


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


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**RESERVE COMPONENT LEADER DEVELOPMENT:
PRE/POST-MOBILIZATION**

BY

**Colonel Robert L. Cooch, Jr.
United States Army**



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**RESERVE COMPONENT LEADER DEVELOPMENT:
PRE/POST-MOBILIZATION**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

The results of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM have reinforced the necessity of a Total Force policy. The policy was validated by the success of the large numbers of U.S. Army Reserve and U.S. Army National Guard units and individuals assigned to Southwest Asia as well as in CONUS and other overseas assignments. However, the issues raised as a result of the mobilization and subsequent training of three National Guard roundout brigades has created a storm of controversy surrounding the readiness of the National Guard, its level of training and leader development, and the relationship between the Active and Reserve Component.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Sullivan, has stated that the Reserve Component will play an increasingly important role in future Army force structure and operations. Increased effort must be placed in the development of the six Army imperatives within the Reserve Component to create a team of Active and Reserve units based upon common standards and expectations. The imperatives are listed here for review.¹

Quality soldiers

Viable doctrine

Trained and ready force

Balanced force structure

Modernization of equipment

Qualified and competent leaders (leader development)

The importance of leadership can not be overstated. General Vuono writes in FM 22-100, Military Leadership, that, "A Trained and Ready Army has as its foundation, competent and confident leaders."² He went on to describe the vast expectations of our nation in the Army's leadership.

Leaders in our Army have a challenge. They must take care of soldier's needs; develop them into cohesive teams; train them under tough, realistic conditions to demanding standards; assess their performance; assist them with their personal and professional growth; and reward them for their success. To meet that challenge our leaders must be competent, and confident in their ability to lead. Such leaders will remain essential to our Trained and Ready Army, today and tomorrow.³

Leader development in the Reserve Component will be the key to success in establishing solidly-trained individuals and units in both pre-mobilization and post-mobilization conditions. Properly trained leaders are needed to ensure that the proper focus for pre-mobilization training is maintained and that the leaders are prepared to meet rapid post-mobilization training requirements in order to provide capable units.

The brigade has been the cornerstone for Army National Guard combat units for several years. General Sullivan has stated that roundout brigades will continue to play a vital role in future force structure changes; therefore, the leadership of these brigades must be competent professionals in order to ensure the success of these key units. A prescriptive leader development program for the Reserve Component is needed, and this paper proposes such a program.

This leader development program will focus within the roundout brigade in both a pre-mobilization and post-

mobilization status. Leader development will deal with combat arms officers only (armor, infantry, and field artillery), but the principles of this program can also apply to combat support and combat service support officers. The Army Reserve as well as the National Guard can apply this program to develop successful leaders.

Platoon leaders, company, battalion, and brigade commanders will be the objects of this leader development program. The goal of this program is to establish standards which are appropriate at each level of command, based on developing tactical and technical competence, and focused on pre- and post-mobilization tasks given the limited resources, especially time, available to the roundout brigade.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

All of the roundout brigades have competent, professional leaders. However, there are issues, common to the environment of the Reserve Component units, which affect leader development. The following is not an all-encompassing list, but are those items which seem to cause the greatest impediment to good leader development.

- ▶ Lack of sufficient training time.
- ▶ Leaders not trained/schooled prior to assuming leadership positions.
- ▶ Training level focus is too high; "attain and maintain battalion level proficiency"⁴ as an RC training objective during pre-mobilization is too ambitious.

▶ Training is not focused on essential tasks or adequately divided between pre-mobilization and post-mobilization requirements.

▶ Readiness expectations held by Reserve Component unit commanders upon mobilization tend to be too high. This has been reinforced by Active Component leaders for several years.

The amount of adequate training time provided to the roundout brigades is not only one of availability, but also one of proper utilization by leaders. The standard of 39 days per year (24 IDT, 15 AT) is actually much less when administrative time, travel time, and post operations activities are subtracted. Twenty to twenty-five days of training is closer to actual available time.⁵ The organization is faced with limited time for leader development, or for leaders to train and develop their subordinates. Without thorough assessment of the specific tasks on which to train leaders, poorly trained or untrained leaders fail to properly train their subordinates. This results in untrained units even in the basic individual, crew, squad, and platoon tasks.

Too many instances are found, especially at the platoon and company level, where officers are assigned as platoon leaders and company commanders without having completed the prerequisite schooling. The Army's leader development system consists of three equally important pillars: formal education and training, operational experience through assignment, and self-development.⁶ Formal schooling prepares individuals for positions of greater

responsibility; without it, serious degradation in leader development and training occurs.

The result is that platoon leaders who are untrained cannot train their soldiers or establish a basis for self-improvement. Company commanders who are not advance course graduates cannot train their platoon leaders nor begin to develop a cohesive, well-trained organization. Frustration among soldiers and leaders abounds, resulting in an increasing inability to meet Army standards, decreasing morale, and lack of retention of soldiers within the unit.

The concept of "training to the level organized" is fatally flawed when compared to the number of available training days. As each increasing level of command directs appropriate training for their level of organization, time for leader development and training of basic essential skills is forfeited. For example, during annual training, if the brigade and battalion commander each direct appropriate training events of three to four days each, no time is left for company or platoon level training.

Combining this concept with a training program for leaders and subordinates that is not focused on essential war fighting tasks, and further divided by pre-mobilization and post-mobilization requirements, results in wasted time and untrained soldiers, leaders, and units. Especially damaging, as a result of this policy, are leaders who are not trained, and ultimately not effective trainers, and who cannot effectively lead their units through post-mobilization training requirements.

The mobilization of the three National Guard roundout brigades during Operation DESERT SHIELD reinforced this lack of leader development. Both Reserve and Active Component commanders had an expectation level of readiness that was not only incorrect but beyond the ability of the brigades to have achieved upon the date of mobilization.

Lessons learned from DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM include the following items on unit readiness and leader development in the roundout brigades.

Actual readiness was lower than reported on pre-mobilization unit status reports (USR).⁷

Many key leaders (officer and NCO) lacked technical/tactical skills along with basic leadership abilities. These shortfalls can be attributed to the lack of formal schooling, limited training opportunities, inefficient training accomplished during IDT/AT, nonavailability of RC configured OPD/NCOPD professional development courses, and existing procedures for leader selection.⁸

These lessons learned emphasize the point that leader development programs must have a formal schooling and training requirement as well as development requirements within the unit. Current policies and guidelines concerning leader development for the Reserve Component should be reviewed to clarify intent as well as make recommendations for improving the program.

