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**UNITED STATES FUTURE INVOLVEMENT IN INSURGENCY:
NO SIMPLE MODEL**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The United States has lived with a frustration of dealing with insurgent warfare during the cold war. While the focus on the enemy was simple, we never did very well in uncomfortable little wars. When it appeared the Soviets or their surrogates were involved, we weighed in against them and at least showed our resolve. The search for "the new world order" makes it not so simple now. It would be nice to have an uncomplicated model to signal when insurgents were about to win so we could save the day. However, in today's world such a model misses the point. A holistic approach to U.S. involvement is presented that includes in the framework national interests, strategy, policy, and a set of criteria that ask whether we should be involved at all. A refocusing of our bureaucratic institutions is also necessary to insure an environment that fosters a unity of effort in preventing insurgencies that threaten our national interests. Both a pragmatic and a more radical change to our bureaucratic structures as possible solutions at the national and regional level are presented.

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INTRODUCTION

The threat of world communism is dead. Seething nationalism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is the replacement. The painful birth of capitalism and democracy is now beginning in emerging countries. The feeling is euphoric, but the experience is chaotic. Add the frictions of recurring religious fundamentalism, regional conflicts, rising despots, drug traffic, and economic crises and you have the formula for continuous conflict. Grinding conflict will shatter the dream of a democratic and economically sound family of nations living in peace. To keep the dream alive the United States must reflect on its new role as the world's only superpower. One point to question is the relativity of United States' support to foreign governments embroiled in insurgency or internal conflict.

Since 1945, the United States' dominant criterion for supporting governments with insurgent problems was to challenge the Soviet's direct or indirect sponsorship of the rebels. Our intervention policy clearly followed the lines of U.S. - Soviet confrontation. We sought to ensure the "freedom" of governments friendly to the West. Some we won and some we lost. It seemed to us that life was simple when we had a clear purpose in keeping the tentacles of communism from strangling the free world. It's not so simple now.

Though a clear picture of "the new world order" has not emerged, it is apparent the focus of the old Soviet Union will be decidedly internal over the next decade. As a result, one would

think that as the sponsor wrestles with internal struggles of its own, we would see a decline in the armed internal conflict of other nations. Unfortunately all signs point to even greater chances for insurgencies and violent internal disputes. Over half of Third World countries have authoritarian governments. Those that call themselves democracies have weak, fragile governments. One third of the developing world is suffering economic regression. The world population explosion, especially in the underdeveloped world is out of control. Adding to the danger, we see a rising proliferation of modern weapons and the tendency to use force to achieve political goals.¹

United States military strategic planners see the likelihood of conflict increasing. The reason is due to a variety of factors. One is the pent-up release of smoldering ethnic hatreds, as we now see between Serbs and Croats. Another is the increased awareness and raised expectations of the "have nots" due to the communication technologies that vividly accent the differences between rich and poor.²

Though we see democracy on the rise, the process of changing from authoritarian governments is proving itself inherently unstable.³ The evidence shows that whatever else the new world order brings, with it comes a load of disorder. It will be in the United States' interest as well as our moral responsibility to minimize the turmoil of change where we can.

There is, however, a gap in the ability of the United States to intervene in the counter-insurgencies of other countries.

Likewise, we are inept at supporting insurgencies attempting to overthrow oppressive governments. There are reasons this is so. We have no national strategy that deals with the complexities of insurgent conflict. The multi-threat, multi-scenario, and multi-agency environment is too much to handle. We also have a tendency to view all conflict in the same way. Low intensity conflict is the same as high intensity conflict minus the mass destruction weapons.⁴ Further, we tend to commit totally or not at all. Some have blamed our reluctance for involvement in the affairs of others on the Vietnam syndrome. It is really our experience with World War II that weighs on us. It produced the necessity for our near total commitment to war.⁵ We must break the mold.

The United States must adopt two courses of action to meet adequately the conflict challenges through the beginning of the next century. One is an analytical tool to guide our response to countries beset with insurgencies and internal conflict that clearly threaten U.S. national interest. The second is to adopt changes in our bureaucratic structures that allow productive unity of effort. Someone must take the lead.

