses to the Israeli Self Defense Forces⁸⁸.

The Administration seemed to actually fan the fear of escalation through announcements and threats regarding the Syrian and Soviet role in Lebanon. Secretary of State Shultz, following his peace-seeking tour in May 1983, alleged that Soviet pressure was hampering a Syrian pullout from Lebanon⁸⁹. Two days later Secretary of Defense Weinberger stated the U.S. would "retaliate strongly" if Syrian or Syrian-based Soviet troops were used in Lebanon or against the Israelis, although the Administration acted quickly to soften that threat⁹⁰. After the Marine barracks was bombed, Weinberger again attacked Syria, claiming he was "sure" Damascus was behind the bombing⁹¹. His conviction was perhaps backed up by the 4 December U.S. bombing raid on Syrian positions. Again, though, by mid January the Defense Department eased off on its blame of Syria for the bombings and shifted the blame towards Iran⁹².

The American public recognized this potential for escalation to war with Syria and even the Soviet Union. The public also had definite opinions on whether this escalation

should be allowed to occur, as indicated in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4

Question: U.S. involvement in Lebanon could escalate into war with Syria, which could lead to war with Russia?

	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
December 1983	64%	31%	5%
January 1984	49	44	7

Question: Do you favor/oppose joining with the Israelis to drive Syria out of Lebanon, even if it risks getting into a war with Russia?

	Favor	Oppose	Not Sure
December 1983	20%	74%	6%
January 1984	14	80	6

Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1983-1984

The marked drop in fear of greater Syrian or Soviet involvement in 1984 probably resulted from widespread speculation that President Reagan was looking for a graceful exit from Lebanon. The opposition to escalation, however, increased during this period, probably reflecting the widely held belief (to be discussed later) that the Administration's goals were not achievable at virtually any cost.

Syria and the Soviet Union did not provide the only potential for escalation in Lebanon. The intervention took place within the wider arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which had produced three major wars and numerous skirmishes over the past four decades. There was certainly a potential for Lebanon to provide the spark for a regional conflagra-

tion that could indeed have started WWII.

There was also the threat of terrorism to consider. U.S. involvement in Lebanon angered many fanatical (by Western standards) regimes and organizations. This point was brought home not just by the barracks and embassy bombings in Beirut, but also by the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait following stepped up U.S. attacks on Syrian and Druze positions in December 1983. Americans knew all too well this relative vulnerability to terrorist tactics and certainly considered it an escalatory threat.

The temporal realm provided still another potential for escalation. Americans feared an open-ended commitment of U.S. troops, largely because of the many unknowns involved in the conflict. Reagan first was prepared to maintain a presence for "a limited period of time" to get the Lebanese government "back on its feet."⁹³ Congress enthusiastically approved of these limited means and objectives in the beginning, but questions were inevitably asked about what "limited" meant, and whether the Lebanese government had any feet on which to stand, even with American help. Congress was seeking a more active role in the intervention by August 1983, and in September began debating the U.S. role under the War Powers Act. Reagan was ready to cede some Congressional role by then, conceding "I don't think we were prepared for, or believed there would be an outright civil war."⁹⁴ By October 1983 Congress and the President ham-

mered out a war powers compromise that set an 18 month limit on U.S. military involvement in Lebanon. It is difficult to ascertain how credible the U.S. public perceived this limit to be, but it is clear by Table 4.5 that they were nearly evenly split on whether or not it was the proper amount of time.

Table 4.5

Question: Do you think the 18 month time limit (on U.S. presence) is:

	Oct 28 1983	Jan 1984
Too long	48%	46%
About right	41	42
Not long enough	8	7
No opinion	3	5

Source: The Gallup Poll 1983

These polls indicate that half of all Americans were wrong about how long it would take for U.S. intervention in Lebanon to achieve its goals. It is highly probable that very few people knew what U.S. intervention goals should have been, whether these goals could have been achieved, and how they should have been pursued. And indeed, this assertion seems to have been borne out when the President himself admitted the Marines' role in Lebanese politics was untenable, and much of the American public came to see intervention as a well-intentioned mistake.

A cloud of uncertainty permeated the American understanding of Lebanon in general, and U.S. intervention in

particular; an uncertain environment, uncertain goals, and uncertain commitments. All of these uncertainties invoked the classic analogy of Vietnam. And, as in Nicaragua, Americans accepted this analogy on a large scale. This analogy undoubtedly influenced their support for intervention. A Gallup poll in early October 1983 asked specifically whether U.S. involvement in Lebanon "will" (not "could") turn into another Vietnam. Sixty-four percent said yes, with 28% rejecting the analogy.⁹⁵ The comparison points to a fear of unknown (but probably substantial) commitment for dubious and/or poorly understood objectives, with the added possibility of superpower escalation. It is quite reasonable to argue under these circumstances that fear of escalation moved the American public away from supporting the Lebanese intervention policy.

E. GLOBAL/REGIONAL REACTION

America's intervention in Lebanon received mixed reviews throughout the Middle East and the globe. Nearly all of America's allies, along with many non-aligned states, supported the broad goals of intervention, i.e. a stable central government and the ultimate withdrawal of all foreign forces. Most states also agreed that a temporary MNF was a reasonable means to these ends. But support began to wane in the fall of 1983 when the U.S. stepped up its combat role. Many nations (allies included) saw the American role

changing from that of allowing an environment for reconciliation to forcing a solution on the non-Christian factions. In effect, the United States was taking sides. This was where many supporters got off the train and lessened or even withdrew their support for U.S. intervention.

1. Regional Reaction

Arab reaction to U.S. involvement in Lebanon was largely negative, although to varying degrees. Hard line anti-Western states like Syria, Iraq, and Libya were predictably and vehemently opposed to the U.S. role in the region, viewing it as imperialist, colonial, and unwarranted meddling. It can be assumed that these states' opinions were largely discounted by the U.S. public due to their long tradition of anti-U.S. dogma on virtually any matter of foreign policy. The more important reactions emanated from capitals of so-called moderate Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States. These attitudes were certainly less vindictive toward the American role, but still they were hardly supportive. The May 1983 peace accord brokered by the United States particularly rankled the Arabs because of its recognition of Israel by Lebanon and legitimization of the Maronite regime. These Arab states also opposed the U.S. military strikes in November 1983 through February 1984 because these strikes surpassed "the essence of the American role in Lebanon and [were] an infringement of Washington's attitude and obligations toward

the peace operation and of what is expected of it as a superpower."⁹⁶ The United States, it seemed, had overstepped its bounds.

Overall Arab attitudes on the U.S. intervention can be amply illustrated by their reactions to the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks bombings in April and October 1983 respectively. Many Arab states blamed Israel for the bombing, citing benefits the Jewish state could derive from continuing chaos and MNF withdrawal⁹⁷. Others, spanning the political spectrum from Syria to Saudi Arabia, saw the bombings as the inevitable consequence of flawed Western policy. This latter stance was adopted by the Arab League as well⁹⁸.

Israel exhibited an interesting reaction to the U.S. intervention. The Israelis supported the MNF goal of a stable Lebanon with Gemayal as its leader. But their idea of how this should be done evolved from supporting the very behavior the MNF was meant to deter, to virtual abandonment of its Lebanese conquests and objectives.

Antipathy between the United States and Israel over the latter's invasion of Lebanon ran high in the summer and fall of 1982. Washington called for an Israeli withdrawal early on, and the MNF was originally meant to facilitate this withdrawal by guaranteeing the removal of Israel's primary target - the PLO - from Lebanon. The PLO was evacu-

ated in August 1982, followed almost immediately by the MNF. But then Israel moved into West Beirut contrary to the cease-fire agreement and allowed the Christian militia to ravage the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, killing hundreds or even thousands of non-combatants.⁹⁹ The Multi-National Force nations agreed to return to Beirut almost immediately.

Israel continued its support for Christian factions and maintained control over the strategic Shouf mountains overlooking Beirut as the MNF was reestablishing itself in Beirut proper. Confrontation between MNF and IDF forces was all too common, though. In one celebrated incident, a Marine Captain stopped three Israeli tanks from crossing his checkpoint by drawing his pistol and threatening to shoot them¹⁰⁰. This was but one case of alleged "taunting" of Marines by IDF units¹⁰¹. The primary tension was caused by the U.S. insistence that Israel withdraw and let the MNF restore order. This demand was backed in April by Washington's refusal to deliver F-16 aircraft Israel had ordered until that country left Lebanon.

The situation had reversed, though, by the fall of 1983. The Israelis wanted out, even without security guarantees or Syrian withdrawal. But now, Washington recognized that an Israeli withdrawal would create a power vacuum. The Israelis did pull out of the Shouf mountains unilaterally in September 1983, creating the worst-case scenario of all out

factional war for this strategic location. This action drew the United States' forces deeper into the fray and increased tensions further between Washington and Jerusalem.

2. Global Reaction

America's European allies were more supportive of intervention, but in the end they too saw it as a futile albeit necessary effort; necessary to prevent a total conflagration, but futile in that the objectives of a stable government and removal of foreign forces could not be achieved. Europeans in general disapproved of America's stepped-up combat efforts in the fall of 1983, although few useful alternatives were offered. This feeling of good intentions but lost goals was pervasive both in America's MNF partners and other European capitals. Fifty percent of the French, for example, approved of the MNF in October of 1983, but barely a third approved of U.S. strikes in Lebanon¹⁰². Similar feelings could be found in Britain and Italy.

