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New Directions in US Military Strategy

JAMES P. McCARTHY

The past two years have witnessed extraordinary flux in the international security environment. We have transitioned rapidly from an intense superpower rivalry marked by bloc-to-bloc confrontation to a constructive partnership between former adversaries in search of enduring peace and stability. The United States has responded to this dramatic turn of events by crafting a new national defense strategy to cope with evolving challenges to our nation's vital interests for the remainder of this decade. The product of this endeavor constitutes the first fundamental change in American strategy since the flexible response doctrine was enunciated in the early 1960s.

In October 1991 I joined military leaders from 37 other nations at the second Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar sponsored by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). For nearly a week, we engaged in straightforward discussions about our respective military policies, force structures, and training activities in a concerted effort to reduce tensions and enhance stability in Europe. My purpose was to present America's new strategic vision, the concepts that underlie it, and its particular application to Europe. This article encapsulates the views thus presented.

During the initial Doctrine Seminar in January 1990, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, spoke of an unbounded American faith in democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law; of the unique role of the American military in protecting and defending the Constitution, the rights it guarantees, and the institutions it establishes; and of how we respond to the will of the people as expressed through their elected political leaders in Congress and the White House.¹

Those lofty ideals still hold true today. Our armed forces continue to serve as the nation's sentinels. They encompass Americans from every walk of life and are imbued with a firm commitment to democracy, freedom, and justice. As military professionals, we are dedicated to safeguarding our nation's vital interests in a complex, still-dangerous world. That dedication

includes the willingness to give the last full measure of devotion, just as 148 brave young Americans did during the Persian Gulf War.

The American people recognize the significance of this ultimate sacrifice made by their citizen soldiers. Moreover, they acknowledge the vital contribution made by military professionals to our nation's victory in the long, bitter Cold War. However, they insist upon America's armed forces adapting to the sweeping transformation of the security environment as we embark upon a promising new era in international relations. We have responded to the will of the people with a revamped national defense strategy, prudent cuts in military force structure, and dramatic changes in our nuclear posture.

These initiatives will enable the United States to continue to play a key leadership role in promoting peace and stability on the changed global scene. In that role, President Bush has committed our nation to strive toward a New World Order based on democratic values, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. In conjunction with our friends, allies, and international security organizations, we will labor to create a more secure world in which political and economic freedom, democratic institutions, individual rights, and justice can flourish.² We dare do no less.

It is not America's intention, however, to become the world's gendarme. Rather, we will seek to mobilize the community of nations to address world security problems and to promote an environment conducive to the growth of democratic ideals and free-market economies. We anticipate working with friends, allies, and collective security organizations in future endeavors to encourage regional political stability and counter aggression.³

Emerging Realities for the United States

America's new defense strategy has been devised to support President Bush's vision of a New World Order in light of several emerging and enduring realities of the geopolitical environment. The most significant emergent factor is our new and encouraging, yet still-evolving relationship with the successor states of the Soviet Union. Regardless of the ultimate nature of the Soviet states, the bipolar superpower rivalry that formed the basis of our defense policy over the past 40 years has disappeared. The Soviet people have

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championed political and economic reforms that facilitated the liberation of Eastern Europe, unification of Germany, withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Europe, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and implementation of landmark accords on conventional and nuclear arms. Far-reaching changes in Soviet political, economic, military, and foreign policies since the failure of the August 1991 coup have marked a watershed in US-Soviet relations.

In late September, President Bush took this historic opportunity to move to a safer, more stable relationship with the Soviet Union. He directed that the United States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range theater nuclear weapons. Consequently, we will withdraw and destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and short-range nuclear ballistic missile warheads. However, we will preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe to ensure NATO's security. In recognition of monumental changes in the international military landscape, the United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and attack submarines as well as nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval aircraft.⁴

President Bush also implemented further stabilizing measures in America's strategic nuclear posture. He directed an immediate stand-down from alert of all US strategic bombers and those intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for deactivation under the START agreement. Elimination of the affected missiles will soon follow. The President also terminated development of the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM, the mobile portion of the Small ICBM program, and the replacement short-range attack missile carried by strategic bombers. Moreover, he proposed discussions with Soviet leaders on eliminating all ICBMs with multiple warheads.⁵

President Bush also endorsed greater efforts to curb the growing threat from nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation as well as immediate, concrete steps to permit limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes. Finally, he proposed that the United States and Soviet Union cooperate to ensure safe and secure command and control, handling, dismantling, and destruction of nuclear weapons.⁶

We are consulting with our allies on the implementation of these sweeping initiatives, which fit well into NATO's new strategy and force posture. We welcome comparable initiatives being undertaken by the Soviet successors and trust that ongoing discussions will result in actions that move us closer to a new world of peace, stability, and security.

Enduring Realities for a Global Power

America's new defense strategy recognizes that our security is inextricably linked to that of Europe. The transatlantic partnership is embodied in the Atlantic Alliance, which remains at the center of our security relations with all of Europe. This collective defense organization is indispensable to

security and stability on a rapidly transforming continent. NATO's recent emphasis on dialogue, cooperation, and collective defense has promoted a constructive partnership with Central and East European nations seeking democratic governments and free markets. Moreover, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to the formation of a Euro-Atlantic security community founded on CSCE, NATO, and the growing integration of Europe.

We remain concerned over potential political and economic instability in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The delicate evolution to democracy and a more integrated Europe is endangered by the resurgence of fear and hostility, competing territorial claims, extreme nationalism, ethnic rivalries, and historic antagonisms. The Yugoslavian civil war is but one manifestation of the centrifugal forces that threaten to disrupt the peaceful transformation of Europe. Continued US participation in a strong and reliable Atlantic Alliance will play a vital stabilizing role during this pivotal time of instability and uncertainty in Central and Eastern Europe.

The enduring interests of the United States and our allies dictate that we also remain engaged in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific, as well as the Western Hemisphere. Our new strategy will support America's continued efforts to enhance regional security and stability, promote democratic reforms, support economic progress, and fulfill our obligations to other nations in these vitally important regions.

Furthermore, that strategy anticipates we will collaborate with allies and coalition partners to resolve a variety of unexpected, fast-rising crises in the future. For many, the world remains a place of danger, turmoil, tyranny, and conflict. Continued global proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them threaten regional peace and security. In addition to Kuwait and Iraq, recent crises in Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Zaire, as well as natural disasters in Bangladesh and the Philippines, drive home the need for US military assistance and the difficulty of predicting when that assistance may be required.

A Revamped US Defense Strategy

The improved security environment in Europe has enabled us to move from a strategy based on containing communism and deterring global conflict to a more diverse, flexible strategy that responds to regional threats to peace and stability. Our new defense strategy is based upon four foundations to ensure we can respond to tomorrow's challenges as we streamline our military force structure today.⁷

- *Nuclear Deterrence.* The central concept that guides our military strategy remains deterring potential adversaries from using force against the United States, our friends, and allies. We will continue to field modern nuclear forces to convince potential adversaries that the cost of aggression will exceed

any possible gain. Modern strategic nuclear forces combined with a defensive system against limited strikes will provide a credible deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons. Advanced fighter bombers and air-delivered nuclear weapons will help underwrite NATO security in Europe.

- *Forward Presence.* We will maintain a meaningful, albeit smaller, presence of US military forces in key regions of the world. The diminished threat of global conflict makes it possible to scale back forward-based US troops, yet still demonstrate America's commitment to allies; contribute to regional stability; and provide an initial capability to respond to unfolding crises. In Europe, we plan to cut our forces by more than half, to approximately 150,000 troops by mid-decade.

- *Crisis Response.* We have refocused our strategy to deal with regional crises as the most likely threat to security and stability in the world. The potential crises we may face are many and varied, and could arise on short notice. We fully expect that the United States, our allies, and coalition partners will be called upon to deter regional aggressors, mediate regional economic and social strife, and promote the stability necessary for fragile democracies to flourish. Thus, American forces must be able to respond on short notice to a variety of crisis situations and conduct operations ranging from disaster relief to combat.

- *Reconstitution.* As we draw down our forces, we will pay close attention to the vital elements of military potential necessary to reconstitute large, competent forces in the event a global threat resurfaces. We will do the necessary planning and invest in the required assets to enable our nation to mobilize manpower, form and train units, and activate the industrial base on a broad scale. We will monitor the world situation for indications of a resurgent threat that would require the United States to begin rebuilding its global defenses.

Underlying Military Strategy Concepts

These four foundations are underwritten by a broad set of military strategy concepts designed to capitalize on our enduring military strengths while exploiting the weaknesses of those who might challenge our interests.

- *Readiness.* America's streamlined forces will maintain a high state of readiness to provide the capabilities required for deterrence and rapid response. They must be able to respond on short order, deploy to the flash point, and conduct effective operations upon arrival. Moreover, they must be capable of prosecuting complex military endeavors in conjunction with allied and friendly forces. Therefore, our armed forces must continue to engage in realistic training and rigorous exercises with our friends and allies to ensure they remain ready for action.

During the Persian Gulf Crisis, the US VIIth Corps deployed from Germany to Saudi Arabia to spearhead the coalition offensive that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Realistic training alongside Allied forces in Central

Europe prepared the corps for this crucial mission which entailed integrated combat operations with coalition forces.

- *Collective Security.* We expect to strengthen the world community's response to crises through multilateral operations under the auspices of international security organizations. Collective security arrangements coordinate common security interests; codify commitments, roles, and responsibilities; enhance combined doctrine and interoperability; and provide integrated command structures. We will rely on international security relationships to further mutual interests in a future marked by declining defense budgets and reduced forward presence.

As we saw in the Gulf War and Kurdish relief operations thereafter, the United States seldom responds to a crisis on its own. We consult with our allies and friends, then work together to prevent a crisis, manage it, or resolve it. In early January of 1990, NATO members agreed to dispatch Allied Command Europe's Mobile Force-Air to eastern Turkey to serve as a warning to Iraq against attacking an Alliance member. This historic first deployment of NATO's immediate response force proved effective in deterring Iraqi aggression against Turkey.

- *Arms Control.* Arms control agreements can bound uncertainty and reduce nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional arsenals. The United States engages in arms control not as an end in itself, but as a means to enhance national security. We seek to reduce military threats to our national interests, inject greater predictability into military relationships, and channel force postures in more stabilizing directions while we retain vital military capabilities for defense of our interests.

Over the past several years, we have worked with our allies and former adversaries to establish a series of treaties which provide the foundation of Europe's developing security architecture. These precedent-setting agreements include the 1986 Stockholm Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the 1990 Vienna Document on CSBMs. The CFE Treaty brings us closer to a stable balance of conventional military capabilities in Europe. Moreover, CFE follow-on negotiations seek to establish manpower limits and stabilizing measures to further constrain the capability of nations to regenerate combat power and jeopardize stability in Europe.

- *Security Assistance.* We will employ security assistance programs to enhance collective security, demonstrate US commitment, reinforce alliance cohesion, stabilize regions, strengthen developing democracies, and contribute to allied military professionalism. Investing in the security infrastructure of allied and friendly nations greatly enhances their ability to resist coercion or aggression while facilitating coalition assistance in the event of a crisis. In particular, the United States has extended military education and training

programs to officers from Europe's new democracies to further their professional development, while NATO has offered an Alliance familiarization course that addresses civilian oversight of defense matters.

The military strategy concepts described above are designed to promote conditions that help prevent crises and deter conflict. If it becomes necessary to invoke major military force to resolve a crisis, then the following military strategy concepts are especially applicable.

- *Maritime and Aerospace Superiority.* As a trading nation, the United States must maintain assured access to the airways, space, and sea-lanes. The economic health and well being of our country depends upon the free flow of goods and people between nations. During a crisis, the capability to establish and maintain control of the air, space, and seas en route to and within an affected region is vital to an effective response and sustained operations.

Given the criticality of Mediterranean sea-lanes, NATO acted to prevent Iraqi mining of key choke points during the Gulf Crisis. Forty Allied ships serving in four naval formations guarded the Mediterranean lines of communication in conjunction with more than 30 maritime patrol and airborne early warning aircraft. The integrated efforts of this combined air-sea task force assured the safety of the Mediterranean sea lanes and kept supplies and combat forces flowing to Southwest Asia.

- *Power Projection.* Our reduced forward presence makes it imperative that we have the capability for rapid movement of forces from the United States and forward bases to regional hot spots. The certain knowledge that we can reach out and affect a situation with military capability should deter would-be aggressors, assure friends and allies in volatile regions, and reinforce our contribution to collective security. If all else fails, then the capability to employ America's military power around the globe will help resolve a crisis in favor of US and coalition interests.

The rapid deployment of American Patriot missile units from Germany to Israel during the Desert Storm air campaign vividly demonstrated the importance of a robust power projection capability. From the time European Command received the tasking order from the Joint Staff, it took only 28 hours and 35 minutes to have the first Patriot firing battery in place and operational, defending innocent civilians from Iraqi SCUDs. That rapid response was crucial to the morale, not to mention the physical security, of our friends, and it assured continued coalition solidarity against Iraq.

- *Decisive Force and Strategic Agility.* Once America's leaders decide to respond to aggression with military power, we will assemble on short notice the necessary elements to apply the decisive force required to prevail in the shortest feasible time and with minimum loss of life. That capability rests on the strategic agility of forces based in the United States and overseas to deploy anywhere in the world in response to a crisis. We are

structuring our military forces abroad and in the United States to be more responsive while continuing to invest in the airlift and sealift required to deliver those forces in a timely manner to a crisis flash point.

The massive deployment of coalition forces to Southwest Asia and their victory over Iraq reflected the importance of possessing both strategic agility and overwhelming force when responding to crisis situations. America's success in this endeavor hinged upon the strong support from friends and allies in Europe who enhanced the movement of our forces bound for the Gulf in the largest US military deployment since World War II

- *Technological Superiority.* The United States will continue to focus on technology to offset quantitative advantages of potential adversaries; to reduce the risk to US and friendly forces; and to increase the potential for a prompt and successful termination of a crisis. In peacetime, advanced technology is a key element of deterrence. In war, it enhances combat effectiveness and reduces loss of life and equipment.

Our experience in the Gulf with stealth fighters, precision-guided munitions, M1A1 tanks, Patriot missiles, multiple launch rocket systems, and other advanced weapon systems demonstrated the efficacy of fielding forces with modern weapons and advanced support systems. The United States must remain on the leading edge of modern technology to fulfill security obligations to its citizens, to its friends and allies, and to the international community.

Principal Directions in US Defense Strategy

We will follow three key directions in implementing the concepts that make up our revised defense strategy. Those include contending with the continuing Soviet reality, adopting a regional orientation, and emphasizing flexibility.

The United States is pleased with the general direction being taken by the former Soviet Republics in political and economic liberalization, foreign policy, and military reform. However, we realize the transition to free, democratic societies may be a difficult one fraught with instability and violence. Thus, the United States will continue to maintain a strong defense posture with the capability to reconstitute America's global defenses if a major threat to our security resurfaces.

While the political and economic transformation of the former Soviet Union progresses peacefully, we will continue to adapt America's defense strategy and force posture to the improving security environment, much as President Bush did in his recent nuclear policy initiatives. Continued expansion of Soviet cooperation with the community of democratic nations, combined with the flexibility of our national defense strategy, will enable us to do much more, together, to resolve regional crises and promote peacetime engagement.

Our new defense strategy emphasizes the importance of democracy, regional stability, the capability of friends and allies to resist aggression or

coercion, and reducing the need to employ military force. We will seek to strengthen the bonds of friendship and alliances through activities that assist governmental and socioeconomic development. These activities extend beyond increasing indigenous military capabilities to assisting countries in building their national infrastructures. In concert with the needs and desires of host nations, our forces can help improve a country's capability to perform public functions and services in response to societal needs.

Moreover, we will engage other nations in peacetime activities of broader significance to the world community. Those endeavors include detecting and significantly reducing the production and trafficking of illegal drugs; deterring, monitoring, and neutralizing terrorist threats while protecting vulnerable targets; and conducting humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and disaster relief operations.

As one of the few nations in the world with the means to respond meaningfully to disasters, the United States will continue to help nations when they request assistance. Not only must our forces be prepared to provide humanitarian aid, but in cases such as the resettlement of Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq, they must be capable of employing force to assist and protect those in need.

Prepared for the Future

America's revamped defense strategy is designed to cope with sweeping change in a remarkably different but no less challenging world. The United States is responding with new approaches to security that seek to build constructive relationships with former adversaries, reinforce regional stability, and counter remaining threats through multilateral coalitions. Moreover, bold initiatives in the nuclear arena by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev promise a more peaceful, hopeful future for all mankind.

America is prepared for the challenges of the future. We will remain engaged in the world, as a friend, as a reliable ally, and as a leader in the pursuit of peace and stability within a New World Order.

NOTES

1. Speech by General Colin L. Powell to CSCE Military Doctrine Seminar, Vienna, Austria, January 1990.
2. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, August 1991), p. v.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
4. George Bush, "Unilateral U.S. Nuclear Arms Drawdown Seizes Historic Opportunity," *Defense Issues*, 27 September 1991, p. 2.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
7. George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991-1992* (Washington: Brassey's [US], 1991), pp. 98-127. A fifth foundational principle—"A Smaller and Restructured Force"—is, of course, self-evident.

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense and US Contingency Operations

MICHAEL W. ELLIS and JEFFREY RECORD

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"As is clear from the . . . crisis in Iraq, the growing sophistication of missile arsenals in countries that may be willing to risk attacking US forces can complicate decisions about whether and when to intervene in regional conflicts. The arsenals have already prompted concern about the safety of Western military installations and forces overseas."¹

—Janne E. Nolan
Brookings Institution

The coalition war against Iraq in early 1991 marked the first time that theater ballistic missiles were fired at US forces engaged in a contingency operation. The threat of theater ballistic missiles (we'll refer to them as TBMs) to US contingency operations is, however, almost certain to grow in the future.

During the 43-day war, Iraq fired a total of 86 Scud or modified Scud ballistic missiles at targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel. They had negligible military impact and, with one exception (the successful attack on a US military barracks near Dhahran), inflicted little damage and loss of life.

The ineffectiveness of the Iraqi Scuds during the war was attributable to at least four factors. First, the missiles themselves were relatively primitive. They were inaccurate, incapable of maneuvering in flight, lacked decoys, and carried small conventional (and, in desperation, even cement) warheads. Second, they were fired singly or in twos or threes rather than in barrage, which simplified available defenses against them. Third, the US Patriot PAC-2 anti-TBM proved capable of intercepting and destroying many Scuds. Fourth,

Saddam continued to “hit us where we (the Patriots) were.” He could have targeted locations, especially in Israel and Turkey, where no Patriots were deployed.

Iraq’s use of Scuds, though having no influence on the war’s outcome, initially endangered the political cohesion of the coalition by encouraging possible Israeli intervention in the conflict. The Scud threat also compelled diversion of a sizable number of coalition air sorties toward their detection and destruction; this diversion, coupled with some bad weather, delayed the launching of offensive ground operations by at least six days.² The United States and its allies were nonetheless lucky to be dealing with what technologically amounted to little more than souped-up versions of the old V-2 German rocket of World War II. Had the Iraqis possessed more advanced missiles, and had they mounted chemical or biological—to say nothing of atomic—warheads on them, coalition casualties and perhaps even the outcome of the war itself might have been different.

Indeed, the war against Iraq signals a turning point in the traditional technological milieu of US military operations in Third World regional contingencies. Given the experience with Iraqi Scuds as well as the continuing proliferation in the Third World of ballistic missile technologies (and munitions of mass destruction),³ future US contingency operations must be prepared to deal with the threat of ballistic missile attacks not only upon in-theater US military forces and installations as well as civilian population centers of countries hosting US forces, but also upon allies and US bases in allied countries outside the immediate war zone. This means that US power projection forces must be endowed with a capacity to deter such attacks, and should deterrence fail, to defeat them. As House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin recently observed of the Gulf War,

Saddam Hussein and his Scuds should teach us two lessons about theater defenses. First, we are increasingly likely to face adversaries who are not deterred by the possibility of terrible retaliation. Saddam wasn’t. He used his Scuds anyway. This is an important lesson. Second, although no Third World country can hit the United States with a missile today, short-range missiles abound. Theater defenses against these missiles are needed to protect our own forces and allies.⁴

The Threat

The Third World ballistic missile threat is pervasive and growing. The recent war and the terms of the US-imposed cease-fire will deprive Iraq of both TBMs and weapons of mass destruction for the foreseeable future. But at least 15 other Third World countries now have or are trying to acquire ballistic missile capability. Libya, Syria, India, North Korea, and Pakistan are also known to have, or to be pursuing, a nuclear weapons capability—as was Iraq before the recent Persian Gulf War.

Third World missiles already threaten such US allies as Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and South Korea, as well as US military installations in Turkey and southern Europe. Saddam Hussein *could* have fired Scuds at the US air base at Incirlik, Turkey; in April 1986, following punitive US air strikes against Libya, Gadhafi *did* launch two Scuds at a US facility on Lampedusa, an island off the coast of Italy.

For the time being, the TBM threat is limited largely to short-range, Scud-type missiles. A preview of capabilities to come, however, is already on the scene. For example, in addition to the Chinese 1600-mile-range CSS-2, India is testing the 1500-mile-range Agni missile, which has the range to hit Diego Garcia and targets deep in China. China is also reportedly marketing its 180-mile M-11 missile to Pakistan (complete with mobile launchers) and its 375-mile-range M-9 missile to Syria and possibly to Iran.⁵ Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Director Henry F. Cooper also estimates that by the year 2000, at least six countries in the Third World will have ballistic missiles with ranges of 1800 to 3300 miles.⁶

Especially important, these longer-range missiles may soon be armed with nuclear warheads. Recent UN inspections of Iraqi research facilities have shown conclusively that Iraq was pursuing both a biological and a nuclear weapon production capability. It is likely that Saddam Hussein is still bent on developing such weapons. India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, and North Korea are also suspected of having nuclear weapon development projects. US intelligence sources reportedly believe the Chinese are secretly building a nuclear reactor for Algeria capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons, and that China has supplied Pakistan the complete design of a tested nuclear weapon with a yield of about 25 kilotons.⁷

There does not, moreover, appear to be much hope for arms control solutions to proliferation. The weaponry and munitions of the Iraqi army on the eve of Operation Desert Storm stand as testimony to the ineffectiveness of national and international controls on the transfer of TBM and mass-destruction

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weapon technologies to Third World countries having the money and determination to acquire them. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) established in 1987 by the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Great Britain has retarded ballistic missile proliferation, but China and North Korea are not party to the MTCR. Indeed, the MTCR may have actually accelerated cooperation among governments seeking ballistic missile capability. For example, in the late 1980s, Iraq, Argentina, and Egypt were jointly developing the 480-mile Condor 2 missile. (The program subsequently fell apart because of the Persian Gulf War, Egypt's withdrawal for reasons of cost, and Argentina's abandonment of it under strong US pressure.)⁸

Diplomacy certainly has an important role to play in limiting and retarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. But the main deficiency of the MTCR is that it addresses only the "supply side" of the problem; it does nothing to reduce demand. Third World demand for TBMs stems from a variety of motives, including legitimate defense considerations and desire for national prestige. TBMs also offer a relatively cheap substitute for manned bomber forces and, given the proliferation of sophisticated air defenses, a higher probability of reaching their targets and causing at least some damage, even if the targets are defended by anti-TBM systems such as Patriot. Nor does the MTCR contain any enforcement mechanisms. There are no sanctions for violating the regime, and some US allies have been less than scrupulous in enforcing it. Senator John McCain has concluded that the "magnitude of [ballistic missile proliferation] compels us to be frank about the MTCR. It is . . . a nearly toothless agreement."⁹

Policy Dilemmas and Choices

The expanding TBM threat to future US interests, allies, and contingency operations poses major policy dilemmas for the United States. Until the war against Iraq the United States firmly abjured preventive military actions against hostile countries known to be seeking TBM, chemical, and nuclear capability. In late 1988 and early 1989, the Reagan and Bush Administrations even refrained from attacking the huge chemical munitions facility nearing completion near Rabta, Libya, despite the fanatical, overtly hostile, and unbalanced character of the Gadhafi regime.

However, during the war against Iraq, which was waged on behalf of Kuwait's liberation, the United States took advantage of hostilities to attack Iraq's chemical munitions facilities, nascent nuclear weapons capacity, and TBM production sites, even though few of those targets had a direct bearing on Iraq's ability to defend its occupation of Kuwait. In effect, the United States, under cover of a war fought ostensibly for other objectives, undertook a military action, like the 1981 Israeli strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, aimed at denying Iraq certain kinds of weapons in the future.

All of this raises the question of whether the United States (and other like-minded countries) should adopt a policy of preventive armed response to forestall the proliferation of TBMs and other dangerous military capabilities, at least among monster regimes and outlaw states. The United States has always rejected the doctrine of preventive war; at a minimum, strong domestic and international political criticism would attach itself to preventive military actions undertaken by the world's only remaining superpower against "helpless" Third World states. On the other hand, not until recently has the civilized world confronted the highly dangerous phenomenon of politically maniacal regimes armed with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles to deliver them.

An alternative to preventive action would be preemptive action: to await a military confrontation or crisis but to strike first in an attempt to disarm the enemy. This was, in effect, what the United States did in attacking Iraq on 17 January 1991. The main drawback of preemption is, of course, the likelihood that the enemy has already produced and fielded TBMs and weapons of mass destruction, as had Iraq. Denying an opponent an ability to acquire proscribed weapons is a militarily less exacting task than trying to eliminate weapons already deployed.

Preemptive strikes also risk higher levels of collateral damage than preventive ones, especially against enemies like Iraq which have no compunction about using their own civilian population to shield valuable military assets—although this dilemma may be lessened (as it was in Desert Storm) by the emergence of brilliant precision weapons. Strikes on already functioning nuclear reactors and chemical munition production facilities also entail risks of catastrophic collateral damage. Though both the Israeli attack on Osirak and Desert Storm strikes on other Iraqi nuclear facilities have demonstrated the possibility of taking out nascent nuclear weapon capabilities without unleashing radioactive debris in the environment, the possibility of a misdirected bomb (producing a Chernobyl) can never be discounted. In any event, preemption is likely to be only partially effective, even in the best of circumstances. If the enemy is alerted, or very cautious, he will normally disperse or conceal his assets so that the effectiveness of preemption is reduced.

Another, if more traditional, policy option would be deterrence based on the threat of retaliation. The problem here is: retaliation with what? The moral and political onus attached to a US use of either nuclear or chemical weapons against even the most despicable Third World state probably precludes them ever being used even in retaliation for a strike in kind against US military forces; during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm the United States made it clear that, come what may, it would not resort to chemical or nuclear weapons. Moreover, assuming the continuing obedience of US military doctrine to the principled avoidance of inflicting unnecessary damage on enemy civilian populations, and given the revolution now unfolding in the delivery

of brilliant conventional munitions, it is far from clear that chemical or nuclear retaliation would afford any practical military advantages over conventional responses, and certainly none that would outweigh the countervailing political negatives of their use.

There is, too, the fact that successful deterrence is predicated upon an assumption of prudent rationality on the part of the object of deterrence. Unfortunately, this assumption cannot be taken for granted with respect to the likes of a Moammar Gadhafi, Ayatollah Khomeini, Idi Amin, Pol Pot, Kim Il Sung, or Saddam Hussein. In the case of Iraq, US threats (implicit and explicit) to expand its war aims—e.g. to take Baghdad or try Saddam as a war criminal—may have deterred him from using his chemical TBM warheads.¹⁰ But there is no guarantee that this type of escalatory threat will deter a similar aggressor in the future.

Nevertheless, it is probably safe to conclude that deterrence of even crazy Third World regimes was significantly reinforced by the stunning display of US military power against Iraq. Most TBM-seeking countries are, like pre-Desert Storm Iraq, relatively well developed. They have large and valued—and vulnerable—economic infrastructures, while lacking any effective capacity to defend them against the kind of massive, sophisticated air campaign visited on Iraq by Desert Storm. The threat of such an air assault will be implicit in any future US confrontation with a relatively developed Third World state. This threat may not deter war or the use of conventionally armed missiles. However, it might be possible to use the threat of a less restrained air campaign, or attacks specifically directed against the aggressor's leadership, to deter employment of TBM-delivered munitions of mass destruction. As a note of caution, however, another air campaign of Desert Storm's magnitude would, of course, require weeks if not months of preparations, as well as access to a robust network of in-theater air bases, which might not be available. Moreover, the example of Desert Storm provides no foolproof deterrence; future US adversaries in the Third World are drawing their own lessons from the recent war against Iraq, and the advantages the United States enjoyed in Desert Storm—such as several months for deployment uninterrupted by enemy action—may not be available in other contingencies.

In sum, policies of prevention, preemption, or deterrence offer no firm protection against the emerging TBM threat to US military forces engaged in contingency operations in the Third World. Neither Iran nor Iraq was deterred from launching as many as 870 TBMs against each other during their eight-year war; nor did a war against virtually the entire rest of the world deter Saddam Hussein from shooting as many Scuds as he could against Saudi Arabia and Israel. A policy of crisis preemption against already-deployed TBMs provides no guarantee of their complete eradication—witness initial US underestimation of the number of mobile Iraqi Scud launchers and the subsequent difficulties

encountered in locating and destroying them. Nor could an avowed and implemented policy of prevention, even assuming its domestic and international political acceptability, provide foolproof guarantees; repeated heavy British aerial bombardment of Peenemünde during World War II disrupted, but did not forestall, German development, production, and use of thousands of deadly V-1 and V-2 missiles. Moreover, preventive military action is not a one-time enterprise; the Israeli strike on Osirak set back, but did not forever eliminate, Iraq's progress toward developing a nuclear weapon capability; Iraq's nuclear facilities had to be revisited by US air power ten years later, and it is still not certain that coalition forces and the UN inspection teams were successful in destroying all of Iraq's nuclear materials.

Indeed, one lesson that Saddam and other Third World dictators will probably draw from Desert Storm is the importance of having nuclear weapons. A second lesson that Third World planners will likely draw from the Gulf War is that ballistic missiles are indispensable components of their military forces. While Saddam's TBMs had little direct military impact on the campaign (in part because they were employed with so little skill), they achieved a significant political impact, nearly bringing Israel into the war—an event which would have had dire consequences for the solidarity of the coalition. As a result, the great Scud hunt became a military obsession for the coalition, diverting an enormous number of allied air sorties from other missions. And, despite this unprecedented air and ground effort, as well as total coalition air supremacy, Saddam's mobile Scuds proved highly survivable (unlike his air force).

The TBM Defense Challenge

There will be no substitute for providing US military forces direct, active protection from TBM attacks. But ballistic missile defenses in contingency operations will have to defend more than the forces themselves. Four categories of assets will have to be protected: (1) US (and allied) military forces; (2) the in-theater installations that permit them to operate (e.g. ports, air bases, encampments, ammunition and POL dumps); (3) host-country civilian population centers and critical economic assets; and (4) extra-theater allies, coalition partners, and third countries where the United States has bases.

Third World host countries willing to permit their territory to be used by US military forces for either deterrence or warfighting invite hostile retaliation against their own populations, and if a reasonable measure of protection cannot be guaranteed, an invitation to intervene or permission for base access might not be forthcoming. Apparent Saudi lack of confidence in US resolve and ability to shield Saudi Arabia from Iraqi ground and air (including ballistic missile) attack contributed to an initial, four-day hesitation in Riyadh to request US intervention following the fall of Kuwait. In the event, Saddam Hussein did not invade Saudi Arabia, and though he launched

Scuds against the kingdom after the beginning of the coalition's air offensive, their potential military and political impact was severely restricted by inaccuracy and negated by the seemingly magical (at least in Saudi eyes) performance of the Patriot PAC-2.

But what if Iraq had fired chemically armed Scuds at Saudi airports and seaports at the beginning of the US deployment to the Gulf? This would not only have delayed and disrupted our deployment, but would have also shaken Saudi resolve at a time when Operation Desert Shield was still politically as well as militarily vulnerable. Moreover, what if Saddam Hussein (or one of his allies, like Gadhafi) had had missiles capable of reaching Naples? Would that have affected Italy's willingness to join coalition forces in Saudi Arabia and to allow the US Sixth Fleet to operate from its naval bases in Italy? Or what if Saddam had fired Scuds at Turkish as well as Saudi Arabian and Israeli cities? Turkish President Turgut Ozal's decision to support the coalition and to permit Turkish bases to be used by US F-111 bombers was strongly opposed by his foreign and defense ministers—both resigned. Iraqi Scud attacks could have threatened Ozal's political survival.

The specific TBM defense capabilities needed for US contingency operations will differ, depending on scenario-specific political and military conditions, including the particular character of the TBM threat and the number and types of assets which must be defended. Point defenses which are effective against small numbers of unsophisticated Scuds will not suffice against a larger and more robust attack by more modern TBMs. Moreover, nuclear- and chemical-armed TBMs will require different interception profiles than conventional-warhead TBMs in order to minimize chances of unwanted collateral damage resulting even from successful intercepts.

Additionally, levels of acceptable protection will likely differ according to the relative value of assets being threatened and the type of TBM munitions threat. Against conventional or chemical ballistic missile attacks, relatively higher leakage rates would probably be acceptable for most military assets (ships in port being a major exception). On the other hand, political considerations would argue for lower leakage rates against civilian population centers, even if the threat is only conventional. Generally speaking, the more destructive the warhead on hostile TBMs, the lower the permissible leakage rate; for example, the successful penetration by any nuclear-armed TBMs targeted against a main military operating base or a friendly city would be unacceptable.

There are four key components to a comprehensive response to the TBM threat: (1) counterfires to disrupt and destroy the adversary's TBM launch capabilities; (2) passive defenses—such as hardening, dispersal, and improved repair/recovery measures; (3) active defense to intercept ballistic missiles in flight; and (4) the command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) needed for these other components to work most effectively.