A model that tries to predict for us the success or failure of an insurgency is not adequate today. It does not consider the broader picture. The single biggest reason we were involved in any counter-insurgency is gone. The situations now are more complex. There are too many variables to build a model to guide precisely the actions of the United States.⁶ We need an holistic approach to a framework from which the United States can address conflict

prevention and resolution. The approach presented here will address four levels of framework construction. First, is a review and assessment of U.S. national interest in this era without other superpower competition. With an understanding of national interest, a national security strategy that considers all elements of national power is put in place. The third level of the framework is an analysis of policy development to support the national strategy. Finally, the frame is completed with a set of criteria for intervention.

Frameworks to guide analysis and action are numerous. Many can work while there is a clear focus on the goal. It was relatively easy for our bureaucracies to remain focused when the Soviet Union was our clear adversary. It is not so clear today. Who is the adversary? There are several possibilities and gone is the clarity of our focus . The simplicity of our objective provided the beacon for action and it was difficult for any to drift off course. The critical element missing in these foggy times is our clear objective. The complexities of the world today and our changing role makes our external challenges very diverse. We need a system that assures focus. Our bureaucracies have to change the way they do business. Two possible solutions are examined.

UNITED STATES INTERESTS

The implications of who, when, and how we support insurgencies

or counterinsurgencies are great. To maintain our credibility as a World power, the United States must be successful meeting the direct and indirect challenges to our security interests.⁷ We also have four core interests that say much about our national character. They are homeland defense, economic well being, international order, and democratic values.⁸ President Bush in his Aspen, Colorado speech on August 2, 1990 emphasized our role in a policy of peacetime engagement. It is as important to our interests and ideals as any commitment to conflict we made during the cold war, maybe more.⁹ Our National Security Strategy signed by the President in August 1991 more specifically spells out our interests in the 1990's. It commits the U.S. to "Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations" and "A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish."¹⁰ Because we are, like it or not, the single remaining superpower, our obligation is to advance our stated interests.¹¹

Our stated commitment, however, is inconsistent with a perceived cultural bias to stay out of other peoples' business. Equally inconsistent, it would seem somehow we often manage to get involved in other peoples' business anyway. When we have been involved, however, it seldom turns out the way we wanted and further reinforces a stand off attitude. The confusion between commitment and bias, along with our track record, highlights that insurgencies and low intensity conflict are not well understood. Even many in the military or political realms of our country, in

spite of our past experiences, are ignorant.¹² We continue to be uncomfortable with supporting insurgencies or governments even when many in the U.S. feel sympathetic to the issues. We are inept in dealing with the discretion and the finesse required in some operations.¹³ By example, recount the increased resolution of Congress and the strength of their debate to restrain the Executive Branch from further ill-advised adventures in supporting insurgency or counter-insurgency in Central America during the last decade.¹⁴ It is difficult to find any critical analysis that speaks highly of our past low intensity conflict policies. Neither are there many optimists that see any maturing of those policies in the near future. Yet, it is clear insurgent conflict in the world can threaten U.S. national interests. Stability and economic development of friendly nations are often in jeopardy. Thus, there is an impact on our economic well being. Insurgencies can produce hostile regimes that can provide bases or support to other hostile powers and insurgents. At risk are U.S. citizens and property. The refugees generated often flee to the United States and further burden our economy. The increase in narcotic trafficking is also a danger. Insurgents can use drug production and trafficking to fund their causes.¹⁵ The United States cannot ignore the risks.

We now sit on a major policy dilemma. We have stated our interests and recognize the risks. Active support and protection of those interests will require significant energy in managing political and economic struggles throughout the world. These struggles have a high probability of becoming insurgencies or

violent internal conflicts. The criteria for becoming involved in the internal struggles of another country must support our stated national security interests. They must also support of our national character.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The economic well being of the United States is crucial to our national security. There is now strong political debate on how to regain a strong competitive economy. Some say we must be protectionist, even isolationist. Others say we cannot survive by pulling away from the rest of the world.¹⁶ The resulting outcome will define the degree that we will involve ourselves in low intensity conflict around the world. If the direction takes the nation farther into the international market place for our own survival, we must prepare to use political-military means to keep market places open and stable. United States' strategy has neither focused on the low end of the conflict spectrum¹⁷ nor a viable political-military policy to pull it together.

