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
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PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT -- A SEARCH FOR RELEVANCE?

BY

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PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT -- A SEARCH FOR RELEVANCE?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Although the September 1991 Draft National Military Strategy document identified peacetime engagement as a key direction of the Department of Defense, what is peacetime engagement, and is it a relevant military mission? This paper defines the term (changed to forward presence operations in the January 1992 National Military Strategy of the United States), examines the differing arguments of whether it is a relevant military mission, and explores the impact of this policy on the Army. It concludes that while it is a relevant policy, there are a number of hurdles that must be first overcome. These hurdles include (1) a lack of a government policy on when and where to use it, (2) an inadequate government system for interagency cooperation, (3) a lack of public support, and (4) the potential that the military will become part of the problem, instead of the solution. If these hurdles can be overcome, then the military must be ready to take on the mission. To be fully prepared, the military must first resolve a number of doctrine, force structure, and training issues.

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INTRODUCTION

Washington Post. . . 20 January 199X

WASHINGTON -- The President announced today that he has directed the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division (AA) to Sudan. In keeping with his policy of using military forces in peacetime engagements, the mission of the division will be to help in the distribution of food to famine victims. . .

Unlikely scenario? Not any more. In the New World Order, the idea of using military forces in a clearly humanitarian assistance role will become more likely. President Bush, in his August 1990 Aspen Speech, outlined his vision for a revised U.S. defense policy and used a new term as a guiding concept:¹

What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy, a policy of *peacetime engagement* every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and cold war.

He further noted that:

Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made great gains, threats remain. Terrorism, hostagetaking, renegade regimes and unpredictable rulers, new sources of instability -- all require a strong and *engaged* America.

The decision to remain actively engaged in world affairs, as expressed by the President, comes from the hard learned experiences of the 1930s and World War II, reinforced by a 45 year struggle to contain the Soviet Union. This history has demonstrated that isolationism is not in our long term interests. To survive and flourish as a nation, the United

States must remain engaged in shaping its security environment.²

But what does the term peacetime engagement mean? How is it being defined? Is it really in our national interest? What are the threats to our national security in this new multipolar world? Is peacetime engagement a military mission? How does this concept impact on the Army? This paper will examine these questions to determine the relevance of peacetime engagement to the military.

DEFINING PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT ³

With the Berlin Wall gone and the Soviet "Evil Empire" fractured, the cold war is over. Our success in the cold war has required military planners to develop a new defense strategy. This strategy is one no longer based on the possibility of global war, but rather based on major and lesser regional contingencies. This security planning focuses less on immediate threats to our national existence, and more on promoting American values. The intent of this approach is to prevent the gradual erosion of American security in an increasingly disorderly and complex world. In order to protect and promote our interests, the United States must engage selectively and adroitly in the tasks of shaping her security environment.⁴

One of Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's earliest public referrals to "peacetime engagement" occurred during his

1991 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.⁵ He later amplified this concept in his 1991 Annual Report to the President and the Congress.⁶ Military planners have taken this early idea of peacetime engagement, refined it, and incorporated it into our military strategy documents. The September 1991 Draft National Military Strategy reflects peacetime engagement as one of the four key directions of the our military strategy.⁷ Most recently, the 1992 Draft Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan directs the Unified Commanders to incorporate peacetime engagement activities into their planning and operations.⁸

While each document has a slightly different definition of peacetime engagement, there is a common thread through all. Following is my definition that considers all significant military documents that address peacetime engagement.

Peacetime Engagement is:

- a strategic concept that guides the coordinated application of political, economic, informational and military means to enhance stability and promote democratic ideals.
- primarily directed toward Third World nations.
- a coordinated Department of State and Department of Defense operation, controlled by the Country Team.

- is predominately a non-hostile state characterized by the benign (non-lethal) use of military force to stabilize potential crises.
- successful if there is an absence of regional conflicts, lesser or major.

