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
RETHINKING U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN CENTRAL ENROPE:

KEEPING THE QUILLS ON THE POLISH PORCUPINE

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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For nearly a half century following the Second World War, U.S. military policy in Europe was utterly clear: to maintain a strong deterrent force, especially in West Germany, in order to block Soviet and Warsaw Pact aggression against the Western democracies. Several generations of American military personnel transferred in and out of West Germany with the feeling that our forward defense, under NATO's flag, arrayed against Soviet and Warsaw Pact military power would go on forever.

Beginning in the late 1980s, however, political events in the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact dramatically ended our longstanding assumptions and beliefs regarding East-West relationships. Mikhail Gorbachev, recognizing the deepening economic and spiritual crisis of Communism, transformed Soviet strategy in Europe from confrontation to cooperation. Under a foreign policy characterized as "New Thinking," Gorbachev announced unilateral troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, agreed to negotiate force levels from the Atlantic to the Urals, and disavowed forcible intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The Warsaw Pact countries were allowed to redefine their own political, economic and military policies. In mere months, the Soviet "bloc" dissolved, Germany reunited and one East European country after another swept away fossilized ruling hierarchies, replacing them with new leadership, mostly popular, democratic and reformist.¹

Because Europe's numerous and complex political, economic and military problems have for so long been overshadowed by East-West tensions, any one of the aforementioned changes could have resulted

in major reconsideration of Western policies. The great number of changes and their breathtaking speed have instead produced a "European nova," in which the old constellations have exploded and their fragments are now in search of new orbits. In Europe there are shared beliefs that the new order should be cooperative, collective and interdependent. Translating those beliefs into real institutions capable of controlling the new relationships, however, is another matter not easily agreed upon. In the absence of shared threats, the tendency is for each European country to seek its own interests first. The challenge for the U.S. in this fractured environment is to rethink traditional policies and adjust them to fit the new realities of Europe.

New European Collective Security

Nowhere is the conflict between separate interests and shared needs in Europe more evident than in the area of collective security. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, "democratic" Europe has shifted eastward. Polish, Czech and Hungarian political and economic structures now have much more in common with the fifteen NATO countries than they do with the Soviet Union and their former Warsaw Pact allies.² Unfortunately, their security needs do not coincide with NATO'S middle-aged sense of identity.

For over forty years NATO, the political and military manifestation of the North Atlantic Alliance, has provided the foundation for West European security. It must be remembered, however, that NATO did not coalesce until after the 1948 Berlin

crisis and only gained true resolve in 1955 with the admittance of West Germany and the simultaneous founding of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, the question of Germany has been the central issue bolstering NATO unity. With Germany united and the Warsaw Pact dissolved, NATO finds itself ill-structured to deal with the new collective security threats to new Europe, which could variously be described as the danger of East European economic collapse, Soviet instability, interethnic disputes, nationalist unrest and spillover dangers from outside areas such as the Middle East.³

There was initial hope that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would be able to provide a new security framework for a new Europe, but it is on even less solid footing than NATO. CSCE encompasses all nations involved in the old East-West confrontation in a thirty-four-member deliberative body with equal representation. It can come to agreement only at the very lowest of common denominators and would have even less unity should a resurgent USSR begin to reassert herself militarily. At best, the CSCE is valuable as a forum to air grievances and to resolve mutually beneficial politico-military and arms control issues.⁴

Many Europeans now feel that the nine member Western European Union (WEU) could shoulder Europe's security burden, while political and economic policies could be formulated by the twelve member European Community (EC). It is true that this arrangement involves smaller and more cohesive memberships, but the two organizations are incompatible. For example, the EC contains

neutral Ireland. The WEU, presaging NATO by a year, was originally established by the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries to counter a potentially revanchist Germany, but quickly added members and refocused on the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, as witnessed by its inability to coordinate out of area operations in the Persian Gulf War, the WEU has no teeth and therefore may only be a temporary fix to the possibly insoluble problem of comprehensive collective security in new Europe.⁵

