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
RESEARCH REPORT

THE COUNTRY TEAM--THE CRITICAL INTERFACE BETWEEN THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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1991



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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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THE COUNTRY TEAM: THE CRITICAL INTERFACE BETWEEN THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

by

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: The Critical Interface Between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

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The United States of America is a world power. It can and should influence the world of nations to act responsibly. Moving into the next century and setting the foundation of the president's "New World Order," the US must ensure the employment its most effective instruments of peace. Only by assessing our past performance, retooling and adjusting our instruments of peace, and moving forward to new levels of performance can we achieve this goal.

In the government, two executive departments are primary conduits of influence in foreign policy: State and Defense. At both the US domestic level and their critical conjunction at the host-country level, too little attention is given to the important interface between them.

This study contains an analysis of existing relationships, possible problem areas, and, at the operational level, differing viewpoints between State and Defense personnel. A review of varied capabilities is provided, and differences in focus, missions, and goals are explored. Methodologies are provided to reduce or preclude conflicts and to take advantage of strong, well-established Department of Defense and Department of State team efforts. This practical, "common sense" document guides the formation and maintenance of these relationships.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Steven E. Cady is a student at the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Colonel Cady enlisted in the United States Air Force in 1966. After graduation from Texas Lutheran College and Officer Training School in 1972, he received his commission as a military officer. He attended a wide variety of service and joint military Schools and completed his formal education at the University of Southern California.

Colonel Cady earned his navigator wings in September 1973 and his Electronic Warfare Officer rating in April 1974. He has served as an aircrew member and a staff officer, and has commanded airmen in a flying training squadron and at a remote base, both of which were awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award.

Colonel Cady is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

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INTRODUCTION

The "new world order" is one of the most exciting political developments since the conquests of Alexander. It must not be allowed to languish as did "war to end all wars" in 1919. This paper argues that one of the best ways to ensure the success of this plan is the application of subtle structural changes in the international model used by the United States to employ its power worldwide. The changes must be worked and implemented from the bottom up. There are several conditions that must be understood before a further discussion can take place. Let us look at some of those.

America's national strengths are used to influence the existing world order, encourage democratic principles, and control the magnitude and intensity of conflict. This influence is an essential deterrent to world disorder and can best be employed by the US representatives located within a host nation. This paper argues that a maturation in the exercise of that influence can and must occur.

In most countries where US government officials are invited to participate, more than one US government entity is represented. Who then is in charge? The simple answer might be that the State Department has primacy during day-to-day operations and the Defense Department has primacy during war. In this complex world, however, the roles are more difficult to define. What is found is that the circumstances at hand dictate which department

has primacy. The relationship is complicated yet interdependent.

The ambassador (the chief of the US diplomatic mission) is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US government officers and employees in a country except the military personnel under the direct command of a unified or specified military commander. President Kennedy established this precedent on 9 May 1961 when he delineated specific responsibilities. By that action, the president specified the duties of the ambassador and retained direct authority over the military chain of command.

An organizational problem arose with that presidential delineation of responsibilities. In fact, a critical step away from the time-proven principle of Unity of Command was taken. On the one hand, the ambassador was told he is in charge; on the other, he was told he is not responsible for the military personnel located in-country. While this division is recognized by all the professionals involved, all consider the ambassador responsible, in the sense that the ambassador establishes the rules of engagement and chairs the country team.

The concept of the country team evolved to support the ambassador. Its purpose is to ensure that the ambassador's entire staff knows and understands the mission, and that all necessary hands have a voice in the process.

Within each country, the country team is intended to provide an important unifying element, but the Department of Defense approaches its responsibilities differently. Having developed

several regional constructs, it has assigned a commander in chief, a CINC, to lead each regional command. The CINCs are expected to plan for regional actions and address multifaceted activities that may go as far as coalition warfare. Regional stability will face constant challenges, and the CINCs must have regional strategies to survive. Ambassadors, primarily concerned with their own country, will specifically look at regional efforts in their own area of responsibility. Country teams are not designed to be effective vehicles for resolving regional concerns, but can through their individual participation bring regional needs into a single, one country, focus.

The Department of State chose to develop their regional focus through the employment of assistant secretaries located in Washington rather than in the field. This may be an adequate approach, but it should be noted that the regions are not the same as the regions defined by the Department of Defense. The Department of State considers Israel and Syria to be part of Southwest Asia, and the Department of Defense considers the two countries to be part of Europe. These different approaches to regionalization must detract from any coordination efforts.