• *Counterfires.* Counteroffensive operations to destroy an adversary's TBM launching complex directly and to disrupt TBM logistics support via interdiction strikes will be a necessary complement to active and passive defenses. Moreover, counteroffensive efforts may include, as they did during Desert Storm, ground action in the form of extensive special operations inside enemy territory aimed at detecting and destroying TBM launchers. Indeed, large-scale conventional ground operations aimed at occupying TBM launch areas cannot be ruled out (they are the only *sure* way of eradicating the mobile TBM launcher threat). During World War II the German V-1 air-breathing and V-2 ballistic missile threats to London and Antwerp were effectively eliminated only by Allied ground force occupation of their launch areas; the small V-1 with its simple and mobile launch rail, and the larger though bunkered (until launch) V-2, survived the full attention of the British Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air Force.

Air power, however, is likely to remain the principal instrument of US counteroffensive capabilities against contingency TBM threats. Air action is usually politically and militarily preferable to ground operations, and the relative importance of manned aircraft in contingency operations has been inflated by the steady erosion of US TBM capabilities. The Army's new Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which reportedly performed well in Desert Storm (though it encountered some pre-Desert Storm congressional opposition and may yet fall prey to the budget-cutter's axe), can also be used to attack enemy missile launchers in some circumstances, though its range (roughly 90 miles) is too short to ensure adequate coverage of the launch areas for most Third World TBMs, which have significantly longer range. Unfortunately, the United States has foresworn, in the 1987 INF Treaty, future possession of any and all land-based surface-to-surface missiles with ranges falling between 500 and 5500 kilometers, and the Bush Administration's subsequent cancellation of the follow-on to Lance leaves only the ATACMS in the US surface-to-surface missile arsenal.¹¹

Critical to any counterstrike capability, of course, will be excellent and timely target acquisition. This is less of a challenge for fixed-site TBMs than it is for mobile TBM launchers, which can be concealed until perhaps just a few minutes before launch, and displaced within a few minutes after firing. During Desert Storm, in which the United States enjoyed satellite intelligence and virtually complete air supremacy over all of Iraq, the US and allied air forces were able to maintain robust combat air patrols—virtually unhindered by Iraqi air defenses—over Scud launch areas, which enabled US fighters to strike mobile Scuds within moments of their detection. Nevertheless, though the rate of Iraqi Scud launches declined during the war, the Iraqis still managed to launch 16 missiles in the conflict's last week, with some reports indicating that Iraq still possessed scores of launchers and was preparing for a massive Scud attack against Israel at the very end of the war.¹² There is, too, the fact that the United

States cannot count in future contingency operations on being able to replicate the ease and swiftness with which it gained air supremacy in Desert Storm.

Thus, it is only through the *combination* of offensive and defensive capability that it will be possible to achieve effective TBM defense.

- *Passive Defense.* Passive defense is another important component of a comprehensive defense against TBMs. Passive defenses may include reliance on hardened command and communications nodes and main operating bases of the kind that were available in Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm; mobile facilities when and where possible (e.g. aircraft carriers), dispersion and cover, concealment, and deception; and measures to enhance an asset's ability to recover after an attack. Against the threat of TBM-delivered chemical munitions, such standard passive responses as protective masks, individual protective suits, overpressure systems for command bunkers and armored vehicles, and stockpiles of decontaminants are important. As for threatened host country civilian populations, Israel has pointed the way to some measure of protection via shelters, mass distribution of gas masks, and the creation of hermetically sealed rooms in family residences. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that most other countries will bear the financial expense or political and social costs of adequately preparing passive defenses for their civilian populations; in this regard, Israel is probably unique, because its people have lived under the near threat of imminent attack for so long.

Moreover, chemically armed TBMs would still be highly disruptive of military operations and logistics support. For example, an airfield which has been attacked with chemical weapons will certainly have its sortie generation operations disrupted for some time, even if it is well-stocked with chemical protective gear and decontaminants. Or, to take another example, what if Saddam Hussein had fired a few TBMs with chemical warheads at the port of Jubayl during Desert Shield/Desert Storm—how many civilian stevedores would have reported to work the following day? At the very least, such attacks would have disrupted the flow of shipborne forces and logistics severely. Some types of passive defense can also be costly and politically difficult. For example, one passive measure to enhance the survivability of air bases against TBM attack is simply to build more runways—a very expensive proposition in places like Europe and other areas where land costs are high and environmental concerns compete with security interests.

- *Active Defense.* Active defenses involve neutralization or destruction of TBMs already in flight. Currently, the Patriot PAC-2 surface-to-air missile is the free world's only existing anti-TBM system. Despite the public hoopla touting its success in the Gulf War, even the PAC-2 version of the Patriot missile has limited effectiveness against most kinds of TBM threats because of its relatively small and narrow engagement area.¹³ The current Patriot also requires an excessive amount of airlift for strategic deployment

(it cannot be moved while assembled except in a C-5), and subsequent analysis has shown that Patriot's effectiveness against the Scuds in Desert Storm was not as great as would be desired—especially if the threat includes TBMs with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads.

An improved version of the Patriot, the PAC-3, will upgrade its missile (and air) defense capabilities, but will still not provide reliable defense against all classes of TBMs. Far more promising is the THAAD (theater high-altitude area defense) system, now being developed by the US Army with Strategic Defense Initiative Organization funding. The THAAD, unlike the Patriot, is designed exclusively as an anti-TBM interceptor, and has a much larger engagement area than the Patriot. An anti-TBM architecture combining Patriot and THAAD would provide coverage against both long- and short-range TBMs as well as cruise missiles and manned aircraft (the Patriot's specialty). Patriot's limited battlefield mobility also argues for the US Army's corps surface-to-air missile concept (i.e. a new air defense- and anti-TBM-capable missile) specifically designed to support US corps- and division-level forces and Marine Corps amphibious operations.

Also worth considering are the ERINT (extended range intercept technology), another Army anti-TBM under development, and the Arrow, which is being developed by Israel with US funding. ERINT's main advantages are that it is a hit-to-kill missile, i.e. it destroys its target with a direct hit, imparting massive kinetic energy, and is also fire-and-forget, i.e. it guides itself to its target. It is also much smaller in diameter than Patriot, so that more missiles can be mounted on a launcher. ERINT's main drawbacks are its projected cost, which is likely to exceed that of the Patriot, and the fact that in the Patriot it is competing with a deployed system of proven worth. The final decision on whether ERINT is needed and cost-effective will have to await further testing and analysis. The Arrow, though having greater coverage than the Patriot, is also a much larger system, and therefore too logistically cumbersome for rapid strategic mobility in support of US contingency forces.

A key feature of any anti-TBM system designed to accompany US contingency forces overseas is that it be readily compatible, in terms of size and weight, with existing US C-5 and C-141 strategic airlifters, and preferably with the tactical C-130.¹⁴ To cover initial US Air Force and Army deployments, as well as the ports and air bases for their disembarkation and logistics support, anti-TBMs must already be present or must be among the first items deployed, which means that they must go by air. The implications of this new requirement for early anti-TBM deployment in contingency operations, for both existing and planned strategic and tactical airlift capabilities, are as yet unclear, and the subject merits proper analysis.

There may also be circumstances requiring heavy or even exclusive reliance on sea-based ballistic missile defenses—for example, in support of

US Marine Corps or Army amphibious operations. Sea-based anti-TBMs may be applicable too in situations in which a threatened ally or client requires protection but is unable for political reasons to invite US forces ashore, or when we do not want to put forces ashore.¹⁵

The Global Threat and Longer Term Requirements

The presumption of continued proliferation in the Third World of ballistic missiles of ever increasing range and sophistication suggests that at some point in the not-too-distant future, perhaps before the end of the century, US forces and allies will confront both Third World short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and even ICBMs.

This increasingly long-range ballistic missile threat will have important consequences for theater missile defense. First, the missiles will address much larger geographic areas, threatening US bases and allies much farther from the missile-armed state. Second, longer-range missiles have much higher reentry speeds, which effectively reduce the area protected by short-range defensive systems such as the Patriot—i.e. many more Patriots are required to defend an area of given size or collection of assets against longer-range missiles. Third, the coupling of long-range missiles with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads means that devastating damage could be inflicted on a target country with only a very small number of missiles. This means that more effective, longer-range interceptors are required, and also argues for a multi-tier defense composed of two or more weapon types. Moreover, a Third World terrorist missile strike may come with little warning, so that strategic warning times needed for the deployment of surface-based defensive systems must be very short.



Strategic Defense Command

Since ERINT is much smaller than Patriot, four missiles might be packaged in each canister on the existing Patriot launcher, as shown in this artist's conception.

The Bush Administration's reorientation of the Strategic Defense Initiative toward Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) was driven in large measure by concern over the growth of ballistic missile capabilities in the Third World. There is also concern, as Daniel O. Graham has put it, over "the increasing danger that civil war or other violence in the Soviet Union can put strategic nuclear weapons in the hands of irresponsible elements and that shaky discipline in Soviet forces sharply increases the danger of a military Chernobyl—the accidental launch of a deadly missile."¹⁶ The performance during Desert Storm of the Patriot PAC-2 has spurred confidence in GPALS' feasibility. Moreover, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Director Henry Cooper believes that with requested funding levels, deployment of GPALS' space-based components could probably begin by the late 1990s—just about the time that some Third World countries are expected to be acquiring intermediate-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.

The principal obstacle to GPALS is congressional opposition. Some critics still question GPALS' feasibility and cost; others, including Les Aspin and Sam Nunn, support the need for theater missile defense, and even the desirability of national missile defense against small attacks (including accidental or unauthorized Soviet launches), but oppose GPALS' Brilliant Pebbles component. But by far the most potent and emotional source of opposition is the fact that deployment of Brilliant Pebbles (and perhaps even Brilliant Eyes alone) would violate the 1972 ABM Treaty in its present form. GPALS proponents claim that the treaty was designed for the Cold War confrontation between the superpowers, and point out that there was no Third World ballistic missile threat 20 years ago. In their view, the treaty has been rendered obsolete by events, by technology, and by the Third World ballistic missile threat.

However, some opponents of GPALS still regard the ABM Treaty as an important, almost inviolable symbol of arms control as well as an effective barrier to an unwanted and costly strategic defense arms race with the Soviets. Others fear possible Soviet reactions to a unilateral US abrogation of the treaty, including withdrawing from START, bringing their submarines armed with nuclear ballistic missiles up close to American shores and relying on depressed-trajectory launches, concentrating their faster-burning mobile SS-24s and SS-25s in one region of the country so as to overwhelm space-based US defenses, and/or developing sophisticated and relatively cheap penetration aids for their missiles. GPALS proponents argue that it is as much in the interests of Moscow as Washington to be able to negate the Third World missile threat. Indeed, some already see signs of a Soviet volte-face on the ABM Treaty.¹⁷ They also argue that GPALS would be (intentionally) too limited to threaten Soviet assured destruction of the United States. However, their critics argue that the Soviets would view GPALS with Brilliant Pebbles as but the first installment in a far more extensive space-based missile defense.

Soviet concerns that GPALS is but the first step toward a comprehensive strategic defense aimed at defeating a large-scale, deliberate Soviet attack might be allayed by a new or revised ABM Treaty that placed verifiable caps on the number of deployed space-based interceptors: enough to handle limited attacks, intentional or unintentional, but insufficient to defend against large attacks. A new agreement also might restrict deployment of space-based interceptors and sensors to cover only those areas of the globe between, say, the 10th and 40th parallels in the Northern Hemisphere, wherein lies the bulk of the Third World ballistic missile threat; this would bar boost- or post-boost-phase intercept coverage of the Soviet ICBM threat (though not necessarily the Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile threat), whose launch sites and polar trajectories fall well north of the 40th parallel.

GPALS, even without space-based interceptors, may be the most effective long-term solution to the Third World ballistic missile threat posed to US contingency forces and allies. Brilliant Pebbles is but one type of space-based weapon that could be deployed, and a clear distinction must be made between space-based weapons (of whatever configuration) and sensors. Though both have ABM Treaty implications, the future effectiveness of even exclusively ground-based ballistic missile defense weaponry is almost certain to rest on space-based sensors.

Moreover, ballistic missile defense coverage by Brilliant Pebbles or some other form of space-based weaponry would be essential for global ballistic missile defense missions, i.e. in areas where: (1) theater missile defense requirements cannot be anticipated in advance, (2) the United States cannot—or chooses not to—deploy ground-based defenses, or (3) the United States cannot deploy them in time. Arguably, these three conditions are often present in most places in the Third World, and there are few countries outside of Western Europe, Israel, and perhaps Japan to which the United States is likely to transfer technology adapted for theater high-altitude area defense. However, when any or all three of these conditions are present, then space- or sea-basing of ballistic missile defenses becomes critical, and space is the more attractive of the two because ships require days or even weeks to deploy to some geographic areas. Moreover, if ICBMs (e.g. the Chinese CSS-3/4 or Soviet SS-19s) are part of the theater threat to Europe and other strategic theaters, and if we are unwilling to count solely on offensive retaliation to deter this threat, Brilliant Pebbles would provide an essential second layer for theater defense (ground-based theater missile defense systems capable of intercepting ICBMs would also violate the ABM Treaty).

Thus, the main attribute of Brilliant Pebbles is that it provides global reach and instantaneous response capability, against all exo-atmospheric trajectory missiles. Brilliant Pebbles (like sea-based weapons) might be particularly valuable as a theater missile defense umbrella for contingency operations,

before land-based weapons can be deployed. Brilliant Pebbles could also offer important deterrent leverage against Third World dictators who, having their missiles intercepted, would suffer political humiliation (as did Saddam Hussein via Patriot intercepts of his Scuds). Moreover, the presence of US space-based ballistic missile defense could have a salutary, stabilizing influence on a crisis between two missile-armed Third World states; the prospect that the United States would use its space weaponry to intercept either party's missiles would reduce incentives to strike first, and increase the possibility of a negotiated end to the crisis. A global ballistic missile defense capability might also dissuade some Third World leaders from investing their scarce resources in ballistic missiles, and could support future nonproliferation treaties.

In any event, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 has, for the moment at least, added a sense of urgency to the long-term need for more comprehensive and integrated ballistic missile defenses. Henry Kissinger has concluded that "limitations on strategic defense will have to be reconsidered in light of the Gulf War experience; no responsible leader can henceforth leave his civilian population vulnerable."¹⁸

Summary

The Third World ballistic missile threat to US contingency forces is expanding, and can no more be wished away than the Soviet ICBM threat to the United States itself. Indeed, as W. Seth Carus has pointed out, "There is no longer any question of keeping the missiles out of the hands of the Third World. Nor is it possible to prevent the indigenous production of missiles."¹⁹

What is certain beyond doubt is the inadequacy of the Patriot PAC-2 to provide adequate protection in the future for US contingency forces and host-country civilian population centers. Patriot is inadequate because it: (1) covers too small an area, (2) does not intercept chemical or biological warheads high enough to prevent possible massive collateral damage, (3) lacks adequate battlefield mobility to move with tactical maneuver forces, (4) has decreasing capability against longer-reaching intermediate-range ballistic missile threats, and (5) cannot deal with ICBMs at all. The improved PAC-3 version of Patriot will redress some of these deficiencies, and Patriot will remain a key element of US theater missile defense long into the next century. But no one weapon system can be adequate to deal with all aspects of the TBM threat. The need to supplement Patriot—and the wide variety of theater missile defense threats—argue for the corps surface-to-air missile for battlefield missile defense, plus the theater high-altitude area defense system and a ship-based counterpart, Brilliant Pebbles (or some other type of space-based weapon), or some combination of these weapons for higher-altitude, area theater missile defense.

The performance of the Patriot missile against primitive Iraqi Scuds during the Gulf War, dazzling though it appeared, underscores the deficiencies

of present US theater ballistic missile defenses against far more sophisticated and longer-range missiles either already deployed or under development by other thug regimes in the Third World. Neither counteroffensive operations nor passive defenses, alone or together, provide a military panacea to the theater ballistic missile problem. Nor can the United States rely on arms control or appeals for voluntary restraint to curb the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies among countries whose record of political and military sobriety makes one nostalgic for the Cold War. The United States and its allies must look to their own resources to protect themselves and their forces overseas, and improved active missile defense will be a necessary ingredient in future US contingency planning.

NOTES

1. Janne E. Nolan, *Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 9.
2. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 21 May 1991. Lieutenant General Charles Horner, USAF, stated that initial plans called for a 32-day air campaign, but that six more days were required to accommodate unexpectedly bad weather and high Scud suppression requirements.
3. See Kathleen Bailey, *Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many: The Arms Control Challenge of the '90s* (Champaign: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1991).
4. "Patriots, Scuds, and the Future of Ballistic Missile Defense." Speech before the Washington Chapter of the National Security Industrial Association, Arlington, Va., 24 April 1991.
5. Bruce W. Nelan, "For Sale: Tools of Destruction," *Time*, 22 April 1991, p. 44.
6. "Statement on the Strategic Defense Initiative," Hearings Before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, 17 April 1991, p. 3.
7. Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," *The Washington Post*, 12 May 1991, p. D-2.
8. See Holly Porteous, "Argentina Cancels Condor 2 Missile," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 8 June 1991, p. 948.
9. "National Security Implications of Missile Proliferation," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 31 October 1990.
10. Iraq's failure to employ chemical munitions against coalition ground forces, or chemically armed Scuds against Israel and ports and airfields in Saudi Arabia, was one of several mysteries of the Gulf War. One explanation for this and other mysteries related to Iraq's conduct of the war is that with the launching of Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein's top priority became his own survival and the preservation of his Baathist regime.
11. As ATACMS is deployed in larger numbers, the Lance will largely lose its conventional role; the US Army has stated that Lance will reach the end of its service life in the mid-1990s in any event.
12. Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Special Ops Teams Found 29 Scuds Ready to Barrage Israel 24 Hours Before Cease-Fire," *Armed Forces Journal International*, July 1991, p. 36.
13. Despite the dramatic success claimed for the Patriot during the Gulf War itself, soberer postwar studies are casting that success in doubt. See Mary McGrory, "Missiles in Search of Missions," *The Washington Post*, 21 November 1991, p. A2.
14. The current Patriot cannot be moved fully assembled except in the C-5; however, the so-called Quick Reaction Program, initiated in response to the lessons of Desert Shield/Storm, includes a "Patriot Light" proposal that would downsize some Patriot components to eliminate this restriction.
15. Several TBM defense options are available to the Navy. Both the Navy and the Air Force are also investigating the potential for anti-TBM missiles launched from tactical fighters.
16. "An SDI Program for the Clear and Present Danger," *New Dimensions*, May 1991, p. 31. See *The President's New Focus for SDI: Global Protection Against Limited Strikes*, SDIO, 6 June 1991, for a discussion of GPALS' goals and elements.
17. Jorg Bahnemann and Thomas Enders, "Reconsidering Ballistic Missile Defense," *Military Technology*, April 1991, p. 48.
18. "A Sea Change in U.S.-Soviet Relations," *The Washington Post*, 12 April 1991, p. A-13.
19. W. Seth Carus, *Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict* (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 56-57.

NATO Force Planning Without the Soviet Threat

TED GREENWOOD and STUART JOHNSON

In November 1990, the 22 member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed a document that declared, among other things, that they were “no longer adversaries” and would “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State.”¹ The event was hardly noted in the press. Coming as it did on the heels of the collapse of communist governments in Eastern Europe and the decision to unite East with West Germany, and with an apparently benign government ruling in Moscow, the Declaration seemed to do no more than confirm the obvious.

At the same Paris meeting of heads of state and government of parties to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the alliance members also signed the treaty limiting their conventional forces in Europe (CFE),² and the full 34 participants in CSCE signed a new agreement on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe.³ These latter documents, years in the making, attracted the primary attention. Only later, as NATO set about the serious business of articulating the new strategic concept that the NATO countries had promised at their London summit meeting the previous July,⁴ was the problem that the Declaration posed for NATO force planning realized.

The problem can be simply stated: in the absence of its traditional adversaries, NATO can no longer do force planning in its accustomed manner. For over 40 years, NATO force planning began by identifying military threats posed by the Soviet Union and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. These threats were translated into particular scenarios, which included detailed estimates of the size and quality of the forces that NATO might find arrayed against it, the length of time that NATO might have to prepare its defense after detecting hostile activities, and the strategy and tactics that the adversary might use in its offensive operations. These scenarios, in turn, were employed as a basis

for sizing and structuring NATO's forces. For example, the primary scenario that NATO long used for force planning envisioned a Warsaw Pact attack against the Central Region employing some 90 to 100 divisions, preceded by an air attack against airfields, nuclear facilities, command and control installations, and other fixed targets, all with no more than 14 days' warning time.

NATO might well be in for a turbulent decade on its periphery, as many expect, but in the absence of identifiable adversaries, threat scenarios are no longer adequate as the basis for NATO force planning and certainly are not sufficient to win public support for national defense budgets. Yet no alternative basis for force planning has emerged. The abandonment of the term "threat" in the alliance's New Strategic Concept⁵ and its replacement by the term "risk" acknowledges the problem, but does not yet suggest a solution. Risks, by their nature, are highly uncertain and elusive; they do not suggest a methodology by which NATO and national military bureaucracies can do serious force planning. If the alliance's force planning process is to survive, a new conceptual basis will be required, one that does not rely on the outdated concept of threat scenarios but, at the same time, offers planners something more substantial than elusive risks.

In many ways, not only force planning but also the survival of NATO itself is at stake. The annual force planning exercise, in which almost all member nations participate, is the central business of the alliance and the glue that holds it together. Through the mechanism of combined force planning, NATO members share information about their military forces and coordinate their defense plans. What would otherwise be independent national planning is transformed into alliance planning, encouraging each member nation's security debate and national forces to reflect alliance-wide interests. Unilateral national defense policies and the attendant risk of misunderstanding—or even arms races among member states—are avoided. For all these reasons, NATO's force planning process is as important to preserve as NATO itself.

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Making NATO more political would not compensate for its loss. Without a meaningful force planning process, NATO, while not likely to disappear, would certainly risk drifting into irrelevance. Because NATO is the primary institution for guaranteeing European security and stability, preserving its vitality serves the interests not only of its own members but also of the rest of Europe and the world. Therefore, achieving a new conceptual basis for NATO force planning is indeed both an important and an urgent task.

The purpose of this article is to articulate such a new conceptual basis for NATO force planning and to illustrate in a general way its utility to force planners as a guide for sizing and structuring NATO's conventional forces. Detailed force sizing and structuring, which are properly done on a classified level through the NATO force planning process, will not be attempted here.

Underlying Principles

The proposed conceptual basis for NATO force planning is based on three principles. The first and most important is that NATO should no longer seek to define detailed threat scenarios but rather seek to prevent excessive imbalances between NATO military capabilities and those of nations on its periphery, including both the confederation of former Soviet republics⁶ and others. The balance of forces in Europe is important for two reasons. The presence of an excessive force imbalance would harbor the seed of instability and provide the temptation, if not the motivation, for stronger states to employ their forces to coerce or intimidate others or even to initiate hostilities. Over the long term, this is an unstable basis for a lasting peace. Even a state with a benign intent one day could have hostile intent another, and the ability to act out that hostility might well increase the likelihood of such a transformation.⁷ In addition, the balance of forces between states has always been an important determinant of the psychological context for interstate relations in peacetime, influencing not only perceptions of security but also the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy over issues to which military forces are not immediately central. This will remain true in Europe for the foreseeable future.

The second principle is that the military capabilities of those countries on NATO's periphery, other than the confederation, that could pose a threat to NATO members must be taken into account more explicitly in NATO force planning than they have been in the past.⁸ The third principle is that NATO's force posture must continue to be supportive of the alliance's military strategy and political objectives, and must continue to accommodate national requirements, including the continued viability of their military organizations and, in some cases, non-NATO requirements.

Because of the number of largely separate military capabilities that must now be taken into account, NATO's overall conventional force posture must in the future be cobbled together from a series of separate requirements,

each one tied to a particular military capability of a potential enemy that must be counterbalanced. The table below lists these various capabilities. Each will be discussed in order to demonstrate how the proposed conceptual basis for NATO force planning could be employed.⁹

Conventional Military Capabilities NATO Must Counterbalance

Confederation:

Peacetime Force Deployments
Medium-Range Bomber Force
Forces Potentially Oriented Toward NATO's Central Region
Forces Potentially Oriented Toward North Norway
Forces Potentially Oriented Toward NATO's Southern Region

Other:

Conventional Capabilities of Turkey's Southeastern Neighbors
Mass-Casualty Weapons Within Reach of Southern Europe

It is worth noting initially that several of the military capabilities that NATO must counterbalance are tied to the Southern Region: confederation or other successor state forces in the Caucasus and the Ukraine; forces of Turkey's southeastern neighbors; and mass-casualty weapons within range of Southern Region countries. In addition, NATO countries are concerned about instability in southeastern Europe and out-of-area contingencies in Southwest Asia and North Africa. NATO's Southern Region clearly will play a growing role in NATO force planning in the future.

Counterbalancing Confederation Military Capabilities

Despite the changes in Moscow's foreign and defense policy of the last five years, the recent turmoil within the former Soviet Union, and the possibility of more fragmentation than now seems likely, the confederation will probably possess the largest military forces in Europe. Five different conventional military capabilities can be identified, each of which must be counterbalanced by NATO forces.

• *Peacetime Force Deployments*

Unless interstate relations in Europe are transformed and a security arrangement is established that does not rely on military forces, the peacetime force balance in Europe, as indicated by quantitative measures, will remain an important component of security for NATO countries. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the most relevant balance will be between NATO forces and those of the confederation.

The CFE treaty provides equal aggregate entitlements to NATO and former Warsaw Pact states in five categories of treaty-limited equipment: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. Moreover, as a result of the CFE sufficiency rules, NATO's entitlement to this equipment exceeds the Soviet Union's entitlement.¹⁰ Despite these provisions of CFE, however, the confederation's conventional force inventories in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region could remain larger than relevant NATO forces. NATO's current inventories of artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft are below its CFE entitlement, and NATO inventories are programmed to decrease over the next several years in all of the treaty-limited equipment categories.

Not all numerical disparities are cause for concern, however. There will be no more reason in the future for NATO to field conventional forces in peacetime that numerically match the confederation's than there has been in the past. NATO's technological advantages, superior training, and the advantages of being a defender can compensate to some extent for numerical inferiority. Nonetheless, because of the political saliency of the peacetime Europe-wide quantitative force balance, NATO should continue to pay attention to it and avoid conventional force reductions, either on land in Europe or at sea around it, that will result in an excessive force imbalance favoring the confederation.

Deciding what constitutes an acceptable peacetime conventional force posture in Europe and even how to measure it will continue to be problematic. The attention given in the CFE negotiations to the Atlantic-to-the-Urals geographic region, various subregions, and particular categories of equipment suggests that these will remain salient factors. There is, however, no logical or empirical way to decide what degree of imbalance would be excessive. This is necessarily a policy judgment, subject to debate in Brussels and all NATO capitals.

- *Medium-Range Bomber Force*

The confederation's Fencer and Backfire medium-range bombers need not be reduced under CFE. Although uncertainties abound, there is every reason to expect that it will eliminate primarily older and short-range ground-attack aircraft. As a result, the number of Fencers and Backfires within range of Europe is unlikely to decline and could even continue to grow as Badgers and Blinders are retired. Flying from airfields in Belarus, Ukraine, or Russia, they can reach and therefore hold at risk almost all of Europe. After CFE reductions are complete, these aircraft will be the only forces capable of a short-warning attack against the Central Region of NATO. They also contribute significantly to the confederation's military capability relative to North Norway and southern Europe.

Although an air attack in isolation is unlikely, if this residual capability is not countered, the prospect could foster feelings of insecurity in Western

Europe. As NATO's peacetime deployments are reduced, therefore, adequate air defense capability, including surface-to-air missiles and interceptor aircraft, should be maintained at high readiness in Europe to provide a counterpoise to confederation Fencers and Backfires.

- *Forces Potentially Oriented Toward NATO's Central Region*

Even after withdrawals from Eastern Europe and CFE-mandated force reductions, the confederation could still retain a military force capable of posing a threat to NATO's Central Region. However, depending on how its ground and air forces are ultimately configured, a good six months and possibly more of highly visible mobilization would be needed before an attack could be launched against the Central Region.

The size and configuration of ground and air forces needed to counterbalance this Soviet capability could be derived only from detailed analysis by NATO force planners. However, assuming that NATO would react in a timely fashion to a threatening mobilization and would possess adequate strategic mobility assets, some of the general features of such a force structure can be discerned:

- Fewer ground and air units will be needed than in the past.
- Only minimal forces need be forward-deployed because time will be available to move ground units from western Germany and elsewhere to establish positions well east of the traditional NATO defense line.
- Much of NATO's main defense forces needed to counterbalance this capability could be held as reserve in peacetime.
- Fewer US augmentation divisions and tactical fighter squadrons would be needed and fewer of the former would need to have equipment prepositioned in Europe.

All of the above features are consistent with the outlines of a future force structure for the Central Region now agreed to by the NATO Defense Ministers.¹¹

Of particular note in the changed strategic geography of Europe is the fact that the southern approaches to Denmark are now well buffered by eastern Germany and Poland. In consequence, the allied ground and air augmentation forces programmed for Denmark have diminished military significance and thus from a purely military perspective are candidates for elimination. However, political imperatives might argue for retaining a small commitment.

Mobility assets will remain crucial to ensure that adequate US ground and air forces could be moved to Europe during mobilization. However, because of the increase in expected warning time, heavy reliance can be placed on sealift to move unit equipment, and only modest reliance need be placed on prepositioning and airlift, the latter primarily to move tactical fighter squadrons. Time will be available for multiple trips of sealift assets

and for numerous trips for airlift assets. Therefore, current and programmed government-owned and government-controlled assets, including the C-17 and the Ready Reserve Fleet, would be adequate to the task when augmented by privately held equipment that would be requisitioned for the purpose. Little to no additional sealift assets would be necessary to meet NATO needs.

The ability to defend sea lanes of communication will also remain an essential part of NATO's hedge. In the unlikely event of mobilization, the sea lanes across the Atlantic must be secure for the initial surge of unit equipment moving to Europe and later for sustainment shipping. Adequate naval forces must be retained to accomplish that task. However, more anti-submarine warfare assets than at present could be kept in the reserves.

- *Forces Potentially Oriented Toward North Norway*

In some respects, the potential for North Norway to be threatened has declined. An attack against Norway in isolation is improbable, and its likelihood has diminished along with that of aggression against the rest of Europe. Similarly, warning time available to Norway prior to a ground offensive has lengthened, as it has for all of NATO.

However, the actual military capability facing North Norway has declined less than for the Central Region. Under the CFE Treaty, force reductions in the Leningrad Military District can be minimal. Moreover, there is ample modern equipment to upgrade ground forces in the region, and combat aircraft, most notably Fencers, have been relocated to the Kola Peninsula.¹² The Northern Fleet is being modernized with new and improved combatant vessels, even as the numbers decline modestly. Norway remains concerned about the "predominant Soviet military power" in the north and the potential threat it poses.¹³

Because of its small size and exposed geographic position, Norway is incapable on its own of maintaining forces adequate to counterbalance forces across its border in peacetime or to defend successfully in the unlikely event of conflict. Therefore, in order to ensure an adequate balance of forces in the north, Norway should avoid excessive reductions in its own forces, and other NATO countries should maintain most forces now committed to the defense of North Norway. NATO reaction forces and their transportation are especially important to demonstrate NATO solidarity and resolve in support of Norway. Naval forces must be adequate to defend sea lanes across the Atlantic and through the Norwegian Sea.

- *Forces Potentially Oriented Toward NATO's Southern Region*

In some respects the potential threat to NATO's Southern Region has also declined. As in the case of North Norway, a confederation attack against the Southern Region in isolation is most improbable. It is unlikely that the confederation would be supported by Bulgaria or Romania, either through use

of airfields or for troop transit. This makes a ground attack against Greece and European Turkey much more difficult than in the past. Longer warning time also applies in the Southern Region. In particular, the ground threat to Italy has all but vanished, especially as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. As in the case of Denmark, from a purely military perspective, the allied ground and air augmentation forces programmed for northern Italy are candidates for elimination. Again, however, political imperatives might argue for retaining a small commitment.

However, the confederation's military capabilities facing Greece and especially Turkey have declined less. Under the CFE Treaty, ground forces in the Kiev, Odessa, Transcaucasus, and North Caucasus Military Districts of the Soviet Union can be reduced disproportionately less than in the Western Military Districts. Units in the old Southwestern and Southern Theaters of Operation can be upgraded with equipment being withdrawn elsewhere.

Greece and Turkey, like Norway, are incapable on their own of maintaining forces adequate to counterbalance confederation forces in peacetime or to defend successfully in the unlikely event of conflict. Therefore, in order to prevent an excessive imbalance of forces facing the Southern Region, Greece and especially Turkey should avoid excessive reductions of their own forces. The US Sixth Fleet should be maintained in the Southern Region in peacetime. NATO countries should maintain most forces committed to the defense of Greece and Turkey. NATO Reaction Forces and assets to transport them are especially important to demonstrate NATO solidarity and resolve in support of Greece and Turkey. Maritime forces must be adequate to defend sea lanes across the Atlantic and through the Mediterranean. The plan to base US tactical fighter squadrons at Crotona, Italy, now killed by congressional action, would also have been very useful.

Counterbalancing Military Capabilities of Others

The military capabilities of countries that have traditionally not been primary concerns of NATO must now also be taken into account in the alliance's force planning to ensure that excessive imbalances do not occur.

- ***Conventional Capabilities of Turkey's Southeastern Neighbors***

Turkey continues to face instability and uncertainty across its southeastern borders. NATO must therefore provide an adequate balance to the military power of Turkey's neighbors—Iran, Syria, and Iraq—to deter intimidation or military adventurism and to hedge against the possibility that deterrence might fail. Turkey plans to maintain a large military force and would be able to deter or deal with small contingencies on its own. However, planning for military assistance from allies at an early stage would enhance deterrence by demonstrating alliance solidarity and resolve. To meet larger

contingencies and to defend successfully should deterrence fail, Turkey would need to count on military assistance from its allies.

