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(unclassified paper)

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

The International Green Movement:
Menace, Monster or Martyr

by


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operation.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.


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19 June 1992



Paper directed by Captain H. Ward Clark
Chairman, Department of Military
Operations
Naval War College

Approved by:



Faculty Research Advisor Date

92-12652

92 5 11 124

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS NONE	
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY NAVAL WAR COLLEGE		3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for Public Release; distribution is unlimited.	
2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT	6b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) C	7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, R.I. 02841		7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) THE INTERNATIONAL GREEN MOVEMENT: MENACE, MONSTER OR MARTYR (v)			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) MACKENZIE, BRUCE W., LCDR, JAGC, USN			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL	13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 920619	15. PAGE COUNT 29
16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.			
17 COSATI CODES		18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
		National Military Strategy; Environmental Activism; Impact	
19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Non-governmental environmental activist groups in the international arena have a profound effect upon the military's ability to effectively deploy and train. An examination and analysis of the environmental activist phenomenon as it applies to past and future operational effectiveness is presented. The scope of examination is limited to environmental activism outside of the jurisdiction of the United States and territories and its effect upon operations. Generally, environmental grass roots movements have had marked success in restricting military exercises and training regimes. In this regard however, giant multi-national, corporate styled, environmental activist groups have had and will have little effect upon military operations.			
20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT		22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 841-3414	22c OFFICE SYMBOL C

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Accession For	
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Unannounced	☐
Justification _____	
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Distribution/ _____	
Availability Codes	
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THE INTERNATIONAL GREEN MOVEMENT:
MENACE, MONSTER OR MARTYR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Since the advent of the industrial age, myriad pollutants of almost every achievable combination, description, proportion and lethality have been infused into the Earth's air, water and soil. Furthermore, these pollutants saturated into the environment generally have transnational effects. The prospect of fatal harm to the world community by environmental suicide has dramatically increased global environmental sensitivity over the past two decades. Accordingly, there is little argument, either on a national or international scale, that environmental issues are of great importance to all nations. Moreover, there is little argument in the world community that affirmative action must be taken to sustain our fragile world for future generations. Where the United Nations, industrialized nations, developing nations, scientists and non-governmental environmental organizations radically differ is the identification and degree of the threat, the most feasible and appropriate approach in which to combat the environmental threat, and which countries should take such appropriate action.

While governmental agencies and organizations, both national and international, utilize traditional means of international diplomacy and cooperation, non-governmental organizations are not limited by the constraints of tact and diplomacy. These non-

governmental organizations are traditionally grass roots based organizations which are organized, at one end of a spectrum, on an ad-hoc basis to counter a perceived environmental threat in a specific region. At the other end of the spectrum are highly organized international organizations with comprehensive environmental/animal rights/anti-nuclear agendas. Many of these non-governmental environmental organizations specifically target military installations and operations as the source of their particular protest. These groups have had marked success in achieving their respective goals. As such, the effect of these non-governmental organizations have had a significant impact on overseas military operations.

Purpose

With the monolithic threat of Soviet Communism to Western security and democracy relegated to a position of historical analysis, the United States has shifted its national security focus to one of flexible response to the demands of regional contingencies around the globe. To meet the needs dictated by shrinking fiscal resources and a smaller active duty force, increased flexibility in planning, realistic training and deployment of forces in areas outside the United States will be necessary. As the international community has become more environmentally conscious, operations outside the jurisdictional limits of the United States which are necessary for continued operational efficiency and effectiveness will continue to be

affected. Of particular concern is not the expansive body of international customary law, treaty agreements and restrictive domestic statutes which can be anticipated and planned for by the military commander; but rather, continued impediments erected by non-governmental environmental groups which detract from operational efficiency that will continue to influence overseas operations. Additionally, domestic laws and regulations provide sufficient guidelines, restrictions and sanctions to armed forces training and operating regimes in the United States and territories. Such constraints can be adequately planned for. Accordingly, the primary focus herein is upon non-governmental environmental groups and their effect on extraterritorial operations.