U.S. Security Interests in Europe

The U.S. is accustomed to conducting its affairs in Europe by multilateral relations through NATO. NATO has been a familiar institution by which all U.S. policies on Europe have been measured against for the last forty years. Therefore we cling to it, unable to believe that the common threat has changed.⁶ But even if Gorbachevian reforms in the Soviet Union fail and "imperial" Russia returns to hegemonic ways, the fact of the matter is that NATO will still be unstable. The calculus of Europe has irrevocably changed and a half-century of bipolar paradigms and allied war plans must be consigned to the archives.

This is not to wish the hasty demise of NATO or to suggest we prematurely abandon it. The grand alliance still has value and should hold together at least until the last Soviet tank passes back into Soviet territory, presumably by 1994. However, U.S. policy makers must bring themselves to realize that U.S. influence in NATO is already diminished to a more representational role and

will further fade as U.S. theater forces are drawn down. Even if a major confrontation brings on "Cold War II," the U.S. must find additional ways to pursue its European interests.

Current U.S. policy in Europe is to follow a patchwork approach of supporting NATO, the CSCE and other multinational organizations toward building political stability and economic prosperity for the region. But because European defense issues defy clarification at this time, our security policies remain murky and disjointed. Generally speaking, we want fragile NATO and the broad-based CSCE to represent our interests in Europe. We support the democratic reforms in the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany, but wish neither country to play too great a political or military role in the region. Finally, we support the fledgling democratic institutions and market economies of East European countries and want them drawn into Europe proper, but are disinclined to let them join NATO. Yet, President Bush has declared: "We do not want to see Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary off in some kind of no-man's land."⁷

The Central Problem is Central Europe

If we objectively analyze the current state of affairs in the region, we arrive at the conclusion that for long term security in Europe, there are two "problem" countries: Germany and the Soviet Union - Germany because of her waxing power and the Soviet Union because of her waning power. For a thousand years, the Germanic and Great Russian tribes have struggled with each other for

dominance in the area and have fought countless wars of territorial aggression. It is true that modern Germany and the Soviet Union have cooperated when it was convenient to do so, such as the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo and the 1939 Nonaggression Pact, but more often than not throughout history, the Germanic and Russian nations have tried to conquer and make vassal states out of one another. It is true that both countries have undergone significant change in the postwar era and the immediate prospect of confrontation between them seems dim. Nevertheless, if viewed from the perspective of history, the German-Russian relationship in the "New World Order" returns as the most vitally important issue related to overall European stability and security.

Between the Germans and the Russians lie the emerging democracies of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Freed by the "European nova" from the gravitational pull of the Soviet Union, they are seeking new orbits.⁸ Although their societies have tendencies toward one-party rule, due in part to relatively late industrialization and nineteenth century suppression of their burgeoning middle classes by the Romanov and Hapsburg dynasties, Poles, Czechs and Hungarians are making serious attempts toward establishing true parliamentary governments. And though there is much to be done in the region to modernize industries and clean up the damages incurred during the postwar period of "perfecting socialism," the three countries are on the pathway to establishing self-sustaining market economies.⁹

After the "withering away" of the Warsaw Pact dictatorship and

finding themselves unable to join NATO, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are adrift among great powers without security guarantees. Their first inclination is to look to themselves for protection and recent agreements on mutual cooperation are harbingers of a possible "Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact." But as they strive to build a collective security framework of their own, they will find that the circumstances of three medium powers with ethnic differences in a linear north-south geographical disposition are not conducive to establishing their own security zone.