POLICY AND GUIDELINES

The Army leadership is moving ahead to fix systemic problems concerning leadership, training, force structure, and modernization for the Reserve Component through several enhancements. The revitalization of the Reserve Component

Coordination Council, chaired by the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, General Reimer, Forces Command's BOLD SHIFT program, and upgrading the Reserve Components Training Development Action Plan are three of the Army's major initiatives.

General Sullivan has reaffirmed that the Army will continue to base its programs and proposals upon the six imperatives. Referring to leadership, he stated, "Leader development programs for officers and NCOs are the Army's investment in the future, and will continue to be fully funded."⁹ Each of the major initiatives focuses a great deal of effort into leader development.

A new Reserve Component Officer Education System (RC-OES) has been approved at the Department of the Army with an implementation date of NLT 1 October 1994. Key policies of that new system, designed to strengthen leader development, are as follows:¹⁰

- ▶ Two-phase Reserve Component Officer Advance Course (RC-OAC) to facilitate student attendance and completion.
- ▶ Implement Reserve Component Combined Arms and Services Staff School (RC-CAS³) into all USARF schools.
- ▶ Completion of CAS³ will be a requirement for promotion to Major, effective 1 October 1994.
- ▶ Two-phase Command and General Staff Officer Course for the Reserve Component (RC-CGSOC) to facilitate student attendance and completion.

▶ Completion of Phase 1 of the RC-CGSOC will be required for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. Completion of Phase 1 and 2 will be required for promotion to Colonel.

Forces Command's BOLD SHIFT program is designed to improve Reserve Component readiness, thereby enhancing the total force. BOLD SHIFT is divided into elements organized under the acronym RESULTS. These elements are as follows:¹¹

- R -- reorganize and realign
- E -- ORE (operational readiness evaluation)
- S -- soldier training (MOSQ)
- U -- unit training
- L -- leader training
- T -- training involvement of the wartime chain
- S -- support (full time)

The intent is to establish policies, programs, and procedures to ensure a high level of Reserve Component readiness. Although much is planned under each element of RESULTS, only leader training initiatives will be addressed within this paper. The key points of leader training contained in BOLD SHIFT are as follows:¹²

- ▶ Identify leaders by name who are not qualified and the training programs needed for leader qualification.
- ▶ Tailor BNCOC and ANCOG programs to focus on optimum payoff leadership skills.
- ▶ Coordinate, support, and monitor the execution of leader training at the unit level.

▶ Support TRADOC in determining specifics of POI for Junior Leader Battle Skills Courses.

▶ Assist in preparation of Roundout/Roundup units for participation in the Tactical Commander Development Course (TCDC).

In addition to the actions mentioned above, General Sullivan outlined several initiatives aimed at strengthening the Total Force through better integration of the components. He discussed these initiatives at the annual conference of the National Guard Association. One of these initiatives deals with pre-mobilization training and leader development in the Reserve Component.

Reserve Component pre-mobilization training, both individual and collective, and leader development are receiving increased emphasis. Annual training next summer will focus more on small units and staffs. Leader development requirements are being reviewed as we compile lessons learned and courses are being tailored to fit the specific needs of the Reserve Components.¹³

Reserve Component leader development is also being addressed in two other plans. The Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan (RC-TDAP) and the Reserve Component Leader Development Plan (RC-LDAP) deal primarily with leader development as part of the selection and schooling process. There are many significant, important issues raised in both these plans. The following recommendations reinforce these plans and provide additional issues which will improve the baseline development of Reserve Component leaders and better align basic leader development requirements with those of the Active Component.

▶ Concentrate officer accessions through ROTC. As the Active Component is reduced in size, the ROTC program will graduate more officers than can be used by active units. College graduate ROTC officers should replace state OCS academy graduates within the Reserve Component as accessions.

▶ Eliminate state OCS academies. These initiatives are resource intensive in terms of manpower and money and do not produce quality officers in a timely manner. Reserve Component soldiers desiring a commission should be sent through the Active Component OCS program.

▶ Only college graduates should be commissioned into the Reserve Component. A smaller, high-quality force requires this basic level of education in order to deal with high technology and improved training management and simulations.

▶ Reserve Component officers should be required to complete the appropriate branch specific Officer Basic Course and Officer Advance Course prior to assignment as a platoon leader or company commander. The limited training time available is too valuable to have officers in charge who are not branch qualified.

▶ Completion of the Combined Arms and Service Staff School (CAS³) should be required prior to promotion to Major. This policy would greatly enhance leader development at company level and assist with the transition to battalion level staff.

▶ A combined arms training center for the Reserve Component should be developed. This RC-CTC should mirror the missions and resources of the National Training Center (NTC).

The NTC has proven itself as the premier leader development activity for the Army. However, it can not handle the needs of the Active Component plus roundout/roundup units as well as the remaining 180 RC battalions that need a CTC training experience. A dedicated RC-CTC is needed to enhance leader development and unit training in a stressful environment.

▶ Leader development training at the unit level should be divided into pre-mobilization tasks and post-mobilization tasks. Training time within the Reserve Component is so limited that without separating tasks, training standards are not achieved at the basic levels of individual, crew/squad, and platoon.

▶ Leaders should be required to complete two correspondence courses per year that are focused on post-mobilization tasks and requirements. This policy would help keep leaders current on requirements that will be faced during post-mobilization training.

▶ Reserve Component training for units and leaders during pre-mobilization (IDT and AT) should be focused at the individual, crew/squad, and platoon levels. This policy will ensure that the foundation for successful leadership during post-mobilization training at company, battalion, and brigade is prepared and qualified. Current regulations and policy that direct training to attain battalion level proficiency must be changed to redirect the level of training.¹⁶

The limited amount of available training time inevitably produces a discussion of how to best use this time for leaders;

spend the time with their units or in formal schooling. If leaders are untrained, spending time with their units in order to "train their subordinates" will only result in individual soldiers and units being untrained and wasting valuable training resources. The value of the individual leader and his unit are dramatically improved when the leader is properly schooled prior to assuming a trainer's role.

The choices become (1) accept the absence of leaders to attend formal schooling in order to benefit the organization over the long term, or (2) demand that leaders be with their units every IDT and AT period while attending formal schooling on an as available basis. The first choice maximizes available training time for Reserve Competent leaders. The second choice will require changes in current law to provide additional time and funding for leaders to attend formal schooling, and possibly face additional absence from civilian employment. Given the projected trend of reduced defense spending and the Army leadership's commitment to expand leader development courses that match available training time, the first choice is the most prudent.