It may be obvious that the low end of the conflict spectrum poses a threat to United States national security. It was not until 1987, however, that we had any national security strategy to guide a policy for low intensity conflict. The first National Security Strategy of the United States, published as a result of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, included a section on low intensity

conflict. In that strategy were four elements of national power. They were political, economic, military, and informational policies to deal with low intensity conflict.¹⁸ To further illustrate our confused approach to low intensity conflict, it is interesting to note that the 1991 strategy drops what may be one of the more potent powers in dealing with insurgencies, the informational element of national power. Informational power in the 1991 strategy is hidden between the lines in a section that discusses our role in the contest of ideology and the nurturing of democracy.

In 1988 the same document does not specifically mention policies relating to any element of national power. Instead the approach is more ambiguous. Security assistance is touted as the most appropriate application of our military power in protecting friends from insurgencies. Also included as a possible United States' action is the support of selective resistance movements opposing oppressive regimes.¹⁹

Through 1989, the possible negative consequences suffered from unfriendly insurgencies related to the disadvantage we could suffer in relationship to the Soviet block. Soviet political-military gains were the concerns expressed to Congress by the Secretary of Defense in his 1989 Annual Report.²⁰ By 1990 we were in a new era that began the search for a "new world order."²¹ We had not found a consistent strategy to understand and deal with insurgency. Now, the playing field has totally changed and our search for a focused strategy must begin anew.

The new approach to our relations with the world is regional.

The latest published national security strategy spends an entire section on U.S. concerns from a regional perspective. The organization of the Department of Defense provides regional responsibility to five combatant CINCs thus emphasizing the regional focus. The design for our future base force provides the capabilities to meet regional contingencies rather than a specific threat. This theater perspective better suits reality.²² It only takes a quick examination of regions and their history of insurgency to understand the complexities of insurgent warfare. In the Middle East the Arab - Israeli struggle is the core issue. The Palestine homeland issue takes center stage.²³ Throughout the region from North Africa to Iran, there are Islamic fundamentalists in power or vying for power. Algeria, Sudan, Iran, and Libya are prominent examples of the impact of Islamic fundamentalism on the area and the world community.

Along with religious fundamentalism and the Israeli - Palestine issue, ethnic struggles are found all over the region. Continual friction with the Kurds affect Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Likewise, close by in the Horn of Africa ethnic struggle has a devastating effect. Somalia has disintegrated as a country because of internal conflict. Most consideration for the starving masses is overridden by the conflicts in Ethiopia.²⁴

In Sub-Saharan Africa, racial and ethnic struggles also impede the peaceful progress of nations. South Africa in particular is hindered in the transition to a modern democratic state by the weight of apartheid.

Tribal traditions are strong throughout the area. Loyalties to families and tribes often overshadow loyalty to young and fragile democratic governments in the region, increasing the chance for conflict.²⁵ These young African governments continue to mature and internal strife is a part of the consolidation of power.²⁶

Economic inequity forms the basis for most of the struggle in the Caribbean and Central America. Historically, the same has been true in South America with an added ingredient of political repression. Future conflict, though, may come the joining of internal frictions of economic inequity with the economic inequities developing between countries.²⁷ Drug trafficking is an additional factor as traditional suppliers of insurgent support have dried up. The drug trade has become an important new form of monetary support for rebel causes.

The Pacific Rim has long been an area of intense U.S. interest. For over a century there have been many examples from the Philippines to Vietnam. In the Philippines the issues range from land reform to unequal economic distribution. Even religious and ethnic factors are included in the southern provinces.²⁸ The Philippines are diverse, but cannot compare to the complexities of Indonesia. There are more than 350 different ethnic groups spread over 13,000 islands, making it the most geographically fragmented, ethnically diverse and culturally diffused society in Southeast Asia.²⁹ The Indonesian history of internal struggle is as complex as its society. Insurgencies fueled by idealistic communism, nationalism, religious extremism, and ethnic friction are all

present. Indonesia and the Philippines are contrasting examples. They show how the special characteristics of the Southeast Asia societies influence the socioeconomic distortions that are the basis for political violence throughout the region.³⁰