The concept of peacetime engagement is being institutionalized into our military strategy. Although the missions associated with this concept are not unprecedented, they have not been a major focus of defense planning during the last 45 years. The ongoing transition to a multipolar environment requires the integration of peacetime engagement operations into the restructuring of our military forces to meet the challenges of the 1990s and beyond.⁹

A ROLE FOR PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT?

The economy of the world is more interrelated than ever, and any instability or conflict can have a direct impact on our national security. If we are denied access to natural resources or economic markets, then our national security may be threatened. It is far better to use military forces to solve the problem peacefully, than to revert to armed conflict. But what are the underlying threats to global stability? Most analysts agree that the root causes of future instability in the Third World include famine, population migration, population growth, war, devastating natural disasters, and consummate poverty. Each has the potential to

destablize a country, or an entire region.

While the above threats to global stability are not all inclusive, they are sufficient to prove that the New World Order will not be a conflict free world. In a speech to the Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff on 24 July 1991, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

As our recent evacuations of our citizens from Liberia and from Somalia have demonstrated, the world has not suddenly become a Utopia. Far from it, because we have seen crises and natural disasters occur in places ranging from the Philippines to Kuwait, from Ethiopia to Bangladesh. Uncertainty and instability are all too familiar faces in the modern world.¹⁰

Visible use of military force in peacetime serves the purposes of detection, nation building, influence building, deterrence, and promoting stability, which may eliminate the need for lethal military response and complement its effectiveness, should deterrence fail.¹¹ Reducing the need for lethal military force can be accomplished by addressing the root causes of conflict (as discussed above) so as to prevent its occurrence. A multitude of peace time military options are available for use. There are specific programs such as foreign assistance, security assistance, nation assistance, disaster relief, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, nuclear weapons recovery, civil affairs, and noncombatant evacuation operations which are designed to either promote stability or lessen the opportunity for situations to become hostile. Two more stabilizing missions are peacekeeping operations, such as those that support the

United Nations, and shows of force, most often used in the transition from peacetime operations to hostilities.¹²

Clearly the Department of Defense can accomplish the mission. The military has a long history of peacetime involvement in the world. When a calamity strikes, either man-made or natural, politicians often turn to the military for help. Armed forces can respond rapidly and massively to a wide range of crises. They have transportation capabilities, communication equipment, fuel, food, tents, tools, and building supplies. These are the types of stocks needed immediately during disasters, and which are most often lacking in Third World countries.¹³

The earliest recorded instance of the military providing humanitarian assistance occurred shortly before the time of Alexander the Great in the Third Century B.C..¹⁴ This tradition has carried through time, with Operation Provide Comfort being the most recent large-scale effort. The linkage between soldiers and humanitarian concerns under the laws of war were codified at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences.¹⁵ It was at these conferences that the "Law and Customs of War on Land" section was encoded. Driven by an agony of conscience aroused by the atrocities committed by U.S. troops in the Philippines, the new section placed limitations on the conduct of land warfare. Such concerns as "respect of family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice"¹⁶ were

codified. Further, Article XXIII prohibited the use of poisonous weapons, use of weapons designed to cause unnecessary suffering, or weapons which killed or wounded "treacherously".¹⁷ Following World War II, in occupied Germany and Japan, military rather than civilian authorities provided relief assistance. Military recruiters actively sought highly skilled administrators and humanitarian assistance planners to augment the talents of those trained in the staff colleges.¹⁸

But campaigns by some Third World governments to block international relief efforts are major problems today. The right of suffering civilians to relief is not yet a universally respected principle.¹⁹ Such was the case of Operation Provide Comfort, which was a forced entry, and conducted over the objections of the Iraqi government. The success of Operation Provide Comfort may have established the precedent for future international relief interventions in domestic disputes.

These types of relief operations have always been a tertiary mission of the military, accomplished on an ad hoc, as needed, basis. However, with peacetime engagement now being cited as a key direction of the Department of Defense, and a stated military strategy, it is becoming a mission of the armed forces. This implies that resources and force structure will be designated to accomplish the mission. Is this what we want from our military?