As was stated earlier, the rest of Europe supported the goals of intervention, especially at the beginning. But the means became less popular as combat escalated in the fall of 1983. There was universal support for the ceasefire in September that temporarily halted fighting following the Israeli withdrawal. And the Europeans were appalled at the barracks bombings of October 23. But the picture paint-

ed in the European press after that was one of an America stuck in a just but hopeless cause. Editorials in Belgium, Sweden, and elsewhere acceded the requirement for peacekeepers for regional stability, but acknowledged that those forces could do little to solve Lebanon's problems. The Swedish paper Svenska Dagbladet captured this sentiment in an article titled "Innocent Optimism Wiped out:"

Many good intentions have been buried in the Middle East. The [MNF] in Beirut ... has been transformed into one military factor among many in the complicated Lebanese game, a hostage to the superior power of circumstances.¹⁰³

This ambivalent feeling was given concrete form in September and December 1983 when as many as 15 Western nations refused to participate in the peacekeeping mission¹⁰⁴. The possibility of a U.N. peacekeeping force was brought up, but quickly died under a veto threat from the Soviet Union. Among the European allies, it seemed, condolences were abundant, criticisms frequent, and alternative solutions few.

Asian reaction was similarly ambivalent. North Korean and Vietnamese tirades were predictable and probably had little influence on the American public. The Japanese were typically lacking a consensus on the role of peacekeeping forces, first pledging aid for the MNF, and then opting out after it became apparent the forces would actually be used in combat¹⁰⁵.

The South Korean government supported the U.S. role

in Lebanon, placing it in the broader East-West conflict, especially following the KAL-007 shooting.¹⁰⁶ Neither Japan nor Korea, though, had a large stake in Lebanese events so theirs' and most of their neighbors' reactions were relatively moot on the matter of U.S. intervention.

The overall reaction to U.S. involvement seemed to precede what Americans eventually felt about U.S. intervention in Lebanon. It was a good cause, but nothing could really have been done. The regional Arab and Israeli reactions to U.S. involvement were largely negative, and America's important allies saw some intervention necessary if futile. These mixed reviews probably served to further complicate the contradictory cues Americans received from abroad about their government's actions. This confusion was readily apparent in a February poll in which Americans were evenly split on the question of whether removing the Marines would be setback for U.S. foreign policy¹⁰⁷.

When all things are considered, it would be difficult to argue that the global/regional reaction to U.S. intervention swayed public opinion either toward or away from support for that intervention. International reaction probably did, however, contribute to the ultimate feeling of helplessness Americans felt about Lebanon, even if this helplessness did not translate directly into dissension over the Administration's Lebanon policies.

F. VALUES

The initial August 1982 U.S. intervention in Lebanon could have served as a model for putting American values into practice. The goals were quite in line with the liberal ethic, including stopping an already deadly conflict, ridding a sovereign state of outside (Syrian, Israeli, PLO) influence, and strengthening the central government. There was even the benefit of having been asked in by the host government's leader, in this case Bashir Gemayal. Costs would be virtually non-existent in the Marines' "carefully limited, noncombatant role."¹⁰⁸ But the satin finish soon began to fade on this picture as Americans began to feel that even these limited objectives were out of reach, and that eventual costs would outstrip the objectives, even if they were attainable.

The initial Marine intervention in Lebanon was solely to evacuate the PLO fighters from Beirut. In this they were successful, and the Marines left shortly thereafter. But the massacres at the Shatila and Sabra camps horribly illustrated the central government's weakness and renewed calls for the MNF to return and prevent a recurrence. President Reagan, with widespread Congressional and public approval, agreed to send the Marines back into Beirut for a limited period to get the Lebanese government "back on its feet." And in fact, even in the fall of 1983 when the Marines had been in Beirut for a year with little to show for it, a

majority of the American public supported the assertion that Lebanon needed U.S. help to reestablish control of its country, both from enemies within and without¹⁰⁹. It is ironic in retrospect that the viability of any U.S. role in these objectives did not come under serious doubt in the Administration, especially when Reagan himself recognized in September 1982:

Israel must have learned that there is no way it can impose its own solutions on hatreds as deep and bitter as those that produced [Sabra, Shatila massacres]. If it seeks to do so, it will only sink more deeply into the quagmire that looms before it.¹¹⁰

The Administration continued to couch its objectives in the liberal ethic, even after the original goals had lost their luster. Following the 23 October 1983 Marine barracks bombing, Reagan cited vital U.S. national interests in Lebanon, and asserted "...our actions are in the cause of world peace."¹¹¹ Later, in December, the President defended increased U.S. combat action by stating "Weakness on the part of those who cherish freedom inevitably brings on a threat to that freedom."¹¹² But the American public was losing confidence in the "rightness" of its government's actions, or at least in its ability to achieve its objectives. A February 1984 poll indicated that less than a third of Americans thought U.S. policy was successful in any of the original intervention objectives¹¹³. It is clear that, while the original objectives of U.S. intervention

were perfectly acceptable to American values, over time the public began to see these objectives as unattainable, except possibly at a large and unacceptable cost.

As the Marines' tenure in Lebanon continued, what had at first been only potential costs became quite tangible to the American public. The first U.S. combat deaths in August 1983 forced America to put a price tag on its intervention objectives. As it turned out, the "price" the public was willing to pay did not match what would be needed to meet even the limited objectives set forth by the Administration. Something had to give. Polls taken in the fall and winter of 1983-1984 indicated that Americans did not see war or even the risk of more deaths as worthwhile in Lebanon, given what could be attained there. In a word, it seemed that Americans were tired of Lebanon. They were tired of bleeding. They were tired of pursuing objectives that were probably not attainable, and whose value had ebbed over time. Achieving the objective of ridding Lebanon of foreign forces, especially Syrians, was no closer in January 1984 than it had been in August 1982. The "host" government that had requested assistance had turned out to be just another fighting faction with a thin veneer of legitimacy. And the idea that the U.S. could stop sectarian strife in Lebanon simply lacked legitimacy given events of the past year. This combination of increased costs and rapidly deteriorating objectives could hardly be expected to support the

weight of American ideals and the liberal ethic. U.S. Marines, most Americans agreed, had been placed in "shameful and wrong" defenseless positions¹¹⁴, and for what? To fight an unwinnable war whose outcome, even if successful, would provide dubious gains for the United States, propagate repugnant conditions within the host country, and involve unwarranted costs in blood and treasure for the American people. Once again, the Vietnam analogy cannot be avoided, although it requires little elaboration by now. The Vietnam syndrome, for better or worse, was alive and well in Lebanon and arguably acted as a catalyst in translating the general growing public dissatisfaction with the Lebanon intervention into a tangible political force. In the end, the American value system could not support continued intervention in Lebanon. The Administration reacted to, or at least paralleled, this lack of support and eventually ended the intervention.

G. CONCLUSION

The American public ultimately did not support intervention in Lebanon. Dissension over the Administration's policies evolved and grew over time as it became increasingly clear that the goals of intervention could not be achieved at a reasonable cost. The public was also unclear about whether the administration itself understood and could pursue the goals it had set for itself.

The potential for U.S. involvement in Lebanon to escalate certainly played a part in increasing the American public's perceived potential costs of the intervention. The United States could have been dragged into a wider Arab-Israeli conflict, or worse, even into direct fighting with the Soviet Union. There was also a real potential for U.S. forces to be stuck in Lebanon indefinitely, sinking deeper and deeper into that state's strife-ridden morass.

The global and regional reactions to U.S. intervention provided little consolation to the American public. The local Arab and Israeli states did not necessarily share the Administration's goals, and resented U.S. meddling in their regional affairs. Washington's European allies provided some forces and even encouragement, but in the end lost confidence in America's or anyone else's ability to untangle the web of Lebanese sectarian violence. It is not unreasonable to assert that this international ambivalence contributed to the ultimate feeling in America that their forces were stuck and nobody was going to come to their aid. Eventually, Europeans argued against these forces even using offensive tactics for self-protection, contributing to the feeling among many Americans that their "boys" were being left in a lurch.

These feelings of increased potential costs and international isolation combined with the realization of unattainable goals and caused a vast majority of Americans to with-

draw support for intervention in Lebanon. By the late fall of 1983 it was clear that the potential costs clearly did not justify any possible gains. The American public continued to support their forces and these forces' ability to conduct operations to defend themselves, but overall support for the goals and methods of intervention waned. It is not surprising that the Administration picked up on this sentiment and was seeking a graceful exit from Lebanon by January 1984. Finally, even a graceful exit was too much to ask and President Reagan ordered the "redeployment" of troops offshore in February, allowing the American people to put the Lebanese intervention behind them.

V. CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

The previous cases traced public attitudes during the course of two American interventions in the early to mid 1980s.¹¹⁵ In each case, the President failed to gain public support for an intervention decision. In Nicaragua, the Reagan administration failed to make a case that direct military intervention would achieve worthwhile objectives. In Lebanon, reluctant early acquiescence gave way to an overwhelming public desire to end the ordeal as objectives became muddled and costs, both in blood and prestige, escalated.

This study has argued that public reactions in both cases were affected if not molded by three primary factors: fear of escalation, global/regional reaction, and an eventual affront to the American value system. The question remains, though, of how public opinion in each of these cases was eventually translated into non-intervention policy. Public opinion was not the only factor affecting the President's decisions to be sure. But it certainly was one factor, and arguably the most important determinant of his policy.

In this age of instant polls it might be tempting to claim the President rules by plebiscite on issues as impor-

tant as military intervention. And indeed, it has been documented that President Reagan had a large staff devoted to poll watching¹¹⁶. But this possibility, appealing though it may be to those in the majority on a give issue, is much too simplistic. Raw public opinion data can be but one force acting upon the President's decision-making process. In reality the public will passes through a filtering process that includes the Congress and, to a lesser extent, the President's own bureaucracy.¹¹⁷

A direct if slow process occurs between the public and its elected or appointed representatives in the legislative and executive branches. First and of foremost importance, Congress can (or should) act as a conduit for the public will. But a major impediment to this idyllic goal is Congress's own inability or unwillingness to share responsibility for American intervention abroad. This problem is best illustrated by the relative impotence of the War Powers Act of 1973, which was designed to give Congress a greater say over whether and for how long the President could commit U.S. troops in hostilities. In reality, Congress has taken decisive action only when it has enjoyed a clear mandate of overwhelming public dissatisfaction with the President's policy, or when public apathy has run rampant. Congress has in effect abrogated its oversight responsibility for making war as delineated in the Constitution, even as its overall foreign policy clout has increased since the Vietnam

war.