Geostrategically, Poland is under greatest threat. As the main branch of the Western Slavs, the Polish nation rose to become a great European power and, in alliance with Lithuania, was an early example of relative political freedom and religious tolerance. Poland gradually weakened and finally yielded to three successive partitions by Prussia, Russia and Austria in the eighteenth century. In the aftermath of the First World War, Poland regained sovereignty, supported by President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Poland fought nascent Soviet Russia to a standstill from 1919 to 1920 in a border dispute and then succumbed to the Nazi onslaught in 1939. At the decision of Allied powers at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945, Polish borders were literally moved away from traditional territories in the east, the so-called post-World War I "Curzon Line" (named for Britain's Lord Curzon), westward at the expense of traditional Prussian territories. There she remains, a proud and cohesive nation, suspended uneasily between the Baltic Sea in the north, the

Carpathian Mountains of Czechoslovakia in the south, the Russians in the east and the Germans in the west. Poland is the main line of communication between her two powerful neighbors for political intrigue, economic desires and war plans.¹⁰

Soviet Regional Interests

Under the slogan of a "Common European Home," Gorbachev redirected Soviet policy in Europe away from the explicit and implied threats of the Brezhnev era to declarations that the Soviet Union desires to be a cooperative European partner. This "New Thinking" calls for political means rather than military force to solve regional disputes and declares the primacy of individual and states rights. In the area of national security, the Soviets have altered the political-social aspects of their military doctrine to include concepts such as reasonable sufficiency, defensive strategies and the pursuit of war prevention as a military goal. Since the mid-1980s, Soviet political, economic and military representatives have actively pursued cooperation with pan-European organizations such as the CSCE. In the Soviet view, "Security for Europe, above all, should also be security for the Soviet Union."¹¹

At the same time, there can be little doubt that in this "Common European Home," the Soviets have more in mind for themselves than a one room Moscow-style apartment. In spite of its current preoccupation with internal economic matters, the Soviet Union (or whatever name she chooses to call herself), by virtue of her vast resources, large population, dominance of the Eurasian

land mass and possession of nuclear weapons, will remain a global power. Sooner or later, the Soviet Union will again cast its formidable gaze toward traditional areas of confrontation and expansion, such as the Far East, Turkey and Central Europe. This could come with or without Gorbachev's ouster and the most sensitive area is the former alliance to the west. As the liberal Foreign Minister of the Russian Republic, Andrei Kozyrev, warns: "If the forces of darkness prevail in the Soviet Union, Central Europe is next on their agenda."¹²

We may already be witnessing a major correction in the Soviet mood swing as conservatives and major military figures publicly blame Gorbachev's former reformers, such as previous Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, for "losing" the former Warsaw Pact countries. The recent military crackdown in the Baltic republics, major disputes on the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and refusals to pull out all of the 50,000 man strong Northern Group of Forces from Poland until 1993 or later are seen by many as outward signs of the end of the current phase of internal Soviet reforms. In a step backward for "glasnost," the main Soviet evening television news program, Vremya (Time), has reverted to blaming interference by foreign governments for Soviet problems."¹³

Soviet-Polish relations are now particularly strained. In a recent Red Star interview, the bellicose commander of the Soviet forces in Poland, General-Colonel Viktor Dubynin, complains of the behavior of Polish government officials. They wanted his troops

to stay prior to the unification of Germany (to ensure the integrity of their western border) and then demanded that they leave immediately afterward, with subsequent "provocative" attempts to charge the Soviet Union for damage to the environment and transit routes. Other Soviet military spokesmen criticize the Poles for beginning military exercises against an "eastern opponent" before the ink was dry on the agreement to dissolve the Warsaw Pact.¹⁴