The military capacities of Turkey and other NATO countries needed to counterbalance confederation capabilities relevant to Turkey and Greece, including especially NATO Reaction Forces and the US Sixth Fleet, would be adequate to counterbalance other capabilities as well. Therefore, this case does not generate any new force structure requirements. Nonetheless, it does underline the importance of NATO's maintaining a robust capability to reinforce Turkey.

- *Mass-Casualty Weapons Within Reach of Southern Europe*

Several states on NATO's periphery now possess ballistic missiles capable of attacking NATO's southern states with conventional or chemical munitions.¹⁴ During the 1990s, the number, range, and sophistication of such missiles is likely to increase. Moreover, unless the effectiveness of the missile technology control and nuclear nonproliferation regimes improves markedly and unless an effective global ban of chemical weapons is achieved, which now seems improbable, missile, chemical, and perhaps nuclear capabilities are likely to spread to other Middle Eastern and North African states.

This ability to attack southern Europe with mass-casualty weapons can be countered in two ways. First, their use can be deterred by maintaining a credible retaliatory capability. In the absence of maintaining chemical weapons, which most NATO countries are reluctant to do, a credible retaliatory capability would require US and allied aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean capable of attacking hundreds of miles inland and land-based, ground-attack aircraft based in or programmed for reinforcement to southern Europe. Some of the latter should preferably be American to demonstrate US commitment and enable a rapid reaction. Some should also possess nuclear strike capability in order to deter nuclear attacks. Second, defensive capabilities can be deployed to reduce the effectiveness of mass-casualty weapons. NATO should deploy adequate chemical warfare defenses and develop an anti-tactical ballistic missile system deployable across southern Europe.

Forces Employable Out of Area

European members of NATO have been unwilling to give NATO out-of-area missions or even to discuss within NATO the coordination of national military operations for out-of-area contingencies. Some prefer coordination of operations by European forces through the West European Union. For the foreseeable future, therefore, NATO is unlikely to generate an alliance military capability with acknowledged out-of-area missions.

Nonetheless, NATO states have economic, security, and other reasons to be concerned about instability and conflict outside the NATO area,

especially in southeastern Europe, Southwest Asia, and the southern and eastern Mediterranean littorals. Only under the aegis of NATO can European and US forces train and prepare for combined out-of-area operations. Although unacknowledged, there is broad understanding of this critical role for NATO, and generic planning might be possible. The NATO Reaction Forces, intended for NATO missions, could be employed and would be adequate on their own for most out-of-area contingencies, either as coordinated national forces or as a NATO force, should member countries ever decide to do so. Their missions might include dispute mediation, crisis management, peacekeeping, conflict suppression, or conflict containment. Larger contingencies would require allocation of additional national forces, including US forces deployed from the continental United States.

Conclusions

In the future NATO's force planning can and should be based not on threat scenarios, but on the need to avoid excessive force imbalances between NATO forces and those of others, including especially the confederation and other countries with a capability to strike NATO members. In surveying the many conventional military capabilities that NATO forces must counterbalance, several general conclusions emerge about NATO's future force structure:

- Southern Europe will play a more central role in future NATO force planning than in the past.
- NATO must avoid excessive quantitative imbalances relative to the confederation in its peacetime force deployments in Europe.
- NATO must maintain adequate air defense capability, including surface-to-air missiles and interceptor aircraft, at high readiness in peacetime.
- Allied ground and air augmentation forces programmed for Denmark and northern Italy have diminished military importance.
- NATO forces needed to counterbalance confederation forces potentially oriented toward NATO's Central Region will require fewer active ground and air units than in the past, including the US augmentation which will itself require less equipment prepositioned in Europe.
- Norway, Greece, and Turkey should be encouraged to avoid excessive reductions in their own forces, and other NATO countries should be encouraged to maintain most forces committed to the defense of North Norway, Greece, and Turkey.
- NATO's Reaction Forces and transport are especially important to demonstrate NATO solidarity and resolve in support of Norway, Greece, and Turkey.
- NATO's Reaction Forces would have the capability to be employed out-of-area for dispute mediation, crisis management, peacekeeping.

conflict suppression, or conflict containment, either as coordinated national forces or as a NATO force, should member countries ever decide to do so.

- NATO should deter the use of mass-casualty weapons against southern Europe and take actions that would reduce their effectiveness if used.
- For augmentation forces, greater reliance can be placed on sealift and less on airlift and prepositioning. Current sealift assets and planned airlift assets, including the C-17, seem adequate to meet NATO mobility requirements.
- Maritime forces must be adequate to defend sea lanes across the Atlantic, through the Norwegian Sea, and through the Mediterranean.

Most important, we have sought to demonstrate that as a conceptual basis for NATO force planning, the concept of force balancing, unlike the concept of risk, can be a useful guide to NATO force planners as they continue day to day to carry out the alliance's most important function.

NOTES

1. Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, paragraph 2, 20 November 1990.
2. *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, Paris, 19 November 1990.
3. Vienna Document, Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, November 1990.
4. "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5th-6th July 1990." NATO Press Communique S-1 (90) 36, 6 July 1990, paragraph 20.
5. *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, NATO Press Communique S-1 (91) 85, 7 November 1991.
6. At this writing, the former Soviet Union has given way to its republics and a newly proclaimed Commonwealth of Euro-Asian Independent States as its successor states. The latter seems likely to have control of most, although not all, military forces of the former Soviet Union. Because of the cumbersomeness of this name and the uncertainty about its longevity, we have chosen to use a more generic term, the confederation of former Soviet republics, or for short, the confederation, to mean whatever major state ultimately succeeds the Soviet Union.
7. The best recent example is probably Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Possessing superior forces relative to Kuwait and those that he expected might support Kuwait, Saddam used these forces first to try to coerce Kuwait and then to capture it.
8. This concept is analogous to the recent changes in US military strategy from containment of the Soviet Union to a broader set of requirements, not tightly tied to specific scenarios. See, for example, the testimony of Brigadier General William Fedorochko, Jr., Deputy Director of Force Structure and Resources, Joint Staff, before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee, 5 June 1991.
9. The same approach could be employed for NATO's nuclear force posture.
10. Although the former Soviet Republics have declared that they will be bound by arms control treaties entered into by the Soviet Union, whether this occurs in practice and, if so, exactly how the Soviet Union's CFE entitlement will be divided among its successor states remains to be seen.
11. Paul L. Montgomery, "NATO Agrees to Expand a Rapid-Reaction Force," *The New York Times*, 14 April 1991, sec. I, p. 4.
12. Robert Toth, "Cream of Soviet Military is Flowing North," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 May 1991, p. 3.
13. Johan Jørgen Holst, "Toward New Security Arrangements in Europe," speech to the 1991 NATO Symposium, Washington, D.C., 18 April 1991.
14. See Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *International Security*, 16 (Summer 1991), 5-42; Thomas L. McNaugher, "Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War," *International Security*, 15 (Fall 1990), 5-34; Janne E. Nolan and Albert D. Weelon, "Third World Ballistic Missiles," *Scientific American*, 263 (August 1990), 34-40; Martin S. Navias, "Ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East," *Survival*, 31 (May/June 1989), 225-39; Aaron Karp, *The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East* (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990); and Mark Heller, "Coping with Missile Proliferation in the Middle East," *Orbis*, 35 (Winter 1991), 15-28.

The Preparation of Strategic Leaders

GEORGE B. FORSYTHE

As fierce gusts of wind lashed the early morning rain against the windows of Southwick House, the lone standing figure paced the floor, pondering the weight of this momentous decision. . . . As he paced, he considered the options. Finally, quietly but clearly and confidently he spoke, "O.K., let's go." Immediately, a cheer went up as his commanders rushed to their command posts to oversee the invasion. The liberation of Europe had begun.¹

World events brought General Eisenhower quickly from obscurity to this critical moment in history. Indeed, his advancement to strategic-level leadership was meteoric—from lieutenant colonel to general of the army in four years. However, the significance of Eisenhower's story is not in his advancement, which was accelerated by the requirements imposed on an army at war, but in the fact that he was so well prepared to assume the responsibilities of strategic-level leadership when the nation called. It is a story of strategic leader development, a career-long process involving experience, formal professional education, and self-study.

Strategic leadership and strategic leader development have recently attracted considerable attention in the Army, as evinced by the publication of DA Pamphlet 600-80, *Executive Leadership* (1987), the publication of Field Manual 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* (1987), and the Army War College's Strategic Leadership Conferences in February and October 1991. What does it mean to develop officers as strategic leaders? This article explores the concept of strategic leader formation from the point of view of developmental psychology, addressing in the process two fundamental questions: What is development? and What can the Army do to foster the development of strategic leaders?

Before turning to these questions, two prefatory issues deserve mention: Can leaders be developed? and What is meant by strategic leadership?

Scholars have invested years of study in pondering whether leaders are born or made, but the scientific evidence they have amassed is equivocal.² Common sense alone, however, would tell us that neither explanation by itself is sufficient to account for the complex phenomenon of leadership.³ Leaders are both born and made; or, more accurately, stable attributes of the leader establish certain boundaries within which further development can occur. Thus even so-called "natural" leaders can benefit from the studied pursuit of leadership enhancement. In sum, the Army's concern for leader development surely must rest on the assumption that a soldier's capacity for leadership can be improved by the intelligent application of educational and training procedures.

What is strategic leadership? In the civilian sector, scholarly work in the area of strategic management signaled an interest in leadership at the top levels of the organization by arguing that the work of senior executives is qualitatively different from the work of lower-level managers and therefore deserves unique emphasis in theory as well as in practice. Research emphasis shifted away from leadership in the context of small groups and focused instead on studying the job requirements and management practices of business executives.

With the publication of FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, and DA Pamphlet 600-80, *Executive Leadership*, the Army gave formal recognition to the idea that leadership at higher organizational levels differs substantively from leadership at lower levels. Unfortunately, FM 22-103 does not provide a delineation of senior levels, leaving the reader to infer that the differentiating factor is the reliance on indirect as well as direct forms of influence.⁴ However, DA Pam 600-80 is more explicit, defining the executive level (more recently, the term "strategic" has come to be used in lieu of "executive") as the top one or two echelons in a large, multi-layered organization.⁵ Furthermore, DA Pam 600-80 argues that leadership, regardless of level, aims to achieve "understanding and commitment of subordinates for the accomplishment of purposes, goals, and objectives envisioned by the leader, beyond that which is possible through the use of authority alone."⁶ Hence, strategic leadership involves the building of understanding and commitment

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among followers by incumbents at the top. Both DA Pam 600-80 and FM 22-103 acknowledge that leaders at the top of an organization direct demanding systems in the context of complex, dynamic, and uncertain environments. Consequently, strategic leader development should focus on developing officers for the unique mental, behavioral, and emotional requirements of leadership in such milieus.

What is Development?

With all the recent interest in leader development, it is surprising how little empirical research has been done on the subject. Although considerable attention has been devoted to leadership and to the study of human development across the life span, leader development is a relatively new field of inquiry. Most studies of leader development are retrospective; they attempt to understand leader development by studying the experiences of successful executives. For example, a study of Eisenhower's career might reveal how his childhood and early education at West Point molded his character. Or Ike's assignment experiences and the mentorship of Generals Connor, MacArthur, and Marshall might show how he acquired the technical and professional expertise and interpersonal acumen that made him so effective as Supreme Commander.⁷ Scholars interested in executive development might survey or interview successful corporate leaders to learn how experiences on the job contribute to executive advancement.⁸

Although these methods inform our understanding of leader development, their broader application is limited. Unfortunately, relatively little longitudinal research has been conducted on the subject. The best we can do now is to extract certain concepts from what is known about human growth and relate them to strategic leader development. Two theoretical traditions for understanding such individual change—Learning and Developmental—provide a framework for the discussion that follows.

Learning. One way to conceive leader development is simply as the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and values associated with what is generally acknowledged as effective leadership. This approach is primarily concerned with what leaders do. From this perspective, leader development is a continuous process of building a knowledge base and a behavioral repertoire. The Learning approach might be called the "kit bag" view of leader development—development involves adding tools to the leader's kit bag.

This way of looking at leader development is similar to the approach often taken to shape other aspects of job-related performance. It rests on an analysis of the job and its requirements—the knowledge, skills, and values required of leaders at different organizational levels. For example, Clement and Ayres identified nine competencies associated with leadership at each of five organizational levels.⁹ These competencies include the following: communications, human relations, counseling, supervision, technical skill, management

science, decisionmaking, planning, and ethics. Other researchers have generated similar lists. From a Learning perspective, competencies form the basis for training programs, with specific training objectives tailored to the needs of individual learners. For example, a training program on the subject of group dynamics might serve leaders who need to work on intra-group communications and consensus-building techniques, which are two competencies associated with strategic-level leadership.

The Learning method of leader development should be familiar to all Army officers. It is the basis for the Military Qualification Standards (MQS) program and is embedded in the "Be, Know, Do" framework of FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*.¹⁰ It is also the underlying basis for executive development workshops offered in industry as well as in the military (e.g. precommand courses). This view of leader development is relatively straightforward and certainly helps us understand how we can shape leader behaviors modifiable by learning infusions of relatively short duration. However, this approach cannot account for changes in more complex leader attributes that may take years of experience to bring about.

In practice, leadership is more than the sum of accumulated knowledge and skills; therefore, leader development is more than the process of filling the leader's kit bag. Focusing simply on Eisenhower's knowledge and skills might cause us to miss the richness of his leadership as the Supreme Commander and the essence of his greatness. Leadership at higher organizational levels requires not just more knowledge and skills, but qualitatively different ways of doing business.¹¹ The Learning approach to leader development is inadequate for describing how these qualitative changes occur. Consequently, we must look to the second approach to human maturation to gain a complete understanding of strategic leader development.

Developmental. The complexity of the process of making leaders may be understood as an integral part of the larger process of individual development. (In speaking of the Developmental approach, we will capitalize the term to distinguish it, as a particular formal theory of human change, from the broad general sense of the term, which is lower-cased.) The Developmental approach is concerned more with who the leader is and how the leader makes sense out of the world than with what the leader does. A Developmental paradigm has been applied to a variety of areas, including: moral development,¹² cognitive development,¹³ and personality development.¹⁴ Recently some scholars have begun to apply this framework to leader development as well.¹⁵ Because the Developmental framework is less familiar to most military officers, the remainder of this article will be devoted to it, including some implications for strategic leader development in the Army.

Psychologist Robert Kegan points out two separate Big Ideas that underlie a number of Developmental theories.¹⁶ One is the idea that people

In practice, leadership is more than the sum of accumulated knowledge and skills—more than the process of filling the leader's kit bag.

construct their own reality rather than having it thrust upon them. Humans, in this view, seek to impose sense on their experience. The second idea is that human beings evolve through patterned stages or periods according to principles of stability and change. Taken together, these ideas suggest that development is a life-long process involving progressive patterned changes in peoples' understanding of themselves and their world. From these general ideas come a number of important Developmental concepts that shed light on the process of making leaders.

How do we organize and understand experience? DA Pamphlet 600-80 introduces the concept of a frame of reference to conceptualize how we structure and interpret experience.¹⁷ A frame of reference is a mental map that we use to construct our understanding of reality and to make sense out of life's experiences. We rely on frames of reference to recognize patterns formed by events, to understand cause and effect, and to make decisions and solve problems in a wide variety of areas. For example, a shortstop would use a softball or baseball frame of reference to decide what to do with a ground ball hit between second and third base when there are two outs and a runner on first base. Without a relevant frame of reference, events become difficult to understand. A softball frame of reference would be of little value for understanding a cricket match.

We have many frames of reference. Some are associated with our job (e.g. operational doctrine, weapon systems, unit organization, training doctrine); some are associated with what distinguishes us as individuals (e.g. personal values, career experiences, self-identity); others are associated with interpersonal relations (how to behave at a party). We also have frames of reference about leadership that have been formed over the years through formal study, practical experience, and observation. From a Developmental perspective, leader development can be viewed as adaptive changes in the soldier's leadership frames of reference as he progresses through successively higher organizational levels.

What causes change? Developmental theory suggests that the impetus for change results from a recognition that existing frames of reference are inadequate to deal with new situations. Novel experiences and new information that cannot be understood in terms of existing frames of reference

create the conditions for change. The inability to make sense out of experience often brings with it strong emotions—frustration, confusion, and anxiety—because it makes us vulnerable to unanticipated events and makes adaptation to life's demands more difficult. The resultant disequilibrium sets the stage for development, because it forces a restructuring of our frames of reference to take into account the new experience.

How do frames of reference change? Change often occurs through a process of accommodation, where existing frames of reference are altered to take into account new information.¹⁸ Accommodation leads to a reorganization of frames of reference; old elements are reinterpreted and previous structures are rearranged to deal with the new information. For example, frames of reference concerning tactics and operational art developed during the Vietnam War had to be restructured to make sense of AirLand Battle doctrine when it was first published in 1982. AirLand Battle doctrine offered a qualitatively different way of conceptualizing operational art, thus requiring a restructuring of the way in which Army leaders viewed combat operations. In leader development, accommodation helps account for qualitative and structural changes in a person's understanding of the leadership requirements at succeeding levels of responsibility—from face-to-face influence at the small-unit level all the way up to system management at the strategic level. Accommodation is closely related to the leader's ability to empathize with different points of view (i.e. to accommodate to alternative ways of understanding) when faced with novel situations or competing demands, which is a critical feature of strategic leadership.¹⁹

Hence, change in our frames of reference involves both the addition of new elements and the reorganization of old elements in a way that leads to greater understanding of experiences.²⁰ Adding new elements permits us to differentiate or discriminate between things that we originally saw as the same and to see parts of a larger whole.²¹ Reorganization of the frames of reference permits us to recognize patterns when we saw only parts before. To show how frames of reference influence understanding of events, consider the case of a young captain, newly appointed as one of the aides to a service chief, who accompanies his boss to a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the national military strategy. The captain's frame of reference for national strategy is likely to be relatively simple (not very many elements and not well organized), while the Joint Chiefs probably possess highly complex frames of reference. The captain may view military strategy in terms of units, weapons, and tactical doctrine. In contrast, the service chiefs' strategic frames of reference may include both military and nonmilitary factors, such as demographics, trends in the industrial base, technological developments in non-defense related research, political considerations, fiscal constraints, and world security trends. The captain may not even be able to recognize the

relevant features of the national security environment that affect our military strategy, much less know what to look for ten years into the future. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs will see both great detail as well as patterns and interrelationships.

It is important to recognize that development is not simply a quantitative change in the frames of reference, that is, the addition of more elements. Development also involves qualitative change (reorganization and restructuring), whereby we come to understand the world in fundamentally different ways than we did using less advanced frames of reference. Developmental theory suggests that restructuring of the frames of reference is always in the direction of increased complexity, leading to more sophisticated ways of understanding. Higher levels of development are considered to be more adaptive than lower levels because they permit us to make sense out of an increasingly wider range of experiences.

Developmental Theory Vis-à-vis Producing Strategic Leaders

What are the implications of the Developmental perspective for the development of strategic leaders? There are at least three. First, because development is progressive, with each level building on preceding levels, strategic leader development actually occurs over the course of an entire career. If the services delay attention to strategic leader development until an officer matriculates at a senior service college, it may be too late. Development is a life-long process. The ability to deal with the complexities inherent in the strategic environment are related to a number of developmental characteristics that take considerable time to mature. For example, Lewis and Jacobs argue that the extent to which a person can view his work environment objectively—to step back in a detached fashion—is essential for strategic-level leaders.²² Psychologist Siegfried Streufert has made a similar case, suggesting that the ability to discriminate among new elements of information as well as organize them in some coherent fashion characterizes successful executive performance.²³

Second, Developmental theory suggests that the formation of strategic leaders is facilitated when existing frames of reference are challenged. As

If the services delay attention to strategic leader development until an officer matriculates at a senior service college, it may be too late.

suggested earlier, the intellectual, interpersonal, and technical requirements of strategic-level leadership are fundamentally different from the leadership requirements at lower levels of the organization. If development is to occur, officers must be challenged to think and act in ways that go beyond the requirements of their current level in the organization. We will return to this subject shortly.

Third, development occurs as we interact with the environment and attempt to make sense out of our experiences. This implies that the formation of strategic leaders is enhanced when officers at lower levels are exposed to experiences, even on a modest scale, that give them a glimpse of and feel for the organization's strategic environment. These experiences can be provided on the job or they can be simulated in educational settings.

What Can the Army Do?

There are a number of ways in which the Army can incorporate Developmental theory into its programs for preparing strategic leaders. Three broad areas will be discussed here: professional education, on-the-job development, and self-development.

Professional Education. As mentioned earlier, strategic leader development occurs over the course of a career. The Army cannot afford to wait until War College attendance to lay the foundation for leadership at the strategic level. The foundation must be established early on in the officer education system and must be built upon at each subsequent educational level. Despite the practical requirement to focus on technical training during the basic and advanced courses, some steps must be taken even at those levels to provide the kinds of developmental experiences that help shape strategic leaders. Furthermore, such developmental experiences must become progressively more central to the professional school curriculum as one moves to higher levels in the educational system. The emphasis should shift from skill training to education and development as an officer progresses.

Listed below are a number of ways to incorporate Developmental concepts into the officer education system. These can be applied at all levels, from the basic course through the War College; however, they become increasingly more important at the higher levels.

- Officers must be exposed to multiple points of view in the curriculum. They should be encouraged to consider alternative explanations and alternative ways of doing business. Learning experiences should give students the opportunity to argue the merits of competing solutions to complex problems. Single approved solutions should be avoided, especially when students are dealing with complex conceptual tasks (data-assimilation, evaluation, decisionmaking, problem-solving).

- Learning exercises should cause students to engage in synthesis as well as analysis. Analytical tasks help students add new elements to their frames of reference, but synthesis fosters the ability to integrate and thus reorganize their frames of reference. Both are important, but Army education tends to be weighted toward analysis rather than synthesis. Case studies, for example, are a common feature of officer education. The central intellectual task is analysis—the student identifies the relevant features in the case in order to see how specified principles are applied or specific concepts are illustrated. Less frequently in education do officer students derive principles based on a synthesis of different cases where the facts may be contradictory and ambiguous. Studying the ethical climate in the My Lai case, for example, requires analysis; deriving characteristics of an ethical command climate based on a review of several cases requires synthesis.

- Learning experiences that challenge existing frames of reference are more likely to foster development than those that do not. A by-product of this may be student discomfort and frustration. Few officers like to have their opinions challenged and their logic critiqued. Such challenges can lead to defensiveness and anger directed at instructors. Consequently, sufficient supports should be available to help officer students work through the emotional responses that accompany threats to their customary modes of thinking. Explicit feedback, opportunities to modify and resubmit written work, and one-on-one coaching are possible support mechanisms.

- Wherever possible, students should be challenged to deal with demands that are characteristic of the strategic environment—complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty. Donald Schön refers to simulating the context of professional practice as creating a “virtual world” in professional education.²⁴ A virtual world is a representation of the real world that permits the student to experiment with new ideas and techniques, while real-world variables are purposefully manipulated. Officer students should be encouraged to undertake open-ended projects on complex topics of contemporary relevance to the Army. Recent changes in the international security environment provide a perfect opportunity to explore the implications for national military strategy in the coming decade. Strategy-formulation simulations and crisis scenarios used at the senior service colleges are good examples of learning exercises that take into account the strategic leadership environment. The more, the better.

- Time must be provided for reading, reflection, discussion, and writing. All too often, military educators confuse quality with quantity in their drive to improve educational standards. They add more subject matter but fail to provide opportunities for the students to actively use what they have learned. If development is to occur, and indeed, if we are to encourage self-development, then officer students must be given the opportunity to build and modify their frames of reference by truly engaging the subject matter with their minds.

***Time must be provided for reading, reflection,
discussion, and writing.***

- Students should be given the opportunity to engage in collaborative tasks. Army education has recently made extensive use of small-group instruction. However, in most cases, the collective tasks can actually be accomplished by a single student. True collaborative tasks cannot be accomplished by a single individual (e.g. a situation where each group member has different information, which they must synthesize in order to solve a problem). Collaborative tasks encourage the development of interpersonal skills that are critical for successful strategic-level leadership.

Officer education based on Developmental theory has significant implications for the selection and preparation of service school faculty. Traditional methods of instruction still remain necessary tools in the instructor's kit bag, but they are no longer sufficient. They must be supplemented by educational and developmental concepts that equip the faculty to provide the kinds of experiences that lead to true growth. They must become educators as well as trainers.

On-the-Job Development. A number of scholars have argued that most significant development occurs on the job, not in the schoolhouse.²⁵ On the job, leaders are faced with the actual requirements of leadership rather than a virtual world of practice. Job experiences that challenge existing frames of reference are more likely to have developmental value than experiences that are comfortable. In studies of successful executives, Cal Wick found that novelty and challenge were the two most frequently mentioned developmental features of work experience.²⁶

What kinds of experiences foster strategic leader development on the job? A number of practices that have been suggested for leader development at the battalion level apply equally to strategic leader development.²⁷ Assignments may be based on developmental needs. For example, the emphasis on joint service experience illustrates a policy that links assignments to developmental requirements. However, regardless of the particular job or position, officers at all levels might be assigned tasks and responsibilities based on their specific developmental needs (considering strengths as well as shortcomings). For example, officers who need to broaden their perspective on civil-military relations may be given tasks that require interaction with local community leaders. Strategic vision might be fostered by assigning a team of

officers to prepare a strategic assessment for the organization to which they are assigned. Mentoring and coaching as well as private reflection also have the potential to enhance the value of job experiences. Self-evaluation, in particular, enhances one's ability to learn from experience, which is itself an important feature of strategic-level leadership.

Self-Development. Ultimately, each officer is responsible for his or her own development. Professional education and on-the-job developmental experiences can greatly facilitate leader preparation, but in the final analysis, the burden rests with each individual. Much of Eisenhower's development, for example, was self-directed. Throughout his career he engaged in disciplined, purposeful, self-directed study and reflection.²⁸ The same applies to George S. Patton, Jr., perhaps more so even than in Eisenhower's case.²⁹

What can the individual officer do in this regard? A number of ideas come to mind. First, involvement in an active reading program is highly advantageous, not only in the military field but in areas outside specific professional interests. Broadening horizons enhances the ability to discriminate and expands frames of reference. A second technique is to seek challenging assignments in the service that provide opportunities for stretching one's abilities, with resultant professional growth. This may sound overly idealistic, since our assignments are often beyond our control. Nevertheless, within a particular job, the potential generally exists to assume responsibilities that stretch current ways of thinking and behaving. Third, it is desirable to seek challenges outside the job, as well as at work. Community service, for example, provides exposure to different points of view and broadens one's understanding of domestic issues as they influence national security. Finally, writing for publication is certainly a promising avenue of self-development. Professional writing forces us to organize and communicate our thoughts, and it provides a vehicle for serious discussion among professional colleagues. These are only a few examples of techniques that can be used by the individual officer to prepare himself for the responsibilities of strategic-level leadership.

Conclusion

Despite all the rhetoric regarding leader development, we have a great deal more to learn, especially concerning the preparation of strategic leaders. The Army's approach to leader training based on Learning principles is sound and has served us well. However, the field of developmental psychology offers important insights which have, until recently, gone unrecognized. This is a fertile area for systematic study. Fortunately, our sparse understanding of the process of leader development does not prevent well-qualified people from ascending to strategic leadership positions. As we come to understand more about this complex phenomenon, the Army will no longer

have to leave the preparation of its strategic leaders to chance or to providence. Instead, the Army will be able to provide planned developmental opportunities for more of its officers and, as a consequence, have a larger pool of talent from which to select its top leaders.

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Career Management: Time for a Bold Adjustment

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It's not easy to make a case for reform of an organization flushed with victory. Still, that is just what this essay will endeavor to do. But perhaps *reform* is not the right word, summoning up as it does the military reform movement of the 1970s and '80s, in which a host of external critics urged fundamental change upon what they labeled a stubbornly conservative body of military professionals.

In fact, significant changes for the better have been made within the armed services and the defense establishment since the Vietnam War. Leadership skills have been strengthened, individual training has been systematized and unit training made more realistic, and high standards of troop discipline have been restored. The readiness of our forces deterred Soviet expansion and our military assistance blunted communist adventurism in the Third World, contributing to the collapse of Marxism-Leninism as a force in international politics. In the Persian Gulf War, so-called gold-plated weapons more than proved their worth, an extraordinary excellence in joint staff planning was displayed there, and maneuver operations worthy of a Hannibal or a Napoleon precipitated the rout of a numerically superior enemy. Whether part of the credit for all this should go to external critics is academic—it was professionals who implemented the needed changes and produced those victories.

So, rather than urging reform because of alleged failure in the past, this essay will suggest that we adapt America's profession of arms to the changes wrought by victory. Specifically, it will explore whether the current military career system, created in the aftermath of World War II and based on preparedness for massive expansion against a monolithic enemy, is suitable for the non-bipolar, New World Order of the future.

Origins of the Current Career System

The mobilization for World War II entailed a fortyfold expansion of the services, causing extraordinarily fast promotions within the officer corps. Among the legends from that period is Army Chief of Staff George Marshall's little black book, from which he rapidly advanced those who would become the senior ground leaders of the war. (It goes almost without saying that similar apocryphal lore exists within the Navy and Air Force concerning Admiral King and General Arnold.) Less well known is that all of the service departments concurrently boarded out large numbers of officers judged to be too old or otherwise not up to the demands of the coming conflict. Then, as the mobilization and the war itself progressed, it was discovered that many officers, including some whose performances had been exemplary in peacetime, could not cope with the turbulent reassignments and varied stressful duties required during hostilities. A life-or-death struggle did not permit second chances, so there were many personal failures as well as successes attendant upon America's worldwide victory.

Having experienced two great mobilizations in their lifetimes, and foreseeing the emergence, in Soviet communism, of yet another major adversary, service leaders were determined to make their institutions readier for the next international confrontation. Among other lessons learned, they seem to have perceived a correlation between success in the rapid reassignments of wartime and a previous pattern of varied experience in peacetime. This became the "generalist ideal," and led to its administrative manifestation, a new and elaborate system of career management. Officers' careers would be directed to ensure them varied experiences, and those who could not cope with variety would be eliminated. Peacetime service would thus approximate, at a reduced risk to national security, the developmental stresses of war.

The means for quality control, an up-or-out promotion standard, was institutionalized in the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. Lieutenants not promoted to captain (Army/AF/Marine titles of rank are used here for simplicity) would leave the service in their twenties; captains not promoted to major, in their thirties; majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and brigadier generals

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would retire in their forties or early fifties, in each case a few years after having been passed over. Except for a small number of very senior generals and admirals, the military would no longer be a lifetime career.

It is curious to note that the same age/rank relationship was made to apply to all officers, regardless of function. For example, those whose duties did not require any particular degree of physical vigor (e.g. a lieutenant colonel of the adjutant general's corps managing an administrative office) would be held to the same up-or-out standards as those whose duties clearly did (e.g. an infantry lieutenant colonel commanding a combat battalion). The principal rationale of the act apparently was not, contrary to conventional wisdom, a need for youth and vigor, but simply a desire for rapid peacetime advancement—possible only if those not advancing got out of the way—as a means of testing adaptability to rapid wartime advancement. The services would thus be more ready for the next major expansion, having (to use a business term) an “inventory in motion” officer corps.

A factor not taken into account by the creators of the new system was that of institutionalized large-scale overseas stationing of our armed forces. Following promulgation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, communist power seizure in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Red Army's victory in China's civil war in 1949, and North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, we deployed and long maintained between a quarter and a third of our forces overseas. The result was an increase of turbulence in officer career patterns. In addition to changing jobs upon promotion (on average, every fourth year) and upon each assignment to and from resident schooling (about every fifth year), the successful officer would be assigned overseas and back perhaps three times in a 20- to 30-year career. It is not necessary to wrestle with the mathematics—a random survey of, say, colonels with 25 years' service will show that average tenure in each duty position has been scarcely a year and a half. This appears to have been the case regardless of the criticality of the position; a case in point (and one can find many such) is that the Army's M-1 tank had nine program managers in its 12 years of development.

Does Up-or-Out Make Sense?

Speaking from the standpoint of business (which this writer does, after a decade of managing executive development in a major corporation), such turbulence would be regarded as absurdly counterproductive. An executive in charge of a typical factory, marketing organization, research laboratory, or sales force would just be getting truly effective after a year and a half on the job. Moreover, that short a time would not be enough to judge an executive's performance or to determine his readiness to advance to higher levels of responsibility.

But, it will be argued, the military is not a business organization. True as that may be, the suspicion remains that rapid reassignment, even given its advantages as a winnowing device and in preparing officers for mobilization expansion and wartime turbulence, has been overdone.

For one thing, it appears to have resulted in a requirement for vastly larger numbers of officers. If each officer in an organization has arrived there so recently as to still be on the learning curve, it will take many more officers to provide the skills and knowledge for effective operation. A case in point—obvious to an observer from the business world—is the astonishing profusion of officers in positions labelled “deputy,” “executive officer,” “special assistant,” and “aide.” Statistically, the proportion of all officers in the services has burgeoned from 9.4 percent to 15.5 percent since World War II, with that of the field grades—major through colonel in the Army, Air Force, and Marines, lieutenant commander through captain in the Navy—more than quadrupling, from 1.3 percent to 5.4 percent.

In 1983, the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (the “Grace Commission,” for which I directed manpower analysis on the Department of the Army Task Force) estimated that the services could, by a moderate reduction in reassignment frequency, substantially lower officer requirements. Steps recommended were replacement of lengthy resident schooling by short courses on a TDY-and-return basis, lengthening of “desirable” overseas tours, extension of *tenure in command* and key staff jobs, and flexibility in hewing to a position’s prescribed rank (with, say, a year’s limit) for those promoted while in the position. Action has never been taken on those recommendations; and, to no one’s surprise, the current drawdown, temporarily put on hold by the Persian Gulf crisis but now gathering momentum, reduces officer strength far less proportionally than overall manpower.