Students of Clausewitz would argue that this would be a great misuse of the military. Clausewitz's view was that if there was not a military objective, or solution, the military should not be used. It is difficult, for example, to determine the military objective of a humanitarian assistance mission. Lacking a military objective, the argument can then be made that the military is the wrong element of national power -- that either economic, political, or diplomatic means should be used. These are weak academic arguments that fail to consider the multipolar world of today. In a multipolar world, any element of national power, or combination of elements of power, should be used if it will avoid the necessity for lethal military force.

But will the American people be supportive of an increased military role in international affairs? A recent TIME/CNN poll²⁰ would suggest not. When asked "What approach to foreign policy should the U.S. follow in the 1990s?" only 19% answered "use its leadership to help settle international disputes and promote democracy" while 74% responded "reduce its involvement in world politics to concentrate on problems at home." This view has already been displayed toward the African famine, where Western donors seem to be suffering from "donor fatigue".²¹

Recent journal and magazine articles are also beginning to reflect a desire to use the military more at home. The military is already involved in domestic counterdrug

operations. In the October 1991 issue of the Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, Colonel Maxwell Alston argues that now is the time to tighten the military and civilian planning for natural and technological disasters.²²

William G. Hyland, editor of the Foreign Affairs, has suggested downgrading U.S. foreign presence. At a point where the threat to U.S. interests has receded to the lowest levels since World War II, Hyland wrote that the time has come ". . . to start selectively disengaging abroad and seize the opportunity to put our house in order".²³ In short, it is time to shift attention to the domestic agenda and concentrate on some things that in the long term pose as great a threat to the U.S. position in world as any foreign enemy does: the failure of the U.S. education system, the crises in the cities, drugs, crime, and the budget deficit. Hyland further advocated cutbacks in foreign aid, which is becoming harder to justify when there continues to be such unmet needs in the United States.²⁴

But perhaps more indicative of the American public pulse is the "America First" Presidential Campaign of Republican Patrick Buchanan. Now that the Red Menace is gone, ultra conservatives like Buchanan see no justification for vigorous American involvement abroad.²⁵ Some Democrats have been honing variations on isolationist and protectionist themes as well. While Buchanan does not have much chance of winning the Presidential nomination, his position has caused the more

moderate candidates of both parties to take notice. Aiding Buchanan is the emergence of the emotional "Buy American" fever spreading across the country.

Clearly the mood of the American public is more toward domestic issues. The military must proceed cautiously on the peacetime engagement road, or risk losing the people support of Clausewitz's "Holy Trinity". Without the public support for military involvement abroad, we are conducting a program doomed to great criticism and eventual failure.

A policy of peacetime engagement may also be counterproductive. Many nations are tottering on the brink of democracy. A basic premise of democracy is that the military is subservient to civilian control. When our military forces deploy to another country the normal linkup would be with that country's military force. This will provide that military force with a bigger role in the affairs of the country, in effect making it stronger. So while we may be helping, we may also be delaying full democracy in a country by strengthening its military forces.

The drug war in Central and South America is beginning to show signs of this problem. Fearful that peasant resistance will feed leftist insurgencies -- and that U.S. military aid will fatten corrupt, abusive militaries -- the civilian presidents of Bolivia, Columbia, and Peru, all originally balked at U.S. plans to militarize the struggle.²⁶ Military trainers in Bolivia say the drug cartels may even be

benefiting from their efforts. For example, 85% are conscripts and are on one year hitches. Many have relatives in the drug industry who may well hire these recruits as security guards. There is feeling that with few exceptions, as one adviser said, that ". . . all we are doing is training the bad guys".²⁷

Our military is finding out what has long been understood -- it is not any easier to conduct a "war" against drug cartels which are motivated by money, than one motivated by ideology. In this instance, the question is begged as to whether U.S. military participation in the Central and South American drug war is employing the most effective element of national power.