It is difficult to predict what kind of behavior will be involved with a "post-glasnost/perestroika" Soviet Union. While there is general agreement that there cannot be a return to Stalinist socialism, the Soviet populace has changed too much for that, the USSR may not be as good a neighbor to the rest of Europe as she is at present and may seek greater control over eastern Poland to buttress Soviet national security.¹⁵ The Gorbachev government is currently tormented over the potential loss of the Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia with their electronics industries and seaports. If the Baltic republics achieve independence and Soviet troops pull out of Poland, Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg, the capital of East Prussia) and its surrounding piece of the Russian Republic will be physically isolated from Mother Russia. And when Soviet troops pull back from eastern Germany and Poland, the Soviets will lose control of the main east-west military axis to Germany, the thought of which strikes neuralgic fear in Russians who have had to fight the Germans twice in this century alone. Gorbachev, understanding the

severity of these issues all too well, made an emotional appeal to a visiting Polish delegation in April 1991: "History has given us many problems, but we must not forget that we remain neighbors and slaves."¹⁶

German Regional Interests

With unification, Germany has become the most economically, and therefore most politically, powerful country in Europe. Chancellor Helmut Kohl, barely staying ahead of a unification process which had its own inertia, orchestrated the incorporation of seventeen million segregated Germans and their eastern lands, including prized Berlin, into a united Germany without having to relinquish the security of membership in NATO.¹⁷ Part of the price for this achievement was a pledge to Gorbachev for economic assistance in the orderly and phased removal of the former Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (now Western Group of Forces) by 1994. Although Kohl's government is finding it temporarily difficult to "swallow" eastern Germany, most analysts agree that Germany will be able to manage and control its economic future, and Europe's for that matter.¹⁸

Like the Soviet Union, Germany is now preoccupied with "materialism" rather than nationalism or socialism. In other words, Germany is currently focused inward on economic matters. But also like the Soviet Union, Germany will inevitably reappraise relations with surrounding countries. It should not be forgotten that modern Germany united in 1871 after a succession of wars with

its neighbors, that blundering German diplomatic activity was a contributing cause of World War I and German nationalist-driven territorial expansion was the primary cause of World War II.¹⁹

As the German armed forces transition from NATO's "Forward Defense" positions to guarding German borders, they will be guarding an artificial eastern border: the Oder-Neisse Line imposed by the Allies at the end of the World War II. There are many Germans still alive who with longing remember living in the Prussian territories of Poland.²⁰ And these same people are not an insignificant portion of the German electorate, as testified by politically expedient and vague public remarks concerning ownership of these lands made by Chancellor Kohl in the 1989 federal elections. Admittedly, the Two Plus Four (the two Germanies and the four World War II Allies) Accords paving the way for German unification stipulated, at Polish insistence, that Germany and Poland guarantee the integrity of their border. Consequently, a formal treaty to this effect was signed between the two countries in late 1990.²¹

Few treaties, however, last forever. The current trend in Europe is to increase economic interdependence and to break down political barriers, which is causing tension along the Oder-Neisse border. When Germany recently dropped entry visa requirements for Poles, old habits returned. Several hundred neo-Nazis shouted "Germany for Germans!" and pelted the first busloads of Polish shoppers with stones.²² Die Zeit editor Theo Sommer worries over his new fellow countrymen who have not experienced forty-five years

of West German federalism: "They're more xenophobic than we are, condescending and even offensive to Poles and Russians. The priority here is not to get back on the nationalist track."²³

The danger to Poland from Germany, however, is not from military force but from economic absorption. The new German expansionism will most likely be directed into Silesia, where a large number of ethnic Germans still inhabit this once, and potentially future, powerful industrial area. Already, Germans are buying up properties in a form of "soft irredentism."²⁴ It is not inconceivable that Silesia and other portions of western Poland may soon be under greater control from the banks of Frankfurt than from the Polish Government in Warsaw. Poland may once again be divided up into German and Russian spheres of influence.