Now, it should be noted that there has indeed been an expansion of the services with every major crisis but the most recent, and an attendant speedup in the promotion of officers. This would appear to make somewhat of a case for the sort of turbulence-conditioning we have been talking about. In the future, however, it is probable that such expansion, with or without reserve-component mobilization, will become a distant memory. There is no imposing enemy to the United States on the horizon, nothing at all comparable to the Central Powers of World War I, the Hitler-Tojo Axis, or Moscow-centered communism at its height of aggressiveness. To be sure, Japan and the European Community threaten our international economic competitiveness, but it strains imagination to foresee a role in either case for armed intervention.

Before further discussing rapid reassignment, rapid promotion, and up-or-out attrition, let us dispose of what I consider to be a side issue—the question of “youth and vigor” that I raised earlier. In today’s Army, a junior

officer remains in grade as a lieutenant for only four years. (All of these figures may be stretched out somewhat during a drawdown, but experience indicates that the effect will be temporary.) This is necessary, it is argued, because only someone in the vigor of his or her early twenties has the hustle and stamina to lead a platoon of teenage soldiers in the field. Apparently unquestioned is the anomaly that the platoon sergeant is usually in his thirties or even early forties, with duties that are likely to be even more arduous than the lieutenant's. The same paradox exists with the captain in his late twenties commanding a company, whose first sergeant is likely to be a grizzled veteran in his late forties.

The officer/NCO relationship aside, one wonders why a lieutenant colonel commanding a battalion must be in his or her thirties, a colonel commanding a brigade in his early forties, and so on into the general officer ranks, when it is taken for granted that an obviously vigorous Norman Schwarzkopf should retire in his fifties. It would seem to make better sense for officers to command a decade later in age and service, if the individuals concerned were fit; and for flag-rank officers to serve until age 65, as is accepted practice for comparable positions in business. If the logic is truly one of vigor, and if age has been merely a convenient surrogate, could not there be a physical fitness requirement for continuation in a combat-type career track?

In fact, physical vigor as such cannot be the true reason for current practice. There already exist fitness tests for duties with specific physical requirements, aviation being the largest and most obvious example. It is hard to understand why existing tests for overall physical ability could not be applied on some sort of sliding scale, by age and type of function. There has to be some other rationale underlying the services' insistence on maintaining the up-or-out system of promotion and retention.

Up-or-Out: Rationale and Consequences

There is such a rationale—it is officer recruitment and retention. Forget (if you ever believed) that old Chinese proverb about not using good iron for horseshoes nor good men for soldiers, for its suggestion that stupidity befits soldiership has no validity in this day and age. Anyone familiar with the fast changing, technologically intricate, and politically and managerially sophisticated requirements of modern warfare knows the gross untruth of such a saying. There is hardly any use in a modern armed service for the mythical dumb soldier, and there is certainly no place for other than first-rate managers and leaders among its officers.

The problem is how to attract and retain such officers, given the managerial challenges and the financial and lifestyle rewards of a business

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career in our business-oriented society. Rapid promotion does indeed provide such a means, at least during the early years of service. There is little in civilian industry to compare with the opportunity for an Army or Marine captain, at the age of 27 or so, to lead a company/battery/ troop of 100 to 200 soldiers. Indeed, the prospect of so much responsibility at so young an age is a principal recruiting theme of all the services' ROTC programs. This also applies to command of a Navy ship or Air Force squadron (or Army/Marine battalion), where an officer in his or her late thirties is responsible for hundreds of men and women and tens of millions of dollars in budget and inventory. By that age, of course, near-term eligibility for full retirement (including immediate receipt of benefits) after 20 years is a powerful force for retention. As a result, a resignation between the 15th and 20th years of service is a rare occurrence, while retirement immediately upon reaching 20 (typically at 40-plus years of age) is so common as to be unremarkable.

Unfortunately, the logic cuts both ways. If we value officers for the intelligence and resourcefulness shown in their duty performance, we have to give them credit for applying the same intellectual energy to their personal lives and careers. It is all very well to hope that patriotism, dedication to duty, and love of military life will keep enough of these better officers in the service. Only a tiny minority, however, have the prospect of achieving such high rank as to remain past their forties, and this is generally understood. Many of our finest officers, therefore, will choose to resign in their first decade in uniform, to begin civilian careers at an age and level where there are ample opportunities for entry into business organizations. Others, after completing 20 years of service and thus achieving minimum eligibility for retirement, will leave while still young enough to start a genuine second career.

This is not necessarily a bad thing. If there were no up-or-out method for narrowing the promotion pyramid, and if too many officers chose to remain, promotion would soon grind to a crawl and the services would lose a recruiting and retention inducement that speaks powerfully in America's materialistic society. As it is, those who remain to compete for high rank, like those who depart, have made an intelligent risk/reward analysis. For those who stay, the ceremony, camaraderie, adventure, moral satisfaction of public service, compensation adequate to a middle-class lifestyle, and security afforded by a

relatively stable institution have made the risk worthwhile. If they then succeed in achieving high rank, the rewards are considerable in terms of continuing prestige within a community where they have spent most of their lives.

Thus it can be demonstrated that from the services' traditional point of view, up-or-out makes eminently good sense. The question remains whether it makes good sense from the standpoint of current trends in defense expenditures, national budgets (and deficits), and the ability to finance the relatively large, intensively trained, and high-tech standing force required by the interventionist strategy arguably implied by the New World Order.

Let us assume, for the sake of a rough analysis, that the drawn-down Army requires 75,000 officers. If 65,000 have less than 20 years of service, and receive, in pay and benefits, \$100,000 a year, their active-duty cost would be \$6.5 billion. Given that the 10,000 remaining past 20 years of service receive not only higher pay but also greater perquisites, a combined pay/benefit/perquisite cost of \$150,000 per officer seems not unreasonable, for an additional cost of \$1.5 billion. This is not all the cost, however. Of those who do not stay past 20, some 2000 per year may be assumed to have retired at 20 years (say, age 42), with a life expectancy to age 75 (a conservative average, given the physical vigor of military officers); if these receive pensions and benefits equal to half of what they got on active duty, the cost may be computed at $33 \times 2000 \times \$50,000 = \3.3 billion. The 10,000 who stay beyond 20 years are of course all eligible to retire. If they do so at an average 25 years of service, their retirement costs will be 2000 (per year) \times 28 (years in retirement) \times \$75,000 = \$4.2 billion. The total cost for the Army's officer corps thus adds up to \$15.5 billion.

However, if we then assume that promotions and reassignments are slowed and the career stretched out, the Army could presumably get by with perhaps a third fewer officers (see the Grace Commission recommendations cited earlier). This means the Army would have only 50,000 officers, 43,000 of them with less than 25 years of service (a new minimum retirement point), and 7000 remaining past 25, some to 40 years. If, as a consequence of both reduced numbers and increased apprehension about remaining further into middle age, only 1000 per year stay long enough to retire at 25 years, with the 7000 beyond 25 retiring at an average of 35 years, the total cost of the officer corps becomes around \$7.7 billion, half the cost under the current system. If reductions in education and training costs (because of longer payoff time in each duty position) are included, the total cost would be far less than half. Adding in the other services, we are talking about savings on the order of \$20-30 billion a year.

These figures are admittedly crude, but one can be sure that critics outside the services, in an effort to design and create intervention-capable forces within severe budget constraints, will use just such sorts of analyses.

A Need for Adaptation

Suppose that a study by the Joint Staff, using the authority granted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (and the capability so ably demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War), confirmed the premises developed in this essay: that rapid promotion is justifiable only for the sake of recruiting and retention; that frequent reassignment and up-or-out attrition are justifiable only to support the expedited promotions; and that none of these procedures makes sense in the context of constrained resources, a non-mobilization strategy, and the strong likelihood that stretched-out time between promotions and during assignments would actually enhance performance. Would the services then insist that recruiting and retention are so vulnerable as to justify reduction in the other aspects of mission capability?

The question, then, boils down to whether recruiting and retention are really so vulnerable. As for recruiting, college graduates are surely attracted into the officer corps for many of the same reasons that attract less-advantaged men and women into the enlisted ranks—the distinctive attributes of military life (adventure, outdoor activity, exercise of leadership and responsibility, foreign travel, discipline, etc.) plus the benefits of education (beforehand in a service academy or ROTC scholarship, or afterward in a GI Bill) useful in or out of the service. The prospect of 20-year retirement does not appear to be a prominent incentive for entering the service, if one may judge from a lack of emphasis on the subject in recruitment advertising.

The most productive area for examination, therefore, would be whether a stretch-out of promotion during the early years of service and a shift of eligibility for full retirement to 25 (or even 30) years would so decrease junior officer retention as to diminish force effectiveness over the long term. Possibly, the opposite would occur—that career extension of experienced and physically vigorous officers past 20 years of service would significantly enhance their leadership and thus the retention of their subordinates. Given a program of assistance when the time comes to make a transition to a second career, it is also possible that more officers would be willing to risk deferring that transition to a later age. Most large business corporations, recognizing the difficulty of managerial job-hunting at a mid-career level (and at middle age, when financial obligations tend to be at their highest) have made such outplacement programs a standard practice.

Equally important to determine would be the impact of a new career system on the military's sense of professionalism. There appears to be a consensus among scholars that the military services in modern industrialized nations are converging with their larger societies, that is, becoming more occupationally oriented than professional (in the traditional sense of the

military as a culturally separate professional group). Whether reestablishment of the military as a "lifetime career" (which is what the suggested changes would amount to) will move the American military closer to or farther from the mainstream of national work patterns, and whether that result is good or bad for national security, are surely as important as tangible questions about manpower and budgets.

"But why change at all?" the skeptic may well be asking. As I remarked earlier concerning cost analysis, that which is distasteful to the military traditionalist may very well be attractive to civilian critics, those who are seeking to design and create intervention-capable forces within severely constrained resources. And make no mistake about it, our nation—given all its problems of urban decay, educational decline, crumbling infrastructure, drug abuse, rampant crime, and diminished international competitiveness, and given further the opportunity presented by the end of bipolar confrontation—is not likely to keep defense expenditures at the top of its agenda. The military, for its own sake, needs to undertake appropriate reforms before they are imposed from above by its political masters.

Summarizing the foregoing, effective reform of the military career system would include these elements:

- Reducing the number of non-essential officers by lengthening assignments, curtailing resident schooling, and eliminating deputy/executive/assistant-to positions.
- Eliminating blanket up-or-out as a device for managing officer age and rank distribution.
- Setting minimum eligibility for full-benefits retirement at 25 years, with eventual extension possibly to 30 years, depending on experience with retention patterns.
- Stretching out promotions, in keeping with such stretched-out careers.
- Establishing a schedule of fitness standards for appointment to positions (or continuation in career tracks) requiring a high degree of vigor. Alternatively, retaining up-or-out as an exception for those career tracks only.
- Involuntarily terminating officers whose performance has unacceptably declined, or whose skills are no longer needed by any of the services.
- Establishing a transition program, similar to the outplacement programs offered by major corporations, for officers terminated in mid-career.

The last of these, a career transition program for officers (with a parallel program for noncommissioned/petty officers) whose careers end in middle age, is needed whether overall reform is undertaken or not. Under the

That which is distasteful to the military traditionalist may well be attractive to civilian critics, who are seeking to design and create intervention-capable forces within severely constrained resources.

present system, officers retire on average in their late forties, noncommissioned and petty officers in their early forties. Whatever the rank achieved, the effect is the same: a reduction in income to around half that on active duty, at an age when financial obligations are at a maximum, and loss of the psychological and emotional satisfactions of employment just when civilian counterparts are at their height of productivity. There is thus a built-in need for military retirees to find a second career. Immediate pension and continued benefits ease the financial transition, but the morale transition is another matter. To pretend, as the current system seems to, that perception of this situation by high-potential junior officers has no bearing on their retention is to fly in the face of reality. If cost is seen as a stumbling block, by coupling a transition program to a restriction on current retire-at-will policies (i.e. limit eligibility to retirement-eligibles who contract to serve out some minimum tenure in their current positions), the program could be made essentially cost-free. (I am speaking here of the post-drawdown milieu, when the Selective Early Retirement Boards and other early-release programs have run their course.) In any case, to the extent that military service is by its nature only the first of an individual's careers, the profession should adapt that situation to its benefit rather than its detriment.

However good the design and careful the implementation, there will be much risk in modifying the officer career system. A lot of details will have to be worked out over time, as was the case following the post-World War II adoption of the current structure. That—it need hardly be said—is no excuse for inaction. The services must either take the initiative or have reforms imposed upon them by individuals and agencies who lack an experienced understanding of the profession of arms. In either case, someone has to undertake the task. The national strategy which produced the present career system has given way to a new world order, and the nation's military must be properly structured for its mission within that strategy. □

The Indian Wars and US Military Thought, 1865-1890

CLYDE R. SIMMONS

We're marching off for Sitting Bull
And this is the way we go—
Forty miles a day, on beans and hay,
With the Regular Army, O!

This verse from an old marching tune recalls perhaps the most storied period in the history of the US Army, the Indian wars of 1865 to 1890. The era is certainly familiar to most Americans thanks to countless novels, television programs, and movies telling of the Army's battles with various tribes of the West. The popular images of campaigns against the Sioux, Cheyennes, and Apaches are of a small professional Army meeting an unconventional enemy on his own terms and defeating him. The romantic view created by movies and novels, however, is only partly true. Engagements with hostile Indians were rare, and rarer still was one that was an unqualified victory for the Army.

Even rarer yet were instances of Army units fighting Indians with unconventional techniques. The casual student of this chapter of history assumes, of course, that the Army developed a doctrine of war specifically tailored to the mobile hit-and-run tactics employed by the Indians. On the contrary, as noted by historian Robert Utley, "The Army as an institution never evolved a doctrine of Indian warfare." No course of instruction distinguishing between conventional and unconventional warfare was ever instituted at West Point, nor did the staff bureaus ever issue guidance to deal with the guerrilla tactics of the Indians. Utley concluded, "Lacking a formal doctrine of unconventional war, the Army waged conventional war."²

This unconcern with doctrine for fighting Indians is remarkable. Throughout most of the Army's history to that point, its principal occupation

was dealing with Indians. In fact, this mission was often the only justification Congress and the American people saw for the continued existence of the Army.

What explains the Army's neglect of unconventional warfare doctrine? Several factors contributed. The Army of 1865-1890 was an organization that became increasingly isolated from the society it served during the post-Civil War period. Army leaders recognized that the Indian threat would sooner or later end and the Army's traditional internal security mission would end with it. Therefore, the Army sought to define a new role for itself in the closing decades of the 19th century.

Influencing this search for a continuing relevance in society was the Army's own history, contemporary political and social trends, and the belief that the United States would become a prominent force in the international community. In combination, these factors led the Army to reject its previous self-image as a largely constabulary force and to see its future as a professional force oriented on external threats. These foreign threats, while not clearly defined, would certainly be conventional military forces on the pattern of leading European armies. Thus unconventional war and doctrine, such as that typified by the Indian campaigns, was viewed as tangential and not worth pursuing.

Isolation of the Army

The most important factor leading to the rejection of unconventional doctrine as a subject of importance was the Army's increasing isolation from American society. Though John M. Gates and a few other revisionists reject the concept of isolation,³ the mainstream scholarly view, typified by that of Samuel P. Huntington, holds not only that the frontier Army was isolated from society but that indeed such isolation was a "prerequisite to professionalism."⁴ Certainly the officers stationed on the frontier believed they were isolated, and understanding this is crucial to understanding their resulting neglect of unconventional warfare. At times the presumed alienation of the civilian sector toward the Army was seen as a threat to its continued existence. Civilian ambivalence and, at times, hostility were the catalysts that drove the Army to a redefinition of its role.

The Army's isolation was itself the product of various causes. The first and perhaps most pervasive cause was the traditional American belief

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that a large standing military was a threat to a democratic society. Samuel Adams summarized this American suspicion of standing armies in general in his observation that a "standing army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always dangerous to the liberties of the people." He further noted:

Soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a body distinct from the rest of the citizens. They have their arms always in their hands. Their rules and their discipline is severe. They soon become attached to their officers and disposed to yield implicit obedience to their commands. Such a power should be watched with a jealous eye.⁵

The nation's response to this belief in the danger of a standing army had always been to have the smallest Regular Army possible in peacetime. This tiny regular force would be augmented in an emergency with state militias and volunteer troops. Paradoxically, the success of the Union Army in the Civil War reinforced both the fear of a large peacetime Army and the belief in the utility of the militia system. Between 1865 and 1890 Congress often acted on this principle of American democracy and sought to limit the size of the Regular Army. In doing so, Congress came to be viewed by the Army as an enemy.

The first post-Civil War act establishing the peacetime strength of the Army was signed by President Andrew Johnson in July 1866. This act set the strength of the Army at 54,302 officers and men.⁶ However, Congress shortly began to cut the strength of the regular force: in 1869 the number of infantry regiments was reduced from 45 to 25, effectively reducing the Army to a total strength of 37,313. The next year Congress imposed further reductions, to a total of 30,000 enlisted, and in 1874 it limited the enlisted force to no more than 25,000.⁷

These reductions did not lower the number of companies in the force structure, so strength within the individual companies was reduced dramatically. For example, in 1881 the average strength of infantry companies was only 41, of artillery batteries 40, and of cavalry troops 58.⁸ Such curtailment was extremely detrimental to unit efficiency, and its ill effects were compounded by the usual absences due to desertion, illness, and detached duty.

The Army leadership viewed this long-term trend with alarm. They saw that the Army was overcommitted and in danger of being unable to perform its missions. Further, they feared that continued reductions could eventually threaten the organization's very existence. Reviewing the cumulative effects of these reductions in his annual report of 1880, the Army's commander, General William T. Sherman, noted that "the Army is too small in enlisted men to fulfill the heavy duties now imposed on it, and is overworked."⁹ Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, commander of the Division of the Missouri, felt compelled to add to his superior's remarks in his own annual report for 1880. He stressed the danger of inadequate strength:

To thoroughly and effectively perform the duties devolving upon us compels us many times to overwork our troops, and not unfrequently obliges us to take the field with small detachments, which have heretofore occasionally been over-matched and greatly outnumbered by our foes. This is not as it should be; but so long as our companies are limited to their [low] average strength, . . . it cannot be avoided.¹⁰

To remedy this situation, the Army leadership made numerous appeals to Congress for increases in the size of the force. Typical of these appeals was that of Sherman in 1880 when he asked for a net increase of 5000 men.¹¹ Congress's usual response was to ignore the request. In fact, by 1885 the overall strength of the Army was allowed to decrease to a total of 26,859.¹²

Appropriations were another area of congressional neglect and hostility to the Army. In 1877 and 1879 Congress failed to pass an appropriations bill. The effect of these failures was that soldiers didn't get paid. Although rations and clothing issues to enlisted men continued, officers and married soldiers faced severe hardship until Congress passed emergency funding measures.¹³ This action further weakened the convictions of soldiers and officers that the Army was a promising career and that Congress was sympathetic toward the military.

The traditional concern about the threat of a standing army to liberty was not the only source of congressional hostility. In the early years following the Civil War, much of the Army was assigned to duties in the South enforcing Reconstruction. The problems inherent in these duties were essentially unsolvable. The Army became involved in political power struggles, first between the executive and legislative branches and later between the Republican and Democratic parties. Initially, the Army was compelled to follow the more moderate policies of President Andrew Johnson. However, Radical Reconstructionists in Congress soon began to gain the political ascendancy. Grant, first as Commanding General and later as President, moved the Army into the Radical Reconstruction camp.

Most Army officers, however, disagreed with the harsh policies of the radicals. Many expressed the view that the radical approach was self-defeating because it would only provoke Southerners rather than speed their reassimilation into the Union. Sherman best expressed this view in a letter to his brother in 1865: "No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of people . . . we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we afford to maintain . . . an army large enough to hold [the Southerners] in subjugation."¹⁴

Another view widely held within the Army was that the demands of Radical Reconstructionism were counter to the constitutional provisions mandating civil control of the military. In a public statement rebuking a military subordinate who had taken the position that civil government in the South was

subservient to the military, the Commander of the Fourth Military District of Arkansas said: "Your assertion that the military forces are not the servants of the people of Arkansas, but rather their masters, is unjust both to the people and the military. . . . The military forces are the servants of the laws and the laws are for the benefit of the people."¹⁵

Expressing a similar viewpoint was Major General Winfield Scott Hancock. In a letter to his wife he explained his reluctance to assume Reconstruction duties in New Orleans: "I have not been educated to overthrow the civil authorities in time of peace."¹⁶ Lenient views such as these neither pleased Radical Reconstructionists nor escaped their notice. The result of this displeasure was that congressional radicals disbanded regiments no longer needed for Reconstruction rather than posting them to the frontier. By these acts, the radical Republicans demonstrated that the Army could expect no sympathy from that quarter.¹⁷

Compounding the Army's predicament, Southerners themselves were generally hostile. In some cases, local Federal commanders did support harsh Reconstruction. For example, Sheridan saw fit to fire the mayor of New Orleans, the governors of Louisiana and Texas, and numerous other Southern officials during his tenure in the South.¹⁸ Southerners objected particularly to the Army enforcing the new laws regarding black suffrage and civil rights. In any case, Southerners clearly saw that without the Army, Reconstruction would be finished. Their natural desire for self-determination guaranteed resentment of uniformed authority.

In 1875, Democrats won majority control of the House of Representatives. This event began the return of Southerners to national power. Allying with Northern Democrats, they began to attack the Army, hoping to eliminate it as a means of enforcing Reconstruction. The Southern Democrats supported all attempts to decrease the Army's size and appropriations. These attacks on the Army continued until the end of Reconstruction in the late 1870s.¹⁹

Another source of problems for the Army in its relations with Congress was its use to suppress strikes and other civil disturbances. The Army was used often outside the South to quell riots and break strikes. For example, in 1885 and 1886 troops were used to suppress anti-Chinese riots in Wyoming and Washington. The Army broke strikes in Michigan in 1872, intervened in the Great Railway Strike of 1877, and was employed in a similar role in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, in 1892 and 1894. Labor interests were enraged by these actions and sought political support from Democrats to halt them. Labor leaders became the willing allies of Southerners and actively supported the efforts of the House majority to reduce the size of the Army drastically.²⁰

Yet another reason for the Army's isolation was the deep domestic conflict over Indian policy. One faction was resoundingly pro-Indian, believing that the Army was directly responsible for most disturbances involving the

Indian tribes. Groups within this faction, known generally as Reformers, were made up largely of liberal Easterners who advocated the gradual, peaceful assimilation of Indians into American society. These groups, the most powerful of which was the Indian Rights Association led by Herbert Welsh, argued that land-hungry Western whites were using the Army to annihilate the Indian. While most of the Reformers' attacks were directed at Western civilians and their supporters in Congress, the Army was the target of many attacks in the media and in Congress.²¹ On the other hand, Western civilians often castigated the Army for failing to protect them from Indian raids. Many believed the Army to be incompetent and too sympathetic to the Indian.

For its part, the Army generally held both sides in contempt. Army leaders criticized the Eastern Reformers, holding that these groups were ignorant of the true conditions in the West. General Nelson A. Miles perhaps best summarized the Army view of these humanitarian groups. In a letter to his wife he noted it "required a peculiar kind of genius to conduct an Indian campaign from West Point—or Boston, although they know a great deal about Indians in that model city—at least they think they do, which is very important."²²

Army contempt for Western extremists was also harsh. Many officers believed greed on the part of whites was responsible for hostilities. This view is typified by the writings of Major Alfred Hough, who charged that frontiersmen were a "wholly unscrupulous" lot. "It is an outrage," he continued, "that we of the Army who have all the hardships to encounter should be made such catspaws or mere tools of ambitious men who care only for their own interests and cater to the public for sympathy."²³

So, the Army sought to walk the middle ground between these two counterposed groups. As is the usual fate of those who seek compromise, it found itself assailed by both sides. Being caught between these two factions strengthened professional soldiers' feelings of alienation and, in turn, reinforced their fears for the future of their organization.

Another factor contributing to the Army's isolation was the low esteem society had for soldiers and the Army in general. A not uncommon view of soldiers was presented by a reporter in Hays City, Kansas, in 1883 who referred to soldiers from the local post as "white trash" and "coons."²⁴ Officers were held in only slightly better regard, as evidenced by Congressman Fernando Wood's remark that they were "idle vagabonds who are well paid and do nothing."²⁵

The manifestations of these adverse attitudes ranged from ridicule to open hostility and were plainly evident to soldiers. For example, one regular soldier asked his Congressman for help in getting a pension and was flatly refused. Writing his former commander, he explained that the politician had refused to help because he "had worn the uniform of a 'regular.'"²⁶ A more ominous result of civilian antipathy was an incident in Walla Walla, Washington,

where a gambler shot and wounded a soldier. Enraged, and fearing that the civilian criminal would escape justice, a group of soldiers seized the man from the sheriff and lynched him on the jail grounds.²⁷ Obviously, such episodes did little to elevate soldiers in the eyes of civilians.

The final source of isolation which must be understood was the physical separation of the Army from the population. During most of the post-Civil War era, the Army was posted to numerous small forts on the frontier. Physical isolation contributed to a growing civilian ignorance of the Army and its problems. The reaction of an Eastern woman in 1885 was not atypical. Meeting a colonel, she exclaimed, "What, a colonel of the Army? Why I supposed the Army was all disbanded at the close of the [Civil] war."²⁸

Search for a New Role

The psychological and physical separation of the Army was a matter of great concern to the Army's leaders. Major General John Pope addressed the danger of alienation on soldiers' attitudes:

So long as the soldier remains one of the people; so long as he shares their interests, takes part in their progress, and feels a common sympathy with them in their hopes and aspirations, so long will the Army be held in honorable esteem and regard. . . . When he ceases to do this; when officers and soldiers cease to be citizens in the highest and truest sense, the Army will deserve to lose, as it will surely lose, its place in the affections of the people, and properly and naturally become an object of suspicion and dislike.²⁹

Pope went on to note, "The well-being of the people equally with the well-being of the Army requires a common sympathy and common interest between them."³⁰ Thus, Pope saw isolation as a threat to the bonds between the Army and the society it served. If these bonds were broken, the Army's existence would be threatened.

For most of the period 1865-1890, therefore, the attention of the Army's more enlightened leaders was focused on articulating a role which would secure its link to society. Unconventional war against Indians did not offer this sort of mission and therefore was downplayed. Indian war did not seem to be a promising role for two reasons completely apart from the Army's aversion to being drawn into domestic political conflict.

First, Indians posed only a minor regional threat. By 1865, the Indian threat was confined to the Great Plains, the Southwest, and the interior portions of the Pacific Northwest. The major population areas in the East and on the West Coast were not in danger, and, as noted earlier, civilians from these areas tended to view the Indian as the threatened party. Therefore, the majority of Americans could not be expected to support the Army in its battles with hostile tribes.

Second, Army leaders believed that even this modest Indian threat would soon end. As early as 1866, General Grant foresaw the end of the Indian wars, noting, "With the expiration of the [Civil War], Indian hostilities have diminished."³¹ In 1875, Sherman echoed this view in his annual report: "Generally speaking the damage to life and property by Indians is believed to be less during the past year than in any former year, and the prospect is that as the country settles up it will be less and less each year."³²

Even had a greater Indian threat remained, Army officers would have continued to devote little effort to developing an unconventional war doctrine because conventional tactics often worked well. As Robert Utley points out, "The conventional tactics of the Scott, Casey, and Upton manuals sometimes worked . . . [and] when they worked, they worked with a vengeance."³³

Essentially, the problem with conventional tactics was that normally the Army was not sufficiently mobile to bring the Indians to battle. Time and again, cavalry and infantry would trail hostile bands for weeks but fail to get them to stand and fight. An excellent example of this sort of futile campaign was that led by Major General Hancock against the Southern Plains tribes in April 1867. Hancock was in command of a force of approximately 4000 soldiers consisting of 11 troops of the 7th Cavalry, seven companies of the 37th Infantry, and a battery of the 4th Artillery. Initially he attempted to negotiate a peace treaty with a large band of Cheyenne and Oglala Sioux. When these attempts failed, Hancock attacked the villages only to discover the lodges were empty. He immediately gave pursuit and followed the hostiles



Brigadier General George Crook is pictured with two Apache scouts. He employed the highly mobile scouts to fix Apache hostiles in actions in Arizona in 1882-83, then relied on dogged pursuit to wear down and defeat the enemy.

through Kansas, southwestern Nebraska, and eastern Colorado. In spite of his best efforts, Hancock never caught the Sioux and Cheyenne war parties. Finally, his command exhausted, he was forced to return to his base in Fort Wallace, Kansas, in early July 1867.³⁴

Analyzing this failure, Sherman saw winter warfare as a means to deprive the enemy of mobility. Putting this idea to the test, Brigadier General George Crook began a winter offensive against the Paiutes in Oregon during the winter of 1867-1868. Keeping constant pressure on the hostiles, he pursued them far into the winter months. Since Indian horses foraged on grass, the winter months were exceptionally hard on them. Also, pursuit forced the Indians to move constantly, which kept them from hunting or gathering other food supplies. Army horses, on the other hand, were grain-fed and could be replaced if necessary. The wagon trains or strings of pack mules which slowed the Army in the summer allowed them to continue operations in the coldest of winters. Thus, in winter the Army had the advantage of superior mobility. Crook's tactics forced the Paiutes to surrender in the late winter of 1868. This campaign clearly demonstrated that the innovative application of conventional tactics under the right circumstances could defeat the Indians.³⁵

Variations on this theme were frequent. Crook altered his own tactics in 1882-1883 in actions against the Apaches in Arizona by using highly mobile Apache scouts to fix the hostiles. However, he still relied on a dogged pursuit to eventually wear down and defeat the enemy.³⁶ Using essentially the same tactics, Brigadier General Miles finally completed the defeat of the Apaches in 1886. He added a new feature: outposts of signal troops to detect and report enemy movement. In his instructions to his soldiers he stressed constant pursuit, stating, "Commanding officers are expected to continue a pursuit until capture, or until they are assured a fresh command is on the trail."³⁷ Praising Miles for his successful campaign, Lieutenant General Sheridan summed up the success of conventional tactics: "[Miles'] troops followed up the hostiles with vigorous energy, broke up their camps by attack four or five times, and gave them no rest until they surrendered."³⁸

Conventional tactics were not always successful, of course. However, they did achieve victory often enough to persuade Army officers that there was little point in devising new doctrine. Utley notes that "unit for unit—however great the numbers, the Indians could not come close to matching the discipline and organization of the Army." Utley concludes that "when Indians made the mistake of standing and fighting on the Army's terms, they usually lost."³⁹

The Rise of Professionalism

The final factor tending to deflect doctrinal thinking from Indian fighting was the rise of military professionalism. In the view of historian

Edward M. Coffman, professionalism was an emerging trend throughout American society in the last three decades of the 19th century. He argues that society changed because of the emergence of a new middle class in which the professions organized and established standards for themselves. Soldiers became a part of this movement.⁴⁰ Further, realizing that the Army's days as an Indian-fighting force were numbered, "Sherman and other leaders had reached the conclusion that the Army's mission in peacetime was to prepare for war."⁴¹

Since officers were coming to see themselves as professionals dedicated to preparing for future wars, the question then became, What would a modern war be like? In answering this question, leaders looked to their own most recent experience and to those of other modern, 19th-century armies. The most relevant American experience was obviously the Civil War. Almost every senior officer during the period 1865-1890 was a veteran of this conflict, and many had held high volunteer rank. The war was obviously the shaping event of these men's lives. In the words of Jerry M. Cooper, it "affected the officer corps more profoundly than had the Mexican War. The nature of the Civil War, with its enormous logistical demands and costly battlefield stalemate, altered the corporate consciousness of a significant element of officers."⁴²

The Civil War, as the seminal event of their careers, influenced Army leaders' thinking about both current operations and the nature of future conflicts. In the area of immediate operations against the Indians, it reinforced the tendencies of commanders to apply conventional tactics. The massive scale of Civil War operations and the emergence of a total-war philosophy were key features in the minds of Sherman, Sheridan, and their subordinates. Lacking the resources for truly massive campaigns against the Indians, they nevertheless practiced total war against the tribes to the degree permitted. As noted earlier, their real and perceived success using conventional, total-war tactics further reinforced their bias toward this doctrine.⁴³

The war's influence on their perceptions of the future also prompted them to emphasize conventional doctrine. The carnage and lengthy stalemate of the Civil War caused them to seek new methods of command and organization to prevent a repetition. Americans believed they had found these new methods in the examples of foreign armies. Especially significant was the model provided by Prussia in its defeat of the French in 1871 during the Franco-Prussian War.

Sheridan and Colonel William B. Hazen were observers of the Franco-Prussian War. Both were enormously impressed with the similarity of that war to the American Civil War and with the German military system.⁴⁴ Upon receiving their observations, Sherman dispatched his protégé, Emory Upton, on a worldwide tour to study foreign armies and methods.

Upton published the results in 1878 in his book *The Armies of Asia and Europe*. In this work, he severely criticized the American military system, arguing strongly for adoption of the German model. Although Congress was unwilling to accept most of Upton's suggestions, Sherman implemented those he could on his own authority. Most important for future doctrine in the American Army was Sherman's attempt to foster professional development. Specifically, Sherman instituted a series of professional schools which together could grow to mirror the Prussian army's educational system.

These efforts began in 1881 with the establishment of the Infantry and Cavalry School of Application at Fort Leavenworth. A logical extension was the requirement for officers to participate in lyceum programs at their posts. These programs were conceived by Major General John Schofield in order to "stimulate professional zeal and ambition."⁴⁵

In addition, Army leaders encouraged participation in professional organizations such as the Military Service Institute. Other professional organizations were formed, including associations of cavalry, artillery, and infantry officers. The most significant feature of these organizations was that they all published journals and urged their members to contribute articles.⁴⁶ Through these works, Army officers' views of themselves as professional soldiers were strengthened.

Officers began to actively develop new ideas and theories about tactics, logistics, leadership, and the purpose of an army. It was natural for them to view conventional war as being on the scale of the Civil War, but as practiced by an army on the European model established in 1871 in the Franco-Prussian War. Such, to them, became the epitome of modern war and professionalism. Their experiences in unconventional war against savages in the West clearly did not fit this mold. Consequently they tended to ignore Indian-fighting as beneath them as professionals. Clearly, unconventional war would not be relevant in the future, and thus generation of doctrine peculiar to it would be of little value.