Conversely, the executive branch and the media may have a top down influence on public opinion. This possibility has been studied to ascertain who affects whom, i.e. does public opinion influence policy-makers, or do policy-makers mold public opinion to their predetermined decisions. No clear cut answer exists, but there appears to be a reciprocal process that ultimately favors public opinion's predominance in the foreign policy decision-making process.¹¹⁸

A. REPRESENTATION

Does public opinion ultimately affect the intervention decision, and if so how? The President obviously makes the decision to send troops abroad as Commander in Chief. But Congress's rising power in foreign policy has obligated the executive to consider Capitol Hill's opinions as well. This increasing congressional role begs the questions, should legislators be tied by their constituents' opinions, i.e. does the public really know what is good policy; and the second question, do representatives in Congress follow their constituents' opinions? A negative reply to either of these queries removes the public from the decision loop and implies a top down "public be damned" process. While this "elite" decision-making process may have had merit in the past, it apparently does not apply in today's world of mass communication and global awareness¹¹⁹.

1. Should Opinion Make Policy?

Alexis de Tocqueville, in his eloquent nineteenth century observations of the American democracy, foresaw a danger in foreign policy resulting from intense mood swings from private self-interest to passionate, even religious idyllic zeal. These swings, he asserted, may have been acceptable and even proper in domestic politics where the people had a firm grasp of the issues. But volatile mood swings had no place in foreign policy, where no mass expertise existed and the consequences of failure were much higher¹²⁰. Gabriel Almond expanded on de Tocqueville's worries in the 1940s and 1950s to develop what is now called mood theory.

Americans, according to Almond, have a low specific heat. They grow warm suddenly and cool off with equal rapidity. Americans also place an extreme premium on achievement. These factors combine to form volatile and shortsighted opinions on foreign policy. This is not due to a lack of enthusiasm. Almond described an America with tremendous elan, which could work wonders. But when elan failed, the mood would shift and foreign policy would suffer¹²¹. The Vietnam syndrome could certainly be described in this light. Since these characteristics would combine to make mass American opinion on foreign policy volatile and shortsighted, it would be best to place foreign policy in the hands of a competent elite, responsible to mass constit-

uencies, but better able to make stable and rational decisions¹²².

de Tocqueville's and Almond's fears of a volatile mass public had more merit in their times than in the present. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, was certainly correct when he eased the nation into World War II despite an isolationist public. His elite decision-making apparatus arguably survived his administration and flourished well into the 1960s¹²³. But modern studies (1970s on) have discredited mood theory¹²⁴. Today's public, it seems, is neither moody nor volatile. It is not uniformly uninterested or uninformed about foreign policy issues, although pockets of ignorance and apathy inevitably exist¹²⁵. It follows, then, that if a democracy's public opinion on foreign affairs is relatively interested, informed, and stable, the public should enjoy a say in its foreign policy. Evidence does seem to support the assertion that policy follows opinion, although the relationship is sometimes tenuous and always conditional.

2. Does Policy Follow Opinion?

It should not be surprising that as public awareness has increased, so too has the effect of public opinion on congressional and, ultimately executive policy. Studies in the 1960s and early 1970s indicated that constituents' attitudes had little impact on Congress¹²⁶. But these find-

ings have been updated in the 1980s by studies that suggest policy changes do indeed succeed opinion changes, and that foreign policy issues do have a strong impact on elections¹²⁷. But opinion's impact is not always direct, nor even consistent. Other factors affect the efficiency and purity of opinion's ascent to policy.

Success or failure in international policy, it has been argued, is a function of domestic political developments. Foreign policy strategy is aimed as much at home constituents as at friends and enemies abroad.¹²⁸ The public has taken an interest in foreign policy, and has often held its elected representatives responsible for policy failures. This has been especially true since the Vietnam war. Foreign policy has thus become, in effect, a domestic political issue, subject to many of the same constraints as traditional domestic politics. For this reason, Congress's rise in foreign policy involvement since Vietnam has not been met with universal admiration. A strong case can be made that U.S. foreign policy has been trapped in the web of congressional politics, and so reflects the "distortions, limitations, and incoherence" of American domestic policy¹²⁹. To some degree, this effect is an inevitable consequence of America's representative form of government. Legislators must seek reelection to keep their jobs. This means that their actions will most often be geared toward pleasing (or at least not offending) their constituents' sensibilities.

Some inefficiencies should be expected, and even hoped for in many cases. The picture of a Congress or executive catering to every whim of public opinion is as fallacious as is that of an immune elite guiding U.S. policy over complex and treacherous shoals.

Policy-makers, including Congress, can in fact exercise considerable autonomy when the public is not decisively bent in one direction or the other. What this means for the executive-congressional relationship is that when Congress is faced with a policy choice between even a popular president and clear constituent interest, popular opinion will always win. But if no clear interest exists, Congress will follow either the President or its own leadership¹³⁰. Thomas Graham's study was able to quantify this observation with a scale ranging from less than fifty percent of public support to eighty-plus percent. At the lower support levels (<50%), opinion rarely influences decision-makers. Opinions' influence increases, though, until at eighty percent and above it dominates the entire political process and "sweeps all political opposition away."¹³¹ It appears, though, that these percentages must reflect not just the level of support for a policy, but also implicitly the level of interest. The vast majority of Americans who understood U.S. involvement in Nicaragua in 1983-1984, for example, opposed that involvement. But these people repre-

sented only a quarter of the population. This comparative ignorance gave the President and Congress considerable latitude, seemingly reinforcing "elite" theories of decision-making. But the situation soon changed. Public opposition became deeper and wider as information surfaced about U.S. and contra malfeasance.

Hedrick Smith applied a concept known as "widening the circle" to the Nicaraguan example¹³². The model describes a process in which the losing (dissenting) side widens the circle of "knowers" until a new power base is formed. In the Nicaraguan case, covert assistance to the contras eventually became overt due to leaks etc., and obnoxious acts were brought to the public's attention to garner support for lessening the U.S. involvement there. The audience was eventually drawn into the fight and ultimately determined the outcome¹³³.

Special interests also influence representation in foreign policy. Many of these groups command resources in organization, information, funding, and political connections that allow them to influence policy-makers in ways that often seem out of proportion to their actual representation. These lobbying efforts can take on dramatic proportions, such as dumping fifteen million postcards on the House leader's desk in a single day¹³⁴. Lobbying efforts can also consist of constant behind the scenes wrangling.

Perhaps the best known foreign policy interest is

the so-called Jewish lobby. Their power is amply illustrated by the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its ability to shape arms sales policy in the Middle East. It has been reported that when the Reagan administration wanted an arms package for the Saudis in 1986, Secretary of State George Shultz negotiated directly with AIPAC director Tome Dine to solicit congressional approval¹³⁵. Shultz knew Congress would never approve the sale without AIPAC support, so he went straight to the power source. Similarly, active lobbying by human rights and church groups in the early 1980s provided a cushion of support for congressmen dissenting from Reagan's Central American policies¹³⁶.

Certainly special interest lobbying, which has sometimes euphemistically been called ethnic pork, has impacted U.S. foreign policy, and intervention decisions in particular. But even powerful special interests can succumb to the public will. There are, after all, special interests on either side of a given issue. Somebody must lose. That somebody is generally the side that fails to convince Congress and/or the President that public opinion is on their side.¹³⁷

Thus far it has been argued that public opinion is stable, interested, and in the long term, informed enough to provide a base for foreign policy decisions. The underlying

tenet of this belief is the assumption that basic values and belief systems play a larger role in framing public attitudes than do the details of any particular case. What matters in the final analysis is the overall perception of the policy, i.e. its "rightness" or "wrongness" based upon the Sliding Factors that have been a continuous thread throughout this study. The argument has also been presented that policy can follow opinion, or more accurately, that strong opinion forces a change in a President's intervention policy, generally as a result of increased congressional interest. By returning briefly to the two case studies, it can be seen that Congress does work as the primary vehicle (albeit an inefficient one) for opinion's ascent to policy.

B. OPINION'S ASCENT TO POLICY -- CASE STUDIES

1. Nicaragua

The Nicaraguan case - even in the brief period considered - provides an example of congressional inaction, followed by an increasingly activist role as public ire became aroused. Congressional moves were afoot in the summer of 1983 to cut off Reagan's contra aid - especially in the House. But information and interest among the public and in Congress were lacking at these early stages. The tide began to turn, though, as even the administration's allies were alienated by being left out of the decision loop. Large-scale military exercises in August 1983, for example, caught Democrats and Republicans alike off guard¹³⁸.

But Reagan still had friends in the Senate and was able to maintain \$24 million in contra aid that fall, despite two separate House votes to eliminate it¹³⁹. The House would prevail, though, in 1984.

Two events came to light in 1984 that turned the tide and caused policy to be dictated to the Reagan administration. The first was the CIA's mining of Nicaraguan harbors. This incident outraged even staunch Republicans like Barry Goldwater, who gave CIA director William Casey a thorough public scolding over the incident¹⁴⁰. Less than a month after the mining became public, House leader Jim Wright led a more activist movement with his famous "Dear Commandante" letter to Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega. Wright said he and his cosigners opposed U.S. armed intervention and sought a reconciliation process. Needless to say, this act was looked upon with outrage by the more conservative congressional minority¹⁴¹.

The second incident was the so-called assassination manual - written for the contras by the CIA - that became public in the fall of 1984. The administration's \$28 million contra aid request had already been passed by the Senate and rejected by the House (as in the previous year) when details of the manual became public. This seems to have been the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back, though, and the request was cut in the conference commit-

tee¹⁴². In the end, Congress asserted itself by cutting off the purse strings for Reagan's policy. Even the previously described MIG scare would not convince Congress to support U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, either directly or in support of the contras.