Certainly one of the most appealing aspects of peacetime engagement is the potential training benefit to the military forces. As demonstrated by Operation Provide Comfort, every range of full deployment was used. The joint and combined operation involved the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marines, and military forces from 13 other countries. No other operation, short of war, could have provided the same training benefit. With the REFORGER exercises continuing to shrink in size, and with a heavy reliance on computer simulation, the opportunity to conduct deployment training is vanishing. Any future regional conflict will require an ability to quickly deploy. Like any part of a military operation, the more opportunity to train, the better the

chances of success. General Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, repeatedly stated his belief that the reason VII Corps was able to deploy so quickly from Germany to Saudi Arabia, was because of the training obtained from previous REFORGER exercises.

The most difficult policy aspect of the peacetime engagement concept is selecting the "when and where" to use it. Does the United States need to respond to every crisis around the world? If civil unrest in Zaire cuts off the world's cobalt supply, should we intervene? If after we have pulled our forces from the Philippines, and the guerrilla insurgency there threatens to topple the government, is there a compelling U.S. interest at stake that would warrant our intervention? These are questions that can only be answered at the highest levels of the U.S. government, but for now no clear cut answers are available.

Donald Nuechterlein, in his book America Overcommitted, makes a significant first stride in developing a framework for evaluating threats to our national interests.²⁸ Neuchterlein has developed a national interest matrix, which compares the basic interest at stake to the intensity of the interest. Using this matrix, policy makers have a framework to develop a strategy for a specific country or region. A more basic approach might be as simple as ensuring two criteria exist before we would help a country: (1) the country must have a democratic government, and (2) it must have a record of

respect for human rights and dignity.

Another simplistic approach could be called the "Freedom Test". This assumes that a democratic government exists, but the determination of whether or not to help is based on the viewpoint of the citizens of the country. If the government is viewed as a popular government (has the support of the people) then we provide assistance; if the government has some popular support, then provide some help, but also put pressure on the government to change; and lastly, if there is not any popular support of the government, then we do not provide any assistance, and apply a lot of pressure to induce change.

These approaches may not be very sophisticated, but each is an effort to establish a policy which would permit the U.S. to selectively engage in world affairs. The current approach seems to be a "brush fire" policy -- figure it out when something flares up. Establishing our "vital national interests" in a multipolar world must be accomplished prior to using the military. A clear understanding of our national interests by our policy makers will avoid "quagmire" situations. Once the military has taken command of a crisis, a graceful exit is not always easy.²⁹ For example, months after most American forces left northern Iraq, Army helicopters are still flying tons of food from Turkey into Iraq. Some crises, such as the civil war in Yugoslavia, are simply beyond American influence. Intervention in others

might exact an unacceptably high cost in either blood or treasure.

While policy issues regarding U.S. involvement in the Third World are difficult, the corresponding operational requirements can be complex in the extreme. There is widespread recognition that interagency coordination is seriously flawed. The three former Ambassadors to El Salvador each identified coordination of policy and operations as their most serious problem. The ability to achieve unity of command and effort among various competitive authorities must be addressed.³⁰ Who is in charge? What are the short and long term goals and objectives? Again the counterdrug operations in Central and South America provide an example of the problem. Turf battles have developed between the U.S. military and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). DEA agents have openly called American Special Forces troops arrogant young brats with no understanding of intelligence or law enforcement, while the Army sees the DEA as city cops with no real training for jungle operations.³¹

With this kind of "cooperation", can the counterdrug operations succeed? Can we expect better cooperation on future peacetime engagement operations? Not without fundamental change in how the government addresses interagency operations. Todd Greentree, at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, believes a priority objective of the government should be the creation of a small interagency

coordination body. This interagency body would come from a cadre of civilian and military officials from the core foreign affairs agencies, specifically to deal with U.S. involvement in Third World assistance. As an ad hoc organization developed for a specific operation, it would have overall responsibility for the entire operation. It would also serve as the link between Washington and the regional CINC, and the U.S. mission in the assisted country.³² While there are other possible approaches, the key point is a system must be developed to insure unity of command and effort.