The commander-in-chief (CINC) commands the military forces assigned to support a host nation within a region. While the CINC is not a member of the diplomatic mission, his designated representative participates in meetings of the country team. For necessary coordination within the region, the CINC appoints, when invited by the ambassador, a contact officer to represent his

interests in-country. This officer is most often the chief of the Security Assistance Organization (SAO); it is his duty to help coordinate military activities with the members of the country team and help avoid military initiatives that may prove counterproductive.

Ultimately, the CINC and his staff integrate all the country-specific military security assistance plans and activities into the regional US military plans and activities. He provides the SAO with technical assistance and administrative support, and he supervises the activities of the SAO in matters that are not ambassadorial functions or responsibilities.

The CINC's role is especially critical and difficult in assessing low-intensity conflict. His perspective must be regional and country-specific, and focus on the operational level of conflict. On the surface, while exercising his chain of command, he is expected to identify and apply the resources necessary to achieve US goals in the area. In actuality, he must coordinate and recoordinate every action with the specific ambassador. The CINC knows that while the ambassador cannot direct military activities, he may request, approve, and deny any military activity.

Eventually, the country team will be the arena for interaction between the professionals, military and diplomatic. If the country team is efficient, effective and timely, it works as a classroom. The military teaches the diplomats and the diplomats teach the military. Each sensitizes the other to his or her

specific areas of concern and to his or her capabilities and limitations to ensure that everyone understands the mission at hand and that effectiveness is maximized. Such are the conditions under which the interface between the two departments functions.

ORGANIZATION

The step from the grand strategy of the national command authority to the unified command level is coordinated in that the CINC has a senior foreign service officer (of ambassadorial rank and frequently a former ambassador) with the title and function of political advisor (POLAD) serving on his personal staff. This official, usually a capable and experienced professional at the O-6/O-8 stage in his career, reports to the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs of the Department of State but functions as a member of the CINC's personal staff. He advises the CINC and staff on political or diplomatic issues crucial to the planning process, including overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, and basing and servicing agreements.

Many efforts have been made to produce an organizational chart to describe the coordination points between the CINC's staff and the country team. Unfortunately, this is not possible because there is no "standard" country team. Each team is organized by the individual ambassador to support the ambassador, and the composition of each is personality-dependent. Each country team must be evaluated independently, and its coordination points must be determined. Coordination between the CINC's staff and the country teams in each region is complex and difficult.

Each region or theater is uniquely organized also. Several of the regions, Latin America, Europe, and the Pacific, contain

many countries and have one CINC headquartered within the region. Each of these countries has a resident US ambassador and country team and each maintains a different political, economic, and diplomatic relationship, by treaty and history, with the United States. In the middle east (CENTCOM), however, the CINC's problems are further compounded, in that his headquarters is located outside his area of responsibility. He faces the same situation as his counterparts, in that his interests and responsibilities encompass many countries, ambassadors, treaties, and historical relationships (friendly and unfriendly) existing between each country and with the United States.

The relationships have been reviewed from the top, the National Security Council, down to the country-team level. What are found are two distinct approaches to a region or country. The government which assigned two senior American representatives to a country and directed coordination between them, does not specify how that coordination should take place.

One senior American representative is the combatant CINC. He is the senior military representative responsible for US military activities throughout a specific region. The other representative, the ambassador, is the senior American civilian responsible for all US civilian activities within a single host nation. Within a specific nation, the ambassador is the president's senior representative, and within that specific nation the military activities are constrained by treaty, status of forces agreements, or other formal agreements. Many difficult problems

of coordination arise as the host nations interface with each other, the various US ambassadors interact with each other, and as individual nations may move from day-to-day operations into conflict.

The need for increased coordination between the country-level representatives of the two departments was recognized during the early 1950s. Congress participated in the development of the concept of the country team, but it did not direct the establishment of these teams, nor did it direct their composition. While most ambassadors employ the country-team concept today, the team's usefulness varies widely from country to country and from ambassador to ambassador. That fact, of course, constitutes part of the problem.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REALITIES

Ongoing cooperation and coordination between the US civilian and military leadership, and between the United States and host nation representatives is of critical importance. Discussion of the differences in levels of military operations between day-to-day (peacetime) activities, low- and mid-intensity conflict, and warfighting is necessary and will be provided.