A LEADER DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Leader development is ultimately a command responsibility. In addition to new policies and programs that outline basic requirements, a solid plan at the unit level is needed to enhance leader development. Commanders must ensure that it is

comprehensive in nature and includes formal schooling, experience through assignments, and self-development.

Leader development must be oriented on critical battle tasks that emphasize the technical and tactical skills that leaders need not only to lead and survive on the modern battlefield, but also to train and develop their subordinates. The limited amount of training time available to the Reserve Components in a pre-mobilization status mandates that a thorough analysis be done at the unit level to eliminate non-battle oriented tasks from training programs to the maximum extent possible. To further maximize the time available, tasks must be separated into pre-mobilization and post-mobilization categories.

In addition to battle focused tasks that are categorized by mobilization status, the level of training must also be separated by pre-mobilization and post-mobilization in order to ensure adequate basic skill preparation that will allow units to meet and complete a 60-day post-mobilization training program prior to deployment. Pre-mobilization training must be focused on individual, crew/squad, and platoon. Post-mobilization must concentrate on company, battalion/task force, and brigade.

The Department of the Army Inspector General, in its Special Assessment of National Guard Brigades' Mobilization and Deployment, reached the same conclusion concerning the necessity of separate but linked mobilization training strategies. Discussing pre-mobilization training, the reports states,

The post-mob training process for Roundout units can be shortened by realigning current training focus to prescribed training strategies that complement a deliberately planned post-mob training readiness improvement process.¹⁵

Therefore, leader development training strategies must have the required foundational elements. These will ensure Reserve Component leaders are qualified in their basic skills during pre-mobilization training so that they can rapidly train to standard on more complex tasks during post-mobilization.

- ▶ Critical battle focused tasks
- ▶ Technical and tactical skills
- ▶ Pre-mobilization task list
- ▶ Post-mobilization task list
- ▶ Pre-mobilization training focused on individual, crew/squad, and platoon tasks
- ▶ Post-mobilization training focused on company, battalion/task force, and brigade tasks.

Using the roundout brigade as the model, a leader development training strategy can be described for the platoon leader, company and battalion commanders, and the brigade commander. The strategy includes the three pillars of officer education: formal schooling, training and experience through assignments, and self-development. Additionally, pre-mobilization and post-mobilization considerations will be addressed as well as input from a survey on Reserve Component Leader Development which was given to the U.S. Army War College Class of 1992.

PLATOON LEADER DEVELOPMENT

Platoon leaders are the foundation of the officer corps. Professional, well-trained, qualified, motivated, and successful platoon leaders will become the future successful company, battalion, and brigade commanders. It is essential to the Total Force that platoon leaders are trained on pre-mobilization tasks which focus on tactics, gunnery, and maintenance.

A. Formal School: Pre-Mobilization

- ▶ Completion of branch specific Officer Basic Course prior to assignment as a platoon leader.

- ▶ Completion of a branch specific Junior Leaders Battle Skills Course¹⁶ within the first three years of assignment as a platoon leader.

B. Unit Training: Pre-Mobilization

- ▶ Individual Weapons Qualification: Annually.

- ▶ Common Task Testing: Annually.

- ▶ Gunnery Skills Test: Annually.

- ▶ Annual Crew Gunnery Qualification: The platoon leader must qualify with his crew on an annual basis (Tank Table VIII for armor crews, for example). Preliminary training will include successful completion of selected "gates" in an appropriate Conduct of Fire Trainer (COFT) as well as pre-gunnery crew drills.

- ▶ Vehicle Maintenance Training: In addition to individual weapon and equipment maintenance, the platoon leader will participate with his crew in a Quarterly Service (Q-

Service) of their vehicle or a like vehicle. This training must be completed prior to Annual Training.

▶ Selected Drills and Situational Training Exercises (STX): Platoon leaders will receive preliminary training on selected drills and STX and then train their crews and platoons. These drills and STX will be selected by the company commander based upon an analysis of assigned missions and the level of proficiency of the platoon leader and his platoon.

C. Unit Training: Post-Mobilization

▶ Individual Weapons Familiarization: Platoon leaders would be required to familiarize if they last qualified with their weapons within six months of mobilization. If more than six months had lapsed since last qualification, qualification with the individual weapon would be required.

▶ Platoon Level Crew Gunnery Qualification: Tank Table XII, Bradley Table XII, and equivalent crew gunnery for field artillery crews would be the requirement. Refresher crew training would be supported primarily by Conduct of Fire Trainers (COFT).

▶ Selected Drills and Situational Training Exercises (STX): These drills and STX will be more complex than during pre-mobilization. They will focus on battlefield conditions and introduce combat support and combat service support elements. Additionally, these exercises will also begin combining platoons, working together to successfully accomplish an STX mission requirement.

D. Self-Development Training: Pre-Mobilization

▶ Correspondence Courses: Platoon leaders must complete one correspondence course every six months that is focused on a post-mobilization task. Company commanders must approve the correspondence course selected by the platoon leader and maintain a record of courses completed.

▶ Professional Reading List: Platoon leaders must complete one military related book every six months and provide a short narrative summary to their company commander and fellow platoon leaders.

COMPANY COMMANDER DEVELOPMENT

Company commanders are responsible for the development of their platoon leaders. They are critical not only for ensuring the basic skills development of their platoon leaders, but also in developing the company into a cohesive unit. Company commanders must be well-versed in basic skills and corrective tasks to bring the platoons together as a potent fighting force.

A. Formal Schooling: Pre-Mobilization

▶ Completion of branch specific Officer Advance Course prior to assuming duty as a company commander.

▶ Completion of a branch specific Junior Leaders Battle Skills Course within the first three years of assignment as a company commander.

▶ CAS³: Although completion of CAS³ is not necessary for leader development of the company commander, it should be accomplished immediately following command. In order

to become a competent staff officer and be eligible for promotion,¹⁷ the company commander should complete CAS³ within the first two years following command.

B. Unit Training: Pre-Mobilization

- ▶ Individual Weapons Qualification: Annually.
- ▶ Common Task Testing: Company commander must pass annually and certify his platoon leaders have passed CTT.
- ▶ Gunnery Skills Test: Company commander must pass annually and certify his platoon leaders have passed.
- ▶ Annual Crew Gunnery Qualification: The armor and infantry company commander must qualify with his crew on an annual basis; Table VIII for tank and Bradley crews. The artillery battery commander must successfully complete an annual service qualification firing with his battery.
- ▶ The armor and infantry company commanders must successfully complete selected "gates" in a Conduct of Fire Trainer (COFT) as well as pre-gunnery drills prior to annual crew qualification.
- ▶ ARTBASS, Map Exercise (MAPEX), and Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT): Company commanders will participate in these exercises conducted by the battalion commander and his staff. These exercises will focus on assigned wartime missions and be designed so that the company commander must take actions appropriate to his entire unit. The goal is to participate in one of each type of these exercises during the training year.