2. Lebanon

The Lebanon case provides another example of initial congressional deference to the executive giving way to activism in the face of public unease. The executive-congressional battle over Lebanon was fought mostly within the framework of the War Powers Act of 1973 (WPA). This act was passed over President Richard Nixon's veto to give the Congress a stronger voice in when, where, and how U.S. troops would be committed overseas.¹⁴³ Briefly, the act should be invoked whenever U.S. troops face imminent hostilities. Three major requirements are enumerated. First, the President should consult with Congress prior to the intervention decision being taken. Second, the President should submit to Congress a report detailing the U.S. force commitment within forty-eight hours of that event. And third, this report starts a sixty day clock, after which U.S. troops must be withdrawn if Congress does not specifically authorize their continued commitment. Implementing the act has proven to be very problematic for reasons that will be discussed later. But first, it is interesting to examine the battle that went on over the act during the Lebanon

intervention.

President Reagan refused to cite the WPA in either the initial August or later September 1982 Marine deployments in Beirut. He did submit a report to Congress "consistent with" rather than "pursuant to" WPA. But he did not start the sixty day clock because there was "no intention or expectation that U.S. Armed Forces will become involved in hostilities."¹⁴⁴ And indeed, U.S. forces did not become involved in significant hostilities for a number of months. Relatively weak congressional calls for a larger role for itself were virtually ignored by the administration during this period.

The WPA debate was rekindled in August 1983 when Marines began dying in Beirut. Initial congressional calls for a WPA debate were resisted by the administration, which claimed only "sporadic" fighting. But congressional threats to cut off funds for the Marines within thirty days brought the administration to the table¹⁴⁵. A joint resolution was agreed upon in early October 1983 that technically invoked the WPA (although Reagan did not recognize this) and established, among other things, an eighteen month limit to U.S. involvement in Lebanon¹⁴⁶. This resolution, as well as continued support for administration policy, was aided to a large extent by the efforts of House speaker Tip O'Neill. It was also O'Neill who staunchly defended the Marines'

presence following the barracks bombing of 23 October 1983, although his support clearly started to wane as the cold winter set in on Washington, and on the administration's policies.

The tide began to turn against the administration following the barracks bombing. The public was growing weary of war in Lebanon, and congressional dissenters were gaining support. Congress adjourned on 18 November with legislation pending in each house that would limit the Marines' stay to two or three months at most. Even Speaker O'Neill said time was running out for the administration to prove its policies could work, although he was not yet prepared to reverse his own policy¹⁴⁷. That would come later.

By January the public and Congress had had enough of Lebanon. The administration managed to fend off attacks until early February, when the Democratic caucus passed a resolution calling for the "prompt and orderly withdrawal" of U.S. forces¹⁴⁸. Reagan said he would ignore this resolution, but in fact plans were already being made for the redeployment of Marines to offshore naval units.

3. A Slow Steady Climb

In each of the cases presented here, public dissatisfaction was eventually followed by increased congressional activism, which arguably led to changes in the President's intervention policies¹⁴⁹. Unfortunately, these cases also

demonstrate that affecting policy in any meaningful way through congressional action can take months or even years. This delay was what the WPA was supposed to fix, but it obviously did not. If Congress is the peoples' voice, should it take that long for the people to be heard? Certainly Congress can act as buffer between public whim and foreign policy, smoothing the transient crests and troughs while steering a course to maintain the overall current. But in both of these cases, Congress was slow to act, even with the luxury of overwhelming public dissatisfaction over the President's policy. How, then, can Congress heal itself and be a more timely player in intervention policy? The answer may still lie in the WPA, but changes must be made.

C. WAR POWERS AND CONGRESS - LIMITED CONSENSUS

The War Powers Act resulted from congressional moves to expand its foreign policy role following the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Suddenly the people cared about foreign policy and Congress, as the most direct representative of the people, sought to assert its role in that hitherto presidential realm. Americans were better informed and had a first-hand knowledge of the effects bad policy could produce. They therefore were willing to extend the U.S. system of checks and balances to the foreign policy arena¹⁵⁰. Unfortunately, while Congress was willing to take on this new role in principle, events have shown it to be woefully

deficient in affecting the intervention decision. Its structure and its psychology are not amenable to the decisiveness and risk-taking required to decide an issue as complicated and politically charged as intervention.

The 1970s saw Congress move more towards a horizontal structure than had previously been the case. Young members wanted more of a say in policy. The result was an overhaul of the committee and caucus systems that took much power from the patriarchal leadership. In short, there was a diffusion of power¹⁵¹. This diffusion was good in some respects. It allowed more and varied opinions and insights. It took power away from the few and placed it in the hands of the many, which is intuitively appealing for a democracy.

But decentralized or diffused power has had its drawbacks as well, especially where war powers are concerned. The new process has left nobody singularly accountable for congressional intervention decisions¹⁵². In effect, everybody is in charge, which really means nobody is in charge. Also, this situation provides few political incentives for sticking one's neck out, while acquiescence - or better yet, ineffectual dissension - usually carries neutral political effects, and may even be advantageous. This points to the real problem, which is that Congress does not wish to share in the intervention decision because it fears "the international consequences of compelling a [U.S.] withdrawal [and] the domestic consequences of [U.S. losses]."¹⁵³ This fear

was certainly borne out in Lebanon. No sooner had Congress sanctioned intervention for eighteen months than the Marine barracks in Beirut was bombed, killing 241 Marines. Congress was forced to share the blame for flawed policy (and even tactics), even though it had little or nothing to do with that policy's formulation and implementation. It did not take long for Congress to regroup and withdraw the carte blanc it had given the administration. But the mood on the Hill was that they had been duped into sharing the blame for failed policy, while there was little chance of receiving credit had the policy worked. It is interesting, though, that the congressional reaction was not one of retreat, but a resurgent activism to end U.S. intervention. Perhaps it had nothing to lose at that point.

The Nicaraguan experience was similar. Congress approved contra aid in 1983, only to be embarrassed by the mining and "assassination manual" incidents, after which it stood up to the administration. Was Congress reacting to and channeling public opinion? This study argues yes. Did Congress play a timely role? Certainly not. But these cases do not negate the possibility that Congress can play a positive and timely role in the intervention decision.

D. DEMOCRATIZING INTERVENTION

It has been stated here that Congress is the branch most in touch with public desires. It is most responsive to

currents in public opinion, especially the House with its two year election cycle¹⁵⁴. It would be a mockery of this nation's democratic principles, then, if Congress were denied a voice in the intervention decision. The founding fathers called for such a role in Article I of the Constitution, empowering the Congress to raise armies and declare war. Congressional involvement in the intervention decision legitimizes the act in the democratic process. It creates a bond between the people and their government that acknowledges intervention's potential costs and legitimizes its objectives. Harry Summers, in his treatise on the Vietnam War, goes so far as calling for a congressional declaration of war in significant interventions. Summers claims that a declaration is like a marriage certificate. It legitimizes the relationship (between government and people) and announces it to the world¹⁵⁵. The effects and the advantages of congressional participation go deeper than this, though.

Certainly a democratic basis for means and ends in intervention is preferable to the old model of elite policy-makers and a largely ignorant public. This basis would emerge through acknowledged debate within Congress and under the public eye¹⁵⁶. This, of course, should occur before the intervention decision is made. But the longer term benefit of congressional involvement is in its abilities as an overseer of policy. The inadequacies of Congress as a decision-making body were brought out previously.

Congress is well suited, though, to act as a reviewing body or as a board of directors. Congress could draw upon its considerable knowledge and expertise to examine policy in light of its "shareholders'" wishes¹⁵⁷. The appropriateness of this role has been acknowledged by prominent members of Congress, including Senator Les Aspin¹⁵⁸. Despite this acknowledgement, though, an institutionalized oversight system was not achieved in the 1980s. The culprit again seems to be a lacking, or at least a conditional willingness to accept shared responsibility for the possible consequences of intervention. In the beginning phases of the Lebanon intervention, for example, the Republican head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee claimed that "There is a willingness by Congress to share responsibility with the President in [the intervention]."¹⁵⁹ But when President Reagan refused to share that responsibility, Congress was unwilling or unable to press the issue until nine months later when dead Americans were being shipped home.

Senator Joseph Biden D-Del supported an amendment in June 1984 that would have restricted the use of U.S. troops in Central America, stating that the President should welcome the law as a basis for building popular and congressional support¹⁶⁰. Again, Reagan demurred and Congress did not assert its role until the fall, when direct U.S. military intervention was a very real possibility. In both of

these cases, Congress deferred to the executive branch on whether and how much intervention should take place until significant losses in U.S. personnel and/or prestige had already taken place. One could certainly expand the Nicaragua case to include the Iran/Contra affair and reach the same conclusion.

Congress simply has not exercised the policy oversight role carved out for it in the Constitution. The War Powers Act is the most notable attempt at asserting this power, but it too has been lacking. Authorities on the subject have delineated several changes that might make the WPA more salient to the intervention decision. Some of the more pertinent ones include:¹⁶¹

- Require congressional approval prior to intervention except in well defined emergencies.
- Strengthen the provision requiring the President to report "in every possible instance." The President has often deemed it "impossible" to report U.S. troop commitment in a timely manner.
- Form a standing consultative body within Congress to consult with the President prior to and during an intervention.

The first two suggestions require the President to formulate and articulate his objectives early in the intervention process, and allow for a timely review by Congress. All three suggestions force Congress to shoulder its share of responsibility for intervention. The standing consultative body would place somebody or some group in charge of congressional input to the intervention decision. These

people would be responsible for and, theoretically, conscientious in their efforts. These provisions would force the President to consult, and compel congress to share responsibility for intervention. They would also allow early and continuous congressional oversight and input into intervention policy. Such a policy should benefit from the thoughts of as wide an array of expertise - military and political - as possible. Congress has much to offer in the latter respect.