Thesis

Despite reductions inherent in future overseas commitments envisioned by recently promulgated national security requirements, overseas presence by United States armed forces will undoubtedly continue. While maintaining a United States presence and readiness in overseas areas, the potential still remains that extraterritorial operations of all services will be affected by non-governmental environmental groups. To illustrate this potential threat from overseas non-governmental environmental groups, the evolution of this grass roots phenomenon and its effect on military operations will be examined. Following the analysis of organized non-governmental

environmental activism in this context, an appraisal and conclusion regarding the prospect of continued interference with military operations in the future from these groups is offered.

CHAPTER II

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

To adequately assess the effect that transnational non-governmental environmental activism will have on future military operations, a brief examination of future strategy is necessary. Dramatic events over the past year have altered the complexion of United States military strategy that, while vacillating in various degrees over five decades from containment to flexible response, was always directed at a monolithic expansionist Soviet Union. With the dissolution of traditional icons of bi-polar separatism between East and West and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, United States leadership quickly realized that massed arrays of nuclear weaponry and enormous arsenals of conventional capabilities were no longer necessary to maintain a secure and forward presence. With the unilateral reduction of an assortment of nuclear weapons and a substantial reduction of forces deployed in forward bases, the United States has created a framework designed to respond to regional conflicts as national interests dictate.

A significant facet of this military strategy of the future is the ability of a smaller base force to retain increased flexibility in planning, training and employment.¹ This strategy also contemplates force integration with regional coalition allies and a continued commitment to NATO.² While the military

force of the future will be undoubtedly leaner and more flexible, forward deployed forces will remain a necessary cornerstone of national defense. However, only continued training in joint exercises with organic land, air and naval forces and integrated exercises with the armed services of our allies will render the military force of the future more flexible and competent to meet the challenge of future regional conflicts. Without training the interoperability of the armed forces will suffer as well as the ability to reconstitute existing forces with reserve forces and future coalition partners. One impediment to the ability of our armed forces to train and deploy in overseas regions are the obstacles erected by environmental activists.

CHAPTER III

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM

In the domain of the environmental protectionist, affiliation rests with either a non-governmental group or with a governmental entity. Governmental environmental agencies and organizations are divided into national and international concerns. National agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and its progeny at the state level, exist to enforce environmental concerns of their respective domestic jurisdictions. International environmental governmental organizations, such as the United Nations Environmental Program, Earthwatch and Mediterranean Sea Program which were established by the United Nations, are likewise proactive in environmental protection but on a global basis. While these international organizations admittedly lack the necessary enforcement power that sovereign states may choose to employ, they provide a consistent approach and forum for transnational environmental concerns.³ Sovereign nations also provide the scientific, technical and legal expertise to international symposiums, conferences and treaty negotiations in an effort to meld national environmental concerns with worldwide efforts.

Governmental organizations represent only part of the environmentalist picture. On the national and international stage, environmental activists pursue their organization's

commitments with varying degrees of confrontation. In the international arena the focus of non-governmental environmental activist groups runs a wide gamut depending upon the particular cause seized upon by the group. Non-governmental organizations are generally not directly affiliated with a particular sovereign state or its state-run environmental defense network. Non-governmental organizations may be highly organized and well funded with a corporate transnational hierarchy or merely exist as a neighborhood group organized to protest a solitary cause against a particular antagonist. The tactics employed by non-governmental groups are as varied as the groups who actively pursue their goals. To achieve their particular goals non-governmental groups may utilize a nation's judicial process, lobby a country's legislative body, distribute education material or engage in varying degrees of direct protest.

