Oversight of and Within the Department of Defense: Is It Becoming Counterproductive?

Abstract

Oversight of and within the Department of Defense (DoD) has become so intense and detailed that the perception of senior DoD personnel is that oversight is now detracting from the ability of system program offices (SPO) to focus on fielding new weapon systems which achieve the government's requirements of performance, schedule, and cost. This study researched this assertion by exploring oversight and control of and within the DoD, and specifically through a single unique case study of the C-17 SPO. The three sources utilized in gathering and analyzing data were archival records, interviews, and documents. Data gathered indicated oversight has been perceived to have become counterproductive in three areas; overlap in scope, duplication in data requests (oral and written), and overall excessiveness. The C-17 SPO has expended 2,035 manhours in response to 72 agency actions. Overlap in scope or duplication in data requests occurred in 25 of the 72 actions.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Sep 01, 1991
Accession Number
ADA246703

Entities

People

  • Thaddeus G. Knue

Organizations

  • Air Force Institute of Technology

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Biomedical
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Aircrafts
  • Business Administration
  • Case Studies
  • Computer Programming
  • Computer Programs
  • Computers
  • Congress
  • Contractors
  • Contracts
  • Department Of Defense
  • Governments
  • Law
  • Management Personnel
  • Organizational Structure
  • System Software
  • Test And Evaluation

Readers

  • Defense Acquisition Program Management
  • Organizational Psychology.