Caspar Weinberger, in his famous six tests for U.S. intervention, stated that "...there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress..." Unfortunately, there is no workable formal mechanism to achieve this noble goal. The time is past when foreign policy elites can commit the United States to foreign adventures with little regard to public opinion. Congress, with its fingers on the pulse of domestic political rhythms, is far better suited than the President to ascertain whether or not intervention is an acceptable alternative to the American people. Congress must become a full partner in the intervention decision-making process. This means sharing responsibility, which is politically risky. But if the decisions made are correct, Congress can also share in the credit.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. INTERVENTION AND DEMOCRACY

It has been asserted here that the United States has shown a varying propensity to intervene militarily, and that this varying propensity is a product of two primary decision-making processes. First, Core Factors are analyzed by decision-makers to make a rational analysis of whether, given the materials and conditions at hand, victory is attainable at a cost commensurate with the national interest.

The second process used by decision-makers, and the one of primary interest to this study, is where public support regarding the potential intervention is formed and acted upon. It has been argued that public opinion can be measured by examining three primary Sliding Factors: fear of escalation, global/regional reaction, and liberal values. If decision-makers can identify agents within the intervention that will act upon these factors, and predict accurately how the public will perceive these factors, leaders can then assess whether the intervention will be supported by the American people. Furthermore, U.S. leaders can take these factors into account as they formulate intervention policy to ensure initial and ongoing public support, if

intervention should prove necessary. It is certainly within the purview of military strategic planners to examine these factors and estimate their effects on public opinion. It seems the JCS gave planners their marching orders with the statement, quoted previously, that the U.S. has the means to fight in LIW, provided it has "the political will to act promptly and decisively and the national will to endure the conflict" (my emphasis). The military would do well to understand the relationships between the public will and intervention. All planning, after all, ultimately depends upon that will in our democracy.

It is not enough, though, to say that public opinion affects the initial intervention decision. Sustained public support is necessary to carry out an intervention policy to a successful conclusion. The Lebanon case provided an example where increasing public displeasure over intervention policy contributed to that policy's failure by forcing an American withdrawal, although it is certainly arguable that the policy was doomed from the start. The public just seemed to perceive that more quickly than did the administration.

Finally, the study has pointed out the role Congress plays as a conduit between public opinion and the President. The executive has the power to make intervention decisions. But Congress, as the most direct representative of the people, also has a responsibility to consult with and over-

see presidential policy. Even as Congress's foreign policy clout has increased over the past two decades, its role in the intervention decision has remained minimal. Congress's views have prevailed eventually, as in Lebanon and Nicaragua, but its role has hardly been timely.

Congress should assert its constitutional prerogative as the branch vested with war-making powers. The executive branch need not abdicated its role as policy-maker for Congress to reach its rightful place as the people's voice. Congress should act as a consultative body prior to and during military intervention, as well as an oversight body for guiding policy, although the President is still much more aptly suited for making policy in the first place. These mutually understood roles would ensure that presidential policy was in tune with the nation's feelings, and raise the prospects for its success by including the people - through their congressional agents - in the intervention decision. Nothing could be more important to the success of any policy decision in today's environment of heightened awareness brought on by the "CNN" generation of Americans.

One area that only implicitly comes out of this study is the role of domestic priorities in the intervention decision. Certainly events at home will affect the public's and Congress's affinity for intervention as a foreign policy. As America's economic, educational, and racial concerns

deepen and its citizens tend to look inward, it may well be that foreign policy will suffer. This study has concentrated upon how the factors of a particular intervention affect public opinion towards that policy. It would be useful to expand the research to examine how factors not relating to a particular event, but more "signs of the times" affect opinions towards an intervention.

B. BROADENING THE BASE - ADDITIONAL CASES

The two detailed cases presented here seem to support the study's hypotheses. Table 6.1 summarizes the effects of each Sliding Factor on the Nicaragua and Lebanon intervention policies.

TABLE 6.1

<u>Country</u>	<u>Fear of Escalation</u>	<u>World Reaction</u>	<u>Liberal Values</u>	<u>Intervene</u>
Nic.	Vietnam analogy Soviet supplied Cuban advisors	Yankee Imperialism Contadora process	Harbor mining Assass. manual	NO
Leb.	Soviet prox Syrian involv. Arab/Israeli war	MNF coop. Regional animosity	Worthy causes Untenable objectives	YES-NO

It would be useful, though, to apply the Sliding Factors model to other interventions and further scrutinize its validity. This final section is a cursory attempt at just that. Table 6.2 illustrates a "first look" attempt at classifying five policy decisions made by the United States

since the 1950s, as well as the Nicaragua and Lebanon cases presented previously.

TABLE 6.2

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Fear of Escalation</u>	<u>World Reaction</u>	<u>Liberal Values</u>	<u>Intervene</u>
N/A	Optimum interv.	T	T	T	Y
N/A	Opt. Non-Int.	A	A	A	N
9/83-11/84	NICARAGUA	A	A	A	N
8/82-2/84	LEBANON	A	A	T-A*	Y-N
7/58-10/58	LEBANON	A	T	T	Y
4/65-9/66	DOM. REP.	T	A	T	Y
8/68-10/68	CZECH.	A	A	T	N
1/87-8/88	P. GULF	T	T	T	Y
8/90-	IRAQ	A-T	T	T	Y

*indicates effects changed during intervention

Briefly, a "T" indicates that factor influenced public opinion Toward supporting an interventionist policy by the United States. Conversely, an "A" indicates that public opinion moved Away from supporting intervention as a policy option. The Lebanon case illustrated how a sliding factor could change during an intervention, eventually resulting in changed policy. In that case, American values became repulsed by the increasing costs of intervention, while at the same time the policy's objectives lost credibility. The

recent Desert Storm campaign had a similar result, except in fear of escalation. Prior to the military phase, many Americans were warning of thousands of U.S. casualties if the conflict escalated out of control, as some argued it would. This fear was not realized over the conflict's course, though, and fear of escalation lost much of its importance.

It is also interesting to note that one overriding concern can cancel the effects of all other factors. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, for instance, elicited strong value-oriented arguments and near universal condemnation. But a fear of war with the Soviets certainly pervaded and influenced the U.S. decision to limit its protests below the level of military action. It may be that in this case, the Core Factor analysis yielded an answer that intervention could not be successful at a cost commensurate with American national interests. As an aside, this case also illustrates the fact that global/regional reaction, if it is to affect U.S. opinion, must emanate from a credible source. The Warsaw pact nations, for instance, did not condemn the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But that probably had less impact on American feelings than did reactions from other countries, NATO members for instance.

It is also interesting to note the only case in which all three Sliding Factors influenced opinion towards sup-

porting intervention - the reflagging operation in the Persian Gulf. It should come as no surprise to the reader by now that this was also considered a successful operation.

That the public generally approved of the reflagging can be explained in light of the Sliding Factors presented. There was little fear of escalation, although the shooting of the Stark, the mining of the Roberts, and the Vincenne's downing of an Iranian Airbus all illustrated that the policy was not risk free. Also, the reflagging was widely supported in the international community, largely because much of that community needed the oil that U.S. ships were protecting. And finally, an appeal to "Freedom of navigation" and free commerce appealed to, or at least did not offend, the liberal value system. These factors certainly combined to influence public opinion towards supporting the intervention, or at least not actively opposing it as were the cases in Nicaragua and Lebanon.

Finally, these measures should be seen for what they are, highly subjective and difficult to quantify. While this study has been far from anecdotal, future research would benefit from more rigorous attempts at quantifying the relationships between the various factors presented here, and by validating these factors against a larger spectrum of cases.

There is convincing evidence, though, that public opinion plays a major part in the long term success of any

intervention policy. The Sliding Factors presented here should provide accurate gauges of whether an intervention will meet with popular approval and, more importantly, assist in the framing intervention policy to ensure that decision-makers include the all-important factor of public approval in their intervention policy. To do otherwise usurps the ideals of democracy and, more practically, dooms policy to failure.

APPENDIX A

NICARAGUA TIME LINE

- 9/19/83 President Reagan signs finding, requesting \$45 million to aid Contras and "[put] pressure on the Sandinistas and their Allies to cease [assistance] to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador."¹⁶² Congress ultimately rejects request.
- 9/25/83 U.S. forces invade Grenada, in part to evacuate U.S. citizens. Invasion is widely supported by U.S. public and congress. SecDef compares Nicaragua to Grenada¹⁶³. Nicaragua consequently guarantees U.S. citizens' safety.
- 1/10/84 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala approve "Contadora" peace plan.
- 1/5/84 CIA-controlled operatives begin mining several Nicaraguan harbors, eventually destroying or damaging nine ships and fishing vessels.¹⁶⁴ Mining becomes public in March and April 1984 setting off a furor in the Congress, including resignation of Senator Patrick Moynihan as vice-chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and a strong rebuke by Senator Barry Goldwater to CIA director William Casey¹⁶⁵.
- 1/12/84 Kissinger Commission report released. Espouses hard line towards Central American communism and largely backs President Reagan's policies.
- 3/13/84 Nicaragua seeks military and technical assistance from "the world" to stop U.S. intervention.¹⁶⁶
- 3/24/84 U.S. announces major exercises Grenadero I and Ocean Venture for April. To include "emergency deployment exercise" and building of "assault airstrips."¹⁶⁷
- 3/27/84 70 Nicaraguans sent to Bulgaria for flying/maintenance instruction on MIG-21.¹⁶⁸
- 4/9/84 Nicaragua goes to World Court, accuses U.S. of mining its ports and assisting Contras. U.S. says it will not accept court's jurisdiction on Central American matters for a two year period.

4/25/84 Two U.S. destroyers deployed to interdict arms from Nicaragua bound for El Salvador guerrillas.

5/9/84 Reagan in televised speech invokes communist threat and "genocidal" tendencies of Sandinistas in appeal to "roll back" communist subversion of Central America.¹⁶⁹

5/10/84 House defeats contra aid request. World Court orders a halt to "aggressive acts" by U.S. against Nicaragua.