The influence non-governmental environmental groups have upon governmental activity has increased dramatically over the past decade. Driven in part by the activity of vociferous grass roots environmental groups and tragic environmental disasters, nations are becoming increasingly conducive to expanding their environmental protection. Specific incidents such as the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the chemical spill of 30 tons of deadly chemicals into the Rhine River and the Union Carbide methyl isocyanate gas leak in Bhopal, India intensified international concern. Furthermore, international concerns over acid rain, global warming and ozone depletion have

further solidified global apprehension. As a result, political parties with definitive environmental platforms have experienced increased clout in developing nations.⁴ Former Warsaw Pact countries, some of the worse transnational polluters, have experienced the growth and political clout of green movements which have migrated over national boundaries.⁵

It is difficult to precisely define when or where international environmentalism, or the Green Movement, was born. A good starting point to examine this particular phenomenon is to examine the exploits of one particular group - Greenpeace. While this organization may not be wholly responsible for developing a widespread international concern over environmental issues, the members certainly are representative of one extreme of environmental activism. Greenpeace's avowed policy of "nonviolent direct action" has had mixed reception on the public.⁶ However, Greenpeace's actions, which have been principally designed to highlight their particular vision of environmental consciousness, have always been extremely visible. Greenpeace is commonly believed and advertised to be an environmental group. However, Greenpeace was formed from a splinter group of British Columbia Sierra Club members and Canadian Quakers in 1971 to protest nuclear weapon testing by the United States near the Aleutians. Many of the original members had direct links to the anti-Vietnam War movement. Over the next two years the group sponsored two other vessels which sailed into French nuclear test zones in the South Pacific intent on

preventing nuclear testing. While enjoying success in preventing specific nuclear testing, Greenpeace vessels were intercepted, rammed and boarded by military naval vessels.⁷ Over the succeeding years Greenpeace continued to garner international support (offices in 17 countries and 1.5 million members by 1986) and resistance to their views and tactics.

The tactics employed by Greenpeace have been intentionally designed to interfere with and draw attention to their particular view of environmental world order. Despite efforts to fight for traditional environmental and animal rights concerns on a global scale, Greenpeace remained an anti-nuclear/anti-war group. Their activities which have garnered the most international press have been those activities expressly aimed at preventing the employment of nuclear energy - for any reason. Traditionally, Greenpeace has sought to advertise their anti-nuclear stance by attempting to block or interfere with nuclear powered naval vessels or those naval vessels capable of employing nuclear armament from exercising rights of innocent passage, transit passage or from entering or leaving ports. While generally concentrating upon United States naval vessels, NATO naval vessels and those from the former Soviet Union have not been immune from Greenpeace. A representative listing of Greenpeace styled protest is included in Appendix A. While not an exhaustive listing of Greenpeace activities, it is illustrative of this organization's modus operandi. Tactics employed by Greenpeace range from direct intervention by preventing lawful

passage; to issuing false and alarming information; to violating the territorial integrity of sovereign nations with impunity. Each confrontation is orchestrated to ensure that sufficient media coverage is available to document their activities and calculated to illicit a response worthy of any colossal media event.

As previously described, non-governmental environmental activists are represented on a wide spectrum of dynamic intervention. For well-organized and funded international organizations such as Greenpeace, their agendas are in global proportions. For other groups, the environmental concerns they have on a local level in forward deployed areas have a definitive impact upon military operations. In particular, the European theater of operations has seen the greatest degree of lessening of tensions with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. With a diminished threat perception, West Germans, who had accepted the need for a large NATO presence and accepted the risks associated with the deployments, became less tolerant of low level flights, air mishaps, artillery fire, military convoys and tank maneuvers. As a result, residents near these forward deployed bases in Germany became more hostile to interference in their lives from military operations. For example, in October and November 1988, local protestors demanded cessation of low-level helicopter operations and cancellation of plans to add 20 more helicopters to the air contingent at a United States airfield. The particular American airfield involved was located