Some success has been made in this direction, most often in the humanitarian assistance area. Large relief efforts tend to be multi-agency. Since the 1984 establishment of the position of Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Global Affairs, who is also the Director of the Humanitarian Assistance Program, the incumbent has participated in several interagency task forces. Most notable have been the mid 1980s task force on famine relief in sub-Saharan Africa, the late 1988 task force on the earthquake in Soviet Armenia, and presently, a new interagency task force established for the relief effort to the Commonwealth of Independent States.³³

Long term, the only effective way of dealing with the threats to global stability is to address the conditions that cause the threats. To do so, it will be necessary for the United States (and its Allies) to develop policies that give greater priority to political and economic reform in the

affected countries. A failure in the developing, as well as the industrial nations to take action to hold back poverty, violence, persecution, and population growth and migration, will have direct or indirect repercussions for the security of the industrialized world itself.³⁴

Recently, former President Richard Nixon has reminded us of the high stakes involved in our nonparticipation in global events. One of the few voices in the wilderness, he has voiced the argument that domestic and foreign policy are inescapably mixed, and that one cannot survive without the other. He believes that the key to prosperity is trade, and that we cannot retreat from international participation and competition. The success of Russia, and its leader Boris Yeltsin, will provide a huge free-market for billions of dollars in trade, which will create millions of jobs in the U.S.. More importantly, a democratic Russia would ensure a safe world into the next century. "We are now at a watershed moment for America's world role,"³⁵ he wrote, and ". . . the West must do everything it can to help President Yeltsin succeed."³⁶

While the American public may not want the United States to help settle international disputes, promote democracy and economic development, it is clearly in our national interest to do so. If we can use our military in a coherent peacetime engagement role to achieve this, and avoid potential lethal conflicts, then clearly we must.

IMPACT ON THE ARMY

As with any new concept, peacetime engagement has found both avid proponents, and a fair share of doubters. Colonel (Ret) Harry Summers, a Distinguished Fellow of the U.S. War College, has been one of the more vocal doubters. In his Army Times column, he has argued against what he sees as a drifting of the military towards the more "politically correct peacetime operations". He further wrote that "Some today within the U.S. military are also searching for 'relevance' with draft doctrinal manuals giving touchy-feely prewar and post-war civil operations equal weight with warfighting. This is an insidious mistake".³⁷ Earlier he had written that "The primary purpose of the Army is to fight and win on the battlefield. All else is beanbag".³⁸

Benjamin Schwarz, a political scientist with the Rand Corporation, has been particularly critical of the peacetime engagement concept. His premise is that to avoid becoming the world's policeman and social worker, the United States must take a more benign view toward instability in the Third World.³⁹ His uneasiness with peacetime engagement is twofold. First, he views it as a very crass political move for certain groups to protect turf, and even if it is not, that it is very wrongheaded. He believes that the idea that what makes countries unstable is ". . . a lack of roads or bridges is extraordinarily naive."⁴⁰

The positions of Colonel Summers and Mr. Schwarz are well stated and timely. The Army must not rush headlong into peacetime engagement operations simply because it is seen as a "force structure justification". It is not the "Holy Grail", and should not become a new turf building exercise in a Defense Department searching for new roles and relevance. We must never lose sight of our true purpose. On the other hand, peacetime engagement provides the opportunity to enhance our training, while at the same time completing actions or projects that are enhancing to the nation being assisted. A balanced approach, one of "moderation", is the most appropriate as we begin to take on peacetime engagement operations.

In the following sections I will address a number of areas that the Army must contend with as it adopts the peacetime engagement concept.

DOCTRINE. PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT VERSUS

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS. The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict has been trying to closely link peacetime engagement to low intensity conflict. This link is viewed as a way to justify more special operations force structure. This is a mistake. There is not room for covertly executing intelligence collection operations, supporting host nation military conduct of counterinsurgency operations, and tactical

operations in foreign internal defense, as part of peacetime engagement. This association will kill the innovative concept of nation assistance.

