Strategic Warning--Strategic Myth

Abstract

Amidst the euphoria of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War came a realization that strategic warning of a Soviet or Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe had increased from tens of hours or a few days to weeks or even months. However, not everyone was quite as optimistic. Arguing against the position that the new longer warning scenarios would obviate the need for rapid response airlift, Commander-in Chief of USTRANSCOM, General H.T. Johnson stated, I'm not sure we will have the warning... Warning time in itself is uninteresting unless you make a decision TO MOBILIZE. Historically, we have not reacted to warning. (17:64) Having enough strategic warning is meaningless if the political decision makers who receive this warning do not (or cannot) respond within the warning time. Thus, these so-called intelligence failures are frequently, in fact, a lack of political decisions or failure to execute a meaningful response. According to a former Air Force Chief of Staff, this results in the military response time often being zero.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 01, 1991
Accession Number
ADA249626

Entities

People

  • Ronald A. Mccallum

Organizations

  • Air War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Cold War
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Deception
  • Economic Sanctions
  • Europe
  • Intergovernmental Organizations
  • International Organizations
  • National Security
  • New York
  • Personality
  • Second World War
  • Security
  • Strategic Warning
  • United States
  • War
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Emergency Management and Homeland Security.
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.