only 50 miles from the East German border. Interestingly, both members of the conservative Christian Democrat party and left-of-center Social Democrat party joined in the local protest. However, this protest was not atypical of others in West Germany in 1988. Angered over the noise generated by the low-level flights and numerous fatalities caused by military air mishaps, many Germans believed in 1988 that the 5,000 military exercises conducted annually and the 87,500 combat jet training flights conducted at 1,500 feet or less must be curtailed.⁸ In February 1989, responding to increased public opinion over noise pollution caused by low-level flights and increased public sentiment against military training exercises, the United States scaled back its huge annual Reforger airlift exercise and NATO field commitments. Instead of airlifting large contingents of personnel to the theater (approximately 17,000), the Pentagon chose to conduct training with its field commanders and their staffs on computer simulated war games and with a small corps sized field exercise.⁹ Buoyed by the scaled down Reforger, German citizens and environmental groups discovered a new ally in German administrative courts. Citing obscure human rights laws, local green activists persuaded local German administrative courts that excessive military exercises represented an intrusion upon the right to maintain a quality environment and lifestyle. Accordingly, in one instance expansion of a airfield was halted which prevented an Apache helicopter unit from transferring to the facility. Another court, relying on the same rationale,

prevented the expansion of a military firing range¹⁰. Later in 1989, NATO agreed to reduce low-level training flights which would reduce the noise pollution problem by 45%, thus signalling the power of popular unrest and the power of grass roots organizations.¹¹ West German authorities, urged on by green activists, have been equally ambitious by requesting permission to inspect military vehicles for compliance with civilian safety and pollution standards.¹²

Protest by local activists are not restricted to the European theater or to groups organized under a "green" banner. While identifying the villagers near the Koon-Ni gunnery range in South Korea as "greenies" may be in error, the source of their protest was the noise level generated by low level flights and bombing at the range. At the initial stage, local villagers protested to their local government officials claiming the noise levels reduced the productivity of their livestock. In response, the U.S. Air Force constructed an off shore bombing facility costing 14 million dollars. Local protests continued despite diversion of most bombing training missions to the off shore site. In a series of violent attacks prior to Team Spirit Exercises, portions of the facility were destroyed or damaged by the protestors, thereby temporarily denying its use as a training facility. The local protesters were augmented by student agitators and members of opposition party instigators who seized upon the protest to further their political ambitions rather than the noise pollution controversy.¹³ This incident clearly

demonstrates how a matter of local environmental concern can be
mired in anti-American sentiment or regional politics.

CHAPTER IV

IMPACT OF THE ACTIVISM

One facet which dictates the effectiveness of a fighting force depends upon the military force's ability to realistically train. Training enables the commander to take conceptualized plans and evaluate his effectiveness as a commander, his command and control structure and to survey the strengths and weaknesses of his/her tactical units. Individual servicemembers rely on practical application of learned skills in order to maintain a competitive edge. Without the ability to actually and realistically test equipment and personnel in a field scenario, force strengths may only be a statistical mirage. As a general proposition, environmentalists have severely affected the ability of this nation's armed forces from training in an overseas environment.

Comparatively, on an international scale, the United States has the most comprehensive environmental protection network of laws, regulations and policy in the world. Military commanders are extremely sensitive and cognizant of their responsibility. Accordingly, field exercises within the jurisdiction limits of the United States and her territories are conducted with regularity and in accordance with national security planning and environmental concerns. As forward deployment and presence in overseas theaters has been national policy and strategy for five decades, training regimes in those respective environs have

continued with the motive to prepare for future potential operations in the local terrain as realistic preparation against threats to collective security. However, those operations have continued in the past with the then current host country laws and policy in mind. As a collective security threat existed, allied host nations were willing to balance national priorities in favor of a continued American presence. These allies sacrificed other issues, such as environmental concerns, for the perceived greater good. This is not to intimate that the representative case studies described above which occurred in the past in Germany and Korea represented anti-American sentiment, but rather demonstrate that the environmental status quo needed adjustment. It is important to note that grass roots environmental movements generally occurred and protest commenced to counter a particular environmental nuisance on a local scale which grew to larger (and sometimes national) proportions.