As the events of 1989 and 1990 demonstrate, great changes can come with dramatic suddenness. Most changes are not as exciting but are instead only changes in levels of intensity. Between 1945 and 1988, there were over 160 major conflicts, and the US military was deployed over 242 times. During January 1990 alone, there were 32 major armed conflicts (each involving more than 1000 battle deaths) underway. Of those, 30 conflicts involved third-world countries. Of the 30, 29 were ethnic, religious, or racial; 27 were violent attempts to take control of a central government; and only 5 of the 32 involved traditional political disputes over national borders or resources.¹ Who then has responsibility for damage limitation in these crises? How does this process really work?

When the subject of responsibility is addressed, it must be recognized that the circumstances at hand will dictate primacy. One simply cannot state that because there is no conflict in a region, the Department of State has primacy. During day-to-day operations, America's nonmilitary strengths provide a primary

source of pressure and influence. The commander in chief, however, also controls a significant amount of security-assistance money, and the ambassador and his staff will be eager to participate in its distribution. Even though the host nation is in a day-to-day or peacetime environment, the military will have first call here.

Alternatively, the military does not have primacy in all actions during a conflict. The ambassador and his staff have accumulated information and intelligence, and even though conflict has erupted and they may have departed the host nation, the successful military professional calls on and refers to the ambassador's prior collection activities. The members of the country team may continue to provide a wealth of valuable information. This is a time in the process of extremely important activity.

No one department can or will always have primacy and overall responsibility. Because of the interdependent nature of the two departments, circumstances must be continually evaluated and a coordinated approach applied to achieve as much effectiveness as possible. While it is expected that the CINC and the ambassador coordinate with one another, coordination must occur at all levels of operation and not simply be limited to the commander in chief or ambassador levels.

Even though the CINC does not fall under the ambassador on organizational charts, the ambassador considers his host country to be his country. International law also expects the ambassador

to be a nation's senior representative. To be successful then, the military professionals assigned to work with the ambassador must be sensitive to the ambassador and his desires. Unfortunately, there is no regional superstructure available so that the CINC can meet with "his" ambassadors to consider the region at large or to produce a coordinated regional plan. Clear authority to dictate compliance is seldom provided to a CINC or to any other US entity, and what authority there is generally remains vague. There is simply no efficient overarching framework to satisfy the need to integrate, coordinate, and employ resources. The CINC's communication and coordination process is all the more difficult because there is no formal organization to interface with the various country teams.

During day-to-day operations, the military commander and the ambassador and their staffs have a valuable resource at their disposal. That resource is time--the time to effect the necessary coordination: integration: and, to a large extent, "cross-education" of military and civilian counterparts.² Much of this time could be better employed in learning each other's tasks, but on the whole it is used wisely.

In a very broad sense, during day-to-day operations, the planner is "shaping the battlefield." The Department of State, from the secretary of state down to the lowest country team members, must play an important role in the preparation. One significant problem that must be corrected is that classified war plans are not always shared with the ambassador and his staff

before a significant conflict has called the plans to the forefront. It is not realistic to open long-term plans that might carry through four or five ambassadors and their staffs. There are times while conflict is simmering to open the books. So, while the planner is "shaping the battlefield," important coordination with the embassy staff should be taking place; often it is not. Careful consideration must be given to this deficiency.

A prime function of an ambassador, whether posted to a friendly country or a hostile one, is representation. Representation includes the formal and informal activities of a country team, which establishes contact and develops mutual confidence, and opens channels of communication with the diplomatic, political, economic, social, and military sectors in the host nation. An effective ambassador orchestrates the representational efforts so that the national-security interests of the US are also coordinated and well served.

Most important, successful representation establishes the climate in which combined planning and military interfaces can be established. Specific examples of representational activities involving the Department of Defense and affecting the military area commander's estimate and plans are attendance at formal military ceremonies and social occasions, informal military-to-military visits to host countries' military schools and exercises, and the arrangement of visits of the host country military to the US. The overt intelligence value of these activities is widely recognized, but the establishment of mutual confidence is

probably the most useful product of representational activities.³ US military coordination and support of these representational responsibilities can be of mutual benefit to all involved.