6/3/84 Secretary of State George Schulz returns from surprise visit to Managua and reaffirms U.S. hard line position vis à vis Sandinistas.

6/7/84 Nicaraguan army cancels all leaves, charges that Washington is planning a "large scale assault."¹⁷⁰

6/26/84 Senate kills \$21 million contra aid bill by 88-1 margin.

8/10/84 Senator Patrick Moynihan warns Nicaragua not to import warplanes, saying it could turn a regional crisis into a global one.¹⁷¹

9/16/84 Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega announces Nicaragua will have their air base and pilot training completed by early 1985, are actively seeking MIGs.

9/21/84 Nicaragua announces it will sign Contadora treaty. U.S. sponsors new proposal, citing faults of current text.

10/3/84 Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega claims in U.N. speech that U.S. is planning an invasion for 15 Oct. U.S. calls claim "nonsense."

10/15/84 CIA manual for contras advocating political assassination, mob violence, and blackmail becomes public. Public and congressional reaction are immediate and strongly negative. Reagan calls it "much ado about nothing."

11/84 U.S. forces conducting seven separate land and naval exercises in Central American region. Exercises reportedly complemented by SR-71 flights and sonic booms over Nicaraguan airspace.

11/4/84 Nicaraguan elections. Sandinistas receive 67% of vote. U.S. calls elections a "sham." Major opposition boycotts vote.

11/6/84 U.S. elections. Reagan wins by a landslide. U.S. announces that Soviet vessel Bakuriani is ready to unload MIGs for Nicaraguan Air Force.

11/8/84 Nicaraguans deny MIGs inbound. Say U.S. is using it as a pretext for invasion.

11/9/84 U.S. confirms no MIGs aboard Bakuriani, but other sophisticated hardware, including helicopters are. Widespread support for military action if MIGs ever do appear. Nicaragua mobilizes population - calls for emergency session of U.N. Security Council.

11/13/84 Secretary of State Schulz denies invasion plans. Nicaragua continues defensive plans.

11/14/84 U.S. shifts policy - says military action could be justified if Nicaragua attacks neighbors or continues to support Salvadoran rebels.

11/20/84 U.S. cites Nicaraguan threat to Honduras. Hondurans downplay threat.

11/29/84 Secretary of Defense Weinberger denies U.S. plans for Nicaraguan intervention. Says that policy is designed to "obviate the need for military involvement." Outlines six tests for U.S. military intervention, specifically stating that Nicaragua does not meet the criteria established by these tests.

APPENDIX B

LEBANON TIME LINE¹⁷²

- 6/82 Israeli army invades Lebanon in response to Palestinian border incursions and ambassador's assassination in London.
- 8/21/82 French peacekeeping forces arrive as first contingent of MNF. U.S. and Italian forces will follow. PLO begins evacuation from Beirut.
- 8/25/82 800 U.S. Marines arrive at Beirut Harbor to cover PLO evacuation. Reagan assures Congress Marines will stay 30 days at most and avoid combat.¹⁷³
- 9/14/82 Lebanese President Bashir Gemayal assassinated, probably by a Syrian agent.¹⁷⁴
- 9/16/82 Massacres at Shatila and Sabra Palestinian refugee camps by Christian militia. "Horrorified" Reagan demands immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.¹⁷⁵
- 9/20/82 Reagan agrees to send Marines back to Beirut, along with French, Italians, and British.
- 12/12/82 U.S. Marines begin three week training program for a reported 75 Lebanese Army soldiers.
- 2/2/83 Marine Captain raises gun to stop Israel tanks in sixth incident so far with IDF.
- 3/16/83 Grenade attack on MNF patrol wounds five Marines and eight Italians.
- 4/18/83 17 Americans killed as bomb wrecks U.S. embassy in Beirut.
- 4/25/83 Secretary of State George Shultz embarks on Middle East peace mission. Returns May 12 with an agreement between Lebanon and Israel calling for simultaneous Israeli-Syrian withdrawal and normalized relations between Israel and Lebanon. Syria is not a party to pact, dooming it to failure.
- 8/29/83 First Marine casualties. Two killed and 14 wounded in sustained firefight involving helicopters and artillery.

- 9/3/83 Israelis pull out units from Shouf mountains to the Awwali. Protests that their retreat will create a vacuum.
- 9/8/83 U.S. warships fire to halt shelling of Marines from Shouf range. Intense factional fight for control of Shouf mountains beginning.
- 9/26/83 Cease-fire goes into effect, assuring greater say in Lebanon for Syrians, Muslims.
- 10/8/83 Reagan claims Syria has obtained new mobile SS-21 missiles from the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁶
- 10/12/83 Reagan signs bill authorizing Marines to stay in Lebanon 18 months, after War Powers battle with Congress.
- 10/23/83 Marine barracks at Beirut Airport bombed, killing 241 and wounding 70. French barracks bombed simultaneously.
- 10/25/83 U.S. forces invade Grenada, citing communist threat to region.
- 11/29/83 September cease-fire broken with shelling of Marine positions.
- 12/4/83 U.S. launches 28 aircraft to strike Syrian and Druze positions in Lebanon. Two aircraft lost, with one death and one airman captured. The Navy lieutenant would be released in January during a trip to Syria by presidential candidate Jesse Jackson.
- 12/27/83 Reagan accepts blame for barracks bombing. Long Commission report on the bombing is released the following day, blaming major Marine commanders. Two low-level commanders eventually receive reprimands.¹⁷⁷
- 1/84 Heavy fighting continues to involve Marines and naval units offshore.
- 2/7/84 Reagan announces Marine contingent will redeploy to ships offshore. Later claims U.S. is "not bugging out, we're just going to more defensible positions."¹⁷⁸

- 2/26/84 Marines complete redeployment, leaving just 100 men behind to guard U.S. embassy. New Jersey shells Druze and Syrian positions with 16 inch guns one hour after redeployment is complete.
- 3/30/84 President Reagan formally ends U.S. participation in the multi-national forces.

APPENDIX C

INTERVENTION CRITERIA

SecDef's Six Major Tests for Use of U.S. Combat Forces

- The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
- If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.
- If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that.
- The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed - their size, composition and disposition - must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our combat requirements.
- Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing close consultation.
- The commitment of U.S. Forces to combat should be a last resort.

Excerpt from a speech by the Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 29 Nov. 1984.

REFERENCES

1. LIW, for this study, is defined as the direct use of U.S. military forces in combat or in a combat role for, clearly limited objectives, and for a limited time. The importance of this definition will become more apparent as factors pertinent to this study surrounding LIW are discussed. Sources of and statements on LIW are well represented in Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict, Report of the Regional Working Group Submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, June 1988; George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1991; and Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the Congress and the President, January 1991.
2. Barry M. Blechman, Stephen S. Kaplan, et. al. Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1977).
3. Ibid., p. 23.
4. Philip D. Zelikow, "Force Without War: 1975-1982," The Journal of Strategic Studies 7 no. 1 (Mar 1984) pp. 29-54.
5. Herbert J. Tillema, Appeal to Force: American Intervention in the Era of Containment (New York: Crowell Company, 1973). Tillema's theory is presented in his chapter 1.
6. Bruce Russett takes this idea of constraints further with his recent work Controlling the Sword (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). Russett asserts that decision-makers "must put together specific policies from within some range of acceptable options which the majority is prepared to tolerate." p. 118.
7. Russett, Sword, p. 102.
8. Russell W. Neumann, The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) in Russett, p. 88. The trend has been a decreasing public awareness or interest in foreign policy immediately after Vietnam, with a steady climb since the mid 1970s. See American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987, ed. John E. Reilly, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1987.
9. Much of the foundation for modern public opinion study was laid by Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1950) and V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1961). Key traces public opinion from its formation through its effects on the American democracy. Almond is best known for mood theory, which will be discussed at greater length in chapter V.

10. Floyd H. Allport, "Towards a Science of Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, Jan 1937 was among the first to effectively articulate this distinction.

11. D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counter-Insurgency Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 39. This is one of five alternative approaches to foreign policy Shafer describes.

12. Soviet Naval Diplomacy, ed. Bradford Dismukes, James M. McConnell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) makes this point and also addresses the Soviet's response to U.S. forces.

13. Bush, Strategy, and Cheney, Annual Report.

14. See for example an interview with General H. Norman Schwarzkopf in "U.S. Commander Urges Caution on Attacking Iraq," New York Times, 2 November 1990, p. A6.

15. Zelikow's study suggests that U.S. intervention is more successful when it aids or supports a government's behavior than when the intervention is meant to coerce or change behavior.

16. i.e. able to provide what Shafer calls the three great oughts - security, good government, and progress. Shafer, p. 105.

17. See Richard J. Ellings, Embargoes and World Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985) for a good history of sanctions' success. Also E.W. Carter III, "Blockade," Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1990, pp. 42-47 makes a strong argument for blockade, provided there is no hurry for results. Finally, Kimberly A. Elliot "Evolution of U.S. Sanctions in the Third World," in Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World, ed. Peter J. Schraeder (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989) studies 58 cases of U.S. sanctions and concludes their usefulness, while significant in many cases, is declining due to the diffusion of global economic power.

18. The January 11 New York Times contains excerpts from congressional and administration leaders espousing the proper roles of sanctions and military force. The debate has been overcome by events, but the issue is hardly moot.

Future scenarios may require reliance upon sanctions, and indeed the sanctions against Iraq are still largely in place.

19. General Accounting Office, The Low-Intensity Threat is not necessarily a Low-Technology Threat, GAO/PEMD-90-13.

20. Derived from SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); IISS, The Military Balance 1989-1990 (London: Brassey's, 1990); and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1988, June 1989.

21. Bush, Strategy, and Cheney, Report.

22. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Military Net Assessment, 1990, pp. VI-18.

23. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, indexed edition, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard, Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) VIII:6, p. 603.

