The V-22 Osprey: Phoenix or Albatross
Abstract
Any debate about national security and military strategies becomes strident and tense when the subject of 'interest groups' is introduced. Interest groups are regarded by many as sinister or troublesome entities bent on group satisfaction even at the expense of the greater good of the nation. The idea that elements as important as national security or military strategy could be materially influenced by the vagaries of interest groups is unacceptable to many military leaders. However, regardless of existing sensibilities, interest groups are a fact of American life. In many cases, such as in defense procurement, interest groups directly affect military decisions and concomitantly, they contribute to the definition of our national military strategy. This paper examines how interest groups exercise their power and influence through mechanisms like the 'iron triangle of defense' and political action committees (PACs). Through a case study of the V-22 osprey, the paper will analyze whether defense procurement decisions are simply obedient responses to direct interest group stimuli, or whether they are, in fact, rational decisions which have merely emerged from the synthesis of conflicting, contrasting, and irrational interests that routinely bombard the national political and military leadership. The paper also considers the importance of interest groups and PACs in the future and the relative increase or diminution of their influence given anticipated force reductions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 09, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA249599
Entities
People
- Stephen T. Johnson
Organizations
- United States Army War College