Polish Regional Concerns

As Western Slavs who joined the Roman Catholic community in 966, blocked the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century and (in the Polish view) saved a weakened Europe from the Red Army at the "Miracle of the Vistula" defense of Warsaw in 1920, the Poles resent what they see as Western rejection and lack of full recognition of their status as a European partner. They have foreboding that the great powers of Europe will ultimately sacrifice Polish sovereignty and independence as they have for most of the last three hundred years. Many in the West try to dismiss these fears as "typical" Polish paranoia, but vague hopes for a peaceful new Europe are little comfort to the yet mournful

relatives of the victims of the combined German and Soviet invasions, the Nazi death camps and the Soviet massacre of the Polish officer corps at Katyn Forest. After surviving postwar Soviet rule with its periodic brutal suppressions, the Poles fear that by not being quickly incorporated into the EC and NATO, there is nothing to prevent the Germans and Russians from signing secret protocols to treaties subordinating Poland as they did in 1939.²⁵

The feeling of the Germans and Russians "dealing over their heads" returned to Poles during the Soviet-German troop withdrawal deliberations, which did not include Polish representatives. The Soviets consider it unnecessary to consult with the Poles over the movement of troops through Poland or what forces are positioned at Soviet bases on Polish soil. For example, the Poles learned only recently that until the first half of 1990 the Soviets had positioned nuclear weapons in their country.²⁶

Envious of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, who will be free of Soviet occupation forces by the end of 1991, Poland is concerned that Soviet troops and tanks returning from Germany will stop and remain with the Northern Group of Forces on Polish territory. The 1956 Soviet-Polish Treaty, forced on Poland after her violent uprising against Moscow rule, authorizes Soviet troops to be stationed "temporarily" in Poland, but has no force limitations or expiration date. The new Polish government has forced the issue and the Soviets have responded by moving up the evacuation of units already scheduled to withdraw, but refusing to pull completely out until the end of 1993. Polish parliamentarian Bronislaw Geremek,

speaking for his countrymen, reminds all concerned that: "Poland is a sovereign nation and only Poland can decide about who stays in its territory and in what way."²⁷

In spite of all her difficulties, Poland is working hard at building democratic institutions and transitioning to a market economy. The Poles first adopted a democratic constitution in 1921, but slow social change and poor economic growth weakened the government until it fell to Marshal Pilsudski's one-man rule. Lech Walesa, Solidarity (the trade union-social movement hybrid), and the Catholic church seem to be holding the country together during this drive toward democracy.²⁸ Meanwhile, the Polish economy is being given International Monetary Fund aid and the U.S. and West European governments have forgiven more than half of the \$48.5 billion Polish external debt. Polish economic policies have established a stock exchange, ended hyperinflation, filled stores with food and produced a multi-billion dollar trade surplus. High unemployment, bankruptcies and an enormous need to modernize industry remain, but the new government is so far providing the leadership necessary to guide Poland through these delicate times.²⁹

If the central problem of Europe is Central Europe, then the central problem of Central Europe is Poland. She is an ethnically distinct nation who for centuries has resisted assimilation into the cultures and controls of her Germanic and Russian neighbors. Poland is the key to stability in Central Europe and must be allowed to stay sovereign. If she becomes weak, as history shows,

Germany and Russia will rush in to gain geostrategic advantage, resulting in insurrection or war.

Keeping the Quills on the Polish Porcupine

If the proud Poles will excuse the irreverence, the perfect symbol for Poland is not her traditional emblem of the heroic eagle, but the admirable porcupine. The porcupine is a peaceful animal desiring to live in harmony with others. However, should a larger animal attack it from any direction, the porcupine can defend itself with pain-inducing quills, convincing the aggressor that the prize is not worth the cost.

Because Poland cannot be included in anything more than the most general European security discussions or relatively small cooperative efforts with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, she will need assistance in keeping her "quills." In the past, Britain and France have extended treaties to her, but Poland does not need dangerous balance of power maneuverings or war-provoking security guarantees. Poland needs a stability-producing military-to-military relationship with the U.S.