Conclusions

The Army turned its back on its unconventional war history mainly because it felt itself threatened as an institution. The conclusion of the Civil War unleashed the antimilitary sentiment always close to the surface in American society. The fact that the North had won a brilliant victory with a volunteer army in the greatest war of American history only increased suspicions of the Regular Army. In the civilian community, it clearly seemed the Regular Army was not essential to fighting great wars. Further, with the South's defeat, there did not appear to be any threat of a great war on the horizon.

The only obvious roles for the Army now lay in enforcing Reconstruction, quelling civil disorders and strikes, and campaigning against the

Indians. All of those missions were controversial, subjecting the Army to the rough-and-tumble of American politics, with all the perils associated therewith. Further, both Reconstruction duty and the conduct of Indian wars were missions which promised to end shortly.

The hostility, political pressure, and neglect suffered by the Army caused a sense of psychological isolation to develop within, and its leadership began to search for a new mission. At the same time, professionalism became a force in American civilian society. Eagerly assimilating the professional ethic, the Army came to see its peacetime role as preparing for war. Leaders adopted European styles as the governing model for professional armies and modern wars. Accordingly, the American Army came to emphasize conventional war rather than irregular, unconventional struggles against hostile natives.

But what were the costs of this evolution to conventional war doctrine? By failing to develop and record a coherent unconventional doctrine, a valuable tradition was lost. Many lessons learned by hardship, trial, and error on the frontier were pushed out of mind. Ironically, the Army soon found itself fighting an unconventional war in the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902). Could that conflict have been won at a lesser cost if officers and soldiers of that time had been trained in unconventional doctrine based on the Army's Indian-fighting tradition? Further, if unconventional doctrine had been explored in depth as the Army sought to professionalize itself, could the doctrine have become a part of the traditional field of study in the American Army's school system? And if unconventional war was a legitimate area of study for the Army, could more study have helped avoid the errors made in 20th-century unconventional war? One can only speculate as to the answers, but it seems plausible that there is at least some causal connection between the lack of relevant tradition codified in doctrine and the lack of success on future battlefields.

On the other hand, the move away from unconventional war held benefits for the Army and the nation. True, the Army would be engaged in unconventional wars after the close of the frontier, but these wars would not be as vital to the nation as its conventional conflicts. The Spanish-American War (1898) accelerated America's assumption of an important international role. The two World Wars continued this process and ultimately validated the United States as a preeminent world power. This status would not have been possible had the Army not become a professional organization oriented toward fighting large-scale conventional wars. The words of historian Russell Weigley are of particular point in this regard:

If isolation from the main currents of American life encouraged an unhealthy introspection in such a figure as Emory Upton, it also . . . encouraged the healthy aspects of concentration upon things military. The rapid accomplishments of the early twentieth century in building a new Army suited to world power were built upon foundations laid in the twilight years of the old and isolated Army.⁴⁷

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The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War

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A central critique of the US conduct of the Vietnam War is that gradual escalation of the war against North Vietnam and limitation of US ground operations to South Vietnam condemned the United States to fight a war of attrition on Hanoi's terms. Various scholars have proposed that massive and quick application of US military power against North Vietnam could have overwhelmed that small country's defenses, while extension of US ground operations into the southern Laotian or North Vietnamese panhandles could have choked off the North Vietnamese infiltration which fed the insurgency in the South. In this way, North Vietnam's ability to prosecute the war would have been largely and quickly destroyed, while the Viet Cong insurgency, deprived of Northern cadre and arms, could have been handled by the Saigon government.

In advancing these propositions, their proponents acknowledge that it was primarily American decisionmakers' fears of direct Chinese entry into the war that precluded such options. Guenter Lewy, for example, acknowledged that "in the final analysis . . . Chinese deterrence was the main impediment to a more effective air campaign against North Vietnam. . . . The decision for 'gradualism' was . . . made primarily because of fear of Chinese intervention, and whether the likelihood of such an intervention was overrated will never be known."¹ General Bruce Palmer concluded that "one cannot quarrel with the decision not to invade North Vietnam because it was too close to China; our experience in misjudging the Chinese intervention in Korea was still fresh in our memory."² Yet Palmer, like Lewy, rejected the strategy of gradual escalation and limitation of ground operations to South Vietnam. One of the most influential of the critics of gradual escalation, retired Colonel Harry G. Summers, goes the furthest in discounting the Chinese threat. In his

book *On Strategy*, Summers quotes approvingly Dave Palmer's appraisal of the US failure to launch a strategic offensive against North Vietnam at the end of 1965 after the US 1st Cavalry Division defeated three regiments of the North Vietnamese army in a head-on battle in the Ia Drang Valley:

The Johnson Administration had already barricaded the one sure route to victory—to take the strategic offensive against the source of the war. Memories of Mao Tse-tung's reaction when North Korea was overrun by United Nations troops in 1950 haunted the White House. America's fear of war with Red China protected North Vietnam from invasion more surely than any instrument of war Hanoi could have fielded.³

Summers does not directly say that such fears of Chinese intervention were ill-founded. He strongly implies this, however. The United States, Summers says, "allowed [itself] to be bluffed by China throughout most of the war. . . . Our error was not that we were fearful of the dangers of nuclear war and of Chinese or Russian intervention in Vietnam. . . . The error was that we took counsel of these fears and in so doing paralyzed our strategic thinking." The closest Summers comes to addressing the question squarely is in a note in which he says that "whether the Soviets or the Chinese ever intended intervention is a matter of conjecture." Even here, however, the two events he cites (Mao's rejection of Moscow's 1965 proposal for united Sino-Soviet action in support of Hanoi, and Mao's suspicions that Moscow was trying to maneuver China into a war with the United States) both point toward the conclusion that Mao was already more afraid of the Soviet Union than of the United States and, by implication, that he was not serious about China's threats to intervene on behalf of Hanoi.⁴

Summers and similar critics are quite correct in concluding that fear of Chinese intervention was a principal factor underlying the US strategy of graduated escalation. A basic purpose of that strategy was to prevent Chinese intervention by keeping the level of violence directed against North Vietnam controlled, precise, and below the threshold that would spark full-scale Chinese intervention. There is also no question that the China-induced US strategy of

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gradual escalation was an immense boon to North Vietnam. It allowed Hanoi time to adjust to US pressure and to find ways to circumvent US moves. By helping to induce Washington to adopt this particular strategy, Beijing contributed substantially to Hanoi's eventual victory over the United States. The question, however, is this: Were Washington's fears of possible Chinese intervention well-founded?

For us to accept Summers' thesis, the question of the seriousness of China's threats to go to war with the United States in Indochina in the mid-1960s must be squarely addressed. If the strategy advocated by Summers had been implemented, would China have sent armies to fight against the United States in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam? Would the Vietnam War have escalated into a Sino-American war? It is, of course, impossible to definitively answer such questions regarding the "what ifs" of history. It is sometimes important to try, however, since humans learn and mislearn so much from history.

China's Stake in Hanoi

During the early 1960s North Vietnam was one of Beijing's closest political and military allies. As the Sino-Soviet polemic escalated, and as the Soviet Union under Khrushchev inched toward disengagement from the mounting Indochina conflict, Hanoi increasingly lined up behind Beijing. With respect to the bifurcated international communist movement of early 1964, Hanoi was virtually in China's camp.⁵ Hanoi moved back to a more balanced position after Khrushchev's fall and Moscow's adoption of a more interventionist policy under Kosygin and Brezhnev, but Hanoi-Beijing relations remained quite close. According to Vietnamese defector Hoang Van Hoan, until 1968 Hanoi always consulted with Beijing prior to deciding on any major move.⁶ In short, the United States was making war on one of China's closest allies.

Beijing's alliance with North Vietnam served important national security and ideological objectives. From the standpoint of national security, China's support for Hanoi was Mao's way of rolling back US containment in Asia. The "liberation" of South Vietnam would be a significant blow to the South East Asian Treaty Organization and other US-fostered anti-Chinese containment schemes in Asia. Conversely, were American control over South Vietnam consolidated, the American imperialists might be tempted to move even closer to China's borders. Ideologically, victory for North Vietnam's war of national liberation with the support of the socialist camp would prove the political correctness of Mao Zedong's more militant strategy for dealing with US imperialism and the incorrectness of Khrushchev's apostate acceptance of peaceful coexistence. Once the correctness of Mao's line was demonstrated, the general direction of the international communist movement might be rectified and reoriented toward more militant struggle against US imperialism.⁷

The China-induced US strategy of gradual escalation allowed Hanoi time to adjust to US pressure and to find ways to circumvent US moves.

The gravity of Chinese interests in North Vietnam was reflected in the magnitude of Chinese support for Hanoi during its wars. According to Beijing, between 1950 and 1978 China provided over \$20 billion worth of materiel to Vietnam. This included weapons, ammunition, and supplies sufficient to equip two million soldiers. In 1962 alone, China supplied 90,000 machine guns and rifles to the Viet Cong, substantially upgrading the latter's ability to counter US-Saigon counterinsurgency efforts. As the US-North Vietnam war unfolded, China provided vital support for Hanoi's logistical effort, supplying more than 30,000 trucks and two million tons of gasoline, and repairing 900 kilometers of railways. China also provided Hanoi with a large quantity of railway rails, locomotives, and wagons, fully equipped several hundred North Vietnamese factories, and provided 300 million square meters of cloth and five million tons of grain, along with large quantities of items needed by North Vietnam's populace for daily living. China also gave Hanoi several hundred million dollars in hard currency.⁸

As important as China's material support was its diplomatic-military support. One critical manifestation of this support came during the Laotian crisis and Geneva convention of 1961-62. At Geneva the United States eventually accepted a "neutralization" of Laos which tacitly allowed Hanoi to continue using the supply lines running through Pathet Lao-controlled areas of the Laotian panhandle.⁹ Hanoi had begun using and expanding these Laotian supply lines in 1959 when it decided to renew armed struggle in the South. As the war escalated those lines became increasingly vital to Hanoi's war effort. Summers and kindred critics of US strategy have assigned a large portion of responsibility for the US defeat in Vietnam to Washington's acceptance of the particular type of "neutralization" of Laos agreed on at Geneva in 1962 and the limitation of the ground war to South Vietnam which followed from that decision.

Chinese threats to intervene in Laos figured prominently in the US decision in May 1962 to "neutralize" Laos. One of the key reasons why US leaders ruled out the use of US troops to occupy the Laotian panhandle (this was the military alternative to the political solution of neutralization) was a belief that North Vietnam and China would strongly resist such a move. On 19

May 1962, for example, *Renmin ribao* (*People's Daily*, a newspaper published by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party) had warned:

US aggressive moves in Southeast Asia are a serious threat to the security of China. The Chinese people cannot remain indifferent to this. . . . The Chinese people firmly oppose US imperialist armed intervention in Laos, and absolutely cannot tolerate the establishment by US imperialism in areas close to China of any new military bridgeheads directed against this country. . . . We must serve a fresh warning to the Kennedy Administration that it shall be held fully responsible for all grave consequences arising from its policy of playing with fire.¹⁰

These were strong words. Not as hard or as blunt as those used by Beijing in the final weeks before its entry into the Korean conflict, but strong enough to convey Beijing's belief that China's own security was involved and that China might consider war to deal with these threats. Just as important, Beijing's verbal warnings were backed up by a concentration of Chinese military forces in southern China adjacent to Laos.¹¹

Confronted by the possibility of waging a land war with China in the interior of the Indochina peninsula, Washington retreated to the neutralization alternative. In the face of possible Chinese counter-intervention, the military option in Laos was simply unacceptable. According to Roger Hilsman, director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research during the Laotian crisis, "What the United States would do if the Chinese Communists intervened was not spelled out, but the general impression was that the recommendation would be to retaliate on the mainland with nuclear weapons."¹²

Again in 1965-67 China provided Hanoi with political-military support—support which, as Summers correctly points out, figured prominently in shaping Washington's strategy of graduated escalation. In essence Beijing threatened to enter the war on Hanoi's side if the United States carried the war too far. Its purpose was to deter, limit, and defeat American attacks against its North Vietnamese ally.

There were five prominent dimensions to China's deterrent support for Hanoi in the mid-1960s.¹³ First, it was sizable. By the spring of 1966, nearly 50,000 Chinese soldiers were in North Vietnam manning anti-aircraft defenses, carrying out logistic work, and repairing bomb damage. According to official Chinese statistics, between October 1965 and March 1968 (when Chinese forces were withdrawn) a total of 320,000 Chinese troops served in North Vietnam, with the annual maximum reaching 170,000.¹⁴ North Vietnam's air force also operated out of bases in south China. An integrated radar grid, including stations in south China and covering all of North Vietnam, was established to provide intelligence about US air operations to North Vietnam's air defense system. China's own air defenses in south China were also strengthened.

Second, Chinese deployments were conducted in a way that made their presence plain for the world to see. To avoid locking itself into a situation that might escalate into a direct confrontation with the United States, Beijing did not officially acknowledge its military presence in North Vietnam. But Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) units deployed to North Vietnam retained their normal unit designations, wore regular uniforms, and used nonsecure methods of communications. This insured that Washington knew of China's moves and the seriousness of its intentions.

Third, PLA units in North Vietnam did not remain in a passive, reserve role but actively engaged US forces in combat. PLA aircraft based in China scrambled on occasion and engaged US aircraft that penetrated Chinese airspace during combat operations against North Vietnam. Beijing claimed to have shot down nine US aircraft and damaged two others in these engagements. Information regarding the number of US aircraft shot down by Chinese warplanes, or Chinese-piloted North Vietnamese warplanes, over North Vietnam's airspace is unavailable, but it is quite possible that this occurred. In any case, Chinese forces serving in North Vietnam suffered heavy casualties from US bombing—20,000 dead and wounded according to later Chinese reports.

Fourth, Chinese units constructed a large, heavily fortified complex at Yen Bai, some 140 kilometers northwest of Hanoi on the rail line running from Kunming to Hanoi along the Red River. This complex, with a large runway and replete with anti-aircraft guns placed in caves and mounted on railway tracks, seems to have been designed to serve either as a North Vietnamese redoubt in the event that a US-South Vietnamese invasion overran Hanoi, or to serve as a base for the PLA in the event of Chinese intervention.

The first four aspects of Chinese support for Hanoi were intended to convey to Washington the seriousness of China's intent to stand firm behind North Vietnam. The fifth characteristic of China's support for Hanoi was careful maneuvering to avoid an unnecessary war with the United States. While warning Washington not to go too far, Beijing also signaled that it hoped to avoid a Sino-American war.

As US bombing of North Vietnam escalated in 1965-66, the Chinese and US Ambassadors to Poland discussed the Vietnam situation. (Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw begun in 1955 and continuing through 1971 were the main conduit for Sino-American communication during that period.) At those talks US representatives assured China that American aims were limited to compelling Hanoi to forgo the conquest of South Vietnam and did not seek the destruction of the North Vietnamese regime. It is widely believed that by November 1965 the two sides had reached a tacit understanding that, as long as US forces did not invade North Vietnam or attack China, China would not directly enter the war.¹⁵ Even if such an understanding was reached, however, it could have been undone by events. As long as China and the United States

remained at swords' points, leaders of both countries moved cautiously to avoid a second Sino-US war. Both sides sought to avoid a war by misperception and miscalculation as had happened in Korea.

China's Preparations for War with the United States

Another indication of the seriousness of Beijing's threats to intervene on Hanoi's side was a massive crash program to construct a large, self-sufficient industrial base deep in China's interior.¹⁶ Begun in August 1964 as the United States initiated air attacks against North Vietnam in spite of Chinese warnings, this industrial base had as its purpose the sustainment of a war effort against the United States. The program was called the Third Front. Under it, key industrial facilities from the coastal areas were completely or partially dismantled and moved to the provinces of Sichuan, Guizhou, western Hubei, Yunnan, Qinghai, and Hunan. In addition to relocation of existing factories, a large portion of budgetary investment in new industry—perhaps as much as two thirds—was concentrated in the Third Front region between 1965 and 1971. In 1965 the proportion of China's total industrial investment going to Sichuan and Guizhou provinces tripled. Within a few years, hundreds of new mining, metallurgical, energy, chemical, and military industries appeared in the Third Front region. Rail lines were built to connect these plants, along with dams to provide electricity. In some cases, existing rail lines were torn up to provide rails for new lines into interior regions. The objective was to develop an integrated, comprehensive defense industrial base in China's interior.

To minimize their vulnerability to air attack, Third Front industrial plants were widely dispersed, typically situated away from major urban areas, and often located in deep, narrow canyons or caves. This particular spatial arrangement was costly, entailing much greater infrastructural spending to sustain operations. Often new towns, roads, and rail lines had to be built for the workers. Transport costs were greatly increased by having to move components long distances.

The Third Front program was premised on the assumption that in the event of war with the United States, China's established industrial centers along the coasts would be destroyed or occupied in the early stages of the conflict. The Third Front was rushed forward under top secrecy and with little regard to costs or proper planning. The disruption it imposed on China's economic development was immense. It was also immensely costly. Twenty-five years later China's economic planners were still grappling with the costs of the program and struggling to recoup some of the capital invested in it. The decision to undertake this program can only be interpreted as an expression of serious intent to wage a war, if necessary, with the United States. The Third Front is powerful evidence of the seriousness of Beijing's warnings to the United States. These were not minor moves to signal messages to Washington.

They were serious efforts to prepare China for a major war with America. Significantly, not until 1969 was the Third Front reconfigured to deal with a possible Soviet attack. Until that point, America was the hypothetical enemy.

Even if the Third Front is taken as convincing evidence that China's leaders seriously contemplated war with the United States, it does not necessarily follow that they would have committed China to war had the United States completely devastated North Vietnam, as Summers and similar critics suggest should have been done. Indeed, during 1965-67 Chinese leaders made statements indicating that they believed that the United States would *attack China*. Premier Zhou Enlai elaborated Chinese perceptions in a December 1965 rally celebrating the fifth anniversary of the founding of the National Liberation Front. If US imperialism failed to achieve its aim of repressing the Vietnamese people's war of national liberation, Zhou warned, "It is possible that in accordance with the objective laws governing the development of aggressive wars, US imperialism will go a step further and extend its war of aggression to the whole of Indochina and to China."¹⁷ These words imply that as long as the United States limited its attacks to North Vietnam's territory, China would have remained on the sidelines.

On the other hand, Zhou made these comments a month *after* the US Ambassador to Warsaw had made it clear to his Chinese counterpart that the United States had no intention of invading China or of crushing North Vietnam.¹⁸ The fact that China declared its intention to remain nonbelligerent *after* the United States adopted its policy of graduated escalation cannot logically be taken as evidence that China would have followed the same policy had the United States adopted a very different policy. Indeed, the contrary is suggested by comments made by Zhou Enlai to Algerian leader Ahmed Ben Bella and Cambodian leader Norodom Sihanouk in April 1965 to the effect that China would not intervene in the Vietnam conflict unless there was a US invasion north of the 17th parallel.¹⁹

Most probably China's policy toward the Vietnam War was not governed by hard and fast principles, but evolved in response to US actions and other international developments. It may well be that China's leaders had not themselves decided precisely what circumstances short of US attack on China itself would lead to Chinese entry in the war on Hanoi's side. There is abundant evidence, however, that Beijing was deeply committed to Hanoi. There is also evidence indicating the seriousness of Chinese warnings to the United States. Taken together these argue strongly in favor of the prudence of Washington's policy of limiting the conflict with Hanoi to avoid a broader war with China.

1972 Was Not 1965

Implicit in the go-for-broke criticism of US strategy is the notion that because China did not react strongly to the American naval blockade and heavy

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bombing of North Vietnam in 1972, it would have reacted in an equally tolerant fashion to comparable US moves in 1965. Similarly, it is often implied that because Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai concluded in 1972 that China's interests would be best served by a several-year suspension of Hanoi's military campaign to conquer South Vietnam, the two Chinese leaders were not strongly committed to Hanoi in 1965.²⁰ These propositions are non sequiturs. In 1965, the world was very different from what it was in 1972. Chinese policy was very different. Chinese views of the world were very different.

In the mid-1960s, Chinese global strategy was focused on thwarting US containment. There were, of course, sharp disagreements between Moscow and Beijing, but the primary origin of those disagreements had to do with how to deal with US imperialism. As noted earlier, Mao Zedong favored a much more militant, confrontational approach, while Khrushchev and Brezhnev generally favored avoidance of confrontation with the United States.

Virtually all of the studies of Sino-American rapprochement focus on the 1968-69 period. The militarization of the Sino-Soviet border began in 1963 and threats of Soviet intervention in China were grave by 1967, but it was the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border confrontation which boosted the Soviet threat over the American threat in the minds of China's leaders. Just as the Soviet threat was mounting, the United States was fundamentally altering its policies toward China. By the time of Henry Kissinger's secret July 1971 visit to Beijing, it was clear that Washington was willing to modify substantially the policy of isolating China which it had pursued since 1950. It was also clear that it intended to withdraw militarily from Indochina.²¹

By 1972-73 Beijing was quite concerned with the danger of Soviet attack or encirclement, and saw the United States as a partner in dealing with the Soviet threat. It is extremely wrong-headed, however, to read those views back to 1965-66.

Another non sequitur is the proposition that Mao Zedong's determination to launch the Cultural Revolution and his purge of PLA Chief of Staff Lo Ruiqing in late 1965 indicate that Mao was primarily concerned with the internal purification of China's revolution and not prepared to undertake a war with the United States. I will concede that Mao gave defeat of China's

revisionists priority over the anti-imperialist struggle against the United States—as long as US imperialism did not encroach on China's borders. But this latter caveat is important. Had US forces directly threatened China, for instance by moving into Laos or waging an all-out war against North Vietnam, Mao might have reordered his priorities.

Nor can we conclude that Mao believed his domestic anti-revisionist struggle was contrary to preparation for war with the United States. Indeed, from Mao's perspective, the opposite may well have been the case. To Mao, Moscow was Washington's lackey while China's revisionists fawned over Moscow. The authoritative November 1965 statement rejecting Moscow's proposal of "united action" in support of Hanoi, for example, charged that "the US imperialists urgently need to extinguish the roaring flames of the Vietnamese people's revolution. And so do the Khrushchev revisionists because they want to carry out their line of Soviet-US collaboration for world domination."²² If Moscow was set on a course of collusion with Washington, purge of China's revisionists who had illusions about Moscow could well be necessary preparation for a final, cataclysmic struggle with the United States. Just as Stalin believed that elimination of internal opposition dovetailed with the forced industrialization of the Five Year Plans to prepare the Soviet Union for war, Mao may well have believed that the purge of revisionists from China's leadership prepared China for battle. Mao, like Stalin, may have been mistaken about the military efficacy of his purges. That, however, is another matter. We are concerned here with whether Mao's initiation of purges can be taken as evidence of expectation that war could or would be avoided. It seems to me that they cannot.

But surely Mao would not have thrown China into the chaos associated with the Red Guard rebellion had he anticipated war with America. This statement may well be accurate. But again, it cannot be taken as evidence that Mao was unprepared to undertake war with the United States had Washington waged a much more violent and expanded conflict in Southeast Asia. First, Mao may well have underestimated the turmoil which would result when he helped create the Red Guards. Second, Mao did not unleash the Red Guards until after China and the United States had come to the tacit understanding at Warsaw in November 1965. Mao's critical moves supporting the nascent Red Guards came only in mid-1966, well after the Sino-American understanding at Warsaw.²³ Mao did not cross the Rubicon with the Cultural Revolution until October 1966.²⁴ In sum, Mao's support for the Red Guard upheaval may well have been premised on the Sino-American understanding at Warsaw. That support cannot, therefore, be taken as evidence that Mao was averse to pursuing war with the United States had such an understanding failed to develop.

Nor did the chaos of the Cultural Revolution necessarily diminish the danger of Chinese intervention. The weakening of central command and

control might have combined with radical Red Guard influence in certain military units to produce provocative moves or more forceful reactions to American moves. There was tremendous frustration in China over the Vietnam War by 1967. Washington had twice ignored China's warnings not to attack North Vietnam, once in August 1964 and again in 1965. From the Chinese perspective, the arrogant American imperialists were humiliating China and ravaging China's fraternal ally. The inflammatory nature of such emotions were probably kept in check by central organs of power. But American decisionmakers could not assume the effectiveness of central command and control once the Cultural Revolution gained steam. Even with the advantage of hindsight we have no way of knowing whether Beijing could have maintained control had US escalation gone much further and faster, fanning emotional fervor and factional debate in China. Could Chinese frustration have combined with the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution to produce tougher responses to American moves? Had greater assertiveness on the Chinese side been combined with a less cautious approach on the American side, an escalating spiral of response and counter-response might have made it difficult for either side to back down.

Even with effective central direction, there was no diminution of Chinese risk-taking in support of Hanoi at the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967. In that year the United States waged the most unrestricted war against North Vietnam of any year up to 1972. All North Vietnamese air bases were destroyed, forcing North Vietnamese planes to operate out of bases in China. Select targets within Hanoi and Haiphong were bombed. By late 1967 the buffer along the Sino-Vietnamese border off-limits to US pilots was pared down to only five kilometers. In response to this expanded US bombing, China increased the number of Chinese anti-aircraft divisions in North Vietnam from two to three.²⁵

The Consequences of a Sino-American War

Since Summers' critique is basically historical "what-if-ism" on a grand scale, it is perhaps fair that we engage in a comparable exercise and ask what might have been the consequences if American leaders had waged the war as Summers suggests and China had entered the war on Hanoi's side?

To stop and roll back a Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia, the United States would probably have used nuclear weapons, either against Chinese forces in Southeast Asia or against military and industrial centers in China itself. Even if we assume that this would have been militarily effective and that US bombing could have preempted Chinese nuclear retaliation against US bases or allies in Asia (China tested an A-bomb in 1964 and an H-bomb in 1967), the political costs would have been heavy. What would have been the effect of this resort to nuclear arms on public opinion in Japan and

West European countries about their alliance with America? As it was, America's war in Vietnam seriously tarnished the United States' moral reputation in many eyes. The political costs of a general Sino-American war involving nuclear weapons would have been far more grievous. Conceivably, the Atlantic alliance or the Japan-US alliance would have crumbled under the impact of a general Sino-American war.

A Sino-American war fought on the Southeast Asian peninsula would probably have facilitated the growth of communist power in Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, and Malaysia. China would have spared no efforts to outflank the United States by supporting insurgencies elsewhere in Southeast Asia. As it was, Foreign Minister Chen Yi warned Bangkok not to allow the United States to use its bases in Thailand to support the war in Indochina, or face greater opposition within Thailand.²⁶ When Bangkok failed to heed Beijing's warning, Chen's prediction came true. In 1965 full-scale guerrilla war erupted in north-eastern Thailand. Thai communists began broadcasts from a radio station located in south China or North Vietnam. Two new Thai revolutionary organizations emerged, rapidly received Beijing's endorsement, and then merged with the older Thai Communist Party-dominated revolutionary front.²⁷ By the late 1960s the insurgency led by this group was a serious threat. That threat would have become far more serious if China and America had gone to war and China's support for the Thai Communist Party and other Southeast Asian revolutionary movements had been magnified.

We should not take the developmental success of most of the ASEAN countries for granted. The successful economic and political development of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia might well have been aborted by war. A Sino-American war in the mid-1960s would also have greatly strengthened the Soviet global position. Moscow could have tilted toward either Washington or Beijing. If it had tilted toward Washington, Moscow would have been in a good position to demand various concessions from the United States. American efforts to contain the Soviet Union might have been seriously relaxed as a result. If Moscow had tilted toward China by acceding to Chinese requests for assistance under the 1950 mutual security treaty (which was not abrogated by Beijing until August 1978), the Sino-Soviet alliance might have been restored. This would have represented the collapse of the US strategy of "driving a wedge" between Moscow and Beijing that informed US policy since the 1950s.²⁸ Soviet support for China, combined with the Chinese fear and hatred for America which would certainly have issued from a Sino-American war in the 1960s, could have revitalized the Sino-Soviet alliance and sustained it well into the 1970s. If Sino-Soviet rapprochement had occurred in the 1960s instead of Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s, Moscow's global expansionist drive of the 1970s might have had Chinese support rather than opposition.

In sum, the world could well have been a much darker place if the strategies advocated by Summers had been tried and resulted in a Sino-American war.

NOTES

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Angels of Mercy: The Army Nurse Corps on Bataan and Corregidor

MICHELE MANNING

When Second Lieutenant Minnie Breese, United States Army Nurse Corps, arrived in the Philippine Islands for a two-year tour of duty in 1940, she reported to an assignment much coveted by the 942 Army nurses then on active duty. The balmy green islands were a paradise for liberty, and the ratio of patients to medical personnel ensured a reasonable work schedule for the nurses assigned to the various Army medical installations on the islands.

For the Army nurses there, it was a time when duty hours were short—often they worked half shifts because of light patient load—and liberty opportunities were unlimited. Many of the nurses took advantage of their abundant free time to develop their golf or tennis game. Night life might consist of dinner and drinks at the Army-Navy Club in Manila, followed by dancing and entertainment at the popular Manila Hotel. For those who enjoyed spectator sports, an evening of jai alai might be followed by a visit to La Paloma, where the taxi-dancers always drew large crowds.

In such a carefree atmosphere, romances flourished. Minnie Breese met her future husband in Manila, where he was serving as an artilleryman. Second Lieutenant Lucy Wilson was dating Dan Jopling, a lieutenant in the 200th Coast Artillery, and just beginning to think seriously about resigning to marry him.¹ Both weddings would occur, but not until a world war was fought.

Life was good for the military nurses in the Philippines, and if they didn't have the status of or make the same money as their male contemporaries, well, that was the law. The military rank held by Army and Navy nurses was called "relative rank." It was authorized for the ranks second lieutenant through major in the Army and ensign through lieutenant commander in the Navy. Roughly, it gave nurses authority in and around military hospitals directly beneath that of officers of the medical corps. Base pay was not the same for a male officer and a nurse of the same rank. In 1941, a Navy nurse who was a

Lieutenant (JG) made \$90 a month plus a living allowance called "maintenance," which meant a room in the nurses' quarters and a meal allowance. Single male officers of equivalent rank made \$166 a month plus an additional \$60 for quarters and 60 cents per day subsistence.² But the money was apparently not a bone of contention with the women. After all, they made more than their civilian counterparts, and they were working in a tropical paradise.

During these carefree days in the Philippines, the one sour note was the war news in the daily newspapers. Although the military community was interested in what Hitler was doing in Europe, it seemed far away. As for the Japanese threat to the islands, it was not until the spring of 1941 that the senior commanders of the Philippine command, Generals Jonathan M. Wainwright and George Grunert of the Army and Admiral Thomas Hart of the Navy, became concerned about their readiness for a possible war with the Japanese.

Paradise Lost

As the European war intensified and the possibilities of a conflict in the Pacific increased, the 100 military nurses in the Manila area received two signals of how seriously Washington viewed the possibility of war. In March 1941, the Navy sent the wives and children of its personnel back to the United States. In May, the Army followed suit. Minnie Breese, nearing the end of her two idyllic years in the Philippines, observed an increase in tension at the time of the dependent evacuation. There also appeared to be greater interest in President Roosevelt's Fireside Chats, heard regularly on the radio.³

The golden days in the Philippines were coming to an end for the military. In both Washington and Manila the threat of a war with Japan focused attention on the vulnerability of the Philippine garrison. General Wainwright later wrote that "the sparkle went out of Manila in the spring of 1941. War was coming and we all knew it."⁴

Wainwright would have been even more pessimistic had he known that by the spring of 1941 Army and Navy planners had already written off the Philippines. Reviewing the old War Plan Orange, formulated in the 1920s and calling for relief of the Philippine garrison within six months of the

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commencement of war, the planners had realistically decided that two years was a more feasible estimate of the time required to send reinforcements. In evaluating the strength of the existing garrison, the same planners estimated that it could hold out for only six months.⁵

In July, General Douglas MacArthur was recalled to active duty and given command of US Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). To bolster the manpower available to defend the Philippines, the 76,000-man Philippine army was inducted into the US forces. Coinciding with this move, war supplies and reinforcements began to arrive. Training increased in tempo and security took on an importance unheard of back in 1940.

For the Army nurses, life continued much as usual, except that with the exodus of dependents the patient load greatly decreased. There was even more time to spend at the tennis court or the Army-Navy Club, and few if any of the women really believed that a Japanese force could conquer the Philippines. The source of this belief was the widely held opinion that when an attack came the mighty US Pacific Fleet would sail from Pearl Harbor to succor the Philippines.

First Lieutenant Josie Nesbit was the acting Chief Nurse at Sternberg General Hospital in Manilla on 8 December 1941. The news of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had been arriving by radio in Manila since about 3:30 A.M., and everyone was concerned over the fate of relatives or friends. Nesbit later recalled, "I was acting Chief Nurse and my night nurses . . . were so perturbed. They knew someone in Honolulu . . . So I said, 'girls you have to get to sleep today . . . because you have to go to work tonight.'"⁶

At noon on the 8th of December, less than nine hours after the Pearl Harbor raid, Japanese bombers based on the island of Formosa made a bombing run on Baguio, the summer capital of the Philippine government. Fifteen minutes later another Japanese attack was in progress at Clark Field, where most of the American B-17 bombers were caught on the ground and destroyed.

War had arrived, and the accompanying destruction filled the military hospitals with patients almost immediately. At Sternberg Army Hospital, Second Lieutenant Juanita Redmond had been looking forward to an afternoon of golf; instead, she worked in the operating room for eight hours. She described the wounded as moving "on blood-crusted litters, many of them still bleeding, some with shrapnel lodged in their wounds, or arms dangling, or partially severed legs. And many were dead when they reached us."⁷

For nearly all the nurses, dealing with mass casualties was to be an entirely new phenomenon. Although the two senior Army nurses, Captain Maude Davison and Josie Nesbit, had served in World War I, the other Army nurses had not served during a wartime contingency. Moreover, prior to World War II, American military nurses were given little training beyond that needed to function in a stateside, clinical environment. Indeed, although the War Department recognized that war would require more nurses than the active duty

ceiling allowed, a Nurse Corps Reserve was not established because "the duties of a nurse in a military hospital do not differ in any important particular from the duties . . . in civil hospitals." Training with shock and battle trauma would come on the job. Instruction on how to behave if captured by the enemy would come a few minutes before Japanese soldiers arrived to take the nurses prisoner.