C. Unit Training: Post-Mobilization

▶ Individual Weapons Familiarization: Company commanders will be required to familiarize with their weapon unless their last qualification was more than six months ago. In that case, re-qualification will be required.

▶ COFT and Platoon Level Gunnery: The company commander of armor and infantry units will successfully complete selected advanced gunnery "gates" on the COFT. Additionally, they will lead their platoons through Table XII qualification.

▶ Combined Arms Situational Training Exercise: Company commanders will conduct selected STX's that include their "slice" elements such as the artillery FIST, engineer, air defense artillery, and chemical and smoke unit representatives. These STX's will begin building the combined armor team and reinforcing the concept of battlefield synchronization.

▶ Company FTX and Live-Five Exercises: These will be based on the battalion commander's mission analysis and conducted under his supervision.

▶ Battalion FTX and CALFEX: The company commander and his unit will participate in exercises based upon the battalion and brigade commander's analysis and under the supervision of the brigade commander.

▶ The company and battalion FTX and live-five exercises will be preceded by preliminary sand table exercises and rehearsals that will be led by the battalion and brigade commanders. The participants will be company commanders, "slice" personnel, and selected battalion and brigade staff.

D. Self-Development Training: Pre-Mobilization

▶ Correspondence Courses: Company commanders must complete one course every six months that is focused on a post-mobilization mission requirement. Battalion commanders must approve the selection of courses and maintain a record of course completion.

▶ Professional Reading: Company commanders must complete one military related book every six months. A short narrative summary will be provided to their fellow company commanders and the battalion commander.

BATTALION COMMANDER DEVELOPMENT

Battalion commanders are responsible for the development of their company commanders. Battalion commanders must focus upon the individual tactical competence of the company commanders and develop the combined arms synchronization skills needed by him and his staff.

A. Formal Schooling: Pre-Mobilization

▶ Battalion commanders must complete the Pre-Command Course before assuming battalion command.

▶ Completion of the Reserve Component Command and General Staff Officer Course is not a requirement for selection of Reserve Component officers for battalion command. If a battalion commander has not completed RC-CGSOC prior to assuming command, he should complete the course prior to the end of his second year in command.

▶ Senior Officer Preventive Maintenance Course: Battalion commanders should attend this course during their first year in command. This course provides a superb introduction to the Army's maintenance management system as well as providing indicators of successful maintenance programs that can be applied within his unit.

B. Unit Training: Pre-Mobilization

▶ Individual Weapons Qualification: Annually.

▶ Crew Qualification: Armor and infantry battalion commanders should qualify annually with their assigned tank or Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) crew. Annual crew qualification is critical for the battalion commander in maintaining technical proficiency and in leading his battalions through the most important training event of the year.

▶ Common Task Test: Battalion commanders should successfully complete this test annually.

▶ Command and Staff Exercises: Battalion commanders will have to focus on simulation-based exercises for the majority of his pre-mobilization development and the training of his staff. These exercises should be conducted in a field environment and include the combat support and combat service support personnel habitually attached to the battalion. The specific exercises which should be used are: ARTBASS, CPX, MAPEX, and Staff STX's.

▶ FORSCOM Leader Training Program (FLTP): The battalion commander and his staff should participate in an FLTP rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). This is one of

the best programs for leader and staff development. Under the guidance of the NTC staff, a commander and his staff observe a rotational unit conduct its missions while concurrently preparing operations orders. This should be a priority exercise for battalion commanders.

- ▶ **Combat Training Center Rotation:** The best leader development for battalion commanders is obtained through a training rotation at one of the Combat Training Centers (NTC, JRTC, CMTC). Battalion commanders should make this a priority event and lobby hard through their chain-of-command to obtain a rotation as part of a Reserve or Active Component brigade.

C. Unit Training: Post-Mobilization

- ▶ **Individual Weapons Familiarization.**
- ▶ **Command Post Exercises:** Battalion commanders must get their staff and command and control systems into a field environment as quickly as possible. The development of an efficient, capable staff and sound command and control procedures are the basis for future post-mobilization training success.

- ▶ **Company Level Situational Training Exercises:** The battalion commander will select exercises based upon mission analysis and training ability levels of his units. He will supervise and critique the company level STX's.

- ▶ **Battalion Level FTX:** The battalion commander must develop his unit into a cohesive, fighting organization. The FTX also allows him to develop the synchronization of all of his assets necessary for successful mission accomplishment.

▶ Battalion Level CALFEX: The CALFEX is the culminating exercise for the battalion commander. Maneuver, firepower, and synchronization of assets are combined to demonstrate unit effectiveness and its ability to win on the modern battlefield.

D. Self-Development

▶ Correspondence Courses: Battalion commanders should complete one course every six months on a subject focused on staff development and synchronization of combined arms assets.

▶ Professional Reading: Battalion commanders should complete one military related book every six months. These books could be discussed at Officer Professional Development (OPD) classes if they relate to the tactical subject of the class, or a brief narrative summary can be provided by the battalion commander.

BRIGADE COMMANDER DEVELOPMENT

Brigade commanders must concentrate their development into three areas: command and control, synchronization of assets, and management of resources. It is critical that brigade commanders develop proficiency in these areas during pre-mobilization training in order to be prepared to move rapidly and efficiently through an intense post-mobilization training program. The brigade commander must also have an accurate, up-to-date assessment of his subordinate battalions and companies so that he can tailor the post-mobilization training program to

meet the needs of the individual units as well as the needs of the brigade team.

A. Formal Schooling: Pre-Mobilization

▶ Completion of the brigade level pre-command course prior to assuming command.

▶ Completion of the Senior Officer Preventive Maintenance Course (SOPMC) during the first year in command is critical to a solid understanding of the maintenance management program from a resource management perspective. If this course was completed prior to brigade command (while a battalion commander, for example), this requirement can be waived.

B. Unit Training: Pre-Mobilization

▶ Individual weapons qualification on an annual basis.

▶ **Command and Staff Exercises:** The brigade commander will have to rely on simulation based exercises during pre-mobilization. The development of himself and his staff should be the focus. Brigade commanders must demand that their habitually attached combat support and combat service support assets are represented during these exercises. The specific exercises the brigade commander should use are: CPX (in a field environment), Staff Situational Training Exercises (STX's), BBS, and BASE.