In the wake of warming U.S.-Soviet relations in the late 1980s, the U.S. and Poland established military-to-military contacts. Based on the U.S.-Soviet model, relations with Poland have involved well-publicized events such as U.S. Navy port calls and appeared to culminate in the December 1990 visit by the American Secretary of Defense. These activities have been beneficial, but more are needed. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet military-

to-military relationship, which is limited to easing tensions and increasing mutual understanding, a vigorous U.S.-Polish military-to-military relationship is necessary to directly support U.S. and European security interests by protecting Polish political and economic progress.

But before describing what this robust relationship should be, it is prudent to state what it should not be. The U.S.-Polish military-to-military relationship should not: be a treaty requiring the U.S. to go to war if Poland is attacked, involve stationing American fighting forces on Polish territory, or include any activity which could reasonably be seen by either Germany or the Soviet Union as a provocative threat to their security. The idea is not to forge precarious treaties or build more walls, but to strengthen security in the region.

The U.S.-Polish military-to-military relationship should be an open and visible centerpiece of U.S. security policy in Central Europe. U.S. policy makers for Europe must allow an exception to their multilateral bias and make this a bilateral complement to U.S. support of NATO, the CSCE and other multinational European institutions. Psychologically, this should not be too difficult for Americans to accept, as the two countries have close ethnic and cultural ties. On their part, the Poles know that strong U.S. support for democratic movements has been a major factor in the restoration of democratic processes in Poland and are eager for increased U.S. assistance of any type.

High visibility U.S.-Polish reciprocal visits should be

carried further, but more fundamental military assistance is needed. As the Polish military reorients itself from defending socialism to defending the Polish constitution, it will need to change the education and preparation of its officer corps and rewrite its doctrines and strategies. During the postwar period, the Polish military has been a mirror image of the Soviet military. In the new Polish defense structure, however, a Western style civilian Minister of Defense will be answerable to the President and the "Sejm" (parliament). Therefore, Poland needs officers who are citizens as well as technical military specialists, who receive broad education not found in Soviet-style military schools. A primary and ongoing U.S. initiative should be to provide the Polish military schools and academies with accurate historical documents and course materials. Faculty and students should be exchanged, at least on a temporary basis, to cement the bridge.

Exchanges of views and information are also needed in nonsensitive operational fields. The Polish military will require assistance in developing defensive strategies, operations and tactics for a small standing army and a territorial militia capable of immediate call-up. To the greatest extent possible, information should be exchanged on regional force capabilities and the intentions of Poland's neighbors.

As they move away from Soviet military doctrine and its reliance on mass over technology, Polish military leaders will find it necessary to modernize their armaments, or "quills," much the same way neutral Sweden, Switzerland and Austria have done.

Although Polish industries are now undergoing painful overhaul to catch up with the rest of Europe, Poles in the past have shown great skill in producing quality weapons and there is every reason to believe that indigenous arms manufacturing could return in force. This must be supported in order to gradually wean the Poles away from reliance on Soviet military equipment, but care should be taken not to dismantle too early those Soviet-style practices and processes, such as maintenance and supply methods, which work well enough for the present.

A key role in successful territorial defense in the modern age is played by high technology air defense, involving weapon systems which medium powers are usually not capable of producing. To be a credible "porcupine," Poland must be able to defend her skies with missiles and aircraft. Consideration should be given in the future to supplying Poland with defensive missiles such as the Stinger and Patriot systems. The question of interceptor aircraft is much more complicated. Poland's aging MiGs are susceptible to Soviet supply interference and the Poles understand that a country should never own a weapon system that is spare parts dependent upon a potential adversary. Supplying Poland with a modern Western interceptor such as the F-16, however, which also has offensive capability, may be too provocative for the region at the present time. Perhaps an interim step could be U.S. assistance in updating the electronics and armament on Polish MiGs. Eventually, U.S.-Polish cooperative efforts might be able to produce an interceptor capable of meeting the air threat, but at an affordable cost and

within the bounds of German-Soviet sensitivities.

