Defenses and Disincentives to Proliferation
Abstract
The proliferation of ballistic missiles and their associated technologies through the Third World has become a chief security concern for the United States and its allies. To meet this threat, the U.S. and other industrial nations have attempted to impose export controls on critical missile technologies in order to prohibit certain regimes from acquiring ballistic missile systems. Unfortunately, the controls have largely been ineffective as not only have ballistic missiles been acquired by dangerous Third World regimes, but often the technology and engineering expertise to indigenously produce these weapons have been obtained as well. Two major instances of ballistic missile use in the Third World--the Iran-Iraq War of the Cities and Desert Storm--have brought home the realization that arms control measures alone are not going to be successful in stopping proliferation of these weapons. Other responses to these systems are needed to enhance current arms control efforts. One of these responses is active ballistic missile defense. Desert Storm demonstrated the utility of defense as a response to the products of proliferation. Less obvious, but of great interest to SDI and U.S. foreign policy is how this demonstration of defensive prowess and subsequent development in defensive technologies will affect ballistic missile proliferation. The presence of defenses reduces the value of ballistic missiles that is determined by a potential proliferator. By doing so, defenses provide disincentives for regional countries to proliferate. Examining these disincentives is an integral part of determining the net value of defensive deployments.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 02, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA247311
Entities
People
- F. S. Snipes
- Paul E. Scesney
Organizations
- TASC, Inc