Although the US hopes that its allies will defend themselves in lower level conflicts, there is potential for US involvement in planning for combined operations. Planning for combined operations has the components of joint-operations planning, but to these activities is added the critical development or resolution of sensitive issues of sovereignty and divergent national interests with anticipated allies. The country teams, the CINC's political advisors, the Department of State and the National Security Council in Washington are all likely to be involved in these issues.

Other problems lie within the enormous differences between the two departments. They vary in background, approach, and measures of merit. There will often be differing backgrounds between the CINC and his senior staff and the ambassador and his senior staff. Often the background and experiences of the ambassador (frequently a presidential political appointee) are totally different from those of his counterpart, the CINC. Though both are intelligent, they may come from obviously different backgrounds and have different goals and values. In addition to these differences, if the ambassador is a political appointee, he will probably have strong connections in Washington. These may be stronger than those of the CINC and possibly stronger in a few cases than those of either the secretary of defense or the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the political appointee turns to his friends and employs his political power, the secretary of defense may not be strong enough to protect the CINC or the CINC's programs. It is this political clout that can nullify a CINC's campaigns.

Obviously, the CINC and his staff must be consensus builders. Some might argue that the CINC must adeptly circumvent the system if he wants to succeed. While this approach often may work, in the long term the CINC who employs it in a political environment is in great jeopardy.

When the CINC develops programs, he and his staff must sell the programs within the host countries first. Ambassadors in the CINC's region must concur. Then, with their support, the CINC takes the programs to Washington to complete his consensus-building responsibilities. The important strategy of securing support for the CINC's programs at the lowest levels is much of the CINC's daily business.

The profession-to-profession interface automatically creates some friction. Often the military professional is ready to defer to the Department of State, and sometimes even allow Department of State personnel to act in areas that are legitimately military. Much of this reluctance to act stems from our cultural bias and our desire to uphold civilian primacy.

Coordination, integration, and education must be ongoing at the country-team level. The military professional must be part of the ambassador's team. As a team member, the typical military

professional will develop an awareness, an intuitive judgment of the environment, that becomes a valuable resource and should be utilized to support the leadership in the accomplishment of the mission.

Working relationships with embassy personnel must be developed across the board. Perceptions are critically important, and all the players need to understand each other. In some cases, the military professionals will be viewed as the war mongers always ready for a fight. Embassy professionals are suspicious of the military professionals because they are seen as usurpers on their "turf." The political members of the team, often young, lack experience with the military, carry an inadequate or an inappropriate view of security, and will not understand why the military professionals do what they do.

On the other hand, the military professionals look at the civilian professionals and see their greater money, longer hair, unshined shoes, inexperience, and incredible cockiness. Because they often deal in ideas and words, the civilian professionals will not appear very action-oriented. The military professionals perceive the civilian lack of, or shortage of, discipline. Each professional ultimately discounts the other at a juncture where such discounting is an unaffordable luxury.

The military and political professionals must work to understand each other and to cooperate. In the larger commands with many ambassadors stationed in the CINC's area of responsibility, there may be tensions as each of these ambassadors is

concerned about the senior military personnel operating in "his" or "her" country. Sometimes ambassadors will also be concerned with the other US ambassadors in the region and act as though they are in competition with them. Differences will be compounded as the CINC unites various approaches into a regional approach.

As the unified CINC and his staff usually view a larger portion of the world than does the ambassador and his staff, their starting and finishing points are entirely different. Embassy personnel are often so deep in their own weeds that getting regional comprehension is totally out of the question.

European Command (EUCOM) provides an example of this problem. The political capitals of Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia have formed a competing triangle for many years. In this very complex arena, the US ambassadors try to be an intermediary force. One finds, however, that each of the US embassies became very committed country advocates and later the mediation efforts supported by the US were compromised by that perceived country partisanship. It is this difference in focus, between the CINC and an ambassador and their staffs, that significantly complicates the planning process.

Overall, the country team can be an important unifying concept. No one is served properly when people on a team work at cross purposes, but the country-team concept does not function well at the regional level. The CINCs are encouraged continually to develop regional concepts, plans, and strategies. In fact,

the CINCs build and rebuild regional, "ad hoc" alliances to ensure they are prepared to encounter relatively minor challenges up to threats with or through coalition warfare. Because the region will face challenges, the CINCs must have regional strategies to survive.