The brief descriptions above suggest that a regional approach to monitor insurgencies and their impact on our national interest is prudent. The regional focus on insurgencies supplements the regional focus of our national military strategy. However, we are still struggling to settle on a clear policy to make it work. During the Aspen speech in August 1990 the President stated we must pursue a policy of "peacetime engagement" in this new political era. Peacetime engagement seemed to be a good term to describe a policy to meet our strategy for national security in the future. The 1991 National Security Strategy does not mention the term. In its place is "engagement" used in the context of projecting our positive influence in distant regions by forward presence of military forces.³¹

There is evidence that suggests that our CINCs are embracing peacetime engagement. Engineer battalions deploy to Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to construct civic action projects rather than for military projects. United States' military personnel assist with medical supply distribution in Mongolia. These are just two examples. Those are exciting peace opportunities that involved military and political power as CINCs coordinated their actions with their political advisors and country teams.³²

Meanwhile, the Department of Defense has issued an edict that

erases "peacetime engagement" from its lexicon. The new term, for now, is "forward presence activities."³³ The change is illustrative of the continuing lack of focus on an effective policy or even what term to use to describe it.

Some may argue that the term is immaterial; it is the action that is the key. But, it is the policy name that sets the tone. Peacetime engagement obviously emphasizes our goal of maintaining peace and stability. It is much easier to picture the involvement of a broader base of agencies. The opportunity to employ effectively all elements of national power is increased. Maintaining the peace and protecting stability after the cold war is a challenge. We must know our objectives and how to pursue them. We cannot be everywhere, so where we are must count. Our current policy is too soft to meet the rigor of this challenging new era. Too much of our policy formulation has to do with funding strategy rather than national security strategy. We must develop a policy towards the prevention of conflict.

NEW POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Primarily, past policy for our involvement in insurgencies paralleled an overall policy for the containment of the Soviet Union and world communism. We supported regimes of countries facing communist insurgencies. Often these regimes were merely the lesser of two evils. Their only redeeming quality was their resistance to

communism. United States' policy makers believed that it was in our interest to support a current government rather than risk dealing with a new revolutionary government.³⁴

The national objectives in fact lead us to pursue a policy of peacetime engagement. The military must be aggressive in adapting to the political-military environment necessary for success. We know for certain that the size of our forces is shrinking significantly. The reserve components must play an integral role in all our missions. We must take every opportunity to exercise as much of our force as possible around the world. Peacetime engagement provides a multitude of opportunities.

Our military combat support, and in particular combat service support units, are perfect for peace projection missions. Using medical, engineering, transportation, quartermaster, water purification, civil affairs, and police units in direct or advisory assistance to nations or their militaries in humanitarian, civic, or security programs can sharpen unit skills and meet the needs of developing nations. Naval units could play an integral role in short term assistance and good will missions during port calls.

The benefits are many. Our units would exercise mobilization procedures. Units would work together in accomplishing missions associated with their wartime skills. We would gain familiarity with the areas and regions where we deployed and the supported countries would become more comfortable in working with our units. Our soldiers would be an example of the subordinate role of the military to civilian authority necessary in a democracy. By down

playing the U.S. role and emphasizing the supported government's part in planning and executing projects that benefit their people we would strengthen the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population, thereby increasing stability. Local workers, contractors, and businesses could benefit from the building of roads, schools, and medical facilities and other infrastructure requirements by providing much of the labor and materials necessary. Countries and their economies would be strengthened in this interactive process. Ensuring new democracies and politically leading nations toward democracy is the goal. The result is a more stable world where economic freedom has the environment to flourish.

Assistance programs in peacetime engagement are the keys to conflict and insurgency prevention. They are the essence of a forward presence doctrine for "the new world order." The remainder of operations in the low end of the conflict spectrum continue to be important. Rescue and recovery operations along with NEO and counter-terrorism are insurance for the safety of our citizens abroad. When called on, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions fulfill much of our responsibilities to the United Nations. Other contingency operations conducted against hostile nations to guarantee our national security interests are possible. A peacetime engagement policy with a strong assistance program will lessen the risk of these other low intensity operations.