For peacetime engagement to be successful, it must be delinked from low intensity conflict operations. Peacetime engagement should cover the broad categories of humanitarian assistance, civic assistance, nation assistance, security assistance, and peacekeeping. Low intensity conflict operations should be limited to primarily combat type operations, e.g. counterinsurgency. A simple rule of thumb would be: "If weapons will be used, it is a LIC operation...if weapons will not be used, then it is peacetime engagement".

One of the problems is in the operational continuum. Shown below is the current doctrine, and where peacetime engagement and low intensity conflict operations would occur. As can be easily noted, many of the operations occur at the same time in the continuum.

OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM ⁴¹

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PEACETIME COMPETITION ----- CONFLICT ----- WAR
|-----PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT -----|
|-----LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPS -----|
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To clarify the doctrine, and to separate peacetime engagement and low intensity conflict operations, I propose the following

operational continuum, which clearly separates the two operations. Of course, there will be occasions when both operations are occurring, but these need to be the exception, not the rule.

OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

PEACE ---- STABILITY OPERATIONS ---- CONFLICT ---- WAR
|-----PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT ---|--- LIC ---|

I have also changed the term peacetime competition to stability operations. Peacetime engagement operations are really actions that assist in providing stability to a friendly nation. "Stability operations" is also a more military oriented term, and would help deflect some of the Summers' type criticism. The key to our doctrine, however, must be a clear division between peacetime engagement and low intensity conflict operations.

FORCE STRUCTURE. Peacetime engagement activities are predominately combat support and combat service support operations. Some fine tuning of these forces may be required.

The Department of Defense total force policy is to achieve the most cost effective mix of active duty, reserve, civilian and contract personnel consistent with the requirements of peacetime employment and responsiveness to war.⁴² Historically, this break out of forces has been combat

heavy in the active force, with the reserves providing the majority of the CS/CSS forces. If the Army is going to increase participation in these operations, this split between combat, combat support, and combat service support must be relooked.

This really touches on the larger issue of developing our force requirement based on the threat, or basing our forces on a need, a capability. For example, 97% of the Army's civil affairs units are in the reserve structure.⁴³ The one active civil affairs battalion has been very busy, and has found itself deployed overseas the last three Christmas holidays, supporting operations in Panama, Saudi Arabia, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Clearly, more active duty civil affairs units will be needed.

The same argument can be voiced for maintenance, supply, transportation, and engineer construction units. There must be enough of these forces to support the daily training needs of the units they normally support, while at the same time deploying to support peacetime engagement operations. A U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute Report, "Expansibility of the Army", examined having a "robust" combat support/combat service support capability in the Army. The report concluded that having this "robust" capability would not only allow the Army to expand faster in times of conflict, but would also provide an increased ability in peacetime to support peacetime engagement operations, both abroad and at home.⁴⁴ To believe

that the Army can increase these types of operations without adjusting the active duty/reserve force mix is "wishing away" the problem. Readiness will suffer if the force mix is not fine tuned.

TRAINING. While the Army will not and should not transform itself into a relief agency, many situations will inevitably require the Army's assistance. To effectively participate in peacetime engagement operations, officers must be trained at the Army's schools in areas such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and civilian support operations. Most of these operations require effective coordination with and subordination of the military to international civilian relief authorities. Our officers must learn to operate in an environment where there are not clear operational guidelines or explicit criteria for success. Further, the Army will need to retain and promote officers whose expertise is in these areas -- areas which have not in the past been career "fast tracks".⁴⁵

Specific unit level training will not be necessary. These operations will provide the best training scenarios, short of war, for all participating units. Normal mission essential task list training will be adequate for preparation for peacetime engagement operations.

One of the most positive aspects of training, is that these operations provide an ideal opportunity for training the

total Army force, not just the active force.

U.S. Southern Command has had a number of years of experience in this area, having had several long term projects and programs throughout Central and South America. This effort has been significantly supported by Reserve and National Guard units using overseas deployment training (ODT). ODT cannot be duplicated within the United States. Overseas deployment training in remote, austere conditions allows the reserve component units to closely approximate war time conditions. These ODTs are a great boost to readiness and to building a credible force.