While the CINC's staff operates with regionally oriented plans and strategies, the ambassador and his staff operate mainly with country-specific policies. The country teams have not proven themselves to be effective vehicles for resolving regional concerns. They must rely on regional policy guidance from their geographic bureaus. In many cases, the CINC and Department of State geographic divisions differ.

Looking at Panama during December 1989, one sees that the military implemented President Guillermo Endara's swearing in on a US military installation without prior coordination with embassy personnel. In Panama, the military sanitized the Nicaraguan embassy residence without prior coordination with the US embassy. The military (or some other US agency) mined the Nicaraguan harbors of Corinto on the Pacific and El Bluff on the Caribbean (during February 1984), independently and without coordination with either the Department of State or the US embassy. There are other instances in which the Department of Defense offered to coordinate its activities but the Department of State declined to participate. An example is the Department of Defense's efforts to build drug-interdiction-equipment lists within SOUTHCOM. Some embassy personnel chose not to be part of

that action. Unfortunately, no general criteria for interdepartmental cooperation exist.

The best immediate course of action would be for the Department of State and the Department of Defense to examine their regional constructs to determine if they could be drawn along the same lines. For the Department of State, the Southwest Asia region includes Israel, Syria, and Libya, but the Department of Defense identifies these states as part of the European region.

Further, both executive departments need to develop an interagency review system to establish similar regional boundaries. They should develop a means by which regional goals could be established; regional measures of effectiveness set forth; and a long-term, overarching regional strategy developed. Some interface mechanism could then be established for an appropriate Department of Defense and Department of State interface at this level.

The CINC and the Department of State's regional assistant secretary are an appropriate level for interface. With both organizations coordinating on strategy, ultimately one could expect to find the military's CINC testifying to Congress in support of State's or the ambassador's programs, and the ambassador or State's personnel testifying in support of the CINC's programs. In fact, an early result could be a single regional interagency program, fully coordinated and presented to the Congress for their approval.

Interaction between the CINC and the ambassador is an understandable one. They meet socially and professionally, and coordinate often. The same cannot be said for their staffs, for, with some exceptions, there is at this time very little coordination between them. Historically, they have operated in their own arenas and consequent vacuums and have not interfaced to the proper extent.

Since the purpose of both teams is the securing of our national goal of peace and stability throughout the world, that translates to a goal of mutual support, understanding, education, and consensus. The civilian members of the country team and the military professionals must seek each other out and provide as much education and familiarization as possible. This interface, this coordination, will strengthen the decision making process and ultimately the region itself. The requirement for mutual education cannot be overemphasized.

Another aspect of this education for the military professional is to quickly understand the coordination procedures of the individual country-team members. While the individual team members report to the ambassador, they also report directly to their staff agencies in Washington. Because so many officials are involved, both directly and indirectly, coordination is all the more difficult and all the more important.

Several military representatives are assigned directly to the ambassador and serve as part of his staff. The defense attache (and specific service attaches) is among them. The

CINC's staff will normally have very little contact with the attache because he is committed to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and his day-to-day activities are largely driven by requirements for intelligence collection. Furthermore, his role is clearly regarded by his host military counterparts as that of an overt collector of intelligence, an analyst of same and thus a potential ally. He meets with them and sees the people and resources that the host nation chooses for him to see. His ability to support the CINC in other roles is minimal.

The CINC's staff usually works very closely with security-assistance personnel. In fact, the security-assistance personnel usually report to members of the CINC's staff, often within the J5 directorate. These Security Assistance Organization personnel (SAO) are active in the CINC's arena, as they are players in tying together the CINC's regional strategy. The ideal security-assistance officer should lash up the military strategy with existing policy and preclude disconnects. It is the security-assistance personnel who influence the host-nation leaders to focus on their real defense needs. Too often, nations will work to acquire very high technology weapons that show very well to their indigenous populations. Small, undeveloped or developing nations often want to demonstrate that they are keeping up with the rest of the world by securing new supersonic aircraft when they should concentrate on helicopters or small naval vessels. Security-assistance personnel influence their decisions.

The CINC can apply significant leverage in this arena. The CINC and the security-assistance team both play a very active role in the preparation of the five-year security-assistance budget. Security-assistance personnel sometimes find themselves with conflicting loyalties, though, because they simultaneously owe allegiance to the CINC, the ambassador, and their service. In most cases, the chief of the SAO will act as the CINC's representative on the country team.