▶ **Tactical Commander Development Course:** Brigade commanders, their staff, and attached support elements should attend this program once during a brigade commander's three-year tenure. It should be conducted early enough in the command

assignment to provide the brigade commander an assessment of himself and his staff so that a focused training program can be developed.

▶ FORSCOM Leader Training Program (FLTP): The brigade commander, his battalion commanders, and their staffs should participate in an FLTP rotation at the National Training Center. This superb leader development program should be scheduled once during a brigade commander's tour and one year prior to the brigade's Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation.

▶ Combat Training Center Rotation: The brigade commander should conduct a CTC rotation once during his three-year tour. Ideally, it would be scheduled during his last year in command as a culminating exercise for the brigade headquarters and an assessment of its ability to command and control, synchronize assets, and manage resources.

▶ Battle Command Training Program (BCTP): The brigade commander and his staff must participate in the training and execution of BCTP as part of their parent Active Component division. This is a unique opportunity for leader and staff development while under the control of the "go to war" headquarters.

C. Unit Training: Post-Mobilization

- ▶ Individual weapons familiarization.
- ▶ Command Post Exercises: Just as the battalion commander, the brigade commander must get his staff and command and control apparatus into a field environment quickly.

Development of staff and command and control procedures must be the initial priority of the brigade commander.

▶ **Brigade Level FTX:** The brigade commander must plan and execute a series of FTX's focused on specific wartime missions of the brigade. These FTX's must include the attached combat support and combat service support units. The tactical orientation of the FTX's must include both offensive and defensive missions.

▶ **Brigade Level CALFEX:** The CALFEX at brigade level will be the culminating point for the brigade's post-mobilization training program. The brigade commander must focus not only on command and control, synchronization, management of assets, and firepower, but also on the special conditions of the battlefield: NBC, mobility/counter-mobility, and limited visibility.¹⁸

D. Self-Development

▶ **Correspondence Courses:** Brigade commanders should complete one course every six months on a subject focused on "conditions of the battlefield"¹⁹ and management of resources.

▶ **Professional Reading:** Brigade commanders should complete one military related book every six months.

ACTIVE COMPONENT SUPPORT TO RESERVE COMPONENT LEADER DEVELOPMENT

As the Total Army becomes dramatically smaller through 1995, current plans call for the Reserve Component to become an increasingly important player in the capability of the force

structure to meet its many requirements. The concept of "power projection" requires units to be mission capable, professionally led, and able to respond under short notice conditions to conflicts anywhere in the world. Reserve Component units must be prepared to mobilize and conduct intensive post-mobilization training. Their leaders must be technically and tactically proficient and have achieved a level of competence necessary to successfully accomplish the mission requirements of post-mobilization training as well as winning on the battlefield.

Leader development programs in the roundout brigades, as well as other Reserve Component units, lack adequate available time for the chain-of-command to successfully develop good leaders without outside assistance. The Active Component Army must provide essential resources to help leader development in the Reserve Component units. The chain-of-command is still ultimately responsible for leader development; these resources are designed to make their task easier.

The following items provide a measure of support across a wide spectrum; they are not cheap nor readily available in all cases. However, for the Reserve Component to maximize its time for leader development, resourcing for these items must be a high priority.

A. Reserve Component Training Doctrine: All training doctrine and literature must be reviewed and re-examined in light of the changing world situation and corresponding changes to the role of the Total Army. Doctrine and literature must include specifically tailored portions for the Reserve

Component; it must take into account the peculiarities of minimally available training time, units spread over great distances, post-mobilization requirements, and leader development challenges. As much as possible, Reserve Component training doctrine should be included as chapters of the same manual for Active Component units, thus reducing the perception of being in the "other Army" while providing a single source document for the Total Army.

B. Reserve Component Courses: All courses developed by the Army school system must have an exportable counterpart for use by Reserve Component units. This is true for technical as well as leader development courses. These courses can be taught through regional training centers as well as the USARF school system. TRADOC, through its proponent schools, must annually certify that these schools have the most current material as well as qualified instructors.

C. Simulation Based Training Devices: The Army must increase its investment in the development, purchasing, and distribution of simulations-based training devices for the Total Army. The Reserve Component must receive these devices in greater numbers and speed. Leader development programs will be greatly improved and, in many cases, be based upon availability of these devices. For example, ARTBASS, Conduct-of-Fire Trainers (COFT), SIMNET, BASE, and BBS are excellent leader development devices that need increased production and distribution.

D. Active Component Personnel Support: Active Component personnel can be extremely effective in developing and executing leader development programs in conjunction with the chain-of-command. Advisors down to battalion level are essential. Also, the various Readiness Groups should be adequately manned to provide instructors for leader development programs. Readiness Group - Salt Lake City, 6th U.S. Army, has a superb program for leader development in the Army's training management program.

E. Active Component Unit Support: Active Component unit support should be stressed in two areas. First, all roundout/roundup units must have their leader development programs approved by their go-to-war division commander. The division commander can also provide assistance in the focus of trainers/instructors for the leader development program. Secondly, all other RC battalions and brigades must have a Directed Training Association (DTA) with an Active Component unit. Although extremely useful in supporting the development and execution of leader development programs, the greatly reduced size of the Active force will curtail the amount of time and resources available to devote to this type program.

F. Reserve Component - Combat Training Center (RC-CTC): The best leader development training is currently provided by the three CTC's: NTC, JRTC, and CMTC. However, these facilities can not provide support to all the Active Component units, as well as all the Reserve Component units, that need this type of training. A dedicated RC-CTC is needed to provide this essential, go-to-war leader training. An investment today

in developing and resourcing an RC-CTC will provide future commanders, the type of trained units, and leaders that were evident in DESERT STORM who were products of the Combat Training Center (CTC) environment.²⁰

RESERVE COMPONENT LEADER DEVELOPMENT SURVEY

A survey of the U.S. Army War College Class of 1992 was conducted by this author and LTC Jack R. Fox (ARNG), in order to determine the level of knowledge about Reserve Component organizations and leader development. Two hundred Army officers (Active and Reserve Components), were surveyed with responses returned from 142 (71%). The information gathered deals with specific knowledge about the Reserve Component, as well as schooling and training used in the leader development of platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion and brigade commanders.

Analysis of the survey data was used to determine whether there is a requirement for formal schooling about the National Guard and where that schooling should take place. Analysis of the survey also helped focus leader development onto the most valuable and necessary training and schooling to better prepare Reserve Component officers.