24. Empire may be a better word than allies in this case. But nevertheless the Spartan general Brasidas appealed to Athenian allies in Thrace and Chalcidice to defect, citing their lack of commonality of interest with Athens.

25. That this assessment led to faulty U.S. strategy is agreed upon. There is contention, however, on what the strategy should have been. See Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982) and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) for two views on whether the U.S. should have been fighting a conventional war or a counter-insurgency. It seems at least arguable that we fought a conventional war against an insurgency, and then switched to CI after the war had gone conventional.

26. Clausewitz, On War, I:1, p. 81.

27. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959). Brodie's concept of limited war argued that superpower conflicts were limited by the fear of escalation and limited tolerance for pain. This concept works in regional wars as well because limited interests and objectives limit this tolerance even further.

28. U.S. Policy and Low Intensity Conflict: Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian, William L. Scully (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981)

discusses aspects of and the need for popular support at some length.

29. Herman Kahn, On Escalation (New York: Praeger, 1965).

30. This point relates back to Brodie's limited tolerance for pain (or potential pain) discussed earlier, where spiraling escalation could lead to total annihilation.

31. Quoted in William Safire, "Forming Public Opinion," New York Times, December 10 1990, p. A17.

32. Sarkesian and Scully, 55.

33. American public opinion pioneer Gabriel Almond stated that "Americans would appear to be happiest when they can cloak an action motivated by self-interest with an aura of New Testament selflessness, when an action which is 'good business,' or 'good security' can be made to 'look good' too." This assertion recognized that American values are of utmost importance in appeals to the public for support. Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, with a forward by Frederick A. Praeger (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960) p. 60.

34. Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978) traces this ethic from ancient times to the modern day and describes the evolution of its symbiotic relationship with war.

35. Ibid., p. 116.

36. in Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) p. 98.

37. In Summers, On Strategy. See also Russell F. Weigley The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973) for an historical account of the American tendency towards technology and wars of annihilation.

38. Sarkesian and Scully, p. 8. For a current debate on whether the Vietnam Syndrome died with Desert Storm, see a Dov Z. Zakheim and Eric Alterman in New York Times, 4 March 1991.

39. Howard, p. 129.

40. Herbert J. Tillema's arguments, summarized in David W. Tarr, "The Employment of Force: Political Constraints and Limitations," in Sarkesian and Scully, p. 56. The Tarr

article is worthwhile as a summary of domestic constraints on intervention.

41. Edward N. Luttwak, The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1987) p. 50.

42. Ibid.

43. in Summers, p. 37.

44. Luttwak, p. 59.

45. Clausewitz, in Summers.

46. Numerous poll results cited in this study were gleaned from U.S. State Department internal memorandums. These memos were provided (and often prepared) by Mr. Al Richmond, Senior Public Operational Analyst, Opinion Analysis Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State. These citations will be shortened to "Reported by State Dept."

47. Primary sources for this historical review include Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End Press, 1988); James Cockcroft, Neighbors in Turmoil: Latin America (New York: Harper & Row, 1989); E. Bradford Burns, Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History, 3rd Ed. (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1982); John A. Booth and Thomas A. Walker, Understanding Central America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

48. Cockcroft, Neighbors, p. 176.

49. Burns, Latin America, p. 279.

50. Cockcroft, Neighbors, p. 180.

51. Sklar, Washington's War, p. 36.

52. Robert Jervis describes the concept of "Security Dilemma," wherein defensive steps taken in response to a neighbor's arming are perceived by that neighbor as offensive, and the cycle spirals from there. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2 (Jan 1978) pp. 167-214.

53. Appendix A summarizes the key events of these years and identifies many of the sources of friction between the United States and Nicaragua. Major sources for these events include Sklar, Washington's War; Cockcroft, Neighbors; Cynthia Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, and Central America, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989);

Washington Post; New York Times; and Baltimore Sun.

54. Washington Post, 30 March 1984, p. 1.

55. Washington Times, 10 April 1984, p. 2.

56. Washington Times, 2 Sept. 1984, p. 1.

57. The pundit was Jack Anderson in Washington Post, 16 Nov. 1984, p. C11.

58. See for example excerpts of Reagan's 9 May speech in New York Times, 10 May 1984, p. 1.

59. Baltimore Sun, 7 June 1984, p. 5; and 9 Nov. 1984, p. 1.

60. Business Week, 15 Oct. 1984, p. 65.

61. Washington Post, 13 May 1984, p. 32 and Baltimore Sun, 17 May 1984, p. 1.

62. Washington Post, 6 Nov. 1984, p. 1.

63. Derived from articles contained in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS Daily Report - Western Europe, throughout 1984.

64. "Volksstimme Condemns Alleged CIA Manual," in English, Vienna Volksstimme, 17 Oct 1984. In FBIS - Western Europe VII (19 Oct 1984) p. E3.

65. A succinct example of this thinking can be found in "Washington Seen Interfering With Nicaraguan Affairs," in German, Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 June 1984, p. 3. In FBIS - Western Europe VII (6 June 1984) p. J8.

66. Quoted in "Comment on Nicaraguan Elections Issue," in French, Paris Diplomatic Information Service, 8 Nov. 1984. FBIS - Western Europe VII (9 Nov. 1984) p. k2.

67. "Le Monde Urges U.S. Respect," in French, Paris Le Monde, 6 Nov 1984. In FBIS - Western Europe VII (9 Nov 1984) p. k3.

68. Washington Post, 19 July 1984, p. 17.

69. Washington Post, 21 Aug. 1984, p. 12.

70. New York Times, 8 April 1984, p. 1.

71. Baltimore Sun, 9 Nov. 1984, p. 1.

72. Interview in U.S. News and World Report, 25 April 1984, p. 27.

73. For example, in Philadelphia Inquirer, 20 Oct. 1984, p. 1D.

74. Again, Sklar, Washington's War, details accusations and evidence of contra malfeasance.

75. ABC/Washington Post in 1983, reported by State Dept.

76. A CBS/New York Times poll in February 1984 showed that 45% of Americans felt sending the Marines was "a good idea at the time, but it didn't work." Reported by State Dept.

77. Primary sources for Lebanese history and the United States' involvement there were Tabitha Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987); Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); and Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989).

78. Cobban, p. 15.

79. For a military analysis of U.S. involvement see Roger J. Spiller, Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon, Leavenworth Papers Series (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981).

80. Cobban, p. 89.

81. The numbers were 42% approve, 34% disapprove, and 24% undecided. The Gallup Poll 1949-1958.

82. Petran in particular argues the importance of economic factors in the civil war.

83. Petran, p. 207.

84. Cobban, p. 131.

85. Cobban, p. 161 and Petran, p. 241.

86. Petran and Cobban provide a wide spectrum of reasons for the Israeli invasion and the subsequent violence caused to Lebanon and the Palestinians. These reasons vary from the extermination of the Palestinian people and Zionist expansionism (Petran), to the more pragmatic goals of eliminating the source of cross-border attacks and retaliation for past acts of terror (Cobban). Fortunately, this study does not

require the author's commitment to any particular justification, but needs only point out that widely divergent points of view on the invasion's legitimacy existed, and that reasonable arguments could be made for any of these views.

87. Cobban, p. 185.

88. New York Times, 26 Sept 1983, p. 18.

89. Washington Post, 12 May 1983, p. 1.

90. Washington Post, 14 May 1983, p. 1; and 17 May, p. 10.

91. Baltimore Sun, 27 Nov 1983, p. 1.

92. Washington Times, 12 Jan 1984, p. 5.

93. Washington Post, 21 Sept 1983, p. 1.

94. New York Times, 11 Sept 1983, p. 1.

95. The Gallup Poll 1983.

96. Hamzah Muhsin as-Saqqaf, "Riyadh Views U.S. Raids on Syrian Positions," in Arabic, Riyadh Domestic Service, 5 Dec 1983. Translation by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - Middle East/Africa V (6 Dec 1983) p. 23.

97. See for example "AR-RAY Comments on U.S. Embassy Bombing," in Arabic, Amman Domestic Service, 19 April 1983. In FBIS - Middle East/Africa V (19 Apr 1983) p. F1.

98. "Arab League Statement on Beirut Embassy," in English, Tunis TAP, 19 Apr 1983. In FBIS - Middle East/Africa V (20 Apr 1983) p. A1.

99. Accounts of Israeli involvement in the massacres vary from actual participation to criminal neglect on the IDF's part. There is virtually no dissent - even within Israel - that the IDF could and should have stopped the massacres once they had begun. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon ultimately paid for this mistake with his forced resignation. See Petran for an extremely critical view of the Israeli role. The popular press of the time presented the more mainstream interpretation of events. This interpretation is well represented in Friedman's work.

100. Washington Post, 3 Feb 1983, p. 1.

101. For an official Marine reaction, see Washington Post, 21 Mar 1983, p. 2.

102. Index to International Public Opinion 1983-1984.
103. "Paper Views MNF Role in Conflict," in Swedish, Stockholm Svenska Dagbladet, 25 Oct 83. In FBIS - Western Europe VII (1 November 1983) p. P4.
104. New York Times, 11 Sept 1983, p. 1; and Baltimore Sun, 23 Dec 1983, p. 2.
105. "Government to Withhold Aid to Peacekeeping Force," in English, Tokyo Kyodo. In FBIS East Asia/Pacific IV (6 December 1983) p. C1.
106. "Reagan's Measures on Lebanon, Grenada Examined," in Korean, Seoul Kyonghyan Sinmun, 28 Oct 1983. In FBIS East Asia/Pacific IV (31 October 1983) p. K1.
107. ABC/Washington Post in Public Opinion, (April/May 1984).
108. President Reagan in New York News, 21 Aug 1982, p. 1.
109. Index to International Public Opinion 1983-1984.
110. Washington Post, 21 Sept 1982, p. 1. It is difficult to reconcile this with Reagan's later statement: "I don't believe we were prepared for, or believed there would be an outright civil war." New York Times, 11 Sept 1983, p. 1.
111. Baltimore Sun, 15 Oct 1983, p. 1.
112. Washington Post, 13 Dec 1983, p. 1.
113. Index to International Public Opinion 1983-1984. The poll queried about each objective individually, including ridding Lebanon of foreign forces, strengthening the government, strengthening the military so it could support the government, and other lesser goals.
114. Index to International Public Opinion 1983-1984.
115. Unless otherwise specified, reference to public attitudes, opinion, awareness etc. are towards foreign and not domestic affairs. Likewise, references to policy imply foreign policy.
116. Bruce M. Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) p. 108.
117. The President's bureaucracy, especially his national security apparatus, certainly can affect the efficiency with

which public and congressional sentiment is translated into policy. But Post-WWII history indicates that foreign policy is generally a product of the President's own personality, largely independent of the bureaucracy or the process through which policy options ascend. For an in-depth examination of the President, Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Council see Decisions of the Highest Order, ed. Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1988). For a critical analysis of presidential delegation of power to his bureaucracy see Carnes Lord, The President and the Management of National Security (New York: The Free Press, 1988) or John Tower, The Tower Commission Report: Full Text of the President's Special Review Board, with an introduction by R. W. Apple, Jr. (New York: Times Books, 1987).