The most direct consequence identified by the case studies indicated a sharp reduction in training and capability. For example, a "grass roots" group which employed direct, but peaceful, local protests were able to prevent the augmentation of a helicopter unit, consequently reducing the unit's numerical strength and presumably the unit's enhanced capability. Likewise, resort by local activists to judicial relief enabled them to achieve the same result at other locales. As the "green snowball" gathered momentum, the political influence exhibited by West German residents led Pentagon planners to abort a massive

annual training exercise which had been held for 22 years. As a result, military leaders in NATO were forced to conduct their operations on computer screens vice actual terrain. Furthermore, little could be gained by substituting a small corps sized war game with organic units. Without augmentation of fresh divisions flown in from the United States to test the true proficiency of the United States to fulfill NATO commitments, the ability to meet ever-changing international commitments is questionable. Additionally, by reason of the same political impetus, NATO planners were "forced" to substantially reduce low-level overflight in West Germany. Such decision making would severely hamper the ability of pilots to train on the ground that they would be potentially expected to defend. Conversely, protests which evolved into violent demonstrations resulting in damage to a training facility were also costly in terms of training sorties lost during a major exercise. The protests of the magnitude which occurred in South Korea were not planned for as well as the loss of 252 training sorties during an annual military training exercise. It is axiomatic to state that without practical application of skills acquired in intensive training, a pilot's proficiency and the missions which depend upon that proficiency are effectively diminished. Moreover, military construction costs, which were designed to placate the local discontented farmers, were ineffectual to prevent costly damage to the main facility perpetrated by violent demonstrators.

One other factor generated by a grass roots movement is the

political ramifications which may flow from popularized environmental movements. Environmentalists can galvanize many issues under the single banner of their particular cause. Such causes are popular and may cross-over political boundaries. The environmental lobby creates a powerful political force that a host country would be bereft not to seriously consider.

Likewise, environmental groups may galvanize their particular issue to include matters not remotely relevant to local environmental discontent. These movements may not be represented by a single national corporate entity, but rather exist and grow as a populist environmental groundswell. Thus, a movement to halt helicopter noise at one installation may garner sufficient political strength on a national basis to convince or compel area commanders to curtail all helicopters flights in his/her area of responsibility.

Other non-governmental activists groups, such as Greenpeace, contrast markedly from non-governmental environmental movements which are populist in nature. As previously mentioned, Greenpeace evolved from an anti-nuclear/anti-war platform to one of more encompassing environmental activism. The United States was the primary target of such intervention, yet Greenpeace's anti-nuclear commitment was eventually multinational in scope. Moreover, Greenpeace has primarily been the nemesis of naval forces. Except for isolated incidents, Greenpeace activity has had little effect upon naval operations. The most glaring example of their resolve was demonstrated in July 1989 when the

group was able to prevent the test firing of a Trident 2 missile. However, Greenpeace tactics merely delayed the launch until December 1989. While Greenpeace again attempted to thwart the launch, careful planning and anticipation of Greenpeace interference resulted in successful interception tactics which prevented the protestors from entering the firing safety zone. United States Navy officials learned from the French fiasco of an attempted covert sabotaging of a Greenpeace ship in New Zealand vessel in 1985 that extreme response was counterproductive. In that incident, a Greenpeace activist was killed, a Greenpeace vessel was sunk and international tension ensued between France and New Zealand which lasted for years. In short, prior planning and a limited calculated response by the United States prevented the 1989 incident from becoming another protracted media event.

Greenpeace's other position of note is an attempted blockade of military ships from foreign port visits unless the Commanding Officer declares the vessel "nuclear free". Nuclear powered vessels are by definition nuclear capable, thus a natural target of protest. Moreover, Greenpeace has taken this position irrespective of a country's declared policy of being within a "nuclear free" zone and with the knowledge that the United States has always declared a policy of neither confirming nor denying the possession of nuclear weapons on board naval vessels. Quite simply, confrontation is expected and initiated by Greenpeace. At most, Greenpeace's protests of this type have been an irritant to operations and have not in the past prevented a port visit.