Bombing attacks on the islands' Army and Air Corps installations continued daily. The Navy base at Cavite experienced a bombing run for the first time on 10 December. For over two hours, wave after wave of Japanese bombers pounded the huge installation. Army nurses at Sternberg, 20 miles away in Manila, could see the flames from the many fires that reduced the once strong naval facility to rubble and ashes.

The Manila area hospitals began to fill. All patients and medical personnel from Canacao were evacuated to Sternberg Hospital. The hospital and the annex were renamed the Manila Hospital Center on 11 December, and a combination of Army and Navy medical personnel worked round the clock to care for the hundreds of injured streaming in nonstop.

The first elements of the Japanese invasion force had been on Luzon since the morning of the 10th, landing on the northern tip of the island. It was just a matter of time until the enemy began landing in force to drive the outnumbered American-Filipino forces south to the Bataan peninsula.

By this time, the Army nurses had shed their white uniforms. The only available fatigues that could be found were size 46 male coveralls. Each nurse received two pair, and with the help of some makeshift tailoring, combat nursing uniforms were born.

The Japanese advanced rapidly to the south. On Christmas Eve, 24 Army nurses, 25 Filipino nurses, and Lieutenant Ann Bernatitus, Navy Nurse Corps, were sent by motor convoy to the town of Limay on the Bataan peninsula. They were tasked to prepare a field hospital in a collection of run-down barracks. Their Christmas celebration consisted of cleaning floors, washing windows, assembling cots, and setting up a hospital facility from stored supplies. The equipment at hand was certainly not modern. The nurses noted that most items were wrapped in 1918 newspapers! This makeshift hospital became General Hospital No. 1, and patients began arriving within days. Since this would be the field hospital closest to the fighting, all battle casualties were brought there for surgery and recovery.

On Christmas Day, 20 Army nurses were sent by harbor ferry to the town of Lamao, south of Hospital No. 1 on the Bataan peninsula. Further in the rear, they established Hospital No. 2 as a convalescent hospital. It was much more primitive, with mats spread over foxholes for beds. This mostly open-air jungle facility occupied three acres.

Once casualties had been transported to the new sites, a routine at both hospitals quickly appeared—work, work, and more work. Nurses were on duty

at first light and worked until it became too dark to see. Artificial lighting could not be used to lengthen the working day because of the danger of revealing the sites to Japanese aircraft. Nurses on night duty carried flashlights covered with layers of blue cloth, making their rounds in almost total darkness.⁹

During the days immediately following Christmas, Josie Nesbit, ten of her Army nurses, and dietitian Ruby Motley departed Sternberg Hospital and were evacuated directly to Corregidor by boat. It wasn't a happy day for any of the nurses—too many doctors, corpsmen, and patients were being left behind.

As the Japanese approached the outskirts of Manila, 224 wounded Americans and Filipinos from Santa Scolastica and Sternberg Hospital were loaded on an inter-island steamer built for a passenger load of 75. Colonel Percy J. Carroll, one of the senior Army doctors, Second Lieutenant Floramund Fellmeth, Army Nurse Corps, and several Filipino doctors and nurses accompanied the wounded on what would become a 27-day journey to Australia and freedom. It was New Year's Eve.

During this hectic time in southern Luzon, two of the Army nurses were having a very different kind of adventure farther north at Baguio. Second Lieutenants Ruby Bradley and Bea Chambers had been attached to a dispensary at the Army installation located near the summer residence of Philippine President Manuel Quezon. With the Japanese landings in the north the nurses had joined other Army personnel in literally taking to the hills. They were free for a short time, but by New Year's Eve 1941 they had been imprisoned at the Baguio internment camp.

The frantic retreat of the Americans into the Bataan peninsula continued through 5 January 1942. At 2:00 A.M. on 6 January, Army engineers destroyed the Layac Bridge, the only entrance to the peninsula and situated at its neck. The last tank of the 21st Division's covering force had crossed the bridge at 1:59 A.M.

Although for the time being the American force was in a favorable defensive position, the logistic situation was grim. There were more than 100,000 people on the Bataan peninsula. Of these, 80,000 were American or Filipino troops and the remainder were civilian refugees fleeing the invading Japanese. The food available in Bataan consisted of field rations for 30 days, canned meat and fish for 50 days, flour and canned vegetables for 30 days, and approximately 20 days of rice.¹⁰ Other items in short supply were gasoline, trucks, sandbags, and clothing. Communications almost ceased to exist, since there were no telephone lines, very few radios, and only two scout cars that were radio-equipped.

To conserve food, General MacArthur sent word from Corregidor that both Bataan and Corregidor would go to half rations. Since that was barely enough to keep a sedentary group alive, much less a combat force, General Wainwright ordered his men into the countryside to forage for anything vegetable or animal that could be found.

The temporary lull in the fighting ended when the Japanese launched a series of amphibious attacks on Bataan. Slowly but surely, General Wainwright was being pushed closer and closer to the tip of the peninsula. And his forces were beginning to take severe casualties.

Hospital No. 1 at Limay was relocated after the front lines broke on 23 January. The medical personnel transported patients and what supplies and equipment they had to a new location to the south. They called the new hospital "Little Baguio." To call it a hospital was pretentious. It really was an old motor pool site with a couple of wooden frame buildings and one huge, tri-level shed with a corrugated roof and a concrete floor. On each of the levels in the shed a ward was established. Sheets were set out to clearly mark this facility as a hospital for the benefit of any Japanese aircraft that might spot the activity below.

Both field hospitals were swamped with patients, nearly 3000 in each by the end of February. In addition to the injured, the hospitals now housed severe cases of dysentery and diarrhea. But the two most serious illness problems to face the Bataan force were just beginning to appear: malaria and malnutrition.

Before the Japanese invasion, malaria had been almost nonexistent in the Philippines. It was later determined that the parasites that cause the disease were brought to the island by Japanese soldiers infected elsewhere. Mosquitoes who bit the infected soldiers became carriers, infecting the Filipino population. With the large number of civilians on the Bataan peninsula, malaria inevitably reached epidemic proportion. At first, quinine and atabrine kept the disease under some control. Like other supplies, however, these medicines existed in limited quantities. By 1 March hospital admissions for malaria had reached 500 or more *daily*. When asked what happened when the quinine gave out, Minnie Breese said, "We gave them TLC . . . about all you could do."¹¹

By the end of March, the hospitals on the Bataan Peninsula held 7000 patients, with an additional 4000 being treated in a provisional hospital (staffed by corpsmen and medical officers only) that had been established even closer to the fighting.¹²

On 11 March, morale plummeted when General Douglas MacArthur, Mrs. MacArthur, their son Arthur, a Chinese nurse, and various members of the USAFFE staff boarded PT boats at the dock on Corregidor and began their journey to safe haven in Australia. Although the General was leaving as a direct result of orders issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, many of the Corregidor defenders were bitter about being left while "Dugout Doug" sailed to freedom. An anonymous ditty, sung to the tune of "The Battle Hymn of the Republic," was a popular number after MacArthur's departure:

Dugout Doug's not timid, he's just cautious, not afraid;
He's protecting carefully the stars that Franklin made.
Four-star generals are as rare as good food on Bataan;
And his troops go starving on.¹³

For the most part, however, the senior officers and NCOs felt that MacArthur was more valuable to the war effort in an active role, and agreed with the decision that sent him to Australia. The doctors and nurses generally concurred.

As March progressed, General Wainwright moved his headquarters to Corregidor. The bombing in Bataan increased in intensity. On 30 March, Hospital No. 1 was bombed by the Japanese, who later claimed that it had been an accident. No such claim was made on 7 April when the hospital was hit again. Second Lieutenant Hattie Brantley was on duty at 10:00 A.M. that day when she heard a weird whistling noise outside. The bomb hit an ammunition truck near the hospital. Immediately, the corpsmen, nurses, doctors, and ambulatory patients hurried to cut the vines and ropes that held the more seriously wounded in traction. The bombs came even closer, sending huge clouds of dust and clods of dirt flying into the wards.

One of the wards set up in the open was hit directly. The patients in the orthopedic ward began to panic, and Lieutenant Brantley ran to help them. She can remember the Catholic chaplain, Father William Cummins, climbing up on a nurse's desk and reciting the Lord's Prayer. The patients became quiet, listening to the priest and praying themselves. She remembers crying and seeing others weep. Then Father Cummins stopped, climbed down from the desk, and said, "Somebody take over . . . I'm wounded."¹⁴ Elsewhere in the hospital, nurses cared for two of their own. Second Lieutenants Rosemary Hogan and Rita Palmer had been hit by shrapnel during the bombing. Each would later receive the Purple Heart.

The end was nearing on Bataan. The front had been penetrated in several places where men weakened from malaria and near-starvation rations lacked the strength and energy to resist further. On the eastern side of the peninsula the Japanese had broken through in force and threatened to overwhelm Major General Edward King's Bataan force. General Wainwright suggested an attack to the east to establish a new line. General King knew that his troops did not have an attack left in their emaciated bodies. He sent his Chief of Staff to Corregidor to inform Wainwright that surrender might come at any moment.

General Wainwright was adamant that King not surrender. The Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Arnold Funk, turned to Wainwright with tears in his eyes and said, "General, you know, of course, what the situation is over there. You know what the outcome will be." Wainwright replied, "I do." Regardless of Wainwright's message, General King knew what he would have to do and how quickly he would have to do it. He sent instructions to evacuate the nurses from the peninsula to Corregidor.

On 8 April, the senior medical officer at Hospital No. 1, Colonel James Duckworth, ordered Josie Nesbit to have her American nurses in his office by 8:00 P.M. with "what they can carry in their two hands." Lieutenant Nesbit asked about her Filipino nurses and was told that only the Americans were to go. In

her best head-nurse voice, Nesbit told him that if the Filipino nurses didn't go, she wouldn't either. The entire contingent of nurses—American and Filipino—then boarded an old bus for the journey to the pier at Mariveles, many of them protesting that they did not want to leave their patients. At Hospital No. 2, surgery was in progress and the nurses initially refused to leave. The doctors had to force them to go by issuing direct orders.

The journey to Mariveles was slow for both groups of nurses. The group from Hospital No. 2 arrived so late that no boat remained to transport them that night. They crouched on the docks and waited for a boat to be sent for them in the early hours of 9 April. At 6:00 A.M., General King surrendered Bataan to the Japanese commander. Ill, hungry, exhausted, angry, and helpless, the bedraggled group of nurses left Bataan for the tiny fortified island of Corregidor. The question on everyone's mind was "How long can we hold out on Corregidor?"

Corregidor: Nursing in a Tunnel

Those fortunate enough to escape to Corregidor before the fall of Bataan joined the almost 12,000 already overcrowded on the small island. Of these 12,000, only 7000 could really be termed combat troops. Colonel Sam Howard's Fourth Marine Regiment, 1000 strong, represented the only trained infantry on the island. The bulk of the combat-ready troops were the 5700 coast artillerymen who were needed to man the artillery pieces. The remainder of the inhabitants of Corregidor included 2000 civilians; assorted staff, support, and administrative personnel; and medical personnel.


Malinta Tunnel had housed the headquarters of USAFFE until 11 March when General MacArthur left for Australia. Now it would be General Wainwright's headquarters in his new capacity as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces in the Philippines. The tunnel complex was elaborate, consisting of a series of tunnels and laterals that ran from east to west from one side of the 400-foot Malinta Hill to the other. The main tunnel, 1400 feet long and 30 feet wide, was bisected by two trolley-car tracks that connected with the outside. The tunnel complex was dirty, noisy, and crowded. It became noisier with the constant bombing and shelling that the Japanese provided, sometimes both day and night. It became more crowded with the fall of Bataan.

The arriving nurses were immediately absorbed into the nursing staff already functioning in the tunnel hospital. In all, there were 85 military nurses, one American Red Cross nurse, several Filipino nurses, a civilian American nurse, three civilian dietitians, and a physical therapist serving with the Army Medical Department. In addition to nursing battle injuries, they would treat patients in the hospital with severe upper respiratory infections, malaria, and diarrhea. There were few neuropsychiatric cases, perhaps because there was no way to escape from the horrible reality of the situation at hand. The vitamin deficiency diseases so numerous on Bataan were just beginning, with a few

isolated cases of neuritic beriberi. Nursing shifts had already changed from the traditional three-shifts-a-day concept of peacetime garrison duty to a 12-hour, two-shift rotation. As the casualties increased, 16-hour shifts became the norm and 18-hour shifts were not uncommon.¹⁵

With the fall of Bataan, the Japanese commander, General Homma, now devoted his full energy to the assault on Corregidor. The shelling intensified as the Japanese moved 240mm howitzers to Cavite, just across the bay from the Corregidor mortar pits. There was a steady increase in dead and wounded. So many new patients soon necessitated a little Yankee ingenuity in the hospital tunnel. With the imaginative use of a welding torch, some of the men created double- and triple-decker beds. This helped to solve space problems, but the nurses found it an almost impossible task to nurse patients on the third story of a triple-decker. Another problem presented by the tunnel was its air quality. The air was so dirty, hot, and dusty that normal breathing became a problem. The nurses would routinely take gauze, wet it, and put it over the patients' mouths in order to allow more comfortable breathing.¹⁶

A more pressing worry for the medical personnel was the problem of reduced rations. Because of severe shortages and no real assurance that a relief convoy would ever arrive, the entire garrison was on half rations. While too little food weakened the healthy, it became life-threatening to the injured and seriously ill. General Wainwright was urged by his operations officer to



Tending to patients in the triple-decker beds of Malinta Tunnel.

double the ration, but he declined. With an eye toward holding out until the end of June and possible resupply by the long-rumored convoy, the General reluctantly decided to continue the garrison on half rations.

The shelling and bombing were almost continuous now. Individual acts of heroism became so commonplace as to be overlooked as just part of the day-to-day routine. Associated Press correspondent Clark Lee expressed it this way in one of his releases to the United States:

The bombs took thirty years to hit. While they were falling they changed the dimensions of the world. The noise stripped the eagles from the colonel's shoulders and left him a little boy, naked and afraid. It drove all the intelligence from the nurse's eyes and left them vacant and staring. It wrapped a steel tourniquet of fear around your head, until your skull felt like bursting. Then would come the fires, and the heroism. Men and women dashing out and picking up the wounded while the bombs were still falling. They would carry the dead and the wounded to the hospital tunnel.¹⁷

Few people still believed in the relief convoy that had been talked about since 7 December.¹⁸ Each day was the same now, with the constant bombardment stretching nerves to the breaking point. Food supplies were close to exhausted, with no possible source of replenishment.

On 28 April, Colonel Stu Wood, Wainwright's G-2, told the General that the Japanese would most probably launch an all-out offensive on the next day to commemorate Emperor Hirohito's birthday. Sure enough, on the following day the Japanese hit the island fortress with a combined artillery and air show. It has been estimated that 100 tons of bombs and 10,000 artillery shells fell on the island in those 24 hours.

In the midst of this fierce shelling, General Wainwright did receive some good news. His previous request to Australia for medical resupply by seaplane had been approved. Two Navy PBVs were en route to Corregidor that day. In addition to bringing in much-needed supplies, the planes offered Wainwright a last opportunity to send some of his garrison to safety in Australia. His priority passengers were civilian women, nurses, and some of the older male officers whose chances of survival in captivity were slim. Fifty passengers could be carried out on the PBVs. General MacArthur had asked for a few people by name, including Colonel Wood, the G-2. General Wainwright selected the civilians, including a few dependents, and several older male officers.

The way the nurses were selected differs according to source. General Wainwright indicated after his release in 1945 that his Chief Surgeon, Colonel Webb Cooper, made the selections. One of the more senior nurses, First Lieutenant Gladys Mealer, remembered the decision being made by Captain Maude Davison and General Wainwright, with some specific criteria in mind: "Some of those that were inclined to be hysterical or anything like that were sent out

and most all of them were really sick. They had malaria and we didn't have the proper diet for them and that's the way they were selected."¹⁹ Second Lieutenant Helen Cassiani remembered it with less goodwill:

We had no idea even that some nurses were going to be able to get out. But there was no consultation about how it would be done. What were the priorities for somebody being chosen to leave or anything like that. . . . And believe me, there was a good deal of what could I call it? Let's just say hard feelings. Because certainly I felt that some that had not been taken out really deserved to be going out because of medical problems. . . . Politics works no matter where you are and what the circumstances. I have to say that because I feel that very sincerely. I know that there was some preference shown.²⁰

Regardless of how the choices were made, 20 nurses were instructed to be ready to depart by 9:30 P.M. on 29 April. They were each allowed one small bag to take what belongings they might still have. The two PBVs took off, each carrying ten nurses and 15 other passengers.

The planes flew first to Lake Lanao on Mindanao Island. It was a very foggy night, and both planes had trouble landing. One plane was damaged as it landed, and its passengers were stranded on Mindanao and subsequently captured. The other plane was hidden in a cove until the following night so that Japanese reconnaissance planes would not spot it. The next evening it was able to take off and arrived safely in Australia.

Back on Corregidor, the Japanese artillery destroyed one of the two large mortar installations on the morning of 3 May. Nearly every man in the gun crew was killed. This catastrophe, added to the shortage of food and water, the number of sick and injured, and the constant pounding of Japanese bombs and shells, signaled the beginning of the end.

General Wainwright had one final option. The submarine *USS Spearfish* was lying submerged near the mouth of Manila Bay, just outside the minefield. Several more personnel, plus important records and a great deal of American currency, were to be sent on the *Spearfish* to Australia. Among the records to be sent out were promotion letters which would ensure that the wives and children of those to be imprisoned received larger allotments during the course of the war. Wainwright, generally acknowledged as a soldier's general, was later highly praised for this humane and caring act in a time of extreme crisis.

The hard part was deciding which people to send out on the submarine. General Wainwright offered a space to Johnny Pugh, one of his aides, but Pugh turned it down. Wainwright also wanted to send Gladys Mealer out as a reward for her fine service as one of the chief nurses. Lieutenant Mealer also refused the opportunity, saying later, "I couldn't see how anybody could walk off and leave all those wounded people, and I had enough faith in that old tunnel to realize that I could make it if the Japs came."²¹ Eleven Army

nurses and Navy nurse Ann Bernatitus were among the 25 finally selected to leave on the submarine. Under cover of darkness, with one small bag of belongings each, the lucky few went by boat to rendezvous with the *Spearfish*.

As dawn broke over Corregidor on 4 May, the Japanese began another brutal artillery attack. In the next 24 hours, 15,000 shells fell on the island. By the next morning, the Rock was just that—stripped bare, without a tree standing.

The situation was desperate. Only two of the 48 beach defense guns still functioned. The Japanese were already landing on the island, and the reserves—a hodgepodge of Navy bluejackets, headquarters personnel, and coast artillerymen without guns to man—had already been ordered out to meet the enemy. In the tunnel, the sick and injured numbered in excess of 1000. The smell of blood was everywhere, as casualties were placed in laterals, the main tunnel, and just about anywhere space could be found.

General Wainwright had an agonizing decision to make. In the early hours of 6 May he sent out the prearranged message “execute Pontiac”—the code for surrender. At noon, 6 May 1942, Corregidor was officially surrendered to the Japanese. After five months of intense bombardment, the last island of resistance in the Philippines had fallen, though a few scattered remnants survived on the main islands. More than 10,000 men and women waited underground in Malinta Tunnel, wondering just what would happen to them now.

Afterword

The fall of the Philippines opened another chapter in the Army Nurse Corps story. Along with the soldiers, sailors, and Marines on Corregidor, the nurses emerged from the Malinta Tunnel as prisoners of the Imperial Japanese army. Their subsequent imprisonment in the Santo Tomas civilian internment camp lasted until 3 February 1945 when the US Eighth Cavalry Regiment entered the former Philippine university and liberated all the prisoners held there.

Three things seem to have worked well for the nurses during their captivity. First, the Japanese were confounded at finding women in military uniform, and after some deliberation decided to classify the nurses as Red Cross workers. This placed the American women in internment camps rather than in military prisons such as Bilibid or Camp O'Donnell. Because of this, none of these nurses made the trip to mainland Japan on the “hell ships.” Second, an “old corps” chief nurse, Captain Maude Davison, was the senior nurse who dealt directly with their Japanese captors. Captain Davison had been in the Army Nurse Corps since World War I and was the oldest of the nurses taken prisoner. A short, stocky, white-headed lady, she commanded a certain respect from the Japanese for her age and no-nonsense attitude. Third, the nurses had a goal and purpose for each day of captivity. They were able to practice their profession and did not give in to the feeling of helplessness that afflicted many of the male prisoners. Many of the men in Santo Tomas died of malnutrition, ennuui, or wet beriberi.



After their capture, some of the nurses were gathered outside Malinta Tunnel for a Japanese propaganda photograph. They refused their captors' request that they smile. Left to right, they are Vivian Weisblatt, Adele Forman, Jeanne Kennedy, Peggy Greenwalt, Eunice Young, Dorothy McCann, and Eleanor Goren.

Except for complications from surgery, not one woman died in Santo Tomas. All the nurses came home—though on the average 32 pounds lighter, weakened by malaria, and with lingering reminders of bouts with pellegra and malnutrition.

Arrival in the states meant some handshaking with generals and admirals, hometown newspaper stories about local girls returning from the war, medal ceremonies where Bronze Stars²² were presented, and, for many of the Philippine campaign nurses, expeditious discharge. The war was over, but for most of the nurses, as for all veterans of war, nothing would ever be the same. Nothing would ever again fall into the “too hard” category for women who had changed bandages on bloody stumps of legs during the bombardments on the Bataan peninsula. No assignment, no matter how remote, would approach the hardship of a Japanese internment camp where people died daily from starvation.

There was catching up to do, with personal and professional lives. Hattie Brantley returned home to find that her father had died while she was in captivity. Lieutenant Buelah Greenwalt hurried home just in time to nurse her mother during a fatal illness. All the nurses needed training in the use of penicillin and new burn treatment techniques, both medical innovations since 1941.

While the nurses were still in captivity, two Hollywood movies had been released, based somewhat loosely on the experiences of the Army nurses on the Bataan peninsula and Corregidor. The first of these, “So Proudly We Hail,” while tending to lean toward romantic interludes more than combat nursing, did portray graphically the danger of work in combat areas and the devotion of the nurses performing their duty. The second film, “Cry Havoc,” spent more time

dramatizing the rivalry of two nurses for the same man than it did talking about the nature of the service of Army nurses in combat. Colonel George C. Clarke, himself a veteran of Bataan and Corregidor, wrote a letter to *Time* magazine objecting to a review of "Cry Havoc" that typified the nurses as flighty and teary:

These angels of mercy did not "grow jittery" or quarrelsome. . . . I left Bataan five minutes before its capitulation and during its entire terrible struggle I saw these wonderful women serve their country with heroism and fidelity. They were truly angels of mercy—dirty, underfed, overworked, but always cheerful. They deserve individual medals for their heroism and devotion to duty, rather than to be depicted as they are in the play you reviewed.²³

Numerous books covering every possible aspect of the fall of Bataan and Corregidor were written in the years immediately following the war. Some mentioned the nurses, but usually in some romantic reference with little or nothing said about performance of duty. Once in a while someone with firsthand knowledge of the situation in the Philippines would write a piece focusing on the nature of the wartime duty performed by military nurses. Clark Lee, in his book *They Call It Pacific*, praised the nurses he had observed on Bataan:

The nurses on Bataan were great guys. They dressed in Regular Army khaki pants and shirts and lived under shelter tents. They washed their underclothes and bathed in a muddy stream that ran through Base Hospital No. 2. With the bombers overhead, they walked about the wards of their open-air hospital, carrying out their duties and cheering up the Filipino and American wounded. When the bombs fell near they helped the shell-shocked patients crawl into foxholes dug right under their beds. Twice, in the final horror-filled days, the bombs fell—not near, but squarely—on the hospital.²⁴

Noted war correspondent Ernie Pyle, who later died on Okinawa, had this to say about the American military nurses serving in the Philippines: "The American nurses—and there were lots of them—turned out just as you would expect: wonderfully. Army doctors, and patients, too, were unanimous in their praise of them. Doctors told me that in the first rush of casualties they were calmer than the men."²⁵

General Wainwright did not forget his nurses, nor did he in any fashion deny the importance of their contribution to the fight for the Philippines. In an interview with author Bob Considine, Wainwright said of his nurses:

But never forget the American girls who fought on Bataan and later on Corregidor. They had no training in pioneering hardships; theirs had been a life of conveniences and even luxury. But their hearts were the same hearts as those of the women of early America. Their names must always be hallowed when we speak of American heroes. The memory of their coming ashore on Corregidor that early

morning of April 9 [1942], dirty, disheveled, some of them wounded . . . and every last one of them with her chin up . . . is a memory that can never be erased.²⁶

Beyond references such as these, some romanticized and some substantive, little was written about the experiences of that unique group of military women. Although some of the nurses were asked to give testimony for use in the Japanese War Crimes Tribunal, no comprehensive written or oral histories were recorded by either the Army or the Navy. In 1983, on the occasion of a POW/MIA celebration, the Department of Defense finally videotaped interviews with several of the Army nurses as well as their Navy nurse counterparts who had been captured in Manila and on Guam during World War II.

Through all the debate of recent decades concerning the possible use of women in combat roles or combat zones, too often the historical record of the nurses of Bataan and Corregidor has been overlooked. These women saw the entire range of combat experience someone in a combat support or combat service support role could reasonably be expected to endure. Their service should not be forgotten.

NOTES

1. John Toland, *But Not in Shame* (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 300.
2. Elizabeth A. Shields, *Highlights in the History of the Army Nurse Corps* (Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1981), p. 22.
3. Minnie Breese Stubbs, oral history, Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1983.
4. Duane Schultz, *Hero of Bataan: The Story of General Jonathan M. Wainwright* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 52.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
6. Josephine Nesbit Davis, oral history, Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1983.
7. Schultz, p. 79.
8. Richard R. Taylor, *Medical Training in World War II* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1974), p. 127.
9. Marian N. Fernandes, "Women in Combat? Meet the Heroines of Corregidor, Bataan," *Army* (April 1979), p. 42.
10. Schultz, p. 132.
11. Breese Stubbs oral history.
12. "Bataan: Where Heroes Fell," *Time*, 20 April 1942, p. 20.
13. Ronald H. Spector, *The Eagle Against the Sun* (New York: Free Press, 1985), p. 117.
14. Toland, p. 288.
15. Madeline Ullom, oral history, Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1983.
16. Helen Cassiani Nestor, oral history, Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1983.
17. Schultz, p. 261.
18. For a discussion of the psychological state of those awaiting the promised relief, see Matthew S. Klimow, "Lying to the Troops: American Leaders and the Defense of Bataan," *Parameters*, 20 (December 1990), 48-60.
19. Gladys Ann Mealer Giles, oral history, Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1983.
20. Nestor oral history.
21. Mealer Giles oral history.
22. The Bronze Stars were for meritorious service vice valor, so combat Vs were not authorized for the women.
23. Philip A. Kalisch and Margaret Scobey, "Female Nurses in American Wars," *Armed Forces and Society*, 9 (Winter 1983), 232.
24. Clark Lee, *They Call It Pacific* (New York: Viking Press, 1943), p. 238.
25. Kalisch and Scobey, p. 227.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

Commentary & Reply

CONJURING MORE GHOSTS OF OMDURMAN

To the Editor:

I am sure that the article by Dan Bolger, "The Ghosts of Omdurman" (*Parameters*, Autumn 1991), will elicit a fire-storm of emotional critique from the readers of *Parameters*—both for and against his particular view of the Army and the emerging world order. At the risk of joining this clamorous pack, I would submit that to understand this article, we must first return to an earlier piece done by the same writer entitled "Two Armies," published in *Parameters*' September 1988 issue. "Two Armies" was a well-written but baseless diatribe against heavy forces, particularly heavy forces stationed in Europe. The premise of that article was that a pronounced distinction exists between our "Expeditionary Army" (light fighters and heroes) and a "Display Army" (heavy forces simply put in place in Europe to intimidate the Soviets as a trip wire against aggression with no real warfighting capability whatsoever).

Bolger went on to argue that the "Display Army" was trained in the belief that "somehow war of the future will feature incredibly rapid movements and gruesomely executed slaughters, concepts that have proven historically antithetical." The appeal of that line of reasoning, of course, evaporated in the wastelands of Iraq and Kuwait. For indeed, if Desert Storm proved nothing else, it proved that this "Display Army" could not only deter the Soviet Union, but could also fight and win the wars of this nation.

It seems remarkable to me, if not to Dan Bolger, that VII US Corps could go from a standing start in November; deploy thousands of miles by land, sea, and air; land at the ports of Jubayl and Dammam; march 600 kilometers over the Saudi desert; hook north into Iraq; and then lay waste to the fourth largest Army in the world. That strikes me as warfighting writ large. And I believe that the inability of Bolger's earlier thesis to explain that phenomenon has led to his most recent polemic against heavy forces. This latest piece is a noble effort to snatch intellectual victory from the jaws of historical defeat.

Having said that, I think the real value in a critique of "Ghosts of Omdurman" lies in an evaluation of the assumptions that underlie Bolger's vision of the future. It is clear in both of his pieces that Bolger sees an evolving world situation dominated by insurgencies and brush-fire wars—small operations requiring light forces as the principal instrument of US military power. He sees a world in which the United States is in a steady state of conflict, operating in the realm of twilight war. But the actual trends suggest just the opposite. For, while small-scale conflicts may well be a prominent feature of international relations, the frequent need for direct American involvement is not apparent. Indeed, the reduction in superpower competition is revising the calculus by which the United States determines the level of its commitment to fringe conflicts. No longer do we need to embroil ourselves in every brush-fire war simply as a reaction to Soviet adventurism; the era of proxy wars may well be drawing to a close. The focus of Soviet attention on its revolutionary implosion

and collapse, and the concomitant reduction in Soviet expansionism abroad, mean that the global environment is changing in profound ways. Absent superpower competition, brush-fire wars and insurgencies will have little impact on vital US interests and will only rarely demand a US military response.

At the same time, the proliferation of weapons of high-intensity warfare—tanks, heavy artillery, armored fighting vehicles, aircraft, ballistic missiles, and chemical weapons—suggests that the kind of war we saw in Southwest Asia may become the defining feature of the new world order and the centerpiece for the US Army of the 1990s. For the Iraqs of tomorrow, like the Iraq of 1990, will possess the capacity to threaten vital American interests as never before. It will be the armored legions of the developing world that will be the focus of our global defense—not Bolger's "New People's Army."

Can we point to a specific adversary against whom we will be required to commit forces at this point? Probably not. But two years ago we could not have pointed to Iraq. In such an environment of uncertainty, the rising number of military powers around the world and the spread of sophisticated weapon systems argue strongly for the capability to defend our vital interests with armored and mechanized forces—the very forces that Bolger feels we can do without.

So I believe there are fundamental flaws in Bolger's piece. As well written as Dan Bolger's article is, eloquence of expression does not replace rigor of analysis. Serious attempts to come to grips with force structure issues of the future must purge themselves, first and foremost, of emotionalism and of personal philosophies and look *hard* at what the Army and the nation are likely to require in the next century.

Colonel Christopher C. Shoemaker
Commander, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery
Germany

To the Editor:

As a 1984 graduate of the Sudanese Command and General Staff College, I was intrigued by the title of Daniel P. Bolger's article, "The Ghosts of Omdurman." However, his argument that Desert Storm may have been the last massive armored sweep just as the 21st Lancer's foray was the last cavalry charge is flawed by glaring factual errors. Bolger unfortunately sought to build his case without making sure of his history.

First, Omdurman (or Karriri as the Sudanese called it) is directly across the junction of the Nile rivers at Khartoum. Far from being some sleepy little oasis, it was at the time of the battle the Sudanese capital. Moreover, the term *hardpan* desert implies that the battle was fought purely on flat ground when in fact it was dominated by a jebel which the Sudanese used to mask their initial approach toward the troops. Numerous dry water courses crisscrossed the battle ground, one of which played a major part in the charge of the 21st Lancers. Most of the defending regiments were not British. They were colonials, either Sudanese or Egyptian.

As for the Mahdi rallying his troops to charge Kitchener's entrenched troops, the Mahdi died nearly a decade earlier—had he appeared at the battle, history might be different. Kitchener received the Mahdi's head after the British troops, acting under Kitchener's order, broke open his tomb. As it occurred, the Sudanese fought

under the flag of the Khalifa—the Mahdi's successor—and they charged the Imperial forces which defended from inside a zariba of acacia (camel thorns) and from behind sangars (rock barricades). The Sudanese, though fanatical in their belief in Allah, did in fact believe very strongly in the effects of rifles. They had debated long into the previous day as to whether to conduct a night attack or to surrender the cover of darkness to better muster their available firepower. They chose the latter.

The selection, however, of the charge of the 21st Lancers as a high point in that regiment's history is both curious and ironic. Curious in that most British casualties in the otherwise one-sided battle were from the 21st Lancers. Kitchener was reportedly quite angry over the Lancers' charge, considering it a frivolous action deviating from the regiment's mission of preventing the main Sudanese body from falling back on Omdurman. Aside from the jingoistic British press (including Winston Churchill) and the cavalry fraternity, British military circles regarded the action with disdain.

Ironic in that Osman Digna, the Sudanese general responsible, was one of the wiliest guerrilla fighters to ever challenge the British Empire. Convinced that a frontal assault against the zariba was fruitless unless conducted in a surprise night attack, Digna held back his forces, hiding them in a wadi. Anticipating the British would send their cavalry out to pursue survivors of any shattered Sudanese attack, Digna placed a screen out in front of the wadi as bait. The 21st Lancers charged the screen, which disintegrated allowing the left wing of the regiment to bore full speed into the waiting Sudanese. One full troop of the 21st died in the wadi, trapped and decimated by Digna's Hadendowa tribesmen. Osman Digna and many of his men escaped to fight again. To this day, a statue marks the location of that less than epic charge.