There is a danger, however, with the forward presence philosophy of assistance. The exposure of our soldiers to possible

terrorist actions such as the Marines experienced in Lebanon is the most feared. We must assure that everyone involved clearly understands the situation in each country that we involve ourselves. The American people will not tolerate any more tragedies of the magnitude of the Lebanon experience.

Dangerous also is the possible perception of the American people that we are neglecting domestic issues while spending assistance dollars abroad. This domestic political danger reinforces the need to answer why we are going to involve ourselves in the troubles of other nations. The reality that in many cases the stability of other regions in the world can in fact assist in solving domestic problems related to economics by opening up new and stable markets. Additionally, stronger third world governments can better address the drug production and trafficking that impacts our society. The importance of tying interventions abroad with our national interests, including domestic interests, cannot be over emphasized.

In the new world order the United States must broaden her outlook of low intensity conflict. In the past we supported governments and insurgencies along lines connected to U.S. - Soviet confrontation. Those lines are now gone. A more mature set of criteria must be used in assessing whether we should step in to assist nations or insurgents around the world.

CRITERIA FOR INTERVENTION

Over the last thirty years a model to determine what made an insurgency successful was a matter of some pursuit. Such a tool would assist policy and decision makers in determining when and how we should respond to a friendly nation about to go under.

There have been several models, frameworks for analysis, or imperatives presented in an attempt to make us better in dealing with insurgent warfare. Most have done a more than adequate job in reviewing a multitude of conflicts from all over the world. They gleaned the important factors that would separate success from failure. There are a few common threads that link most of them together.³⁵

Legitimacy, external support, and unity of effort are included in some way in four of seven models developed most recently. Other factors like primacy of political effort, environment, or perseverance may have had much relevance, but appear less frequently in a model analysis.

These models may be more useful, perhaps, in analyzing conflict. They may be helpful in developing strategies if we intervene or provide support. They do not, however, assist in analyzing whether we should be involved at all. We must take more care in answering that question.

We are truly in a new era. There is reason for great euphoria. There is also reason for concern. Much of the Soviet - United States competition held in check otherwise unstable regions. It was

clear to us when to support nations suffering from instability through insurgency and internal conflict. If the Soviets or their surrogates supported an insurgency in any way, we saw it in our interests to oppose it in some fashion. We stepped in many times to support regimes that shared few of our true ideals save being anti-communist. During the Reagan years, we even began to support insurgencies trying to overthrow communist governments, as in Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

When the criteria for involvement was straight forward, our general experience with low intensity conflict has been painful, Vietnam being the most prominent example. Now, a new set of criteria is necessary that adds more variables and new dimensions. The national character remains hesitant to become involved in any foreign adventure that might require armed conflict or an inordinate amount of aid aimed at a military solution to political goals.

The criteria must realistically consider the possibilities of U.S. support of governments as well as the support to "freedom fighter" insurgencies. Our national interests and objectives are best served in a world where democracy and its ideals are secure and growing.³⁶ There are three broadly defined situations in which we might find ourselves measuring criteria to determine who, when, and how the U.S. will support a country or faction embroiled in internal conflict. The first is the support of a legitimate government challenged from within by its army, or externally supported elements. The second situation is the support of a people

repressed by an authoritarian or despotic government. The final situation is the support of a weak government incapable of controlling the international drug trade that paralyzes the nation. The criteria for intervention must apply to all three general situations.

The primary criterion is legitimacy. Our intervention must be seen by the American people as legitimate and in our clear interests. Legitimacy in this context should not be confused with the legitimacy of the government with whom we may be involved. While supported government legitimacy may be an important factor, here the legitimacy criterion is broader than recognizing the "legitimate" government in the context of international law. For U.S. involvement, the critical measure of legitimacy is against our stated objective of a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.³⁷ The result of an examination of the legitimacy of our proposed intervention will be a clearly stated and attainable political and, if necessary, military objective.