Thus, while Greenpeace represented the epitome of an organized aggressive multi-national environmental activist group, their actions in the past brought minor press attention to their antics and little, if any, effect on United States Navy operations.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION:

ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURE FOR THE FUTURE

Perhaps the single most important event which gave rise to the successes experienced by environmental activists overseas over the past few years was the thawing of the Cold War. With tensions decreased, other long dormant issues surfaced. Citizens which had suppressed discontent over military operations for years suddenly became advocates. Bowing to public pressure, military operations were altered (or attempted) to conform to more acceptable public standards. Likewise, as security tensions decreased, United States policy shifted to meet the demands of a new world. Even in view of international economic woes, transnational non-governmental environmental groups are likely to enjoy considerable political clout in the future. Therefore, it is logical to assume that as the United States presence in forward bases decreases, training regimes will become more "enhanced" by computer war gaming and smaller field exercises held on less frequent basis. Training posts designed to train for firing of various types of ordinance will be consolidated and severely restricted in their use. Field maneuvers will likely be restricted to small training areas and travel to and from the training areas will be restricted by national fiat.

Groups such as Greenpeace will have less effect on challenging port visits. Since most ship visits were challenged

due to a possibility of nuclear capability, due to Presidential proclamation, sea borne nuclear weapon capability will cease and all such weapons will be centrally stored. Thus, while the irritant of Greenpeace provocateurs may persist, the overall threat is substantially reduced. While nuclear powered vessels will undoubtedly remain a target of opportunity for anti-nuclear protesters, the threat will remain primarily as a security and safety threat to individual naval units or potentially central nuclear storage sites.

However, these multi-national groups do represent a different and continuing threat. These groups have the ability to create controversy by manipulative use of the international media. For example, while Greenpeace does issue reports of environmental issues which represent accurate interpretation of facts, they are not above relying on misleading facts or presenting unsupported sensationalist propaganda.¹⁴

Irrespective of the efforts of non-governmental groups, nations have been taking steps to control pollution and destruction of Earth's environment. Nations are organizing and becoming more cognizant of the definitive link between national security, economic development and the environment. Albeit aberrations may occur in the future, such as the torching of Kuwaiti oil fields by Iraqi military personnel during Operation Desert Storm, such acts of environmental terrorism are universally seen as criminal. Despite the gap apparent between developing nations and industrialized nations, international

consensus accompanied by a flood of domestic legislation, international agreements and treaties signals new appreciation for environmental issues. In short, the green movement is an amorphous entity with three heads. These groups have been a menace to military operations; a monster - large and unwieldy to contend with; and to the general public, a group of martyrs out to save the world from itself. As a result, military planners will have to take into account the ever-increasing limitations posed by environmental conditions dictated by host countries, organized provocateurs and citizen activists.

APPENDIX A

Representative Sample of Major Nuclear Inspired Incidents Involving Greenpeace Post 1985