A great deal of time should not be spent looking for a standard command-and-control (C²) methodology to employ between the CINC's staff and the ambassador's staff. There is none. Civilian and military responsibilities overlap at this country-level interface, and continuous coordination and cooperation will be the answer, not command and control as we consider it in military terms. Again, it will be the critical educational process between these two staffs that makes the difference between success and failure. Success will depend on personalities of those involved.

On the surface, one might consider the interface between a CINC and twenty plus embassies an impossible task. What is the case, though, is that the CINC will often establish a triage strategy to deal with the embassies in his region. He will concentrate his efforts on the few embassies that represent any risk or opportunity to the CINC. These will be the embassies in which he feels he has some ability to cause change. He will visit the other embassies for appropriate ceremonial reasons.

Another problem facing the warfighting CINC and his staff is that they are not recognized entities in some countries within the region. America developed the idea of a regional area of responsibility, but not all countries recognized this American approach. Brazil, for example, does not recognize SOUTHCOM.

The CINC-country team relationship has been discussed, but one also must consider the CINC's relationship to Washington. As stated earlier, the CINC's challenge is to build consensus. He must interface with the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and their staffs. The CINC will also need to develop the closest of possible working relationships with the leadership in the Department of State. Experience has shown that the CINC's level of entry into the Department of State under the Bush administration will most often be the assistant secretary and the regional assistant secretaries. Coordination will be difficult since the regions as defined by the Department of Defense are not identical to those as defined by the Department of State. It will be the quality of consensus established by the CINC in the Washington arena that ultimately determines the success or failure of the CINC's programs.

The next consideration with which we must deal is whether the CINC should go to the Department of State and or Congress directly or work through the secretary of defense. Experience to date shows that most CINCs work directly with the Department of State or the Congress, but that they try not to conclude any actions. No hard and firm guidelines exist, simply the sound

judgment and intuition of the CINC. When intercession from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is needed, coordination with the secretary of defense takes place. When the Department of State or the Congress requests military advice, the CINC and his staff deal directly with Department of State or congressional personnel to preclude unnecessarily filtering of the information by OSD. The CINC also has action centers at the desk of the deputy director for politico-military affairs, J-5, OJCS and the desk of the assistant secretary for international security affairs, in the Department of Defense.

The importance of coordination within the CINC's staff also needs to be stressed. The CINC must ensure adequate and appropriate coordination between intelligence, security-assistance, and his operations personnel. All too often intelligence personnel and the security assistance personnel develop an important document without coordinating with the operations personnel. The operations personnel are not always aware of the proposed action and need to be more closely linked by a solid coordination process.

Coordination between the two executive departments, State and Defense, is especially difficult at the country level. There we find two dissimilar organizations--different in internal structure and external perspective. Significant effort throughout the entire arena is required to ensure successful coordination at all levels of endeavor.

Ultimately, a great deal depends on the ambassador's point of view, yet there are no "standard" ambassadors. Approximately 30-40 percent are political appointees who have little if any experience in the Department of State. The largest percentage are career appointees, who know how Washington politics is played and have fought the bureaucratic wars so successfully that they have become ambassadors. They also know how best to thwart what they might perceive to be a CINC's misguided approach.

Normally, the ambassador and his staff will not denigrate the military professionals on their team. Some Department of State personnel will, however, think they know more about the military affairs of a country than the military professionals themselves. Some think they can do the job of the military professional as well as their own, but that the reverse could not be true.

Interestingly, if military and civilian professionals adequately nurture their relationships with each other and work to educate their counterparts, it is possible to develop a strong "team" mentality between the representatives of the two staffs. The association can be developed to the point that the Department of Defense and Department of State teams in a country will be stronger than the link between an embassy team and their counterparts in the bureaucracies in Washington.

Another concern that requires sensitivity and some attention involves developing loyalties. Many people, civilian and military, can develop great affinities for their host country and its

people, a circumstance which can color their decision making. Everyone, Department of Defense and embassy personnel alike, must remember whom they are representing. It is possible for team members to consider their efforts to be supportive of their host country. Too few of either team have a sufficient understanding of the total effort to entitle them to make this decision themselves. The CINC and the ambassador must be sensitive to this problem of "going native" and provide an adequate level of education to ensure balance in the decision-making process.

The senior leadership of these two teams must also ensure an appropriate method of measuring the success of their people. If a person's success is based solely on an ability to get things accomplished in the host country, then the problem of loyalties may be exacerbated. Everyone must realize that, quite often, actions can take years to be completed.