Our first priority in foreign policy is maintaining the solidarity with our allies and friends.³⁸ The second criterion in measuring whether to intervene in external affairs must measure the impact on our friends and allies. In fact, this includes an examination of the question whether or not we might be served better by the intervention of other countries. This criterion ensures that we are continuing in the tradition of the coalition building illustrated during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The third point to consider is regional stability. All elements of power in the region must be examined. A balance must be maintained in the political, economic, military, and socio-cultural elements of power. U.S. intervention could possibly create a larger regional vacuum that would lead to greater conflict. Escalation by the introduction of large numbers of forces may result. We must clearly see the risks and understand the price.

Time is the fourth criterion to examine. The time dimension is critical to how we will intervene. To a large nation or superpower, low intensity conflict means low commitment of resources. To the small nation or insurgent force, it is total war. In the past, the United States has been reactive, responding to events rather than shaping events.³⁹ The long term interests of the United States in nurturing the growth of democracy are better served by recognizing problems within nations and taking an active roll in a solution before insurgency has a chance to develop. As in the past, remaining reactive may drive the cost of dodging disaster too high. Sun Tzu recognized centuries ago that there has never been a protracted war that benefitted any nation.⁴⁰

The last criterion then is to measure cost. Ideally response and resources will be minimal. However, our tradition calls for total commitment. Our recent victory in the Persian Gulf has only added to that thinking. Our criteria for the commitment of forces includes measuring vital interest, establishing clear and attainable military objectives, and the commitment of overwhelming force.⁴¹

In working to prevent internal conflict, minimal resources may in fact be the answer. There are positive implications for the U.S. In less developed countries a policy of denying arms and persuading powers to stay out, may lead to less damaging and more humane consequences than direct intervention. With conflicts involving more developed powers, targeting their economies may have greater effect than targeting their armies.⁴² We must be more precise in determining what the real cost are. The commitment, people, material, dollars, and political cost will not come cheaply.

TASK ORGANIZING BUREAUCRACY

We have experience in low intensity conflicts. However, our track record is less than sterling. A major threat for America when dealing with revolutionary warfare lies in the vulnerability of the national character and the inability of the bureaucracies of government to shape a strategy.⁴³ Our current political and military institutions do not have the proper direction or support to carry out either National Security Strategy or National Security Directives.⁴⁴ We need policy and structure to meet the challenges ahead.

There are significant road blocks to our effective involvement in the internal conflicts of other nations. First is the lack of understanding that the military can and should take part in the

prevention of conflict. The Clausewitzian balance between people, government, and the armed forces is even more critical when involved in internal conflicts.⁴⁵ Yes, the military is an instrument of war. But, Clausewitz writes war is the continuation of politics by other means. Then the political arm and the military arm of the nation must be partners in the transitional period that spans peace and war. Our national inclination, though, is to disdain involvement in the internal affairs of other nations. Congress, the people's representative, is suspicious of military involvement in other countries. Their suspicions must be eased. Legislation must encourage and support a unity of effort across bureaucratic boundaries.

Second, the bureaucracies of our government are not effective partners. The political arm, the Department of State, does not work in a very synchronous manner with the military arm, the Department of Defense, not to mention the other seventy plus government agencies that might have a role in suppressing the internal conflict of other countries. It is not that the State Department, the Defense Department, or any other agencies of government are at odds in the pursuit of national security objectives. They would all quickly say they are on the same team. However, if they did understand fully the intertwining of their roles in the fragile period before conflict begins, it is unlikely they could find a mechanism to pull them all together in an effective manner. We have a better chance of solving the descriptive riddle for our policy, and that has been impossible, than any chance for redesigning our

bureaucratic institutions in the near term. It is a difficult problem.

There is some hope. At the national level, there is already the Low Intensity Conflict Board. The board could provide a structure for interagency analysis of the criteria for intervention, coordination for action, and recommendations to the National Command Authority. It has been ineffective so far, however. The LIC Board has suffered from inattention and low priority. Thus, any effective interagency coordination through the board has been virtually nonexistent. The Executive Branch must take the lead. The Vice - President should chair the board. Departments of State and Defense would provide their Deputy Secretaries as a minimum. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff should be the military representative. Senior representation from the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency is also required. Other governmental agencies should sit as required by their possible contribution to conflict prevention or resolution. To fully pull the government, the military, and the people together, the Congress must have input to board recommendations. The structure is there. It will take leadership and commitment to provide focus and unity of effort at the national level.