The following summary of selected questions from the survey reflects the perceptions, experience, and beliefs of the respondents from the U.S. Army War College Class of 1992. A copy of the complete survey with responses is included at Appendix A.

- A. 89%: Active Component officers
11%: Reserve Component officers
- B. 57%: Combat Arms
17%: Combat Support
21%: Combat Service Support
- C. Average years of service: 21.2 years.
- D. 89% of the Active Component officers had never been assigned as a Reserve Component advisor or member of a Readiness Group.
- E. 62% had evaluated a National Guard unit during its annual training period.
- F. 39% had served in a Regular Army unit that had an assigned roundout unit.
- G. Worked with Army National Guard units during the following:

DESERT SHIELD:	30%
DESERT STORM:	32%
National Training Center:	11%
Other training events:	47%
- H. 20% had never worked with the National Guard.
- I. Courses completed prior to assuming battalion command:

Senior Officer Preventive Maintenance:	24%
CGSC:	92%
Pre-Command Course:	85%

J. The formal schooling found to be most beneficial in preparation for platoon, company, and battalion command:

Officer Basic Course

Ranger

Officer Candidate School

Officer Advance Course

Maintenance Officer Course

Pre-Command Course

Command and General Staff Course

K. The field experiences found to be most beneficial in preparation for platoon, company, and battalion command:

Field Training Exercises (FTX)

ARTEP Evaluation

Deployment Exercises

Gunnery Training

Combat Training Centers (CTC)

L. 40% had participated in a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation.

M. 89% of respondents who had participated in a CTC rotation believe it was an effective tool in leader development.

N. Officers, who had participated in a CTC rotation, believed the following simulations-based training devices were effective in leader development:

ARTBASS: 56%

BASE: 55%

BCTP: 61%

SIMNET: 57%

O. 70% believed the training and schooling required for Reserve Component leader development should be the same as that required for the Active Component. The House Armed Services Committee is exploring ways to have Reservists attend professional military education courses.²¹

In summary, the following conclusions can be made from the survey concerning leader development.

A. Formal schooling completed prior to assumption of a command position is more beneficial than when completed during command.

B. The most beneficial schooling and field experience in preparation for a command position is that which is hands-on, technically and tactically oriented.

C. The Combat Training Center experience is rated as a very valuable tool in the development of leaders.

D. Simulations-based training is considered very effective for leader development by a majority of officers who have experienced the ultimate leader development challenge: a CTC rotation.

E. The majority of officers believe the leader development requirements should be the same for both the Active and Reserve Components.

CONCLUSION

Qualified and competent leaders is one of the Army's imperatives. The development of leaders is a difficult and resource-intensive process; it is also the vital link in

ensuring trained and ready soldiers and units will be available to successfully accomplish the Army's missions. As the Total Army is reduced in size, the Reserve Component units will become even more important to the capability of the entire force. Leader development in the constrained training environment of the Reserve Components requires a carefully laid out plan that maximizes available resources against battle-focused tasks which are identified as pre-mobilization and post-mobilization requirements.

The leader development program which is described in this study will ensure that Reserve Component leaders are tactically and technically competent. It focuses them on the necessary schooling and training which provides basic competence as well as the ability to rapidly assimilate post-mobilization demands. Above all, this program recognizes the very limited amount of training time available to Reserve Component leaders and attempts to maximize that time on wartime mission preparedness. Battle-focused leader development programs must be an integral part of unit training programs. This program is a step toward achieving the Army's top priority of quality training throughout the Total Army.

The top priority is training. The training focus is on the wartime missions. Every soldier, leader, and unit training program must be carefully planned, aggressively executed, and thoroughly assessed. Realistic, sustained, multi-echelon, totally integrated combined arms training must be continuously stressed at all levels.²²

Quality leadership is the decisive edge in achieving victory on the modern battlefield. Quality leader development

programs will ensure that the Total Army continues to produce leaders of the type exemplified throughout DESERT STORM. "Quality leadership gave the U.S. military an agility and consistency to its operations that the Iraqis could not match."²³

APPENDIX A

RESERVE COMPONENT ORGANIZATION AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT SURVEY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Army Students in the USAWC Class of 1992

SUBJECT: Survey to Determine Knowledge of Reserve Component Organization and Leader Development.

PURPOSE: To gather information from Reserve Component (RC) and Active Component (AC) officers in the U.S. Army War College Class of 1992. The information will deal with specific knowledge about the Reserve Component as well as schooling and training used in the leader development of platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion and brigade commanders.

The information that is gathered and analyzed will be provided to the National Guard Bureau; Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); Headquarters, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center; and the Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The results will be used to identify whether there is a requirement for formal schooling about the National Guard and where that schooling should take place. The information will also help focus leader development onto the most valuable and necessary training and schooling to better prepare the Reserve Component Officers.

Your assistance in filling out this survey is greatly appreciated. This survey should not take you more than 20-30 minutes to complete. Please return the completed survey through the student mail/distribution window to Colonel Cooch, Box 82.

Robert L. Cooch Jr
ROBERT L. COOCH, JR.
COL, ARMOR

Jack R. Fox
JACK R. FOX
LTC, ADA, ARNG

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DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE: AR 70-1

AUTHORITY: 10 USC 4503

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(s):

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only.

MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION:

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information.

RESERVE COMPONENT ORGANIZATION AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

I. Background Information

1. What is your component:

<u>127</u>	Regular Army
<u>7</u>	U.S. Army Reserves
<u>8</u>	Army National Guard
<u> </u>	Other

2. What is your primary branch:

<u>81</u>	Combat Arms
<u>24</u>	Combat Support
<u>30</u>	Combat Service Support
<u>5</u>	Health Services
<u>2</u>	Other

3. Source of Commission:

<u>21</u>	USMA
<u>85</u>	ROTC
<u>22</u>	OCS
<u>4</u>	State Academy OCS
<u>10</u>	OTHER

4. Years of Service: 21.2 (MEAN)

5. What is your current rank?

<u>41</u>	LTC
<u>74</u>	LTC (P)
<u>27</u>	COL

6. Have you ever been assigned to the Army National Guard either as an advisor or as a member of a Readiness Group?

<u>4</u>	Yes
<u>126</u>	No
<u>12</u>	I am in the National Guard/Reserves

7. Have you ever been assigned to evaluate a National Guard unit during its' annual training period?

<u>88</u>	Yes
<u>46</u>	No
<u>8</u>	I am in the National Guard/Reserves

8. Have you ever served in a Regular Army unit that had a National Guard Roundout or Roundup unit?

<u>55</u>	Yes
<u>79</u>	No
<u>8</u>	I am in the National Guard/Reserves

9. were you ever a member of a national guard or Army Reserve unit prior to coming on active duty as a Regular Army officer?

