CRAF: The Persian Gulf War and Implications for the Future
Abstract
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program today provides almost one- half of the U.S. military's strategic airlift needs. Although CRAF's partial activation was successful in the Persian Gulf War, weaknesses in the program will reduce its effectiveness during a total mobilization. This examination of the CRAF performance in the Gulf War will identify issues. provide conclusions, and recommend solutions to improve the program. In addition, unique operational considerations are presented to improve the Ebener commander's awareness of CRAF limitations. As such, this study will focus on the operational considerations of CRAF relative to the war-fighting Commanders-in-Chief. The case is argued that CRAF can not effectively fulfill its war time commitments under a fill Stage II or Stage III activation. Problems experienced during the Gulf War in stage allocations, logistics, management, and equipment will be magnified in a larger activation and significantly reduce CRAF effectiveness when we'll need it the most. To insure the future effectiveness of CRAF, this paper recommends we reorganize the stage system, restructure CRAF logistics concept, emphasize contingency management of CRAF, and provide basic military equipment to the CRAF forces. Civil Reserve Air Fleet; CRAF;; MAC; TRANSCOM; Senior Lodger; Civil Airlines; Strategic Airlift.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 19, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA249892
Entities
People
- Brooks L. Bash
Organizations
- Naval War College