Just as important as the interagency unity of effort in Washington is the effort in the field. A look at two possible solutions will be undertaken. One is pragmatic. It assumes the status quo and suggest action to be taken within current

bureaucratic structure. The second recommends some actual change to bureaucratic structure to facilitate the unity of effort with others in the host country.

The political effort to rearrange bureaucracy would be immense. To get on with solving the problem of who is in charge, however, the military is the best candidate. The structure of the combatant unified commands can aid the combining of all the elements of national power. Through the CINCs, a national strategy can deal with possible internal political violence that threatens our national interest. CINCs have forces to use through the conflict spectrum from peacetime engagement to major conflict. The CINC's political advisor and the ambassadors in the region provide the insight to the political issues. Military command authority, good offices with U.S. ambassadors, and an image in regional countries as a major player positions the CINC as an informal leader in developing and executing national strategy in the region.

Currently, SOUTHCOM is a good example of the informal approach. The CINC flies in the U.S. ambassadors and their wives frequently for consultation and planning. SOUTHCOM's approach is decidedly peacetime engagement. Military units and personnel are involved with building and maintaining stability wherever they can. Activities emphasize the contributions of the host nation rather than profile U.S. involvement.⁴⁶ Thus, the legitimacy of host governments is enhanced and the chances of political violence diminished.

There are serious drawbacks to the practical approach,

however. First, it is not a formalized structure with clear national direction. The chance for military bias is obvious. Our military in the lead on borderline political issues is counter to a basic value of our country. Many military commanders are hesitant to walk that fine line, preferring more specific direction from civilian authorities. The personality of the CINC weighs heavily on the success of this balance between political and military primacy. Therefore, it would be better to have a more formal structure to link our political-military institutions within world regions.

This second proposal to more formally link the political - military functions in the field is not new. General Nutting, the SOUTHCOM commander 1979-1983, for one, expressed such an idea.⁴⁷ A similar approach that places a State Department structure in the field parallel to the Department of Defense combatant unified command structure is proposed. A State Department Assistant Secretary of State would head the regional department with a full staff and a regional CIA chief. All ambassadors in the region would report through the regional assistant secretary to the Secretary of State. The regional assistant secretary in partnership with the regional CINC would be invaluable. Their input through their respective channels to the LIC Board would provide first hand regional considerations for national policy and strategy formulation.

There are many benefits. A senior level Department of State official in the region will have a much clearer understanding of the region. A stronger tie to the military commander, who has many

useful assets for peacetime purposes, also results. Political primacy of U.S. efforts in the region is emphasized. A regional approach to national security can be better planned, developed, and executed.

There are political difficulties both internal and external to changing major bureaucracies. To overcome the difficulties is worth the effort. Unity of effort in our bureaucratic institutions is essential in this radically different era to protect our interests.

CONCLUSIONS

Success in this challenging era will require a balance of political and military acumen that has seldom been seen or necessary, in most cases, during our history. Changes are necessary. The nation must decide that it is in the national interest to stabilize the countries and regions where our economic interests rest. Our political leadership must further define the policy of "peacetime engagement."

The tendency for political action to turn violent has increased. The probability for our increased involvement in internal struggles is therefore higher.

A simple model to predict insurgent success so we know when to get involved misses the point. We cannot be everywhere. Our choices for involvement must be clear, fully supporting our national

interests and our national character. The five criteria including legitimacy of effort, foreign policy balance, impact on regional stability, timing, and cost measurement provide the framework for answering "should we?" Our track record in the past is poor in dealing with uncomfortable little wars⁴⁸. Our future success will be measured in the prevention of insurgencies in the areas that could seriously impact our national interests.

United States' governmental institutions must begin to work together, meeting on the boundaries that separated their functions during the cold war. The military must design a force structure that can function efficiently along the entire spectrum of conflict from peacetime engagement to high intensity combat. CINCs must take the initiative in the use of their assigned forces, active and reserve, within their regions to help meet the political objectives of our country.