Jul 1985	Rainbow Warrior intent on preventing nuclear testing by France sabotaged by French commandos in New Zealand
Oct 1986	Sirius seized by Iceland for attempting protest at Summit Conference
Oct 1986	Vega seized by France near South Pacific nuclear test zone
Nov 1986	Protestors seized in Australia for interfering with off load of nuclear materials
Oct 1986	Protest of cruise missile test in remote Canada (prior year same group attempted to catch cruise missile in fish net)
Jul 1987	Greenpeace protestor clings to bow of U.S.S. Texas while underway
May 1988	Greenpeace zodiac places anti-nuclear flag to Soviet vessel Silnyy in Danish Straits
Jul 1988	25 protestors obstruct U.S.S. Conynham from docking in Denmark
Dec 1988	Greenpeace vessel seized by Spanish authorities for disobeying Naval orders
Mar 1989	Greenpeace dinghies surround H.M.S. Illustrious in Hamburg claiming nuclear weapons aboard
May 1989	Greenpeace repeats protest when H.M.S. Ark Royal enters Hamburg harbor
May 1989	Greenpeace publishes report that U.S. lost nuclear weapon off coast of Okinawa. Greenpeace also reports 47 other nuclear weapons and nine nuclear reactors on ocean floor.
Jul 1989	Greenpeace prevent U.S.S. Tennessee from Trident 2 test launch by placing anti-nuclear banner on vessel
Dec 1989	Vancouver, B.C. court finds protestors who spray painted peace symbol on U.S. aircraft carrier not guilty as vessel's presence "invited protest"
Dec 1989	Navy vessels prevent Greenpeace protest of sea launched firing of Trident 2 missile off Florida coast
Oct 1990	Greenpeace vessel seized by KGB for violating Soviet borders in Arctic nuclear test zone, Greenpeace issues statement that radiation levels are up to 50 times normal rates; statement is later retracted since estimates were over-estimated by 1000 %
May-Jul 1991	Greenpeace calls for scrapping of Polaris/Trident programs

FOOTNOTES

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy for the 1990s (Draft 0827, Washington 10 August 1990), Introduction by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff.

2. *ibid.* pp. 9-10.

3. Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1484 (May, 1991), pp. 1528-1529.

4. For example development of green power is described in England by Tom Burke, "The Year of the Greens," Environment, November 1988; in Australia by David Clark Scott, "Aussies Take on Activist Mantle," Christian Science Monitor, 11 May 1990.

5. For developments of Greenpeace movement in Moscow see, Richard Palmer, "Greenpeace Goes Pop in Soviet Campaign," The London Times, 11 September 1988, p. A4c; environmentalist activities in former Eastern Bloc see, Mary Battiat, "Nuclear Fuel Debate Moves East," The Washington Post, 15 May 1990, p. A12:1.

6. Peter Dykstra, "Greenpeace," Environment, Vol 28. July/August 1986, p. 5.

7. In 1971, the U.S. Coast Guard prevented the M.V. Greenpeace from reaching the nuclear restrictive zone. In 1972 French naval vessels rammed the sailboat Greenpeace III disabling her and in 1973 French commandos boarded the vessel and physically injured the crew. Michael Harwood, "Greenpeace Puts the Spotlight on This Planet's Ills With Attention Grabbing Stunts," The New York Times, 2 October 1988, p. 72:1.

8. Robert J. McCartney, "Allied Army Maneuvers Irk Germans," The Washington Post, 2 January 1989, p. A1:1.

9. George C. Wilson, "U.S. Cuts Role in NATO Exercise," The Washington Post, p. A27:1.

10. Molly Moore, "German Protests Hamper U.S.," The Washington Post, 22 April 1989, p. A11:4.

11. Robert J. McCartney, "NATO Agrees to Cut Overflights," The Washington Post, 29 September 1989, p. A48:1.

12. James O. Jackson, "Thanks, but No Tanks," Time, 5 February 1990, pp. 21-22.

13. "Protests Threaten to Cripple USAF Training Operations," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 June 1989, pp. 239-244.

14. Following intrusion onto a Soviet nuclear test site, Greenpeace overestimated radiation levels by 1,000 times the actual, and normal, radiation levels. ("Radiation Alert," The London Times, 16 October 1990, p. 13a, "Radiation Error," The London Times, 24 October 1990, p. 10h). Greenpeace cites that British Polaris submarine is unsafe and that there was risk of accident, ("Polaris Claim, The London Times, 11 May 1991, p. 2h) and that nuclear hardware in/on ocean and on ocean floor posed health and contamination threat due to presence of 16,000 warheads and 544 nuclear reactors, (George Hill, "In the Depths of Danger," The London Times, 11 May 1989, p. 11h).

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