Coupled with this is the joint training derived. General Powell, in his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, stressed the necessity for continual joint training as the military forces get smaller. He believes that the humanitarian assistance program provides an exceptional opportunity to conduct this type of training.⁴⁶

CONCLUSION

Whether or not the military participates in a policy of peacetime engagement will, in the end, be a political decision. The debate is not yet over. But there is a strong historical tradition of military participation in operations that would support this policy. Nations have long used their military forces for humanitarian reasons. Peacetime engagement is taking this idea one step further -- using the

military element of national power, in conjunction with the political and economic elements, to attack the root causes of world instability. While it is not a pure military mission (it lacks a military objective), it is a policy that is in our national interest. If the peaceful use of our military will avoid future lethal conflict, then clearly we must. Certainly, it is a relevant policy in today's world.

In order for a peacetime engagement policy to be successful, a number of hurdles must be overcome. First, a policy to determine when and where the military will be used must be developed. I have previously suggested three possible approaches, and I am sure there are more. The United States must develop this policy to allow for selective engagement in world affairs. As a nation, we can not become the policeman of the world. Without this policy, we risk becoming involved in no-win situations, that are not necessarily in our national interests.

Secondly, a system of interagency cooperation must be established. Government agencies must set aside their long held parochial interests. A peacetime engagement policy can only be successful when there are clear lines of command, which allow for unity of effort in the operation. Unfortunately, the United States has not been very good at doing this. Each government agency has its own agenda, not always supporting a common government goal. This paradigm must be broken. Real and meaningful lines of interagency

communications must be opened at all levels in order to facilitate coordination and success.

Thirdly, the American public must be convinced that this policy is in our long term interest. Without the support of the people, the policy is doomed to failure. We must not be deterred from this policy because of the current "America First" attitude of some Americans. As the recession ends, this attitude will also end. By concentrating on the nonlethal aspect of this policy, and by initially limiting participation to humanitarian and disaster relief operations, who could object?

Lastly, we must pay close attention to the lessons learned from the ongoing drug war. Using the military in predominately civilian operations is never easy. We must be mindful so that the military does not become part of the problem, instead of part of the solution.

If the above hurdles can be overcome, then the military must be prepared to take on the mission. For the military to be successful, a number of steps must first be taken. Doctrine must be written that clearly delinks peacetime engagement operations from low intensity conflict operations. They are not the same. This point can be clarified by modifying the current operational continuum, primarily by adding "stability operations" to the continuum. This will provide a clear separation and differentiation between the two types of operations.

Force structure needs to be modified, allowing for a more robust combat support/combat service support active duty force. Not only will this provide adequate forces for peacetime engagement operations, it will also ensure that the training base does not suffer. Doing this also has the added benefit of providing a more rapidly expansible military in the event of a major regional contingency requiring mobilization.

Key to military success will be an officer corps trained in the areas of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and civilian support operations. Without this up-front training, the potential for significant problems, and eventual failure, is greater. This training is critical, as these operations are in many ways alien to how the military normally operates. The operations will often require subordination of the military to international civilian relief organizations. Coupled with the training must be a clear message that officers who become experts in these operations will stay competitive for promotion and advanced schooling.

The military must not use peacetime engagement as an argument for force structure or size. This a flawed argument that strays from the true mission of a military force -- to fight and win on the battlefield. Very simply, these operations are the best training that we will have for our forces. Gone are the REFORGERS of the past. These operations will provide one of the few opportunities to train in areas

such as short notice deployments, and operations in an undeveloped theater. This training is vital to our overall strategy of having a smaller, yet highly reactive, deployable force.

As we move towards the 21st Century as the sole superpower, more and more nations will be seeking our assistance. The military's ability to provide immediate and massive aid has been well documented, and will continue to be called upon. The United States cannot save the world. But by selectively engaging in operations that combine our national elements of power, we can significantly contribute to the national strategy of "a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish." ⁴⁷

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