It is a revolutionary time. The political and military challenges of this era are large. We must be ready to expand our horizons in "the new world order" to meet the needs of our nation. Proficiency in the partnership of political-military affairs at the low end of conflict can spell the difference between realizing the dream or experiencing a nightmare.

ENDNOTES

1. Rod Paschall, LIC 2010, (McLean, Va: Brassey's, Inc., 1990), 32-34.
2. USAWC, "Current U.S. National Military Strategy" lecture 11 October 1991.
3. Critical comment by COL Dale Ackels, USAWC.
4. Bernard F. McMahon, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Pentagon's Foible", Orbis (Winter 1990): 3-16.
5. Max G. Manwaring, ed., Uncomfortable Wars (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 28.
6. Bard E. O'Neill, Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, (McLean, VA: Brassey's, Inc., 1990), 160.
7. James R. Locher III, "Low Intensity Conflict: Challenge of the 1990's" Defense 91 (Jul/Aug 91): 17.
8. Manwaring, 57.
9. Ibid., 19.
10. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (August 1991): 3-4.
11. Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century (New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 101.
12. Locher, 17.
13. Col(Ret) James B. Motley, "U.S. Unconventional Conflict Policy and Strategy", Military Review (January 1990): 2-16.
14. Paschall, 120.
15. Steven T. Hosner, The Army's Role in Counter Insurgency and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1990), v.
16. The beginning of the 1992 Presidential campaign and other events, like the President's trip to Japan to seek concessions in the trade imbalance during January 1992, has brought these diverse views from both democratic and republican candidates as well as the media commentators.

17. Conflict spectrum is used throughout this paper rather than the newer term, operational continuum. Conflict spectrum connotes a broader view of conflict and takes in more elements of national power than the narrower operational continuum which seems to weigh only a military operational approach.

18. William F. Furr, Low-Intensity Conflict Policy And Strategy Statements (Langley Air Force Base, VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1989), 1-5.

19. Ibid., 3.

20. Ibid., 28.

21. The White House, v.

22. Steven Metz, A Theater Approach to Low Intensity Conflict (Langley Air Force Base, VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1989), 3.

23. Ibid., 4.

24. Ibid.

25. Africa Regional Appraisal Seminar, USAWC.

26. Blank, 178-180.

27. Metz, 5.

28. Low Intensity Conflict, Policy and Plans seminar, USAWC.

29. Blank, 276.

30. Ibid, 305.

31. The White House, 27.

32. USAWC, Commandant's Lecture Series, 6 February 1992.

33. The information here comes from a variety of sources covered by the USAWC non attribution policy.

34. Robert A. Pastor, "Preempting Revolutions: The Boundaries of U.S. Influence", International Security (Spring 1991): 57.

35. There were seven models or frameworks that were examined. Two were from Max Manwaring. One in chapter two of his book Uncomfortable Wars: Towards a New Paradigm and the second from a yet to be published work co-authored with LTC John Fishel. Two were

from Bard O'Neill. The first came from his book Insurgency in the Modern World and the second in a work published ten years later in 1990, Insurgency and Terrorism - Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. The last three come from the U.S. Government. They are Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, Joint Pub (Test) 3-07 Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, and FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.

36. The White House, 4.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., 13.

39. LTC(Ret) Donald B. Vought, "Support for Insurgencies Nike or Nemesis?", Military Review (January 1990): 22.

40. Manwaring, 32.

41. USAWC.

42. Blank, 248.

43. Bowyer J. Bell, "Revolutionary Insurgency: The Threat to This Generation - Waiting for the Fat Lady to Sing", Conflict (9): 268.

44. LCDR Charles P. Mott, "Realistic LIC Strategy in Latin America", Military Review (May 1989): 16-23.

45. Arthur V. Grant, "Strategic Decisions: The Mire of Low Intensity Conflict", (Comparative Strategy (Vol 10, 1991): 167.

46. USAWC Commandant's lecture series, 1992.

47. Manwaring, El Salvador at War: An Oral History (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press: 1988), 403.

48. GEN John R. Galvin, "Uncomfortable Wars: Towards a New Paradigm" Parameters (December 1986)

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