118. The President can and does seek to influence public opinion. Ronald Reagan earned his title "The Great Communicator" for this talent. But it has been effectively argued that both presidential and media influences are short-lived, invoking emotions similar to those present for the "rally 'round the flag" effect. Opinion on more important and long-term issues is much more stable and is based upon factors that are relatively immune to these top-town influences. See Russett, pp. 26-52 and 87-119.

119. See for example Thomas W. Graham, The Politics of Failure: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control, Public Opinion, and Domestic Politics in the United States - 1945-1980, Doctoral Dissertation for Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1989. Graham replaces the traditional elite/mass relationship with a "Two World" theory wherein a stable and informed mass opinion has the ultimate effect on policy, while elite opinion is only important because it is often mistaken by decision-makers for mass opinion, and thus may affect short-term policy.

120. in Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1950) p. 32.

121. Ibid., pp. 36-43.

122. Ibid., p. 233.

123. For an insightful and entertaining history of Washington's foreign policy elite in the 1940s-1960s see Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).

124. Again, Graham's work provides a well documented rejection of the Almond model.

125. Ibid., p. 23. See also Russett, Sword, pp. 92-95 for corroborating evidence, although Russett himself relies heavily on Graham's work.

126. Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," in Elections and the Political Order, ed. Angus Campbell, et. al. (New York: Wiley, 1966); and Christopher Achen, "Measuring Representation," Public Opinion Quarterly 42 pp. 455-510. Both studies cited in Russett, Sword, pp. 97-98.

127. Steven Hess and Michael Nelson, "Foreign Policy: Dominance and Decisiveness," in The Election of 1984, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984); John H. Aldridge, John L. Sullivan, Eugene Borgidan, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?'" American Political Science Review 83 no. 1 (March 1989) pp. 123-142. For a more Congress-oriented study see Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," The American Political Science Review 77 no. 1 (March 1983) pp. 175-190.

128. Russett, Sword, p. 7.

129. Daniel Henningen, "Bipartisan Incoherence: Foreign Policy Goes Domestic," National Interest 14 (Winter 1988-1989) pp. 22-28.

130. Douglas Rivers and Nancy Rose, "Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress," American Journal of Political Science 29 no. 2 (May 1985) p. 187.

131. Graham, p. 3.

132. "Widening" is a concept by E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1961), cited in Hedrick Smith, The Power Game (New York: Random House, 1988) p. 82.

133. Smith, p. 82. It is important to point out that increasing information is not the same as education. Widening the circle of "knowers" will not necessarily increase the number of "believers." President Reagan sought to "educate" the public beginning in 1983 on the Soviet threat, believing that it would result in greater support for his defense buildup. At least one study based upon this effort concluded that knowledge levels do not predict specific opinion or general orientations toward foreign policy issues. Knowledge only selectively reinforces preexisting belief sys-

tems, and can actually lead to greater polarization. See Llewellyn D. Howell, "Public Opinion On Reagan's Foreign Policy: The Impact of Knowledge," The Washington Essays 13 (Jan 1985) pp. 28-36.

134. Smith, p. 237.

135. Smith, pp. 216-231 presents a mostly anecdotal case study of AIPAC in the early and mid 1980s.

136. Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, The Reagan Administration, and Central America (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989) p. 22.

137. Smith devotes an entire chapter to special interests' growing tendency to seek mass support rather than directly lobbying policy-makers. pp. 216-272. Also, continuing with the Jewish example, Israel bitterly opposed the U.S. pullout from Lebanon in 1984. But its lobbying efforts paled in comparison to rising public sentiment supporting withdrawal in the United States.

138. "Congress Irresolute on Central American Plans," Congressional Quarterly 41 no. 31 (6 Aug 1983) pp. 1596-97.

139. "Congress Approves Measures to Aid Nicaraguan Rebels," Congressional Quarterly 41 no. 46 (19 Nov 1983) p. 2411.

140. "Administration Moves to Placate, Pressure Hill," Congressional Quarterly 42 no. 17 (28 Apr 1984) p. 957.

141. "Foreign Assistance Measures; Bipartisanship Proves Elusive," Congressional Quarterly 42 no. 18 (5 May 1984) p. 1011.

142. Rep. Patrick Leahy D-VT asserted [Hill] outrage over the manual "certainly has made it impossible" for contra aid to pass. "CIA Role in Nicaraguan Manual Getting Scrutiny on Capitol Hill," Congressional Quarterly 42 no. 44 (3 Nov 1984) pp. 2874-75.

143. The War Powers Act has been written about extensively. Barry M. Blechman's The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) devotes a chapter to the act's shortcomings, many of which will be discussed later in this study.

144. "Report on Marines Skirts War Powers Issue," Congressional Quarterly 40 no. 35 (28 Aug 1982) pp. 2157-58.

145. "Domestic Debate Follows Lebanese Violence," Congres-

sional Quarterly 41 no. 36 (10 Sept 1983) p. 1912.

146."Reagan Letter on Resolution," Congressional Quarterly 41 no. 39 (1 Oct 1983) p. 2044; and "Joint Resolution to Keep Marines in Lebanon," 41 no. 40 (8 Oct 1983) pp. 2102-3.

147."Escalating Lebanese Warfare, Slowed Diplomatic Progress Rekindle War Powers Debate," Congressional Quarterly 41 no. 50 (17 Dec 1983) pp. 2671-72.

148."Democrats Step Up Pressure For Beirut Pullout," Congressional Quarterly 42 n. 5. (4 Feb 1984) pp. 227-8.

149.Polls taken before and during both cases indicate a general increase in interest across a broad background of dissatisfaction over potential or actual intervention. Poll data are listed within each case study.

150.Blechman, Politics, p 21.

151.Contemporary descriptions of this process and its effects can be found in A Question of Balance: The President, The Congress, and Foreign Policy, ed. Thomas E. Mann (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1990); and Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: New Procedures and Old Realities," in Toward A More Effective Defense: Report of the Defense Reorganization Project, ed. Barry M. Blechman and William J. Lynn (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985).

152.Jeffrey T. Bergner, "Organizing the Congress for National Strategy," Comparative Strategy 6 no. 3, pp. 281-304. See also Alvin P. Drischler, "Foreign Policy Making on the Hill," Washington Quarterly 8 no. 3 (Summer 1985) pp. 165-175.

153.Blechman, Politics, p. 7.

154.Blechman, Politics, p. 218. This opinion is espoused by conservatives as well, including Alexander Haig, who stated "I think the legislature is the best manifestation of popular support [for U.S. military action]." in Blechman, Politics, p. 189.

155.Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of The Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982) p. 17.

156.Morton H. Halperin and Gary M. Stern, "Lawful Wars," Foreign Policy 72 (Fall 1988) p. 173.

157.This is a fairly widespread belief. Others advocating a

"review" role for Congress include Blechman, in Policy, especially pp. 189-218; Drischler; and Alice M. Rivdin, "Systematic Analysis of Defense Issues: The Role of Congress," Naval War College Review 41 no. 4 (Autumn 1988) pp. 6-14.

158. Art, in Blechman/Lynn, p. 151.

159. Sen. Charles Percy Rep-IL in "Percy Insists on Approval by Congress for Decision to Expand Role in Lebanon," Congressional Quarterly 40 no. 49 (4 Dec 1982) p. 2979.

160. "Vote Belies Eroding Support on Nicaragua Issue," Congressional Quarterly 42 no. 25 (23 June 1984) p. 1485. The amendment was offered by Sen. Ted Kennedy, and would have banned the use of American troops in most instances.

161. Distilled from Blechman, Politics, p. 197; and Halperin and Stern.

162. Sklar, Washington's War, p. 150.

163. Baltimore Sun, 7 Nov. 1983, p. 1.

164. Sklar, Washington's War, p. 165.

165. Cynthia J. Arneson, Crossroads: Congress, The Reagan Administration, and Central America, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989) pp. 160-161.

166. Washington Post, 14 March 1984, p. 20.

167. Washington Post, 24 March 1984, p. 1.

168. Washington Times, 27 March 1984, p. 5.

169. Sklar, Washington's War, pp. 173-174.

170. Baltimore Sun, 7 June 1984, p. 5.

171. Washington Times, 10 Aug. 1984, p. 1.

172. This time line draws most heavily on Benis M. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982-1984 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division - Headquarters, USMC, 1987). Other sources include the Petran and Cobban works previously cited, as well as the Washington Post, New York Times, and Baltimore Sun.

173. Washington Post, 26 Aug 1982, p. 1.

174. Friedman, p. 191.

175. New York Times, 19 Sept 1982, p. 1.

176. Washington Post, 9 Oct 1983, p. 1.

177. Frank contains Marine Commandant P. X. Kelly's statement to Congress on the bombing, as well as major portions of the Long report.

178. Washington Post, 23 Feb, 1984, p. 1.

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