8 Yes
121 No
13 I am in the National Guard/Reserves

10. Did you work with Army National Guard units during:
(Check all that apply)

7 Just Cause
42 Desert Shield
46 Desert Storm
6 Provide Comfort
16 National Training Center
66 Other
28 Never worked with the Army National Guard

II. Information about the National Guard

11. Have you ever received formal instruction on the National Guard in any Army school?

52 A. NO formal instruction
90 B. YES, check all that apply.
24 Basic Officer
33 Advanced Officer
4 CAS3
76 CGSC

12. Do you feel that Senior Active Component Officers possess adequate knowledge of the National Guard?

4 More than adequate
51 Adequate
54 Barely adequate
32 Not adequate

13. In your opinion, when Senior Army Advisors are assigned to National Guard units, they have:

0 A lot of knowledge of the Guard upon initial assignment.
71 Some knowledge of the Guard upon assignment.
57 A little knowledge of the Guard upon assignment.
10 No knowledge of the Guard upon assignment.

14. Do you feel that National Guard (NG) officers have better knowledge of the Regular Army than Regular Army (RA) officers have of the National Guard?

35 A. NG much better knowledge of RA
63 B. NG somewhat better knowledge of RA
41 C. About the same
3 D. RA somewhat better knowledge of NG
0 E. RA much less knowledge of NG

15. At which school(s) do you feel an education program on the roles and missions of the National Guard would be of most benefit to Active Army officers?

44 Basic
97 Advance Course
50 CAS3
115 CGSC
70 AWC
17 Other (specify: _____)

16. Do you feel a meaningful/effective training program for Active Army officers on the National Guard in Officer Basic Courses, Officers Advanced Courses and Command and General Staff College would improve the relationship between the Army and the Guard?

91 Yes
25 No
26 Don't know

17. To your knowledge, with what funds are Army National Guard Personnel paid for weekend drills?

29 State funds
84 Federal funds
24 Don't know

18. The State Area Command (STARC) is the headquarters of the Adjutant General and his staff. As such the STARC:
(check all applicable):

59 A. Commands all units in the state
70 B. Is a resource headquarters
65 C. Is responsible for mobilization
76 D. Provides staff for State Adjutant General
27 E. Is a state-only function with no federal activities or connections.

19. Are commissioning and promotion requirements for Army National Guard officers the same as for Active Army Officers?

27 Yes
93 No
21 Don't know

20. To what extent are senior National Guard commanders treated as equals by their Active duty counterparts?

16 Always
42 Frequently
45 Sometimes
32 Seldom
4 Never

21. To what extent do you feel Army National Guard units may be relied upon in combat.

<u>25</u>	A. Always
<u>57</u>	B. Frequently
<u>50</u>	C. Sometimes
<u>7</u>	D. Seldom
<u>0</u>	E. Never

22. To what extent do National Guard units use the same criteria as Active Component Units when developing Mission Essential Task Lists?

<u>24</u>	A. Always
<u>60</u>	B. Frequently
<u>34</u>	C. Sometimes
<u>14</u>	D. Seldom
<u>2</u>	E. Never

23. To what extent are Guard units graded to the same criteria when taking ARTEPS as Active units?

<u>16</u>	A. Always
<u>29</u>	B. Frequently
<u>45</u>	C. Sometimes
<u>38</u>	D. Seldom
<u>6</u>	E. Never

24. National Guard Officers and NCO personnel subject to the same time in grade, time in service and educational requirements for promotion as Active component personnel.

<u>23</u>	True
<u>83</u>	False
<u>34</u>	Don't know

25. National Guard Bureau formulates and administers programs to insure the continued development and maintenance of Army Guard units.

<u>98</u>	True
<u>9</u>	False
<u>32</u>	Don't know

26. National Guard Bureau serves as the channel of communications between the states and the Department of the Army.

<u>119</u>	True
<u>4</u>	False
<u>17</u>	Don't know

27. Regular Army personnel are assigned to serve on the National Guard Bureau Staff.

89 True
17 False
33 Don't know

28. Commanders of 1st, 2nd, 5th and 6th Armies command the National Guard units within their Army area.

16 True
100 False
24 Don't know

29. To what extent do you feel Active Army officers treat their National Guard officer counterparts as equals?

9 Always
48 Frequently
53 Sometimes
22 Seldom
3 Never

30. Based upon your knowledge or opinion do you feel that Active Army headquarters:

28 Highly value their Guard units
81 Somewhat value their Guard units
16 Are indifferent to their Guard units
14 Place little value on their Guard units
0 Do not value their Guard units

III. Leadership and Training Experiences

31. In all Army components, how long were you in command of:

Platoon 1.8 yrs. (MEAN)
Company 2.3 yrs.
Battalion 2.1 yrs.
Brigade 2.3 yrs.

32. Which courses did you complete prior to or during platoon command?

	<u>Prior to</u> Command	<u>During</u> Command
Ranger School	<u>43</u>	<u>0</u>
Officer Basic Course	<u>117</u>	<u>4</u>
Reserve Component Tank Commander Course or equivalent	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>

33. Which courses did you complete prior to or during company command?

	<u>Prior to</u>	<u>During</u>
Officer Advance Course	<u>72</u>	<u>5</u>
Battalion Motor Officer Course	<u>20</u>	<u>2</u>
CAS3	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>

34. Which courses did you complete prior to or during battalion command?

	<u>Prior to</u>	<u>During</u>
Senior Officers Preventive Maintenance Course	<u>34</u>	<u>0</u>
CGSC	<u>130</u>	<u>0</u>
Pre-command Course	<u>120</u>	<u>2</u>

35. Which formal schooling (resident or non-resident) did you find was most beneficial in preparing you for:

Platoon Command:

OFFICER BASIC COURSE
RANGER

Company Command:

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL
OFFICER ADVANCE COURSE
MOTOR OFFICER COURSE
CGSC

Battalion Command:

PRECOMMAND COURSE

36. What field experiences/training were most valuable in preparing you for:

Platoon Command:

FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES (FTX)
ARTEP EVALUATIONS

Company Command:

DEPLOYMENT EXERCISES
GUNNERY TRAINING
COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS (CTC)

Battalion Command:

37. Listed below are training simulation devices that have been used with leader development. Please rate the effectiveness of each of the listed training simulation devices you have used by circling the number that best corresponds to your assessment.