That Bolger—himself a student of low-intensity conflict—should ignore the implications of Digna's action at Omdurman does not reflect well on the author's research or the merits of his argument. Granted the British were in fact slow to give up the glory of the lance: in South Africa, the Boers despised it as a weapon unsuitable for use against fellow white men and were brutal in their treatment of captured lancers. Later, cavalry proved short-lived on the Western Front. Nevertheless, cavalry and mounted infantry served brilliantly in the Middle East. The lesson here is that "lessons learned" are generally situational and must be examined carefully. The need for heavy forces that can be shifted rapidly to meet global contingencies is, perhaps, one of the key lessons from Desert Storm, not that such forces are unlikely ever to be needed. Bolger would have been on more secure ground had he pointed out that light forces arrived in theater first, but that it required over five months to get the main punch—the heavy forces under VII Corps—ready to swing at Saddam's flank.

Major Thomas P. Odom
The Pentagon

To the Editor:

I found the article by Major Daniel P. Bolger in the Autumn 1991 issue of *Parameters* interesting. Bolger's conclusion, that "yesterday's solutions . . . rarely address tomorrow's problems," is a truth that perhaps cannot be said often enough. Unfortunately, he has selected some poor examples to illustrate his point.

The stupid charge of the 21st Lancers at Omdurman was certainly unnecessary and accomplished nothing, but to say that the Battle of Omdurman was

“unimportant” is to err. One result of the battle was to free the Sudanese people from a barbarous and tyrannical government; another—and it must be looked at from the British viewpoint—was that the French were denied a foothold on the Nile. (Remember the Fashoda incident?)

Bolger says that during the Anglo-Boer War “when overconfident British lancers charged” they were picked off by “hidden Boer riflemen . . . with well-aimed rapid fire.” Really? When was this? I know of not a single instance in which British lancers were shot to pieces by hidden Boer riflemen. On the contrary, the Boers had a particular horror of the lances and regarded their use by the British as barbaric.

This was particularly so following the charge of the 5th Dragoon Guards and the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers at the end of the Battle of Elandslaagte in October 1899. As the Boers on their ponies were trying to retreat, the cavalry did just what it was trained to do: it rode through and over them repeatedly, changing the retreat into a rout. One lancer reported that the Boers “went on their knees, begging us to shoot them rather than stab them with our lances.”

Bolger says that the Boers were not defeated until there was, among other things, “an overhaul of the British army’s infantry, artillery, and cavalry. . . .” Please tell us about this. The British discovered the value of mounted infantry, true, but an “overhaul”?

I would suggest that Major Bolger’s thesis would have been better expressed had he pointed out that the success of British cavalry in South Africa—French’s cavalry relieved besieged Kimberly and it caught and fixed the Boers under Cronjé at Paardeberg—led the British mistakenly to believe that cavalry would be equally successful in the next war. Thus, there were cavalry divisions kept waiting for a breakthrough that never came in the First World War.

Perhaps it should be noted that the Boers also made some successful charges with their mounted commandos. Witness the attack by Smuts’ commandos on the 17th Lancers during his invasion of Cape Colony.

Byron Farwell
Hillsboro, Virginia

To the Editor:

It becomes apparent that Major Daniel P. Bolger has set out to establish himself as writer and pundit, and he’s doing pretty well at it. In presenting his free-swinging opinions, he has adopted a personal style of vivid and colorful prose calculated, I suppose, to maintain reader interest. That’s all right too, within bounds.

In discussing Bolger’s article “The Ghosts of Omdurman,” I’m reacting not to what he says about the future, but to his careless, thus irresponsible, use of the Army’s history.

On page 37, Bolger discusses pursuit, pointing to the Eighth Army’s advance in Korea in the autumn of 1950. The paragraph in full reads:

Indeed, the last such chase came in the autumn of 1950, when Eighth Army ran wildly upcountry along the twisting roads of Korea, bypassing hundreds of thousands of waiting, hidden Chinese infantrymen. The happy playboys of occupied Japan looked great speeding by in their

trucks, but they lacked steel when the Chinese peasant soldiers came out of the barren hills and out of the winter night, hungry for Yankee blood. Eighth Army turned tail and ran back south as fast as it had come north. There is a harsh lesson in that sorry tale, if anyone cares to remember.

When I arrived in Pusan on 31 July 1950, I did not come as a happy playboy of occupied Japan. I came from Fort Lewis, Washington, on a piece of equipment called an APA troop transport. A lot of other soldiers who arrived in the Naktong Perimeter came from points other than Japan, and not an overt playboy in the lot.

When we came north out of the Naktong Perimeter in mid-September, coincident with the Inchon invasion, and "ran wildly upcountry" (who, *me?*), we were pursuing North Koreans, not, distinctly not, bypassing hundreds of thousands of hidden Chinese infantrymen. The same applies to our initial advance north from Pyongyang. The Chinese who caused me and many associates within Eighth Army to "turn tail," as the colorful writers put it, were Chinese who met us head-on on the Chongchon River and later sat astride our route. I too had the impression that they were "hungry for Yankee blood," but I must wonder if Major Bolger has actually read enough military history to justify his retrospective judgment in that most irritating of sentences, "The happy playboys of occupied Japn looked great speeding by in their trucks, but they lacked steel when the Chinese peasant soldiers came out of the barren hills. . . ." No matter how much history he has absorbed, he is not justified in casually dismissing the episode as "that sorry tale," which, as he uses it, equates with "contemptible."

If the paragraph had been written in straightforward English and with some basic attention to facts, it could have been useful in support of a discussion of pursuit. As it stands, it comes across to me, and possibly to some others of my vintage, as an exercise in attention-seeking. I doubt if that was a goal—or even an expected by-product—when he sat down to the hard work of writing such an article.

Colonel Rolfe L. Hillman, USA Ret.
Arlington, Virginia

To the Editor:

Major Daniel P. Bolger's essay "The Ghosts of Omdurman" was an attempt to salvage the theme of his equally controversial essay "Two Armies" which appeared in the September 1989 issue of *Parameters*. In this earlier piece, he argued that "today, America fields two armies, one for show and one for real fighting." Bolger assigned to the "show" army the Army's heavy divisions while claiming that "the real fighting since 1945 has been done by the other US Army and its Marine Corps brothers who together form the expeditionary army." Yet even before the Gulf War was fought and won by the "show" army, fault could be found with Bolger's view of history. The wars in Korea and Vietnam saw the deployment of plenty of "heavy" ordnance. However, Bolger was voicing what was a dominant theme in the 1980s: low-intensity conflict (LIC).

During the years 1981-85, active-duty Special Operations Forces increased 30 percent from 11,600 to 14,900 soldiers, mostly due to an expansion of Army Special Forces and Rangers. A further expansion to 20,900 was planned by 1990. A

Special Operations Command was created. In addition to SOF, the Army began shifting priorities toward light infantry divisions. The balance shifts further since seven of the heavy divisions required roundout units to reach full strength, an important consideration given the decision not to deploy the three roundout brigades activated during the Gulf crisis.

It would seem that the end of the Cold War combined with the widespread discrediting of Marxist revolution would lessen America's interest in LIC. Yet some have gone beyond a post-Cold War analysis to predict a trend in favor of LIC, this despite the fact that these conflicts drag on for years and decades because neither side can muster the necessary forces to win. Governments are unable to completely eradicate guerrillas or terrorists, while the rebel bands are unable to seize control of the centers of national authority. It is indecisive warfare, and neither the Pentagon nor the American public has any desire for substantial involvement in "no-win" wars.

Mao Tse-tung knew what many of today's proponents of LIC have missed—that LIC is the strategy of the weak. It is only the initial phase of the war during which a cadre is formed and blooded and the mettle of the enemy tested. Victory cannot come until the latter phases when the rebels can field a conventional army that can beat the government's troops in open battle and seize control of the country. Thus the importance of sanctuaries or secure base areas where a real army can be built and of foreign support for modern weapons.

A conflict that remains in the LIC phase should be handled by local forces. It is a matter for paramilitary police units, not for the regular army, and certainly not for a foreign army. American involvement should not need to go beyond the provision of weapons and equipment, training, and advisors to the embattled ally. Indeed the principal contribution of SOF units to LIC has been the deployment of Special Forces training teams to several dozen Third World countries.

Should a conflict escalate beyond LIC in an area of strategic importance, the US response should be directed at the source of the increased threat. The enemy's shift to a potentially decisive level of conventional attack against allied forces should be met with an overwhelming response aimed at an equally decisive defeat of the enemy. Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, USA Ret., in his recent book *Secrets of the Vietnam War* outlined how Bolger's "show army" could have won in Vietnam by striking directly at the center of the enemy's power: North Vietnam. Written before the Gulf crisis, Davidson's plan is quite similar in philosophy to what General Schwarzkopf, another Vietnam veteran, implemented against Iraq.

American policy should be to provide its Third World allies with capabilities they cannot provide for themselves. That means air and sea power to isolate the battle zone and bring to bear overwhelming firepower, and sophisticated airmobile and heavy ground combat units against which a Third World opponent cannot stand. Rather than develop forces geared to becoming entangled in LIC, the US posture should aim at extracting allies from LIC by providing them with the means to wage decisive warfare.

In those cases where the United States must act on its own to launch a punitive expedition or overthrow a petty tyrant (as in Grenada and Panama, the two examples of LIC cited by Bolger in his "Spectrum of Conflict" graphic),

regular forces can accomplish these tasks without the need to restructure the entire force pool.

Since Bolger chose the Victorian era with its "savage wars of peace" as his analogy, perhaps he should read Colonel C. E. Callwell's 1896 textbook *Small Wars* which has been recently reprinted. Callwell strongly condemns those commanders who become entangled in "desultory" warfare by trying to fight prolonged campaigns on the enemy's level. "Guerrilla warfare is the form of operations above all things to be avoided," he warns. The regular forces must seize the initiative and force the enemy to fight a kind of war they cannot win. The side that dictates the form and tempo of the war is the side most likely to prevail. In contrast, Bolger's entire case rests on the assumption that the enemy will gain and hold the initiative throughout the struggle. No officer should want his service to accept, let alone seek, battle on these terms. Instead, thinking should be directed at finding ways to avoid the LIC trap.

Though the Third World appears to be awash in LIC, the desire of both Third World regimes and insurgents is to escape its constraints. The widespread and large-scale acquisition of tanks, artillery, helicopter gunships, submarines, missiles, and advanced aircraft by states seeking regional power (not to mention chemical and nuclear programs and the construction of indigenous arms industries) represents a search for the means to wage decisive war. As the Iran-Iraq War demonstrates, this goal is still out of reach of most Third World states. However, as governments become better armed, the ability of insurgents to challenge them declines unless they can gain equivalent outside support. Thus while the incidence of LIC may remain high, its importance will diminish, as only the weakest movements will be confined to a LIC strategy.

The real threat to US interests is not guerrillas but Third World states bent on using their increased capabilities to pursue new ambitions as well as old feuds. It is thus most inappropriate for the United States to downgrade its forces towards LIC. SOF units can support allies engaged in LIC at a cost low enough to be sustainable, but any larger commitment of American military power in a warfighting situation must be in the form of high-intensity operations that seek victory rather than a protracted stalemate. Of course, the United States needs a force mix that includes SOF and light units for specific missions (counter-terrorist and commando operations for SOF; rapid deployment by sea or air and rough/urban terrain combat for light units), but they should be seen as auxiliaries to the main force of heavy units. They are not strong enough to stand on their own, let alone fight and win a decisive struggle.

If the Army is to be reduced to only a handful of divisions, most of them should be at the high-tech/heavy end of the spectrum since such units would represent a capability superior to what any opponent could field. In, say, a 12-division force, the Army should not deploy more than two light divisions (one trained for jungle warfare, the other for mountain/arctic conditions) in addition to its two airborne/airmobile divisions. And if the force falls below 12 divisions, the light units should be deactivated first, leaving their duties to the paratroopers, Marines, and perhaps some independent infantry brigades.

William R. Hawkins
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Knoxville, Tennessee

The Author Replies:

Every author hopes that his work will generate interest, and it looks like my Gulf War piece drew some pretty respectable incoming projectiles. I owe a hearty thanks to Colonels Hillman and Shoemaker, Major Odom, and Messrs. Farwell and Hawkins, all of whom obviously thought long and hard as they addressed the same issues that prompted me to write. Certainly, one cannot help being impressed by the eloquence and passion of the critiques presented. I found all of their letters fascinating, both for what they said and what they implied. Still, as those unforgiving sergeants taught me years ago at Fort Benning, when in a near ambush, you must assault through. So here goes.

In general terms, the letters express two criticisms: first, that my brief consideration of Omdurman got it so wrong that it ruined any analogy; and second, that I am continuing what Colonel Shoemaker calls a "baseless diatribe" against the utility of modern US Army heavy forces. Since I agree with George Orwell that he who controls the past controls the present, at least when suggesting a historical parallel, we'll start first with the Omdurman segment.

Trying to provide a sketch of a battle is never easy. The Duke of Wellington, who fought in plenty of engagements, likened developing a battle account to an attempt to write the history of a ball. I defer to Major Odom's evident knowledge of the Sudanese side of the engagement, as well as to Byron Farwell's well-earned reputation as an expert regarding the British army of the Victorian era. My intent involved introducing my main argument with a properly stirring "battle piece" focused on a celebrated heavy cavalry action. I did not attempt to address all of the nuances of terrain and Sudanese political organization, nor to pass judgment on the progress of British empire-building along the Nile. The 21st Lancers definitely charged, and whatever else one thinks of Winston Churchill's account, he participated and saw, and we did not.

With regard to the aftermath of Omdurman, I do take issue with Mr. Farwell's curt dismissal ("please tell us about this") of frantic British attempts to solve long-standing military ills revealed during the ugly reverses of the Boer War (1899-1902). I would urge him to reread his own *Mr. Kipling's Army* (particularly the chapters titled "Reform," "Education and Training," and "Attitudes, Beliefs, and Prejudices") for numerous examples touching infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Major Odom rightly stated that only "the cavalry fraternity" remembered Omdurman fondly. Unfortunately, this clique ran the British army (right into the Flanders mud, some might say) from 1902 to 1918. Men like Sir John French, Sir Douglas Haig, and their many mentors and disciples gained and retained power more than ample to keep their lancers' dream alive long after reality had passed them by.

And that brings me around to Colonel Shoemaker and Mr. Hawkins, defenders of the modern heavy cavalry. I grant that our Gulf War planning and execution proved masterful at every step. When their moment came, mighty armored forces pursued with a vengeance, admittedly against an already cowed, dazed, and beaten foe—sort of like Lancers against Dervishes.

Colonel Shoemaker describes the campaign in glowing terms as proof that heavy forces can really fight as advertised in "warfighting writ large," and goes on to announce the good news that America need not intervene frequently in the

present and future Third World except to redo campaigns like Desert Storm. Mr. Hawkins also advocates mid-intensity war "directed at the source" as the solution to pesky guerrillas and terrorists.

The only problem involves reality. America's enemies are fighting us right now, and they do not try conventional armored slugfests very often (four days in four and a half decades, by my arithmetic). They prefer to grab hostages, threaten American nationals and businesses, foment insurrections, trade narcotics, and talk dirty about us. Would that, as Lord Kitchener said of the Dervishes, our opponents would "stand up to a fair fight!" But they prefer to lash out on their terms.

We don't usually (even in Iraq) strike directly at the source. Instead, our political culture leaves soldiers to react to outcomes: American citizens held hostage, American military dependents under siege, American tourists and students in peril, American allies threatened by opportunistic factions spoiling for coups d'état. These situations will seldom rest easy for five months while the great armored divisions move slowly into theater aboard an ever-shrinking pool of ancient shipping. Saddam Hussein chose to wait and paid for it. His imitators and comrades, perhaps North Korea or Iran, will not be so foolish.

Fighting only conventional wars is not even an option. As you read this, teams of US Army advisors assist in several counterinsurgency efforts (in El Salvador and the Philippines, for example), aviation units work against drug smugglers (in Jamaica and on the US border), soldiers keep the peace in the Sinai, and counterterror operatives work daily to penetrate and disrupt the lurking cells of bombers and kidnapers. Colonel Shoemaker's heavy forces may believe themselves to be at peace, but the US Army is not, nor has it been since 1941.

With the Soviet Union in chaos, Germany reunited, and Korea ever more self-sufficient, our overseas divisions will all be home within the decade. Tomorrow's Army must be deployable on short notice from the United States. More ships and more airplanes probably won't appear, so what we have must be tailored to move on what is available. If armor units want to play—and we surely need them—they had better lighten up.

And that, after all, is the crux of the matter. Whether in Iraq or Grenada, tanks need to *get there* first, then fight. America cannot afford and will not maintain two armies anymore. Willingly or not, the forward-deployed heavy forces, like the lancers before them, are passing into history.

I think our armored force leaders understand that. Colonel Hillman's understandable pride notwithstanding, the ill-trained and ill-equipped forces that entered Korea in 1950 landed basking in the afterglow of World War II victories, a false pride quickly punctured by the North Koreans and then the Chinese. Despite my fears when I wrote "The Ghosts of Omdurman" back in March 1991, I am convinced that today's regulars will not lapse into complacency. From what I have seen, Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan, a tanker's tanker, spoke for most of our senior leaders when he said: "The world today is undergoing fundamental transformation, . . . and the Army cannot rest on its laurels." That's an Army I'm proud to serve.

Major Daniel P. Bolger

Book Reviews

The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America's Intervention in Vietnam. By James R. Arnold. New York: William Morrow, 1991. 444 pages. \$24.00. Reviewed by Guenter Lewy, author of *America in Vietnam*.

This book deals with the early history of the American involvement in the Vietnam conflict—from the end of World War II until the election of President Kennedy in 1960. The author relates how time and again the United States pressured France to grant independence to its colonial possessions in Indochina and how France managed to evade all calls for meaningful reform. The same dilemma arose after the defeat and withdrawal of the French. President Ngo Dinh Diem similarly managed to capitalize on US concern about an expansion of communism in Southeast Asia which enabled him to pursue his autocratic rule without fear of an American abandonment. The result was the steady alienation of his regime from the population of Vietnam and the growing strength of the Viet Cong insurgency, led and supplied by communist North Vietnam.

Arnold's book tells this story without breaking any new ground. The dust jacket claims that Arnold relied on many "heretofore unused sources" and that his findings "are both surprising and shocking." This, unfortunately, is publisher's hyperbole. It may well be that the author here and there was able to tap some newly declassified documents, but there is nothing in this book that has not been discussed exhaustively in any number of other works, including in prominent place the Pentagon Papers. Moreover, Arnold, described by his publisher as an "accomplished historian," appears unfamiliar with or has failed to draw on some of the standard works on his subject.

A case in point is the Geneva Conference of 1954 and its aftermath, where the author should have consulted Robert F. Randle's definitive study, *Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War* (Princeton University Press, 1969). Arnold states correctly that the Final Declaration providing for elections to be held in July 1956 in order to bring about a final political settlement was not signed by the United States and South Vietnam, but he fails to mention that nobody else signed it either. Indeed, the Final Declaration was not even adopted by a formal vote, and these facts have, of course, an important bearing upon the significance and validity of the so-called Geneva accords. There are strong indications that nobody at the conference took the idea of an early unification through free elections seriously. Why have a massive exchange of population if the two zones were to be unified within 700 days or so? Why was the machinery for settling future disagreements on the implementation of this agreement so haphazard? "The provision for free elections which would solve ultimately the problem of Vietnam," wrote Hans J. Morgenthau perceptively in 1956, "was a device to hide the incompatibility of the Communist and Western positions, neither of which can admit the domination of Vietnam by the other side. It was a device to disguise the fact that the line of military demarcation was bound to be a line of political division as well."

Arnold's failure to assess correctly the meaning of the Geneva accords leads him to misunderstand Ho Chi Minh's game plan. The author correctly points out that the repressiveness of the Diem regime in the years 1956-59 created pressure upon the

Southern communist leadership to resume armed struggle, but his statement that by 1959 the "northern leaders had no choice because their southern cadre was fast disappearing" is misleading. It suggests that the North Vietnamese communists were forced to start full-scale hostilities in the South because of Diem's oppressive rule. In point of fact, according to documents captured later and the testimony of well-informed defectors, the communists never expected the elections to take place and from early on prepared for a strategy of armed struggle to reunify the country.

Ho Chi Minh had to wait until 1959 because, first, in the years immediately following the Geneva Conference the communists in the North had severe problems with their own "counterrevolutionaries." In 1955-56 perhaps as many as 50,000 were executed in connection with the land reform law of 1953 and at least twice as many were arrested and sent to forced labor camps. Arnold does not mention these events; he refers to this period in the history of North Vietnam as one of "nation building." Secondly, the Northern leadership felt that the revolutionary situation in the South was not yet "ripe," the masses having not yet become convinced that armed struggle was really necessary. Hence, the communists started a policy of assassinating the most effective officials who tried to improve the lives of the peasants. This program of systematic terror predictably goaded the Diem regime into stepping up its brutal antiterrorist program, thus further undermining its popular support. Arnold mentions the Viet Cong's campaign of terror, but calls it unauthorized by the North.

In his concluding chapter Arnold states that the "domino theory proved a fallacy." This assertion will come as news to the people of Laos and Cambodia. He also suggests that the enormous human misery besetting the area under communist rule could have been avoided if the United States had responded positively to Ho Chi Minh's gestures of a friendly relationship at the end of World War II. It is questionable findings such as these which unfortunately make up whatever new elements are to be found in this book.

The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice.

By Christopher Bellamy. New York: Routledge, 1991. 314 pages.
\$42.50. Reviewed by Archer Jones, author of *The Art of War in the Western World*.

Christopher Bellamy aims to demonstrate the value of the study of military history, including that of Asia, to "military policy making and planning for the future." Beginning with a brief chapter called "Ground Rules," he shows his emphasis on the operational level of war by including various lists of the principles of war, a discussion of attack and defense, and an excellent clarification that maneuver and attrition are complementary rather than antithetical. He completes the chapter with *enfilade* and *defilade*, lines of operations, permanent and field fortifications, and varieties of envelopments and encirclements.

In his second chapter, "Technics and Warfare," Bellamy makes a number of generalizations about the significance of technology and war, using the history of artillery and cavalry to illustrate some of his points. But often he assumes that his readers have a knowledge of wars and campaigns that many may lack. He wisely concludes that "there are no technological panaceas—only intelligent, studied, and laborious adaptation of tactics and operational art to new means of warfare."

The next two chapters offer an interpretive survey of operational military history from 1800 to 1977. Here I expected the author to emulate the 19th-century theory books of P. L. MacDougall and Edward Hamley by applying the operational principles presented in the first chapter. But he does this only six times and misses at least seven opportunities to employ them to explain the operations. Moreover, he fails to give a consistent exposition of envelopment.

These chapters may presume too much knowledge for the novice without offering new insights for the expert. For example, Bellamy refers to "Allied strategic deception" before the Normandy landings which "involved phantom armies." In seven lines he then quotes Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to make a syllogism which explains "reflexive control." Some readers will not understand unless they already know what phantom armies were.

The next two chapters, comprising two case studies, fill nearly half the book. The first uses the origins of the Soviet army's operational maneuver group (OMG) to show the "practical utility of military history." This formation had the mission of penetrating deeply to disrupt NATO armies and block withdrawal routes. Mr. Bellamy exploits his expertise in Russian military history to trace the origin of the OMG in Russian military practice and thought. Going beyond the Soviet field service regulations of the 1930s, he finds ancestors of this doctrine of deep mechanized penetration in the Imperial army, beginning with the cossack tradition of raiding and a 1760 raid on Berlin.

The author then examines how the cavalry raids of the American Civil War influenced the Imperial army to adopt similar deep raids against logistic objectives. It is intriguing to read of the incorporation of the English word "raid" into Russian and of the attackers in the Russian maneuvers of 1876 using cavalry to conduct an "American raid" 150 kilometers into the defender's rear to break a major railroad. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 a Russian force of 11,000 infantry and cavalry moved rapidly ahead of the main army to take and hold Shipka Pass, the key to an easy passage through the Balkan Mountains.

But this brilliant seizure of Shipka Pass was not a raid in the sense of an incursion into the enemy rear to break railways and then withdraw. Taking the pass is the real antecedent of the deep mechanized penetrations envisioned in the Soviet doctrine of the 1930s and in the OMG. Since Mr. Bellamy knows that the air forces are the heirs of the cavalry's raiding mission, he would have made a clearer presentation had he distinguished the two kinds of raids. After treating the Russian Civil War of 1918-21 and the Russo-Polish War of 1919-20, where small armies in large spaces facilitated raiding, he completes the chapter with selected operations from World War II.

The other case study chapter, "Don't get involved in a land war in Asia," uses something of a great captains approach in going from Genghis Khan to Giap, which does not lend itself to operational lessons. But the author's excellent account of the Taiping Rebellion is instructive in strategy, a subject beyond to scope of his book.

In beginning his concluding chapter, the author says he "has demonstrated that the intelligent study of military history is of practical value for today and the future." I cannot estimate how many readers will feel he has come reasonably close to attaining this objective. But when he says that his examples have demonstrated "key principles and ideas," I think many will disagree. If these are the ones in his chapter titled "Ground Rules," he has failed to organize the work to use or illustrate

them. Though, in the course of his narratives, he has made many good generalizations, he has failed to codify them or provide a thorough development. But this book's sound history and well-founded interpretations will mislead no one and surely inform many.

Guadalcanal. By Richard B. Frank. New York: Random House, 1990. 801 pages. \$34.95. Reviewed by Dr. Allan R. Millett, author of *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*.

As the 50th anniversary of World War II passes in review, a host of authors will discover an equally large number of "decisive" campaigns and battles, critical turning points, moments of high drama, and many gallant hours. In his comprehensive account of the Guadalcanal campaign, Richard B. Frank, a newcomer to the ranks of popular military historians, argues that America's war in the Pacific turned from defeat toward victory in the Solomons between August 1942 and January 1943, and not as a result of the Battle of Midway in June 1942. Although he admits that expert accounts of the campaign already exist, he believes his own work makes better use of Japanese sources—especially the Japanese official history of the campaign—and gives a more integrated account of the related naval, air, and ground actions than earlier histories. The latter judgment gives Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith's earlier book, *The Battle for Guadalcanal* (1963), scant credit, but on balance Frank does what he claims. *Guadalcanal* is an impressive piece of work, especially for a first book. For newcomers to the struggle for the southern Solomons, Frank's study is an able introduction.

In his explanation of the origins of the campaign and the strategic assessments that sent the South Pacific theater forces into a major offensive operation long before they were prepared, Frank is sound in his judgment that Admiral Ernest J. King could claim the biggest share of paternity for Operation Watchtower, with assists from Douglas MacArthur, Chester A. Nimitz, and Richmond Kelly Turner. He also is quite correct that the focus on Guadalcanal—rather than on other islands in the Solomons and elsewhere—came from Major General A. A. Vandegrift and his staff of the 1st Marine Division, who drafted an operations order long before Turner, the amphibious task force commander, or Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, the theater commander, could produce a solid plan. The senior naval officer afloat for the operation, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, showed little interest in the initial operation beyond providing carrier air support and getting his task force out of Solomons waters as quickly as possible. Frank, in fact, does some service in giving Ghormley and Fletcher a more judicious assessment than other historians or Admirals King and Nimitz, who insured that neither officer again held a high command in the war against Japan. If some Americans could not see Guadalcanal—its northern coastal plain was the only suitable airfield site in the southern Solomons—as the crucial objective, the Japanese were no less uncertain about the island's importance, and their procrastination cost them far more dearly.

Relying on the American official histories and after-action reports, Frank does a sound job in discussing the intelligence and logistics aspects of the campaign. His treatment of the same problems from the Japanese perspective provides excellent insight into their 17th Army's dilemmas and courageous improvisation. The Japanese essentially lost the campaign because they could not put "Cactus Air Force" (US land-based air on Guadalcanal) out of business except for short periods of time. With Japanese air positioned too far north for sustained operations over Guadalcanal, the

Japanese reinforcement and resupply convoys had to offload at night and then retire or risk destruction. At critical moments in October and November 1942, American land-based air ruined the Japanese resupply effort, which doomed offensive land operations against the 1st Marine Division's enclave around Henderson Field.

Not that the resupply effort worked only against the Japanese, for Ghormley and Turner wondered if they could get their own convoys to Guadalcanal through the Japanese naval interdiction effort they faced. Frank, in fact, is too sympathetic to Ghormley, who advised Vandegrift by private letter that the Marines should plan to abandon the enclave and prepare for a Dunkirk-like evacuation or fight as guerrillas in the Guadalcanal mountains or surrender. Frank has reservations about whether this letter, delivered by Kelly Turner on 11 September 1942, actually existed, and there is no question that it was lost on the island. Frank cites Generals Vandegrift and Merrill B. Twining (the assistant division operations officer) as witnesses, but confesses his own uncertainty about their remembrances. As the author of a forthcoming biography of the division operations officer, General Gerald C. Thomas, I, too, had to deal with the missing "defeatist letter" by Ghormley, and I am convinced that General Twining's account—which has remained consistent for years—is accurate. Thomas himself read the letter: in fact, he was the last person to see it. Over the years he and most of the division staff—including Twining, the late General H. W. "Bill" Buse, Colonel Stanford Hunt (division external communications and cryptographic officer), Herbert C. Merillat, and Martin Clemens (Australian coastwatcher and chief of native scouts and bearers)—told their contemporaries and other historians of Ghormley's letter. Twining's written account in the *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 1987) is definitive.

At the operational and tactical levels, Frank is best on the seven naval battles (most of them Japanese victories), sound on air operations, and uneven on the ground campaign. Like all historians, he is dependent on his sources and his own energy and acuity as a researcher, and he appears to have taken greatest interest in the naval struggles, a novel choice for a former Army infantry officer. He does excellent work in reconstructing the naval engagements from the perspectives of the opposing commanders with just due to Japanese night tactics and torpedo employment. The air operations start with professional appraisals and move into "wild blue" war stories, but with the histories by Miller and Sherrad to show the way, Frank's account is dependable. He does not give adequate credit, however, to Marine anti-aircraft fire, which drove Japanese bombers to heights where their aim became uncertain and their vulnerability to fighter attack increased. The fact that Japanese bombers arrived on a predictable schedule (driven by flying time in daylight) made air defense, of course, easier for the Americans, although the short engagement times of the escorting Zeros helped too.

Frank overlooks several crucial points in 1st Marine Division ground operations. He catches some of the personalities of the Marine commanders, but he misses the impact of personal relations among the senior officers, especially Thomas's close relationship with Vandegrift, Edson, and Twining. He is correct in identifying Edson and William J. Whaling as strong influences on the conduct of operations because of their reputations for field command before World War II. One factor Frank fails to mention is the division's abundant supply of machineguns in its artillery and other combat support battalions, and the fact that these guns went to the frontline infantry where they proved crucial in defensive operations. Another overlooked tactical matter is that Edson's 1st Raider Battalion fought the Battle of Raider Ridge with highly effective M-1 rifles, the

only battalion so equipped in the whole division. The Japanese noticed the difference as did Edson, who urged Commandant Thomas Holcomb to get M-1s to Marines as quickly as possible. Last, Frank does not stress enough the importance of the Japanese artillery threat to Henderson Field in October when the Japanese employed several batteries of 150mm howitzers against the Marine enclave. With only one battalion of 105mm howitzers to use for counterbattery fire, the Marines had to move closer to the Japanese guns, which justified the jumbled attacks along the Matanikau River. Not until the Navy brought Army and Marine 155mm gun and howitzer batteries to the island did the artillery threat lessen. Air attacks alone did not end the life of "Pistol Pete," the term the Marines coined for Japanese long-range artillery snipers.

Although Frank writes with care—and his supporting charts and tables on losses and order of battle are excellent—he needs better editorial support and more stylistic discipline. Planes "waddle," torpedoes "gore" ships, men "ambulate" when they walk, and "digits" do the work of fingers. Such gaucheries, however, should not distract the reader from appreciating the strengths of this book, which will no doubt serve as the most detailed and comprehensive account of the Guadalcanal campaign for the 50th anniversary of the war with Japan. Mr. Frank has begun his own career as a military historian with an ambitious work that comes close to his own goals. *Guadalcanal* deserves serious reading by military professionals as well as the popular audience for which it was designed.

Antietam: The Soldiers' Battle. By John M. Priest. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Publishing Co., 1989. 437 pages. \$34.95. **Reviewed by Stephen W. Sears,** author of *Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam*.

This book is a worm's eye view of the bloodiest single day in American history. John M. Priest, a high school teacher in Hagerstown, Maryland, tells us he spent eight years studying the nearby battleground at Sharpsburg and the men who fought there 130 years ago. He describes Antietam as "the soldiers' battle," and that precisely describes what his book is about—a minute-by-minute accounting of what it was like out on the firing lines for Johnny Reb and Billy Yank on 17 September 1862.

As Jay Luvaas of the US Army War College faculty points out in his introduction to the book, this focus on the true face of battle is a comparatively recent trend in the writing of military history. John Keegan is probably the most popular practitioner of the art. Among Civil War historians, Bell Irvin Wiley pioneered in treating of the man in the ranks, telling us of Johnny Reb in 1943 and of Billy Yank in 1952. In the 1950s Bruce Catton brought the Yankee soldier to life (and by extension the Rebel too), and more recently we have seen studies of the Civil War soldier by Gerald F. Linderman, Randall C. Jimerson, Reid Mitchell, and James I. Robertson, Jr. John Priest focuses in tightly on one day on one field, and the result is an excruciating chronicle of what that day was like. Of course not every one of the 24,412 casualties (Mr. Priest's figure) is recorded here, but it sometimes seems that way.