As noted above, there will be obstacles to overcome in establishing a solid military-to-military relationship with Poland. And, it will not be a panacea for all security problems in Central Europe. The need for U.S. bilateral security support to Poland, however, is clearly evident. Without increased territorial security, Poland will become increasingly vulnerable. If Poland is perceived as weak, its democratic government will falter and foreign investment and trade will decrease. A defenseless Poland will bring nothing but trouble to Central Europe, ending the marvelous gains of the past decade; but a Poland with many "quills" on its back may stabilize the region for decades to come.

Notes

1. For analysis of the conditions leading up to Gorbachev's change in policy toward Eastern Europe, see chapters nine and ten of Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, 3rd Ed. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1988).

2. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would like to be members of the European Community (EC), but they are not ready and have not been invited to be part of the pending Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Further, the EC is undergoing an identity crisis of its own: see "Reshaping the EC: At the Top of the Slope," The Economist, December 8, 1990, p.17.

3. Sir Michael Howard, "Military Grammar and Political Logic: Can NATO Survive If Cold War is Won?," NATO Review, December 1989, p.7 and Michael Mecham, "Reduced Threat, Budgets Driving NATO to New Strategy as Europe Tries to Unify," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 18, 1991, p.66.

4. Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO's Future in a New Europe: An American Perspective," International Affairs, 63.3, 1990, p.495.

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7. The quotation is from President Bush's speech in Prague, in "CFE Treaty Realigns Forces Among Warsaw Pact Forces," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 26, 1990, p.26. The President reemphasized U.S. political and economic support for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in his address to the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, April 13, 1991.

8. On the postwar dominance of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, see chapters three and four of Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, Ed., Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984).

9. East European transitions to democratic institutions and market economies are not being made without problems. See Rod Nordland, "Learning to Breathe Free," Newsweek, April 30, 1990, p.38.

10. Abraham Brumberg, Ed., Poland (New York: Vintage Books, 1983) and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1981).

11. Quote from M. Zheglov, "Varshavskii dogovor i bezopasnost' Evropy," Krasnaya Zvezda, February 22, 1991, 3. For a comprehensible analysis of current Soviet external relations, see Robert Legvold, Gorbachev's Foreign Policy (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1988).

12. Charles Gati, "Central Europe is Scared," New York Times, February 14, 1991, p.A19.

13. Serge Schmemmann, "Envoy Assails Soviet TV for Scapegoating U.S.," New York Times, March 22 1991, p.A3.

14. The Dubynin interview is in A. Belousov and A. Bugai, "Voiska ukhodyat iz Pol'shi," Krasnaya Zvezda, April 9, 1991, p.3. The "eastern opponent" complaint is in V. Petrukhin, "U Pol'shi novyi protivnik," Krasnaya Zvezda, March 2, 1991, p.2.

15. On the current transformation of the Soviet Union, see Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1988) and Martin Walker, The Waking Giant: Gorbachev's Russia (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

16. "Gorbachev prinyal prem'er-ministra Pol'shi," Novoe Russkoe Slovo, April 5, 1991, p.5.

17. A. James McAdams, "An Obituary for the Berlin Wall," World Policy Journal, Spring 1990, p.357.

18. Ferdinand Protzman, "Germany Sees Sharp Downturn," New York Times, March 18, 1991, p.C1.
19. David Childs, Germany Since 1918 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp.72-107 and George N. Shuster and Arnold Bergstraesser, Germany: A Short History (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1944), pp.90-114)
20. John Tagliabue, "Plucky Countess Visits the Ghosts of Prussia," New York Times, December 12, 1990, p.A4.
21. Stephen Engelberg, "Poland and Germany Sign Border Guarantee Pact," New York Times, November 15, 1990, p.A6.
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24. Observation made by Dr. Peter K. Breit of The University of Hartford after a November 1990 visit through Germany.
25. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, "The Nazi-Soviet Pacts: A Half-Century Later," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1989, pp.175-189.
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