	VERY INEFFECTIVE	SOMEWHAT INEFFECTIVE	MARGINAL	SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE	VERY EFFECTIVE	N/A
MCOFT	1 4	2	3 1	4 5	5 3	6
UCOFT	1	2	3 1	4 9	5 17	6
ICOFT	1	2	3 2	4 3	5 10	6
DUNN/KEMPF	1 2	2 5	3 18	4 18	5 7	6
ARTBASS	1 1	2 4	3 9	4 33	5 16	6
BASE	1	2 1	3 3	4 9	5 6	6
BCTP	1 3	2 1	3 5	4 14	5 42	6
SIMNET	1 1	2 1	3 3	4 14	5 27	6

38. Have you participated in a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation? Where and in what capacity? (Example: NTC, tank platoon leader)

57 Yes: Location(s): _____
Capacity(ies): _____
80 No

39. Please rate the effectiveness of the Combat Training Center (CTC) experience in relation to your leader development.

Very Ineffective	Somewhat Ineffective	Marginal	Somewhat Effective	Very Effective
1	2	3	4	5
4	1	1	9	47

40. What training or schooling do you feel should be required for Reserve Component leader development?

70% RESPONDED "SAME AS REQUIRED FOR THE ACTIVE COMPONENT"

IV. The following section consists of attitudes about the National Guard and its relationship with the Regular Army. Please circle the number that best describes your attitude.

41. All too often the National Guard has tended to be a "Social Club" or a haven for retirement pay seekers, draft dodgers, and the like.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
19	63	37	21	1

42. National Guardsmen are, for the most part, adequately trained to make a positive contribution from the first day of their activation.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
11	54	24	48	4

43. Some missions traditionally reposed in the Active Army can be shifted to the Army National Guard with little or no loss of capability.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
8	33	21	64	15

44. The Army National Guard should be at the same level of readiness and be able to deploy as quickly as the active forces.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
25	84	7	22	1

45. Rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard roundout brigades has proven to be impossible.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
8	35	31	50	17

46. I am confident most (90%) of the National Guardsmen will report for duty in response to a mobilization order.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
2	7	8	79	45

47. Legal constraints will probably delay the rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
8	55	36	39	2

48. National Guard units are structured to be rapidly integrated into the Active Army during a war or national crisis.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
3	36	36	60	6

49. Political constraints will probably delay the rapid mobilization of Army National Guard units.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
4	35	27	60	14

50. The Regular Army Capstone/Roundout Headquarters strive to make their National Guard Capstone/Roundout units an important part of their command.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
3	25	39	68	6

51. The more knowledge Army leaders have about the National Guard, the better their coordination with the Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
0	6	5	91	38

52. The more knowledge Army leaders have about the National Guard, the more they value the Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
0	14	27	79	21

53. National Guard Bureau has an adequate voice in force structure development.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
2	21	64	39	12

54. Active Army personnel have to be more involved with the Army National Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
2	10	21	73	34

55. The greatly increased warning time of conventional conflict in Europe increasingly allows the heavy armor mission to be shifted to the Army National Guard.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5
34	59	18	24	5

56. As compared with the Active Army, how much influence does the National Guard exert with the United States Congress?

<u>100</u>	<u>Much more</u> than Active Army
<u>30</u>	A little <u>more</u> than Active Army
<u>7</u>	About <u>the same</u> as Active Army
<u>4</u>	A little <u>less</u> than Active Army
<u>0</u>	<u>Much less</u> than Active Army

=====

V. Comment Section:

57. What can be done to improve the "One Army" concept?

- INCLUDE THE RESERVE COMPONENT IN TRAINING EXERCISES
- MORE FORMAL EDUCATION ON THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENTS
- INCLUDE THE RESERVE COMPONENTS IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING
- COMMON STANDARDS APPLIED
- BETTER EVALUATION OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS

58. What should the Active Army reasonably expect from the Army National Guard?

- MISSION PERFORMANCE
- TRAINED TO STANDARD
- PROFESSIONALISM
- DEPLOYABILITY AFTER PRESCRIBED POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING

What should the Army National Guard reasonably expect from the Active Army?

EQUAL TREATMENT, TRAINING, AND EVALUATION TO STANDARDS
RESPECT FOR THE UNIQUE RESERVE COMPONENT ENVIRONMENT
TREATED PROFESSIONALLY
A TRAINED AND READY FORCE
REALISTIC READINESS REPORTING

60. Comments:

Thank you for your time and attention.
Please return the completed questionnaire to COL Cooch, Box 82.

Optional, if you would like a copy of the results,
please fill in the following information.

Name: _____
Box No.: _____

ENDNOTES

1. General Dennis Reimer, U.S. Army, address to Annual AUSA Meeting, 13 October 1991, Washington, D.C.
2. General Carl E. Vuono, U.S. Army, FM 22-100 Military Leadership (Washington, D.C.: 31 July 1990), i.
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5. Major Jimmy Jones, U.S. Army, Reserve Component Training Enhancement, briefing at Armor Update Conference, November 1991, Ft. Knox, KY.
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7. U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Memorandum for Desert Shield/Storm Lessons Learned General Officer Steering Committee (Fort Leavenworth, KS.: 2 August 1991), K-1.
8. Ibid., K-2.
9. General Gordon R. Sullivan, U.S. Army, "Sullivan Imperative: No Compromise on Soldier Quality," The Army Times (28 October 1991), 16.
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11. U.S. Army Forces Command (FCJ3), "Reserve Components Enhancements (Bold Shift) Milestones," message (152339Z Oct 91), 2.
12. Ibid., 4-12.
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14. U.S. Department of the Army, Reserve Components Training Development Action Plan (Washington, D.C.: 18 May 1989), 2-3.

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16. U.S. Army Forces Command (FCJ3), "Reserve Components Enhancements (Bold Shift) Milestones," message (152339Z Oct 91), 5.

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20. Greg Seigle, "Army Sticks to its Guns on Training," The Army Times (23 December 1991), 20.

21. Greg Seigle, "Plan Would Make Time for Schooling," The Army Times (27 January 1992), 20.

22. U.S. Army War College, Army Command and Management - Theory and Practice, 1991-1992 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 19 August 1991), 21-48.

23. Don M. Snider and Benjamin Ederington, "Debating Defense Cuts," The Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta Constitution (8 September 1991), Viewpoints page.

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