He has tapped published sources, particularly the myriad regimental histories and participants' memoirs, and numerous letters and diaries in manuscript collections, including the large collections at the Perkins Library at Duke, the Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina, and the US Army

Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks. He has also utilized Ezra A. Carman (1834-1909), who knew more about the Battle of Antietam than all the rest of us put together, although I think he has somewhat undercredited Carman. Brevet General Carman wrote not only the definitive tactical study of Antietam—which Mr. Priest fails to properly credit; it is in the Library of Congress—but was also primarily responsible for the Antietam Battlefield Board's series of 14 splendid situation maps, including the troop positions thereon and the accompanying orders of battle.

In any case, Mr. Priest has earnestly collected a large mass of material on the men who fought Antietam, and woven it together in a narrative that very seldom strays from the battle lines. He does not often quote from his sources but instead uses them to write his own account of the incidents they portray. While he is certainly honest to the spirit of these participant accounts, he does sometimes dramatize or interpret them to improve his story. Less is more in writing military history, and Mr. Priest could have reined himself in on occasion. Even so, there is no doubt that this is what it was like on that murderous field hard by Antietam Creek.

While Mr. Priest gives us the stink and fear of Civil War combat, one consequence of his tight focus is confusion about the overall picture. We see all trees and none of the forest. From this book we don't know *why* these men were sent in where they were, *what* they were supposed to accomplish there, and *how* one event affected another. This is a true enough picture of Civil War combat in general, but by itself it does not tell us as much about the Battle of Antietam as I think the author intended. My suggestion would be to read up on Antietam before tackling Mr. Priest's book, so that what he records can be put in better perspective. And I further advise some advance map study. Mr. Priest's 72 detail maps are as earnestly conceived as his research, but many of them confuse more than they enlighten.

Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History.

By Alan T. Nolan. Chapel Hill & London: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1991. 231 pages. \$22.50. Reviewed by Professor James Kirby Martin, who in conjunction with John Morgan Dederer is now completing a study of the sources of Lee's innovative generalship to be published by Ticknor & Fields.

Lawyer-historian Alan T. Nolan states at the outset: "I believe that Robert E. Lee was a great man" (p. ix). If that is the case, then Nolan must have rather loose standards for measuring greatness, since this book is not so much a consideration as a denunciation of Lee. Indeed, this study portrays the Confederacy's most celebrated military hero as a deceptive, manipulating, self-serving hypocrite, the very antithesis of the noble, high-minded, saint-like figure featured by most Lee biographers. Then again, Nolan's is really not a biography. He devotes one paragraph to summarizing Lee's life (pp. 5-6) before donning the mantle of prosecuting attorney and laying out his brief. Nolan's readers, functioning in the role of jurors, will each have to decide whether the proffered evidence is compelling enough to declare Lee—and the Lee mythmakers—guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.

Of necessity, we must first turn to the author's bill of indictment. It tells us that even though Lee on various occasions acted as an opponent of slavery, he was actually an advocate of that "peculiar" institution. A reputed opponent of secession,

he willingly and even eagerly fought for the South. An acclaimed strategist and tactician, he was so blindly committed to offensive warfare that he ultimately destroyed the fighting capacity of his own army. Although Lee loved his soldiers, he recklessly expended their lives. Worse yet, he "continued the war long after a Southern victory was possible" (p. x). Almost as serious, he acted the part of a conciliator after the war but was really an unreconstructed secessionist who vilified the Union and resented the freedom of blacks.

So much for the charges. What of the evidence? Nolan's exposition begins in his chapter on "Lee and the Peculiar Institution" (pp. 9-29). To take one representative example, we find the author poring over Lee's 1856 statement concerning how "pleased" he was "with the President's [Franklin Pierce] message" (p. 13) to Congress that agitating abolitionists were driving the nation toward irreparable division and war. Lee goes on to indicate that his slaveholding neighbors would not continue to tolerate such interference in their lives and to express his hope that Providence might somehow work out a plan for emancipation before it was too late. Nolan then rearranges selected words (p. 14) to make it appear that Lee actually favored slavery. What Lee said in context and what Nolan asserts he said (with words stripped of their context) are not the same. With respect to Lee as a proponent of slavery, Nolan's evidence should be called extremely circumstantial.

So goes much of the rest of the text. Nolan probes and picks, repeatedly separating Lee's thoughts from their particular context. In some instances the author's argumentation is downright fatuous, such as implying that Lee by a "preresignation arrangement with Virginia" (p. 44) delayed severing his ties with the Union Army until 20 April 1861 in order to secure what intelligence he could about Lincoln's war plans. Just as unconvincing is Nolan's discussion of Lee's strategic thinking. Lee was no Quintus Fabius Maximus, the Roman general who became famous for avoiding decisive battle, but to reduce Lee's actions to a "grand strategy of the attack" (p. 87) represents a vast oversimplification of a complex subject. According to Nolan, Lee knew by Gettysburg, if not before, that the war could not be won, largely because his offensive-mindedness was using up his manpower—apparently this was not happening to other Confederate forces—at a rate that defied the South's capacity to provide additional troops. Lee should have recognized this reality and surrendered his army "from twenty to fifteen months before Appomattox" (p. 115), thus sparing the Confederacy the terrible carnage that came in 1864 and 1865. Stubborn cavalier pride, Nolan asserts, kept Lee in the field.

This line of reasoning assumes that Lee, whom Nolan admits always deferred to civil authority, held such complete power as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia that he alone—without reference to Jefferson Davis, the Confederate Congress, various southern governments, or other Confederate armies in the field—could determine when to stop the war. The dust jacket calls such an evaluation "thought-provoking." Most readers will just shake their heads in disbelief. If this is the best argumentation that Nolan has to offer, then the courtroom verdict should be: misleading presentation, Lee not guilty.

The pro-Lee legend as it emerged from a defeated South after the Civil War was clearly overblown, as are the worshipful biographies of Douglas Southall Freeman (*R. E. Lee*, 4 vols., 1934-35) and Clifford Dowdey (*Lee*, 1965) among others. As a corrective undertaking couched in the form of courtroom prosecution, Nolan's

considerations are equally unconvincing. Somewhere in between resides the real General Robert E. Lee, still waiting to be understood in terms of both his strengths and weaknesses.

Amateurs, to Arms! A Military History of the War of 1812-1815.

By John R. Elting. Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1991. 353 pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Dr. Donald R. Hickey, John F. Morrison Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College and author of *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict*.

The War of 1812 has always been a neglected conflict. Although a significant benchmark in American history, it has never attracted the kind of attention that has been lavished on the American Revolution, the Civil War, or World War II. Even historians who have been drawn to this conflict have usually focused on the battles and campaigns, ignoring the war's political, diplomatic, economic, financial, and social dimensions. The result may be good military history, but it distorts or at least presents only a partial view of what actually happened.

John R. Elting's new book is very much in this tradition. Despite the inherent limitations in his approach, there is much in Elting's study that merits praise. A retired army colonel who has written extensively on military subjects, Elting knows army organization and operating procedures and shows a fine grasp of geography (which is no mean achievement given the fact that many of the camp and battle sites have undergone name changes). The maps supporting his text are well drawn, though they do not show the layout of forces or the progress of the battles. Elting's narrative is lively and his language colorful. (Some readers may find his old-fashioned treatment of the Indians too colorful.) His text contains much fascinating detail although the paucity of footnotes makes it impossible to verify his research. His work also contains the usual second-guessing of command decisions that one expects in popular histories aimed at a general audience.

Although Elting shows a good grasp of tactics, he is on much weaker ground when addressing strategic or naval matters. He misconstrues American naval strategy on both the high seas and Lake Ontario. He claims too much for the American victories on Lake Erie and at Chippewa and too little for Andrew Jackson's triumph over the Creeks. He postulates a strategic connection between British offensives in northern New York and eastern Maine that did not exist, and he fails to appreciate the insurmountable problems of trying to retake Maine without a naval force. Indeed, in the flurry of operations that he describes, the year is rarely given and the larger picture is often lost.

The main problem with this work, however, goes much deeper. It is based almost entirely on secondary sources. Some (such as Henry Adams' *History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison*) have been used in abridged form, while others (such as Fletcher Pratt's *The Navy*) are known to be unreliable. Elting's failure to exploit primary sources or even to utilize fully the secondary sources available has left him at a decided disadvantage in reconstructing events. The result is a book marred by a host of errors, large and small.

Elting has the wrong years for the Battle of Fallen Timbers (it was 1794, not 1795) and the *Chesapeake* Affair (1807, not 1808), and he has reversed the correct order of America's two assaults on York. He shows little understanding of Federalist

opposition to the war, New England's position on the dispute over the militia, the sectional nature of congressional opposition to schemes for arming and classifying the militia, and the effect that the establishment of state armies was likely to have on the United States Army. (Given the enormous bounty offered to regulars near the end of the war—\$124 and 320 acres of land—recruiting probably would have remained brisk.)

Elting is wrong to assert that James Madison continued Thomas Jefferson's program of constructing gunboats. (Madison's Secretary of the Navy actually lost no time in discontinuing it.) He is also wrong when he says that loyalty oaths were required in British-occupied Maine (they were only encouraged), that the British sought navigation rights on the Mississippi River (they already had them), that the Duke of Wellington declined the American command (he actually accepted it), and that Republican interest in West Florida was an anomaly (it was fully consistent with their policy of territorial expansion).

Elting's conclusion may raise some eyebrows. "Such times," he writes, "may come again: the United States government shattered by a surprise nuclear attack, communications out, a panicked public swayed by fainthearts and traitors screaming for surrender. In such broken-backed war, commanders of the breed of Brown, Scott, Macomb, and Jackson will grip whatever forces they can rally and lash out against every target they can reach, taking an overconfident enemy by surprise" (p. 328).

What, then, are we to make of this book? Although a lively and interesting account of the battles and campaigns, it ignores other aspects of the war, and even as military history it must be treated with caution. It is best used in conjunction with more reliable accounts, such as Reginald Horsman's *The War of 1812* (1969) or James R. Jacobs and Glenn Tucker's *The War of 1812: A Compact History* (1969).

The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990. By Marilyn B. Young. New York: Harper Collins, 1990. 286 pp. \$25.00. **Reviewed by Colonel Paul F. Braim, USA Ret., Ph.D.,** who served four tours in Vietnam.

Marilyn Young has produced an exhaustive and well-crafted collection (she calls it a synthesis) of criticism of the United States for its actions in the war in Vietnam. The text covers the period from the return of the French to Vietnam after World War II to the fall of South Vietnam to North Vietnamese forces in 1975. There is little new information in this polemical text. It is a celebration of protest from the political Left, taken from thousands of condemnatory pamphlets. However, there is one new emphasis with which I agree: Young has excoriated the Kennedy Administration for establishing the program of counterinsurgency which defined the US effort in South Vietnam. True, the author condemns all Presidents from Truman to Bush for what she sees as their aggressive actions, but in recognizing the primacy of the Kennedys in escalating the war she defames the Kennedy dynasty particularly. You are right, Marilyn. The war in Vietnam was Kennedy's War. I listened to Bobby Kennedy describe the new program of "Nation-Building" for South Vietnam just before departing on my first tour in that nation.

But Young is very wrong about the purpose of the Kennedy program, which she sees as another "evil" attempt at subjugating the Vietnamese. (She ignores the term "nation-building.") The program launched by President Kennedy, and followed by subsequent administrations, was a noble effort to create a free and prosperous

nation in South Vietnam. To this crusade we gave much of our treasure, including the most precious of resources, the lives of our young. It was, unfortunately, a very naive program—attempting to build a nation in our image in an alien culture half a world away. All our programs of assistance to Vietnam are deserving of criticism. They were based upon unrealistic assumptions and optimistic prognostications: they were, however, altruistic in the extreme. Programs for conquest they were not.

Why were we in Vietnam? Young asserts repeatedly that no one in "The Establishment" could ever answer that question. Most of the 550,000 Vietnam veterans should be able to answer her. They were all issued a MACV card, which oriented us precisely on our mission. We were in South Vietnam to assist the Vietnamese in preventing their subjugation by communism. Young, however, has her own answer, which is the thesis of her book: The United States "invaded" Vietnam to expand and protect our "empire in Asia." She attributes our long and arduous commitment to "imperial longing," damning our leaders for their alleged desire to dominate others, for their "disease of mannishness."

Marilyn Young is a professor of Asian history at New York University. She is an active feminist and socialist, who has written and lectured on the protest circuit. She calls herself a Re-revisionist, and has castigated other writers (e.g. Fox Butterfield) for explaining America's crimes in Vietnam as mere mistakes. Her text is not history; it is a prosecutor's brief, lacking even the pretense of balance. As a prosecutor, she makes a good case by adroitly selecting quotations and references to buttress her charges. Her scholarship is copious, but scarcely complete. She uses secondary references entirely, and ignores those which don't support her prejudices.

The hero of the book is Ho Chi Minh; the villain is our ruling elite, upon whom Young places responsibility for all the suffering in Vietnam (to include, by devious reasoning, causing the massacres of Vietnamese civilians by the communists). The author sprinkles asides throughout her narrative to suggest, subtly, the tone of US wickedness rampant (e.g. American nuclear war on Japan and US terror bombing of Gadhafi). She says nothing about torture of US POWs, and, in that regard, fails to give credit to her sister-in-protest, Jane Fonda. Fonda's combat support of enemy soldiers killing Americans should never be so slighted, nor forgotten.

In hailing the communist victory, Young ignores the flight of the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese "boat people," who did not agree with her judgment that the victory portended a better life. Young also eulogizes those US Vietnam War veterans who have decried their service and their nation. While many of these afflicted veterans deserve aid, it should be frankly recognized that a number of those whose public sufferings are unassuageable have assumed the status of professional veterans.

I found the book difficult to read and evaluate. I put the text down, in anger, several times. But I finally concluded that it should not be ignored. Young's catechism and dogma are being accorded the status of history by publication without riposte, although there are many balanced histories on the market (such as Bruce Palmer's *The 25-Year War* and Jeffrey Clarke's *Advice and Support*), which accurately describe our aims and programs, and our mistakes and failures. It was unfortunate that we accepted and executed the Vietnam commitment while the United States was undergoing a societal revolution, aptly called a "national temper tantrum." It would be doubly unfortunate should the lasting record of our Vietnam tribulations be made mostly by the few remaining spokespersons of that "revolution" who continue to hate America.

Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck. By Hans von Luck. Introduction by Stephen E. Ambrose. New York: Dell 1991. 304 pages. \$4.95 (paper). **Reviewed by Colonel John B. B. Trussell, USA Ret.,** former Chief of the History Division, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

In seeking to record the author's war experiences and his recollections of his impressions at the time, this book accomplishes the first objective more effectively than the second.

Few soldiers can have seen more extensive and varied service in World War II. In broad outline, Colonel von Luck entered Germany's small peacetime army as an officer candidate in 1929 and was commissioned in 1932. Serving always at the forefront with armored reconnaissance units, he commanded a company in the September 1939 Polish campaign; a company and then a battalion in the Blitzkrieg that swept across France in May and June 1940; and a battalion in Russia from June 1941 until January 1943. At the request of General Erwin Rommel (his division commander in France) he was transferred to North Africa. Leading a battalion and then a combat group, he took part in the fighting withdrawal to Tunisia but was sent to Berchtesgaden in a last-ditch effort to organize a "German Dunkirk" to rescue the Africa Korps. Although his mission failed, he himself escaped capture.

Assigned next as a regimental commander in a Panzer division near the coast of the English Channel, he saw hard fighting through the Normandy campaign, and again in the bitter engagements in the Saar and around the Maginot Line before what was left of his division was sent east in mid-January 1945 to the Oder River to oppose the Russian drive on Berlin. Fighting and falling back, finally encircled, two weeks before the German surrender he was taken prisoner. Not until late December 1949, after almost five years in Soviet labor camps, was he released.

Colonel von Luck's account of his combat experiences is fascinating, although the complete absence of maps detracts seriously from its value. His description of the absolute paralysis of the German command following the Normandy landings is especially interesting, providing one of many graphic illustrations of the hazards of uncompromising centralization of authority deriving from rigid preconceptions of "enemy intentions." His views of the opponents he faced are generous—perhaps too much so, because when he cannot praise them he is careful not to criticize but to make allowances for the difficulties they faced.

From such an authoritative source, his anecdotes of the personal leadership and command methods of his revered commander, Rommel, deserve particular attention. While they emphasize Rommel's well-known qualities of drive, flexibility, and resourcefulness, in some instances they are more revealing than may have been intended, showing as they do an unwillingness to listen to differing views and a propensity to relieve immediately any subordinate who questioned the feasibility of an order.

Some of the anecdotal material raises questions. Rommel and other senior officers deliver long statements (ostensibly verbatim, since they are presented in quotation marks) on the strategic situation and the war's likely outcome. Without challenging the accuracy of the *substance* of these statements, this reviewer could only marvel at Colonel von Luck's total recall. In this connection, it is in Von Luck's

recollections of how he and his associates felt about political events and the state of the war at various stages of his narrative that this book becomes least satisfactory.

One can accept his assertion that the German officers of the 1930s were concerned with politics only to the extent that the institutional interests of the army were affected. He is disingenuous, however, when he more than hints that the army should have overthrown the Nazis by force, while stressing that the senior generals who did oppose Hitler in the pre-war years were crushed, and acknowledging the army's gratification in its expansion and rearmament under the Nazi regime.

In Von Luck's suggestion that the German war effort was perceived almost from the outset as doomed, one can only conclude that his memory is colored by hindsight. For example, it seems hardly credible that in the winter of 1941, well before the invasion of Russia, Von Luck and some of his associates had concluded that the war could not be won. Again, Rommel may well have said in November 1942 that the North African *campaign* was lost, but Von Luck's statement that Rommel said that the war was lost is less convincing—particularly in light of Rommel's energetic and optimistic efforts the following year to meet the anticipated cross-Channel invasion.

Be all this as it may, Colonel von Luck is clearly an able, honorable, and gallant officer. If what he remembers of attitudes prevailing at given times is distorted—or perhaps tailored to what he thinks his readers want to be told—it is not important. In essence, this book is about soldiering, about fulfillment of duty in the face of adversity. In this regard it provides insights and object lessons that are worth the attention of every thoughtful military student.

Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Edited by Benjamin F. Cooling. Washington: Office of Air Force History. 1990. 606 pages. Reviewed by Colonel John Schlight, USAF Ret., author of *The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965-1968*.

A reader can most profitably approach this volume by keeping in mind two caveats. First, it is an anthology of case studies rather than a methodical history of close air support. Each of its 11 chapters has a different author and consequently, to some degree, a different emphasis and theme. Like most anthologies, it lacks a unifying and consistent treatment of each of the important and often divisive close air support issues that separated ground and air officers from 1914 to 1973. The reader who is seriously interested in the details of many of these issues, however, can piece them together into a fairly coherent story by diligent reading and cross-referencing.

The second characteristic of the book that should be borne in mind is that, with several minor exceptions, it treats of close air support only during periods of war. Six of the chapters are devoted to selected (rather than all) major campaigns of World War II, and one each to the pre-war period, to Korea, to Vietnam, and to the Israeli wars. Yet it can be reasonably argued that many major decisions on close air support (as well as other military) issues were made in times of peace, and wars were to a large extent testing grounds for what had been decided beforehand. While the major peacetime lacunae include the absence of analyses of peacetime budgets, peacetime failures to develop joint doctrine, and the inadequacy of peacetime joint exercises and maneuvers, virtually all of the other close air support issues treated in the book also had important peacetime antecedents which are at best noted in passing.

These limitations, however, are more than compensated for by the volume's depth of research and scholarship. At one place or another the authors treat most of the pertinent close air support issues that have separated air and ground forces around the world: what should be the priorities for the three tactical air missions of air superiority, interdiction, and close air support; who should exercise operational control of close air support aircraft; whether forward air controllers perform better on the ground or airborne, how many should be attached to each ground unit, and whether they need be fighter pilots; whether the airspace above the battlefield is part of the ground below or the airspace surrounding it; how much input should ground officers have in developing close air support aircraft, armament, and tactics; whether it is better to have a plane designed solely for the close air support mission or a multipurpose aircraft that performs all tactical air missions; whether jets are better than propeller planes or fighter-bombers better than medium bombers for the mission; what is the best way to organize an air-ground system to improve response times and insure the safety of the troops from short rounds; how have lapses in communications contributed in a major way to the weaknesses of close air support; what effect has the advent of armed helicopters had on close air support; etc. All of these have been heated issues at one time or another and all appear within the chronological framework of this volume.

The reader comes away from this book with several vivid impressions. One is that close air support has been, with some notable exceptions, a less than effective and efficient means of using aircraft in battle. The Stuka formed a small part of the *Luftwaffe*, which preferred interdiction and did not rank close air support among its top missions. In North Africa close air support operations remained a minor objective of the allies. Likewise, through Sicily and Italy allied aircraft performed more interdiction than close air support. Close air support in France in 1944 was impaired by the frequent inability of ground forces to follow up the air strikes. In the Pacific, planes were generally used more profitably against lines of communication than for close air support. Close air support did save the day in Korea during the North Korean and Chinese onslaughts of 1950, but was of minor importance during the next two and a half years. Even the Israelis in their wars with the Arabs often found it necessary to defeat the enemy air force or interdict his lines of communication before attacking his troops directly from the air. These examples illustrate, as can no amount of *a priori* reasoning, the importance of having planes flexible enough to perform more than close air support missions.

Another clear conclusion that emerges from these pages is that the canons for tactical air power as proclaimed by American airmen have arisen not out of parochial interservice prejudice, as is frequently alleged, but rather have flowed from the very nature of the aerial vehicle. Claims by airmen that close air support should be assigned third priority behind air superiority and interdiction, that developing tactical planes for only one type of tactical mission was grossly inefficient, that letting subordinate ground commanders control close air support planes prevented planes from realizing their true potential, etc., are shown in these pages to have been universal. Thus, as I. B. Holley, Jr., points out in his excellent concluding chapter, the *Luftwaffe* and the Israelis, as well as the Americans, assigned third place to close air support missions. Likewise, other air forces learned the importance of centralizing control of their air assets in the hands of airmen. Obstacles to close air support, such as poor communications, difficulties of target identification, night and bad weather, airfield siting, etc. are also shown to be universal and not confined to the American experience. This is an important conclusion

which, if taken to heart, could raise the level of discussion of close air support from the narrow service-oriented prejudices of the past to a more universal consideration of objective factors which are inherent in the nature of military aircraft.

Cossacks in the German Army: 1941-1945. By Samuel J. Newland. London: Frank Cass, 1991. 218 pages. \$35.00. **Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph S. Lahnstein**, a Foreign Area Officer with a specialty in Russia and the Soviet era.

The issue of indigenous Russian collaboration with the Germans during the war in Russia 1941-1945 has long been a fascinating topic to historians. The continuing attention to Vlasov's army of Russian prisoners of war, mobilized to fight their own countrymen, testifies to this interest. The excellently researched work *Cossacks in the German Army: 1941-1945*, by Dr. Samuel Newland of the US Army War College faculty, examines a relatively little-known aspect of this topic. With the recent demise of a monolithic Soviet Union, the issue of national resistance to the Soviet government and alliance with Germany takes on new significance.

Dr. Newland covers the subject briskly, from Hitler's inane racial policies and the plan for the subjugation of the East, through a short history of the Cossacks and their special relationship with Imperial Russia, to their employment in Yugoslavia and ultimate betrayal by the British who repatriated them to the Soviet Union against their will. The scope of this work is impressive. Dr. Newland covers this era with meticulous research using personal interviews with the survivors as well as a huge array of German records. With the opening of Soviet archives to public scrutiny, the fate of the Cossacks is likely to become even better known.

This book portrays the Cossacks' hope of finally eliminating Bolshevik control of their homeland during World War II, a continuation of the struggle which they lost during the Russian Civil War following the Bolshevik coup of 1917. The book shows the harsh ideology of the Nazis and the subterfuge the General Staff undertook to bring the nationals of occupied territories into the *Wehrmacht*. The Staff was well aware of the need for an immense increase of manpower with which to prosecute the war against Stalin. Further, German intelligence realized the dramatic and savage nature of the partisan war their army would face without the active cooperation of the occupied peoples.

The recent dramatic unraveling of the Soviet government echoes many of the cries uttered by the Cossacks and others who collaborated with the Germans. Dr. Newland makes an impressive case for the notion that the Cossacks, in thus collaborating, believed they were enlisting in a cause which presented the best possible chance for the liberation of their homeland. Unspoken but also present is the idea that fighting traditional enemies, surrounded by family and friends, was preferable to rotting in a prison camp. Without overwhelming self-deception, the Cossacks surely could not have equated combatting Yugoslavian guerrillas (communist or otherwise) with fighting in Russia against the Red Army. As the tide of battle turned against Germany, the Cossacks appeared to be attempting to make the best of a horrendous situation. The tragic reality of the Cossacks, as Dr. Newland so graphically portrays, is that they fought for a power which denigrated and duped them (Germany) against a power which sought to destroy their traditions (the USSR), only to be betrayed by a power which believed in self-determination as a tenet of faith (Great Britain).

Cossacks in the German Army provides a fascinating look at desperate men in desperate times trying to seek the best they can for themselves and their families, but only to lose in the end. It lends an excellent insight into the duplicity and infighting of the German General Staff and the Nazi hierarchy. Lastly it reveals some of the shortcomings of coalition warfare and the human cost it entails in the interest of alliance harmony. Altogether, an excellent read.

The Banana Wars. By Ivan Musicant. New York: Macmillan, 1990. 470 pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Major Daniel P. Bolger, author of *Americans at War 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace*.

In *The Banana Wars*, noted naval historian Ivan Musicant has written two books in one. Both segments are well written, but only the first is worth reading.

The first four fifths of the volume offer an intelligent, balanced, and perceptive military history of certain especially interesting American interventions in the Caribbean and Central America from 1898 to 1934. Musicant speaks in a far different voice than the one heard among the leftist cacaphony that dominates most current scholarship on US relations with its southern neighbors. Since most of the book represents a promising and substantial effort, the final fifth could not be more disappointing. It consists of half-baked, ill-researched jaunts through the Dominican Crisis of 1965-66, the Grenada operation of 1983, and the Panamanian intervention of 1989-90, all more suited to the back pages of mercenary soldier magazines than a serious historical book. Unfortunately, given the way Macmillan Publishing Company hyped the book, with a heavy slant toward Grenada and Panama, that specious last part is what will entice people to buy *The Banana Wars*.

Discerning readers, especially those in uniform, should buy the book for what it tells them about a fascinating era in American military history, a period in which many US military men, especially those in the small US Marine Corps, learned a very different kind of soldiering than that taught in bloody Belleau Wood or in the cratered trenches of the Meuse-Argonne.

Musicant opens his examination of America's military role in Central America and the Caribbean with a masterful consideration of the 1898 war with Spain and its consequences, "an empire by default." He proceeds to examine American military efforts in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. The author carefully interweaves the threads of US domestic politics, State Department hopes, local aspirations, and external events into his main narrative, producing an entertaining and well-crafted examination of how Marines, soldiers, and sailors dealt with the knotty challenges of running these small, unhappy states.

Men trained to fight met their share of nationalist insurgents and heavily armed bandits, but they also faced other, less familiar problems. Soldiers like General Leonard Wood learned how to handle cholera, hunger, and illiteracy in Santiago de Cuba. Marines like Lieutenant Colonel Smedley Butler designed and ran a huge Haitian public works project that repaired island roads and bridges. Sailors like Captain Edward L. Beach picked local administrators and, in 1915, even the president of Haiti. "We took over the guardianship, I guess you could call it, of the republic," mused Marine Major General Walter G. Farrell, who served in perennially restive

Haiti. Like the guardian class in Plato's ideal republic, the Americans both fought and ruled, although few could mistake 1912 Nicaragua or 1930 Panama for ideal states.

Musicant does justice to Wood, Butler, Beach, Farrell, and many others who did the thankless tasks that held together America's informal hemispheric empire. Simply by rescuing their stories from undeserved obscurity, Ivan Musicant has done a great service to today's soldiers and citizens wrestling with similar problems. Yesterday's Banana War is today's low-intensity conflict, and the experiences of others can be ignored only at great peril.

It is far easier and wiser, though, to ignore the last three chapters of *The Banana Wars*. Musicant himself acknowledges that "the second Nicaragua campaign [1934] ends the classic period of the Banana Wars, and what follows are but epilogues." Would that the author (or more probably, a less sales-conscious publisher) dispensed with these flimsy addenda.

The concluding chapters lack the careful archival research, balanced approach, and attention to detail characterizing the majority of the book. Musicant's confusing, truncated account of the 1965-66 Dominican Republic episode does not even name American commander General Bruce Palmer and barely mentions the US Army, which provided the bulk of the intervening troops. The Grenada chapter is an error-filled embarrassment, based mainly on material from James Adams' sensationalist and inaccurate book *Secret Armies* and a potboiler biography of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North by journalist Ben Bradlee, Jr. Ignoring a multitude of open sources, Musicant alleges that "much of the operation is still classified," the standard excuse for insufficient research on recent military events. The author's summary of Operation Just Cause, which *Publishers Weekly* called "the most complete and clarifying account to date," is a rather muddled rehash of contemporary newspaper reports, noteworthy for additional and gratuitous slurs on the planning and execution of the Grenada operation. One hopes that a better version comes along soon. Musicant's meanderings will not be hard to top.

Still, the stumbles at the end should not detract from Musicant's significant accomplishment. *The Banana Wars* is worth a look. Just stop reading after Chapter Seven.

Off the Press . . .

- Arnold, James R. *The First Domino: Eisenhower, The Military, and America's Intervention in Vietnam*. New York: William Morrow, 1991. 444 pp. \$24.00.
- Asprey, Robert B. *The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War I*. New York: William Morrow, 1991. 558 pp. \$27.00.
- Baumgartner, Frederic J. *From Spear to Flintlock: A History of War in Europe and the Middle East to the French Revolution*. New York: Praeger, 1991. 353 pp. \$45.00.
- Betts, Richard K. *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1991. 326 pp. \$16.50 (paper).
- Bush, George. *National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991-1992*. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1991. 135 pp. \$14.00.
- Caputo, Philip. *Means of Escape*. New York: Harper Collins, 1991. 405 pp. \$25.00.
- Cimbala, Stephen J. *Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy*. London, Eng.: Frank Cass, 1991. 218 pp. \$37.50.
- Clark, Susan L., ed. *Soviet Military Power in a Changing World*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 324 pp. \$31.95.

- Commager, Henry Steele. *The Story of the Second World War*. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1991. 345 pp. \$23.95.
- Conquest, Robert. *Stalin: Breaker of Nations*. New York: Viking, 1991. 346 pp. \$25.00.
- Cooley, John K. *Payback: America's Long War in the Middle East*. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1991. 257 pp. \$19.95.
- Crackel, Theodore J. *The Illustrated History of West Point*. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1991. 320 pp. \$75.00.
- Daalder, Ivo H. *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1991. 411 pp. \$49.50.
- Davis, William C. *Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour: A Biography*. New York: Harper Collins, 1991. 784 pp. \$35.00.
- Dinges, John. *Our Man in Panama: The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega*. New York: Random House, 1991. 412 pp. \$13.00 (paper).
- Donnelly, Thomas, et al. *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*. New York: Lexington Books, 1991. 453 pp. \$24.95.
- Dunnigan James F., and Austin Bay. *From Shield to Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf*. New York: William and Morrow, 1992. 512 pp. \$20.00.
- Fischer, Edward. *The Chancy War: Winning in China, Burma, and India in World War II*. New York: Crown, 1991. 250 pp. \$23.00.
- Fuller, Graham E. *The "Center of the Universe": The Geopolitics of Iran*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 301 pp. \$35.00.
- Gwertzman, Bernard, and Michael T. Kaufman, eds. *The Collapse of Communism*. New York: Random House, 1991. 600 pp. \$13.00 (paper).
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From the Archives

George C. Marshall and Military Ambition

It was an article of faith among post-Vietnam War military reformers that responsibility for the Army's sad plight could be laid at the feet of uniformed "careerists." These grubby individuals, preoccupied solely with their maneuvering to get promoted, were often contrasted with what was romantically portrayed as the pristine selflessness of the giants of an earlier era. In this idealized old Army, officers were detached spirits, laboring anonymously in the vineyards of their professional pursuits with nary a thought of advancement or glory.

But those who read military history know otherwise. Here, for example, is a letter from George Marshall to General John J. Pershing dated 19 November 1934:¹

Dear General: I am enclosing two letters which are self explanatory. Two or three BG vacancies now exist. I want one of them. As I will soon be 54 I must get started if I am going anywhere in the Army.

Up to this moment I have made no move of any kind. Moseley's and Hagood's recommendations were unsolicited. I have written to no one regarding promotion, but have received numerous letters on the subject.

I would appreciate your bringing my name to the attention of Mr. Dern, and I would appreciate your merely requesting him to send for my efficiency reports since 1915 and allowing them to decide the issue.

In your files there is a volume listing the recommendations for general officers made in France after the armistice. These recommendations were never placed in the War Department files. Consequently, recommendations of me by Generals Liggett, Bullard, Hines, Summerall and others do not appear in my 201 file. I would appreciate your having Adamson place these in circulation.

I am determined not to exert political influence in my effort to be recognized, and I do not want to follow the usual course of writing to a number of senior officers soliciting letters from them, though a number have offered their services without solicitation by me. Such letters as a rule do not mean much, because the War Department is flooded with them, since few care to offend by declining such requests. I am prepared to gamble on my written record in the War Department before, during, and since the war, for I have been told no one else in the list of colonels can match mine.

I have had the discouraging experience of seeing the man [Robert McCleave] I relieved in France as G-3 of the army, promoted years ago, and my assistant as G-3 of the army [Stephen O. Fuqua] similarly advanced six years ago. I think I am entitled to some consideration now. But I will confine myself to you. Faithfully yours,
G. C. Marshall

Are we to think less of Marshall for taking this initiative in behalf of his promotion to brigadier general? Certainly not. "Marshall's career is proof positive that driving ambition and unquestioned ethical principles are not mutually exclusive."²

1. *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall. Volume I: "The Soldierly Spirit" December 1880 - June 1939*, ed. Larry I. Bland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 446-47.

2. Brigadier General David P. Schorr, Jr., USA Ret., letter to *Parameters'* editor, dated 29 June 1988.