Throughout this paper, one of the key issues has been consensus, consensus in-country and in Washington. Most successful CINCs have established patterns of consensus activities that they employ when they visit Washington. They meet the responsible leadership in the appropriate arenas, but they also meet the action officers. These action officers actually write the policy papers. They, the people who are on top of the projects and activities, are certainly aware of any pitfalls or problem areas. Successful CINCs understand these officers, nurture their loyalties, and learn from the action officers.

CONCLUSION

The world will remain dynamic and dangerous. The United States has survived the last forty years in a world with a predictable enemy. We attributed or ascribed intentions as we developed strategies, just as he did for us. That period is ending. We must now refocus our attention and begin determining our grand strategies for the next decade.

America's long-range national goals and interests must be, again, defined. Once these definitions are established, a plan for the best employment of our national diplomatic, political, economic and military strengths should be developed. With these definitions and plans in hand, the actions we must take to achieve our president's "New World Order" can be determined.

We can be reasonably certain that we will not face another enemy like the Soviet Union. Our future battlefields are undergoing definition today in the Middle East, and what we find more dramatically than ever is that the battlefield continues to be highly political, just as Clausewitz demonstrated. All of our national strengths must be employed simultaneously to ensure as much success as possible. Piecemeal handling of the various aspects of conflict in the absence of a coordinated and integrated approach will be clearly insufficient and loaded with contradictions.

While the current interagency approach seems to be working, much can be done to improve the process and ensure more complete

utilization of our national strengths. The two executive departments are not, as fully as they could, coordinating their efforts to influence behavior. The departments are not adhering to the time proven principle of unity of command nor do they look at individual regions or countries from the same perspective. The CINC's regional counterpart is said to be the Department of State's assistant secretary for that region. However, the two departments do not have equivalent regions. While the ambassador is the senior US representative in a country for all US activities, the military regional combatant commander in chief is responsible for all military activities in the region. The primary interface between the CINC and the ambassador occurs generally at the country team.

The country-team concept, first proposed in 1952, still has not become the efficient, useful, productive instrument of policy that it could become. Its employment is dependent on the personality of the ambassador, and while used effectively in some regions and countries (Europe and Poland, for example), it is poorly employed in others (the Middle East and Iraq). If America is to influence the activities of other nations effectively, it must finally develop a coordinated strategy for dealing with each region and each nation in that region. The correct and most effective arena for conducting this coordination activity is the country team.

Properly employed, the country team can be the center for coordination and, more important, education of both the military

and the political representatives. The relationship between the ambassador, the military commander in chief, and their critical staffs must be interdependent. All the players must know each other, and the military must be properly represented on the ambassador's staff.

As we move through the spectrum of influence, from day-to-day political activities to low and middle levels of conflict to war, the military representatives must be full participants in the process. They must be invited to advise, but they must realize that not all military advice will be taken. They must understand the larger environment in which they operate. The Department of Defense representatives must make their civilian counterparts aware of the special competence and expertise the military professionals bring to the arena and, just as important, their limitations. Likewise, the Department of State representatives must educate their military counterparts so their advice becomes more cogent. All the actors must work in concert to achieve our national strategies.

To do this, everyone must realize that our economic strategy, our political and diplomatic strategy, and--not least--our military strategy all must contribute toward the formulation and implementation of a consistent policy truly reflecting America's long-range national interests. Only with a more fully coordinated effort will we effectively extend the cause of peace and come closer to the goal of a new world order.

The arguments I have put forth are sometimes structural, but regional alignments and alternatives are perceptual, as are the constant interaction between State and Defense. In Defense, these arguments are all largely subtle. Our massive bureaucracy is working--it is sorting and collecting an incredible amount of information worldwide. However, to make the "new world order" work, the system needs adjustment, the joints need lubrication, and the subtle nuances require examination. A redesign or a restructuring will most assuredly fail, while the "relook" suggested by this paper stands a much greater chance of success.

NOTES

1. Kent Harbaugh, data included in a lecture provided from the Air War College stage to the Class of 1991 on 22 January 1991. His source was LINGREN noted in the bibliography.
2. Leonard L. Swank, "The Ambassador and the Country Team." The Defense Intelligence School, Washington., 1977. p. 6.
3. Ibid., p. 6.

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